Class and the Development of Trust in Police in Latin America
Supporting Information

February 24, 2025

Contents

Appendix A   Literature on Trust in Police

Throughout this paper, we focus on Latin America and the US as a benchmark case. Latin America has the highest crime rates in the world, and crime, therefore, has substantial welfare costs for its citizens, making it an important setting to study community-police relations. Why use the US as a benchmark? Police-citizen interactions are most studied in the US. To approximate the degree to which existing literature is US-centric, we collect original data from Google Scholar searches of "police AND trust AND [country name]," for 196 countries. The left panel of Figure A1 shows that Google Scholar searches for trust in police in the US yields 2.1 million cites, more than double the number of cites of the second-most studied nation (France). Moreover, there are more citations to trust in police in the US than in the 21 Latin America combined (2.06 million cites).

This disparity is not solely a function of population. In 2024, the population of the US was approximately 337 million whereas the combined population of these 21 countries was approximately 651 million. An more nuanced measure of the relationship between population and representation acknowledges that cross-national analyses implicitly weight small countries more heavily than large (populous) countries, as is evident from the negative slope of the population—cites per capita curve in the right panel. We note that the US has the largest positive residual of all countries in this plot. This means that even after taking into account population and the implicit weighting of cross-national studies, trust in police in the US is "over-studied" relative to other nations.


Figure A1: The left panel shows the number of results in Google Scholar when replacing each country's name for "country" in the query "police + trust + country". Latin American countries are highlighted in purple, while the US is highlighted in violet. The right panel shows the (log) relation between total citations from the same country and the population of each country.

Appendix B Survey Data

A2.1 Samples

This section describes the temporal and geographic coverage of the different survey data used in the analyses. Table A1 shows all the included LAPOP country rounds and the year each round was conducted. Table A2 describes the Chilean ELSOC data, including the number of respondents per survey wave and year of survey collection. Table A3 shows the number of survey responses included in each of the two waves from the Medellín, Colombia, survey Hanson, Kronick, and Slough (2024). Table A4 reports the number of respondents included in each quarterly wave of the rotating Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana panel (ENSU), conducted in Mexican cities by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).

Year	Countries surveyed
2004	Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama.
2005	Colombia
2006	Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru
2007	Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela
2008	Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
2009	Colombia
2010	Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
2011	Colombia
2012	Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
2014	Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
2016	Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay
2017	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama, Peru, Uruguay
2018	Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Panama
2019	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay

Table A1: Table lists all the country-year LAPOP surveys included in the pooled data. All country surveys between 2004 and 2019 were included.

	ELSOC survey wave				
Year	1	2	3	4	5
2016	2,927				
2017		2,473			
2018			3,748		
2019				2,573	
2020				844	
2021					2,740

Table A2: Number of survey responses included in the Chilean Longitudinal Social Survey (ELSOC) data used in the analyses, per survey wave and year of survey collection.

Medellín panel survey wave		
Wave	**Year**	**Observations**
Baseline	2018	5,205
Endline	2019	3,644

Table A3: Number of survey responses included in each of the two waves from the representative survey conducted in Medellín, Colombia (Hanson, Kronick, and Slough, 2024), used in the analyses.

The Encuesta Nacional de Seguridad Pública Urbana (ENSU) is a quarterly rolling panel in Mexico by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). It has been conducted since 2013, with a substantial increase in respondents starting in 2017. It is representative of urban residents at the national level. Starting in 2018, respondents were asked about victimization experiences in the second and fourth quarters.

Mexican rotating panel survey (ENSU)				
	Q1	**Q2**	**Q3**	**Q4**
2017	14,497	15,272	15,303	15,072
2018	15,172	17,548	20,163	18,017
2019	18,113	19,010	22,392	22,158
2020	22,416		22,122	22,283
2021	22,307	22,411	23,356	23,428
2022	23,577	23,688	23,618	24,402
2023	23,778	24,435	24,493	24,064

Table A4: Number of survey responses included in each of the waves from the representative rotating panel survey (ENSU) conducted in Mexican cities that included information about crime victimization, bribe solicitation, feeling of insecurity, and trust in police. Crime victimization and bribe solicitation are asked in Q2 and Q4. Trust in police institutions and feeling of insecurity are asked every round.

A2.2   Survey measures

In Table A5, we report the survey questions and measures employed in the paper and the corresponding data source.

Construct	LAPOP Question	Medellín Panel Question	Chile Panel Question	Mexican Panel Question
Trust in Police	**To what extent do you trust the police?**	**How much do you trust the police?**	**Can you tell me how much trust you have in the police?**	**How much trust do you have in the State Police?**
	7-point Likert scale	4-point Likert scale	5-point Likert scale	4-point Likert scale
Trust in [other institution]	**To what extent do you trust [other institution]?**	—	—	–
	7-point Likert scale			
Education	**What was the final year of education that you completed or passed?**	**What is the highest educational level that you completed?**	**What was the highest educational level that you completed or are currently in school for?**	**What is the highest educational level that you completed?**
	0-18+ years	11 ranked categories	10 ranked categories	10 ranked categories
Income	**In which of the following ranges does the monthly family income of this household fall, including remittances from abroad and the income of all working adults and children?**	**In which of the following income ranges does this home's monthly income fall?**	**Below is a list of income ranges, could you please indicate which of these ranges you are classified in considering your net income, i.e. your income after taxes, health, welfare or other deductions?**	—
	16 ranked categories (depends on local currency)	8 ranked categories	16 ranked categories	
Class (subjective)	—	—	**In society, commonly, there are different social groups or classes. People in the upper social class are those with the highest income, the highest level of education and the most valued jobs. People in the lower social class are those with the lowest income, the lowest level of education and the least valued jobs. In between these classes are others. In your opinion, which of the following social groups or classes do you belong to?**	—
			5 ranked categories	
Class (administrative)	—	Estrato 1-6 (six choices)	—	Estrato 1-4 (four categories)
Preference for *mano dura*	**In order to catch criminals, do you believe that the authorities should always abide by the law or that occasionally they can cross the line?**	—	—	—
	Yes they can /No they cannot			
Crime victimization	**Have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in the past 12 months?**	**Thinking of the last 6 months, have you or anyone in your home been victims of any of the following crimes? Have any family members, friends, or neighborhood acquaintances? [theft, car robbery, verbal threats or abuse from police, extortion, street fights, family violence, sexual abuse, homicide.]**	—	**In the last 6 months, have you or anyone in your home suffered any of the following? [Car theft, burglary, theft, extortion]**
	Yes/No answer	Yes/No answer		Yes/No answer
Police solicited a bribe	**Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months?**	—	—	**In the last 6 months, have the police or any other security authority asked implicitly or explicitly for money or presents in order to avoid a traffic ticket or being detained?**
	Yes/No answer			Yes/No answer
Views police as corrupt	—	**How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The police are corrupt.**	—	—
		5-point Likert scale		
Feels unsafe in neighborhood	**Talking about the place or neighborhood where you live and thinking about the possibility of being the victim of an assault or robbery, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe?**	**In your neighborhood, do you generally feel very safe, relatively safe, relatively unsafe, or very unsafe?**	**How safe or unsafe do you feel in the neighborhood where you live? Very unsafe, unsafe, neither safe nor unsafe, safe, or very safe?**	**Speaking of crime, do you feel safe in the streets you regularly use?**
	4-point Likert scale	4-point Likert scale	5-point Likert scale	Yes/No answer

