THE SCHOLAR AND THE SPOOK:

BUILDING A THEORY OF BUREAUCRATIC OUTREACH

BY

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A senior thesis
submitted to the Department of Politics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Bachelor of Arts

Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey

APRIL 7, 2010

Acknowledgments

I am indebted to Michelle Arader, William Wagner, David Christie, Sam Fox Krauss and Colton Heward-Mills for their tireless support of my antics. I am grateful for the guidance provided me by Ms. Diane Snyder, a fine practitioner-scholar whose deep experience opened untold doors. And I thank those officials who welcomed me into their closed-off world, not only for their contributions to this paper, but also for their service to a much greater cause.

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION

In defending the nation and our liberties, the federal government needs to have recourse to the best minds in the country, including those in the academic community…The university community cannot prosper and protect freedom of inquiry oblivious to the fortunes of the nation.

-Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA, 1986

The intelligence community and academia have a deep-rooted but contentious history. Beginning with the silver-haired professors who staffed the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and then helped establish the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the late 1940s, the two sides have worked together in myriad ways since World War II. From the ivory tower flow fresh recruits, the services of world-class research scientists, and the analytic expertise of the professorial class, whose insights are sharpened by frequent international travel and worldwide contacts. In return, cooperative university personnel have received lucrative research contracts and access to an otherwise sealed-off world. The affinity between the two institutions has been so tight that some intelligence agencies have physically styled themselves after academia. According to the former director of the National Security Agency (NSA), NSA employees refer to their primary headquarters at Fort Meade as "campus."[1] A room containing ten bare army cots on the second floor of the CIA's old headquarters in the Washington Mall was nicknamed "the dormitory."[2] A glossy CIA marketing brochure from early 2010 boasts that its current headquarters, the George Bush Center for Intelligence in Langley, Virginia, "has a campus-like atmosphere with lovely

[1] Ken Minihan, Telephone Interview, February 9, 2010. For a more complete description of an interviewee's background, see Appendix C.
[2] Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 260.

grounds and well-designed work areas."[3] Through such self-identification, intelligence agencies admit the relevance of university culture to their own work.

However, cooperation between the two institutions cannot be taken for granted. To the contrary, over the past six decades the relationship has been periodically marred in serious ways: At various times universities have thrown intelligence recruiters off of campus, scientists have cancelled their research contracts, and once helpful professors have stopped consulting. In response, intelligence officials have turned inward to meet their requirements, left with a sour impression of such unreliable partners. As ill will accumulates, interaction between the two sides can become the exception rather than the rule, despite the immense mutual benefits available from cooperation. Intelligence officials might make fewer overtures to universities, and members of the academy might respond unfavorably when they do reach out. Although the relationship has generally endured the tribulations of successive generations, it has not been a smooth journey.

This thesis aims to construct a theory of outreach to better explain the interactions between the two worlds. The work draws primarily from personal interviews – over sixty in total – with professionals who have impacted the relationship between intelligence and academia. A reliance on the experiences of select individuals has familiar drawbacks, including, as two scholars phrase it, "the tendency to draw conclusions of questionable validity and generalizability."[4] However, such a methodology was the best way to approach this topic: there is a dearth of statistical data available to the public about the behavior of intelligence community personnel, without which it is impossible to perform empirical

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[3] Central Intelligence Agency, "Working at the CIA," February 2010.
[4] Barbara Koremenos and Laurence Lynn, "Leadership of a State Agency," in *The State of Public Management*, ed. Donald Kettl and H. Brinton Milward (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 214.

testing. To guard against unsound generalizations, the thesis tries to frame its points in the context of well-established theoretical concepts. Through an original combination of primary and secondary sources, this paper sheds light on certain fundamental questions: Why and how do intelligence officials solicit help from academia in the first place, and why do university personnel consent? What conditions impact these decisions? Answering these questions is critical to better understanding the relationship writ large.

This paper contributes to two scholarly fields that are relatively immature. First, the existing literature concerning the relationship between the intelligence community and academia is lacking in several areas. Robin Winks' book, *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War* is widely acknowledged as the seminal tract on the topic. However, ending as it does in 1961, the story is nearly five decades out of date. While providing valuable insights into the employment of academics in American intelligence during World War II, the book does not cover the seminal Vietnam War era or its aftermath. Loch Johnson provides a useful overview of the CIA's various means of outreach, devoting an entire chapter to the topic in his 1991 *America's Secret Power*. However, his exclusive focus on the CIA is a parochial treatment of a much bigger issue, for the Agency is but a single part of the intelligence community. Other written references to this relationship can be found mostly in the memoirs of intelligence officers. Typically recounted in passing, these anecdotes are non-analytical. In a similar vein, Congressional reports and speeches delivered by intelligence professionals offer but brief glimpses into the larger relationship. This thesis is the first attempt to establish a theoretical framework for understanding the underlying mechanics of the relationship, combining insights from the paucity of written sources with the observations of practitioners from across the intelligence community.

Secondly, this thesis contributes to the collective understanding of the behavior of bureaus. There exists no scholarship that examines comprehensively the numerous formal and informal mechanisms of "bureaucratic outreach," defined herein as efforts made by government officials, whether ad hoc or systematic, to tap into and utilize sources of knowledge or talent outside of the government. Some attention has been paid to bureaucracies connecting to other bureaucracies. The National Performance Review, spearheaded by Vice President Al Gore in the 1990s, concluded, "Time and again, agencies find it impossible to meet their customers' needs, because organizational boundaries stand in the way…In a rapidly changing world, the best solution…is to melt the rigid boundaries between organizations."[5] Around the same time, a team of Brookings Institute thinkers observed that bureaucrats are hampered by "multiple and cross-cutting boundaries." In order to be effective in the modern era, the report advocated, bureaucracies must "cultivate government managers who are boundary spanners, managers who reach out to find colleagues in other agencies with whom they can solve problems."[6] However, this literature does not address how government connects systematically to actors *outside* the government.

The closest approximations of bureaucratic outreach are probably seen in the literature on how the government outsources services and utilizes volunteers. Outsourcing, a management strategy by which an organization commissions specialized vendors to perform certain activities, has long played a major role within American bureaucracies: In the early 1990s, the United States government paid over $40 billion annually to contractors for a wide

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[5] Al Gore, *Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less: Report of the National Performance Review* (New York: Times Books, 1993), 145.
[6] John DiIulio, Gerald Garvey, and Donald Kettl, *Improving Government Performance: An Owner's Manual* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 60.

variety of professional, administrative, and managerial support services.[7] However, the literature on outsourcing is narrowly focused. Economists, for example, examine its cost-effectiveness and impact on free market competition,[8] while political scientists might look at how the practice changes power relationships.[9] This thesis, by contrast, grapples with the broad underlying mechanics of the outreach process. Meanwhile, government agencies routinely utilize citizen volunteers to help deliver public services from education to health care. In 1992 alone the labor of volunteers working on behalf of government bureaucracies was valued at $1.8 billion.[10] However, the literature on this topic is very sparse. Scholars of outsourcing and volunteer programs have thus far not tried to fit these practices into a larger context of outreach efforts. This work, on the other hand, considers all of the avenues by which a given bureaucrat (defined herein as an employee of a government bureaucracy) might successfully utilize resources in the outside world.

The contours of the relationship between academia and the intelligence community are not uniform. This point merits emphasis: the *purpose* of outreach varies across a range of intelligence agencies, offices and individuals. The intelligence community is comprised of a host of actors, each with different requirements and missions (see Table 1). The demands of the military intelligence services, for example are distinct from those of the FBI. Even within a given agency, the point of outreach can vary greatly. Office chiefs at the CIA might look to academia for a different purpose than CIA case officers, and researchers within the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology have different needs than analysts in the CIA's

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[7] General Accounting Office, *Government Contractors: Are Service Contractors Performing Inherently Government Functions?* (Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 1991), 14.
[8] E. Bruce Hutchinson and Leila Pratt, "Is Contracting Out Government Services the Great Panacea?," *Journal of Private Enterprise* 23, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 67.
[9] Alon Peled, "Outsourcing and political power," *Public Personnel Management* 30, no. 4 (Winter 2001): 496.
[10] Jeffrey Brudney, "Designing and Implementing Volunteer Programs," in *The State of Public Management*, ed. Donald Kettl and H. Brinton Milward (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 193.

Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Nevertheless, this thesis asserts that the *process* of outreach is generally consistent. Therefore, a single theoretical model should be capable of explaining the outcomes of outreach efforts across the board.

Table 1. Components of the U.S. intelligence community and their missions[11]

Agency or office name	"Parent"	Missions
Office of Director of National Intelligence	Independent	To coordinate the activities of the community; formulate a consolidated intelligence budget; and advise the president on all US intelligence matters
Central Intelligence Agency	Independent	To collect human intelligence abroad; analyze all-source intelligence; and carry out covert activities
Bureau of Intelligence and Research	Department of State	To analyze all-source intelligence and advise the Secretary of State on intelligence matters
Defense Intelligence Agency	Department of Defense	To collect human and other intelligence for military purposes; analyze all-source intelligence; and advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense
National Security Agency	Department of Defense	To collect and analyze signals intelligence; to ensure the integrity of national security information systems
National Reconnaissance Office	Department of Defense	To develop, build, launch and manage America's overhead intelligence satellite systems
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency	Department of Defense	To provide imagery analysis and geospatial intelligence to national and tactical consumers
Military intel (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines)	Department of Defense	To support the intelligence demands of the military services and Secretary of Defense
FBI National Security Branch	Department of Justice	To collect and analyze intelligence related to domestic terrorism and WMD threats
Drug Enforcement Intelligence	Department of Justice	To collect and analyze intelligence on global narcotics and facilitate coordination and information sharing
Office of Information and Analysis	Department of Homeland Security	To analyze threats related to homeland defense, including border security, and critical infrastructure
Coast Guard Intelligence	Department of Homeland Security	To collect and analyze intelligence in support of Coast Guard objectives
Office of Intelligence and Analysis	Department of Treasury	To analyze and collate intelligence related to the financing of terrorists, insurgencies and rogue regimes
Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence	Department of Energy	To analyze intelligence related to energy security, nuclear weapons, and science and technology

[11] Information simplified from The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "An Overview of the Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress," January 16, 2009, www.dni.gov/overview.pdf.

This thesis is divided into four sections. The first is an introductory overview of the mechanisms of outreach, meant to orient the reader to the primary avenues of interaction between the intelligence community and academia. This chapter then posits a preliminary sketch of a theory of bureaucratic outreach. The next section details the first part of the outreach process – the solicitation of academia by the intelligence community. The third section describes how academics respond. Each chapter presents new details of the overall theory of bureaucratic outreach. The conclusion synthesizes all of these theoretical elements into a more sophisticated model and reflects on its implications.

Before delving into the theory, it is important to establish why and in what manner the intelligence community and academia work together in the first place. Each time that members of the intelligence community reach out, they do so toward a distinct end. Although the specifics vary in every case, these ends take four general forms: professional, analytical, developmental and educational. That is, intelligence agencies may be looking to cultivate and recruit new full time hires, to access analytic expertise, to farm out the research and development of innovative technologies, or to further educate their workforces. Each manner of outreach confers a distinct set of costs and benefits on the parties involved.

CULTIVATING AND RECRUITING NEW HIRES

Not unlike private sector organizations, intelligence agencies come to universities to augment their own ranks, seeking out those with the strongest shoulders and nimblest minds to become new analysts, field operatives, and scientific researchers. The search is not limited to students; intelligence agencies regularly hire professors and administrators as temporary employees. Distinct from consultants, these individuals are kept on salary and work directly

in intelligence facilities among government employees, sometimes for years on end. Agencies try to cultivate these hires mostly through internship programs, but in recent years, ambitious initiatives have aimed to improve the quality of this human capital pipeline in other ways. Through direct investments, the intelligence community is funding the development of curricula and programs of study intended explicitly to train students for careers in intelligence.

The intelligence community's cultivation and recruitment of university personnel is steeped in history. This manner of outreach traces its roots to World War II, when a strong affinity brought the two worlds together. As an organization, the wartime OSS was risk loving, favoring curiosity over quiet conventionalism. Robin Winks cleverly illuminates how the OSS environment mirrored a university in this regard:

> In any academic community there are scholars of whom it is said that they have twenty fresh ideas a day, ten of them quite mad, five naïve or stupid, three without point, and two exciting and potentially of great value. Most bureaucracies, seeking to homogenize their members, would not tolerate so low-level a return; any sound university will bear with eighteen expressions of madness, stupidity, and nonproductivity in exchange for two of great value. The U.S. Department of State was like the conventional bureaucracy: two acts of madness would more than offset eighteen acts of conventionally performed bureaucratic procedure and would end a career. The OSS was like the university: put itching powder into safes, soon to be delivered to the Germans, so that file clerks would be discomfited? parachute drop thousands of pornographic pamphlets onto the grounds at Berchtesgaden, so that Hitler might be driven mad with sexual desire?...Why not give it a try?[12]

In light of these commonalities, it was "natural" for OSS and early CIA recruiters to turn to American universities for their early officers, in particular to the Ivy Leagues and private colleges that did not "sink the creativity of their students in programs of vocational training

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[12] Robin Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987), 24.

and rote memory."[13] In fact, the Research and Analysis division of the OSS was styled explicitly as a mini-version of academia. Ray Cline, a future head of the DI at CIA, was the chief of the division's current intelligence staff. Another future intelligence executive has described Cline's OSS office as "very much like the publications unit of a large university press." Cline's staff produced pamphlets known as "current intelligence studies," which it intentionally styled after academic monographs. "We maintain high scholarly standards," Cline remarked at the time. To that end, Cline primarily sought out Ph.D. graduates and university professors to fill professional vacancies within the division.[14]

After the establishment of the CIA in 1947, it was clear that the intelligence community's demand for internationally savvy and motivated youth had not abated. Frank Wisner became the head of the CIA's new covert action division in 1948. To carry out his mandate of propaganda and sabotage abroad, Wisner needed spies, thousands of them. Some of them would have to come straight out of universities. "The hunt for talent, then as now, was a constant crisis," records a modern journalist. "[Wisner] set out on a recruiting drive that ran from the Pentagon to Park Avenue to Yale and Harvard and Princeton, where professors and coaches were paid to spot talent. He hired lawyers, bankers, college kids, old school friends, veterans at loose ends."[15] The Agency primarily utilized friendly professors and administrators to point highly esteemed graduates in its direction. Thomas Peck graduated from Princeton University in 1949 and worked in the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) for over thirty years. He recalls that when he left college, the CIA was so

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[13] Ibid.
[14] Russell Jack Smith, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency* (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1989), 21.
[15] Tim Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA* (New York: Doubleday), 33.

new that "it had no recruiters on the campus at that time."[16] On the advice of trusted deans and teachers, students simply sought out intelligence jobs on their own volition.

By the late 1950s and 1960s, the intelligence agencies began to formalize their hiring protocols, sending out recruiters to advertise the prospects of an intelligence career at a small nucleus of elite colleges in the Northeast and Southwest. "In those days, the reception on campuses in the main was quite good," notes Jim Glerum, at one point the director of the CIA's Office of Personnel. "It was very easy to send our recruiters to campuses to have career days, just like any corporation or any government agency does." However, this goodwill was not permanent. As Glerum puts it, "It became more difficult in the later years."[17]

Glerum's observation is an understatement. Starting in the middle of the Vietnam War era, the university ceased to be such a friendly place for intelligence recruiters. In September 1968, radical students at the University of Michigan blew up the CIA's recruiting office on campus. Two months later, students drove a CIA recruiter off of the premises at Notre Dame.[18] The next two decades brought more bad publicity for the intelligence community, most notably the Church Committee's revelations about the CIA's foreign assassination plots and the FBI's domestic spying programs. By the 1980s, the recruiting relationship had still not recovered, with student demonstrators taking frequent aim at the presence of intelligence officials on campus. By the count of one anti-CIA publication from the early 1990s, there were demonstrations against the Agency at 75 college campuses

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16 Thomas Peck, Telephone Interview, January 13, 2010.
17 Jim Glerum, Telephone Interview, February 9, 2010.
18 President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), "Appendix 5: Highlights of Civil Disturbances and Other Disorders in the United States-January 1966 through January 1973," in *Final Report to the President* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 289.

between 1987 and 1991.[19] Facing hostile or unsafe environments, intelligence recruiters abandoned many campuses where they had once been welcomed. Glerum asserts that during this era Harvard and Yale became "the most rigid in terms of bias or prejudice against the intelligence community, followed by Brown and Columbia, and then Pennsylvania bringing up the rear."[20] In an ironic twist, it was the former bastions of intelligence recruitment – Ivy League universities – that became the most ardent critics of the practice.

The animosity toward recruiting is easy to hyperbolize if one focuses exclusively on the CIA. Other intelligence agencies have had more consistent, if less controversial, recruiting relationships. Since its inception in 1952, the NSA has maintained resilient ties to universities with strong programs in computer science, engineering, mathematics, and languages.[21] For example, the NSA recruits heavily at Brigham Young University, whose Mormon students often achieve near-native language fluency during their two years of mission service abroad. The NSA also has strong relationships with the major American engineering schools, such as Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Stevens Institute, and Case Western. According to Jim Devine, the former head of Support Services at NSA, these schools "all provided a lot of help and were very happy to see us come every year and recruit their students."[22] To facilitate these relationships, the NSA caters directly to distinguished professors from these programs. Devine notes that the NSA invites these academics to Fort Meade for regular breakfast meetings and luncheons, followed by briefings and tours, in the hopes that they "would then go back and in their classrooms talk about this great place where you could do this great work." Employing about 750-800 mathematicians (NSA is the

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[19] Ami Chen Mills, *CIA Off Campus* (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 173.
[20] Glerum, interview.
[21] George Cotter, Telephone Interview, February 7, 2010.
[22] Jim Devine, February 6, 2010.

largest employer of mathematicians in the nation), 1800-2000 linguists, 2200-2300 engineers and an equal number of computer scientists, the NSA has no choice but to do everything it can to keep these recruiting channels open and unobstructed.[23]

In addition to bringing on students as full time employees, intelligence agencies recruit professional academics for temporary work assignments. After a professor takes a leave of absence from his university, passes a polygraph test and earns a security clearance, he can integrate among career intelligence professionals to work on projects of mutual interest for a set period of time. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) routinely appoints academics to serve a fixed term of two to three years as full-time National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). For example, Angela Stent took leave from Georgetown University, where she became a tenured professor in 1983, to served as the NIO for Russia and Euraisa from 2004 to 2006. After her two-year period was up, she returned to Georgetown and resumed teaching, and is now the director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown's School of Foreign Service.[24]

The NSA and CIA have both maintained "scholars-in-residence" programs, hiring academics for about a year at a time. According to former CIA officer Mary O'Sullivan, one particular department chairman at a leading research university spent every summer for five years embedded full-time as an intelligence analyst at CIA headquarters.[25] James Noren, a career analyst within the CIA's Office of Economic Research, recalls two such scholars-in-residence in his office. Stanley Cohn, a World War II veteran who spent twenty years teaching planned economics at Binghamton University, came for a year in the early 1970s.

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[23] Ibid. Employment estimates are from a period in the early 1990s.
[24] David Low, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.
[25] Mary O'Sullivan, Telephone Interview, February 8, 2010.

He was followed by Myron Rush, a scholar of Russian politics at Cornell who spent a year analyzing Soviet defense expenditures. Both had to produce concrete deliverables in the form of research papers. Noren recalls that these academics were a full part of the office, noting that he and his colleagues "would meet with them regularly to talk over things."[26]

Such hires were not confined to the analytic side. Science professors would often take their sabbatical year to work in the CIA's Office of Research and Development (ORD), at one time the Agency's incubator for science and technology innovation.[27] These professors would enter the Agency at relatively high rungs on the government pay-scale, at least GS-13 or GS-14. Their yearlong salary, paid by the hosting agency, would be comparable or greater than that earned at their university.[28] According to one former CIA employee, in some cases scholars-in-residence have resigned their professorships and joined the Agency full time.[29] However, it is important to note that these programs are small in scale. "These were not large numbers of people – you're talking about ones and twos," points out former CIA executive director Leo Hazlewood. "But it did happen."[30]

Intelligence agencies try to cultivate talent among students before recruiting them as full-time hires. Several agencies sponsor summer internship programs as a means to generate interest and jumpstart the training process. "The internship programs are a huge draw," says J.R. Johnson, an intelligence officer at the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). "It brings in people from hundreds of universities."[31] Peter Higgins worked for the NRO when its very existence was heavily classified. Even then, the Office hosted summer interns from

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[26] James Noren, Telephone Interview, January 16, 2010.
[27] Leo Hazlewood, Telephone Interview, February 5, 2010.
[28] O'Sullivan, interview.
[29] Joe Tamer, Telephone Interview, January 15, 2010.
[30] Hazlewood, interview.
[31] Jameson Johnson, Telephone Interview, January 22, 2010.

MIT doing programming with top-secret security clearances.[32] Meanwhile, the ORD took on undergraduates from engineering programs at places like Drexel and Georgia Tech through the schools' "co-op" programs, in which students alternate on-campus study with full-time employment in pursuit of a five-year degree. In addition to academic credit for two consecutive semesters of work, the Agency offered full-time professional positions to the most qualified interns upon their graduation.[33] The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) hires approximately sixty interns to work for ten-weeks over the summer, open only to undergraduate seniors and graduate students.[34] Finally, the NSA runs an intern program that channels young mathematicians with advanced degrees into an intensive three-year intensive program focused on cryptologic mathematics. "You show them hard problems and extremely interesting ones," says George Cotter, NSA's former Chief Scientist. "In a sense you get your hooks into them."[35]

The intelligence community is looking to more ambitiously cultivate new hires by developing "intelligence studies" as a legitimate academic field. "The teaching of intelligence at growing numbers of our colleges and universities — the teaching of its place, structure and practice in our democracy — offers the welcome prospect that growing numbers of young Americans will become attracted to the field, " noted A. Denis Clift when he was the president of the Joint Military Intelligence College in the 1990s.[36] The CIA encourages intelligence scholarship through its Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI). In 1999, the

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[32] Peter Higgins, Telephone Interview, February 10, 2010.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Defense Intelligence Agency, "Summer Intern Program," 2008, 5, www.dia.mil/employment/student/Bulletin_Summer_Intern2008.pdf.
[35] Cotter, interview.
[36] A. Denis Clift, "Remarks of Welcome" (Speech presented at the Conference on Teaching Intelligence Studies at Colleges and Universities, Joint Military Intelligence College, June 18, 1999), 1, www.dia.mil/college/pubs/pdf/9980.pdf.

head of CSI Lloyd Salvetti announced that he was assigning an "Academic Referent" as an aid for those looking to start courses in intelligence. Salvetti informed a crowd of university professors that he wanted this referent "to be in frequent correspondence with you — via the telephone, the Internet or the post office. I would like to see him making visits to your campuses to observe and participate in your courses and seminars. I hope you will view him as your resource."[37]

The CSI's signature outreach initiative, known as the Officer's-in-Residence (OIR) program, is designed for a similar purpose. Originally pitched in a 1985 memo as a recruiting tool to place in select schools officers "who can spot promising career candidates, [and] can counsel students as to career opportunities," the OIR program muted the recruiting rhetoric after several schools objected of spies "infiltrating" campus.[38] Today, OIRs serve two-year terms as full-time faculty members at their host academic institutions, where they teach courses on the intelligence. Since its inception, over 100 OIRs have gone into the field, according to the current manager of the program.[39] While OIRs can design courses as they please, most survey the role of intelligence in American life and the challenges facing it. One former OIR deems the program "a relatively inexpensive investment in encouraging understanding and further study in the field of intelligence," and urges fellow officers to take up this unique charge.[40] Through OIRs and related programming, CSI has been encouraging the growth of intelligence studies for over two decades as a means to pique undergraduate interest in the intelligence world.

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[37] Lloyd Salvetti, "Teaching Intelligence: Working Together to Build a Discipline" (Speech presented at the Conference on Teaching Intelligence Studies at Colleges and Universities, Joint Military Intelligence College, June 18, 1999), 17, www.dia.mil/college/pubs/pdf/9980.pdf.
[38] John Hollister Hedley, "Twenty Years of Officers in Residence," *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 4 (2005): 31.
[39] Bev Rush, Telephone Interview, January 27, 2010. For list of known OIRs, see Appendix B, Table i
[40] Hedley, "Twenty Years of Officers in Residence," 37.

In 2004, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) set out to transform the nature of intelligence studies programs. By 2010, the office had awarded multimillion-dollar grants to fund the establishment of Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence on about twenty university campuses.[41] At these centers, intelligence studies programs are no longer confined to the history and theory of intelligence – they are now venues to teach the skills required of intelligence professionals: effective writing, creative problem solving, contemporary diplomatic history and social science research methods. Professors within these programs receive stipends to revise curricula and design new courses. Schools use the money to create new degrees in national security studies, host colloquia on the study of intelligence, organize summer camps for high school students, and sponsor select students to travel abroad.[42]

Similarly, technical intelligence agencies are investing in universities to sharpen specific skill sets. In a 2007 speech, Undersecretary of Defense James Clapper asserted that many agencies are seeking to "engender partnerships with universities that are interested in and supportive of developing course curricula that prepare, from an academic standpoint, graduates for duty in those agencies." Clapper cites the University of Missouri of Columbia, California's University of Redlands, and Virginia Tech as institutions that, in return for funds from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, have developed programs at the undergraduate and graduate level to train students to work in geospatial intelligence analysis.[43] In 2007, A. Denis Clift highlighted the success of such investments, and again emphasized their recruitment potential. "The burning of effigies of intelligence leaders on

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[41] For complete table, see Appendix B, Table ii
[42] Richard Willing, "Intelligence agencies invest in college education," *USA Today*, November 28, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2006-11-27-intel-college_x.htm.
[43] James Clapper, "Remarks" (Speech presented at the Analytic Transformation Symposium, Chicago, IL, September 5, 2007), www.dni.gov/speeches/20070905_speech.pdf.

campus is history," he stated. "Intelligence departments have come into being. Intelligence degrees are being offered. The interests of college students extend beyond the classroom to the prospect of intelligence as a career."[44] In some respects, intelligence recruiting appears to have come full circle, now more fully integrated into college campuses than before.

The mutual benefits that derive from this form of outreach are straightforward (see Figure 1). Intelligence agencies inject new energy and perspectives into their offices through temporary hires, and they replenish their ranks with rising generations of intelligence professionals. As an NRO officer puts it, recruiting relationships "keep the bullpen active and allow us to really highlight some of the up-and-coming superstars and get them into government service early."[45] Universities gain access to steady employment opportunities for their students, as well as money for curriculum development and scholarships.

Figure 1. Mutual benefits of professional outreach

[44] A. Denis Clift, "The Changing Landscape of Intelligence Accountability" (Speech presented at the Trinity University IC Center of Academic Excellence Colloquium, Washington, DC, April 20, 2007).
[45] Johnson, interview.

CONTRIBUTING TO ANALYTIC ASSESSMENTS

The intelligence community relies on professors to contribute analytic insights for a variety of purposes. In his 1991 overview of the CIA's relationship with academia, Loch Johnson notes, "To meet some of its demands for information and interpretation, the CIA over the years has thrown out thousands of lifelines from Langley to the nation's campuses. Just as CIA officers have a lot in common with journalists, so do they with professors, especially, share professional analytical interests." Johnson goes on to say that most offices in the CIA's DI will keep between twenty-five and fifty outside consultants at a given time.[46] Although the numbers may have changed since then, the underlying point remains true: the intelligence agencies tap into the analytic expertise residing within American universities. When they do, agencies are not looking to hire professors full-time, but rather to use them as necessary to meet internal requirements. These interactions with academia are manifested through conferences, in-house lectures and discussions, the appointment of academics to advisory panels, and the use of domestic "contacts" offices.

The conference is the primary vehicle for this type of interchange. From 1982 to 1991, Johnson points out, the CIA sponsored three hundred conferences, compared to three or four each year before that.[47] The NIC hosts regular conferences as part of its long-term planning projects. Ambassador Robert Hutchings was chairman of the NIC from 2003 to 2005. He oversaw the NIC's 2020 project, which formulated a vision of how the international environment would look in fifteen years. According to Hutchings, academic input made this work possible. "It couldn't have gotten anywhere if it had been done in-house," says Hutchings. "It would have been unthinkable to do this from within." In the

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[46] Loch Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 164.
[47] Ibid.

course of this project, NIC representatives met with 1000 experts, including foreign nationals, at conferences and symposia around the world.[48]

In addition to hosting conferences, intelligence agencies often invite select academics into their headquarters for more intimate discussions. "In my particular experience," says senior CIA political analyst Nat White, "what we would do is bring two, three academics in to give us their take on an issue of interest to us." These discussions vary in scope. Some are based on abstract theories of international relations and examine how nations in a certain area of the world are likely to behave. But White also recalls a recent conference "with former officials and a raft of academics addressing a more tightly focused, country-specific issue, with some of them having very deep expertise."[49] According to Mary O'Sullivan, one CIA office that performed particularly sensitive analysis "had a stable of about 100 people that they used to turn to for help in understanding a situation," including many academics.[50]

This practice is not confined to the CIA. Analysts at the DIA are also encouraged to consult with academics on a one-on-one basis. If an analyst comes across an academic's work that he likes, he has the prerogative to invite him to Washington for a focused lecture or group discussion. In most cases the DIA will pay for the scholar's travel expenses and a modest honorarium, typically about $1000 for a full day.[51] The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) brings in about 1,000 nongovernmental experts a year to talk candidly with analysts and policymakers in an unclassified setting under Chatham House Rules – off the record and not for attribution. "A lot of our seminars," notes INR's director of outreach, "are just two hours here in the State Department building," and might include

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[48] Robert Hutchings, Personal Interview, December 10, 2009.
[49] Nat White, Telephone Interview, February 6, 2010.
[50] O'Sullivan, interview.
[51] Patricia Downs, Telephone Interview, February 16, 2010.

as few as one or two academics.[52] The NRO regularly consults professors as a means of testing out new ideas. Says an NRO official, "sometimes you just need a guy who has devoted his entire career to the study of a certain aspect of a certain science to say, 'guys that isn't going to happen."[53] In other words, targeted consulting is common across the major intelligence agencies.

At most of these discussions, academics are pontificating on a topic and answering general questions. But professors are sometimes asked to read over actual intelligence data. "Probably the most significant use of the outside experts was in reviewing draft intelligence assessments," says Paul Pillar, a National Intelligence Officer for Southeast Asia in the early 2000s. Pillar notes that prior to publishing a National Intelligence Estimate, the NIC will pick three outsiders to read it, trying to include at least one person with a different analytic perspective. The comments of these academics are summarized and placed in a section at the end of the estimate.[54] The NIC draws from a fixed pool of consultants, known as the IC Associates, to execute this work. The Associates program was born as the Global Expertise Reserve Program in the mid-1990s, employing scholars to consult on Africa. "From that it spread," recalls the former manager of the Associates program. "Now you have experts on about every conceivable topic... We're fairly expert ourselves, but we always want to get a second opinion."[55]

Using professors to review national estimates has a storied history, dating back to the 1950s and the so-called "Princeton consultants." Drawn from a handful of institutions, these academics met regularly with the leaders of the intelligence world, holding top-secret

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[52] Sue Nelson, Telephone Interview, February 3, 2010.
[53] Johnson, interview.
[54] Paul Pillar, Telephone Interview, January 19, 2010.
[55] Mathew Burrows, Telephone Interview, January 22, 2010.

clearances and access to some of the CIA's most sensitive files.[56] "I will never forget," reminiscences one former CIA officer, "when I'd been at the Agency for a couple of years, walking down the hall of the top floor and seeing my old professor of medieval history, Joe Strayer – looking just the way he did on the Princeton campus – going down to sit in at a meeting of the Board of National Estimates."[57] These consultants debated questions with major national implications: To what extent was the leader of Guatemala under Communist control? How fragile were the Soviet Union's social, economic and political institutions? If oil resources in Iran were nationalized, what would be the impact on the United States? Both Sherman Kent, head of the Office of National Estimates, and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles occasionally sat in on meetings with these academics, illustrating the consultants' direct impact on policy.[58]

A recent highly classified intelligence analysis program has drawn on academics in an even more intimate manner. In 2001, George Tenet authorized the creation of an intelligence think tank called Red Cell that "would think unconventionally about the full range of relevant analytic issues," with topics passed along by the National Security Council staff.[59] If Red Cell wanted to look at an issue, all sources of information were fair game, including the intelligence community writ large, the military, the national labs, and the business community. "We would use literally all available assets and resources, including the academic world," recalled one former official involved in the program.[60] For example, if Red Cell were examining Chinese military power, the head of the Pacific Command would send a

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[56] For known members of the Princeton Consultants, see Appendix B, Table iii
[57] Fred Hitz, Telephone Interview, January 14, 2010.
[58] John Cavanaugh, "Dulles Papers Reveal CIA Consulting Network," *Forerunner*, April 29, 1980, http://www.cia-on-campus.org/princeton.edu/consult.html.
[59] Central Intelligence Agency, "Key Events in DI History," *History — Central Intelligence Agency*, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/history.html.
[60] Former CIA Official, Telephone Interview, February 12, 2010.

representative to participate; NSA, CIA and DIA would have a say; the directors of certain research institutes would be involved; and a handful of top scholars writing books about China would be invited to contribute. These people would come together for a period of six to eight weeks to focus on this problem full-time, eventually producing a highly classified report. For Red Cell, academics are paid not simply to brainstorm and lecture, but to analyze classified intelligence and argue a position; in that way, they have a direct and significant impact on intelligence work.

