

# AC3.0 U.S.A. 1980-2060 Diagnosis and Prediction of U.S. Societal Health: An Agency Calculus 3.0 Analysis

## Part I: A Diagnostic Analysis of U.S. Agency (1980–2025)

### Introduction: The Calculus of Choice Space

This report presents a comprehensive diagnosis of the societal health of the United States from 1980 to 2025, followed by a predictive forecast to 2060. The analysis is conducted exclusively through the rigorous framework of the Agency Calculus 3.0, a moral and analytical system designed for the ethical evaluation of complex systems.<sup>1</sup>

The Agency Calculus posits that the ultimate measure of a society's health is the net flow of agency it provides to its members. "Agency" is defined as the multifaceted "choice space" of any sentient being—a holistic composite of their potential, including their economic control, physical well-being, cognitive freedom, social mobility, and political power. It is the sum total of what an individual is free to do and to be.<sup>1</sup>

Within this framework, moral axioms are defined with computational clarity. An act or system is "good" if it actively cultivates or expands the agency of others. The highest good is the creation of systems that produce positive-sum outcomes, raising the baseline agency of the most vulnerable and fostering feedback loops of empowerment. Conversely, an act or system is defined as "evil" if it involves the *forcible reduction* of another agent's choice space. A healthy society, therefore, is one that systematically expands net agency over time, while an unhealthy society is one where agency stagnates or contracts for its members.<sup>1</sup>

This diagnosis will proceed by examining five core domains of agency: Economic, Health, Educational, Political, and Social. The analysis will employ key concepts from the Agency Calculus 3.0, including **Agency Debt** (the accumulated claims against the future agency of individuals and systems), **Epistemic Debt** (the societal cost of institutionalized falsehoods that prevent accurate diagnosis and problem-solving), and the **Othering Barrier** (the psychological dehumanization of a group, identified as a preparatory act for future, forcible agency reduction).<sup>1</sup> By applying this lens, this report seeks to move beyond conventional metrics of national performance to render

a more precise and morally coherent judgment on the state of the American system.

## **Section 1: Economic Agency – The Great Decoupling and the Rise of Agency Debt**

The period from 1980 to 2025 was defined by a profound and dangerous schism in the American economic system: a fundamental decoupling of macroeconomic growth from the economic agency of the median citizen. While aggregate metrics like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) painted a picture of immense and growing prosperity, a deeper analysis reveals that the "choice space" of the average American was progressively squeezed by stagnant real wages, soaring inequality, and an unprecedented accumulation of debt. This section argues that the U.S. economy, rather than cultivating agency, transitioned into a system that systematically generated **Agency Debt**, mortgaging the future freedom of its people to sustain the illusion of broad-based prosperity.

### **Aggregate Growth vs. Median Reality**

On the surface, the U.S. economy performed exceptionally. It solidified its position as the world's largest economy by nominal GDP, projected to exceed \$30 trillion in 2025.<sup>2</sup> Real GDP per capita, a measure of economic output per person, also showed significant growth over the period.<sup>4</sup> However, these top-line figures obscure a more troubling reality. The economic gains were not broadly shared. Real median household income—the inflation-adjusted income of the household at the 50th percentile—grew far more slowly than the overall economy and experienced long periods of stagnation, particularly from the early 1980s through the early 2010s.<sup>5</sup> From 1980, U.S. GDP per capita increased by over 67%, while median household income rose by only 15%, a stark illustration of this divergence.<sup>6</sup> This gap between aggregate wealth creation and the lived economic reality of the median family is the primary symptom of the Great Decoupling.