Table A5: English translations of relevant survey questions employed in the analyses.

A2.3   Variable recodings and transformations

We transform a number of the variables described in Table A5 in some analyses. We outline the procedures that we use for these transformations, as follows.

Z-**score transformations**:

For a variable X_i, we construct Z-scores using the following formula:

$$X_i^Z = \frac{X_i - \overline{X}_i}{\sqrt{\mathrm{Var}[X_i]}} \tag{1}$$

Decile construction:

We rank respondents by decile of education and socioeconomic status. Since the education and income measures are discrete (as indicated in Table A5), individuals in the same income or education bracket are, in some cases, assigned to different deciles to maintain equal-sized decile bins. We use a random number generator to rank respondents randomly within each education or income category. We then partition the sample into deciles. This preserves equally sized decile bins.

Binary signals of police behavior/security outcomes.

To construct comparable binary signals across the three measures of police behavior/security outcomes, we dichotomize the Likert-measured variable measuring perceptions of safety in a respondent's neighborhood as follows:

$$\text{Feels unsafe}_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if Likert response } \leq 2 \text{ (very safe or somewhat safe)} \\ 1 & \text{else (somewhat unsafe or very unsafe).} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

To maintain comparability across the surveys, we dichotomize the Likert-measured variable of "Are the police corrupt?" from the Medellín panel as follows:

$$\text{Police corrupt}_i = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if Likert response } \leq 3 \text{ (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree)} \\ 1 & \text{else (agree or strongly agree).} \end{cases} \tag{3}$$

A2.4 Household Assets Wealth Index

Following Córdova (2009), we construct a wealth index based on respondents' self-reported household assets. Specifically, we conduct principal component analysis that synthesizes variation in the following yes/no questions: household possession of a television, a refrigerator, a conventional phone, a cell phone, a vehicle, a washing machine, a microwave oven, indoor plumbing, an indoor bathroom, and a computer. After conducting the principal component analysis, we extract the scores for each respondent's first principal component. This measure, standardized within country-wave, is the wealth index.

Figure A2 shows the correlation between trust in police and all measures of socioeconomic status, including the wealth index. As can be seen, the correlation based on the index is very similar to that obtained using the two other measures for all countries and the pooled data. Additionally, it does not systematically result in a higher or a lower correlation relative to the other two measures, bolstering the claim that education and self-reported income are construct-valid measures.

Figure A2: Correlation between LAPOP respondents' self-reported trust in police and three class measures: income (in blue), education (in orange), and the wealth index constructed from household assets (in gray).

Figure A3 shows the evolution of each of the five most influential features' factor loadings on the first component of the principal components analysis. As can be seen, features vary widely in their loading on the first component, both across countries and between years. The same pattern can be seen in Figure A4, which plots the country-specific evolution of the eigenvalue of the first PCA component. Overall, what the wealth index measures differs for each country and year, making the index difficult to interpret in a repeated cross-section. For interpretative ease, we prefer education and self-reported income as measures of SES.

Figure A3: Country and year specific factor loadings on the first component for the five most influential features.

Figure A4: Country and year specific eigenvalue of the first component identified by the PCA.

A2.5 LATAM and USA vs. Canada

We explain cross-country differences in the trust-socioeconomic gradient by emphasizing country-level differences in exposure to good/bad policing outcomes and class-based differences in interpreting experiences with the police as signals about its trustworthiness. We argue that, because interpreting experiences with crime and poor policing as signals of the police's lack of trustworthiness is more likely for higher SES respondents, we observe a negative correlation between class and trust in police in Latin America, where poor policing outcomes are common, and a positive one in the US, where crime is rare, and police are higher quality — despite the fact that wealthier individuals might be exposed to better policing in both contexts.