The intelligence community also elicits academic input by appointing advisory panels. One such panel, headed by Cornell professor Hans Bethe, was involved in assessing the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons capabilities at the height of the Cold War. "They would meet three or four times a year," recalls a satellite engineer who worked with the panel. "And there'd be four or five other people, most of whom I think were academics…and they'd talk it over and think" about the technology challenges of the day.[61] The JASONS are another panel of the country's most elite scientists that advise science and technology activities within the intelligence community. Formed during the Vietnam War as a support element of the Defense Department, the JASONS were initially organized by Princeton University's renowned theoretical physicist and mathematician Freeman Dyson.[62] Sidney Drell, another acclaimed physicist and early JASON, served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board under Bill Clinton. In 2001, DCI Tenet awarded Drell the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the highest commendation available for service to

[61] Garret Cochran, Telephone Interview, January 13, 2010.
[62] Robert Herd, Telephone Interview, February 17, 2010.

the community, noting that he "excites the thinking of everyone around him."[63] In Drell's case, serving on an advisory panel was a stepping-stone to a much more involved engagement with the intelligence world.

The final way in which the intelligence community taps into academia for analytic purposes is through national "contact" offices. The CIA's National Resources Division (NRD) posts officers at field posts across the country, where they maintain voluntary communication with professors looking to share insights, usually by debriefing an NRD officer after travelling abroad. Individuals are not paid to serve as contacts; they do so because they want to share information with the government and this is a convenient way to do so.[64] As of 1991, this operation had field offices in thirty-eight cities nation wide.[65] The insights culled by the NRD reach a broad base of customers in the intelligence world. Garret Cochran, a retired CIA official with a background in chemical intelligence, recalls out that nerve agents are in a class of organo-phosphorous. "Some of the greatest organo-phosphorous chemists in the world at that time were Russian," he says. "Others were Americans. And they would go to international conferences and meet with one another. And when the Americans would come back, sometimes they would sit down and tell us what they thought the Russians were up to" through the NRD.[66] The DIA provides a similar service for its medical intelligence officials, maintaining extensive contacts with US academics who are studying infectious diseases and traveling in sensitive regions abroad.[67]

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[63] CIA Press Release, "Senator, Physicist Receive US Intelligence Medal — Central Intelligence Agency," January 9, 2001, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2001/pr01092001.html.
[64] Jim Olson, Telephone Interview, February 19, 2010.
[65] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 163.
[66] Cochran, interview.
[67] Downs, interview.

The intelligence community benefits enormously from these relationships. By hosting conferences, bringing in academics for informal discussions, hiring professors to review their most sensitive work, and maintaining contact services, intelligence agencies can tap into world-class expertise (see Figure 2). Participating academics receive comparatively little in return: access to sensitive information, minor cash payments and a sense of fulfilling one's patriotic duty.



Figure 2. Mutual benefits of analytical outreach

DEVELOPING TECHNICAL PRODUCTS

The intelligence community utilizes academics to assist with research and development efforts in a range of technical fields. In the 1950s, academics took the lead in some of the intelligence world's most important technological innovations. In 1954, for example, President Eisenhower appointed MIT president James Killian to be the head of a new unit overseeing America's technological capabilities. Kodak founder Edwin Land headed one of Killian's sub-groups. "A number of people on the Land Panel were academics," recalls Garret Cochran. In charge of assessing technologies for aircraft and satellite intelligence collection systems, the Land Panel was ultimately responsible for the production of the U-2 spy plane, the SR-71 stealth bomber, the Corona satellite, and the

KH-11 satellite. "The list goes on and on," notes Cochran. Not merely consultants, this group of academics played an active role in shepherding these innovations to fruition, essentially "pushing those programs through the White House bureaucracy."[68] Robert Herd, director of the Office of Research and Development from 1989 to 1996, recalls that scientists in the ORD would frequently go before these panels to present new program ideas. If the academics approved, then a new technical product or service might get fast tracked into production.[69]

This means of cooperation normally takes the form of outsourcing: the intelligence community will simply put academics under contract to deliver a good or service. Hubert Alyea was a chemistry professor at Princeton in the 1950s placed under contract by the CIA's Office of Technical Services to do chemical research. As part of his duties, Alyea wrote a manual for the office on how to perform certain advanced chemistry experiments. As one member of that office remembers, after receiving the manual, "we'd mark it all up, and he would re-write it again until we finally got it the way they wanted it."[70] When bureaucrats in this office had a question, it would be normal for them to call up Alyea and other scientists under contract.

Former CIA scientist Peter Higgins describes the ORD as "really synced up" with academia in this regard. When ORD was examining ways to capture brain wave patterns digitally, it contracted with academics at San Francisco State University who had already done research in that area. When ORD modeled the outbreak AIDS infections in the late 1980s, it contracted out to academics working on related topics. When ORD began looking

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[68] Cochran, interview.
[69] Herd, interview.
[70] Thornton Anderson, Telephone Interview, January 17, 2010.

for ways to compare facial images automatically, it contracted with scientists at Stanford and Rutgers who had been developing facial recognition technologies for years.[71] Furthermore, when ORD set out to improve the software behind Factions, the CIA's predictive model that forecasts how certain countries will address certain issues, ORD's modeling and simulation office solicited sociologists and developmental economists like Jeffrey Sachs for technical input.[72]

The intelligence agencies specializing in scientific systems draw on academia regularly as an outsourcing client. NRO looks to academics regularly for technology solutions in tight spots. Jameson Johnson, an NRO official, deems the tie to academia as "the touchstone" for the Office's science and the technology efforts. Whenever a satellite is not performing in line with its theoretical capabilities, the NRO seeks out professors. "Stage one" of a problem, says Johnson, "is to turn it over to the academics, thinkers, and engineers." To keep academia informed about upcoming needs, "the heads of the R&D or S&T programs go to the university systems a couple of times a year and do large scale briefs."[73] Scientists at the Rochester Institute of Technology, for example, research optical technologies on behalf of NRO, and RIT personnel used to research advanced topics in image science for the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC). Leo Hazlewood, formerly the deputy director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), points out that Innovision, the agency's R&D directorate, "dabbles" in a wide-range of topics and tries to find experts to help it better understand them. For example, when Innovision executives became interested in advanced topics in computer interfaces, NGA staff contacted a host of computer science departments to identify potential partners in the field. From time to time, distinguished

[71] Higgins, interview.
[72] Herd, interview.
[73] Johnson, interview.

image scientists from Purdue or Ohio State would come to headquarters to review NGA's work and learn about new demands in the field.[74] Thus, scientific agencies are engaging regularly with academics across a number of technical research fields.

From the academic's perspective, the government makes an excellent client. "Successfully navigating the market for technical expertise," write two scholars of contracting, requires "considerable effort and skill." These scholars point out that, in order to survive, contractors "build networks of other contractors, agents and hiring managers to locate, filter, distribute and validate information" from potential clients. Contractors often must turn to staffing agencies to help them find work.[75] Stable government contracts, on the other hand, eliminate this uncertainty. To qualified university researchers, the government provides a reliable customer, a near bottomless reservoir of work, and a steady paycheck. In addition to valuable advice and scientific support, the intelligence community receives clear deliverables, from advanced research to polished products (see Figure 3).



Figure 3. Mutual benefits of developmental outreach

[74] Hazlewood, interview.
[75] Stephen Barley and Gideon Kunda, "Contracting: A New Form of Professional Practice," *The Academy of Management Perspectives* 20, no. 1 (February 2006): 48.

EDUCATING THE WORKFORCE

Intelligence officials periodically venture into academia for educational purposes. This brand of outreach can take several forms, from an analyst earning a graduate degree at a civilian institution to a mid-career executive attending a training seminar run by academics. This form of outreach is a reversal of the recruitment process: Intelligence bureaucrats are here venturing into the groves of academia, rather than vice versa.[76]

Intelligence managers often conceive of academia as a resource for their workforce. In the 1980s, Leo Hazlewood was an executive at the NPIC, a forerunner of today's NGA. One of NPIC's major responsibilities was the production of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) – sophisticated maps of various terrains. "On the GIS side," notes Hazlewood, "we found the best way to tap that resource [academia] was to send people off for advanced degrees." NPIC sent its analysts to do graduate work at RIT, Purdue and Ohio State, the three American universities with the best programs in photogrammetric analysis, on the condition that they would study under certain distinguished professors.[77] For its employees, the NSA operates a "20/20" continuing education program. Through this initiative, when the agency hires a top-notch undergraduate, it allows the student to pick a university within the radius of the Agency, such as Johns Hopkins or Maryland, where he or she can work for 20 hours a week and go to school for 20 hours a week. Additionally, the NSA will regularly offer to pay for an exceptional student to earn an advanced degree full-time at the graduate school of his or choice.[78] The CIA, by contrast, generally does not offer

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[76] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 4.
[77] Hazlewood, interview.
[78] Devine, interview.

to pay for advanced degrees until after an employee has reached a mature stage in his career.[79]

The intelligence community also looks to academia for more compact educational opportunities for its officers. Shortly after a seminal 1986 speech at Harvard University calling for better relations with academia, Deputy Director of the CIA Robert Gates and Harvard professor Ernest May conceived of an "Intelligence and Policy" training seminar, to be hosted at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. This program had two elements. First, Kennedy School students would develop case studies examining the historical impact of intelligence on policy; from 1987 to 1999, they produced eighteen such studies, which have been used in a range of training exercises ever since.[80] Second, Harvard would run an executive training program for the CIA. This would be open to the entire intelligence community, but would mostly bring in senior analysts from the DI. According to Philip Zelikow, who co-directed the program with May, CIA analysts needed such training because they knew next to nothing about the policymaking process. In return for administering the program, the CIA paid May and Zelikow several hundred thousand dollars annually until the program's termination in 2003.[81] Meanwhile, the NSA has close training relationships with MIT's Sloan Business School and Harvard University. For example, Harvard hosts one-year, three-month, and two-week programs in which half a dozen NSA professionals can pick a topic in the field of communications technology and study it in depth.[82]

Although contacts between operations officers and academics have been limited, occasional interactions have been focused on training. One former case officer from the DO

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[79] Joe Hayes, Telephone Interview, February 12, 2010.
[80] Salvetti, "Teaching Intelligence: Working Together to Build a Discipline," 24.
[81] Philip Zelikow, Personal Interview, February 16, 2010.
[82] Devine, interview.

recalls that, prior to an overseas tour in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, case officers would be brought together with outside experts "so that they could talk to them about the situation in the country they were about to visit and what the [intelligence collection] requirements were." These experts included academics and other personnel not affiliated with the intelligence community.[83]



Figure 4. Mutual benefits of educational outreach

Figure 4 displays the mutual benefits when the intelligence community taps academia for educational purposes. In return for hosting specialized training seminars, a university can earn specialized funding and new students to consume its services. In addition to being exposed to new ideas, intelligence officials who go into academia also have an opportunity to build their networks.

PRELIMINARY THEORY

As this introduction makes clear, the intelligence community and academia have a rich history of working together for at least four distinct purposes. The thesis now must address an underlying problem: Cooperation can yield mutual benefits, but cooperation does

[83] Richard Bull, Telephone Interview, January 13, 2010.

not always occur. In some cases, intelligence bureaucracies do not think to reach out to academia, and academics do not always appreciate their overtures. In his seminal work on organizations, Max Weber suggests that bureaucracies create predictable and rational sets of rules to apply to general situations.[84] While bureaus certainly behave more predictably than earlier forms of administrative organizations, it is clear that they do not capture all of the benefits available from outreach, and therefore do not function as fully rational units.

Having covered the manners in which the two institutions interact, this thesis now investigates how outreach comes about and the conditions that determine its success or failure. By building a theoretical model to explain these outcomes, this thesis posits that while the purpose of outreach varies, the process is generally determined by the same five underlying factors: the internal perceptions of intelligence professionals about the usefulness of academic resources and the cost of accessing them; the external perceptions within academia about the intelligence world; the posture of a given university toward outreach; the means by which outreach expectations are hoisted upon intelligence agencies; and individual access to personal networks, intermediaries, and institutional contacts.

This thesis posits that outreach unfolds as a two-step process, first with a solicitation from an individual bureaucrat (the "initiating party"), who must secure the consent of a receiving party (the "outreach target"). The first variable to consider here is the perception of outreach at the level of the individual bureaucrat. Theorists of bureaucratic behavior distinguish between the actions of rank-and-file operators, managers, and executives.[85] Within the intelligence community, these distinctions are undoubtedly important. However, these actors behave the same way in at least one important regard: they all have scarce time

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[84] Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968/1922), 1095.
[85] James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, Inc, 1989), 27.

and want to allocate it most effectively. In making this assumption, this paper borrows from William Niskanen's public choice model, in which the individual bureaucrat "is assumed to face a set of possible actions, and to choose the action within the possible set that he most prefers. He is a 'chooser' and a 'maximizer.'"[86] To economists, bureaucrats are trying to maximize their budgets, since by doing so they will increase their salary and perks.[87] This thesis makes a slightly different assumption: The individual bureaucrat is not maximizing profit, as private sector employees do, but his own time. With rare exceptions, no intelligence analyst, manager or executive will interact with a member of academia unless he or she believes it to be a manageable, worthwhile effort (i.e., one in which the benefits, broadly construed, will outweigh the costs). The perceived utility of outreach is the variable that most directly determines a bureaucrat's solicitation of the outside world. This relationship is pictured in Figure 5.



Figure 5. First phase of outreach - solicitation

The solicitation of academia is the dependent variable in the relationship. As the utility of outreach (i.e., the independent variable) becomes more positive or more negative, the likelihood of solicitation correspondingly increases or decreases.[88]

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[86] William Niskanen, *Bureaucracy and representative government* (Chicago, IL: Aldine Atherton, 1971), 5.
[87] B. Guy Peters, *Comparing Public Bureaucracies* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1988), 120.
[88] This theoretical model follows Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 12-14.

A solicitation necessarily triggers a reaction. The next independent variable is the perception of the outreach target. How an individual student, professor, or administrator views the initiating party's legitimacy and the benefits of cooperation will predominantly shape the outcome of the solicitation (the "outreach outcome"). Academics too are rational actors: they will not respond positively if they think the costs outweigh the benefits. Figure 6 suggests that as external perceptions improve or deteriorate, so too does successful cooperation become more or less likely.



Figure 6. Second outreach phase – external response

Both the initiating party and the outreach target are behaving essentially as utility maximizers. Ideally, a positive internal perception leads to a solicitation; a positive external response yields cooperation.

To write that people act rationally in accordance with their "best interests" is of course nothing new. However, the manner in which people conceive of their best interests is not straightforward. As two scholars of public administration write, "the rationality of the administrator is limited by his unconscious habits and skills, by his values and conceptions of purpose, and by the extent of his information and knowledge."[89] That is, behavior is based on limited information and partial perspectives. Thus, the likelihood of a solicitation is based on the *perceived* utility of outreach, rather than its "objective" utility. Chapters 1 and 4 examine in depth the forces shaping perceptions on both sides.

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[89] Michael Harmon and Richard Mayer, *Organization Theory for Public Administration* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1986), 149.

The posture of a university administration, the sources of bureaucratic funding and authority, and access to personal or institutional contacts in academia are some less obvious "condition variables" regulating outreach.[90] An outreach target responds to a solicitation based not only on his perceptions of the initiating party, but also on the attitude of his employer. When a university administration is hostile toward intelligence (i.e., when this variable has a low value), then the academic will be less likely to respond positively, regardless of his personal ideology (see Figure 7). Similarly, the expectations and support of one's bosses can alter the impact of a bureaucrat's perceived utility on the likelihood of solicitation. If the right people demand outreach, they can incentivize the practice among individuals who think it worthless. Alternatively, if there is no budgetary support for outreach, even those officials who want to reach out will be less likely to do so. Finally, an intelligence bureaucrat's access to academia through interpersonal networks, third party intermediaries and institutional contacts enables many of these solicitations. Chapters 2, 3, and 5 describe these condition variables in detail.



Figure 7. Role of administrative posture on external perceptions

[90] A condition variable proportionally affects an independent variable's influence on a dependent variable. That is, a condition variable with a high value will magnify the effect of the independent variable, while a low value can suppress the independent variable. For example, in the hypothesis *sunshine causes grass to grow, but only after rainfall*, the presence of rain is a condition variable regulating the effect of sunshine, the independent variable. High rainfall magnifies the impact of sunshine on grass growth, while low rainfall mutes the sun's impact on grass growth.

Figure 8 presents a simplified theoretical conception of the two-step process of bureaucratic outreach, based on the relationship between the intelligence community and academia. The five evidentiary chapters of the thesis will examine each of these factors – the two independent variables and the three condition variables – in greater depth, in order to build a more sophisticated model.



Figure 8. Simplified summary of two-step outreach process

Part I – The Solicitation of Academia

1

PERCEIVED UTILITY OF SOLICITING ACADEMIA

Any relationship between the intelligence community and academia begins with a solicitation, whether it is for professional, analytical, developmental or educational purposes. No matter the mechanism of outreach, an intelligence professional's perception of the benefits gained from reaching out, relative to the costs, is central to his or her decision to make this solicitation. To the individual bureaucrat, the cost of outreach is a function of the internal rules and security hurdles one must jump through, the career implications of venturing into the outside world, and the time crunch under which he or she operates. Meanwhile, internal culture, the availability of specialized academic resources, and access to in-house expertise all shape a bureaucrat's sense of the benefits of outreach. To the utility-maximizing bureaucrat, outreach becomes less likely as costs go up, even if the benefits of outreach are clear. Furthermore, when the advantages of outreach seem low, the practice is not likely in the first place.

THE COSTS OF OUTREACH

The likelihood of soliciting academia is especially low among intelligence professionals who attach a high cost to the practice. At some agencies, employees have to navigate laborious internal regulations governing relationships with academics. Strict security procedures that make it a hassle to even approach academia stifle the incentive to reach out. One particular avenue of interaction – going out to civilian institutions for further training and education – is sometimes viewed as harmful to a bureaucrat's career prospects, and no bureaucrat will put his neck on the line for the sake of outreach. Finally, bureaucrats are

keenly sensitive to the time costs of reaching out, given that they want to manage their schedules effectively.

INTERNAL RULES AND SECURITY PROTOCOLS

Standard organizational theory expects that bureaucracies looking to protect their autonomy will identify and shun learned vulnerabilities. Writes James Wilson, "Every organization, like every person, learns from experience what behavior will create big problems; but compared to people, organizations have longer memories and are more risk averse. Once burned, forever shy."[91] Intelligence bureaucracies are no different in this regard. In the aftermath of embarrassing episodes with academia, agencies have designed stiff rules to regulate outreach. According to Alex Joel, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer at the ODNI, this practice traces back to the Church Committee, whose 1976 report is "something we live with still." That experience has made intelligence executives very sensitive toward how their employees approach domestic institutions.[92] The CIA in particular has propagated internal rules as means of avoiding similar incidents in the future.

Following the scandals addressed by the Katzenbach Commission and Church Committee in the late 1960s and early 1970s (see Chapter 5), the CIA disassembled its networks of on-campus talent scouts, formerly the life-blood of its recruitment effort. "No, we can't do that anymore," says former Agency official Mary O'Sullivan. Since that era, "We don't have professors spot and assess people for us."[93] In the early 1980s, there was a publicity firestorm surrounding the CIA's long-term relationship with RIT, the center of imaging science research at the university-level. When several undisclosed relationships

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[91] Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 191.
[92] Alex Joel, Telephone Interview, February 2, 2010.
[93] O'Sullivan, interview.

between the school and the Agency were revealed, the scholarly community took up arms against this so-called infiltration.[94] "From that point on," says Leo Hazlewood, former executive director of the Agency, "inside CIA you could not be doing work with an academic where you did not have a signed approval of that academic's university president in hand."[95]

The CIA stiffened its rules again following in 1986 following a public relations disaster involving Nadav Safran, a Harvard professor and expert on the Arab world. The DI's Office of Near East Affairs had commissioned Safran to do a major study on the Middle East, which he then used as the basis of a book about Saudi Arabia. However, he never disclosed the true source of his funding. Safran also organized conferences using CIA money without informing participants of its source. Paul Pillar was a line manager in the Near East office at the time. "This became a cause célèbre," he says. "As a result of that incident, rules were established by the Agency that any contractor has to certify that he or she is making known…that they are doing business with the Agency, so that we would not have a repeat of the Safran-type incident."[96] In other words, in order to work with an academic, a CIA officer needed to have a signed letter from his president and certification from the academic that he was clearing this relationship through all the necessary channels. Arthur Hulnick, the "Academic Coordinator" at the Agency in the 1980s, summarizes these rules: CIA officials could not work with any academic "without making sure all the Deans, and the President, and the Provost, and everybody else was on board."[97]

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[94] Hazlewood, interview.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Pillar, interview.
[97] Arthur Hulnick, Telephone Interview, February 6, 2010.

To some, working with academics has come to be seen as a liability – *even with* strict disclosure rules in place. Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, both Harvard professors, wrote an article in *International Security* in 1986 partially based on CIA-funded research. The two did not acknowledge the CIA's support, even though the CIA had required this in a contractual agreement.[98] The Agency took heat in the press over this episode, despite the fact that it had tried in earnest to avert such an incident. Agency executives responded by amplifying the constraints on outreach. By the early 1990s, the Agency "had pretty serious disclosure rules in place," says Hazlewood, and it fell to the executive director to ensure they were followed.[99] Senior CIA political analyst Nat White references an incident in the mid-2000s in which an academic was killed because of his ties to the Agency. "Since then, the controls have been tightened," notes White.[100] In other words, new incidents continue to prompt new layers of rules even today.

These internal rules discourage outreach. Former CIA analyst Richard Kennedy notes that during his tenure "it would've been very unusual to directly contact an academic."[101] For Kennedy's office, outreach was confined to the safety of formal conferences. Columbia professor Robert Jervis argues that these rules quash the incentive for bureaucrats to reach out. "They're shy - they're afraid they're going to get rebuffed. They're not rewarded for it, and so they don't do it," he says.[102] Observing that it is "rather difficult to jump through the hoops necessary to minimize the mistakes," Nat White argues

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[98] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 169.
[99] Hazlewood, interview.
[100] White, interview.
[101] Richard Kennedy, Telephone Interview, January 14, 2010.
[102] Quoted in Chris Mooney, "CIA, Scholar Links to Asia, Mideast Reexamined," *Boston Globe*, November 25, 2001.

that "a little bit of sclerosis" has set in at the CIA regarding outreach in recent years. Even making casual contacts is now viewed with suspicion.[103]

The economist Ludwig von Mises once pronounced stifling rules to be endemic to bureaucracies: "Nobody can be at the same time a correct bureaucrat and an innovator," he remarked. "Progress is precisely that which the rules and regulations did not foresee; it is necessarily outside the field of bureaucratic activities."[104] However, not all intelligence agencies have such strict regulations in place. NIC employees, for example, do not have to jump through comparable hoops to reach out. Each National Intelligence Officer is given a budget and has the prerogative to contact American and foreign professors alike. "I would sometimes call an academic colleague and ask questions," notes Joseph Nye, NIC chairman from 1993 to 1995. "Anybody could do that."[105] Ambassador Robert Hutchings served as NIC chairman from 2003 to 2005. He says that except in rare circumstances, "I don't think I ever reported a phone call to a professor that I knew somewhere else."[106] According to Sue Nelson, "INR analysts consult with their supervisors but do not have to obtain formal permission before reaching out to nongovernmental experts." [107] Nor does DIA have disclosure rules discouraging informal contacts.[108] In the absence of these rules, intelligence professionals have the freedom to track down leads, call new professors at will, and maintain casual relations with outside experts while incurring comparatively little hassle.

The NSA's experience presents the starkest contrast to the CIA. Most strikingly, it is still common for academics to act as talent scouts and pass along the names of their top

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[103] White, interview.
[104] Quoted in George Berkley, *The Administrative Revolution: Notes on the Passing of Organization Man* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1971), 91.
[105] Joseph Nye, Telephone Interview, February 12, 2010.
[106] Hutchings, interview.
[107] Nelson, interview.
[108] Downs, interview.

students to NSA employees. "So in a field like mathematics," says George Cotter, formerly NSA's Chief Scientist, "the Agency has had no difficulty whatsoever in picking the best of the best…Leaders in the math community would maintain open, friendly relations with professors who have guided their students in the direction which the NSA would like them to go."[109] Academics do not have to inform their administrators about these relationships in any routine way.

A current member of the CIA's history staff suggests that the situation is improving at the Agency. "IF the individual's employment agreement with the University does not prohibit such contractual work, and IF the payments are going to the individual rather than to the University," he writes, "then permission would not be sought from the University" before making contact with an academic.[110] If the CIA is indeed loosening its internal rules, it is doing so in a highly litigious manner, treading uncertainly around generations of overlapping regulations.

Even if an intelligence officer gets the right permission from academia to work with a professor, there is no guarantee that his agency will allow the contact. "I should say," observes Nat White, "having organized a bunch of these panels myself, it takes forever to do." White declares this process "a pain in the ass."[111] The hassle comes from working with the CIA's Office of Security, which has to run a name trace on any academic with whom an official wants to work. These must be done in advance, before the analyst even picks up a phone. "Because the organization that does that is understaffed, it can take a long time to do," says White. "That means you do traces on people, and then you contact them and find

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[109] Cotter, interview.
[110] Nicholas Dujmovic, "Intelligence and Academia," February 16, 2010.
[111] White, interview.

out their schedule doesn't permit this because they're busy." In effect, if White wants to have three academics come to a discussion, he must initially submit about eight names for traces. One or two might be disqualified for security purposes, another two will be busy, and another two will not be interested. "Maybe then if you're lucky you'll get your three people," says White.[112]

Because of the difficulty of dealing with security issues, the subject matter within a particular office makes a big difference to the level outreach. "Unlike other offices, the material we were working with was less secret than the material…in the Office of Political Analysis [or] in the Office of Scientific Intelligence," says James Noren, whose Office of Economic Research frequently solicited academics to review its work.[113] By contrast, officials working in heavily classified areas often find it easier to draw on intra-governmental resources than to deal with the security measures required to reach out. Greg Thielmann worked as an INR analyst specializing in military and strategic analysis. Noting that it would be time-consuming and unusual for this office to grant a clearance to someone on the outside, Thielmann observes that it was much more convenient to look within the government for additional input, since "all the intelligence agencies had employees with the appropriate clearances."[114] In other words, when classification issues make outreach regulations especially stringent, bureaucrats will look to other government agency's for help, or else not look outside their own walls at all.

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[112] Ibid.
[113] Noren, interview.
[114] Greg Thielmann, Telephone Interview, February 6, 2010.

PROSPECT OF A LOSS

When an intelligence bureaucrat sees a potential loss to his career or operational prospects by means of outreach, the perceived utility of outreach will be very low. For example, if a certain action might jeopardize a bureaucrat's personal safety or standing with Agency management, then he will be reluctant to carry it out. As mentioned in the introduction, outreach is sometimes manifest in training programs through which intelligence professionals return to academia for a fixed period, whether to refresh their knowledge of the latest developments in a field of study, update their academic contacts, or recommit themselves to scholarly pursuits. This practice is common across government agencies. Writes one scholar of personnel management, "it is now recognized that staff at all levels need periodic opportunities to refresh their intellectual background and to keep abreast of new developments."[115] However, educational interactions with academia can seem costly to both intelligence operators who are worried about promotional considerations and managers who are concerned about operational constraints.

A fear of losing life or limb helps explain why many recruiting relationships were dramatically scaled back or cut off during the Vietnam War era. After the 1968 bombing of the CIA's recruiting office at the University of Michigan, Agency executives became wary about the safety of their field officers, a fear that has periodically resurfaced. Former CIA official Paul Pillar recalls a recruiting trip to Cornell in the early 1980s in which he and a colleague ran into three different groups protesting their presence. "There was a group that stood up and disrupted our information session and tried to make a citizen's arrest of me and my partner," he recalls. "The campus police hauled them off. While that was going on,

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[115] William Thornhill, *Public Administration* (Cambridge, UK: ICSA Publishing), 103.

there was another group that had been parading around the building carrying black tulips who came in through the windows. Then there was a third group that was holding a rally outside the student union next door." Pillar notes that the pair was able to get through its scheduled interviews, "but at the end day the chief of campus police personally escorted us off campus and saw us safely on our way out of town." They did not repeat a trip to Cornell the next year.[116]

Intelligence bureaucrats can also fear getting in trouble with their bosses for inadvertently disclosing classified information. In the 1970s, "secure phones were the only way you could deal with other people and not be afraid that you were going to get caught in a security violation," says Bill Christison. But academics did not typically have secure phones. Christison continues that analysts felt more comfortable meeting with professors while at the CIA station in Germany, where he worked in the 1950s, than at CIA headquarters. He argues that as an individual moves further away from Washington and its "overwhelming bureaucracy," it becomes harder to get in trouble. As the potential costs of outreach go down, the likelihood of the practice goes up.[117] Nat White confirms that this is still true today. "When we are traveling overseas, depending on the country," he says, "we *can* have very robust conversations with local academics" due to the more fluid nature of the rules overseas.[118] Essentially, security personnel at CIA headquarters are liable to view outreach as a suspicious liability. In 2004, the Office of Security questioned a senior intelligence analyst as to why he maintained so external contacts. Unsatisfied with his answers, security personnel brought him in for a four-hour polygraph test the next day. "I didn't care," the officer later said. "But imagine if I were a GS-13. No way would I be talking

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[116] Pillar, interview.
[117] Bill Christison, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.
[118] White, interview.

to anybody again. We keep hiring people and giving them titles like director of outreach. But nobody's told the security guys."[119]

The prospect of forfeiting an established position can also be unsettling for bureaucrats. When Garret Cochran returned from a one-year fellowship at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School in 1979, his old job was no longer available to him. To the contrary, "nobody had prepared for my return…so I was on my own." Unable to find work at his previous office within the Directorate of Intelligence, Cochran had to rely on old friends to get him a position at a different directorate.[120] By not facilitating any predictability upon one's return from an educational tour, an intelligence agency can fuel the perception that going into academia - even for a year – can be to go out-of-sight and out-of-mind, and thereby kill one's career.

In addition to job stability, intelligence officers worry about their prospects for advancement if they leave the intelligence world, even for a year. "It's a very competitive process for promotion," says Winsor Whiton, former commander of the Naval Security Group, a cryptology unit with close ties to the NSA. "At the end of the day, you're competing based on your performance in the service." Furthermore, Whiton argues that the skills culled from time in academia do not necessarily bolster a bureaucrat's prospects. "It's not that they aren't helpful or useful or good skills to have, but there is less of a reward for them than you might like."[121] Thomas Peck remembers that during his tenure as chief of his directorate's Japan Desk, which supported the CIA's Tokyo Station, a human capital crisis arose. A crop of *nisei*, first generation Americans born to Japanese parents in the United

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[119] Quoted in Amy Zegart, "Universities must not ignore intelligence research," *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (Washington, DC, July 13, 2007).
[120] Cochran, interview.
[121] Winsor Whiton, Telephone Interview, February 1, 2010.

States, was retiring, "and there was nobody behind them with that kind of family experience." To mitigate this sudden shortage of fluent Japanese speakers, Peck had to farm out a number of case officers to language schools. "This worked a big hardship on many of them because they got taken out of the normal promotion stream," Peck recalls. "Everybody forgot they existed because they were off in these language schools. That was a really big problem."[122] Case officers live in dread of having their prospects sunk in this way. The same fear is present within military intelligence units. "In a lot of communities – aviators, submariners, surface sailors – there are very defined career paths," says Whiton. "And you've got to hit the wickets in that career path, or you'll fall out somewhere."[123] For bureaucrats in this situation, going into academia might seem a major cost.

Managers face their own disincentives against encouraging workers to go into academia. Former CIA officer Joe Wippl believes that intelligence professionals should go back to school not just for two and four week training courses, but for years at a time. "Because you do a lot of reading. You think a lot. You discuss a lot of issues with other academic types of people," he says. But Wippl notes that this is quite difficult in practice: "One thing that hasn't changed in thirty five years is that they're always hard up for people."[124] Whiton reiterates this point. "You never have enough good people, and if you send someone off for two or three years, you've lost the benefit of their services," he notes.[125] Even though it prides itself on reaching out through other means, not even INR cannot afford to send people away. When it comes to this form of outreach, "INR is always

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[122] Peck, interview.
[123] Whiton, interview.
[124] Joe Wippl, Telephone Interview, February 11, 2010.
[125] Whiton, interview.

starved in its relation to the other agencies," says Thielmann, because the loss of any single analyst is almost too great to bear.[126]

Only when a bureaucrat perceives the short-term costs to be outweighed by long-term benefits does outreach seem wise. Whiton tried hard to send his employees out to civilian universities based on the calculation that "you could have sent a lot of those people to institutions of higher learning for less cost [than training them in-house], and it would have the dual benefit of exposing them to a broader segment of the population, and exposing the broader population to them."[127] At the NIC, Ambassador Robert Hutchings looked very favorably on career intelligence officials who had spent time in academia, observing that "they have this other exposure which is enormously beneficial, not just for the officer in his own little world, but for the larger group with which he is associated. It enriched the NIC as a whole."[128] But such benefits are not always apparent or salient to individual bureaucrats.

The most effective advocates of educational outreach have found ways to lower its apparent costs. R. Jack Smith, who became the Deputy Director for Intelligence in the mid-1960s, joined the early CIA after working in the OSS. In 1951, Smith went to the National War College for ten months. This experience, "gave me a chance to recharge my intellectual batteries," Smith later wrote. "For five years after leaving academic life I had been in high-pressure work. I had neither leisure nor energy for systematic reading. At NWC I had both, and my extensive reading, combined with the stimulus of the lectures and the hurly-burly

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[126] Thielmann, interview.
[127] Whiton, interview.
[128] Hutchings, interview.

discussions, had stocked my mind with new perceptions and insights."[129] When he became the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Smith tried to change the rules to reduce the costs of educational outreach. Smith first revamped the selection process that identified officers fit for external training at the nearly dozen places where the Agency sent people for further education. "The difficulty I saw was that the most qualified were not always selected," says Smith, since office chiefs did not want to send away their most talented and productive people. The candidates were either those that could be spared or the "problem children." So Smith instructed office chiefs to pass on a list of subordinates expected to rise within the office. Only people on this list would be considered eligible for external appointments. Moreover, only the people on this list would be eligible for promotion to higher grades in the future. Smith further insisted that any departing officer have a higher-ranking job waiting for him upon return, guaranteed. "These new arrangements made for some very lively discussions with the office chiefs, but as a result we got better qualified representatives and CIA benefited."[130] By mitigating the potential negative implications of a given manner of outreach, agencies can make the practice more likely among individual bureaucrats.

