qpigeon Protocol

Definitions

PS: Public key (for signing)

SS: Secret key (for signing)

PK: Public key (for KEM)

SK : Secret key (for KEM)

K: Symmetric encryption key

N: List of used nonces

B: Contact book

 $\operatorname{Sign}_{SS}(M) = S$ Signs message M using private key SS creating signature S.

 $\operatorname{Sign}_{PS}^{-1}(S,M) = \{0,1\}$ Verifies message M matches signature S using public key PS.

Outputs 1 when signature matches.

 $KEM_{PK}(K) = C$ Encrypts the given key K using public key PK.

 $\operatorname{KEM}^{-1}_{SK}(C) = K$ Decrypts the given encrypted key C using secret key SK.

KEM stands for Key Encapsulation Mechanism.

 $\operatorname{Enc}_K(M) = C$ Encrypts the given message using symmetric key K.

 $\operatorname{Enc}_K^{-1}(C) = M$ Decrypts the given ciphertext using symmetric key K.

Now() = T Outputs the current timestamp.

Registration

Bob registers his keys with the server.

Bob has : PS_{Bob} , SS_{Bob} , PK_{Bob} , SK_{Bob}

Bob sends to server : PS_{Bob} , PK_{Bob}

Server calculates:

$$M = \{0,1\}^{128}$$
 Generate signing challenge. $K = \{0,1\}^{128}$ Generate KEM challenge. $C = \text{KEM}_{PK_{\text{Bob}}}(K)$ Encapsulate KEM challenge.

Server sends to Bob : M, C

Bob calculates:

$$S=\mathrm{Sign}_{SS_{\mathrm{Bob}}}(M)$$
 Sign the signing challenge. $K'=\mathrm{KEM}_{SK_{\mathrm{Bob}}}^{-1}(C)$ Decapsulate the KEM challenge.

Bob sends to Server : S, K'

Server calculates:

$$S_{\mathrm{Verify}} = \mathrm{Sign}_{PS_{\mathrm{Bob}}}^{-1}(S,M)$$
 Verify the signature of the signing challenge.
$$K = K'$$
 Verify the KEM challenge response is correct. Once verified, Server records Bob's keys.

Contact Request and Accept

Bob adds Alice as a contact.

 $egin{aligned} \operatorname{Bob} & \operatorname{has}: SS_{\operatorname{Bob}}, PS_{\operatorname{Alice}}, T_{\operatorname{Threshold}}, B, N \ & \operatorname{Server} & \operatorname{has}: PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}, PS_{\operatorname{Alice}}, T_{\operatorname{Threshold}}, B, N \ & \operatorname{Alice} & \operatorname{has}: SS_{\operatorname{Alice}}, PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}, T_{\operatorname{Threshold}}, B, N \end{aligned}$

Bob calculates:

$$T = \operatorname{Now}()$$
 Get current timestamp. $n = \{0, 1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n, PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \not\in N$ Generate nonce. $N = N \cup \{(n, PS_{\operatorname{Bob}})\}$ Add nonce to list. $S = \operatorname{Sign}_{SS_{\operatorname{Bob}}}(T||n||PS_{\operatorname{Alice}})$ Sign contact request. $B = B \cup \{(PS_{\operatorname{Alice}}, PS_{\operatorname{Bob}})\}$ Mark Alice as able to send messages to Bob.

Bob sends to server : S, T, n, PS_{Alice}

Server calculates:

$$S_{ ext{Verify}} = ext{Sign}_{PS_{ ext{Bob}}}^{-1}(S,T||n||PS_{ ext{Alice}}) \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is from Bob.} \ T > ext{Now}() - T_{ ext{Threshold}} \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is recent.} \ (n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Add old nonce to list.} \ B = B \cup \{(PS_{ ext{Alice}},PS_{ ext{Bob}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Mark Alice as able to send messages to Bob.}$$

Server sends to Alice: S, T, n

Alice calculates:

$$S_{ ext{Verify}} = ext{Sign}_{PS_{ ext{Bob}}}^{-1}(S,T||n||PS_{ ext{Alice}}) \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is from Bob.} \ If \ S_{ ext{Verify}} = 0, ext{ reject.} \ T > ext{Now}() - T_{ ext{Threshold}} \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is recent.} \ (n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Add old nonce to list.} \ B = B \cup \{(PS_{ ext{Alice}},PS_{ ext{Bob}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Mark Alice as able to send messages to Bob.} \ T = ext{Now}() \hspace{1cm} ext{Get current timestamp.} \ n = \{0,1\}^{128} ext{ s.t. } (n,PS_{ ext{Alice}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Alice}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Generate nonce.} \ Add ext{ nonce to list.} \ S = ext{Sign}_{SS_{ ext{Alice}}}(T||n||PS_{ ext{Bob}}) \hspace{1cm} ext{Sign contact request.}$$

Mark Bob as able to send messages to Alice.