However, the story is not specific to the US or Latin America. In other contexts, we should also observe a) that better policing leads to more trust in police overall (intercept shift) and b) a positive correlation between trust in police and class, where there are few opportunities to update negatively on the police, and policing quality increases with class. To test, we use the Canada LAPOP survey. Figure A5 plots the results and benchmarks them with the US and Latin America. The bottom left panel shows that Canadian respondents report having the highest quality policing. Canadian respondents are the group that feels safest while having a close to zero probability of reporting being a crime victim and being asked for a bribe. Consistent with a), the top right panel shows that the mean level of trust in the police across all class deciles is higher in Canada than in the US or Latin America. Further, the bottom right panel shows that the standard deviation in trust in the police in Canada is also decreasing with class. Consistent with b), the top left panel shows that the correlation between the two measures of class and trust in police is positive in Canada, like the US.[1]

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[1]Only the correlation between self-reported income and trust in the police is statistically significant from zero at a 95% confi-

Figure A5: The top-left panel shows the correlation between LAPOP respondents self-reported trust in police and two class measures: income (in blue) and education (in orange) for respondents from the pooled Latin American sample, USA respondents, and Canadian respondents. The top-right panel shows the mean trust in the police on a seven-point scale (1-7) by decile of income (in blue) and education (in orange) for respondents from the pooled Latin American sample, USA respondents, and Canadian respondents. The bottom-left panel shows the estimated probability that a respondent from the LAPOP pooled sample (in black), the USA sample (in red), and the Canada sample (in purple) from each education decile (top row) and income decile (bottom row) reports (from left to right): having been a victim of a crime during the past 12 months, perceiving the neighborhood as unsafe, and a police officer soliciting a bribe. The bottom-right panel shows the estimated standard deviation of trust in police by class decile for the pooled Latin America sample (in black), the USA sample (in red), and the Canada sample (in purple) and its the 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Appendix C   LAPOP vs. Mexico, Chile, and Medellín Panels

This section compares the correlations between class and trust in police estimated with the LAPOP data to those estimated using the Chile, Mexico, and Medellín panels. Additionally, Table A6 presents results using the longitudinal Chile survey of the estimated association between subjective class and trust in police when

dence level.

individuals change their self-identification to a higher socioeconomic class.

Figure A6 benchmarks the national LAPOP-based correlations between class and trust in the police with the panel-estimated correlations. In the case of Mexico, where panel data includes information about respondents' educational attainment only, the LAPOP and panel correlations are negative and statistically indistinguishable from each other. The results from the Medellín panel show a more muted correlation between class and trust in police than results from the country-wide LAPOP data. Analyses with the Medellín panel data show a negative and statistically significant association between education and trust in police and a very weak, negative, but statistically insignificant correlation between income and trust in police. We note that the LAPOP data aims to be nationally representative. In contrast, the Medellín survey aims to be representative of populous police beats in the city (for details on sampling, see Hanson, Kronick, and Slough, 2024). In the case of the Chile panel, the association between class and trust in police is estimated to be positive, although small in magnitude. This is the only positive and statistically significant correlation we find across all analyses.


Figure A6: Figure shows the estimated correlation between two measures of class and trust in the police from the Chile ELSOC, Mexico ENSU, and Medellín panels, and LAPOP data.

In this paper, we characterize how trust in police varies in social class in Latin America. To that end, we compared trust between individuals of different classes when class is operationalized as education and income. In the following analysis, we report additional estimates using class self-categorization, reported in the ELSOC Chile panel, as the measure of social class. Specifically, we make use of the data's panel structure and analyze the association between *changes* in individuals' self-identification with a class and trust in police. Table A6 shows the estimates of the pooled association (across waves), the average treatment effect (TWFE), and the fixed effects counterfactual estimator proposed by Liu, Wang, and Xu (2022) between trust in the police and identifying with a *higher* class than in the previous survey round. Self-identification with a higher class is associated with higher self-reported trust in police, both between and within individuals, as would be expected if treatment by police improved in class. However, the difference is not statistically significant in any of the three specifications and is small in magnitude.

Quantity	Estimator	Estimate	95% CI
Association	OLS	0.046 (0.032)	[-0.017, 0.109]
ATT	TWFE	0.024 (0.031)	[-0.036, 0.084]
ATT (unit avg.)	FEct (LWX 2022)	0.004 (0.049)	[-.092, 0.049]

Table A6: Table shows the pooled association (across waves), average treatment effect (TWFE), and fixed effects counterfactual estimator proposed by Liu, Wang, and Xu (2022) between trust in the police and identifying with a higher class than in the previous survey round for respondents in the ELSOC Chile panel. Treatment is defined as 1 when respondents changed their answer to the question "According to your opinion, to which of the following social groups or classes do you belong?" to self-identify with a wealthier social group, while respondents who identified with the same social class or a lower social class are coded as 0. Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit in parentheses.

Appendix D   Trust as Predictor

This section explores the empirical relevance of heterogeneous levels of trust in the police as related to crime reporting and willingness to take personal steps to ensure personal safetey. In Figure A7, we leverage data from LAPOP to show trust in police predicts respondents' willingness to own a firearm to ensure their safety. On average, 40% of respondents, across countries and waves, state that they would want to own a gun for protection. We show that respondents who trust the police more are less likely to want to own a firearm. Specifically, a one unit increase in the 7-point trust scale reduces the probability of reporting a desire to own a firearm for protection of 2 percentage points. Additionally, we use the two-wave panel survey conducted in Medellín by Hanson, Kronick, and Slough (2024) to explore whether baseline levels of trust in police predict factual or hypothetical crime reporting during the online survey. While criminal victimization is a rare outcome limiting statistical power, panel A in Table A7 shows that higher levels of trust in police predict higher rates of reporting among victims of family violence and theft. Further, panel B shows that higher trust in police predicts a higher willingness to report hypothetical victimization of *all types of crimes*. Last, we reproduce results from Hanson, Kronick, and Slough (2024) in Table A8 and show that higher baseline levels of trust in police made individuals more likely to hear about and attend the police-community meeting interventions.

Figure A7: Figure shows the pooled and country-specific marginal change in the probability that a LAPOP respondent says they would own a firearm for their personal protection when their self-reported trust in police increases by one standard deviation. 95% confidence intervals, built with robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit, are shown.