### **The Rise of Inequality**

The engine driving this decoupling was a dramatic and sustained rise in income and wealth inequality. The Gini coefficient, a standard measure of income distribution where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 represents perfect inequality, provides clear evidence of this trend. After taxes and benefits, the U.S. Gini coefficient began a steady climb from the 1980s onward.<sup>7</sup> One analysis found that U.S. income inequality increased by approximately 20% from 1980 to 2016 alone.<sup>8</sup> By 2022, the World Bank reported a Gini index of 41.3 for the U.S., significantly higher than the average for other developed nations.<sup>9</sup>

This shift is further illuminated by the changing distribution of aggregate income. From 1970 to 2018, the share of total national income held by middle-income households collapsed from 62% to 43%. Over the same period, the share captured by upper-income households surged from 29% to 48%.<sup>8</sup> This was not merely a transfer of wealth but a fundamental restructuring of the economy, concentrating economic agency in the hands of a shrinking portion of the population.

## **The Accumulation of Agency Debt**

To compensate for stagnant wages and maintain a semblance of a middle-class lifestyle, American households were compelled to take on historic levels of debt. This debt represents a direct form of **Agency Debt**: a claim against the future choices, opportunities, and labor of the borrower. The ratio of household debt to GDP provides a stark measure of this trend. It rose from 43% in 1982 to 62% by 2000 and continued to climb, peaking near the 2008 financial crisis.<sup>10</sup> After a period of deleveraging, it remained at a historically high level of approximately 72% in the third quarter of 2024.<sup>12</sup> This massive expansion of debt, primarily in mortgages and later, student loans, became a structural feature of the economy, papering over the fundamental problem of wage stagnation while dramatically reducing the financial resilience and future "choice space" of millions.<sup>14</sup>

## **Labor and Poverty**

Trends in the labor market and poverty further underscore the system's failure to cultivate agency. The labor force participation rate, after peaking at 68.1% in 1997, entered a long-term decline, settling at a much lower 62.3% by early 2025.<sup>16</sup> This indicates a shrinking pool of active economic participants. Simultaneously, despite decades of overall economic growth, the official poverty rate remained stubbornly persistent. It fluctuated between a low of 10.5% in 2019 and a high of 15.2% in 1983, showing no sustained downward trend and ending the period at 11.1% in 2023.<sup>17</sup> From the perspective of the Agency Calculus, a system that generates trillions in wealth but fails to lift its most vulnerable members out of poverty is failing its "Positive Imperative" to raise the baseline agency of all.<sup>1</sup>

The continued reliance on GDP as the primary indicator of national health, while the underlying agency of the median citizen eroded, represents a profound accumulation of **Epistemic Debt**. It is a systemic misrepresentation of reality that has allowed powerful agents to declare success based on aggregate figures while the foundational economic security of the populace decayed. This institutionalized falsehood has prevented accurate diagnosis and delayed necessary corrective action for decades. The economic model that dominated this period did not merely fail to expand agency for many; it actively reduced it by substituting genuine income growth with debt. This has systematically increased the vulnerability of the median citizen, pre-loading the system with fragility. The Agency Calculus's **Vulnerability Amplifier** principle warns that the harm of any future agency-reducing act, such as a recession or job loss, is magnified in proportion to the victim's pre-existing vulnerability.<sup>1</sup> By loading households with debt, the economic system of 1980-2025 has ensured that the next major downturn will inflict a disproportionately severe and potentially irreversible loss of agency on tens of millions of Americans.

Year	Real GDP per Capita (2017\$)	Real Median Household Income (2023\$)	Gini Coefficient (After Tax)	Household Debt to GDP (%)	Labor Force Participation Rate (%)
1980	\$28,726	\$58,930 (1984)	0.347	~43 (1982)	63.8
1990	\$41,257	\$65,990	0.384	~55	66.5
2000	\$54,942	\$70,780	0.394	62.2	67.1
2010	\$58,259	\$68,010	0.404	86.6	64.7

2020	\$64,303	\$79,560	0.418 (2019)	75.9	61.7
2025	\$89,105 (Nominal)	\$80,610 (2023)	41.8 (2023)	~72 (2024)	62.3

**Table 1: Key Indicators of U.S. Economic Agency (1980-2025).** Note: Data points are from the specified year or the closest available year as noted. GDP per capita is from multiple sources and may reflect different base years. Gini and Debt figures are from multiple sources with slightly different methodologies, but show a consistent trend. Sources:.<sup>2</sup>

