qconnect Protocol

Definitions

PS : Public key (for signing)
SS : Secret key (for signing)
PK : Public key (for KEM)
SK : Secret key (for KEM)
K : Symmetric encryption key
N : List of used nonces
B : Contact book

$\text{Sign}_{SS}(M) = S$	Signs message M using private key SS creating signature S.
$\text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS}(S, M) = \{0, 1\}$	Verifies message M matches signature S using public key PS. Outputs 1 when signature matches.
$\text{KEM}_{PK}(K) = C$	Encrypts the given key K using public key PK.
$\text{KEM}^{-1}_{SK}(C) = K$	Decrypts the given encrypted key C using secret key SK. KEM stands for Key Encapsulation Mechanism.
$\text{Enc}_K(M) = C$	Encrypts the given message using symmetric key K.
$\text{Enc}^{-1}_K(C) = M$	Decrypts the given ciphertext using symmetric key K.
$\text{Now}() = T$	Outputs the current timestamp.

Registration

Bob registers his keys with the server.

$$\text{Bob has} : PS_{\text{Bob}}, SS_{\text{Bob}}, PK_{\text{Bob}}, SK_{\text{Bob}}$$

$$\text{Bob sends to server} : PS_{\text{Bob}}, PK_{\text{Bob}}$$

Server calculates :

$$M = \{0,1\}^{128} \qquad \text{Generate signing challenge.}$$
$$K = \{0,1\}^{128} \qquad \text{Generate KEM challenge.}$$
$$C = \text{KEM}_{PK_{\text{Bob}}}(K) \qquad \text{Encapsulate KEM challenge.}$$

$$\text{Server sends to Bob} : M, C$$

Bob calculates :

$$S = \text{Sign}_{SS_{\text{Bob}}}(M) \qquad \text{Sign the signing challenge.}$$
$$K' = \text{KEM}^{-1}_{SK_{\text{Bob}}}(C) \qquad \text{Decapsulate the KEM challenge.}$$

$$\text{Bob sends to Server} : S, K'$$

Server calculates :

$$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Bob}}}(S, M) \qquad \text{Verify the signature of the signing challenge.}$$
$$K = K' \qquad \text{Verify the KEM challenge response is correct.}$$
Once verified, Server records Bob's keys.

Contact Request and Accept

Bob adds Alice as a contact.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Bob has} &: SS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}}, T_{\text{Threshold}}, B, N \\
\text{Server has} &: PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}}, T_{\text{Threshold}}, B, N \\
\text{Alice has} &: SS_{\text{Alice}}, PS_{\text{Bob}}, T_{\text{Threshold}}, B, N
\end{aligned}$$

Bob calculates :

$T = \text{Now}()$	Get current timestamp.
$n = \{0,1\}^{128}$ s.t. $(n, PS_{\text{Bob}}) \notin N$	Generate nonce.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Add nonce to list.
$S = \text{Sign}_{SS_{\text{Bob}}}(T\|\|n\|\|PS_{\text{Alice}})$	Sign contact request.
$B = B \cup \{(PS_{\text{Alice}}, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Mark Alice as able to send messages to Bob.

Bob sends to server : $S, T, n, PS_{\text{Alice}}$

Server calculates :

$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Bob}}}(S, T\|\|n\|\|PS_{\text{Alice}})$	Verify contact request is from Bob.
$T > \text{Now}() - T_{\text{Threshold}}$	Verify contact request is recent.
$(n, PS_{\text{Bob}}) \notin N$	Verify nonce is new.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Add old nonce to list.
$B = B \cup \{(PS_{\text{Alice}}, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Mark Alice as able to send messages to Bob.

Server sends to Alice : S, T, n

Alice calculates :

$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Bob}}}(S, T\|\|n\|\|PS_{\text{Alice}})$	Verify contact request is from Bob.
	If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.
$T > \text{Now}() - T_{\text{Threshold}}$	Verify contact request is recent.
$(n, PS_{\text{Bob}}) \notin N$	Verify nonce is new.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Add old nonce to list.
$B = B \cup \{(PS_{\text{Alice}}, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Mark Alice as able to send messages to Bob.

$T = \text{Now}()$	Get current timestamp.
$n = \{0,1\}^{128}$ s.t. $(n, PS_{\text{Alice}}) \notin N$	Generate nonce.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Alice}})\}$	Add nonce to list.
$S = \text{Sign}_{SS_{\text{Alice}}}(T\|\|n\|\|PS_{\text{Bob}})$	Sign contact request.
$B = B \cup \{(PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}})\}$	Mark Bob as able to send messages to Alice.