Panel A: Factual

	Car-part theft		Family violence		Fights		Police abuse		Sexual abuse		Theft		Verbal police abuse	
Trust in police	0.020	0.021	0.062***	0.063**	0.038+	0.040+	0.019	0.024	-0.017	-0.021	0.031***	0.032***	0.038	0.043
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Age		0.0004		-0.001		0.0004		0.0006		-0.0001		0.00003		0.002
		(0.0009)		(0.002)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.0006)		(0.002)
Female		-0.083**		0.103*		0.059		-0.005		0.0295		0.041*		-0.012
		(0.029)		(0.049)		(0.044)		(0.068)		(0.124)		(0.019)		(0.064)
Observations	508	508	300	300	392	392	220	220	76	76	2,140	2,140	230	230
Mean dep. var.	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.80	0.80	0.77	0.77	0.91	0.91	0.78	0.78	0.71	0.71
R-squared	0.003	0.080	0.031	0.101	0.008	0.071	0.002	0.077	0.003	0.312	0.006	0.019	0.006	0.082
Estrato FE		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Comuna FE		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

Panel B: Hypothetical

	Car-part theft		Family violence		Fights		Police abuse		Sexual abuse		Theft		Verbal police abuse	
Trust in police	0.025**	0.025**	0.020**	0.019**	0.049***	0.042***	0.048***	0.044***	0.019***	0.020***	0.048***	0.047***	0.053***	0.047***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age		0.0003		0.0003		0.002***		0.0013**		-0.0006*		0.001+		0.003***
		(0.0004)		(0.0004)		(0.0004)		(0.0004)		(0.0002)		(0.0005)		(0.0005)
Female		-0.0003		0.050**		0.108***		0.020		0.015		-0.018		0.057**
		(0.015)		(0.015)		(0.019)		(0.014)		(0.009)		(0.019)		(0.020)
Observations	2,203	2,199	2,295	2,291	2,187	2,183	2,291	2,287	2,379	2,375	2,174	2,170	2,291	2,287
Mean dep. var.	0.87	.87	0.90	0.90	0.82	0.82	0.89	0.89	0.95	0.95	0.75	0.75	0.76	0.76
R-squared	0.005	0.018	0.005	0.020	0.016	0.053	0.024	0.036	0.008	0.016	0.012	0.031	0.016	0.042
Estrato FE		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓
Comuna FE		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓

Table A7: Table reports coefficient estimates from a linear probability model that a self-identified victim of car-part theft, family violence, fights, police abuse, verbal police abuse, sexual abuse, or theft reported the crime to an authority (panel A) and the estimated marginal probability that all respondents would report the crime to an authority had they been victims of said crime (panel B). Crime victimization is measured during the end-line survey, while trust in police is measured on a four-point scale and is collected during the baseline survey. Data comes from the Medellín panel (Hanson, Kronick, and Slough, 2024). Fixed effects are incorporated by demeaning the outcome variables by neighborhood (*comuna*) and class (*estrato*). Coefficients for the fixed effects are not estimated and are therefore omitted.

Baseline Trust	Hearing about Intervention	Attended Meeting
1	0.26 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)
2	0.29 (0.02)	0.05 (0.01)
3	0.34 (0.02)	0.06 (0.01)
4	0.43 (0.03)	0.12 (0.02)

Table A8: Table shows the estimated probability of hearing about the police-community meetings and attending meetings as a function of baseline trust in police for participants in the Medellín experiment (Hanson, Kronick, and Slough, 2024). Clustered robust standard errors reported in parentheses.

Appendix E   Trust in Other Institutions

In the main paper, we leverage panel data and estimate the ATT of three signals of poor policing on trust in police. Specifically, we show that, after parsing out time-invariant individual-level confounders, criminal victimization reduces trust in the police. In the absence of individual-level time-varying confounders, the estimated ATTs retrieve the effect of experiencing crime on trust in the police for the subset of individuals who experienced such signals. One concern, however, is that individual-level time-varying confounders that correlate with class are present, making the results spurious instead of causally related to trust in the police. To assuage such concerns, we leverage panel data from Medellín (Hanson, Kronick, and Slough, 2024). Figure A8 plots the association, TWFE, and fixed effects counterfactual estimator proposed by Liu, Wang, and Xu (2022) of criminal victimization and trust in a battery of other institutions. If criminal victimization is indeed an informative signal of police trustworthiness and carries information of no other institution *and* no time-varying individual level confounders are present, trust in other institutions should remain mostly unchanged after experiencing victimization. Reassuringly, the results from both the TWFE estimator and the fixed effects counterfactual show that the only statistically significant decrease in trust after victimization is that of trust in police.


Figure A8: Figure shows the pooled association (across waves), average treatment effect (TWFE), and fixed effects counterfactual estimator proposed by Liu, Wang, and Xu (2022) of any type of criminal victimization on trust in several institutions. Data comes from the Medellín survey panel conducted by Hanson, Kronick, and Slough (2024). The latter two, within-individual analyses, show a statistically significant decrease only in trust in police after criminal victimization.

Next, we report the correlation between the two measures of class and trust in other institutions or fellow community members for the pooled sample of Latin American respondents and US respondents. Figure A9 plots the results. As can be seen, there is no evidence of a systematic negative association between trust in institutions and class for Latin American respondents. Whereas trust in Congress is negatively correlated with class, trust in community members is positively correlated for all respondents. Further, we can see that the correlation between institutional trust and class tends to be the same for Latin American and USA respondents, except for trust in the police. Again, if institutional trust were a fixed trait, we would expect a high level of consistency in the correlation between class and trust for different institutions.

Figure A9: The left panel plots the correlation between Latin American (in black) and USA (in red) LAPOP respondents' self-reported trust in Congress, elections, the media, political parties, the police, the president, and other members of their community and education. The right panel plots the correlation between Latin American (in black) and USA (in red) LAPOP respondents' self-reported trust in Congress, elections, the media, political parties, the police, the president, and other members of their community and self-reported income.

A5.1 Institutional Trust as a Fixed Trait?