TIME CRUNCH

Intelligence professionals have onerous burdens on their time. As Bill Christison puts it, individuals had enough to do without even thinking about academia. If an analyst "was at all interested in his job, he had vastly more than he could do just keeping up."[131] For Kathy Christison, the daily grind included writing up analysis for a range of intelligence bulletins and then reading it aloud to fellow analysts at the DIA and INR. Everyone had to

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[129] Smith, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency*, 72.
[130] Ibid., 174.
[131] Bill Christison, interview.

agree on the wording before the analysis was finalized, leading to time-consuming arguments. "Having the time to talk to some other expert," she says, "was a luxury."[132] Officials across the community cite similar concerns. "A lot of us felt pretty busy," recalls INR analyst Greg Thielmann. "We wouldn't have time very easily to sign up for a two day conference."[133] At DIA, analysts have to respond to a continuous stream of questions about Iraq and Afghanistan. "There's heavy pressure to answer the day-to-day," says DIA outreach coordinator Patricia Downs. Executing long-term open source research or building a network of outside experts "is not plausible" for analysts with competing requirements from the combatant commanders in the field, the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other policymakers at the Pentagon.[134]

Paradoxically, the time crunch under which intelligence officials operate makes some *more* likely to reach out. "What the academic community has that we don't have is time," observes Alex Joel, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer at the ODNI. Academics add value not only because they can interact with a broad range of diverse people, but also because "they have time to really think about and research an issue and carry it through in all of its permutations. And then they can bring that to bear in a well-considered piece or article that is very valuable." Joel notes that he reads these products often, whether in journals, at conferences, or on blogs. "It's not necessarily that you bring them to a particular meeting, and they'll have some blinding flash of insight" on the spot. However, academics often do "trigger thoughts for us" because they can apply a "depth of time" to a question.[135] Nat White observes that he does not have time to keep up with the literature. "I do the best I

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[132] Kathy Christison, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.
[133] Thielmann, interview.
[134] Downs, interview.
[135] Joel, interview.

can, and the best I can is not good enough. So having somebody in, or attending a talk, where a guy distills the essence of a book, or a series of books, can be very helpful."[136] From this point of view, outreach can in fact help intelligence officials mitigate their own time constraints. Nevertheless, when the benefits are unclear, the time required to reach out can seem a major cost.



Figure 9. Costs of outreach

As Figure 9 illustrates, the perceived costs of soliciting academia can be broken down into three areas. The more layers of rules and hoops an individual must jump through, the more of a hassle outreach becomes. These rules often follow after public incidents, and are implemented for rational reasons. Former CIA executive director Leo Hazlewood summarizes this tendency: CIA officials, he says "became very concerned because of the disclosures and the regulations put in place after the Church Committee. They became *absolutely* risk-averse, verging on paranoid, after the disclosures at RIT." After that, "the Agency set the barrier [for cooperation] very high, so that nobody could say, 'Oh my god, I never knew.'"[137] Meanwhile, the prospect of an outright loss – from an analyst foreseeing negative career implications to a desk chief worrying about personnel shortages – also reduces the perceived utility of soliciting academia. The constant crunch for time is the final

[136] White, interview.
[137] Hazlewood, interview.

factor affecting this perception. Working with an academic might be the last thing on the mind of a bureaucrat who is up against hard deadlines. As these costs accumulate, outreach appears more burdensome, and it becomes less likely that a utility-maximizing bureaucrat will try to interact with the outside world.

THE BENEFITS OF OUTREACH

As noted in the previous section, the shortage of an intelligence officer's time is not always a strike against outreach. For some, it is a reason *to* solicit academia. For these officials, the benefits of outreach are clear. This observations points to a larger point about bureaucratic outreach: If an official thinks soliciting the outside world will contribute something of sufficient value, he will do it in spite of the costs. The perceived benefits of outreach are informed by three factors at any given office or agency: its culture, the degree of academic specialization in its subject matter, and its access to in-house expertise.

CULTURE

Joe Hayes helped establish the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence in 1974, which endeavored to increase awareness and understanding of the intelligence world. Bringing academics into the building was easy at first, when it was an informal practice. As outreach became more regular and formal, however, Hayes began to run into resistance. "There was a lot of cultural bias within the CIA against this program," he says. "They didn't see the point of inviting people from the outside into our protected environment."[138]

Bureaucratic theory has long established that internal culture plays a significant role in the behavior of bureaucrats. In the words of bureaucracy scholar James Q. Wilson, "Bureaucracies will in time acquire a distinctive personality or culture that will shape the

[138] Hayes, interview.

attitudes of people who join these organizations."[139] These personalities are passed along through peer expectations, usually hardening over time.[140] The extent to which one's culture endorses outreach influences an individual's perception of the practice. Within a given bureaucracy, the cultural perceptions of outreach are shaped by the relative importance the organization attaches to classified information and the nature of its mission, i.e., whether it is tactical or strategic.

Agencies that lionize classified information have cultures that highly doubt the potential contributions the outside world. George Cave, a career Agency case officer, phrases it bluntly: "The Near Eastern Division didn't have an awful lot to do with academics. Usually we knew more than they did."[141] In 1963, Ray Close went to the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University as a one year, mid-career fellow. Prior to this experience, Close admits he had adopted a strong bias toward classified information. "I didn't think that anyone had any knowledge of anything unless [the information he saw] had a 'Secret' stamp on it," Close recalls. His peers, who discouraged him from going back to school, encouraged this attitude. "Some of my superiors were very scornful," Close recalls, telling him that he would "waste a year of your life and waste a lot of the government's money running around with a bunch of eggheads."[142]

As an employee in the CIA's Office of Technical Services, Thornton Anderson belonged to both the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. While his office received all of the technical literature produced by these associations, it was not very helpful. In Anderson's words, "Most of what

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[139] Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 68.
[140] Ibid., 46.
[141] George Cave, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.
[142] Ray Close, Personal Interview, November 12, 2010.

we did was beyond state of the art. It was stuff that hadn't been done before."[143] Thus, the academic literature had little to add. Meanwhile, Bill Christison adds that analysts within the DI were skeptical of open source information during much of his tenure there. "They didn't want outside papers that were wholly based on unclassified material, because the analysts believed they knew all that already," Christison notes.[144] Insulated within such cultures, individual bureaucrats were naturally skeptical of the potential benefits of outreach.

According to Ambassador Robert Hutchings, there used to be good reason to be biased in favor of classified information. When America's top priority was the East-West stand off and the bipolar world order, "there was a fairly structured set of questions that the policy community wanted answers to," Hutchings says. "They often had to do with hard security questions and hard economic questions, so it was a world in which the secrets that the intelligence community had access to were of relatively higher priority than the insights that we would glean from academics." For that reason, even the NIC was insulated during the Cold War. As NIO David Low points out, during his first tour at the NIC in the mid-1980s, there was indeed "a bit of a tendency to think that by being inside, you had what you needed."[145]

However, the usefulness of open sources transformed with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Hutchings' words, "We are now in a world in which the analysis we need is more likely to be unclassified, is more likely to be possessed by people outside the intelligence community and outside government."[146] In a classic formulation, Joe Nye points out that the real challenges of the new era are "puzzles," not secrets. Any outside expert who

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[143] Anderson, interview.
[144] Bill Christison, interview.
[145] Low, interview.
[146] Hutchings, interview.

understands the context into which a piece fits is useful. "Academics are particularly – by their background and what they do – good at filling in that context and seeing the larger picture," says Nye.[147] What the modern intelligence enterprise needs, adds two-time NIC chairman Tom Fingar, is "knowledge, genuine expertise, brought to bear to address a particular problem at a particular time," and that knowledge can come from a range of sources.[148] The point made by these NIC chairmen is the same: the intelligence community has moved from the secrets business into the information business. Since information now resides in many different locales, placing classified data on a pedestal no longer makes sense.

Though isolated individuals may break free from them, rooted cultural biases are not easy to change. When Ray Close finally came to Princeton over the objections of his office, "I found that these people were very smart people. They knew a hell of a lot about the countries that I thought I knew everything there was to know about...Even the post-grad students were cream of the crop." In retrospect, Close concludes that the Directorate of Operation's culture was pernicious. "It was very arrogant, and that has to break down," he admits. "That sense of isolation and exclusivity is a harmful trend, and it has to be recognized and somehow dealt with."[149] Like Close, the commission appointed by George W. Bush in 2005 to study the intelligence failures leading up to the Iraq War objected vigorously to this ubiquitous cultural bias. Clandestine sources, the commission pointed out, "constitute only a tiny sliver of the information available on many topics of interest to the Intelligence Community. Other sources, such as traditional media, the Internet, and individuals in academia, nongovernmental organizations, and business, offer vast intelligence

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[147] Nye, interview.
[148] Thomas Fingar, "Remarks" (Speech presented at the Analytic Transformation Symposium, Chicago, IL, September 5, 2007), www.dni.gov/speeches/20070905_speech.pdf.
[149] Close, interview.

possibilities. Regrettably, all too frequently these 'nonsecret' sources are undervalued and underused by the Intelligence Community." By drawing attention to the value of open sources, the commission was in effect trying to change internal perceptions of the value-add of academia.[150] However, such views are still far from the dominant culture within today's intelligence community. In Hutchings' words, even today the intelligence community writ large "is dealing with an old paradigm to try to address new problems."[151]

The other force shaping cultural perceptions of outreach is the nature of an agency's mission. The more an organization's work revolves around tactical issues, warfighting support, or current intelligence, the less value its employees see in academia. Paul Pillar argues that the DO's mission is simply incompatible with academic input. "If you're an analytic component whose job is to make sense of events in country X, then you've got a natural set of counterparts with regard to people in academia who are covering the same areas," argues Pillar. "But in the operational business, it's just a different mission. There's not much that people on the outside can help you with."[152] Within the DO, the perception was common that "academics were eggheads – fine for the DI, but we had very little use for academia in the DO," according to Kevin Lindsay, a recently retired case officer. "Our job is not really to think," he adds. "Our job is simply to recruit sources and write the intelligence reports...The idea of ever reaching out to academia would've been suspect."[153] Intelligence officials in this environment are thus conditioned to think that there is little to be gained from working with academia.

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[150] The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Final Report to the President* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), 390, fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf.
[151] Hutchings, interview.
[152] Pillar, interview.
[153] Kevin Lindsay, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.

Due to a similar sense of mission incompatibility, cooperation does not typically occur between academia and the service intelligence agencies located in the Department of Defense. "Academia is not set up to respond to the questions that you would want answered," says Major Mark Harlan, who does intelligence work with the Navy SEALs. For example, military intelligence executives want to know the best candidates to become tribal elders in Ghaani province Afghanistan, and they want to know in real time. "In academia, they're either doing coursework, or they're doing longer projects under a professor. If you need an answer in a month or two months or in a week, there's no way to actually interact with them that way," Harlan says. "They're doing their directed studies stuff. So there's no obligation for them – it doesn't really fit well."[154] Military intelligence officers do not scorn outreach; they simply perceive it to be someone else's job. "We are such a tactically devoted unit, that we rely on other parts of the intelligence community" to interface with academics, notes Harlan. For example, Naval Intelligence officials expect the NRO to work with academia on scientific innovations and the CIA to carry out cultural studies or more strategic political science projects.[155] By then tapping into these partners within the intelligence community, the military service agencies at most enjoy the fruits of academic input indirectly.

In times of war, agencies' missions tend to shift dramatically in the tactical direction, undermining the apparent need for outreach. After 9/11, A.B. Krongard, the CIA's executive director from 2001 to 2004, did not see much value that academics could contribute. "Everything is targeted and specific. We're trying to do a certain thing, or get a certain thing. So it's great to have somebody weigh in on the history of the differences

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[154] Mark Harlan, Telephone Interview, January 20, 2010.
[155] Ibid.

between the Persians and the Arabs and why Iran is one thing and Iraq a different thing or the makeup of Iraq – how it was created. But at the end of the day, if I'm trying to get at Saddam Hussein, it's interesting background and can be helpful, but I'd much prefer to have somebody tell me where he's going to be next Wednesday."[156] In other words, operation-centric environments downplay the potential contributions of academia.

Similarly, civilian agencies dealing with current intelligence are suspicious of the possible value added by cooperative academics. As Richard Kennedy, a career analyst of Western Europe, puts it, "a very large part of our work is very short-term in nature – looking at current developments and trying to analyze the immediate impact of things. So we had a shorter term focus than the academic world normally did."[157]In Kathy Christison's eight years working as an analyst in the Office of Middle Eastern Analysis, she had only one close contact with academics, an invitation-only meeting at the University of Pennsylvania in 1976 between two CIA analysts and about ten university professors. In general, Kathy notes, she and her fellow analysts avoided such intimate contacts with academia. "The attitude of my colleagues at the working level toward academics was rather arrogant and slightly disdainful," explains Christison. Constantly paying attention to changing conditions on the ground, the DI analysts believed they "were not only tuned in to what was going on, but tuned in on a daily basis, on a very current basis, and therefore knew more than any slow-moving academic." As she remarks tellingly, "there was no follow up" to the Pennsylvania conference.[158]

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[156] A. B. Krongard, Telephone Interview, February 11, 2010.
[157] Kennedy, interview.
[158] Kathy Christison, interview.

As R. Jack Smith writes in his memoirs, "Most CIA analysts found academic people too inadequately informed about current developments to have much impact on their judgment." Smith cites a program started in the late 1960s "to tap the knowledge and judgment of the best American scholars of Chinese affairs." The DI set up three regional conferences for three days apiece, inviting "the most prestigious scholars from the most prestigious universities on the East Coast, the Midwest, and the West Coast" to discuss China. Each conference bore the same results. "The scholars were brilliantly knowledgeable of Chinese history, culture, and social structure, but they were as innocent as babes about current conditions, be they political, economic, or military," writes Smith. "It invariably took the CIA Chinese experts at least a full day to bring the academic experts up to speed. After that, the discussions were useful but mostly corroborative rather than seminal."[159] From this perspective, even highly respected scholars often had nothing to contribute to "current" discussions of interest to the Agency.

A bias in favor of classified information and a tactical mission are two cultural elements that can compel a bureaucrat to undervalue the potential contributions of academia to his work. The fact that culture often impedes solicitation of the outside world is consistent with established theories of bureaucracies. James Wilson writes that while a strong sense of mission has positive benefits, "tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended to with the same energy and resources" as tasks that are. More fundamentally, an organization "will resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture."[160] For these reasons, not only can an insulated culture dampen the perceived

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[159] Smith, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency*, 196.
[160] Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 101.

benefits of outreach; it can make outreach impossible barring a major change in the organization's ethos.

ACADEMIC SPECIALIZATION

Agencies derive the most benefit from academic input that addresses the same questions in which they are interested. A common critique among intelligence officials is that professors' work is too esoteric to be useful. "It is sometimes difficult to get them to really focus on the intelligence issue, partly because we can't talk too clearly to academics who don't have clearances about precisely what we're interested in," says senior analyst Nat White.[161] Charles Stuart Kennedy has carried out over fifteen hundred interviews as part of the State Department's oral history project. Whenever he talks to a former employee of INR, he asks about the effectiveness of the political science output of the academic institutions. "And the answer," he says, "is basically nil. They don't read each other," largely because they are answering such different questions.[162]

Michael Doran, an NYU professor who served in the Department of Defense under President George W. Bush, suggests that academics can add great value to the intelligence craft through theoretical exposition. That is, professors do not have to talk about current missile deployments in Europe or tribal structures in Afghanistan in order to add value. As an example, Doran posits two theories of Iran – one in which the country is a defensive actor, one in which it is an offensive actor. The Middle East looks very different depending on the theory to which one subscribes. Doran suggests that intelligence analysts are inherently viewing the region through one of these two lenses, sometimes without realizing it. "People who are doing the intelligence and policy work are not aware of the bigger ideas

[161] White, interview.
[162] Charles Stuart Kennedy, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.

informing their thinking, or the big paradigm assumptions that they're making," he argues.[163] According to Doran, if the concept that analysts are simultaneously dealing with two Middle Easts "were developed intelligently on a theoretical level, it could be very helpful to framing analysis for policymakers, especially if it were combined with top-secret intelligence."[164] CIA analyst Nat White corroborates this thinking, observing that some of his most fruitful engagements have involved two academics making strong and passionate cases for radically different paradigms about how a region functions. "The tension between these points of view can be very helpful in sharpening our own thinking," he says.[165] In other words, academics provide a valuable service when they help intelligence officials understand and challenge the assumptions behind their work.

However, academics rarely provide this value in practice. The problem, according to Doran, is that "in order for academics to provide that wider context and understanding for intelligence analysts, they themselves have to be interested in the same kinds of questions…They have to be intellectually excited by the problem, and you have *very* few academics who are."[166] Like Doran, R. Jack Smith describes professors as too aloof. He writes in his memoirs that the DI did itself a disservice when it tried "to take on a disembodied voice of purest detachment and objectivity. In doing so, it often became so rarified, so academic in tone that it lost its legitimate claim to attention in Washington as the voice of CIA."[167] In Smith's phrasing, an "academic tone" – disengaged and out of focus – is anathema to the work of the intelligence community. By contrast, officials agree that

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[163] Michael Doran, Telephone Interview, February 14, 2010.
[164] Doran, interview.
[165] White, interview.
[166] Doran, interview.
[167] Smith, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency*, 10.

academics who are intently focused on topics in which the intelligence world shares an interest can make valuable contributions.

For this reason, an intelligence agency's relationships are generally strongest with universities that have specialties aligning with its own work. Mary O'Sullivan recalls bringing in the heads of foreign language departments to visit a new language training facility at CIA University and contribute ideas. O'Sullivan invited in two professors from BYU, whose foreign language department has a strong reputation for training missionaries before they go overseas, as well as administrators from the University of Kansas, which has a distinguished junior year abroad program. O'Sullivan also reached out to academics at Wharton, whose expertise in business theory informs the application of languages. The CIA took pains to impress these select scholars, treating them to a dinner at headquarters with top CIA executives.[168] This outreach was designed to solicit expert opinions in a narrow field, and occurred only because Agency officials believed it would be useful.

What is true for language schools is true for science institutes as well. "The technology and complexity of the intelligence business has reached a point where very few agencies are home-growing anything in terms of fundamental skills," says George Cotter. "We must depend a great deal on these universities to produce the skills and the manpower that we need."[169] The NRO has invested directly in at least ten different universities with desired technical specialties (see Table 2). At each school, the NRO has paid for laboratory infrastructure, secure communications lines, and expedited security clearances for the professors and graduate students who populate the lab. The communications equipment enables top-secret conversations between the scientists and the intelligence community

[168] O'Sullivan, interview.
[169] Cotter, interview.

directly from the lab. This investment gives these universities the capability to execute specialized top-secret analysis, research and development on behalf of the NRO and the intelligence community writ large.[170]

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
California Institute of Technology
University of Colorado – Boulder
Maryland State University
Rochester Institute of Technology
Virginia Tech
Penn State
New Mexico State
University of Missouri - Columbia
University of Redlands

Table 2. Universities with Secure Compartmentalized Information Facilities sponsored by NRO

The NRO is not the only intelligence agency that likes to outsource specialized responsibilities. Winsor Whiton points out that academics with expertise in obscure regions of the world provide tremendous value to the community during times of national crisis. Sometimes, it can be counterproductive to try and meet certain requirements in-house. A few years after the Vietnam War, Whiton walked into a room full of people sitting quietly at their desks. He soon found out they were all Vietnamese linguists with nothing to do. "When you get big organizations and you're trying to turn pipelines of people on and off, you've got to be really careful about how you manipulate the valve," he observes. "Because once it's in the pipe, it's there. And unlike civilian firms or outfits or even universities, putting tenure aside, if you don't have a need for someone you can't let them go." For that reason, simply drawing on the regional and cultural expertise of academics in a time of crisis

[170] Johnson, interview.

strikes Whiton as a "better and cheaper way to go" than transforming an agency's human capital reserves. "There is room in academia for a specialist on one province in Afghanistan," Whiton argues. "Two years from now there may not be any need for that in the military…. The bee will be on a different flower."[171] In short, intelligence professionals find the greatest benefit in those academics and universities with specialties that can be applied toward the intelligence community's needs, during both peacetime and wartime.

IN-HOUSE EXPERTISE

Finally, an intelligence bureaucrat's perception of the benefit of cooperation with academia depends on the depth of his office's in-house "expertise." By nature, bureaucracies tend to lean heavily on their own information. As George Washington University professor Ray Rist puts it, "governmental organizations appear more receptive to information produced internally than that which comes from external sources." In fact, agencies actively build filters designed for "keeping information from outside the organization to a minimum." According to Rist, an organization will accept outside information only when "the benefits for the receiving organization are clear."[172] These benefits are clearest within offices that, whether because of small size or unusual subject matter, cannot rely merely on internal information to accomplish their missions.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department is one of the smallest elements within the intelligence community, staffing about 160 analysts who carry out all-source analysis of global issues on behalf of the Secretary of State. Because of its small size, INR has had to focus on outreach since its inception. As a direct descendant of

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[171] Whiton, interview.
[172] Ray Rist, "The Preconditions for Learning: Lessons from the Public Sector," in *Can Governments Learn?*, ed. Frans Leeuw, Ray Rist, and Richard Sonnichsen (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994), 200.

the OSS, INR has a long history of outreach, originally through the Office of External Research. This unit was later renamed the Office of Long Range Assessments and Research, then the External Research Staff, and is today simply the Office of Outreach. The current head of this office asserts that, as a result, "outreach is in our DNA."[173] The office maintains three signature initiatives designed to directly increase analytic input from the outside world: a conference series that arranges seminars and meetings on topics of interest to policymakers; the IC Associates program**,** which the office administers concurrently with the NIC; and the Global Futures Forum, a multinational network of intelligence and national security professionals focused on transnational security issues. These individuals have organized themselves into "communities of interest" around topical areas, such as illicit trafficking, proliferation, and disruptive and emergent technologies. Each community invites in outside speakers for off-the-record engagements, and INR provides administrative support to these meetings.[174]

The reason why INR's small size demands this high degree of outreach is because its analysts are spread thin. According to Ambassador Dan Kurtzer, a former executive at INR, whereas the CIA might have an office full of North Korea analysts looking at narrow facets of the regime, INR will have a single analyst assigned to the entire country.[175] To understand a specific detail about the country, that official must look beyond the INR itself. "The sensitivity of our information antenna was more attuned to things that would come from academia or from the outside world, and less internal, government-oriented like the other big intelligence agencies," says former INR analyst Greg Thielmann. While they can also draw on the reports of Foreign Service Officers at embassies abroad, this data stream has

[173] Nelson, interview.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Dan Kurtzer, Personal Interview, February 19, 2010.

clear limits. For that reason, according to Thielmann, INR analysts are more likely to ask, "Who in the world would know about this and be able to educate me about this subject?" than their counterparts at bigger agencies with more information stockpiled internally.[176]

In a similar manner, academia can be useful to small offices within large agencies when the office's work is esoteric. Few of the officials in the CIA's Political Psychology division in the 1980s had academic backgrounds in psychology, since they were mostly regional specialists with backgrounds in international relations. "So we had a relatively active outreach program," says Mary O'Sullivan, a former division member, to compensate for this fact.[177] In the early 1990s, the CIA established an Office of Leadership Analysis to improve its understanding of general regime behavior. Because this office was brand new, there was no expertise in the Agency that could be consulted to stand up this unit. According to O'Sullivan, a founding member of the office, for this reason the office looked outside of government, sponsoring several colloquia and reaching out to professors across the United States "to help establish leadership analysis as a discipline." In the early years, about ten professors came to CIA headquarters to mediate seminars, sit on panels, or deliver lectures to classes of fifteen DI analysts at a time. The CIA paid the professors' expenses and gave them modest honoraria. Deeming their contributions helpful, this office continues to bring in outside experts to provide insights into this analytic field two decades after its creation.[178]

Figure 10 illustrates the variables that shape an intelligence professional's perception of the benefits to be had by cooperating with academia. First of all, the more weight that an office's culture attaches to open sources and the more strategic its mission, the more an

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[176] Thielmann, interview.
[177] O'Sullivan, interview.
[178] Ibid.

individual bureaucrat will perceive scholarly input as valuable. Secondly, the more access an office has to personnel in academia specializing in an area of mutual interest, the greater the benefits of outreach appear. Finally, the greater an office's need for information that cannot be located internally, whether because of small office size or esoteric mission, the more important academic contributions become. For a solicitation to occur, the summation of these perceived benefits must outweigh the perceived costs.



Figure 10. Perception of value-added

The factors shaping a bureaucrat's perception of the costs and benefits of outreach are presented in Figure 11. On the costs side, strict internal rules and security protocols generally follow after embarrassing incidents. As a result, outreach becomes less frequent. "There is no question at all that the amount of friction involved on a person-to-person basis with academics has gone way up," says Nat White, "to the point that many analysts just don't want to be bothered with it anymore."[179] Furthermore, the prospect that outreach will

[179] White, interview.

either have negative career implications or constrain the operational flexibility of a manager can be enough to impede interactions with the outside world.



Figure 11. Factors that shape an individual's perceived utility of outreach

On the other hand, bureaucrats perceive substantial benefit from connecting to highly specialized academic resources, especially if their organizations lack in-house expertise related to a particular subject. For example, at INR, a tiny agency whose size necessitates locating expertise wherever it resides and whose cultural tradition endorses outreach, solicitation of the outside world is thought to yield significant benefits. Larger agencies, on the other hand, typically look in-house first to find expertise, and so do not see the same

level of value in outreach. Meanwhile, the military service intelligence agencies consider their missions to be incompatible with academia, and do not solicit it for that reason. Before initiating outreach to academia in any form – whether outsourcing research or recruiting new professionals – intelligence bureaucrats are aware, explicitly or implicitly, of this balance of costs and benefits. If the apparent advantages do not outweigh the disadvantages to the individual bureaucrat, then the perceived utility of outreach will likely not be high enough to merit solicitation.

2

LEADERSHIP AND BUDGETS

All bureaucrats must answer to higher bosses. Case officers and analysts report to managers, who report to the agency executives. Executives then must testify before Congress to justify their programs; they must answer to the head of their parent organization (e.g., the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense); and since the intelligence reforms of 2005 they must also answer to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Furthermore, all agencies must answer to the chief of the executive, the president of the United States. From time to time, various bosses have demanded that the intelligence agencies solicit more external help and expand their relationships with academia.

It is logical to think that if an authority demands greater outreach, then the perceived benefits of outreach will increase in the eye of the individual bureaucrat, insofar as reaching out relieves this pressure. However, it is impossible to legislate culture, and few forms of leadership can compel intelligence bureaucrats to overcome the inertia or negative perceptions that prevent them from outreach. Furthermore, of pressing concern to all bureaucrats is money. In a formative work of political economy, William Niskanen argued that the driving engine of bureaucratic behavior is a desire to maximize one's discretionary budget.[180] While other scholars have pointed out the theory's oversimplifications, budgets

[180] William Niskanen, "A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government," in *The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat*, ed. André Blais and Stéphane Dion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 18.

undoubtedly feature prominently in bureaucratic decision-making.[181] The individual bureaucrat must ask himself where the money for outreach will come from. For that reason, the source of these demands matters a great deal: authorities with direct control over budget execution have more clout than those that do not. The two most important authorities to the individual bureaucrat, therefore, are the president and the head of his agency, whose interventions can lead directly to increased outreach. While ODNI or Congressional demands bring more attention and legitimacy to the practice, they rarely change outcomes. Unless the source of funding is clear, intelligence elements often stay insulated from the demands to increase outreach imposed on them by above. Put simply, when money is available, bureaucrats have more liberties to act on their positive perceptions of academia and reach out; when it is not available, even bureaucrats who want to solicit the outside world might not.

PRESIDENTIAL EXPECTATIONS

Political scientists have at times questioned the president's ability to shape bureaucratic behavior. Louise Koenig asserts that the strongest force in the way of "the president's quest for dominion of the executive branch is the giant bureaucracy itself, with its layers of specialists, its massive paper work…lumbering pace, [and] addiction to routine."[182] In a seminal work on the subject, Clinton Rossiter deems the administration of the executive bureaucracies to be "the one major area of presidential activity in which his powers are simply not equal to his responsibilities."[183] However, when the chief executive takes a strong

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[181] Colin Campbell and Donald Naulls, "The Limits of the Budget-Maximizing Theory," in *The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat*, ed. André Blais and Stéphane Dion (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 114.
[182] Quoted in Richard Waterman, Amelia Rouse, and Robert Wright, *Bureaucrats, Politics and the Environment* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004), 47.
[183] Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1960), 19.

enough interest in a certain topic, he can impose his will on any government bureaucrat, including those within the intelligence community. According to Bill Christison, a CIA office chief in the 1970s, in that era the Agency was skeptical of the value of outsourcing. This ethos did change until the late 1970s under the leadership of Jimmy Carter, who decided "to provide the various offices of the Agency with much more money than they had previously had to sign contracts with academics for external research." As the director of the Office of Research and Political Analysis in 1978, Christison all of a sudden had nearly a million dollars to spend on external research for the next year.[184] If he did not spend this money, his office's budget would be cut in the future. Christison and his colleagues were in effect being forced to start looking beyond their own walls.

A prime example showcasing the power of the chief executive involves the CIA's Office of Economic Research (OER). Across several presidents during the Cold War, the White House took a keen interest in Soviet economic capabilities. The OER was the intelligence unit primarily responsible for analyzing these issues. At the direction of the president, external boards of experts, often drawn from academia, scrutinized OER's work routinely. Starting in the 1960s, the OER had to submit its analysis to the Joint Economic Committee, which reviewed the federal government's assessments of the Soviet, Eastern European and Chinese economies. In the 1970s, the Military Economic Advisory Panel (MEAP) was established to review the OER's estimates of Soviet defense expenditures. MEAP, which drew its members heavily from academia, met twice a year for two days at a time to read OER's papers, hear reports and give advice.[185]

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[184] Bill Christison, interview.
[185] Noren, interview. For list of academics on the MEAP, see Appendix B, Table iv

Under the Reagan administration, OER's work came under even closer watch. At the president's direction, Robert Gates established an ad hoc commission to review OER's estimates. Then, longtime RAND analyst Harry Rowen headed a panel set up to critique the office's work. In the late 1980s, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board set up its own oversight board to monitor OER. "The bottom line is we had plenty of exposure to outside views, mainly because the estimates were politically charged," says James Noren, a career OER analyst.[186] As Noren and a colleague later wrote, "All in all, CIA's Soviet economic and defense-economic estimates received a continuous and careful scrutiny by outside observers after the mid-1970s. To our knowledge, no other aspects of agency analysis were accorded the same degree of independent expert review." Even though it was a burden at the time, the analysts admitted in retrospect that they had benefitted from this forced interaction with academia. "[W]e believe this exposure did much to improve the estimates," they write.[187] The demands of the chief executive must be considered an important factor in the solicitation of academia. Not only can presidential attention provide more money for specific causes like outsourcing, it can also force additional interactions onto reluctant bureaucrats.

CONGRESSIONAL EXPECTATIONS

In line with the expectations of political scientists, Congressional attempts to foster greater outreach do not have much traction in the executive. As Theodore Lowi wrote in the late 1970s, "Little in the political science literature is clearer than the analysis of Congress showing shortcomings of efforts to gain administrative accountability through legislative

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[186] Noren, interview.
[187] Noel Firth and James Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990* (College Station, TX: TAMU Press, 1998), 72.

oversight…"[188] In the early 1990s, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence proposed a radical idea: splitting the Directorate of Intelligence from the Directorate of Operations altogether. The Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992, also called the Boren-McCurdy bill, recommended creating an "Office of Intelligence Analysis" reporting directly to a new head of national intelligence. As a practical matter, most of the analysts within the DI would shift into this new office. "Such a realignment," reads the bill's explanatory statement, "is intended, in part, to provide the analytical side greater organizational independence from the clandestine service of the CIA, which has in the past prevented experts on the outside from contributing their talents or sharing their expertise with the Directorate of Intelligence."[189] In other words, this new configuration was partially meant to bolster outreach. CIA officials within both directorates have noted the merits of such a plan. Melvin Goodwin, a former analyst of Soviet affairs at the CIA, asserts that academics will never really be able to work with the Agency until operations and analysis are separated.[190] Jim Olson, a career case officer, agrees that such a split would certainly by helpful for forging relationships with the academic community. "However, I'm not sure if I would support it as a practical matter." The Washington establishment sided with Olson, and the bill went nowhere.[191]

Sometimes, even Congressional statutes that are signed into law are ignored. In 1996, Mark Lowenthal authored a provision in the Intelligence Authorization Act mandating the creation of an intelligence reserve corps, including academics, who would be "on call" to

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[188] Quoted in Waterman, Rouse, and Wright, *Bureaucrats, Politics and the Environment*, 47.
[189] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Explanatory Statement, Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992," 1992, 7, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/.
[190] Quoted in Chris Mooney, "Good Company," *American Prospect*, November 18, 2002, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=good_company.
[191] Olson, interview.

assist intelligence officials during crises.[192] This statute grew out of a recommendation contained in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's IC21 report on the potential transformation of the intelligence community in the next century, of which Lowenthal had been the staff director. Drawing on the model of the NIC, whose NIOs could "tap into noted expert resources that the IC [intelligence community] does not have internally," the report suggested that "in many cases, it can be useful for the IC to have access to noted non-IC experts from academia…because of their access to various forums and other experts who would not ordinarily avail themselves to government employees." The report noted that the "ability to bring in experts who understand local politics and players in a region is especially important during the early phase of a crisis, when the IC is often scrambling to come up to speed," and recommend that such experts be kept on a retainer and tasked only with unclassified work.[193]

President Clinton signed the bill, including Lowenthal's proviso, into law. But Rich Wilhelm, at that time the executive director for Intelligence Community Affairs, was not interested in the program. He told Lowenthal that a reserve was not necessary, nor would the intelligence community want to create one in this fashion. And so the program did not get off the ground. "There is in theory – it's still there, it's on the books – an intelligence community reserve. But nobody's ever given it flesh and bones," laments Lowenthal.[194] At the end of the day, he remarked in a later book, "the main impediment appears to be

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[192] Mark Lowenthal, Telephone Interview, February 9, 2010.
[193] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century," *Staff Study*, sec. X, http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21010.html.
[194] Lowenthal, interview.

attitudes with the intelligence community."[195] In other words, even a Congressional statute had muted impact on the likelihood of outreach.