## Section 2: Health Agency – The Paradox of Expensive Stagnation

The American health system from 1980 to 2025 stands as a stark example of systemic failure when measured by the Agency Calculus. It is a story of negative productivity, where exponentially increasing financial inputs have yielded stagnant, and in some cases declining, outcomes in the physical agency of its citizens. Despite consuming a larger share of national wealth than any other developed country, the system has failed to protect its population from a rising tide of chronic disease, mental despair, and falling life expectancy. It has become a primary vector for the reduction of not only health agency but also economic agency, imposing crushing financial burdens that create vicious cycles of loss.

### Life Expectancy Stagnation and Decline

The most fundamental measure of health agency is the length and quality of one's life. For much of the 20th century, the U.S. saw steady gains in this area. However, this progress faltered and then reversed during the period of analysis. After peaking at approximately 78.8 years in 2014, U.S. life expectancy began a decline, dropping sharply to 76.3 years by 2021 in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, before a slight recovery to 79.4 years projected for 2025.<sup>21</sup> This stagnation and decline, which began even before the pandemic, stands in sharp contrast to the continued gains made in

most other high-income nations and represents a profound, aggregate loss of the most basic form of agency for the entire population.<sup>22</sup>

## **The Chronic Disease Epidemic**

Underpinning the decline in life expectancy is an explosion of chronic, agency-reducing illnesses. These conditions, such as heart disease, diabetes, obesity, and arthritis, are often ongoing and incurable, permanently diminishing an individual's "choice space" by limiting their physical capabilities and requiring constant management.<sup>23</sup> The number of Americans suffering from at least one chronic condition surged from an estimated 118 million in 1995 to 133 million by 2005, with projections reaching 164 million by 2025.<sup>23</sup> In 2020, approximately 60% of U.S. adults were living with at least one chronic condition, and 40% were managing multiple conditions.<sup>24</sup> This escalating burden of disease, much of which is preventable, is a direct failure of the system's "Positive Imperative" to cultivate health agency.

## **Deaths of Despair and Infant Mortality**

The erosion of health agency is also evident in metrics of mental well-being and early-life vulnerability. After years of decline, the age-adjusted suicide rate began to climb steadily after 2002, increasing 30% to a peak of 14.2 deaths per 100,000 in 2018, the highest rate in decades, before fluctuating around that level through 2022.<sup>25</sup> These "deaths of despair" are a tragic and direct indicator of extreme agency loss at the individual level.

Similarly, while the U.S. infant mortality rate improved significantly over the period, falling from 12.6 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 5.5 by 2023, its rate of improvement has been slower than in many peer nations, and the U.S. continues to post worse outcomes than most other developed countries.<sup>27</sup> This persistent gap points to systemic weaknesses in providing foundational health agency at the very start of life.

## The Burden of the Uninsured

A critical factor in this systemic failure is the inconsistent and costly nature of health insurance. For much of the period, particularly before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, the number of uninsured Americans steadily grew as the system of employer-sponsored coverage eroded.<sup>28</sup> In 1980, the uninsured rate was approximately 13.9%.<sup>30</sup> By 2010, on the eve of reform, 18.2% of the non-elderly population—48.2 million people—lacked any health coverage.<sup>31</sup> The ACA dramatically reduced this number, with the uninsured rate falling to a historic low of 7.9% by 2023.<sup>32</sup> However, for the majority of the 1980-2025 period, tens of millions of people faced a direct, prohibitive barrier to accessing the care needed to maintain or restore their health agency.

The U.S. health system demonstrates a catastrophic case of negative productivity in agency terms. It consumes immense economic resources—a far greater percentage of GDP than any peer nation—while failing its "Positive Imperative" to cultivate the health agency of its population. The return on this massive investment, measured in outcomes like life expectancy, is negative compared to its peers.