If institutional trust were a fixed trait, we would expect a high level of homogeneity in each respondent's ratings of different government institutions. To test for this possibility, Figure A10 plots the pooled and country-specific intra-class correlation between respondents' assessments of trust in the police, Congress, the courts, the president, and political parties. The intra-class correlation gives the ratio of between-respondent variance to the total variance in trust in these institutions. If the ICC were close to 1, it would suggest limited variance in an individual's assessment of different institutions, suggesting that institutional trust functions as a stable trait or predisposition. Conversely, we can see that the pooled-sample ICC is estimated to be only 0.047 [0.0193, 0.232 95% CI], and all the country-specific ICCs are estimated to be less than .2.

Intraclass correlation of respondent's ratings of trust in:
police, congress, courts, the president, political parties, and the army

Figure A10: Figure shows the pooled and country-specific intra-class correlations.

Appendix F   Forecasting Instrument

This section explains the forecasting instrument and data in detail. Figure A11 shows the English version of the web interface used to elicit experts' prior beliefs, while figure A12 shows its Spanish translation. Respondents were asked to predict the mean level of trust in the police for an average adult at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of household income. We asked experts to provide a forecast for at least one Latin American country or the region as a whole. Figures A11 and A12 show the Mexico-specific prompts.

Please predict the **average** response of an adult respondent in the **lowest decile** of household income. In Mexico, an average household of four in the lowest decile earns 2,435 USD or 46,877 pesos per year.

Not at all						A lot
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Trust in police

Please predict the **average** response of an adult respondent around the **median** of household income. In Mexico, an average household of four in the fifth decile earns 8,153 USD or 156,929 pesos per year.

Not at all						A lot
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Trust in police

Please predict the **average** response of an adult respondent around the **highest decile** of household income. In Mexico, an average household of four in the highest decile earns 43,838 USD or 843,755 pesos per year.

Not at all						A lot
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Trust in police

Figure A11: Screenshot of the web interface used for eliciting experts' priors. As an example, Mexico was selected, and Mexico-specific data was provided to contextualize the range of income.

Figure A12: Screenshot shows Spanish language version of the web interface used for eliciting experts'
priors. As an example, Mexico was selected, and Mexico-specific data was provided to contextualize the
range of income.

Figure A13: Divergence between average forecasts (in orange) and corresponding survey-based measures
(in blue) for the five countries with more than eight survey responses. The Figure shows that predictions for
the case of Mexico posit a less steep relationship between income and trust in police than for the rest of the
countries. Activists, who tend to predict lower scores than other respondents for higher income levels, drive
this weaker predicted relationship.

Table A9 shows the number of individual forecasts included in the analysis, disaggregated by type of re-
spondent and country for which the forecast was provided.

Country	Professor	Graduate student or Postdoc	Activist	Other	Total
Mexico	24	10	10	12	**56**
Brazil	10	6	0	0	**16**
Argentina	8	3	2	0	**13**
Chile	4	3	1	0	**8**
Colombia	4	4	0	1	**8**
Uruguay	7	0	0	0	**7**
Regional average	0	2	1	1	**4**
Guatemala	2	1	0	0	**3**
El Salvador	0	1	0	1	**2**
Ecuador	1	0	0	0	**1**
Honduras	1	0	0	0	**1**
Nicaragua	1	0	0	0	**1**
Peru	0	1	0	0	**1**
Total	**62**	**30**	**14**	**15**	**121**

Table A9: Count of survey responses per country and respondent type.

A6.1 Compliance with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research

This subsection discusses the expert elicitation exercise's compliance with APSA's principles. Principles are reproduced in bold.

- **Power: When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit.** The forecasting exercise was conducted with a convenience sample of academic experts and activists working in Mexico. Neither of these groups are explicitly composed of low-power or vulnerable participants, nor do they include powerful parties.

- **Consent: Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process [...]** All respondents explicitly consented to participate in the forecasting exercise by selecting "I consent" after reading a brief description of the project and an explanation of the exercise, including who was conducting the survey, how long the forecasting exercise was likely to take, and informing them that no personal identifying information was going to be collected. Participants were able to opt-out at any point during the exercise. No coercion or influence was used to encourage individuals to participate. The study did not involve any risk of harm.

- **Deception: Political science researchers should carefully consider any use of deception and the ways in which deception can conflict with participant autonomy.** Deception was not used at any point of the exercise.

- **Harm and trauma: Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research.** The study did not involve any risk of harm, nor are we aware of any harm that resulted from participating in our study. Further, the study did not include personal questions of any sort, nor did it discuss sensitive topics that could lead to trauma or re-traumatization.

- **Confidentiality: Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity.** The study did not collect any personal identifying information from research participants, including their names, location, or IP addresses, at any point.

- **Impact: Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process.** The study does not intervene in any political process or ask about any past or future real-world political process.

- **Laws, Regulations, and Prospective Review: Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research-related activities.** This study received IRB approval by ███████████████ IRB (IRB-FY2022-6142).

Appendix G   Assessing Artifacts of Measurement

A7.1   Rates of missingness

This section describes the country-specific patterns of missingness in the socioeconomic and institutional trust variables used for the analysis. Figure A14 plots the proportion of survey responses with missingness across all survey country-rounds, according to the type of variable.


Figure A14: Figure shows the proportion across survey waves (and its 95% confidence interval) of respondents in each country that did not give a valid answer to a question about institutional trust (in blue), their income (in orange), and their educational attainment (in green).

A7.2   Worst-case bounds for missingness

Figure A15 shows the worst-case and best-case bounds for the estimated pooled correlation between trust in police and income or education after accounting for missing responses. For survey respondents who reported either socioeconomic status or trust in police but not both (99.8% of observations with missingness in either), we impute the Z-score value of the non-missing response (and $-1 * Z$-score) as the missing value. Since correlations are bounded between -1 and 1, and both responses are Z-scores, this process guarantees that the missing observation lies on the $45°$ line, making the estimated correlation the most positive (most negative) possible. The results show that the correlation is negative and of a similar magnitude, even if all missing observations were perfectly and positively correlated. The correlation between trust in police and

income, if all missing observations were perfectly and positively correlated, is estimated to be 0.13. That is, the most positive correlation that the data's missingness could conceal is *equal* to the estimated correlation between income and trust in police in the United States.