Congress' lack of influence may seem strange, especially considering that Congress has the final say in how much money to appropriate for the intelligence community each year. However, two points bear emphasizing. First, Congress does not control the budget execution of these agencies – this is decided by the individual agencies in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget. Secondly, Congressional appropriators are generally distinct from Congressional authorizers.[196] In this case, that meant the people writing the checks were different from the ones demanding increased outreach. An intelligence agency could maintain its funding even if it upset the latter group. For these reasons, Congress cannot force outreach upon the intelligence community. However, Congress can support existing programs by appropriating funds for them specifically. Mathew Burrows used to administer the IC Associates program at the NIC. "Congress like this program a lot," he says. "It actually has a special mention in the overall budget. So there's always more than ample funds for it."[197] Thus, to have an impact on bureaucratic outreach, Congress can either appropriate line item funding or pressure agency directors to heed its advice. But rarely does it directly change the calculus of an individual bureaucrat vis-à-vis outreach.

COMMUNITY-WIDE EXPECTATIONS

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created a Director of National Intelligence, supported by a small office staff (ODNI), to replace the Director of

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[195] Mark Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 283.
[196] Allen Schick, *The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 191.
[197] Burrows, interview.

Central Intelligence as the coordinator of community activities.[198] The ODNI has repeatedly emphasized the import of outreach. Among its boosters, the rational for outreach is simple: in the 21st century, intelligence officials do not need more data – they need better ways of understanding the information surrounding them. "Piling the data higher and higher doesn't make anybody smarter; it just makes them more tired," says Thomas Fingar, who served as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Transformation. "Finding the insights, gaining the understanding, requires deep expertise. That exists across the community; it exists outside of the community. We have to have a model that will enable us to tap the expertise wherever it is," says Fingar. "We have to find ways to tap what people know wherever they are..."[199]

To communicate these expectations to the intelligence agencies themselves, the ODNI recently released Intelligence Community Directive 205 (ICD-205), which became effective on July 16, 2008. ICD-205 asserts that each intelligence agency must establish an "Analytic Outreach Coordinator, which is meant to be "a central focal point for analytic outreach…whether outreach is centralized or decentralized."[200] In addition to this central coordinator, individual analysts are now expected to "leverage outside expertise as part of their work" and frequently "seek appropriate opportunities to engage openly with outside experts, especially those with unique knowledge, experience, contacts, or nontraditional views."[201] By passing this directive, the ODNI attached a high profile to the practice of outreach.

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198 United States Congress, *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, *S.2435*, 2004.
199 Fingar, "Remarks."
200 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Intelligence Community Directive 205, Analytic Outreach," July 16, 2008, sec. D(2).
201 Ibid., D(3).

However, the impact of this directive still remains to be seen. Most agencies now do have a formal outreach coordinator, but they are not particularly powerful. Patricia Downs, the DIA outreach coordinator, has no staff. Downs' job is immense for a single person: to improve training methods in the art of outreach, advertise upcoming professional conferences and get analysts to attend, and draft agency-level outreach procedures. Downs also notes that she has a "very limited budget" to pull this off. Undoubtedly, Downs has successfully facilitated new avenues of interaction between DIA and academia, in spite of these constraints. In partnership with the DIA historians, Downs now runs a lecture series that brings in between one and three speakers a month from industry and academia. After these presentations, DIA analysts can ask questions or arrange more intimate discussions. However, because of budgetary and staffing constraints, there is not systematic follow-up with these academics. Furthermore, Downs has few authorities; she is a self-described "facilitator." For that reason, if DIA officials opt to ignore her, she does not have recourse to formally reprimand them.[202]

Mark Lowenthal does not believe that ODNI-level recommendations will have much impact. ICD-205 "is not going to do anything," he insists. "First of all, the ICDs – they're lovely and nobody cares." The trouble with the DNI staff," Lowenthal continues, "is they write these ICDs and then expect things will actually happen. Unfortunately the ICDs are totally disconnected from the rest of the process." Lowenthal's objections are grounded in the structure of the community. "Who's going to push it?" he asks. "Who's going to sit down and say to the DDI at CIA or the head of INR – 'hey, what have you done about

[202] Downs, interview.

this?' Nobody owns it."[203] Downs readily admits that progress has been slow. "In terms of actually networking with US academia, we're still kind of in our infancy stages. We're not quite there where DNI has envisioned," she says.[204]

ICD-205 strikes many as something of an unfunded mandate. "The trouble with outreach," says Lowenthal, "is that it's going to cost you money." Maintaining ongoing relationships with academia requires contracts, travel expenses, stipends, etc. These things can have significant price tags, and individual offices do not want to foot the bill. "So to make this real, you have to money behind it," Lowenthal continues, "Somebody has to eat the costs." Even after the creation of the ODNI, there is not a lot of willingness to take on these costs when budgets are being cut.[205] Because the expectations of ICD-205 draw on unidentified sources of funding, real changes have been limited.

Like Congress, the ODNI does not have real power over any agency's budget. "The DNI creates the National Intelligence Program," says Lowenthal, "but he doesn't control budget execution, he doesn't control spending." The DNI can control how much an individual agency asks for in the president's budget, but Congressional appropriators make the final say about each year's budget. According to Lowenthal, if an agency director is unhappy with his budget allocation, he will do an "end-run" around the DNI, "go up to the Hill" and ask his allies on the appropriations committee directly for money. "And they'll fix it in a heartbeat," Lowenthal says. In short, the DNI cannot force outreach because his

[203] Lowenthal, interview.
[204] Downs, interview.
[205] Lowenthal, interview.

power has proscribed bounds. "He doesn't have a hammer," insists Lowenthal. "There's no penalty for defying the DNI."[206]

Despite Lowenthal's critiques, those involved with outreach insist that ICD-205 has made their jobs easier. The director of outreach at INR asserts that ICD-205 "gave outreach or engaging with nongovernmental experts a much higher profile in the intelligence community. It gives us more legitimacy in the IC to pursue outreach activities and enhances the value of open source research." While INR had always thought outreach important, "I think other places in the community are not so inclined to reach out to the outside world," this official notes. Moreover, under the new system, INR chairs a monthly meeting of the designated outreach coordinators to share new information, best practices, and lessons learned. Thus, the ODNI reforms are at least starting to institutionalize interagency procedures to evaluate internal perceptions of the outside world and identify more effective means of outreach, something that the agencies have never done before.[207]

In addition to encouraging the individual agencies to look beyond their walls, the ODNI is also trying to improve outreach unilaterally. Jennifer Kron is the ODNI official responsible for improving the community's training in South Asian cultural and language skills. Her position, the Director of Community Affairs for the Associate DNI for Afghanistan/Pakistan, is only eight months old. Kron notes that the intelligence community has a knowledge deficit in South Asian affairs and partnering with universities might be one way to overcome it. To that end, Kron recently visited the University of Nebraska – Omaha, home of a distinguished Center for Afghanistan Studies, where she brainstormed potential partnerships with the center's director. "This is just me starting to talk to people," says Kron,

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[206] Ibid.
[207] Nelson, interview.

admitting that the process is still young.[208] Kron's efforts illustrate how long it can take to build effective partnerships with the outside world. A 2001 *Boston Globe* article indicated that this same Center for Afghanistan Studies "has longstanding ties with Washington policymakers and collaborates regularly with intelligence." "We're at war," center director Thomas Gouttierre said in the article. "I'm an American, and the American government is leading this war. If we have some knowledge or analysis that could be of advantage, we should be forthcoming."[209] The fact that the community considers itself at square one in thinking about how to utilize such a resource is demonstrative of the time required for bureaucracies to increase outreach ties. Nevertheless, the initiative shows that ODNI is seriously asserting its own prerogative to reach out.

Another avenue of outreach being explored by the ODNI is to offer universities grant money to develop more robust area studies programs, on the model of current grants funding "intelligence studies." Kron notes that the ODNI is trying to win Congressional authorization to directly fund schools with South Asia and Near East culture and language programs, much like the State Department's INR has long funded universities specializing in Russian affairs through the Title VIII program.[210] In a 2002 *Foreign Affairs* piece, Richard Betts underscores the merits of such an idea. In the aftermath of 9/11, he argues, it became clear that America's education system and intelligence system are linked. Betts asserts that "if the United States is going to have markedly better intelligence in parts of the world where few Americans have lived, studied, or understood local mores and aspirations, it is going to have to overcome a cultural disease: thinking that American primacy makes it unnecessary for American education to foster broad and deep expertise on foreign, especially non-

[208] Jennifer Kron, Telephone Interview, February 2, 2010.
[209] Quoted in Mooney, "CIA, Scholar Links to Asia, Mideast Reexamined."
[210] Kron, interview.

Western, societies…"[211] By subsidizing the development of area studies programs, the ODNI hopes to cultivate greater academic expertise in fields of special interest to the community, which intelligence officials could theoretically tap into in the future.

In these unilateral efforts, ODNI staffers are acting essentially as intelligence bureaucrats who reach out because of a high perceived utility of doing so. This solicitation fits consistently with the theoretical model presented so far. These actions are distinct from handing down outreach expectations. In that regard, the ODNI, like Congress, must try to convince the individual agencies to take ownership of its recommendations and budget extra money for them.

INTERNAL AGENCY EXPECTATIONS

Outside of the president, the most important expectations for outreach come from within an agency or office itself. If an agency director makes outreach a clear priority, then he can make a difference in his bureau's level of interaction with the outside world, although this impact will depend significantly on the amount of money made available for outreach.

The NSA's "information assurance" outreach program is an excellent example of the power of a director's expectations. General Ken Minihan was the director of the NSA in the late 1990s. "Outreach programs, in my view, are second to none at NSA," boasts Minihan. Unlike some of his peers, he perceived outreach as essential. "If you look over a long period of time, one of the strengths of the American intelligence capability has been the academic partnership," he says. General Minihan points out that intelligence is a "tough, complex and technical business." Because of the demanding nature of the craft, "you really do have to go to school in order to be an effective intelligence official." Moreover, fielding human

[211] Richard Betts, "Fixing Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (February 2002): 58-59.

resources "has to be done in academia. You can't cheat and pass by the preparatory functions of the educational piece." In other words, Minihan saw a clear benefit in constructing bridges into academia. His high perceived utility of outreach prompted him to encourage the cultivation and recruitment of academics on a large scale.[212]

One of NSA's signature outreach programs has been the information assurance accreditation initiative, started in the late 1990s. The program was born when Minihan approached Mike Jacobs, then the head of the NSA's Information Assurance directorate, and asked him to establish an academic chair in information security at a prestigious university. Jacobs responded that he did not have the budget: endowing an academic chair would cost between two and three million dollars. Minihan told him to do it anyway and pressed him on the issue for a month. To appease the director's demands, Jacobs met with the NSA's director of education and training to discuss solutions within the budget. "At that point in time," recalls Jacobs, "most of the folks that would join the organization right out of college had no background, education or experience in the topic." This presented a significant training challenge to familiarize people once they were on board. The bottom line, Jacobs realized, was that "we'd have to better engage academia, and begin to promote education in information assurance in order to prepare ourselves for the future," even if they could not afford to endow an academic chair.[213]

At that time, there were about 80 different American colleges and universities with curricula relating to information security. Some of them were advanced degree programs, but most were bachelor's degrees, certificates or concentrations, and there was no objective measure of their maturity. Jacobs and his team established standards to validate the strength

[212] Minihan, interview.
[213] Mike Jacobs, Telephone Interview, February 9, 2010.

of these programs, and then invited colleges to apply for a three-year designation as an NSA Center of Excellence in Information Security Education. If they met the criteria, the university would be awarded a certificate signed by Jacobs. In 1998, eleven colleges and universities applied. Seven met the minimum requirements and were designated Centers of Excellence (CoE). The second year yielded a similar result – fourteen universities applied, seven were certified.[214]

Although it had the support of the NSA director, this program's scope was limited due to its sparse access to funds. Not until Jacobs became more creative about financing did the program take off. At that time, Richard Clarke was President Clinton's chief adviser for cyber security and the driving force behind the national plan to protect America's digital infrastructure. With the help of Congressional sponsors, Clarke created the "Cyber Corps," a scholarship-for-service program offering money to students to study cyber security in return for future government service. Jacobs recommended to Clarke that they fuse the Corps with the Centers of Excellence program. With Clarke's consent, in subsequent legislation Congress tied the distribution of Cyber Corps funds to the NSA's accreditation. That is, only universities designated by Jacobs as proficient in information security were eligible to receive these funds. Within a year, Congress was appropriating about $35 million annually that could be used for scholarships, fellowships, curriculum development, and infrastructure development only by NSA Centers of Excellence. Suddenly, the NSA program had some money behind it, and Jacobs was able to expand it aggressively. Thirty-six universities applied for CoE accreditation in its third year, and another dozen were approved.[215]

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[214] Ibid.
[215] Ibid.

The NSA CoE program has remained linked to Cyber Corps since 2001. 106 universities and colleges across the country currently boast a designation as Information Assurance Centers of Excellence, including many of the 80 colleges with weak programs in 1998, and many that started directly in response to NSA's efforts. "It's had the stimulative effect we were looking for," says Jacobs. Between one and two thousand students have graduated from these programs, many of them making "great contributions" to the government's information security abilities, according to Jacobs. These students come in with a specialized education, "so they are able to hit the ground running with an understanding of what the problem is and how to go about fixing it," he says. "It's small compared to the need, but it's a great step." Meanwhile, the costs to NSA have stayed minimal: about three NSA staffers handle the program.[216]

At the National Intelligence Council, aggressive leadership from the chairman has also successfully expanded avenues of outreach. Ambassador Robert Hutchings notes that by the early 2000s the NIC already had an active outreach program. Nevertheless, upon arrival, Hutchings "roughly doubled those contacts, because that was one of my highest priorities." As a direct result of his guidance, the NIC "had some contacts with academics…who had never before had any involvement with the federal government, much less the intelligence community." Because the NIC is so small, the chairman was able to increase solicitations of the outside world by simply by exerting clear leadership. However, Hutchings could not push outreach as far as he would have liked. "It has been a positive evolution about opening up. But it's still much less than I think it should be."[217]

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[216] Ibid.
[217] Hutchings, interview.

Not until Mark Lowenthal had the express support of DCI George Tenet did he feel like he could make real changes in how the intelligence community conducts outreach. Following his frustrating attempts to legislate reform from Congress, Lowenthal was made the Assistant Deputy DCI for Analysis and Production in the early 2000s. In that position, Lowenthal created the Analysts Resource Catalogue (ARC). This program mandated that each year, each intelligence analyst log in to an electronic database and fill out what he was working on currently, what he had worked in the last five years, and the extent of his university degrees and language skills. "We had no idea of the skill set of our work force. We couldn't track it," explains Lowenthal. For example, if there was a crisis in the Caucasus, the DCI could not see all of the intelligence analysts who had previously worked on that region. Through the ARC, the DCI would know where expertise resided across the community. In putting together the database, Lowenthal ran into occasional resistance from various intelligence agencies, but resolved these issues by leaning on executive-level support. For example, to get reluctant NSA officials to participate in the ARC, Lowenthal had to enlist help from Mike Hayden, then the agency's director, for two years in a row.[218]

Lowenthal envisions the ARC as potentially a powerful tool for connecting to academia. He describes it as a set of concentric rings, with intelligence analysts at the core. The next circle includes intelligence retirees, scientists at the national labs, and the researchers at MITRE, the community's Federally Funded Research and Development Corporation. Once retirees were included, Lowenthal postulated, ARC could serve as the foundation of the intelligence reserve corps he had tried to create in Congress. Finally, the outermost ring could include academics, who would also be considered a part of the reserve.

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[218] Ibid.

Lowenthal envisioned that this would be easy to do. Every time an academic agreed to consult for an intelligence agency, the agency could ask for permission to put his or her name in a database along with strictly limited personal details, such as contact information, areas of expertise, publications, and languages. "So you can have a fairly simple, non-intrusive set of data for each person if they agree to be on tap," Lowenthal says. "You could expand it into academia, and I think it would be tremendous." However, the ARC did not get to this point. "You can only get so much done in three years," he laments.[219] The history of the ARC speaks to the importance not only of a director's support, but also of persistent leadership when trying to increase channels of bureaucratic interaction with academia.

OVERALL IMPORT OF BUDGETS

Budgets matter tremendously in shaping the extent to which an individual bureaucrat will solicit academia. For most agencies, the costs for outreach programs fall at the individual office level. For example, when an office hosts a conference or panel, professors' travel expenses will come out of the office budget.[220] Moreover, offices sometimes push outreach costs onto individual analysts when money is tight. One CIA analyst recalls that if one wanted to attend an academic conference he would need to apply in advance, as the office would pay for only a certain number of slots. He points out that "if you wanted to pay your own way, then you were free to do so," but this was clearly a suboptimal arrangement for individual analysts.[221] In short, outreach money usually must come from a small pie that has locked priorities. For an individual manager, there is a built-in bias against spending more of an office budget on any one set of programs unless there is either compelling pressure or

[219] Lowenthal, interview.
[220] Kennedy, interview.
[221] Tamer, interview.

more money to do so. The strongest pressure does not come from Congress or even the Director of National Intelligence, but from the leadership of individual agencies or the president himself.

The more money available, the easier it is for an individual bureaucrat to justify reaching out, and the more frequent the solicitation of academia. David Low recalls becoming the National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats in 2004. "I had a huge budget available to me when I came in…I had plenty of money that I could work with to maximize my desire to reach out." Low organized a large conference of academics every summer who helped him come to a deeper understanding of terrorism. At one conference Low brought in 30 outside experts, a tremendous solicitation for a single official.[222] On the other hand, when overall budgets are declining, even strong leadership will have a limited impact on outreach efforts. CIA officials frequently point to DCI Gates' tenure as a turning point in relations with academia. After all, Gates promised to expand the Officer-in-Residence program "as opportunities arise and as resources allow," tasked the Center for the Study of Intelligence to "strengthen its outreach program to universities," and pledged that the CIA would "support more academic conferences on issues of mutual interest."[223] However, Leo Hazlewood argues that the CIA's funds for external analysis follow macro-level budgets, not changes in leadership. They increased with the general Reagan defense build-up, decreased as George Bush drew down spending, and decreased with Clinton's continued paring of defense expenditures. Personalities did not necessarily move the needle

[222] Low, interview.
[223] Robert Gates, "CIA and Openness," February 21, 1992, http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/gates1992.html.

in either direction. "I never saw anything out of Bob Gates' efforts that I would consider concrete," Hazlewood asserts.[224]

Similarly, Peter Higgins suggests that Gates' leadership did not have a major impact on his own budgeting at the Office of Research and Development. "The budget cycle is so long," Higgins points out. "You put your budget request in about a year before you ever see a dime." For Higgins, every year his research division had to submit a budget to the head of ORD. That request needed to be cleared by the Deputy Director of Science and Technology and then by the DCI (now the DNI). Then the consolidated intelligence budget would be cleared by the Office of Management and Budget, and finally appropriated after discussions with Congress. According to Higgins, "a speech by a senior person can open up one of those bottlenecks for you." But for most individual offices working within a modest budget of $20 million or less, "rarely is our thinking influenced by a sudden policy shift or a sudden twist on things."[225] Figure 12 summarizes this lengthy budget flow.



Figure 12. Budget flow within an executive branch intelligence bureaucracy

[224] Hazlewood, interview.
[225] Higgins, interview.

One scholarly evaluation of effective bureaucratic leadership deems five traits as important to achieving results: a commitment to values, high standards of accountability, an ability to delegate responsibilities, a willingness to approach problems incrementally, and a dedication to public service.[226] Such studies miss a fundamental point about bureaucratic behavior: these qualities alone do not guarantee that an executive will influence the behavior of the individual bureaucrats beneath him. Real influence requires, above all, money and sustained attention. For example, A. B. Krongard points to the difficulty of changing security rules, which are a major impediment of outreach to foreign nationals. CIA analysts cannot solicit the input of a first generation Iranian professor who speaks fluent Farsi and whose family is still in Iran because "it makes the security people very anxious," he says. "Are there ways to deal with it?" Krongard asks rhetorically. "Yeah, but they're very cumbersome and expensive." Krongard and others wanted to reform these rules and more effectively tap foreign nationals. But such reforms would have required sustained focus and reprioritizing funds within a tight budget, not just exhortations from the leadership, so they did not occur.[227]

NSA's successful information assurance program was launched because of pressure placed on an individual manager by the bureaucracy's director. However, money was crucial to its ultimate success. Despite Minihan's leadership, without extra funding Jacobs had to improvise and scale back the director's original ambitions. Jacobs' program became successful only by creating what he calls "a critical mass of activity and money" that allowed him to expand his solicitations.[228] In a similar manner, the CIA's Office of Research and

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[226] Norma Riccucci, "Excellence in Administrative Leadership: an Examination of Six US Federal Execucrats," in *Bureaucrats and Leadership*, ed. Kevin Theakston (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 17.
[227] Krongard, interview.
[228] Jacobs, interview.

Development was able to increase outreach in the late 1980s only after it partnered with DARPA. With this new revenue stream, Peter Higgins saw his unit's budget swell from $13 million a year to $20 million a year, and this increase allowed Higgins and his team to outsource many new contracts to academia.[229] In the absence of increased budgets, individual bureaucrats must be creative in their financing of new outreach initiatives, or else they will not get off the ground.



Figure 13. Conditional impact of budgets on solicitation

Bureaucrats have lots of bosses, and they pay more heed to some than to others. When the president takes a special interest in a topic, he can unilaterally spur outreach

[229] Higgins, interview.

efforts, whether by reprogramming agency funds or establishing review panels to check analytic work. When Congress or the ODNI want to increase outreach, however, the individual agencies are less inclined to heed their advice. Outreach must become important to the individual agency heads before budget execution begins to change. However, where outreach budgets are decentralized across offices, even the priorities of the director will often not be as important as macro-level budget numbers. Figure 13 illustrates these relationships. In order to change the calculations of individual bureaucrats, the authority demanding increased outreach must have power over budget execution. Whether through creative financing or reprogrammed funds, demands for increased outreach must be accompanied by more money. If they are not, this condition variable will depress the likelihood of soliciting academia. Put another way, bureaucrats with a high perceived utility of outreach will not reach out if they lack money to do so, while bureaucrats with a low perceived utility of the practice *will* reach out if pressured by the right sources. In this way, leadership and budgets regulate the weight of perceived utility on the outreach process.

3

NETWORKS, INTERMEDIARIES, AND INSTITUTIONS

Intelligence officials are naturally guarded against the outside world. The interests of national security demand that they protect sensitive and classified information, as well as the sources and methods used to gather that information. Thus, even if an intelligence bureaucrat has a positive perception of academia and sufficient budget for outreach, soliciting the outside world can be awkward. Bureaucrats might not feel comfortable about calling an academic, or might not know whom to call in the first place. In a conversation with a stranger who lacks a clearance, intelligence professionals are afraid of drawing attention to their agency's interests, worried that a confused academic might spin the call as attempted "penetration," and terrified of inadvertently disclosing classified information. This generates a natural inertia against reaching out. A retired CIA analyst summarizes this ethos. "You have to realize that being intelligence officers, you weren't free to go running around and contacting people everywhere," he says. "You had security considerations to take into account."[230]

These inherent tensions give pause to all intelligence officials, even those who want to reach out. Interpersonal networks, third party intermediaries, and institutional contacts can play a critical role in overcoming this inertia. Thus, the stronger an intelligence professional's network or greater his access to intermediaries, the more likely he is to solicit academia, especially if he attaches a positive utility to this activity. However, reliance on

[230] Tamer, interview.

personal networks and intermediaries can result in ad hoc relationships with the academic world that fade away over time. Bureaucracies that cultivate institutional contacts within academia provide a permanent resource for their employees. By impacting the ability of the individual bureaucrat to overcome natural barriers to outreach, the access to such resources serves as another condition variable affecting the likelihood an intelligence official will solicit academia.

PERSONAL NETWORKS

Interpersonal networks can ease the outreach process by giving intelligence bureaucrats points of contact in the academy. Instead of cold calling strangers, officials with strong networks can call on their external associates to solicit information and advice. Intelligence bureaucrats can cultivate personal networks by spending time in academia itself, by working in an area (such as scientific research) that has natural overlap with academia, or by attending external conferences. But while networks in academia can be useful, they are not broadly available to intelligence professionals.

Intelligence officials with prior exposure to the outside world, especially those with teaching experience, bring strong networks to bear in their work. After sitting on the faculty of the University of Virginia, Robert Hutchings served on the National Intelligence Council three times in his career. "My first time around [in 1986], I had pretty good contacts with some academics, because I had come from outside," he recalls. Dealing primarily with Eastern and Western Europe, "I had more active contacts than most." When Ambassador Hutchings became the chairman of the NIC in 2003, he recommended that his staff expand its own horizons, demanding that his NIOs "stay networked with the thinkers and opinion

leaders in their domain."[231] Richard Cooper, an economist who began his academic career in 1963, succeeded Joe Nye as chairman of the NIC in 1995. Cooper deemed his NIOs with intelligence backgrounds to be "quite provincial" in their contacts, so he expanded the number of academics on the Council, bringing in, for example, Bill Foltz, a highly respected scholar in his field of African studies at Yale University.[232]

These networks are invaluable to the NIC's work. In 1995, Cooper instituted a fifteen-year forward look called Global Trends 2010, an effort that has been repeated every five years since. This was an attempt to forecast the status of the international environment in the future. Because the expertise for that "doesn't reside anywhere," Cooper and his staff brought in academic specialists on Russia, China and Latin America to discuss where those areas were heading and how they would use technology in the future. In putting together these conferences, Cooper reached out to people based on his own contacts and his NIOs' networks. He would call up his colleagues, inform them of the NIC's project, and ask, very simply, "Will you attend? Who else should come?"[233] "There're a lot of prior relationships that people bring and maintain, which is encouraged," notes researcher Peter Higgins.[234] "Since I had ten years before come out of academia myself, there were people whom I knew," remarks Leo Hazlewood. With regards to Agency outreach, Hazlewood says, "it was very much who knew who," and it could not be assumed that a given intelligence officer would have such a network to draw upon.[235]

In addition to consulting purposes, intelligence community members have leveraged personal networks to establish recruiting relationships. In the 1950s, Thornton Anderson ran

[231] Hutchings, interview.
[232] Richard Cooper, Telephone Interview, February 17, 2010.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Higgins, interview.
[235] Hazlewood, interview.

a research and development division at the CIA developing sophisticated photography equipment. "We were really looking for first class engineers," he recalls. "Working for the government, we could not compete with private industry. And we needed a wrinkle." To help, DCI Dulles brought in MIT graduate and close personal friend Admiral Luis deFlorez to be the Agency's first director of technical research. "Through him we were able to recruit about a dozen MIT engineers, both at the Bachelor and at the Master's level," Anderson says. "Of these MIT boys, I'd go up there once a year and interview two or three and offer a couple of them a job."[236] In other words, deFlorez's network facilitated the critical introductions needed to get this professional relationship off the ground.

Recruiting relationships are often a direct function of contacts made through time spent in academia itself. For example, Dick Drain was brought into the CIA as the deputy project director for the Bay of Pigs invasion, even though he had no knowledge of paramilitary action. He was hired because he had studied economics at Yale under Richard Bissell, the head of CIA covert action at the time.[237] Tracy Barnes, a future assistant to Bissell, was recruited to the intelligence community by his senior prefect at Groton.[238] Desmond Fitzgerald, later a deputy director of the CIA, was recruited to join the government by Paul Nitze, a classmate from Harvard and hawkish Cold Warrior.[239] In 1993, DCI Woolsey appointed his "good personal friend" Joseph Nye as chairman of the NIC.[240] Nye in turn brought on at least three fellow academics as NIOs, all known previously to him. Ezra Vogel was a leading expert on Japan and China who had started teaching at Harvard in 1967, three years after Nye. Dick Neu, brought on as the NIO for Economics,

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[236] Anderson, interview.
[237] Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 205.
[238] Weiner, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, 94.
[239] Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 50.
[240] Nye, interview.

had earned his M.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard. Finally, Enid Schoettle, Nye's NIO for Global Issues, had served on the faculty at the University of Minnesota and Swarthmore College before moving to the Ford Foundation, an organization that maintains very active connections to Harvard.[241] After Woolsey resigned in early 1995, John Deutch inherited his position as DCI, and appointed his "old friend" Richard Cooper to be the new head of the NIC.[242] Thus, contacts and friendships made in academia often play directly into the intelligence community's recruitment strategies.

Networks also depend on an office's subject matter. Offices that focus heavily on science and technology have natural overlap with professors doing related research at universities. "An S&T [science and technology] director will have a cadre of the leading scientists across the country on certain technologies that affect his agency, and they're kind of his own graybeards when it comes to the theoretics of something," says an intelligence officer at the NRO. "So if you're talking about carbon nanotubes, the head of an S&T function may have a network of five or six of the country's leading carbon nanotube research guys."[243] By contrast, at intelligence agencies with less natural overlap, the strength of networks varies greatly. At the CIA, Paul Pillar had a couple of "outward-oriented analysts" working for him who "had excellent contacts" with various professors. "They wouldn't hesitate to pick up the phone and bounce a question or idea." But this was not true across the board, depending "more on the initiative of individual analysts."[244]

Finally, intelligence officials can build their own networks by attending conferences sponsored by large scholarly organizations. From 1982 to 1991, over 1500 CIA analysts

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[241] Ibid.
[242] Cooper, interview.
[243] Johnson, interview.
[244] Pillar, interview.

overtly attended conferences sponsored by others.[245] INR sends its analysts regularly to the professional conferences hosted in the DC area. According to Sue Nelson, director of INR's outreach office, "that's a great place to see who's doing what latest research," citing the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies and the International Studies Association as popular affiliations. Joe Tamer, a career analyst in the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service, for decades the intelligence community's singular open source resource, noted that many of his colleagues joined the Middle East Studies Association – "the jewel of the Middle East academic establishment" – and the Middle East Institute. As members, they would regularly attend local talks to see academics lecturing in their areas of expertise.[246] Similarly, CIA economists were "strongly encouraged" to frequent the meetings of the American Economic Association.[247] However, most officials view conferences as a poor place to build a network, since they are supposed to be low-key at these events to avoid undue attention.[248] Moreover, even though many consider professional conferences the easiest means of staying apprised of developments in academia, these insights alone do not guarantee a bureaucrat will reach out, given the potential costs outlined in Chapter 1 and 2 and the general insularity of intelligence officials.

An overreliance on informal personal networks has drawbacks. The fundamental issue is that when an officer leaves the intelligence world, he takes his contacts with him. In some cases, personal contacts have led to sustained, office-level contacts. Sidney Gottlieb, who entered the Agency after earning a Ph.D. from Cal Tech, was the director of the chemical division of the Technical Services Staff in the 1950s. Leveraging a personal

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[245] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 164.
[246] Tamer, interview.
[247] Noren, interview.
[248] White, interview.

relationship with the man, Gottlieb contracted with Dr. Hubert Alyea, an associate professor of chemistry at Princeton University, to do classified research in the area of explosives and be available for consultation to all of the office's employees.[249] However, in most cases an individual's contacts are not incorporated into the outreach fabric of the office in a systematic manner. When operations officer George Cave was a member of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC), he met an academic at a war game simulating a crisis with Iran and tried to spark an ongoing professional relationship with the man. The contact had been a lieutenant colonel in the military assigned to the UN's peacekeeping project in southern Lebanon, and was an authority on Hezbollah, "which was of great interest to us" noted Cave. "I stayed in touch with him just for a while when I was in the CTC," but then came a new assignment. "We went our separate ways," Cave says, and the two ceased to correspond.[250] Since a single analyst had maintained this contact, the CTC lost access to the academic's input following Cave's departure.

INTERMEDIARIES

Another way for an intelligence bureaucrat to overcome inherent friction is to utilize intermediaries to make contacts on his or her behalf. These intermediaries may be private companies, other academics, centralized outreach offices, government laboratories, or non-profit organizations. Intermediaries are helpful for three reasons. First, they link intelligence professionals to pre-established networks; second, they make academics feel more at ease; and third, they hide the hand of the intelligence community and mitigate concerns about counterintelligence.

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[249] Anderson, interview.
[250] Cave, interview.

Intelligence officials have found that intermediaries with their own networks can open up outreach opportunities. As an NIO, David Low organized a conference every summer bringing together academics from a range of disciplines to discuss the issue of terrorism. Low relied heavily on a private company called Oxford Analytica. Drawing on a proprietary network of some eighteen hundred academics who write and support the writing of papers on international subjects, the company helped Low assemble regular conferences bringing together about eight experts at a time from Europe, the Middle East and Africa. "They were able to come up with people that I had never heard of," Low says, "and the quality is bar none."[251] By providing access to specialized academics and soliciting them on Low's behalf, this private intermediary both increased the benefits and reduced the costs of connecting with the outside world, raising Low's perceived utility of outreach.

Recognizing the need for such a service, other private companies and associations are lobbying for their own share of the "intermediary market." Phillip Zelikow identifies SAIC, the 45,000 Science Applications International Corporation, as a popular intermediary between the two worlds.[252] Another private firm, NSI was founded in 2007 to provide "social science solutions" to government intelligence clients. The staff is composed of academics with backgrounds in technology and quantitative analysis. When the intelligence community contracts with them to analyze a topic or build a model, this company will then tap into its own set of academic contacts to execute on the project. NSI's work is so valued that the CEO Robert Popp was invited to give a presentation about the firm at the 2007

[251] Low, interview.
[252] Zelikow, interview.