Furthermore, the system's structure actively transforms a loss of health agency into a catastrophic loss of economic agency. A serious illness or injury is not just a physical crisis but a financial one. Medical debt is a leading cause of personal bankruptcy in the U.S., representing a direct mechanism by which the system imposes a crippling **Agency Debt** on the sick and vulnerable. This creates a devastating downward spiral: a reduction in health agency triggers a severe reduction in economic agency, which in turn makes it harder to afford the care needed to recover health. This structure is the antithesis of the resilient, positive-feedback loops that a healthy, agency-cultivating system should foster.

Year	Life Expectancy at Birth (Years)	Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000)	Americans with Chronic Conditions (Millions)	Age-Adjusted Suicide Rate (per 100k)	Non-Elderly Uninsured Rate (%)
1980	73.6	12.6	~118 (1995)	11.9 (MI data)	13.9
1990	75.2	9.4	~118 (1995)	12.4 (Prison data)	~14.0
2000	76.6	7.1	125	10.4	~15.0
2010	78.5	6.2	141	12.1	18.2
2020	77.0	5.5	157	13.5	12.1 (2019)
2025	79.4 (proj.)	5.5 (2023)	164 (proj.)	14.2 (2022)	7.9 (2023)

**Table 2: Key Indicators of U.S. Health Agency (1980-2025).** Note: Data points are from the specified year or the closest available year as noted. Chronic condition figures are interpolated/projected from source data. Suicide rate for 1980 is from a state-level source as national data for that specific year was limited in the provided materials. Uninsured rate is for non-elderly where available. Sources:<sup>21</sup>

### Section 3: Educational Agency – The Credential Trap and the Debt Anchor

The American educational system underwent a paradoxical transformation between 1980 and 2025. On the surface, it appeared to be a story of expanding opportunity, with record numbers of citizens pursuing and achieving higher levels of education. However, a deeper analysis through the Agency Calculus reveals a system that created a "credential trap." The pursuit of educational credentials, increasingly necessary for economic survival, was financed by a ruinous explosion of student debt. For millions, the quest for expanded cognitive and economic agency resulted in a net loss of lifetime agency, as they were anchored to decades of financial servitude. The



system morphed from an engine of opportunity into a primary driver of **Agency Debt**.

## **Rising Attainment, Stagnant Outcomes**

The demand for education as a pathway to greater agency was undeniable. High school completion rates for adults aged 25 and over rose steadily, from 68.6% in 1980 to over 90% by 2019.<sup>36</sup> The increase in higher education was even more dramatic. The percentage of adults with a bachelor's degree or higher more than doubled, climbing from 17.0% in 1980 to 36.0% in 2019.<sup>36</sup>

This push for higher credentials, however, was not matched by an improvement in foundational learning. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the nation's report card, showed that K-12 learning outcomes were largely stagnant for decades. Long-term trend scores in math and reading for 9 and 13-year-olds showed little to no significant improvement from the 1980s through the 2010s, followed by a precipitous drop in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.<sup>38</sup> This indicates a systemic failure to cultivate the fundamental cognitive agency of students, even as per-pupil spending increased.<sup>40</sup>

## **The Debt Explosion and the Credential Trap**

The most damaging trend in educational agency was the monetization of access. As states reduced their public funding for higher education, the cost was shifted directly onto students and their families.<sup>41</sup> The price of tuition skyrocketed, increasing at a rate nearly three times that of inflation since the 1970s.<sup>41</sup> To meet these costs, students turned to loans, fueling an unprecedented explosion in

## **Agency Debt.**

Total outstanding student loan debt, a relatively minor issue in 1980, grew to \$329 billion by 2002 and then exploded, surpassing \$1.7 trillion by 2024.<sup>43</sup> The average debt held by a bachelor's degree graduate climbed from under \$10,000 in 1992 to over \$29,000 by 2023.<sup>41</sup> This created the "credential trap": a college degree became a prerequisite for entry into the middle class, but the price of that entry was a multi-decade claim on one's future economic agency. The choice was between the

low-agency path of not having a degree and the low-agency path of being burdened by immense debt.