Alice sends to server : S, T, n, PS_{Bob}

Server calculates :

$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Alice}}}(S, T\|\|n\|\|PS_{\text{Bob}})$	Verify contact request is from Alice.
	If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.
$T > \text{Now}() - T_{\text{Threshold}}$	Verify contact request is recent.
$(n, PS_{\text{Alice}}) \notin N$	Verify nonce is new.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Alice}})\}$	Add old nonce to list.
$B = B \cup (PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}})$	Mark Bob as able to send messages to Alice.

Server sends to Bob : S, T, n

Bob calculates :

$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Alice}}}(S, T\|\|n\|\|PS_{\text{Bob}})$	Verify contact request is from Alice.
	If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.
$T > \text{Now}() - T_{\text{Threshold}}$	Verify contact request is recent.
$(n, PS_{\text{Alice}}) \notin N$	Verify nonce is new.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Alice}})\}$	Add old nonce to list.
$B = B \cup (PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}})$	Mark Bob as able to send messages to Alice.

Public Key (for KEM) Distribution

Alice sends a public key (for KEM) PK_{Alice} to Bob.

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Alice has} &: SS_{\text{Alice}}, PK_{\text{Alice}} \\
\text{Server has} &: PS_{\text{Alice}} \\
\text{Bob has} &: PS_{\text{Alice}}
\end{aligned}$$

Alice calculates :

$$S = \text{Sign}_{SS_{\text{Alice}}}(PK_{\text{Alice}}) \qquad \text{Signs public key.}$$

Alice sends to Server : S, PK_{Alice}

Server calculates :

$$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Alice}}}(S, PK_{\text{Alice}}) \qquad \text{Verify message is from Alice.}$$

If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.

Server sends to Bob : S, PK_{Alice}

Bob calculates:

$$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Alice}}}(S, PK_{\text{Alice}}) \qquad \text{Verify message is from Alice.}$$

If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.

Bob sends message to Alice

Bob sends a given message M to Alice.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Bob has} &: SS_{\text{Bob}}, PK_{\text{Alice}}, N \\ \text{Server has} &: PS_{\text{Bob}}, T_{\text{Threshold}}, B, N \\ \text{Alice has} &: SK_{\text{Alice}}, PS_{\text{Bob}}, T_{\text{Threshold}}, B, N\end{aligned}$$

Bob calculates :

$K = \{0,1\}^n$	Generates key of length n.
$C_K = \text{KEM}_{PK_{\text{Alice}}}(K)$	Encrypts key.
$C_M = \text{Enc}_K(M)$	Encrypts message.
$T = \text{Now}()$	Get current timestamp.
$n = \{0,1\}^{128}$ s.t. $(n, PS_{\text{Bob}}) \notin N$	Generate nonce.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Add nonce to list.
$S = \text{Sign}_{SS_{\text{Bob}}}(T\|\|n\|\|C_K\|\|C_M)$	Sign message.

Bob sends to server : S, T, n, C_K, C_M

Server calculates :

$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Bob}}}(S, T\|\|n\|\|C_K\|\|C_M)$	Verify message is from Bob.
	If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.
$T > \text{Now}() - T_{\text{Threshold}}$	Verify message is recent.
$(n, PS_{\text{Bob}}) \notin N$	Verify nonce is new.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Add old nonce to list.
$(PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}}) \in B$	Verify Bob can message Alice.

Server sends to Alice : S, T, n, C_K, C_M

Alice calculates :

$S_{\text{Verify}} = \text{Sign}^{-1}_{PS_{\text{Bob}}}(S, T\|\|n\|\|C_K\|\|C_M)$	Verify message is from Bob.
	If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.
$T > \text{Now}() - T_{\text{Threshold}}$	Verify message is recent.
$(n, PS_{\text{Bob}}) \notin N$	Verify nonce is new.
$N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\text{Bob}})\}$	Add old nonce to list.
$(PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}}) \in B$	Verify Bob can message Alice.
$K = \text{KEM}^{-1}_{SK_{\text{Alice}}}(C_K)$	Decrypt key.
$M = \text{Enc}^{-1}_K(C_M)$	Decrypt message.