"Open Source Advantage" conference sponsored by the ODNI.[253] Similarly, the International Association for Intelligence Education was formed in June 2004 as a fee-based professional association spanning diverse disciplines. "Fostering relationships and cultivating cooperation among intelligence professionals in academia, business, and government" is one of the stated purposes of the group.[254] As the market becomes more apparent, more private associations and companies are explicitly positioning themselves as intermediaries between intelligence and the outside world.

Intelligence officials regularly look to the contacts they have already made in the outside to act as de facto intermediaries. In 1952, the CIA recruited George Abrams to travel abroad with the American student delegation to that year's Moscow Youth Festival. When Abrams returned home, his responsibilities expanded to include recruiting others who would "be responsible and representative of U.S. opinion" at future international events. Essentially deputized by the government to find other students to travel with the American delegation to youth festivals at Vienna and Helsinki, Abrams turned first to his circles at Harvard. Because he was managing editor of the *Harvard Crimson*, Abrams approached several fellow editors at the magazine. After tapping fellow graduate students, Abrams scoured undergraduate ranks for "the smartest people I could find," then either asked mutual friends to make direct introductions or sent promising leads on to the CIA.[255] Abrams and his fellow student organizers were never technically employees of the CIA, but the Agency nevertheless used them as intermediaries to bolster recruitment.

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[253] Robert Popp, "Developing Open Source Early Warning Capabilities" (Presentation presented at the DNI Open Source Advantage Conference, Ronald Reagan International Trade Building, September 11, 2007), http://www.dniopensource.org/Conference/Agenda.aspx.
[254] International Association For Intelligence Education, "About Us," http://www.iafie.org/?page=About_Us.
[255] George Abrams, Telephone Interview, January 18, 2010.

Intelligence officials also look to their existing networks to tap into colleagues for analytic input. Each NRO directorate employs a PhD scientist on staff "whose sole function in life [is] to be the science and technology expert for that directorate," says one NRO official. As he puts it, this scholar's job is "to keep the pulse between what academia knows and what the field is demanding," and tap into "his own network" where necessary.[256] For the 2020 Global Trends project, the NIC organized a spate of conferences on topics from climate change to Latin America. NIC staffers regularly outsourced this work. For example, an academic at Georgetown handled Latin American issues.[257] Deemed "the primary focal points" for various topical areas, these outsiders would draw on the other academics they knew to assemble conference participants. "In some cases, within the NIC we had enough knowledge to do it ourselves," explains Robert Hutchings. "In others, the NIO in question may not have had very robust contacts and we'd have to depend on someone else."[258] The NIC regularly uses the networks of its IC Associates for just this purpose, designating an Associate a conference organizer. In those cases, "that person would call the professors up and not the NIC directly," says NIC Counselor Mathew Burrows. For example, G. John Ikenberry, an IC Associate and Princeton professor, organizes a quarterly conference on international relations scholars on behalf of the NIC.[259] Thus, the intelligence community taps into the networks of both private firms and friendly professors to expand its access into academia.

The second benefit of intermediaries is that they put both sides at ease. For the 2020 Global Trends project, most of the meetings involving local experts were not held at the

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[256] Johnson, interview.
[257] Hutchings, interview.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Burrows, interview.

CIA headquarters, then the home of the NIC. As Ambassador Hutchings notes, "There was no need to be out there – it's sort of inconvenient to go out to Langley anyway because you have to get in." Thus, most conferences were held "at some neutral territory," including the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institute, Georgetown University, a government-owned conference facility in Arlington, the Airlie House in Warrenton, VA, and at the Wye Plantation – a meeting space maintained by the Aspin Institute – on the eastern shore of Maryland.[260] The NSA is one of the major sponsors of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), which has three major locations nationwide: Princeton, New Jersey, La Jolla, California and Buoy, Maryland. The NSA regularly passes along some of its most difficult problems to IDA, which then recruits noted academics and brings them to their facilities to work on these matters. "This was sort of a cut-out where the people didn't feel like they were working for the intelligence community, they were working for IDA," says Jim Devine. "They were scientists, and they didn't have to have clearances. So it was really terrific."[261] In other words, academics could do extensive research without feeling like they were being compromised.

Government-owned, contract-operated (GOCO) facilities, such as the constellation of national laboratories, also serve as popular intermediaries. In some cases, these GOCOs are operated directly by university personnel. For example, the Oakhurst National Laboratory has a close relationship with the University of Tennessee, and the University of California runs Los Alamos and Livermore Labs. "Those are important because they often provide a better bridge to industry than dealing directly with the university for research at the university itself," says former NSA scientist George Cotter. "These interlocking relationships

[260] Hutchings, interview.
[261] Devine, interview.

are very important to the intelligence community."[262] Scholars at Johns Hopkins' GOCO, the Applied Physics Laboratory, execute regular classified and unclassified studies on behalf of the NSA. The school also runs a human language technologies program, which takes advantage of the unclassified language, speech, and other linguistic research activities at Johns Hopkins.[263] In the late 1990s, Gary Chase, the long time director of the GOCO, was tapped by DCI Tenet to serve as the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology, demonstrating the importance of this lab to the intelligence world.[264] The NSA also has relationships with the GOCO laboratories at Livermore and Sandia. As at IDA, the intelligence community could utilize GOCOs to tap into academia "but through the cut-out of truly scientific organizations, so they [the scientists] didn't feel like they were working in the intelligence business."[265] Once again, this neutral group made the solicitation of academia more fluid by putting both sides at ease.

Intermediaries can also hide the hand of the intelligence community: Michael Doran suggests that academics may not even know they are being solicited by the intelligence world if an intermediary approaches them. During his time as a professor, Doran has been brought in for several conferences with the intelligence world. Each time, Doran was initially contacted through an intermediary. For example, Booz Allen Hamilton and RAND both invited Doran to conferences. Although he was never told explicitly what agency was sponsoring these events, he noticed immediately intelligence analysts from across the community were present. Nor was it obvious why he was invited. "How your name gets on the list is never quite clear," he says. Doran was also invited to a conference through

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[262] Cotter, interview.
[263] Ibid.
[264] CIA Press Release, "DCI Appoints New Deputy Director for Science & Technology," March 24, 1999, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1999/pr032499.html.
[265] Devine, interview.

Meridian International Center, which fashions itself as "a leading non-partisan, not-for-profit organization dedicated to strengthening international understanding… through leadership exchanges, international collaboration and cultural diplomacy."[266] Based on the faces present, Doran soon realized that the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence was running this event, which was structured as a war game broken down into small-group analytical sessions. Because the true sponsor had not been publicized, Doran was surprised by a few of the attendees, mostly "the type who were inclined to call the U.S. imperialist bastards."[267] The ability to bring in such people underscores the usefulness of these intermediaries to the intelligence community.

When intelligence bureaucrats do not have strong personal networks, they have also turned to centralized outreach offices to figure out who to call and reach out for them. Art Hulnick recalls that he made a lot of solicitations on behalf of intelligence officials when he was the CIA's "Academic Coordinator." "It's not too hard to find out who's an expert in some subject. Almost every subject seems to have some sort of academic circle, like the Latin American Studies Association," he says. And given that outreach was his job, he had no qualms reaching out to the most qualified professors he could identify.[268] However, centralized offices cost money to operate, and are not budget-proof. In the downsizing that took place in the early 1990s, the CIA dissolved Hulnick's old position. According to a CIA spokesman, the responsibility for academic outreach then migrated back to "individual

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[266] Meridian International Center, "About Us," http://www.meridian.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=31&Itemid=209.
[267] Doran, interview.
[268] Hulnick, interview.

agency components," putting increased import on the initiative and pre-existing networks of individual operators and office managers.[269]

Finally, intermediaries reduce the risks of exposing the vulnerabilities of the intelligence agency involved. Polling companies are another regular intermediary between the intelligence community and the academic world. The CIA frequently commissions polls through Bloomberg or Moody's or some other general research arm to ask, say, 100 professors specializing in the Arab-Israeli peace process a series of what-if questions: *Who is likely to replace Mahmoud Abbas? If that happens, then what do you think will happen in Gaza?* By framing these hypothetical scenarios through intermediaries, the CIA can discreetly tap into professors' specialties, notes Mark Harlan. In addition to putting aside the baggage of working with the CIA, this approach is a boon for counterintelligence. "Going through a generic firm gives the CIA a little more protection about what they're interested in."[270] The FBI has a Center of Biometric Excellence program through the University of West Virginia, which it uses as a "portal" to fund biometric researchers at Michigan State in East Lansing, San Jose University, Notre Dame University, and other colleges sponsoring biometric research.[271] Through this intermediary, the FBI can keep its interests closely guarded.

Counterintelligence concerns become even starker when foreign academics are involved. Every two years, the NSA pays the National Institute of Standards (NIST) to run a competition among universities and private companies to develop better algorithms for speech recognition programs. NSA outsources this competition because "it gives NSA and people like that an arm's length away relationship with potentially a foreign university," says

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[269] Quoted in Mooney, "CIA, Scholar Links to Asia, Mideast Reexamined."
[270] Harlan, interview.
[271] Higgins, interview.

Peter Higgins. For example, the University of Bologna in Italy and the University of Kent in the United Kingdom do a lot of research in biometrics, and might participate in this competition.[272] The use of intermediaries to manage such contests allows intelligence agencies and individuals to reach out indirectly and keep a low profile about their research interests.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTACTS

A major problem with the reliance on intermediaries is that the relationships they produce can be transient. At the end of the 2020 project, the NIC had difficulty institutionalizing the outreach it had done. According to Robert Hutchings, having gone to all the trouble and expense of making contact with over 1000 academics, the NIC was still at a loss for how to cultivate these contacts into something permanent. "And the short answer," Hutchings laments, "was it's just too labor intensive to really do." One idea was to hold follow up conferences with the same academics a year later and establish an ongoing relationship that way. However, this suggestion turned out to be too impractical. "So most of those 1000 people we didn't go back to," Hutchings concludes. To do so, he says, would require a small dedicated staff, "because keeping track of a thousand people is not easy unless you can imagine a natural sequence of conferences, meetings, and sessions that could be ongoing. So the conferences produced an interesting set of dialogues and contacts, but they didn't produce a sustained process."[273] The bottom line is that when an academic does not know that an intelligence agency is actually sponsoring a conference, or is involved only as a favor to a colleague, it will not be easy for the intelligence community to go back to him on a regular basis.

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[272] Ibid.
[273] Hutchings, interview.

When contacts are impermanent, intelligence officials must look to institutional memory – the collective recollection within an agency about which academics have been helpful in the past – for outreach guidance. However, most intelligence bureaucracies are hamstrung in this regard by an inability to keep names of Americans. "We didn't keep files or anything," recalls former executive director Leo Hazlewood. "There's a system in the Agency where when you meet some foreign person you create a file. We never did that with academics." According to Hazlewood, these rules emerged from the Church Committee era, during which time the CIA learned that the question, *Why do you have a list of Americans?* invariably turns out poorly. "So the memory was an informal sort of business, where we knew who we'd talked to, but we didn't set up records on them."[274] The DIA does not maintain lists of cooperative academics either.[275] Not even the NSA, with its strong ties to academia, keeps names. "We never did have lists," says Jim Devine. Instead, it "tried to spread the word more than have a specific John Doe who would help," casting wide nets rather than sticking to a narrow base of particular professors. "They were never on the payroll, or never listed as 'this is the guy you should call when such and such happens.'" Except for the few academics under contract, all other NSA contacts were ad hoc and remembered institutionally.[276] James Clapper, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, summarizes the ethos of all of these agencies when he says that, when it comes to outreach, "of course, there's a huge premium placed on mental databases of people."[277]

Agencies have to worry not only about the legal concerns of keeping names, but also the practical difficulties of doing so. Peter Higgins had relationships with a number of

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[274] Hazlewood, interview.
[275] Downs, interview.
[276] Devine, interview.
[277] Clapper, "Remarks."

academics while at the CIA's Office of Research and Development. While one could keep a list of their names, he says, "It's very hard to take it out of the building with you." Higgins and his colleagues began working on desktop Macintoshes for the first time in the late 1980s. These computers had removable hard drives that had to be locked up at night, even though the computers were encrypted and ran on an encrypted server. "So I could keep a list of names on that," says Higgins, "but you can imagine when I moved to my next office, it would be problematical to get that information moved there." He imagines that he would have had to burn a floppy disk with the names and ask the Office of Security to mail it to his new building. Higgins notes that the only place he could conceivably maintain a list of names of cooperative academics without any worries was "in my two-drawer safe next to my bed."[278]

CIA executives insist that they were still able to keep track of helpful contacts in this manner. If, for example, the question of tribal structure in Southeast Asia arose, "you didn't go to your handy dandy list of academics, you went to what was in people's heads," says Leo Hazlewood. As he puts it, an individual might go to his colleagues and say, "'What does anybody know about this? Who's doing work on Pashtos and other regional ethnic groups in Pakistan?' And then someone will say, 'I took this course,' and someone will say 'I read this article,'" and the process goes from there.[279] A. B. Krongard reiterates this point. "You depended upon having a work force that read a lot, who had done advanced work, who might be able to jumpstart you by saying you ought to look at this place." Krongard also asserts that the CIA was continually updating its networks through its hiring process. "You didn't have to keep lists," he says, "because you were bringing graduate students in from

[278] Higgins, interview.
[279] Hazlewood, interview.

those places." For example, graduates of the East-West Institute at the University of Hawaii could pass along the names of people doing interesting work on Japan or China.[280] In other words, individuals at the CIA rely on the informal knowledge of their colleagues to recommend potentially helpful academics as needs arise. The Agency as an institution, along with most other intelligence bureaucracies, does not try to record systematically the nature or scope of its previous relationships with academics.

Current demographics at the intelligence agencies could increase the rate of institutional memory loss in the near future. "What you have at the Agency is a barbell," explains Krongard. "There are a lot of people at the bottom end in terms of youth and experience, and a lot of people at the top end." This picture is largely a result of the deep cuts in staff during the 1990s, and the surges in spending in the 1980s and 2000s. "So you do not have a smooth continuum of age groups from early entrance to people getting out. In between you don't have much, and that's a problem."[281] DIA has a similar youth bulge. If you walk around a place like CIA or NSA, "you will be staggered by the youth of the people around the hallways," says A. Denis Clift, former president of the Joint Military Intelligence College.[282] As executives retire and take their networks with them, these contacts will probably not be remembered. Furthermore, a major shift in Agency culture could undermine the strength of future bureaucrats' networks. When Hulnick was an analyst, most of his colleagues were in the intelligence world for their entire careers. "Naturally, they had a lot of connections with people in the academic world who were researching and looking at the same things they were. But today…people don't stay for careers anymore. They come in for five or six years, and then they go somewhere else. They may not have some of the long-

[280] Krongard, interview.
[281] Ibid.
[282] A. Denis Clift, Telephone Interview, February 18, 2010.

term connections that some of the old timer analysts might have had."[283] In other words, it will be difficult to replicate or even utilize the tight contacts that retiring personnel have with academia.

In isolated instances, intelligence agencies are seeking to keep more systematic records of engagements with the outside world. On May 19, 2008, the NRO Advanced Systems and Technology Directorate launched a database called the "Technology Fellowship and Enrichment Programs and Events" system. In addition to information about NRO contractors, the database maintains tabs on invited technology conference participants "from industry and/or academia." Essentially a historical database of participants and projects featured in a particular NRO lecture series, this system is designed, "To organize and inform, record and administer organizational enrichment programs and events." To that end, the database tracks dates of seminars, event details and every speaker's biographical information, including his name, social security number, work telephone number, and email address.[284] This centralized database of academic participants in NRO's Technology Fellowship program could conceivably be expanded. If it proves successful, NRO's database could be a model for agencies looking to systematically improve institutional memory.

To date, the most successful effort to build institutional contacts has been the National Intelligence Council's IC Associates program. This is a set of about 200 outside experts, over 100 of whom are academics. Each IC Associate earns a retainer of $5000 a year. For that price, the Associate is expected to perform about three activities. For example, if an Associate goes on a foreign trip, the NIC expects him to come back and share his

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[283] Hulnick, interview.
[284] NRO Advanced System and Technology Directorate, "NRO System of Records Notice 30," May 19, 2008, http://privacy.defense.gov/notices/nro/QNRO-30.shtml.

impressions, experiences, and analyses, either in writing or in small group meetings. An Associate might be called on to write short analytic papers or to participate in daylong or half-day conferences. For activities involving extra effort, the NIC will pay a set bonus. For example, if an Associate travels to a conference on the NIC's behalf, the Council will pays his travel expenses, *per diem* costs, and usually an additional honorarium. Some Associates earn up to $20,000 a year for these services. Most of these Associates do not maintain clearances, but get temporary security waivers to do work when called upon.[285] The services of the IC Associates are directly available to all National Intelligence Officers, and are increasingly becoming available to bureaucrats across the community. The Council is proud of this initiative: "This is unique," says Mathew Burrows, current Counselor to the NIC. Indeed, no comparable program exists at any other intelligence agency.[286]

Leadership at the agency-level will be required to transition academics from being the "personal" contacts of individual bureaucrats or intermediaries to being "institutional" contacts that anyone could draw upon. "There's still a fair amount of compartmentalization going on," says Patricia Downs, DIA's outreach coordinator. To combat this, if an analyst is building a relationship with an outside expert, Downs wants him to post it to an online, DIA-wide "share point." Downs envisions that in the future, DIA analysts will post in an agency-wide forum whenever they meet with an academic and good information is produced. While Downs hopes to make this a formal requirement soon, currently most analysts keep minutes from their meetings with academics and distribute those to "whomever they know. But that may not include who *needs* to know." Downs is also encouraging analysts to document the best presentations they see at external seminars and

[285] Hutchings, interview.
[286] Burrows, interview.

conferences.[287] But these ideas are still in the planning stage, and will not go anywhere without sustained agency-level leadership and budgetary support.

Personal contacts and intermediaries make the solicitation of academia easier for an individual bureaucrat, and therefore increase his perceived utility of outreach. However, these resources do not lead to permanent contacts or ones that are broadly available to individuals across an agency. These characteristics of networks and intermediaries can help explain why some very fruitful relationships between the intelligence community and academia have phased out over time.



Figure 14. Networks, intermediaries, and institutional contacts

Figure 14 depicts how these variables fit into the overall model. The dashed lines indicate the impermanence of resources that they may not be available to all. Since transient and narrow contacts are of limited utility, the presence of permanent institutional contacts is

[287] Downs, interview.

the condition variable that most effectively increases solicitations of academia over time. The presence of these resources increases the likelihood that an individual bureaucrat with a positive perception of outreach will overcome the natural hurdles impeding the practice.

Part II: Academia's Response and Outreach Outcomes

4

PERCEIVED UTILITY OF COOPERATION

The second step in establishing any type of relationship between academia and the intelligence world is the response of the outreach target, who can either cooperate with the intelligence bureaucrat or rebuff his overtures. Once again, the individual decision-maker should be treated as a utility-maximizing agent. In responding to overtures from the academic world, pupils and professors alike weigh two primary considerations: the perceived legitimacy of the initiating party and the consequences of cooperation. If, for example, an academic perceives the intelligence community as mischievous or morally reprehensible, he will be reluctant to work with the initiating party no matter the incentives. If he is neutral toward intelligence, he will not cooperate unless there is something to gain from the interaction. And if he views intelligence in a positive light, he may still not cooperate if doing so will result in a personal hassle.

THE LEGITIMACY OF INTELLIGENCE

Academics who perceive the intelligence community as illegitimate are reluctant to work with it under almost all circumstances. While opinions of the intelligence community were widely positive in the late 1940s and 1950s, by the early 1960s, academics were beginning to question the role of secret intelligence in a free society. For example, the failure at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 stirred up early misgivings on many campuses about the competence and motives of the CIA, and this suspicion grew as the Vietnam War took

root.[288] "Social scientists, especially political scientists with expertise in the developing nations of the world," writes the scholar Loch Johnson, "proved to be the most vocal critics of the Agency during this early period and later."[289] According to Robin Winks, by this time, "academics generally wanted nothing to do with what was perceived as an unethical subgovernment."[290] Nevertheless, mistrust of the intelligence community remained muted until the late 1960s and 1970s, when it exploded with the revelations of the Katzenbach Commission and Church Committee. After these reports, a substantial number of academics began to perceive the intelligence world as fundamentally untrustworthy and suspicious, an inappropriate inhabitant of the hallowed halls of free and open inquiry. Even though this era has passed, these negative perceptions have persisted in many parts of academia.

KATZENBACH COMMISSION

Among academics, the first major strike against the intelligence community came in 1967. That year, a tiny left-wing publication called *Ramparts* magazine published an article describing how the CIA had funded select members of the National Student Association to travel to international conferences and represent the United States abroad.[291] The *Ramparts* incident was jarring to the public because it seemed so paradoxical. "The National Student Association saw itself, and was seen by the public, as a paragon of smart liberals," explains Jack Rosenthal, then the deputy to Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. "By 1967, they could hardly have declared themselves to be infatuated with the CIA," yet they worked on the Agency's behalf nonetheless. In his words, these revelations "made the Agency sound

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[288] Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 440.
[289] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 158.
[290] Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 440.
[291] Sol Stern, "A Short Account of International Student Politics & the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, Etc.," *Ramparts*, March 1967.

like an octopus, secretly infiltrating all aspects of American society and reinforcing the worst paranoid fears even of people of good will."[292]

To address the *Ramparts* fallout, President Johnson appointed a commission consisting of Katzenbach, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John Gardiner, and DCI Richard Helms.[293] The commission was under severe time constraints. "There was so much pressure to do this quickly," recalls Rosenthal, "I think we probably did our work in four or five weeks, maybe less, because the President was *so* anxious to get closure on this."[294] With regard to academia, the Commission recommended "that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations."[295] On face value, this report seemed to be a direct repudiation of the CIA's practices, designed in part to rebuild confidence in the legitimacy of the intelligence community within academia.

However, on closer inspection it seems that the commission was less interested in reform than damage control. In fact, the authors of the Katzenbach report have openly indicated that the commission's goal was not to limit the operating space of the CIA. The objective was actually to keep the well regarded Health, Education and Welfare Secretary from leaving the government. "The problem was to satisfy John Gardiner, because he had threatened resignation," recalls Nicholas Katzenbach. "He was a wonderful person, a very good person. That would've been a very unhappy result."[296] The commission leadership thought the scandal itself was overblown. In Katzenbach's words, "It wasn't as bad as

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[292] Jack Rosenthal, Telephone Interview, January 14, 2010.
[293] Richard Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency* (New York: Random House, 2003), 369.
[294] Rosenthal, interview.
[295] Quoted in Helms, *A Look Over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency*, 369.
[296] Nicholas Katzenbach, Personal Interview, November 27, 2009.

Ramparts made it out to be. They did finance some students, but they didn't tell the students what to say…So it wasn't that bad."[297] Rosenthal echoed Katzenbach's sentiment, suggesting that the "public horror…was misguided. The more you learned about, the more you realized that the Agency's response in 1952, from the time of the Helsinki Youth Conference and forward, was in fact quite a liberal thing…It was trying to compromise Communist propaganda."[298] The commission therefore endeavored to do as little damage to the CIA as possible. In Katzenbach's own words, "I didn't feel like I was meant to do a job of reviewing the CIA and telling them what to do. I thought I was trying to solve a problem for the president."[299]

For that reason, it should be little surprise that the Katzenbach Commission's recommendations, formalized neither in statute nor executive order, did not change much. Loch Johnson, a former staffer of the Church Committee who has been critical of the CIA's ties to academia, notes that the report "seem[s] to have had little effect on CIA-academic relations." Although it prompted "a mild flurry of retrenchment," Johnson writes, the report "cast but a minor shadow across the multiple entanglements that had grown up between the colleges and the world of intelligence. The shouts for reform soon subsided, leaving behind in their faint echo little substantive change…"[300] The report did its job in the short term – it was well received by Secretary Gardiner and the media, acceptable to DCI Helms, and therefore satisfactory to the president. However, revelations in the press continued to cast aspersions on the Agency, especially its alleged involvement in assassination efforts worldwide and participation in covert domestic programs. On

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[297] Ibid.
[298] Rosenthal, interview.
[299] Katzenbach, interview.
[300] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 158.

December 22, 1974, Seymour Hersh published an article in the *New York Times* entitled, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years." Hersh opened this shocking exposition by stating, "The Central Intelligence Agency, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon Administration against the antiwar movement and other dissident groups in the United States."[301] Unsatisfied with the job the Katzenbach Commission had done, Congress appointed House and Senate committees to more fully investigate the intelligence community and its proper role in society.

CHURCH COMMITTEE

The Senate committee, under the leadership of Frank Church, took a more confrontational approach than the Katzenbach Commission. "The first decision that we made" recalls Fritz Schwarz, the General Counsel of the Church Committee, "was that it should be an investigation, and that was somewhat contested. There were people who said the way to do this is to bring in a lot of wise people…and have them opine on what the problems with the intelligence community are and what the remedies ought to be." Schwarz convinced his colleagues that this would be a mistake, "because we were never going to get reform unless we proved through facts that there were a lot of things done that were harmful to the country, or illegal or improper."[302] In other words, the Church Committee was out to prove that the intelligence community had transgressed and draw attention to those errors.

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[301] Seymour Hersh, "Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years"," *New York Times*, December 22, 1974, sec. A1.
[302] Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Telephone Interview, January 13, 2010.

Bringing to bear a staff of about fifty individuals, half of whom were lawyers, the investigation began. The investigators were shrewd. In 1975, President Ford had already appointed Nelson Rockefeller to lead his own investigation of intelligence as a means to preempt the Church investigation. Burton Wides, a principal investigator for Church, co-opted Rockefeller's research. "I went to the White House, and talked the White House staff, the President's counsel's staff, into giving me the entire files of the Rockefeller Commission, which I then brought back to the Church Committee," Wides recalls. "When the CIA found out, they went batshit. That's how I started the investigation."[303]

The final report of the Church Committee included over 5500 detailed pages, covering a host of major and minor indiscretions perpetrated by the CIA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and even Army intelligence units. The Committee's work led to many substantive changes affecting the community: the creation of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance court, the creation of standing intelligence oversight committees, and the passage of guidelines by the Attorney General governing domestic intelligence. However, no rules came out of the Church Committee that directly affected the CIA's ability to work with academics. But even without statutory changes, perceptions did change, and they changed majorly for the worse. Schwarz notes that "getting the facts out" was the single most important legacy of the committee. "If the facts are known, they're a warning and they're an alert signal."[304] And indeed, many academics took this warning to heart. "For the whole country," suggests Wides, "the Church Committee, Watergate, and Vietnam, at the broadest level, marked the unraveling, in broad terms, of the trust of the

[303] Burt Wides, Telephone Interview, February 6, 2010.
[304] Schwarz, interview.

public in the federal government, especially in matters of national security."[305] Scores of Americans, especially those within the academy, would from this point forward view the intelligence community with doubt and deep suspicion. Whereas the Katzenbach commission tried to paper over the CIA's previous activities and keep the executive branch intact, the Church Committee endeavored to change Americans' fundamental perceptions of the intelligence community, and it succeeded.

OTHER DELEGITIMIZING FACTORS

The general suspicion generated during this era has survived in one form or another into the present, revived with various scandals along the way. A chorus of suspicions were aired again following the Nadav Safran incident in 1986, when it was disclosed that Safran had written a book with Agency money without disclosing the relationship. The *Boston Globe* declared at the time, "The scholar who works for a government intelligence agency ceases to be an independent spirit, a true scholar." The former *Ramparts* editor who had broken the original story about the National Student Association lamented that the Katzenbach report's "solemn declaration of principle can now be tossed onto the scrap heap of failed national purpose."[306] Into the post-Cold War era, scholars continued to frame the relationship between the CIA and academia as fundamentally suspicious. "When all of these entities and activities are added up, a complex picture emerges," Loch Johnson wrote in 1991. "The campuses become hundreds of islands joined to the CIA by a multitude of bridges, overarching, sometimes intersecting, and often shrouded in a mist of secrecy, lost from sight."[307] Before an Officer in Residence at a southern university took his billet in the early

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[305] Wides, interview.
[306] Quoted in Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 159.
[307] Ibid., 170.

2000s, he had to be interviewed by every single faculty member within his department over a two-day period. "People wanted to see if I had two arms and two legs," he confides.[308]

Even though fears of "penetration" have mostly cooled down, there are still major flash points that sour academia's perception of the intelligence community. The intelligence community, like most national security organizations, has a hard time working with foreign nationals. "I cannot remember a non-U.S. national being brought in for a seminar or presentation," observes one current CIA analyst.[309] Anytime the Agency brought in an academic, it had to vet his name through the security bureaucracy. If the academic was not an American citizen, "the Office of Security was very much opposed to it." When foreign nationals were involved, security concerns would frequently torpedo outreach.[310] Robert Hutchings admits that the NIC does not have formalized relationships with anyone outside the so-called "Commonwealth" – the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. "It would be wonderful to reach a point where the National Intelligence Council would routinely have contacts with a much larger number of people, including Chinese and Russians," says Ambassador Hutchings. "But we're not anywhere close to that point yet."[311] As *The Wall Street Journal* recently reported, the CIA will allow only American citizens to work on research that the agency funds, whether classified or unclassified. This perception of discrimination has prompted outrage among some academics. MIT and the University of California have actually refused Agency money as long as it excludes graduate students and foreign professors from funding.[312]

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[308] Former CIA Official, Telephone Interview, February 16, 2010.
[309] White, interview.
[310] Hulnick, interview.
[311] Hutchings, interview.
[312] Mooney, "Good Company."

Furthermore, the intelligence community has rankled academics by secretly hiring foreign students while they are at American universities through its Foreign Resources. Established in 1963 as the Domestic Operations Division, this office's purpose includes covertly recruiting foreign personnel, including foreign students. Though the name changed after the Church Committee, the mission remained the same: "to spot and recruit foreigners within the United States for intelligence service against their own or other countries," as Loch Johnson puts it.[313] To scholars like Johnson, it is this activity that is the most controversial element of CIA's relationship with academia. Critics have seized on this activity as inherently corrupting. "Once the CIA establishes a covert academic contact, the secret world of intelligence intrudes upon the open world of the university," claims Johnson. "The relationship may lead to operations quite alien to the traditions of free inquiry sacred to institutions of higher learning." For example, an Iranian student may not know on whose desk his term paper will land.[314] To critics, covertly recruiting students while still at school is not an appropriate activity for the intelligence community.

Proponents of the practice counter that the US needs to have spies abroad, and foreign students may become influential actors in their home countries one day. In their minds, the American campus is an ideal location to develop foreign assets, since the students are often lonely, low on cash, and receptive to critical ideas about their governments. Furthermore, for the recruiter the campus environment is far more forgiving than they will find once the students return overseas." Practitioners can also point to Executive Order 12333, the basic guide for permissible behavior. This document notes, "Contracts or arrangements with academic institutions may be undertaken only with the consent of

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[313] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 164.
[314] Ibid., 173.

appropriate officials of the institution."[315] This wording leaves the CIA the prerogative to contact or utilize *individuals*, especially foreign individuals, in whatever manner it sees fit. But whatever the justification, this practice can still causes a major stir among academics, as it did in the fall of 1990, a CIA officer asked for information about foreign students enrolled at the University of Connecticut.[316] Between discrimination against foreign nationals and their surreptitious recruitment on college campuses, academics can still find a lot to dislike about the intelligence community. When an academic perceives an intelligence official to be threatening, irresponsible, or somehow incompatible with the ideals of free scholarly exchange, then he is liable to rebuff the initiating party.

IMPROVING PERCEPTIONS

As mentioned before, perceptions vary across academia. Far from finding it immoral, some academics believe that the intelligence community would do better with more cooperation from their colleagues, to everyone's benefit. Gordon D. Baldwin, a University of Wisconsin professor of law states that, "Foreign intelligence gathering is vital to our common good." He suggests that if intelligence had been more plugged into academia in the past, "we might all have profited." "Maybe if the C.I.A. secured the service of a few university types, it wouldn't make such a bungling mess of operations," wrote another professor in the 1980s.[317] "There's no scenario where the government is *not* going to try to have intelligence," explains Social Science Research Council President Craig Calhoun. "What one would want, then, is the most open intelligence possible, with the most diverse points of

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[315] Ronald Reagan, "Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities" (White House, December 4, 1981), sec. 2.7, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12333.htm.
[316] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 174.
[317] Quoted in Ibid., 167.

view represented."[318] A few factors can impact the perception of the intelligence community's legitimacy among academics, including the occurrence of a major national security crisis, the focus of a given agency, and an organization's historical reputation.

First of all, a major crisis highlighting the need for robust intelligence agencies can alter how people think about the profession. For example, the terrorist attacks of September 2001 changed the underlying calculus of a number of academics. "Everything changed," says A. B. Krongard bluntly.[319] "That event brought a lot of people to the realization that nothing is free anymore, and you can't expect your government to deliver everything you want, need and desire without getting involved," adds Mike Jacobs, a career NSA official.[320] According to former president of the National Defense Intelligence College A. Denis Clift, on 9/11 "a lot of Americans changed their mindset about intelligence."[321] As amorphous sub-national threats have surfaced as a major concern in the 21st century, perceptions of the intelligence community's role in society have improved somewhat, even among academics.

Secondly, an organization's specialty makes a big difference to academics. Those CIA units involved in science and technology programs, for example, have generally avoided ill will. In 1999, DCI Tenet launched In-Q-It, a private, independent non-profit corporation designed to "network and develop partnerships with information technology leaders in industry and academia."[322] Gilman Louie, then the organization's CEO, described In-Q-It as "the bridge that will allow our brightest minds to work on some of our nation's toughest

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[318] Mooney, "Good Company."
[319] Krongard, interview.
[320] Jacobs, interview.
[321] Clift, interview.
[322] CIA Press Release, "In-Q-It, CIA Partner to Find Leading-Edge Technology Solutions," September 29, 1999, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-1999/pr093099.html.

problems to foster creativity."[323] Today known as In-Q-Tel, this organization continues to solicit the regular input of academics with no problems at all. Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, the chair of the engineering department at Stanford University, has served on In-Q-Tel's board and "has never felt any pushback" from her colleagues about it.[324] In fact, the president of Arizona State University is the current chairman of the corporation's board. According to A. B. Krongard, In-Q-Tel "has been a tremendous success, and we haven't had the same backlash in that area that we have had in some of the more classical areas."[325] Meanwhile, at the Office of Research and Development, Peter Higgins would occasionally call academics without contracts or clearances and ask them for help. Working at the CIA, he says, "really opened doors. You could call most places and say, 'I'm at CIA and I'd like to come visit you'" and they'd invite you out. If one was pretty overt about what he was doing, academics rarely turned you down."[326] Thus, the willingness of academics to lend their analytic skills to scientific units has remained constant, even for the CIA.