This dynamic reveals a system that has shifted from cultivating agency to extracting it. The primary "product" of the higher education system for a large segment of its students is no longer just knowledge, but debt. The system creates a coercive choice where, to avoid one form of agency reduction (low-wage work), an individual must accept another (debt peonage). This is not a net expansion of choice space but a forced trade between two constraints, a clear failure from the perspective of the Agency Calculus.

This system also hardens class stratification and violates the **Moral Delta Principle**, which prioritizes lifting agents from low- to high-agency states.<sup>1</sup> Students from wealthy backgrounds can graduate debt-free, starting their careers with maximal economic agency. Students from middle- and low-income backgrounds start their careers with a significant agency deficit. This structural disadvantage makes it vastly more difficult for them to accumulate wealth, purchase homes, or invest in their own children's futures, thereby calcifying intergenerational inequality and reducing social mobility. The "credential trap" is not just a financial problem; it is a structural barrier to the creation of a just and agency-expanding society.

Year	HS Graduation Rate (25+ yrs, %)	Bachelor's Degree Attainment (25+ yrs, %)	Total Student Loan Debt Outstanding (Trillions \$)	Average Debt per Graduate (\$)	NAEP 13-y/o Math Score (0-500 Scale)
1980	68.6	17.0	< \$0.1	\$2,186 (Total per FTE)	269 (1982)
1990	77.6	21.3	~ \$0.1	\$9,200 (1992)	270
2000	84.1	25.6	\$0.229	\$17,480	273
2010	87.1	29.9	\$0.84	~\$24,000 (2012)	283 (2012)
2020	90.1 (2019)	36.0 (2019)	\$1.71	\$30,500	271
2025	>91 (2023)	>38 (2023)	\$1.75	\$29,300 (2023)	271 (2023)

**Table 3: Key Indicators of U.S. Educational Agency (1980-2025).** Note: Data points are from the specified year or the closest available year as noted. Debt figures are

from multiple sources and represent a composite trend. NAEP scores are for the specified year or the closest assessment cycle. Sources:.<sup>36</sup>

## **Section 4: Political Agency – The Erosion of Consent and Liberty**

The political agency of the average American citizen suffered a catastrophic collapse between 1980 and 2025. This was not a single event but a systemic decay driven by four interlocking forces: the evaporation of institutional trust, the rise of toxic political polarization, the capture of the political process by concentrated wealth, and the state's direct, forcible annihilation of agency through the policy of mass incarceration. These trends combined to create a political system that was less responsive to the will of the people and more hostile to their fundamental liberties, accumulating a crippling level of **Epistemic Debt** that rendered it incapable of solving the nation's most pressing problems.

### **The Collapse of Trust and the Rise of Polarization**

The foundation of political agency in a democracy is the consent of the governed, which rests on a bedrock of trust. Over the period of analysis, that bedrock crumbled. Public trust in the federal government, which stood at 73% in 1958, had already fallen to 25% by 1980.<sup>47</sup> After a brief rebound during the Reagan administration and a spike following the 9/11 attacks, trust entered a state of freefall. Since 2007, in every major national poll, fewer than three in ten Americans have expressed trust in the federal government, reaching a near-record low of 16% in 2023 before a modest recovery to 22% in 2024.<sup>48</sup> Gallup polling shows that Americans' concern with "government/poor leadership" as the nation's most important problem has trended sharply upward, consistently ranking as a top concern since the 2010s.<sup>50</sup>

This collapse in trust was both a cause and a consequence of extreme political polarization. The ideological distance between the two major parties widened into a chasm. In 1994, 58% of Republicans identified as conservative; by 2024, that figure had surged to 77%. In parallel, the share of Democrats identifying as liberal more than doubled, from 25% to 55%.<sup>51</sup> This sorting created two distinct political tribes with separate media ecosystems, separate sources of information, and ultimately, separate

realities.