Alice sends to server: S, T, n, PS_{Bob}

 $B = B \cup \{(PS_{\text{Bob}}, PS_{\text{Alice}})\}$

Server calculates:

$$S_{ ext{Verify}} = ext{Sign}_{PS_{ ext{Alice}}}^{-1}(S,T||n||PS_{ ext{Bob}}) \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is from Alice.} \ T > ext{Now}() - T_{ ext{Threshold}} \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is recent.} \ (n,PS_{ ext{Alice}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Alice}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify nonce is new.} \ Add old nonce to list.}$$

Server sends to Bob : S, T, n

 $B = B \cup (PS_{\mathrm{Bob}}, PS_{\mathrm{Alice}})$

Bob calculates:

$$S_{ ext{Verify}} = ext{Sign}_{PS_{ ext{Alice}}}^{-1}(S,T||n||PS_{ ext{Bob}}) \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is from Alice.} \ If \ S_{ ext{Verify}} = 0, ext{ reject.} \ T > ext{Now}() - T_{ ext{Threshold}} \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify contact request is recent.} \ (n,PS_{ ext{Alice}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Alice}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify nonce is new.} \ Add old nonce to list.} \ B = B \cup (PS_{ ext{Bob}},PS_{ ext{Alice}}) \hspace{1cm} ext{Mark Bob as able to send messages to Alice.}$$

Mark Bob as able to send messages to Alice.

Public Key (for KEM) Distribution

Alice sends a public key (for KEM) PK_{Alice} to Bob.

Alice has: SS_{Alice} , PK_{Alice}

 $ext{Server has}: PS_{ ext{Alice}} \ ext{Bob has}: PS_{ ext{Alice}}$

Alice calculates:

$$S = \mathrm{Sign}_{SS_{\mathrm{Alice}}}(PK_{\mathrm{Alice}})$$

Signs public key.

Alice sends to Server : S, PK_{Alice}

Server calculates:

$$S_{\mathrm{Verify}} = \mathrm{Sign}_{PS_{\mathrm{Alice}}}^{-1}(S, PK_{\mathrm{Alice}})$$

Verify message is from Alice.

If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.

Server sends to Bob : S, PK_{Alice}

Bob calculates:

$$S_{\mathrm{Verify}} = \mathrm{Sign}_{PS_{\mathrm{Alice}}}^{-1}(S, PK_{\mathrm{Alice}})$$

Verify message is from Alice.

If $S_{\text{Verify}} = 0$, reject.

Bob sends message to Alice

Bob sends a given message M to Alice.

 $egin{aligned} ext{Bob has}: SS_{ ext{Bob}}, PK_{ ext{Alice}}, N \ ext{Server has}: PS_{ ext{Bob}}, T_{ ext{Threshold}}, B, N \end{aligned}$

Alice has: SK_{Alice} , PS_{Bob} , $T_{Threshold}$, B, N

Bob calculates:

$$K = \{0,1\}^n$$
 Generates key of length n . $C_K = \operatorname{KEM}_{PK_{\operatorname{Alice}}}(K)$ Encrypts key. $C_M = \operatorname{Enc}_K(M)$ Encrypts message. $T = \operatorname{Now}()$ Get current timestamp. $T = \{0,1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n,PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \notin N$ Generate nonce. $T = \{0,1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n,PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \notin N$ Generate nonce. $T = \{0,1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n,PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \notin N$ Generate nonce. $T = \{0,1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n,PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \notin N$ Generate nonce. $T = \{0,1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n,PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \notin N$ Generate nonce. $T = \{0,1\}^{128} \text{ s.t. } (n,PS_{\operatorname{Bob}}) \notin N$ Sign message.

Bob sends to server : S, T, n, C_K, C_M

Server calculates:

$$S_{ ext{Verify}} = ext{Sign}_{PS_{ ext{Bob}}}^{-1}(S,T||n||C_K||C_M) \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify message is from Bob.} \ If \ S_{ ext{Verify}} = 0, ext{ reject.} \ Verify message is recent.} \ (n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})\} \hspace{1cm} ext{Add old nonce to list.} \ (PS_{ ext{Bob}},PS_{ ext{Alice}}) \in B \hspace{1cm} ext{Verify Bob can message Alice.}$$

Server sends to Alice : S, T, n, C_K, C_M

Alice calculates:

$$S_{ ext{Verify}} = ext{Sign}_{PS_{ ext{Bob}}}^{-1}(S,T||n||C_K||C_M) \qquad ext{Verify message is from Bob.} \ If \ S_{ ext{Verify}} = 0, ext{reject.} \ T > ext{Now}() - T_{ ext{Threshold}} \qquad ext{Verify message is recent.} \ (n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})
otin N = N \cup \{(n,PS_{ ext{Bob}})\} \qquad ext{Add old nonce is new.} \ (PS_{ ext{Bob}},PS_{ ext{Alice}}) \in B \qquad ext{Verify Bob can message Alice.} \ K = ext{KEM}_{SK_{ ext{Alice}}}^{-1}(C_K) \qquad ext{Decrypt key.} \ M = ext{Enc}_K^{-1}(C_M) \qquad ext{Decrypt message.}$$