Likewise, there is less of a stigma attached to recruiting efforts carried out by the CIA's most technical offices. At that end of her career in the mid-2000s, Mary O'Sullivan worked in the office responsible for the President's Daily Brief (PDB). The PDB is perhaps the intelligence community's most important product, prepared by CIA analysts and delivered by the Director of National Intelligence to the chief executive and senior staff every morning. Each PDB is structured around the president's preferences, but all use sophisticated maps and graphs as visual aids. For that reason, a large number of graphic designers and cartographers help prepare the PDB. In fact, the PDB office has something of

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[323] Quoted in Ibid.
[324] Elisabeth Paté-Cornell, "In-Q-Tel Project," February 5, 2010.
[325] Krongard, interview.
[326] Higgins, interview.

a celebrated reputation for design. To locate the talent necessary to keep up its standards, the CIA looks to specialized corners of academia. "We had a very, very active outreach program with schools of design," says O'Sullivan. Her office made annuals trips to the Ringling School in Sarasota, FL, the Savannah School of Art and Design, and certain universities in Utah with strong programs in cartography. The Agency would pitch its program to the schools' best designers, get them clearances, and then bring them on as full-time employees with no flak from the campus community.[327] Absent the association with political intrigue that often befalls CIA offices, the graphic design program in the PDB office can market itself to academia purely on technical merits and thereby avoid controversy.

Finally, positive name recognition goes a long way toward mitigating suspicions. "INR analysts have good relationships with academics… It's relatively easy to engage with them in support of the State Department's mission," says the INR's director for outreach. "My experience has been, that when I call from the State Department to invite an academic to share his/her expertise with analysts and policymakers, the academic seems genuinely pleased to have input into the policy process."[328] A former INR analyst remarks that there was "simply not the same kind of stigma about INR that there would be about some of the other intelligence agencies. Even if an academic is dealing with a CIA analyst who is in effect a bureaucrat dealing only with information received and not doing any clandestine CIA things, it's still the CIA. So there's a little bit of some baggage that goes with those kinds of contacts."[329] Ambassador Robert Hutchings notes that for him and his colleagues, successfully connecting with academics was easy. "Unlike other parts of the intelligence community or government, a lot are familiar or have heard of the NIC. They are usually

[327] O'Sullivan, interview.
[328] Nelson, interview.
[329] Thielmann, interview.

interested in the kind of work that's done."[330] In other words, academics often do not maintain negative perceptions of the intelligence community *as a whole*, but rather of those agencies with the most egregious reputations.

The CIA has had many troubles courting academics because of the image associated with its work: cloaks and daggers, assassination attempts and licentious behavior abroad. Few talk about the thousands of CIA analysts trying to improve policymaking through a more sophisticated understanding of global affairs. Even urbane government officials have expressed a general ignorance about the distinctions among CIA's basic missions. A former Agency executive recalls meeting with Daniel Patrick Moynihan when he was the ambassador to India. After responding to some accusations about CIA stirring up trouble in the streets of Calcutta, the executive brought up some of the sophisticated methodologies employed by the Office of Economic Research. Moynihan responded in amazement, "I didn't know you fellows did work like that. You ought to tell people about that sort of thing."[331] As the Agency official put it, "Here was this Harvard scholar and oft-time presidential appointee who had never discovered that CIA was not merely a spy organization and who thought our only game was skullduggery."[332]

Recognizing the importance of name recognition, some have tried to improve the image of the CIA by targeting the clandestine and covert action side of the house. As mentioned earlier, the 1992 Boren-McCurdy bill tried to disassociate the Directorate of Intelligence from the Directorate of Operations, with the explicit intent of improving the CIA analysts' legitimacy with academics. As the bill's explanation put it, the clandestine

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[330] Burrows, interview.
[331] Quoted in Smith, *The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency*, 11.
[332] Ibid.

service of the CIA, "has in the past prevented experts on the outside from contributing their talents or sharing their expertise with the Directorate of Intelligence."[333] Nicholas Katzenbach insists that even in the 1970s the analytic side was "extremely responsible." According to Katzenbach, "The intelligence side of it really did a very careful job of trying to weigh all kinds of information to come to a consensus as to what was going on and what was possible in various countries. I thought they did a very, very good job." However, it was the "dirty tricks" component of the Agency – not well supervised, more prone to highly public humiliations – that delegitimized the analysts among scholars.[334] In a 1973 *Foreign Affairs* article, Katzenbach recommended that the covert side of the CIA be disbanded altogether. "We should abandon publicly all covert operations designed to influence political results in foreign countries," he wrote. "We should confine our covert activities overseas to the gathering of intelligence information."[335] Such a drastic reform, Katzenbach mused, might undo the flagging public opinion of the intelligence world, though even his proposal would keep CIA analysts under the same umbrella as case officers routinely breaking laws to gather information.

However, major reforms have usually had little traction in Washington, in part because bureaucracies are intensely protective of existing turf. Recognizing this, some intelligence professionals have instead tried to simply increase the information about the Agency available to the public. For example, the CIA won respect among economists in the 1970s by releasing declassified estimates of economies behind the Iron Curtain.[336] Likewise,

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[333] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Explanatory Statement, Intelligence Reorganization Act of 1992."
[334] Katzenbach, interview.
[335] Nicholas Katzenbach, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Secrecy," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1973): 7, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/24452/nicholas-de-b-katzenbach/foreign-policy-public-opinion-and-secrecy?page=7.
[336] Harold Shapiro, Personal Interview, December 7, 2009.

the Foreign Broadcast Information System had a regular academic audience for its unclassified reports analyzing global trends.[337] In the 1990s, the Agency earned accolades from environmental scholars through its MEDEA project, which for over a decade has declassified satellite imagery and sensor data that may be useful to scientists studying climate change.[338] However, it is hard to overturn a tradition of opacity. "Secrecy," points out a scholar of bureaucracies, "only becomes endemic because there are powerful reasons for hiding things from people on a continuing basis…"[339] For the CIA, those reasons include statutory obligations to protect national secrets and the sources and methods used to obtain them. For that reason, these confidence-building overtures have been irregular and unpopular within the intelligence world. The Reagan administration compelled the Agency to stop releasing the FBIS reports and economic data,[340] while the Bush administration shut down MEDEA for eight years.[341] The more powerful the reasoning behind secrecy appears to a government official, the harder it is to break down these barriers in a sustained manner.

In the 1990s, the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence emphasized intelligence studies as a means of improving the CIA's reputation and legitimacy among academics. CSI head Lloyd Salvetti argued before an audience of university professors that "the way to close the gap between intelligence professionals and the citizens they work for is to promote the serious academic study of, and research into, the intelligence profession."[342] However, Salvetti's ambitions have not been realized, and there remains a serious lack of public understanding about the CIA. As Amy Zegart, an associate professor of public affairs at

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[337] Tamer, interview.
[338] Herd, interview.
[339] David Beetham, *Bureaucracy*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 97.
[340] Tamer, interview.
[341] William Broad, "C.I.A. Revives Data-Sharing Program With Environmental Scientists," *New York Times*, January 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/science/earth/05satellite.html.
[342] Salvetti, "Teaching Intelligence: Working Together to Build a Discipline."

UCLA, puts it, "At a time when intelligence agencies have never been more important, universities are teaching and studying just about everything else." Zegart records that of the 750 articles published by the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics between 2001 and 2006, only one was about intelligence. Zegart suggests that this dynamic may be intractable: the benefits of studying intelligence are low and the costs are high. Scholars earn tenure and reputation "by contributing to raging theoretical debates in cloistered fields, not addressing practical matters of broad public concern." At the same time, the available data in this field is incomplete and difficult to come by, as it is scattered across a range of secretive agencies with a penchant for classifying everything.[343] In the absence of increased CIA transparency or sustained scholarship, wide swaths of academia do not give the Agency the benefit of the doubt, and continue to view it with suspicion.

In summary, the first thing that an academic considers when responding to a solicitation from the intelligence world is the legitimacy of the initiating party. Simply put, if a professor suspects the official of foul play, disapproves of his agency, or deems his interaction with a university as fundamentally inappropriate, then he will not cooperate. For that reason, a reputation of illegitimate behavior can become a major source of outreach friction for an intelligence agency's employees.

CONSEQUENCES OF COOPERATION

Even if an academic harbors positive views of an intelligence agency, he will not necessarily respond positively to its outreach efforts. Just as intelligence bureaucrats must weigh the benefits of outreach against the costs in deciding to solicit the outside world, so

[343] Zegart, "Universities must not ignore intelligence research."

too must academics consider the consequences of their cooperation. If an academic believes that cooperation will hassle his personal or professional life, the perceived utility of cooperation decreases. If, on the other hand, an academic sees concrete benefits to cooperation, the perceived utility increases. These benefits often come in the form of money or increased access to privileged "insider information. When an individual academic thinks that the initiating party has sufficient legitimacy and that he will derive a net benefit from cooperation, then it is in his best interest to consent to a relationship.

COSTS

Members of academia can incur personal and professional costs for working with the intelligence community. Many worry about the reactions of foreign countries if these relationships are revealed. Cooperative professors and students also risk retribution among their peers. For many academics, getting a security clearance is a time-consuming hassle that then limits their cherished freedom to publish. If these costs are too high, even academics with a neutral or positive perception of the initiating party may still turn down a solicitation.

A recurring fear among academics is that cooperation with intelligence will undermine their research opportunities abroad. Houchang Chehabi, an international relations professor at BU, insists he would never work with the CIA. "It would reflect very badly on me if I cooperated with an agency that has a very bad reputation in the Third World," he said. Chehabi, an Iranian citizen, said that were he to help the Agency, he would "never be able to do research in Iran any more."[344] As Robert Hutchings puts it, "For some it would be awkward to travel to China if it were known that they had an ongoing relationship with the NIC, even though it's a pretty innocent relationship. It would just make

[344] Quoted in Mooney, "CIA, Scholar Links to Asia, Mideast Reexamined."

it awkward."[345] Academics concerned about their credibility abroad might very well turn down potential interactions with the intelligence world on that basis alone.

Cooperation can also trigger social costs among one's peers. Loch Johnson, for example, casts aspersions on any professor who does intelligence work abroad, noting that "the possibility exists that the behavior of an individual member of the academy might discredit the entire community of scholars if, for example, a professor were apprehended overseas on an espionage assignment." Because of this fear, Johnson insists that rules be established "to protect the reputation, and the opportunity for safe travel abroad, of the thousands of American scholars who are precisely what they proclaim themselves to be: free and independent minds in search of truth."[346] The atmosphere at some institutions has been downright hostile to intelligence collaborators: "There was absolutely no Agency contact at the University of California-Santa Cruz…It was almost a threatening kind of environment for anybody interested in this line of work," remembers Kevin Lindsay. "As far as being a professor actually cooperating or having contracts with the Agency in the 70s, at least at UC-Santa Cruz, it would've been unthinkable. You would've been persecuted."[347] In 1976, Cornell professor Myron Rush joined the CIA for one year as a scholar-in-residence. Rush's appointment mobilized protest among Cornell's graduate students. They charged in a resolution that faculty interchange with the CIA "undermines the trust necessary for the survival of the academic community and basic academic freedoms."[348] Thus, social costs can be high for a scholar consulting for an intelligence agency or joining it outright.

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[345] Hutchings, interview.
[346] Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 181.
[347] Lindsay, interview.
[348] Quoted in Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 167.

A third cost relates to academics' freedom to publish. In the early 1980s, this became a big issue at the NSA. At that time, a number of academics became interested in how to encrypt systems, protect them, and identify their vulnerabilities. Three MIT professors – Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adelman – developed their own encryption scheme, entitled RSA after themselves. Whitfield Diffie at the University of Toronto and Marty Helman at Stanford were also working on encryption programs. They all wrote books on the topic "that were extremely damaging," says NSA official Jim Devine, as they highlighted those weaknesses that NSA was then exploiting. Devine was director of policy at the NSA at the time, so he invited all of these academics to Fort Meade and tried to explain why their publications were damaging to the national interest. Only Helman allowed Devine to edit his book, though the changes were not major: "Just a few sentences here and there made a big difference," says Devine. Meanwhile, the RSA trio was insulted by the idea of NSA censorship. If cooperation meant ceding the freedom to publish, these scholars were not interested. For the next five years, the NSA continued to face "a fairly challenging and contentious set of authors who were reluctant to take out sensitive material," according to Devine. However, the NSA did not have any legal recourse to stop them.[349]

Where academics have contractual relationships with intelligence agencies, the impositions on publication rights can become onerous. For example, the restrictions governing publication rights have become stricter at CIA in recent years. DCI Porter Goss led a push in the mid-2000s to "get tough" with intelligence contractors' freedom to write about their work, according to former CIA official Paul Pillar. This has proven most controversial among academics. "I know at least one highly respected academic who has

[349] Devine, interview.

done some wonderful consulting with the Agency," says Pillar. "Because it became a semi-regular thing, he had to sign a contract that caused heartburn for him with regard to possible publication review requirements." Pillar, now an academic at Georgetown, notes that these rules are a big reason why he no longer consults for his former employer.[350] Explain Alex Joel, the Civil Liberties Protection Officer at ODNI, "What we have found is that people in the academic community like to be uncleared. The problem with the security clearance," Joel continues, "is that you get access to all this information, but now you have to go through pre-publication review. It inhibits your ability to talk freely about something that you previously were able to speculate about."[351] Thus, many academics perceive the cost of giving up unfettered publication rights to be greater than the benefits of cooperation.

Acquiring a security clearance is also a time-intensive process. New hires out of academia would often drop out of the process because of the arduous waiting period. "Oddly enough, even though it became difficult to get on campus, we never had a shortage of applicants in my day," recalls Jim Glerum. "There were always people who applied. The single biggest problem was not access to applicants. The single biggest problem was the length and difficulty of the clearance process."[352] The Agency's former executive director reiterates this point. "The process was horrible," said A. B. Krongard. "The Agency was like in the 18th century," he says, and its byzantine processes did not suit the 21st century job market. "Jobs today are much more fluid," he points out. "So the Agency might call you up and say that everything had checked out, and you'd say, 'I haven't heard from you guys in over a year. I've already had two jobs.'"[353] Kathy Christison asserts that because the process

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[350] Pillar, interview.
[351] Joel, interview.
[352] Glerum, interview.
[353] Krongard, interview.

of granting clearances to academics took so long and "was such a big amount of trouble, a lot of academics didn't even want to be bothered."[354] Similarly, the internal disclosure rules created by intelligence agencies sometimes discourage cooperation, not because academics harbor suspicions against intelligence but because they do not want to deal with this nuisance. "What is the effect for any individual academic of having to go to the president of the university and get a 'mother-may-I' letter to enter into a relationship with the CIA?" Leo Hazlewood asks rhetorically. For some, the answer is to not get involved in the first place.[355]

Prescient intelligence officials have sought to minimize these costs as much as possible. The NIC, for instance, does not publicly disclose the members of its IC Associates program, recognizing that some academics "would just as soon keep it quiet. It's not for national security reasons – it's for privacy reasons."[356] To combat the negative perceptions of getting a security clearance, the NIC has streamlined a one-day "temporary waiver" process. In other words, an academic with no prior relationship to government can easily be granted a special one-day clearance to review and comment on draft estimates classified at the "Secret" level.[357]

When publication review issues arose during Robert Hutchings' tenure as chairman of the NIC, he always sided with the professors. If one interfered with an academic's ability to publish, Hutchings points out, that professor would find other ways to spend his time. "So I don't think we imposed any restrictions on their publishing, nor should we."[358] Publication review is rarely an issue for professors working with INR either. When the State Department contracts with an outside expert for a report, "that report remained the

[354] Kathy Christison, interview.
[355] Hazlewood, interview.
[356] Hutchings, interview.
[357] Ibid.
[358] Ibid.

property of the author," says INR's director of outreach. "The State Department could not, for example, sell the report nor did it try to control what the expert did with the analysis. Academics, for example, were free to publish the report."[359] Finally, when members of the CIA's Officers-in-Residence program were told in 2005 that they would have to submit their lecture notes for prior approval by the Agency, several officers pointed out that "not only was this not in line with the academic freedom policies of universities, but…as soon as it ended up on a campus paper's front page or in the *New York Times*, there would effectively be no OIR program, because it wouldn't have any credibility and officers would be shown the door," according to an Agency source.[360] "We went through almost the exact same thing in the mid-1980s," adds a contractor who helped design the OIR program. "Apparently, no one there remembers we've been over this ground before."[361] In short, intelligence offices have successfully maintained or strengthened their outreach programs by targeting the costs facing potential partners in academia, from the clearance process to publication rights.

BENEFITS

Successful outreach has often been premised on having something "in it" for the academics. If an academic is incurring some cost by working with the intelligence community but receiving no concrete benefits, the relationship may not be sustainable. While prestige and patriotism can play a role, the two most common benefits are access to insider information and money. If an academic has none of these incentives, cooperation is unlikely, regardless of his perception of the initiating party's legitimacy or the costs of the relationship.

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[359] Nelson, interview.
[360] Quoted in "Letter to the Editor: Spies vs. Spies," *Government Executive*, August 1, 2005, http://www.govexec.com/features/0805-01/0805-01buzz.htm.
[361] Ibid.

For many prominent thinkers, the early intelligence community seemed a place to earn one's stripes before making a name in academia. Professor Paul Miles notes that the generation of academics who cooperated with the OSS had PhDs, "but they may not have had reputations yet." Spending time in the intelligence world gave them contacts and ideas, helping them "establish their reputations as prominent academics after the war."[362] In other words, for those scholars, working with the intelligence community was a means to enhance one's career. Another benefit for academics can be patriotic pride, the feeling that by cooperating with the intelligence community one is better serving his or her country. This is most common among those who debrief the National Resources Division after a trip abroad for no material benefit. Furthermore, the university personnel who served as talent scouts in the 1940s and early 1950s did so simply because it seemed the right thing to do. However, these characteristics are difficult to measure and probably the weakest incentives for cooperation.

Access to insider information and perspectives is a critical motivator for academics considering a relationship with an intelligence official. In Ambassador Robert Hutchings' experience, scholars did not generally turn down the NIC. According to Hutchings, "the people I would talk to would find it beneficial also to have a window into the government and into the intelligence community, because we have information they didn't have."[363] "Academics were interested in the material that we were producing, and they were also interested in our views in the work that they were doing," observes James Noren, who spent a career analyzing the Soviet economy at the CIA. "So it was a two-way street."[364] Paul Pillar observed a similar draw for academics who worked with the Office of Near Eastern

[362] Paul Miles, November 30, 2009.
[363] Hutchings, interview.
[364] Noren, interview.

Analysis. "One attraction for most of the academics who would do this is they could leverage their work into other books and articles and so on," Pillar says. "[Nadav] Safran at Harvard basically leveraged much of what he did for us into an entire book..."[365] In these cases, the access to inside perspectives is a boon for the individual academic, benefitting his professional prospects.

By contrast, those bureaucracies that approach outreach as a one-way process meant solely to extract things from academia have more trouble in their solicitations. However, at some places, this is precisely the ethos rooted in the culture. When the CIA set up an office to review Freedom of Information Act requests in the mid-1970s, the internal ethos was to give up as little as possible to the outside world. "We were very begrudging," recalls Thomas Peck, who headed a unit that performed the initial review of incoming FOIA requests. "We were able to edit or totally deny an awful lot of documents on the basis of sources and methods, which the Agency is required by law to protect."[366] During that same period, many CIA analysts perceived conferences as directed toward a single end: improving their own knowledge. Joe Tamer's outlook summarizes the ethos within his office. Recalls Tamer, "you sort of have your expertise, and you try to enhance it by study, whether self study or outside study and having contacts with academics. So, much of that was for your own edification."[367] In other words, analysts looked to professors simply as means to improve their knowledge, not as potential partners in a two-way exchange.

At DIA, the outreach coordinator observes a similar cultural bias, noting that a big obstacle to successfully reaching out is the ability of analysts "to engage in an active dialogue.

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[365] Pillar, interview.
[366] Peck, interview.
[367] Tamer, interview.

A DIA analyst generally does not want to share his views on open source information," notes Patricia Downs. According to Downs, it is very difficult to get analysts and their supervisors not to think that their individual opinions are classified. Analysts who have to take a polygraph every five years are predictably risk averse in their conversations with academics. For that reason, DIA analysts are still unsure of how to communicate in a way that does not convey classified information. In Downs' opinion, this dynamic creates a "one way street," in which outside experts provide their views, but receive little feedback. Downs notes that academics "might feel used" over time if there is not an exchange of ideas in both directions. To that end, Downs is currently writing a training module with tips on how to improve two-way dialogue of outreach intended for all analysts across the community.[368] The point of this training is to expand an academics' perceived benefit of working with an intelligence official.

The science and technology intelligence agencies can offer access to cutting edge technologies. Says one NRO official with extensive experience working with academics,

> These guys are scientists and technologists at their core and heart. And we typically are the action end of their true love in life. Usually they want to be a part of what's going on in their field. They work in the theories and they work in the labs, but rarely do they get to shoot anything into space. And so they are very interested in participating in the operational end of what it is that they devoted their life to, to see how it works as well…It's not that much money, and not that common that they could ever actually depend on it…Most of them call it their car fund…They do it, I think, for the love of seeing their life's work come to life or to be tested in a real world environment.[369]

Technical agencies can also engage academics with challenging questions. The NSA runs a summer program called SCAMP, which brings together mathematicians from all over the world. Prior to the event, NSA will identify half a dozen unbreakable cipher systems and

[368] Downs, interview.
[369] Johnson, interview.

turn them into math problems. The mathematicians then congregate for six to seven weeks at an NSA-sponsored facility, such as the Institute for Defense Analysis compound in Princeton, New Jersey. Every third year, the program is held in Shelton, England, and British mathematicians can get involved as well. NSA pays for everything related to the SCAMP program – housing, travel, even a stipend. According to Jim Devine, the SCAMP program "was very highly regarded…Real academics, in my view, are people that love challenge. And they knew that the problems they were going to work on were almost unsolvable in the view of many people. And so they enjoyed that."[370] NSA recognizes that faculty and students nationwide are itching to work on tough problems, and programs like SCAMP capture that enthusiasm. According to NSA Chief Scientist George Cotter, "In many cases, particularly in the technical fields, the attraction of having inside information helps you stay focused and helps you look into areas you wouldn't otherwise know about," which can be a big draw for professors.[371]

Finally, money plays a role. For example, a grant to study something abroad on behalf of the CIA can have immense side benefits. "Sometimes part of the contract for research would involve travel and field research," recalls Paul Pillar. "And as is always the case the person doing the research could benefit from that in writing other things beyond what we had specifically contracted with him to write for us."[372] Indeed, when the monetary incentives are strong enough, cooperating with the intelligence world is never completely implausible. For example, in hard economic climates, academics have stomached negative perceptions of the community's legitimacy in order to ask for research funding. Leo Hazlewood points out that in the 1990s, some academics who normally relied on research

[370] Devine, interview.
[371] Cotter, interview.
[372] Pillar, interview.

grants from the National Science Foundation and other government institutions whose budgets had been slashed turned to the CIA as a last resort. "Their distaste was so strong," recalls Hazlewood, that when they asked CIA to fund their projects, "it visibly pained them to do so."[373] Because of the power of money, partnerships between academia, industry, and an intelligence community agency are often the most successful means of outreach. The NSA' Information Assurance program is an example of such a partnership. The NSA has created a rigorous set of standards that a university must meet if its students want to be labeled as "information systems security" engineers. Many technology firms focus their recruiting on individuals with this specific certification.[374] Any university that can offer this designation to its students has a big advantage over its peers. Thus, the NSA's outreach program is so successful because it has created a real monetary value for those academic institutions which partner with it.

In addition to a steady paycheck, the intelligence community offers new hires what one scholar of recruitment would term "purposive" and "solidary" incentives. A purposive incentive refers to the ability to shape public policy and "to get something done on the job."[375] Many early recruits joined the CIA precisely because it seemed a way to make a real difference. Remarked Agency executive Richard Bissell about the period, "There was a feeling of esprit, a sense that you could accomplish things."[376] In his memoirs, DCI William Colby records the allure of the CIA as a place to take bold action. "After all," he writes, "we were the derring-do boys who parachuted behind enemy lines, the cream of the academic

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[373] Hazlewood, interview.
[374] Cotter, interview.
[375] B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, Inc., 1984), 84.
[376] Quoted in Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 99.

and social aristocracy, devoted to the nation's service."[377] Meanwhile, solidary incentives refer to "the social aspects of employment and group membership."[378] The intelligence community has long sold itself on the tight bonds of its members. As one early Agency recruit noted in his diary, "I immediately sensed the fraternal identification among the CIA people."[379] From a shared lexicon to shared training, insulated intelligence agencies try to build cohesion in order to sustain their ranks, something that can have great appeal for college graduates. When such incentives are present, academics who value them are more likely to have relationships with the intelligence community.



Figure 15. Contributing factors impacting an academic's response to a solicitation

[377] William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 180.
[378] Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, 84.
[379] Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (New York: Stonehill, 1975), 18.

Figure 15 diagrams the factors that shape an academic's perceived utility of working with the intelligence community, which has a direct impact on outreach outcomes. An academic's response to a solicitation is determined by his perception of the initiating party's legitimacy and by the perceived consequences of cooperation. Specific incidents often influence perceptions for a long time: the Church Committee report continues to drive fundamental suspicions about the community. Outside of times of extreme desperation, academics who perceive an intelligence agency's practices as illegitimate will not associate with it. Among indifferent academics, cooperation is possible, but only as long as there are benefits available and it is not too much of a hassle. Among friendly academics, cooperation is likely, but not if the costs are prohibitively high. For that reason, agencies that have addressing negative perceptions, minimized costs, and maximized the benefits available to academics have been productive in expanding relationships with academia.

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ADMINISTRATIVE POSTURE

Since the conception of America's modern intelligence enterprise, university administrations have conceived of the intelligence community in three distinct lights that have guided the perceptions of academics writ large. The first has regarded intelligence as fundamentally different from other functions performed by government and industry, and therefore deserving of special treatment. Particularly in the mid-1940s and early-1950s, many university administrators deemed intelligence work to be particularly virtuous. Harboring no qualms with its insistence on secrecy, these administrators helped meet the intelligence community's research and recruiting needs through covert means. The second administrative perspective of intelligence gained force in the late 1960s and 1970s. This view also regarded intelligence as fundamentally distinct, but deemed it a hostile force whose secrecy threatened the university's core mission. These administrators restricted the prerogative of campus personnel to work for intelligence agencies. The third view regards intelligence agencies as roughly equivalent to all other firms with an interest in the university, including private corporations and non-governmental organizations. This outlook, which has become increasingly prevalent among today's university administrations, does not single out intelligence as befitting special benefits or punishments. In addition to directly shaping the responses of administrators, university posture can influence how individual professors and student react to overtures from the intelligence community by conditioning the perceived utility of cooperation.

OUTREACH-FRIENDLINESS

During World War II and for some time thereafter, the administrators of many elite American universities subscribed to the first outlook on intelligence. Cooperating closely with the wartime OSS – the forerunner of the CIA – university administrators made exceptions for their faculty members to have extended leaves to the intelligence world and channeled promising students into intelligence work. At Yale University, the masters of six out of the twelve residential colleges – Calhoun, Jonathan Edwards, Saybrook, Davenport, Pierson, and Berkeley – served as influential "conduits" into the OSS. For example, Master Elliot Smith scouted undergraduate and graduate students suitable for work in economics, while Master Samuel Hemingway encouraged students in specialized language programs to transition into intelligence work. From Yale's class of 1943, at least forty-two men entered into intelligence careers.[380] The coming of peace did not abate the intelligence community's need for friendly administrators. Thus, even in the postwar years the architects of the intelligence community continued to look to its dense network of deans, athletic coaches and college masters to act as talent spotters on their behalf. These "access agents," as one scholar deems them, made introductions between CIA officials and potential employees, both foreign and American.[381]

At Princeton University, Dean of Students William Lippincott recruited on behalf of the CIA throughout the 1950s. "How would you like to serve your country in a different way?" he would inquire of select students.[382] One of Lippincott's recruits, a future Inspector General of the CIA, recalls receiving a summons from the Dean in his mailbox late in his senior year. The meeting was obligatory: "When the Dean of Students says he wants to talk

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[380] Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 35-38.
[381] Johnson, interview, 158.
[382] Quoted in Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 15.

to you, you don't say no."[383] Lippincott noted that the student had travelled to various places and spent the previous summer on a scholarship in Europe. After gauging the student's interest in foreign affairs, the Dean referred him to the "gentleman down the hall," who offered the student admission to the Agency. As an assistant professor of classics, Robert Goheen ran a reserve unit on the Princeton campus in the late 1940s, encouraging its members to go into intelligence. When Goheen became the president of Princeton in 1957, he maintained his friendly ties to the community. In other words, the selective recruiting of Lippincott and others was smiled upon at the highest level of the university.[384]

The CIA also maintained its close ties at Yale, where it was welcomed by President Charles Seymour. Described by one historian as a "a staunch conservative who championed compulsory chapel because of the Burkean social values it taught," Seymour remained a firm supporter of intelligence work and the principles it instilled – discipline, patriotism, mental and physical health.[385] Skip Walz, the men's crew coach, "would scout for strong shoulders and promising minds at the boathouse and field house," not mention at the local bars and fraternity houses.[386] Many of the Yale college masters continued to act as conduits after the war. Daniel Merriman, a renowned oceanographer, referred students to the Agency until he stepped down as master of Davenport College in 1966.[387]

In short, the special "scouting" relationships forged between intelligence professionals and administrators in the dog days of World War II would survive into the Cold War on about a dozen college campuses.[388] Deemed "gentlemen's arrangements" by

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[383] Hitz, interview.
[384] Close, interview.
[385] Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 29.
[386] Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, 15.
[387] Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 40.
[388] Krongard, interview.

one former CIA officer, these ties often extended to alumni placement offices with the knowing approval of the university brass.[389] This was especially true in the Ivy Leagues. The magnitude of New Haven recruits led one Yale historian to remark that the early CIA had "the atmosphere of a class reunion."[390] After graduating from Princeton in 1958, A. B. Krongard transitioned from the Marine Corps into the Agency. He notes that his recruited class of case officers "was a pretty select group," composed primarily of Ivy Leaguers and students from a selection of other elite universities, such as Stanford and Williams.[391] The Agency usually did not pay these spotters, but expressed its gratitude in other ways. George Cave remembers one day in the 1950s when about forty individuals – an assortment of academics, deans and college presidents – showed up in the middle of his Junior Officer Training program. By bringing them to the heart of the CIA's case officer training regimen, the CIA leadership was trying "to give them a basic briefing on the value these guys were to the Agency for the spotting that they did," says Cave.[392]

In addition to scouting, administrations made other exceptions for the intelligence world. In the mid-1950s, Thornton Anderson sent a man from the Office of Technical Research to get a PhD at MIT. Due to his office's special relationship with the MIT administration, Anderson arranged for the student to write a classified thesis, effectively drawing on MIT's graduate resources for the benefit of a single government office.[393] Harvard historian William Langer was the director of research at OSS during the war. When the war ended, Langer had been on leave from Harvard for four years. Customarily, the maximum leave of absence from an academic institution was two consecutive years.

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[389] Glerum, interview.
[390] Quoted in Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 35.
[391] Krongard, interview.
[392] Cave, interview.
[393] Anderson, interview.

However, Langer successfully secured another four years of leave, during which time he could write about the OSS experience and advocate for a standing intelligence body with strong research programs in the social sciences. In November 1950, the Director of Central Intelligence asked the Harvard administration to grant Langer a ninth year of absence, so that the professor might establish an Office of National Estimates at the CIA. The administrators were happy to oblige, giving Langer an extra year and half of leave.[394] In the end, Harvard provided Langer with nearly a decade of paid leave so that he might help America's nascent intelligence efforts, a reflection of the extraordinary importance accorded to the growing intelligence profession.

In many cases, administrators were so drawn to the intelligence world that they themselves went to work for the community. Dr. James Phinney Baxter III gave up the presidency of Williams College in August 1941 in order to lead the OSS's Research and Analysis efforts as its first chairman.[395] In 1954, James Killian concurrently served as the president of MIT and the chairman of a White House commission on America's vulnerabilities to surprise attacks. A recently declassified exchange at the California Institute of Technology aptly captures the outlook of university administrators during this period. On July 10, 1952, a CIA official phoned Earnest C. Watson, the dean of the Cal Tech faculty, to request a meeting in Pasadena on July 17 with three high-profile Cal Tech physics professors. Since one of the men was going to be absent, Watson brainstormed with the official about other good candidates. With only a week's notice, Watson then arranged the meeting, which included not only three distinguished physicists, but also Cal Tech President Lee DuBridge himself. The meeting covered a highly sensitive and heavily classified topic –

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[394] Winks, *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939 – 1961*, 81.
[395] Ibid., 70.

the feasibility of using satellites as reconnaissance vehicles for intelligence collection. At the conclusion of the discussion, the president and dean sought to further the CIA's research in this area. President Dubridge even arranged for two intelligence officers present – Willis Gibbons from the CIA and Palmer Putnam from the Psychological Strategy Board – to have a follow up meeting with RAND scientists in Santa Monica.[396]

This breed of administrators put intelligence work in a distinct category from everything else. For intelligence, exceptions could be made and time could be spared. Not only was it sensible to do so; it was moral. By maintaining relationships with intelligence agencies not afforded other organizations, these administrators were effectively carving out a special space for the profession. The intelligence world did not have formal policies for cultivating these relationships, rather "it was just one of those things that happened because it was the OSS tradition," supposes a former CIA officer. Administrations helped "because they believed in the cause. Slowly over time that pattern dissipated."[397] These "outreach-friendly" administrations would soon become relics of the time. As the 20th century pushed forward, such a posture became increasingly difficult to maintain.