## **The Power of Money and the Annihilation of Agency**

The political agency of the median voter was further diluted by the overwhelming influence of money in politics. Campaign spending grew exponentially. The average cost to win a seat in the House of Representatives exploded from approximately \$407,600 in 1990 to nearly \$2.8 million in 2022.<sup>52</sup> The rise of Super PACs following the

*Citizens United* Supreme Court decision allowed a small number of ultra-wealthy donors to exert disproportionate influence, making the political system far more responsive to their narrow interests than to the broad public will.<sup>52</sup> In the Agency Calculus framework, this represents a profound violation of the

**Burden of Power** principle, where powerful agents (in this case, the wealthy) are held to a higher moral standard. Instead of using their power to cultivate broad agency, the system allows them to purchase political outcomes that often reduce it for others.

The most direct and brutal reduction of agency was the policy of mass incarceration. Beginning around 1980, the U.S. embarked on an unprecedented experiment in imprisonment. The total prison population skyrocketed from 329,000 in 1980 to a peak of over 2.3 million in 2008, an increase of over 220% in the incarceration rate between 1980 and 2014.<sup>54</sup> This policy represents the literal annihilation of agency on an industrial scale, stripping millions of individuals—disproportionately Black and Hispanic men—of their liberty, their right to vote, their economic potential, and their social standing.<sup>17</sup> From the perspective of the Calculus, mass incarceration is a systemic "evil" act: a massive, forcible reduction of agency inflicted by a powerful agent (the state) upon a vulnerable population, an effect magnified by the

### **Vulnerability Amplifier.<sup>1</sup>**

The combined effect of these trends is the accumulation of a vast **Epistemic Debt**. A society crippled by a lack of trust and divided into warring tribes with separate realities loses its capacity for collective deliberation and problem-solving. It can no longer agree on the nature of its problems, let alone formulate and execute solutions. This cognitive paralysis is a meta-crisis that infects every other domain, preventing the nation from addressing its decaying health, failing educational systems, or precarious economic state. The political system, designed to be the primary tool for

cultivating collective agency, has instead become the primary obstacle to it.

Year	Trust in Federal Government (%)	Partisan Ideological Gap (Cons. R% - Lib. D%)	Total Incarceration Rate (per 100k)	Absolute Intergenerational Mobility (%)	Hate Crime Incidents (Total)
1980	25	N/A	220	~90% (1940s cohort)	N/A
1990	~40	N/A	457	~50% (1980s cohort)	N/A
2000	~40	~35 (1994)	683	~50% (1980s cohort)	~9,000 (FBI data)
2010	~22	41	731	~50% (1980s cohort)	~6,600
2020	19	53	505	~50% (1980s cohort)	~8,200
2025	22 (2024)	22 (2024)	541 (2022)	~50% (1980s cohort)	11,862 (2023)

**Table 4: Key Indicators of U.S. Political & Social Agency (1980-2025).** Note: Data points are from the specified year or the closest available year. Trust data is from multiple polls (Pew/Gallup) showing a consistent trend. Partisan Gap is calculated from Gallup data. Mobility data refers to the birth cohort. Hate crime data is subject to reporting changes. Sources:.<sup>47</sup>

**Section 5: Social Agency – The Fracturing of Mobility and Cohesion**

The social fabric of the United States, the intricate web of trust, norms, and shared identity that enables collective action, became increasingly frayed between 1980 and 2025. The core promise of the American social contract—that hard work leads to upward mobility—was broken for a large portion of the population, undermining a key source of social cohesion. In the vacuum left by this broken promise, the forces of political polarization constructed dangerous **Othering Barriers**, dividing the

population into mutually hostile camps and eroding the potential for a shared future. This fracturing of social agency represents a profound threat to the long-term health of the nation.

## **The Collapse of the American Dream**

Social agency is intrinsically linked to the possibility of improving one's station in life. For generations, the narrative of upward mobility, often called "the American Dream," was a powerful unifying force. It suggested that the system was a positive-sum game in which anyone, regardless of their starting point, could achieve a better life for themselves and their children.