Figure A15: Figure shows the best-case, point estimates, and worst-case bounds for the pooled correlation across LAPOP survey waves between socioeconomic status, operationalized as self-reported education and income, and trust in police. Robust errors are clustered at the primary sampling unit.

Appendix H   Measuring Crime Victimization

We use self-reported crime victimization as one measure of exposure to poor policing outcomes. While the use of survey data is considered a more accurate measure of criminal victimization than crime statistics given heterogeneous reporting to the police, surveys are subject to potential misreporting and differential attrition. In this section, we probe the accuracy of self-reported victimization, benchmarking it to administrative municipal homicide data, and leverage the panel structure of the Colombia and Mexico surveys to analyze if self-reported victimization increases the probability of attrition. Additionally, we explore the empirical consequences of serial victimization using Mexican panel data and report missingness rates in the LAPOP measure of self-reported victimization.

We use self-reported measures of victimization in the past year from the repeated cross-sectional LAPOP surveys for a variety of analyses. We might worry that heterogeneous missingness that covaries with experiences with crime might drive our results. Reassuringly, however, the proportion of survey respondents who refuse to answer the question of criminal victimization in the LAPOP survey is consistently low and comparable to the missingness in the education and trust in police questions. Specifically, only .2% of respondents have missing responses to that question, when pooling across all country-waves. The country with the most missingness in that survey question is Venezuela, where only .5% of respondents do not report a victimization status.

Next, we turn to the accuracy of survey responses of victimization. Figure A16 shows the proportion of LAPOP respondents from Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia who report having been the victims of a crime, grouped by the homicide rate in their municipality. Homicides are the best-recorded crime in administrative data (World Health Organization, 2014, p. 20). Suppose non-lethal crime is increasing with lethal crime, and surveys are an accurate measure of experienced victimization. In that case, we should expect self-reported victimization to positively correlate with municipal homicide rates. Reassuringly, the proportion of victims is generally increasing with the municipal homicide rate in all three countries.


Figure A16: Figure shows the proportion of self-reported victims in LAPOP in Brazilian, Mexican, and Colombian municipalities, according to the municipal homicide rate.

Data from the Mexico rolling panel allows us to explore the effect of serial victimization on respondents' self-reported trust in the police. Recall each respondent is surveyed five times, once every quarter, and that crime victimization is asked every other wave. Consequently, respondents may be asked about experiences with crime up to three times. To test how serial victimization relates to trust in police, we fit the following interactive model

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Trust}_{i,t} =& \beta_1 \text{Victim}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \text{Victim}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{Victim}_{i,t-2} + \\
& \alpha_1 \text{Victim}_{i,t} \times \text{Victim}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 \text{Victim}_{i,t-1} \times \text{Victim}_{i,t-2} + \alpha_3 \text{Victim}_{i,t} \times \text{Victim}_{i,t-2} \\
& + \alpha_4 \text{Victim}_{i,t} \times \text{Victim}_{i,t-1} \times \text{Victim}_{i,t-2} + \epsilon_{i,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{4}
$$

where $\text{Trust}_{i,t}$ is respondent i's self-reported trust in the police in time t, $\text{Victim}_{i,t}$ is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if respondent i reports having been a victim of a crime in the past six months and zero otherwise, $\text{Victim}_{i,t-1}$ is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if respondent i reported having been a

victim of crime the previous time they were asked about it, $\text{Victim}_{i,t-2}$ is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if respondent i reported having been a victim of crime the first time they were asked about it, and $\epsilon_{i,t}$ are robust standard errors, clustered at the primary sampling unit.

Figure A17 plots the results. The left panel shows the cumulative effect of victimization after the first, second, and third instances of self-reported victimization. We calculate the cumulative effect of victimization using (4) as follows: we report $\widehat{\beta_1}$ for the effect of a single instance of victimization. For the effect of a double victimization, we calculate $\widehat{\beta_1} + \widehat{\beta_2} + \widehat{\alpha_1}$. For the effect of a triple victimization, we sum $\widehat{\beta_1} + \widehat{\beta_2} + \widehat{\beta_3} + \widehat{\alpha_1} + \widehat{\alpha_2} + \widehat{\alpha_3} + \widehat{\alpha_4}$. As can be seen, each instance of victimization is related to lower trust in the police. However, subsequent victimization leads to a smaller decrease in the estimated trust in police relative to the first recorded instance. In the right panel, we compute the average marginal effect of victimization when respondents reported being victims only the last time they were asked, the last two times they were asked, and all the times they were asked. As would be expected if individuals learned less about the police after each subsequent instance of victimization, the AME of criminal victimization in trust is always negative but the magnitude of the change decreases with each subsequent instance.


Figure A17: The left panel shows the cummulative effect of self-reported victimization on trust in the police and its 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals, estimated using 4. The right panel shows the average marginal effect of self-reported victimization on trust in police for respondents who reported having been victims in the previous wave, and in the two previous waves as well and its 95% confidence intervals.

Last, one might be worried that our crime results might capture changes in the composition of our sample, driven by differential attrition of victims instead of changes in respondents' belief on the trustworthiness of the police. To test for that possibility, we explore whether self-reported victimization predicts attrition in the next survey wave for the Colombia and Mexico panels. Table A10 shows the results. While attrition is relatively common in the Colombia panel, most respondents in the Mexico panel survive until the end of their five interviews. Self-reported victimization is not related to attrition from the sample at statistically significant levels, either for the Mexico or the Colombia panels. Conversely, socioeconomic estrato is, in fact, weakly related to attrition, although not systematically so. While increasing respondents' estrato by one level is associated with them being .4 pp less likely to drop out of the sample in Mexico, the opposite

is true in Colombia, where wealthier respondents are less likely to attrit. Overall, results show differential attrition by victimization or socioeconomic status is unlikely to bias the results systematically.