OUTREACH-AVERSION

By the late 1970s, many university administrations had turned 180 degrees on the intelligence community. This shift was driven by a variety of factors, including the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the war in Vietnam. Against a burgeoning backdrop of scholarly discontent with American foreign policy and the secrecy of intelligence operations abroad, the talent scouts within various administrations started to peter out in the late 1960s, failing to pass

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[396] Foreign Relations of the United States, *Subject: Discussion of the Feasibility and Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance Purposes*, Memorandum of Conversation, The Intelligence Community, 1950 – 1955, Organization of US intelligence (Pasadena, California, July 17, 1952), 301.
[397] Glerum, interview.

this baton on to their successors. In 1968, Neil Rudenstine succeeded Bill Lippincott as the Dean of Students at Princeton. Rudenstine insists that by 1968 spotting at the administration-level was out of the question. "We certainly never did it in our Dean of Students office. It would've been unthinkable."[398] As the network of clandestine gentleman's agreements dried up at the administrative level, the support of professors faltered as well.

The 1970s intensified this rift between university administrations and the intelligence community. The Congressional investigations carried about by the Church and Pike Committees into American intelligence activities revealed horror stories of assassination plots abroad and widespread spying on American citizens. Whereas previously its secret mission had won the intelligence profession favor and special support, now that same secrecy invited scorn. College administrators raised the alarm – unseen forces that were executing the government's highly controversial agenda abroad had infiltrated their universities. While numerous student disturbances of the era pressured universities to rethink their outlook on intelligence agencies, the Church Committee insisted they do so.

The Church Committee fundamentally changed universities' thinking about intelligence. The report noted with grave concern the extensive use of university personnel as covert elements of the intelligence world, either in operations or in undisclosed recruiting capacities. In lieu of a legislative prohibition against such relationships, the Committee advocated that it be the responsibility of private institutions to set the professional and ethical standards of its members.[399] The report, therefore, was "intended to alert these

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[398] Neil Rudenstine, Telephone Interview, February 10, 2010.
[399] Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Book I*, Final Report, April 26, 1976, 191.

institutions that there is a problem."[400] The Committee was effectively advocating for specific rules at the university level to restrict relationships with the intelligence world, casting serious aspersions on the notion of an "outreach-friendly" institution. The Church Committee also recommended that relationships between the intelligence world and any member of the university community first be cleared at the president's level.[401] Particularly salient was the concept of "mission creep" – the fear that a special intelligence relationship, no matter how benign at first, would inevitably grow into something dangerous. Fritz Schwarz, General Counsel of the Church Committee, describes mission creep thus: "The intelligence agencies would start doing something in secret, and it might have at the first instance a relatively narrow focus. And then, through the passage of time, and because it's secret, and because there's no oversight, there's mission creep and it gets broader and broader."[402] The message to universities was simple: beware.

Administrators took note. Under intense pressure from the scholarly community, in 1977 Derek Bok, then president of Harvard University, established a series of university guidelines to govern faculty relations with the intelligence community. "Any member of the Harvard community who has an ongoing relationship with the CIA as a recruiter should report that fact in writing to the Dean of the appropriate Faculty, who should inform the President of the University and the appropriate placement offices within the University," the new rules insisted.[403] Furthermore, the recruiter now needed to get the consent of an

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[400] Ibid.
[401] Ibid.
[402] Schwarz, interview.
[403] Quoted in Johnson, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, 172.

individual before recommending him to the CIA. Related guidelines demanded the specific disclosure of consulting relationships and operational agreements.[404]

The Harvard guidelines prompted a stir at the CIA. The Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, dismissed President Bok's initiative. "Harvard does not have any legal authority over us," he declared. In marshalling an argument against such regulations, DCI Turner pointed out that the CIA had a statutory obligation to protect its sources and methods, which broadly defined could include its recruiting sources. Furthermore, he lamented that the CIA was being singled out as in need of additional scrutiny.[405] The Bok-Turner exchange highlights just how much mainstream administrative posture had changed by the 1970s. Harvard University, the same institution that had leased out a distinguished professor for an exceptional nine and a half years to help get the intelligence community off the ground, was now castigating the CIA as a problem child in need of extra supervision. The pendulum had swung in the opposite direction, ingraining a basic mistrust of intelligence work and fear of "penetration" among university administrators.

This "outreach-averse" mindset took a firm root nationwide, discouraging cooperation with intelligence agencies. A faculty member at Brooklyn College was denied tenure in the 1970s because of a minor contact with the CIA. In preparation for a trip to Europe, the professor had called the Agency to ask for advice on a research project. The Agency declined, but suggested he get back in touch after his trip to share his impressions. The professor's brother-in-law reported the subsequent 15-minute "debriefing" to Brooklyn

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[404] Ibid., 173.
[405] Quoted in Ibid.

College deans, who then censured the professor and cancelled his promotion.[406] Up through the 1990s, any administration discovered to be outreach-friendly to the intelligence community invited tremendous public scrutiny. For example, in 1991 it became known that Rochester Institute of Technology president M. Richard Rose, a former Deputy Secretary of Defense under Nixon, had worked at the CIA during a four-month leave from the university. Considering this work to be of an exceptional nature, he had not informed the Board of Trustees about the job until he had already started.[407] Local newspapers soon unearthed the fact that the RIT Research Corporation was handling about $1 million worth of CIA research contracts, won through Rose's relationship with the Agency.[408] As it turned out, RIT had worked on thirty-nine Agency-sponsored projects throughout the late 1980s. The University administration had opted not to disclose this fact to the community, and students employed in the work were often unaware of the project's sponsor. A later investigation revealed that two CIA officers had come to RIT as visiting faculty at Rose's invitation, and recruited students informally.[409] Rose defended his actions as patriotic: "We are part of this country," he said. "We enjoy the freedoms and the benefits of being here. If we can contribute to our country's strength, I think we should do that."[410] In other words, the RIT president gave the CIA special treatment on his campus because he believed it was his civic duty.

RIT's policy, which would have been quite mainstream in the 1950s, sparked a major controversy nationwide about the appropriate distance between a university administrator

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406 Ibid., 167.
407 William Glaberson, "College's C.I.A. Links Cause Furor, and Soul-Searching," *New York Times*, June 20, 1991, sec. B1.
408 Ibid.
409 Daniel Golden, "In From the Cold: After Sept. 11, The CIA Becomes A Force on Campus," *Wall Street Journal*, October 4, 2002, sec. A1.
410 Glaberson, "College's C.I.A. Links Cause Furor, and Soul-Searching."

and the intelligence world. Mr. Rose resigned after the faculty voted "no confidence" in him, and the university soon adopted a set of policies to prevent such accommodating relations with intelligence in the future. The university required disclosure of all funding sources and research topics, as well as faculty review of visiting scholars. Moreover, most of the CIA's current research projects at RIT were terminated. This incident rekindled images within scholarly circles of a mischievous intelligence world whose creeping reach merited special university protections. Attitudes at the administrative level that conceive of agencies like the CIA as unique – and uniquely dangerous – entities, can dramatically suppress an individual academic's perceived utility of cooperation.

OUTREACH-NEUTRALITY

The final posture toward the intelligence community at the university level is best described as "outreach-neutral." Universities with this worldview puts intelligence outreach in the same category as all other forms of outreach. For example, these administrators insist that professional relationships between professors and the outside world be disclosed at a basic level, that funding affecting university centers come through regular university channels, and that any research sponsored on campus be unclassified. However, these administrators do not selectively impose rules on any specific outside organizations. While the first two administrative approaches respectively amplified and muted academic engagements with the intelligence community, the third approach does neither, having no effect on an individual's perceived utility of cooperation.

While some universities flipped overnight from especially receptive to intelligence to especially wary of it, others simply transitioned from an outreach-friendly orientation to outreach-neutrality. Princeton University, for example, did not pass any guidelines

concerning intelligence work as Harvard had done. To do so, according to its adminstrators, would have been the equivalent of discrimination. As Neil Rudenstine, who was in time promoted from dean of students to university provost, puts it, "I think that we would have found it very hard to single out one group of people consulting for some other particular group and asked them to do things that we weren't asking others to do."[411]

Princeton's particular philosophy carries on to this day. Provost Eisgruber sums up Princeton's attitude bluntly: "I don't know why we would treat the CIA differently from others."[412] The current Dean of the Faculty, David Dobkin, notes that the administration does not view the CIA as a distinct entity on campus. In Dobkin's words, "From the university's point of view, it's hard to make the distinction between working for the government, working for Goldman Sachs, or working for Google."[413] Thus, the university has certain standing policies against outside companies sponsoring classified research on campus, against using university resources excessively for personal work, and against consulting for anyone for more than one day a week.[414] But these are blanket rules that apply to all professional associations equally. "It was certainly the case in the sixties that we felt very differently about the CIA, for example, than we did about corporations. But I think that gap has changed," says Dobkin.[415]

This arrangement, holding all external organizations to the same standard at the university level, neutralized what was elsewhere a hotly contended issue. In fact, Princeton's relations to the intelligence world were such a non-issue at Princeton that William Bowen, president between the tumultuous years 1972 and 1988, observed simply that there was

411 Rudenstine, interview.
412 Christopher Eisgruber, Personal Interview, November 25, 2009.
413 David Dobkin, Personal Interview, February 4, 2010.
414 Office of the Dean of the Faculty, Princeton University, "Outside Professional Activities," January 5, 2007.
415 Dobkin, interview.

nothing to say about the matter: "I just have nothing to contribute. This was not an issue I focused on."[416] Harold Shapiro, Princeton president from 1987 to 2001, had a similar observation. "I just don't recall any issue arising. When you sit in the office of the president, a lot of issues come to you… And I don't recall anything arising from the CIA." Deeming the CIA a "legitimate organization," he nevertheless added, "I don't think they need any special assistance."[417] Shapiro's attitude captures well the ethos of outreach-neutrality. The intelligence world is welcome to utilize campus resources, but in accordance with the same rules as everyone else. The university is no longer in the business of favors or exceptions.

As the phantoms of the 1970s recede, outreach neutrality has increasingly become the norm. The guidelines put in place at Harvard University, reflective of an outreach-averse era, slowly eroded over the 1980s. Neil Rudenstine assumed the presidency of Harvard from 1991 to 2001 following the departure of Derek Bok. By that time the Bok guidelines had apparently broken down. Despite the guidelines' insistence that the president be informed of any interactions between a Harvard community member and an intelligence bureaucracy, Rudenstine insists he never received a single such report. "None of this was done under my watch. Nobody told me about it when I arrived. I had zero experience with it."[418] As at Princeton, these relationships were handled at the dean's level. A former dean of Harvard's Kennedy School notes bluntly, "As dean I received an annual report from all faculty members disclosing all their outside consulting. That included intelligence."[419] But he did not pass those relationships along to the president or treat faculty members adversely because of

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[416] William Bowen, "Princeton Thesis Research," February 16, 2010.
[417] Shapiro, interview.
[418] Rudenstine, interview.
[419] Joseph Nye, "Referred by Robert Hutchings," February 16, 2010.

them. Despite the tenor of the Bok guidelines, by the 1990s the Harvard administration had ceased to have special considerations for relationships with the intelligence world.

In short, Harvard University had transitioned into a position of outreach-neutrality. Rudenstine speculates that the Bok guidelines were either dropped at some point or simply ignored as the pressure on the university to deal with the intelligence menace abated. As he tells it, the issues that were highly contentious or challenged during Bok's time – classified research, covert ties with intelligence – "were more or less – not in historical time but in terms of people's memories – ancient history." That is, by 1991 the university no longer felt compelled to seem like it was *doing something* to confront the fears raised by the Church Committee report. "I can well imagine that those things simply drift out of sight," concludes Rudenstine.[420]

The Princeton experience indicates that some administrations dealt with a legacy of exceptional cooperation with the intelligence community by adopting a blanket policy of nondiscriminatory neutrality. Meanwhile, Harvard's experience suggests that outreach-aversion against a particular organization is not sustainable for an administration, so the university bends toward neutrality over time. Indeed, it seems likely to expect that, as generations of protests and fears of "penetration" recede, an increasing number of administrations will adopt a similar policy. One former operations officer complains that a "significant number" of schools are still outreach-averse, and at these places it is uncommon for university career offices not to welcome CIA on the campus. "There are a lot of schools where we're not welcome," he says bluntly, and he does not see much potential for change

[420] Rudenstine, interview.

in the future.[421] But there is much for universities to gain by normalizing relations, and the lure of lucrative contracts may further break down these restrictions over time.

At the same time, there is unlikely to be a resurgence of outreach-friendly administrations. Some university presidents do maintain their own intimate ties to the intelligence world. For example, Michael Crow, the president of Arizona State University, is concurrently the Chairman of In-Q-Tel, the CIA's non-profit technology investment firm. Some administrators still refer to patriotism as reason to deepen ties with the intelligence community. In 2002, then-president of RIT Albert Simone noted that RIT should forge a new partnership with the CIA to help the national cause. "I'm less afraid of losing freedoms due to loss of democracy than of losing freedoms because we're all dead due to terrorist attacks," said Simone.[422] However, such rhetoric and relationships have been pushed firmly into the public domain. While open partnerships with the intelligence community have become acceptable, preferential treatment provided through covert channels at the university level remains taboo. No administration wants to invite such scrutiny upon itself. Nevertheless, in a few decades the outlook of many universities toward intelligence has become far more favorable. As stigmas continue to fade, outreach-neutrality is poised to become the dominant posture among American universities.

Administrative posture makes a big difference to how individuals respond to solicitations from the intelligence community. A professor will think twice about behaving in a manner that does not have the blessing of his employer, regardless of his own perceptions of the intelligence community. Furthermore, when administrators themselves are the outreach targets, their university's posture define how receptive they can be. Intelligence

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[421] Olson, interview.
[422] Quoted in Golden, "In From the Cold: After Sept. 11, The CIA Becomes A Force on Campus."

officials that fail to distinguish between these different postures have befallen some awkward moments in recent years. For example, a 2007 effort by the CIA to renew an informal relationship with the Princeton University administration ended poorly when an Agency official under the alias "Sarah Bouldin" met with university provost Christopher Eisgruber.[423] Bouldin inquired about the possibility of more systematically tapping into Princeton's faculty as a source of information. As Eisgruber puts it, she was "interested in having faculty members not 'spy,' but collect information when they were traveling abroad." She asked the provost for the names of faculty members she might contact directly. Eisgruber's response – "that is certainly not something we would facilitate as a university" – should have been expected.[424] An outreach-neutral administration does not scout out individual faculty members on behalf of any outside organization.

This episode reflects the consequence of the internal rules that built up at CIA following the Church Committee era, which contributed to the misperception among some CIA officials that academic relationships must always be cleared at the provost or presidential level of the president or provost. In fact, outreach-neutral administrations like Princeton do not care if an individual professor consults for the CIA. While the administration will not facilitate those contacts, it certainly allows them. If the CIA had been more astute in understanding Princeton's administrative posture, it would have avoided an embarrassing incident that has likely contributed to further negative perceptions on both sides.

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[423] For complete account of this story, see Appendix B, part v.
[424] Eisgruber, interview.

Table 3 summarizes the different postures that a university might assume vis-à-vis the intelligence community. This attitude is a condition variable influencing the likelihood that an academic will work with the intelligence community. The more positive this posture (i.e., the higher the variable's value), the greater the chance that an individual with a good perception of the intelligence community will cooperate with it. As administrative attitudes worsen, however, the personal ideology of the academic becomes less important in determining outreach outcomes.

Administrative posture	Characteristics
Outreach-friendly	Conceives of the intelligence enterprise as exceptionally worthy of help. Makes a special effort to accommodate it and assist it.
Outreach-neutral	Does not treat the intelligence community differently than other outside firm. Does not offer preferential treatment of any sort, whether positive or negative.
Outreach-averse	Conceives of the intelligence community as exceptionally worthy of scrutiny and suspicion. Makes a concerted effort to regulate the conditions under which it may interact with university personnel.

Table 3. The differences in administrative postures toward the intelligence community

CONCLUSION

Figure 16 presents a comprehensive theoretical model of bureaucratic outreach, built from an exhaustive review of the intelligence community's relationship with academia.



Figure 16. Two-step theory of bureaucratic outreach from the intelligence world to academia

This model seeks to better understand the forces shaping the dependent variables in the two-step outreach process – the likelihood of an individual bureaucrat to solicit academia, and the likelihood that the outreach target will cooperate. These outcomes are most directly affected by the perceptions of the decision-makers on either side of the equation, as both sides are looking to maximize their own utility. The theory also identifies a multitude of factors shaping these independent variables and the condition variables that regulate their impact. The point of this theory is to better understand why the intelligence community and academia sometimes partner with each other for mutual benefit, but often do not.

A quick summary of the theory follows: Internal perceptions of utility within the intelligence community determine whether a bureaucrat will solicit a member of the outside world for a relationship. When individual officers – from analysts to scientists to clandestine operators – do not see any value from connecting with academia, or perceive it to be too much of a burden, then they will not reach out. For example, in cases where an intelligence agency's mission is fundamentally incompatible with that of academia, outreach is not going to happen. Then, if there are no funds to pay for travel expenses, retainers, or conference spaces, bureaucrats will solicit outside expertise in very limited ways, regardless of these perceptions. Recourse to personal networks, intermediaries, or institutional contacts reduces the difficulty of reaching over the semi-permeable wall that exists naturally between the two worlds, and therefore makes outreach more likely among those bureaucrats with positive perceptions of academia.

In response, the behavior of the academic is shaped by his perceptions of the intelligence bureaucrat and the consequences of his cooperation. Whether a pupil, professor, or university president, if an academic believes that the intelligence agency has no legitimate business on a college campus, then he will typically turn down the offer regardless of the

potential benefits. This decision can also be shaped by the overarching stance of the academic's institution at large, which can discourage outreach among receptive academics. In most cases, an academic will respond favorably to a solicitation only if he has a neutral to positive perception of the agency's work, the concrete benefits outweigh the costs, and he will not get in major trouble with his university for doing so.

This model has some obvious flaws. For example, it does not account for academics soliciting the intelligence community. Jennifer Sims, a professor at Georgetown, runs an "Intelligence Salon" sponsored by her university. Bringing together practitioners with students and theorists about once every other month, the Salon is meant "to lubricate the exchange of ideas" from the scholarly community into government. In some cases, Sims' graduate students have written papers that practitioners have picked up, taken back into the community, and then incorporated into policy. As Sims puts it, she and her fellow scholars "aren't just waiting to be asked" for their help. They are bringing ideas "up to the front door" and actively bringing the practitioners over the threshold. Georgetown has responded favorably, increasing funding for this successful program. However, this practice is not widespread. Sims admits that the Salon is not a very scalable idea, nor is it meant to be. Salon meetings are deliberately kept to no more than fifteen or twenty people per session, and almost all have been held in a private home. This relaxed setting – participants sit on floors and couches and eat Chinese food – encourages candid exchanges.[425] In these cases, the two steps are reversed, but the condition variables on each side remain the same. The academics must perceive some reason to reach out, and intelligence bureaucrats must see cooperation as a low-cost option that bears sufficient benefits.

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[425] Jennifer Sims, Telephone Interview, January 16, 2010.

This model is not simply descriptive: logical inferences of the theory yield at least eight useful avenues for improving the intelligence community's outreach efforts. The first four will increase the likelihood of first-step solicitations, and the final four will increase the likelihood of a positive academic response.

Reevaluate and Clarify Internal Rules

One reason that intelligence professionals do not solicit academics is because of restrictive agency rules or security protocols governing contacts with the outside world. Though sometimes important, regulations can burden bureaucrats by preventing or impeding certain behaviors. At certain agencies, rules have accumulated, layering on top of each other over time. These protocols have not been systematically reexamined due to the costs involved and the general fear of repeating previous mistakes. But from a comparative point of view, intense regulations of outreach are not strictly necessary. Bureaucrats at agencies without onerous rules have been more active in reaching out than their counterparts, while still avoiding embarrassing incidents. Regulations also have a psychological effect on bureaucrats – that is, the fear of *potentially* breaking the rules makes individuals risk-averse. This is significant because rules are not always expressed clearly across offices. As a result, it is possible that intelligence officials might not know the exact regulations relating to academic outreach. Most officials, especially young ones lacking bureaucratic clout, will err on the side of caution in these situations. Agencies that impede individual outreach efforts may avoid trouble in the short term, but do not capture the long-term benefits of outreach.

Be Careful About "Culture"

Office culture can be a deciding factor in an individual's decision to reach out to academia. If outreach is not an institutional norm because of an agency's mission or methods, then its employees will likely internalize that the practice is inappropriate. But while it is difficult to legislate changes in culture, they are not as rigid as they might seem. Indeed, cultures can be redefined over time. In the 1980s, the National Intelligence Council was insulated and biased toward classified information. However, this ethos began to change with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Over the last two decades, the NIC has transformed into an intelligence bureaucracy that puts great weight on external expertise and maintains perhaps the most regular ties to academia of any agency. Even tactically focused units can have positive relationships with academia, whether by sending officers for education at civilian universities or hiring academics to help solve technology challenges in real time. For this reason, organizations that reflexively point to culture to justify not soliciting the outside world may be depriving themselves of concrete benefits of outreach.

Finance Creatively

Individual bureaucrats are beholden to budgets. These are normally fixed pies divided up into consistent pieces. Increased outreach has a price tag, and bureaucrats hate to cut money from existing priorities. They will be reluctant to perform additional outreach unless there is additional money, which can happen in three ways. The organization's director can reprogram funds for outreach, as Robert Gates tried to do in the early 1990s; the president can increase overall executive agency spending, as Carter and Reagan did; or offices can partner with other elements of government, as Mike Jacobs partnered with Richard Clarke's Cyber Corps to get the NSA's information assurance program off the ground. The first two are beyond the reach of most bureaucrats, so it makes sense to focus

on the final option. By finding synergies with other government programs looking to connect with the outside world, partnering effectively, and securing line-item appropriations by Congress, individual bureaucrats can increase the resources available for outreach.

Encourage Institutional Contacts

Personal networks and intermediaries are helpful resources for bureaucrats that make outreach more likely, but they have drawbacks. Bureaucrats often do not have access to their colleagues' networks, nor do they have many opportunities to build their own. The presence of institutional contacts, on the other hand, can facilitate productive relationships among a range of individual bureaucrats. For example, any National Intelligence Officer can look at the roster of available IC Associates, examine the scholars' areas of expertise, and solicit guidance on a particular project. These academics are slowly becoming available to officials across the intelligence community. Agencies may derive even more benefit from developing their own specialized sets of institutional contacts, or at least keeping better records of previous interactions with the outside world.

Manage Reputations

When approached by an intelligence bureuacrat, academics take into account the reputation of the initiating party. Students, professors, and deans must all deem an agency legitimate before they will work with it. This can be a tricky sell for intelligence agencies with prior involvements in unsavory activities. Recognizing this, some agencies mask their outreach by employing intermediaries to solicit academia on their behalf. However, this practice often yields shallow or impermanent relationships. Positive name recognition has enabled the NIC, NSA, and INR to have very high outreach success rates. Dramatic reforms to improve an agency's public image are not always feasible, but individual offices

can increase their legitimacy by opening up to academia. For example, the CIA won respect among economists in the 1970s by releasing declassified estimates of economies behind the Iron Curtain, and the Agency has earned accolades from environmental scholars through the MEDEA project. However, these overtures have been inconsistent, and various executives have insisted on decreasing Agency transparency. These changes have a negative impact on an agency's reputation within academia, reducing the likelihood of mutually beneficial cooperation.

MINIMIZE THE COSTS OF COOPERATION

Like intelligence officials, academics must overcome certain downsides of cooperation before a positive relationship can be established. These include social costs, restrictive publication rights, and the time required to obtain a security clearance. Intelligence agencies can play a direct role in minimizing these costs, systematically increasing the likelihood of successful outreach. Some of the most successful outreach programs have given academics the discretion to disclose their intelligence affiliations to the broader public, allowed academics generous prerogative to publish their work, and reduced the hassle of gaining a clearance through the usage of temporary one-day security waivers. By recognizing that academics are looking to maximize their own utility, agencies can increase the probability of successful outreach by lowering the costs of their cooperation.

HIGHLIGHT THE BENEFITS OF COOPERATION

In responding to the overtures from the intelligence community, academics consider not only costs but also incentives. For this reason, intelligence officials can improve outreach outcomes by offering and accentuating the benefits available to academics. Agencies that cannot offer substantial amounts of money to partners in academia can emphasize the

potential access to privileged government information and cutting edge technologies for cooperative professors. Especially during national crises, agencies can also play up the patriotic elements of these relationships. If intelligence officials focus on the benefits available to outsiders, they can positively influence academics' perceptions of relationships with the intelligence world and therefore increase the likelihood of successful bureaucratic outreach.

PAY ATTENTION TO POSTURE

The way that an academic institution postures itself toward the intelligence community can condition the responses of its employees. Outreach-averse universities may have strong regulations in place proscribing the cooperation of their scholars and students. While it is possible for an intelligence agency to work with the members of these institutions in various ways, it is prudent to earn the permission of the administrators first, so that there are no concerns about "infiltration." At an outreach-neutral university, on the other hand, where administrators are less concerned about an agency working with their faculty or recruiting their students, this permission is not necessary. As the Sarah Bouldin example makes clear, seeking help from outreach-neutral administrators can actually be counterproductive. Intelligence officials who can distinguish between different university postures and minimize administrative tensions can expect more positive outreach outcomes.

This theory was constructed based on primary source evidence relating specifically to the intelligence community's interactions with academia. For that reason, it is most useful for understanding relationships that form or do not form between those two American institutions. However, with slight modifications, this two-step model could be generalized to

explain bureaucratic outreach between other government agencies and outside sources of knowledge. Whether recruiting new personnel, tapping into analytic insights, outsourcing technical work, or educating their workforces, government bureaucracies of all stripes have much to gain from cooperating with academia, the private sector, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. As decentralized pools of talent and knowledge continue to diffuse across the country, information-based bureaucracies like the intelligence agencies will increasingly need to connect to these resources in order to stay relevant to policymakers. Scholars can contribute to this process by analyzing the dynamics underlying these relationships – how they form, why they succeed, and why they fail. This thesis has attempted to focus this line of inquiry and make a modest contribution to a nascent field that will no doubt grow in importance in this networked age.

APPENDIX A:

COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

ARC: Analysts Resource Catalogue

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

CSI: Center for the Study of Intelligence

DI: Directorate of Intelligence

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI: Director of National Intelligence

DoD: Department of Defense

DO: Directorate of Operations

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIS: Foreign Broadcast Information Service

GOCO: Government-Owned, Contract-Operated

INR: Bureau of Intelligence and Research

MEAP: Military Economic Advisory Panel

NGA: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

NIC: National Intelligence Council

NIO: National Intelligence Officer

NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology

NPIC: National Photographic Interpretation Center

NRO: National Reconnaissance Office

NSA: National Security Agency

OER: Office of Economic Research

OIR: Officers-in-Residence

ORD: Office of Research and Development

OSS: Office of Strategic Services

APPENDIX B:

ASSORTED INDICATORS OF OUTREACH

Table i. Known Officers-in-Residence and their institutions

Officer	University	Officer	University
Richard Houska	Georgia Institute of Technology	Tom Ward	Air Force Academy
Arthur Hulnick	Boston University	John Dullnig	University of Texas – El Paso
Joe Wippl	Boston University	Mary Ellen Cole	Texas A&M
Valerie Patterson	West Virginia University	Jim Olson	Texas A&M
Michael Speckhard	University of Georgia	Gene Coyle	Indiana University
George Fidas	George Washington University	Maura Godinez	USC – Los Angeles
Pamela Noe	George Washington University	Michael Turner	University of San Diego
Lee Strickland	University of Maryland	Barbara Tato	USC – San Diego
Hal Bean	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	Robert Deitz	George Mason University
Noel Firth	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	Michael Kline	Miami University School of Business
Paul Frandano	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	James Kilpatrick	Miami University School of Business
Jim Steiner	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	Luis Rueda	Miami University School of Business
Roger W. Matlak	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	Douglas MacEachin	Kennedy School of Government
Dallas Jones	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	Linda Wetzel	Thunderbird School of Global Management
James Zirkle	Georgetown School of Foreign Service	Robert Vickers	MIT
Randy Deitering	University of South Carolina	Tim Thomas	University of Washington
James McCullough	University of South Carolina	David Edger	Oklahoma University
Lenora Peters-Gant	Trinity University	Don Hughes	Oklahoma University
Larry Boothe	Utah State University	Frank Hofmann	University of Pittsburgh
John Hollister Hedley	Georgetown University	James McInnis	LBJ School
Gary M. Chase	Georgetown University	David S. Black	Ohio University
Hal Gregory	University of Denver	Anita Bucknam	Ohio State University
Floyd L. Paseman	Marquette University	Diane Snyder	Princeton University
Bob Pringle	University of Kentucky	Brian Gilley	Duke University
David Mathews	Jacksonville University / Flagler University	Gerald Haines	University of Virginia

Table ii. Schools designated as Intelligence Community Centers of Academic Excellence[426]

University or Consortium of Universities	Academic Year of Designation
California State University - San Bernardino	2005-06
Clark Atlanta University	2005-06
Florida International University	2005-06
Norfolk State University	2005-06
Tennessee State University	2005-06
Trinity University	2005-06
University of Texas - El Paso	2005-06
University of Texas – Pan American	2005-06
University of Washington	2005-06
Wayne State University	2005-06
Carnegie Mellon University (in a science and technology consortium to study identity sciences with Clemson University, North Carolina A&T State University, and University of North Carolina-Wilmington	2008-2010
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University	2009-10
Miles College	2009-10
University of Maryland	2009-10
University of Nebraska - Lincoln (in consortium with University of Nebraska-Omaha, Creighton University, and Bellevue University)	2009-10
University of New Mexico	2009-10
Pennsylvania State University	2009-10
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (in a consortium with Howard University)	2009-10

[426] Office of Director of National Intelligence, "IC Centers of Academic Excellence: Grant Awardees 2004-2010 Academic Terms," *Intelligence Communtiy Centers of Academic Excellence Program*, http://www.dni.gov/cae/institutions.htm.

Table iii. Known members of the "Princeton Consultants"[427]

Name	Institution	Field
T. Cuyler Young	Princeton	Near Eastern Studies
Klaus Knorr	Princeton	Strategic Studies
Joseph Strayer	Princeton	Medieval History
Cyril Black	Princeton	Soviet Studies
William Langer	Harvard	History
Robert Bowie	Harvard	International Studies
Max Millikan	MIT	International Studies
Raymond Sontag	Berkeley	European History
Calvin Hoover	Duke	Soviet Economics
James Billington	Princeton	History
Lucian Pye	MIT	East Asian Studies

Table iv. Known Military Economic Advisory Panel members drawn from academia[428]

Name	Institution
Holland Hunter	Haverford College
Ed Hewett	Columbia University
D. Gale Johnson	University of Chicago
Ken Dam	University of Chicago Law School
Robert Campbell	University of Indiana
Richard Erickson	Columbia University
Herbert Levine	University of Pennsylvania
William Niskanen	University of California
Lee Badgett	UMass Amherst
Stephen Meyer	MIT
Wesley Posvar	University of Pittsburgh
Thomas Schelling	JFK School at Harvard University
Vladimir Treml	Duke University

[427] Cavanaugh, "Dulles Papers Reveal CIA Consulting Network."
[428] Firth and Noren, *Soviet Defense Spending: A History of CIA Estimates, 1950-1990*.

Part v. Interaction between Princeton University Provost Christopher Eisgruber and CIA official, 2007

Notwithstanding the meeting's substance, this event played out as a comedy of errors. Ms. Bouldin was late for the meeting because she had trouble locating the campus, which Eisgruber found "less than wholly impressive on the part of an intelligence agency." In place of a standard government business card, Ms. Bouldin produced something "that looked like it had been printed on a Dot Matrix printer." She began the conversation by noting that the Agency had wanted to reach out to the Princeton administration for a long time, but had been reluctant since University president Shirley Tilghman hailed from Canada, and was therefore a "foreign national." Eisgruber politely informed her that, as Tilghman's deputy, he would be sharing the content of this meeting with her, to which Bouldin readily consented. According to Eisgruber, "This was just too ridiculous. It was either incompetence or just plain insulting that the CIA would not talk to the president of an American university because she was a Canadian." When Eisgruber brought up the suspicious business card, Ms. Bouldin noted that it was standard practice for covert agents to print their identification materials in such a style. "You're a covert outreach agent?" Eisgruber inquired incredulously, and Bouldin answered in the affirmative. Now convinced that she was a fraud, Eisgruber contacted the University's Public Safety to inform them of a potential CIA impersonator on campus. Princeton's F.B.I. contact later confirmed that Bouldin was, in fact, a covert CIA agent.

APPENDIX C:

SELECT BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Career synopses – in most cases undocumented – of the intelligence professionals and government officials interviewed for this thesis are reprinted here for the benefit of the historical record.

Anderson, Thornton

Thornton Anderson spent World War II in the Marine Corps working with radar systems. During that time he developed a passion for engineering. In 1948, he graduated from Princeton University with a BSE in Mechanical and Electrical Engineering. His first job was working for the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company in Akron, Ohio. Anderson was a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps reserve when the Korean War broke out, and his unit was called to serve.

Anderson's introduction to the CIA was serendipitous. Prior to going to Korea, Anderson was training in amphibious operations at Camp Lejune, North Carolina. In the officer's quarters, the man in the bunk below Anderson was a CIA employee. Through that friendship, Anderson first learned of the Agency. After the war, Anderson interviewed with the CIA. Even though Goodyear paid top dollar, Anderson had no qualms leaving Akron, which reeked of hydrogen sulfide. Furthermore, Anderson and his wife decided that living in Washington D.C. would allow them to be closer to their native Baltimore, so Anderson accepted the Agency's job offer.

Anderson was put under cover right away in the Clandestine Service as a member of the Technical Services Division. Applying his background in engineering, he developed the tools needed support agent operations, including electronics, photography, optics, disguise, secret writing – all of the tricks associated with spycraft. Anderson worked his way up to be a branch chief in this office.

Anderson did two tours of duty in Vietnam in support of CIA technical operations, first in Danang and later in Saigon. Anderson also led a CIA task force to northern Laos, less than 150 miles from Hanoi, to help defend the Phou Pha Thi mountaintop. This location, called Site 85 by the CIA, housed a large Air Force system – the Strategic Air Command's "Skyspot" radar system, also known as the TSQ-81 – which directed U.S. bombing raids into North Vietnam.

Upon returning to headquarters, Anderson ran an R&D division developing advanced technical equipment, such as modems. In place of the high-speed transistors common in modern modems, Anderson's office used vacuum tubes. In the mid-1970s, Anderson volunteered for an operation in Havana that went awry. Anderson spent the next three years in a Cuban prison.

When Anderson came home from Cuba, he went straight back to work at the Agency, helping to open a new CIA base in Japan. As the functional equivalent of a chief of station

in this post, Anderson oversaw about fifty employees at the Japan post. Anderson returned from Japan to run the Electro-Magnetic division in the Office of Research and Development, doing sophisticated research in lenses and photography equipment. In early 1980, Anderson retired from the Agency.

Bull, Richard

Richard Bull graduated from Princeton University with a degree in English in 1954. Out of college he joined the Counterintelligence Corps, which sent him for two years to Berlin. In 1958, Bull joined the Operations Directorate of the CIA, where he spent his first year in the junior officer training corps. Deciding that she did not want to sit around at home, Bull's wife joined the Agency about six months after he did. She received the same training, but was sent on tours under contract, rather than as a full time office. Nevertheless, she spent 34 years with the Agency, and was with Richard at each step of the way. The two began in the DO's Eastern European Division.

From 1960 to 1961, Bull and his wife spent a year studying Polish at the Foreign Service Institute. From 1961 to 1966, Bull and his wife worked in Vienna. From 1976 to 1979, the two were sent to Brussels, where Richard ended up the Deputy Chief of Station. From 1979 to 1986, the pair returned to headquarters. During one of his headquarters tours, Richard served as the head of the Systems Procurement Division, which was a part of the Office of Signals Operations working closely with NSA to acquire code system.

From 1986 to 1989, the Bulls worked as case officers in London, where Richard again became the Deputy Chief of Station. From 1989 to 1991, Bull served as the head of Senate Affairs in the CIA's Office of Congressional Affairs. In 1991, Bull retired at 59 years old. At that point, his retirement salary matched his Agency salary, so it seemed like a good time to stop.

Burrows, Mathew

Currently the Counselor of the National Intelligence Council an director of its Analysis and Production Staff, Mathew Burrows joined the CIA in 1986 in the Directorate of Intelligence analyzing Western Europe. For a period, he ran the NIC Associates program, formerly the Global Expertise Reserve Program and today the IC Associates. In 1998, he became the first holder of the Intelligence Community Fellowship, taking a year off from the CIA to work at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Cave, George

When George Cave graduated from high school in 1947, he decided to try a military career. In 1948, Cave spent the year learning Farsi at a government language school in Monterrey, CA. In June 1949, Cave joined the Armed Forces Security Agency, then America's top-secret SIGINT operators. During the Korean War, Cave befriended a Princeton professor, then a reserve lieutenant commander in the Navy, who convinced him a few colleagues to go to Princeton after the war.

In 1955, during his junior year at Princeton, Cave was approached by the Arabian-American oil company, which offered him a lucrative summer internship in Saudi Arabia. The

company was rapidly expanding – in 1955 it had its first million barrel a day output – and when Cave came back for his senior year, the company offered him a job. However, Cave wanted to get married before he graduated. When the oil company asked him to postpones his wedding, Cave decided to try out an offer from the Agency, which had recruited him for his background in Middle Eastern studies.

Enrolling in the junior officer training program in 1956, Cave was given big operational responsibilities early on. In 1955, the Soviet Union had visited Kabul and offered the Afghans a $100 million loan for development. In his effort to beef up the CIA's Kabul station, DCI Allen Dulles reached out for every capable hand. Thus, after only a couple of months in training, Cave, the only non-Iranian Farsi speaker within the Agency, was deployed to Afghanistan in 1957.

Cave spent his entire Agency career in Near East operations. After Afghanistan, he spent eight years in Iran, five years in Lebanon, three years in Saudi Arabia, three years in Pakistan, and eight years, from 1985 to 1993, at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center. In his most controversial assignment, Cave was the CIA's representative in the delegation that negotiated the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran in the 1980s. In the ensuing Iran-Contra scandal, Cave was investigated by Congress and the FBI, and made five separate appearances in front of a grand jury.

Christison, Bill

Bill Christison graduated from Princeton University in 1950, where he studied Russian language for four years. In his senior year, he applied to both the Foreign Service at the State Department and the CIA. Christison picked the CIA, which offered a considerably higher salary than State. Christison began work at the Agency's Directorate of Intelligence on October 1, 1950 analyzing the Soviet economy. Christison then transitioned into the Office of Current Intelligence.

In the late 1950s, Christison spent a few years at the CIA station in West Germany, which was still a semi-occupied country. He returned to the Office of Current Intelligence at headquarters before joining the staff of the Office of National Estimates. In the late 1960s, Christison did a two and a half year tour at the American embassy in Saigon, Vietnam. From 1971 to 1977, Christison was stateside, where he served as the first National Intelligence Officer for Southeast Asia. From 1977 to early 1978, Christison was the Deputy Director for the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research. In 1978, Christison was promoted to be the Director of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, a rapidly expanding office of 200 people. In January 1979, Christison retired from the Agency, but three decades later continues to write on international affairs.

Christison, Kathy

Kathy Christison's mother was a translator of the Vietnamese language employed by the CIA. The Agency had a program whereby it hired the children of its employees for the summer, and Kathy participated in this initiative several times growing up. In 1962, her parents were transferred to the CIA outpost in Vietnam. At that point, Kathy took leave from her junior year in college to work as a court typist at the US embassy in Saigon.

In 1966, Kathy finally convinced the Agency to hire her as a full time staff officer. Given her background, she was sent back to Vietnam, where she worked under one Bill Christison, her future husband. In 1971, she accompanied Bill back to Langley, where she worked as an analyst of Middle Eastern affairs until 1979.

Close, Ray

Ray Close grew up in Beirut, Lebanon. His father, a chemist, was the Dean of Arts and Sciences at the University of Beirut. At Princeton University, Close studied Arabic and served in a reserve unit with Robert Goheen, then an Assistant Professor of Classics and later the president of Princeton. Close's brother Art, five years his senior, had served in the same reserve unit. After joining the CIA in 1950, Art convinced the Agency to recruit his younger brother as well.

After graduating from Princeton in 1951, Ray transitioned immediately into the Near East division CIA's Directorate of Operations. His first assignment, from 1952 to 1957, was to Beirut, Lebanon, under cover as a Foreign Service Officer. From 1957 to 1962,he served in Egypt, first as a case officer in Cairo, then as the chief of station at Alexandria. For the 1963-64 academic year, Case went to Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School as a mid-career fellow, sponsored by the National Institute of Public Affairs. Close then returned to CIA headquarters in Washington for a year, before returning overseas as the chief of base in Lahore, Pakistan from 1965 to 1967. From 1968 to 1970, Close was the deputy chief of station in Islamabad. For the final seven years of his CIA career, Close was the chief of station in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He retired in February of 1977, staying in Saudi Arabia for another seven years to work as an adviser to various American companies.

Cochran, Garret

Garret Cochran graduated from Princeton in 1956 with a degree in Chemical Engineering. Over the next two years, he earned a master's degree in Industrial Management at MIT. In the summer of 1958, Cochran was recruited into the CIA. When Cochran was drafted in February 1959, the CIA did not pull a deferment for him, so he served in the Army for two years. At first, Cochran was assigned to be a clerk typist, but successfully lobbied for a transfer into the Army Chemical Corps. By doing analytic work on the chemical and biological capabilities of Free World countries, Cochran learned primarily about the functioning and efficacy of different chemical warfare agents.

When Cochran returned to the Agency, he was now considered something of an expert in chemical and biological warfare. Within the Directorate of Intelligence, Cochran studied the impact of chemical industry on the economies and military capabilities of Communist countries, as well as the industry's effect on foreign trade and technology development. By analyzing the chemical industry's role in strategic weapons, especially missile systems, Cochran also became known as an expert in the tools that support warfare. Cochran became a nuclear weapons analyst as well during the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

From 1968 to 1978, Cochran was loaned by the Directorate of Intelligence to the community-wide effort overseeing imaging satellite programs. This unit coordinated the effort between those who designed, built and operated reconnaissance satellites, and those

who used the data in analytic reports. Originally named COMOR, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, in the mid-1960s, Cochran's outfit was renamed COMIREX, the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation. In 1977, they brought online the KH-11, America's first satellite to stream its feeds in real-time.

Cochran spent the academic year 1978 to 1979 at Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School, taking a respite from the psychologically demanding nature of his work. When Cochran returned to the Agency in 1979, he became the top CIA representative to the staff of the National Reconnaissance Organization. Now on the payroll of the Directorate of Science and Technology, Cochran remained within the CIA's arm of the NRO apparatus until 1995, when he retired from the Agency.

Cotter, George

George Cotter spent a 54-year career with the National Security Agency. For 10 years, he was the Agency's Chief Scientist, making him the point person for inquiries from industry and academia about cutting edge research opportunities. Among many other titles, Cotter served as the head of Information Technology, the head of the NSA's Central Information Office, and the Agency's chief of staff. Cotter ended his career with a two-year stint at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as a Senior Adviser to the acquisition program.

Devine, Jim

Jim Devine began his 36-year career in intelligence in 1964. For the first half of that period, Devine worked in a research and development office at the National Security Agency, which evolved into the Deputy Directorate for Research, which then became the Deputy Directorate for Technology, Telecommunications and Computer Systems. Midway through his career, Devine attended the National War College, returning to his old office as the executive assistant to the deputy director. After a year in this position, Devine transitioned to the NSA's operations side. For several years he helped run the national Signals Intelligence Operations Center, where he was the director of policy. Following overseas tours in Turkey and Japan, Devine became the senior NSA liaison officer in London for three years. Devine spent the last six years of his career as the deputy director for support services. In this position, Devine ran all of the NSA's training, medical, security, construction, logistics, and facility management programs. Upon retirement in 2000, Devine became a consultant for Booz Allen Hamilton.

Doran, Michael

Michael Doran has bridged the gap between academia and the policy world. Formerly a professor of Middle Eastern affairs at Princeton University, Doran was appointed the senior director for the Near East and North Africa on the National Security Council by President George W. Bush. Later in the administration, Doran became the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, serving through January 2009. Since then, Doran has returned to academia to teach at New York University.

Downs, Patricia

Patricia Downs joined the Defense Intelligence Agency in the early 1980s as an analyst of the Middle East. She was recently named the DIA's academic outreach coordinator. Her position was created by intelligence community directive 205. She has no staff. Her job is to run a speaker series, improve analytic training in outreach methods, advertise external conferences and lectures, and draft new policies for outreach.

Glerum, Jim

Jim Glerum graduated from Princeton University in 1952 with a bachelor's degree from the department of economics and social institutions and a commission in the US Navy. For two years, Glerum served as an air intelligence officer aboard the aircraft carrier USS Philippine Sea, and for the next two years as a faculty member at the US Naval Academy. In 1956, the Navy offered Glerum a job as a minesweeper in a group whose skipper was preparing to retire. Glerum believes that if he had taken that job, he probably would have been assigned to a sea command after a year or so. Glerum was thinking about the offer on a drive from Annapolis to his home in Fairfield, New Jersey. He stopped by his university alma mater along the way, where a friendly counselor in Princeton's career placement office steered him toward the CIA.

Glerum joined the Agency as a Junior Officer Trainee in July 1956. He served for the next 19 years working under cover within the Directorate of Operations. He spent a portion of this tiking working with Air America Proprietary, the CIA's private aviation company. Glerum was the station manager in Hong Kong and the assistant vice president of operations in Taipei, focusing on missions requiring the use of air assets. From 1975 to 1978, Glerum was the head of the DO element responsible for developing America's covert paramilitary operations. During this time, Glerum co-chaired a joint CIA/DoD committee to ensure working relations between CIA covert operators and DoD special forces. From 1978 to 1981, he ran the DO element responsible for the career development, evaluation, and counseling of all DO personnel.

From 1981 to 1983, Glerum was the head of personnel for the entire Agency, reporting directly to the Director of Central Intelligence and his deputy. In this post, Glerum was responsible for all of the Agency's human resource systems. He oversaw those policies governing everything from recruiting to promotion to post-retirement programs. For the next two years, Glerum headed the effort to develop, maintain and utilize DO's covert paramilitary, propaganda, counter terrorism, and counter narcotics programs. From 1985 to 1987, he was chief of the DO senior staff responsible for liaising with the other CIA directorates and the government at large, coordinating technical support to operations, and providing policy guidance to the directorate. From 1987 until his retirement in January, Glerum was a senior inspector in the Agency's Office of Inspector General.

Harlan, Mark

When Mark Harlan was in high school, he won an Air Force scholarship to study at Princeton University. As a condition of his scholarship, Harlan took a commission as an Air Force intelligence officer upon graduation in 2003. After his compulsory time with the Air

Force, Harlan became a civilian intelligence analyst at the US Navy. He has spent multiple tours with the Navy SEALs supporting counterterrorism targeting and other tactical operations in Iraq and elsewhere.

Hayes, Joe

Joe Hayes graduated from the University of Wisconsin, where he studied both Russian and Mandarin. A university dean – formerly an OSS officer – took an interest in Hayes and passed his name along to the CIA's Midwest recruiter. Hayes was about to accept a job offer from the CIA when he was awarded a fellowship to do graduate work at Stanford. The Agency recruiter encouraged him to go, noting that the CIA would be saving a spot for him if he opted to take it. In 1963, Hayes decided to leave Stanford and join the Agency, which assigned him to the Directorate of Operations.

Hayes' first tour was in Moscow, one of the most challenging assignments during the heart of the Cold War. After two years there, Hayes spent a year in Washington, DC studying consular law. Hayes was next assigned to Berlin for another two-year tour. Assuming the cover of a State Department official, Hayes did economic analysis, even though he had no background in the area. Essentially, Hayes was the economics officer for what would be the East Germany consulate, had the US maintained one.

As Hayes' interest in economics increased, he realized that he had not fully prepared himself for a career in intelligence. Having now completed two of the Agency's most difficult assignments, Hayes asked his superiors if he could return to graduate school for some selective coursework. Management refused, so Hayes resigned in 1970. He applied to and was accepted by the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University using only his State Department background and references, since he was under a solemn obligation not to blow his cover. The university provided married-student housing for Hayes and his wife, a small apartment in Lawrence Court, New Jersey that paled in comparison to their arrangements in Berlin. After finishing his graduate degree, Hayes served as the assistant director of the Wilson School's graduate program for several years.

Around 1974, the CIA approached Hayes again. At that time, Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger was insisting that the Agency make more of a systematic effort to understand its activities. Hayes was brought on to be a founding director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, then a component of the Office of Training. Hayes then returned to the operations directorate developing and managing sophisticated clandestine collection systems. In 2001, Hayes retired from the Agency and went to work at Booz Allen Hamilton, but continued to consult for the DCI's new internal think tank – the Red Cell – under the direction of Charlie Allen and Joan Dempsey.

Hazlewood, Leo

Leo Hazlewood spent 23 years in the intelligence world. He joined the CIA in 1976 as an econometrician within the Directorate of Intelligence's Office of Economic Research. He ran the DI's information technology element for a period, and then drifted into financial management, becoming the Agency's deputy comptroller and then comptroller. Hazlewood was then put in charge of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. Hazlewood then

managed worldwide operational support as the deputy director for administration. From 1993 to 1995, Hazlewood was the Agency's executive director, a position now called the associate deputy director. Essentially, Hazlewood was the CIA's chief operating officer during this time. Hazlewood was then detailed to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency as its first deputy director for operations. He spent four years helping to stand up this new agency, rising to become its deputy director before retiring in early 2000.

Herd, Robert

Bob Herd spent a 31 year career at the CIA, developing technical collection systems, implementing clandestine collection systems overseas, and managing advanced research and development efforts. From 1989 to 1996, Herd was the director of the Agency's Office of Research and Development. Herd then led a task force creating the Clandestine Information Technology Office, which was to focus on how the intelligence community would function in the internet age.

Higgins, Peter

Peter Higgins went to Marist as an undergraduate, then earned a graduate degree in mathematics and computer science from Stevens in Hoboken, NJ. He went straight from graduate school into the CIA, starting in a unit programming mainframe computers in support of the operations of the National Reconnaissance Office. From 1974 to 1980, Higgins worked in the NRO's program office, sworn to secrecy about the very existence of America's reconnaissance satellite program. From 1980 to 1986, Higgins worked in the National Photographic Interpretation Center. While there, he won a fellowship from the American Political Science Association. He studied for about three months at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, then spent the next ten months working on Capitol Hill. He spent five months in the Senate and five in the House, sharpening an expertise in the international narcotics trade. In the late 1980s, Higgins became a group chief at the Office of Research and Development. From 1990 to 1992, he worked on the staff of the Director of Central Intelligence developing strategies to better leverage information technology. In 1992, Higgins went on detail to the FBI to help manage its new $600 million fingerprint scanning system, and spent the rest of his career with the Bureau.

Hitz, Fred

While a senior at Princeton University in 1961, Fred Hitz's name was passed along to CIA recruiters by William Lippincott, then dean of the students. Hitz initially turned down an offer from the Agency, opting to attend law school first instead. In 1966, Hitz entered the Directorate of Operations, serving multiple tours in Africa. In 1974, Hitz left the Agency to practice law until 1980. From 1980 to 1982, Hitz returned to the Agency as the deputy director of the European operations desk. He then worked in the CIA's office of legislative affairs. In 1990, Hitz was appointed the Agency's first statutory inspector general, a position he held until retirement in 1998.

Hulnick, Arthur

In 1957, Art Hulnick graduated from Princeton University and took a commission with the Air Force. He served for seven years in the Air Force, then joining the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence as an analyst. In 1985, Hulnick became the academic coordinator within the Office of Public Affairs, at that time a part of the Director's staff. In 1989, Hulnick came to Boston University as an officer-in-residence. He has stayed on the faculty full time.

Hutchings, Robert

After earning his PhD, Bob Hutchings served briefly on the faculty of the University of Virginia. In the 1980s he became the deputy director of Radio Free Europe in Munich, a position he held until 1986. From 1986 to early 1989, Hutchings did his first tour on the National Intelligence Council. He returned to the NIC in the early 1990s as the director of its analytic group under Joseph Nye. From 2003 to 2005, Hutchings served as the chairman of the NIC. In 2009, he came to the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University as a diplomat-in-residence. In 2010 he will assume the position of dean of the LBJ School at the University of Texas.

Jacobs, Mike

Mike Jacobs began his 38-year career with the National Security Agency in 1964. In 1998, NSA Director Ken Minihan appointed Jacobs to lead the Agency's information assurance program. After establishing the NSA's Centers of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance certification program and partnering with Richard Clarke's Cyber Corps initiative to ensure his program's funding, Jacobs retired in 2002. Jacobs has since served as the mayor of College Park, Maryland, an area that boasts very strong relationships with the intelligence world and NSA in particular.

Joel, Alex

Alex Joel is the first Civil Liberties Protection Officer within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a position created by statute in 2004. Prior to this, Joel had served as a privacy and e-commerce lawyer at Marriot International. After September 11, 2001, Joel joined the CIA's office of legal counsel, where he worked until moving to the ODNI.

Johnson, Jameson

Jameson Johnson went to Citadel as an undergraduate, where he was involved in ROTC. He spent his first six years after graduation in the Army artillery corps, working with various light infantry groups. Johnson soon transitioned into the National Security Agency, working either at its headquarters or an embassy abroad for about ten years. Johnson was posted briefly with the Australian army to command a unit there, but in all his other assignments he focused on Middle Eastern issues. From 2002 to 2004, Johnson was selected to be a "military diplomat" at Princeton University, where he earned a two-year Master's degree in Near Eastern studies. Upon graduation, he returned to the NSA. In 2006, he transitioned to the National Reconnaissance Office, performing space-enabled intelligence work. His job

has been to provide an understanding of America's satellite capabilities to ground commanders, understand their operations, and put together a plan to support them. Between 2006 and 2009, Johnson did five deployments to Iraq in support of operations.

Katzenbach, Nicholas

Nicholas Katzenbach left Princeton University in the middle of his junior year. It was 1942, and Katzenbach was itching to fight in World War II. He joined the Army and served through 1945. At that point, he worked out a deal with the Princeton administration. In lieu of an additional year, he would return to campus, write a thesis and sit his exams, and then be awarded his degree. After attending law school, Katzebach joined the counsel's office at the Air Force. He next taught law at the University of Chicago, until in 1961 he joined the Kennedy administration as the Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel. In 1962, Katzenbach was promoted to Deputy Attorney General, and in February 1965 he became President Johnson's Attorney General. In October 1966, Katzenbach became undersecretary of state, a rank he held until 1969. During this period, Katzebach chaired an executive commission to investigate the CIA's funding of the National Student Association.

Kennedy, Richard

Dick Kennedy came to the CIA by a circuitous route. He graduated from Princeton University in 1963 with a degree in chemical engineering. His summer internship that year sparked his interest in foreign affairs, which crystallized when Kennedy spent the rest of 1963 travelling around Europe. After an unhappy stint at the New York Telephone Company in 1964, Kennedy went to Mississippi as a civil rights worker. In 1965, he took and passed the Foreign Service entrance examination. Upon receiving a medical disqualification to join the foreign service, he went to school in Mexico City, taking classes in economics and international relations. He next studied in Italy from 1966 to 1967, and then taught economics at Potsdam University in New York. Between 1969 and 1972, Kennedy earned a PhD from Rice University, where he was recruited into the Directorate of Intelligece. Kennedy spent the next 31 years working an economic analyst of Western Europe, looking particularly at Poland, Hungary and Turkey. In 2003 he retired from the CIA.

Kron, Jennifer

Jennifer Kron is the Director of Community Affairs for the Associate Director of National intelligence for Afghanistan and Pakistan, a six-month-old office. Before this assignment, Kron worked as an assistant to the ODNI's Chief Information Officer. Prior to that, she worked at the Office of Management and Budget for eight years, and the Department of Education before that.

Krongard, A. B. "Buzzy"

Buzzy Krongard graduated from Princeton University in 1958, earned a law degree from the University and Maryland, and then served for three years of active duty in the Marine Corps. Krongard spent the next 29 years in the private sector, coming to work as the Executive Director of the CIA under George Tenet in March 2001. Krongard held this position until September 2004.

Kurtzer, Daniel

Dan Kurtzer is a career State Department official specializing in Near Eastern affairs. After serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Kurtzer became the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, the number three position at the Bureau. Kurtzer was appointed the Ambassador to Egypt by President Clinton, and served as Ambassador to Israel from 2001 to 2005 under President George W. Bush.

Lindsay, Kevin

Kevin Lindsay graduated from University of California – Santa Cruz in 1979. Lindsay joined the CIA's Directorate of Operations right out of college, and he spent the next 20 years doing tours from Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom. By the late 1990s, when Lindsay and his wife noticed that their kids were referring to the US Congress as "Parliament," they decided that it might be a good time to reintegrate into American culture. Lindsay secured a spot in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University to earn a one-year master's degree in public policy from 2000 to 2001. Lindsay then served in Iraq as part of the DO team doing assessments of Iraq's WMD program.

Low, David

David Low majored in chemistry at Princeton University, and then earned a law degree from the University of Virginia. He spent a few years as a corporate finance lawyer on Wall Street, then became a legal counsel to the Export/Import Bank. Low next became the legal counsel to a company whose sole client was the Shah of Iran. From 1982 to 1985, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey brought in Low to serve as an officer on the National Intelligence Council. Low began looking at Iraq's chemical weapons capabilities and the black market trade. When the current National Intelligence Officer for economics stepped down, Low assumed his portfolio as well, focusing on the economy of Nicaragua and the status of the Sandanista government. Low returned to the NIC in 2002 after a bout of part time consulting in the private sector, this time to look at terrorism issues. From 2004 to 2006, Low was the first NIO for Transnational Threats. For his work, Low has been awarded the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

Lowenthal, Mark

Mark Lowenthal has worked on intelligence issues from a variety of angles. Lowenthal has worked in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research as an office director and deputy manager. He was the staff director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from 1995 to 1997, directing the committee's study on the future of the Intelligence Community. From 2002 to 2005, Lowenthal worked under George Tenet and Porter Goss as the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. Lowenthal has been awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the highest honor awarded for service to the intelligence community.

Mathews, David

After David Mathews graduated from Lehigh University in 1962, he worked at the Pennsylvania Power and Light company for a few months. Unable to find satisfaction in this job, in 1965 he joined the CIA. He spent the next two decades working as a contract officer on support projects all over the world, including Laos, Vietnam and Australia. By 1987, Mathews was the head of the Real Estate and Construction division within the deputy directorate of administration, overseeing 108 engineers and 32 technicians who supported the other directorates. At that time, Mathews left the Agency to become an officer-in-residence at Jacksonville State University, where he taught for the next four years. Mathews then taught for a year at Flagler College while still on the Agency payroll, retiring in 1992.

Minihan, Ken

Ken Minihan was the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from the fall of 1995 until the spring of 1996. From 1996 to 1999, he served as the director of the National Security Agency. Minihan has been awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, the highest commendation awarded for service to the intelligence community.

Nelson, Susan

Sue Nelson began working in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 1984. She is currently the director of outreach within the , the new name of an office that has existed for decades. The office of outreach began as the Office of External Research, was renamed the Office of Long Range Assessments and Research, and then became the External Research Staff before its current incarnation.

Noren, James

James Noren enrolled in graduate school at Princeton in 1951 in economics. After taking his general exams in 1953, representatives of the CIA approached him about a job. However, Noren had to defer this offer when he was drafted into the military. After serving in the Army for two years, Noren returned to Princeton as an assistant instructor in the Department of Economics. The CIA extended a new offer, and Noren soon had to choose between taking a full time job at a midwestern college or working in Washington, DC. With the encouragement of a friend already working at the Agency, Noren and his wife chose the latter. In 1960, Noren joined the CIA's Office of Economic Research, where he spent 32 years analyzing the Soviet economy.

Nye, Joseph

Joseph Nye is regarded as the most influential scholar on American foreign policy in the last 20 years. He began teaching at Harvard University in 1964. From 1993 to 1994, he was brought on by Director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey to serve as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He has held a range of other ranking positions both at Harvard and within government.

O'Sullivan, Mary

Mary O'Sullivan began her career with the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence in 1980. In the mid 1980s she was detailed to the Department of Defense for a tour. In 1989, O'Sullivan joined the CIA's political psychology division. In the early 1990s she helped establish the Office of Leadership Analysis within the DI. From 2002 to 2005, O'Sullivan was the first Chancellor of CIA University, the Agency training facility that she helped stand up. In her final years at the Agency, O'Sullivan worked in the CIA element responsible for putting together the President's Daily Brief.

Peck, Thomas

Thomas Peck graduated from Princeton University in 1948 with a degree in psychology. He joined the CIA's Directorate of Operations in the middle of 1950. From 1951 to 1953, he worked in the Saigon office. Peck then returned to headquarters for a tour overseeing the Indochina desk. From 1956 to 1959, Peck returned overseas, this time to Singapore. Peck then came back to work at the Indonesia desk, now as its deputy chief. With the Vietnam War heating up, Peck was called back to Saigon from 1962 to 1966. He followed this tour with four years on the Japan desk at headquarters, which also dealt with Korea and Okinawa. Peck spent the 1970 - 1971 academic year at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. From 1974 to 1977, Peck worked in the CIA staff division reviewing documents submitted under the Freedom of Information Act. In 1977 he retired and tried his hand at freelance photography. But he was soon brought back to the Agency as a consultant on FOIA documents, which he worked on for thirteen more years. In 1991 he retired for good, concluding 41 years of service to the Agency.

Pillar, Paul

Paul Pillar joined the CIA in 1977 as an analyst in the Directorate of Intelligence just after finishing a doctorate in political science at Princeton University. He had originally wanted to be an academic, but the job market was bad at the time, and he preferred to be on the inside of the national security world looking out than vice versa. Pillar quickly rose to be a line manager in the office responsible for Near Eastern and South Asian analysis. In his first fifteen years, he participated in several campus recruiting events, accompanying a representative from the Office of Personnel and describing what it was like to work at the Agency. In the 1990s, Pillar transitioned to the CIA's Counterterrorism Center in the Operations Directorate. From 2000 to 2005, he served as the National Intelligence Officer for Southeast Asia on the National Intelligence Council. Pillar retired from government in 2005, and has now become a teacher at Georgetown University.

Rosenthal, Jack

Jack Rosenthal was Nicholas Katzenbach's when the latter was undersecretary of State. When President Johnson asked Katzenbach to chair a commission looking into the CIA's funding of the National Student Association, he delegated a majority of the work to Rosenthal. Richard Helms, then Director of Central Intelligence and another member of the Katzenbach Commission, agreed to open all of the CIA's files to investigation and answer any questions, but on one condition – only one person could have this access. Rosenthal was

selected as this person. Thus, every day a senior CIA official would come to Rosenthal's office at the State Department carrying a metal briefcase, hand over any documents that Rosenthal had requested, and then sit down all day in the waiting room outside his office. Since he could take nothing home, Rosenthal spent every day reading voraciously in his office, usually until three or four in the morning for several weeks on end. Rosenthal then drafted the language of the final report, which Katzenbach endorsed and passed along to President Johnson.

Rush, Beverly

Beverly Rush is the program manager of the Officer-in-Residence initiative at the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence. She has 13 OIRs in the field as of academic year 2009-2010, and she is currently spearheading a broad review of the initiative's goals and procedures.

Schwarz, Fritz

Fritz Schwarz graduated from law school in 1960 and entered into private practice, where he served with distinction. He was the general counsel of the Church Committee, remarkably selected for this position at 39 years old even though he did not know a single senator. He has continued practicing law since that time.

Tamer, Joe

Joe Tamer had a lifelong affinity for languages. At the Boston Latin School, he had six years of Latin, three years of ancient Greek, and three years of French. After graduating from Dartmouth in 1958, Joe Tamer earned a graduate degree in Oriental Studies from Princeton in 1961, studying Turkish and Arabic. He also spent a summer studying Persian at the University of Michigan. After Princeton, Tamer spent a year and half in the Army in order to fulfill his ROTC obligations. In 1963 he joined the CIA. At first, he worked in the Foreign Documents Division, which was tasked with translating foreign newspapers to meet intelligence requirements. Tamer stayed on when this division merged into the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service, one of the federal government's primary open source resources. Tamer spent the remainder of his career at FBIS, retiring from the Agency in 1997.

Thielmann, Greg

Greg Thielmann spent his career as a Foreign Service Officer at the State Department. He did two tours at State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. From 1990 to 1993, he served as a division chief in the Office of Strategic Affairs. He analyzed topics such as who within the Soviet Union actually had a finger on the nuclear trigger, and the fate of the nuclear arms in the Ukraine if the USSR dissolved. From 1998 to 2002 he returned to the same office, becoming an officer director for part of the time. His final position at INR was acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs.

White, Nat

Nat White is at the tail end of a 32-year career at the CIA. He joined the Agency's Directorate of Intelligence in 1978, and is currently a political analyst of a sensitive region of the world. He is retiring in the summer of 2010.

Whiton, Winsor

Winsor Whiton graduated from Wisconsin's Lawrence University in 1967 with a degree in Slavic linguistics. Originally planning to join the Slavic Department at the University of Southern Illinois, he opted to join the Navy in order to serve in the Vietnam War. After the war, Whiton's background in linguistics earned him a new assignment in the Navy: cryptology. Fascinated by the work, Winsor spent the rest of his career with the 14,000-person Naval Security Group, a military unit that serves the cryptology branch of the National Security Agency. From 1996 to 1998, Whiton did a tour at the NSA as its director of plans, programs and resources. While at the NSA, Whiton formulated and executed multiyear budgets, in addition to overseeing payroll, comptrolling, manpower, and legislative affairs. Whiton returned to the Naval Security Group from 1998 to September 2001 as its commander. He concluded his distinguished career by serving for one year directly beneath the Chief of Naval Operations at the Pentagon, helping to chart the Navy's role in the early days of the global war on terror.

Wides, Burt

Burt Wides was a senior investigator for the Church Committee, mainly focusing on the CIA's role in international assassinations and Operation CHAOS. He was designated to work on the committee by Phil Hart, the Democratic senator who was originally meant to chair the committee, but could not for health reasons.

Wippl, Joe

Joe Wippl went to Marquette as an undergraduate, and then the University of Minnesota to earn a graduate degree in history. In 1972, Wippl joined the CIA as an operations officer. Over his career, he worked in Germany, Guatemala, Luxemburg, Madrid, Mexico City, Vienna, and Berlin. From 1992 to 1994, Wippl was the deputy chief of human resources for the DO, overseeing counseling programs and promotion panels. Wippl was a member of the Ames Damage Assessment Team, then chief of the DO's Europe Division at headquarters. From August 2006 until his retirement from the Agency in 2008, Wippl was an officer-in-residence at Boston University, where he remains a lecturer in international relations.

Zelikow, Philip

During the Bush administration, Philip Zelikow was the counselor to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice. Prior to that, he was the executive director of the 9/11 Commission. From 1991 to 1998, Zelikow was a co-director, along with Ernie May, of Harvard's Intelligence and Policy program and an associate professor at the university.

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