	Attrited			
	Mexico		Colombia	
Victim	0.001		0.023	
	(0.001)		(0.014)	
Estrato		-0.004***		0.042***
		(0.000)		(0.005)
Mean attrition among non-victims	0.017		0.52	
Mean attrition among lowest estrato		0.042		0.46
Num.Obs.	173613	498412	5205	5205
R2 Adj.	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.012

Table A10: Table shows the estimated association between respondents' self-reported victimization in the baseline survey (Colombia) or the last time criminal victimization was asked (Mexico) and attrition from the sample. Results for Mexico include period and locality fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Appendix I   Updating on Experiences with Police

A9.1   Medellín Survey Data

We use three smaller panel surveys, described in Appendix B, and administrative data to gain additional leverage on our account of updating on police trustworthiness. First, one surprising finding in Figure 6 is that high socioeconomic status respondents report higher rates of crime victimization than poor respondents. The crime victimization survey conducted in Medellín helps to clarify this surprising finding, by examining exposure to different crimes by socioeconomic status. Figure A18 shows that the proportion of respondents that report having experienced theft in the past year, the most commonly reported crime, is increasing in class *estrato*. Thus, the positive gradient of overall victimization and class—seen in the first panel of the top row and Figure 6—is due to the high frequency with which property crimes occur. Conversely, Figure A18 shows that lower-income individuals more commonly report incidences of violence but less frequently perpetrated crimes, like homicide or extortion.

Figure A18: Figure shows the proportion of respondents from the Medellín survey that report direct (in orange) and indirect (in blue) instances of crime happening in their neighborhood in the last 6 months, by administrative class "estrato."

A9.2 Administrative Crime Data

Additionally, we examine how the incidence of different crimes, as recorded in geolocated administrative data, covaries in the socioeconomic profile of inhabitants within two Latin American cities: Medellín and Mexico City. While these data measure only crime recorded by city authorities, it is helpful to contrast the association between recorded crime and class with that using self-reported victimization from our survey data.

Figure A19: Figure shows the mean crime rate by mean adequate income per capita quantile per police quadrant in the city of Medellín. Crime data comes from official administrative crime statistics for the 2011-2017 period. The mean adequate income per capita comes from the national census.


Figure A20: Figure shows the mean crime rate by quarterly income zones in Mexico City. Crime data comes from official administrative crime statistics for the 2015-2022 period. Data on income comes from the 2018 National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH) conducted by the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).

Figure A19 plots administrative crime data and shows the mean rate of four crimes in Medellín according to the adequate income per capita of respondents living in each of the 408 police quadrants. Similar to what the survey data shows, the rate of robbery and burglary increases in income while the rate of sexual crimes decreases. Conversely, homicides show either a slightly decreasing or flat gradient. Similarly, figure A20 shows that the homicide and disappearance rate, as per administrative data, decreases in neighborhood

income while the robbery rate increases. Administrative data is partly a function of the rate of self-reporting, which can covary in class. However, information on severe crimes like homicides and disappearances is thought to suffer less of self-reporting bias. Thus, results are congruent with lower-income respondents experiencing more severe crimes at higher rates than their higher-income neighbors.

A9.3 Mexico Rotating Panel Data

Last, we leverage the panel structure and large sample size of the Mexican rotating panel survey, ENSU, to examine how three different signals of police trustworthiness affect trust in police at different income levels. We employ a two-way fixed-effect estimator and the fixed-effect counterfactual estimator proposed by Liu, Wang, and Xu (2022) to estimate the ATT of these self-reported signals for each administrative class *estrato*. Figure A21 shows that the estimated ATT of each of the signals on trust is remarkably similar for individuals of different classes *estratos*. These results suggest that respondents of different sociodemographic backgrounds are not learning different things from the same signals.


Figure A21: Figure benchmarks the class-specific estimates of pooled associations (across waves) to estimates of the average treatment effect (ATT) on the treated of signals analogous to those in Figure 7 estimated using the Mexico rotating panel ENSU. LWX (2022) indicates the fixed effects counterfactual estimator proposed by Liu, Wang, and Xu (2022). 95% confidence intervals are calculated on standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit.

A9.4 Feeling of Insecurity

For some analyses, we conceptualize the feeling of insecurity as a perceived signal of police trustworthiness on which citizens update, since part of police officers' job is preventing crime and, in so doing, inspiring a feeling of security. However, how feeling "safe" correlates with the objective level of violence in a geography—or whether such feeling tracks objective measures of "successful" policing— is less clear. Table A11 shows the correlation between self-reported feeling of insecurity in respondents' neighborhoods and municipal-level homicides for respondents living in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. The measure of feeling of insecurity comes from all LAPOP survey waves (see Table A5), while municipal-level homicide data come from each country's official administrative records. Feeling unsafe is positively related to the intensity of homicidal violence in all countries and using all transformations of the measure of homicides, as

we would expect if feeling of insecurity increased in the actual level of perpetrated violence. The correlation is strongest in Brazil but positive and statistically significant at the 95% level for Colombia and Mexico as well.

Feels unsafe	Brazil	Colombia	Mexico
Rate per 100k	0.15 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Total homicides	0.10 (0.02)	0.15 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)
Rate per 100k (logged)	0.14 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.08 (0.02)
Rate per 100k (pooled quantile)	0.16 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)
Rate per 100k (year quantile)	0.15 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.07 (0.02)

Table A11: Table shows the correlation between self-reported feeling of insecurity in respondents' neighborhood and homicides (measured at the municipal-level) for respondents living in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. In each country's column, the first row shows the country-specific correlation when the intensity of homicides is operationalized as the rate per 100k municipal inhabitants, the second shows the correlation with the total number of homicides, the third with the logged rate per 100k municipal inhabitants, the fourth when violence is operationalized as the municipal quantile of the overall number of homicides in the entire period, and the fifth when the quantile is constructed using the total number of homicides perpetrated there that year. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Although we use panel surveys to estimate the ATTs of different signals of police trustworthiness, it is helpful to see how associations estimated with these data relate to those estimated from the LAPOP sample. In Figure A22, we plot the association between feeling unsafe in the neighborhood, crime victimization, bribe solicitation, and standardized measures of trust in police. The first and second panels show that the association between feeling unsafe and crime victimization is slightly more negative when using the Medellín panel than the Colombia-wide LAPOP data. The former, but not the latter, is also true when using the Mexico panel, which also shows a similar association for bribe solicitation using the two measures. As for Chile, the LAPOP and panel-based estimates of the association between feeling unsafe and trust in police are similar.

Figure A22: Figure shows the association between three signals of police trustworthiness and a standardized measure of trust in police when estimated using the data from LAPOP (black), the Medellín panel (orange), the Chile panel (blue), and the Mexico panel (green). Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit.

Last, we report the estimated coefficients and their standard errors, plotted in Figure 7 in the main paper.

	Feels unsafe in neighborhood	Victim of crime direct or indirect	Police solicited bribe	Views police as corrupt
Chile				
Association	-0.23	—	—	—
	(0.026)			
ATT	-0.06	—	—	—
	(0.025)			
ATT (unit avg.)	-0.11	—	—	—
	(0.033)			
Medellín				
Association	-0.38	-0.38	—	-0.34
	(0.039)	(0.033)		(0.028)
ATT	-0.20	-0.14	—	0.08
	(0.048)	(0.036)		(0.034)
ATT (unit avg.)	-0.20	-0.13	—	-0.08
	(0.046)	(0.036)		(0.034)
Mexico				
Association	-0.41	-0.28	-0.43	—
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.013)	
ATT	-0.18	-0.09	0.18	—
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.032)	
ATT (unit avg.)	-0.17	-0.09	-0.17	—
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.071)	

Table A12: Table shows the estimated coefficients and their standard errors, plotted in Figure 7 in the main paper. Fixed effects are incorporated by demeaning the outcome variables by country and period. Consequently, the coefficients for the fixed effects are not estimated and are therefore omitted.

A9.5 Interactions with the Police

In Figure 9, we show that the standard deviation of trust in police is decreasing in socioeconomic status. We argue that such a pattern is consistent with a behavioral model in which the rich employ a lower threshold for translating good or bad experiences with the police into signals of police trustworthiness. However, the decreasing variance is also consistent with a pattern of updating in which the rich observe more frequent signals of bad (or good) police performance than the poor. In this section, we offer descriptive evidence from the LAPOP and Medellín surveys that suggests the frequency with which individuals have contact with the police does not substantially vary in class.

Figure A23 shows the proportion of respondents from each class decile who could not assess how long the police would take to respond to a burglary at their home. Suppose frequent interactions with the police allow individuals to be better informed about police practices and provide a (more accurate) assessment of response times. In that case, we should expect the proportion of respondents who cannot reply to the question to decrease with class. Empirically, however, while the trend is slightly decreasing for the pooled sample, there appears to be no systematic pattern across class deciles in most countries.

As a more direct assessment, we leverage data from the Medellín panel survey. In figure A24, we compare the proportion of respondents from different class "estratos " who report seeing police officers patrol their neighborhood daily or never. The figure shows such a proportion does not appreciably change in the respondent's class.


Figure A23: Figure shows the proportion of respondents in each class decile who could not answer the question "In case of burglary, how long do you think the police would take to arrive at your home?" Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit.

How frequently do you see police officers patrolling your neighborhood?

Figure A24: The left panel shows the proportion of respondents in the Medellín survey, from each class "estrato", that report seeing police officers patrol their neighborhood on bicycle or foot daily (in orange) and never (in blue). The right panel shows the proportion of respondents in the Medellín survey, from each class "estrato", that report seeing police officers patrol their neighborhood on car daily (in orange) and never (in blue).

Appendix J   Beliefs versus Preferences

We have argued that trust should be characterized as a belief. As such, the evolution of trust could be subject to motivated reasoning. If this were the case, a respondent who prefers a policy that necessitates active police involvement may be motivated to hold more positive views of the police, thereby generating higher levels of trust in police (all else equal). To gauge if respondents' trust in police depends on their prior preferences over policing practices or policy, we characterize the relationship between socioeconomic status, self-described support for tough-on-crime or *mano dura* policing, and trust in police. A motivated-reasoning or inference process of updating on police trustworthiness should lead to pro-*mano dura* individuals having higher trust in police. Given the generally negative correlations between socioeconomic status and trust in police reported in Figure 1, this should translate to the poor holding more favorable views of *mano dura* policies.

Conversely, the left panel in Figure A25 shows a close-to-zero and *positive* correlation between income and support for tough-on-crime policing across most countries. Additionally, the right panel in Figure A25 shows the predicted level of trust in police by class decile as a function of respondents' self-reported support for 'mano dura.' The black line plots the expected level of trust in police for respondents in each decile, and the blue line plots the conditional expectation for respondents in that decile who support 'mano dura.' In contrast, the orange line plots the conditional expectation for respondents in that decile who are *unsupportive* of 'mano dura.' As we can see, the expected level of trust for individuals supportive of *mano dura* is lower than for individuals unsupportive of the measure across all income levels. Additionally, trust for both groups decreases at a similar rate. The results show the opposite empirical pattern we would expect to find if trust is largely driven by individuals' preferences, discounting the possibility of a motivated-reasoning explanation of our results.

Figure A25: The left panel shows the estimated correlation between income (orange), education (blue), and support for tough-on-crime or *mano dura* policing. The right panel shows the predicted level of trust in police for the pooled sample, by class decile, as a function of support for *mano dura* (yes in blue/no in orange).

Supplementary Appendix: References

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