Data from this period reveals the stark collapse of this narrative. Groundbreaking research has shown that while more than 90% of American children born in 1940 grew up to earn more than their parents, that figure plummeted to just 50% for children born in the 1980s.<sup>59</sup> This is not merely a statistical fluctuation; it is the quantitative measure of a broken promise. It signifies a transition from a society of broadly shared growth to one of zero-sum competition, where the success of one group is perceived to come at the expense of another. This collapse in mobility directly erodes social agency by constricting the perceived "choice space" of future possibilities for half the population.

## **The Rise of the Othering Barrier**

When a unifying, positive-sum narrative fails, it creates a void that is often filled by divisive, zero-sum narratives. The Agency Calculus 3.0 identifies the creation of an **Othering Barrier**—the psychological dehumanization of a group—as a "critical moral event".<sup>1</sup> This is because such barriers are not merely expressions of opinion; they are a "preparatory act for a future, forceful reduction of agency."

The extreme political polarization detailed previously is the primary engine for building these barriers in the contemporary U.S. It recasts political opponents not as fellow citizens with different ideas, but as illegitimate, immoral, and existential threats. This dehumanizing rhetoric creates the social license for future discriminatory actions. This

trend is further evidenced by data on hate crimes. While reporting is inconsistent, the FBI has consistently recorded thousands of hate crime incidents each year, with 11,862 reported in 2023, primarily motivated by bias against race, religion, and sexual orientation.<sup>60</sup> These acts are the violent manifestation of the Othering Barrier, a direct and forcible reduction of the victims' agency and sense of security.

The social landscape of the U.S. can be analyzed through the lens of the Agency Calculus's **Two-Fold Test for Bounded Communities**.<sup>1</sup> This test evaluates whether a self-contained group is coercive. The first test is the

**Right of Internal Exit:** does the community provide a viable, non-punitive path for members who wish to leave? The second is the **Prohibition of External Coercion:** does the community attempt to forcibly impose its values on outsiders?

Increasingly, the major political and cultural "tribes" in the United States are failing both tests. The social, professional, and familial costs of changing one's political identity have become immense, effectively punishing dissent and limiting the right of internal exit. Simultaneously, the very nature of national politics has become a zero-sum battle where each tribe seeks to use the power of the state to forcibly impose its social and cultural values on the entire country. The nation is devolving into a state of low-grade conflict between two large, mutually coercive communities, a profound loss of collective social agency that creates a fertile ground for future, more severe agency reductions.

## **Section 6: Integrated Diagnosis – Net Agency Flow and Systemic Debt (1980–2025)**

Synthesizing the analyses of the five core domains through the integrated framework of the Agency Calculus 3.0 yields a stark and unambiguous diagnosis. The period from 1980 to 2025 in the United States was one of profound systemic decay, characterized by a negative net agency flow for the median citizen. This decline was masked by misleading aggregate statistics that celebrated top-line growth while ignoring the erosion of the underlying "choice space" for the majority. The nation has accumulated unsustainable levels of both **Agency Debt** and **Epistemic Debt**, creating a deeply fragile system vulnerable to cascading failures.



## Dual-Mode Universal Agency Metric (UAM) Analysis

The Agency Calculus 3.0 employs a **Dual-Mode UAM Calculation** to provide both historical context and an absolute measure of progress.<sup>1</sup>

- **Contemporaneous UAM (c-UAM):** This metric answers the question, "How did the system provide agency for its era?" In the 1980s, compared to its primary geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union, the U.S. offered vastly superior agency across nearly every domain. However, when measured against its contemporary developed-world peers (e.g., Western Europe, Canada, Japan), the U.S. performance is far less impressive. Throughout the period, the U.S. has consistently posted worse outcomes on key agency metrics such as health (life expectancy, infant mortality), economic equality (Gini coefficient), and social cohesion (incarceration rates). Therefore, the c-UAM score for the U.S. must be judged as mediocre at the start of the period and declining relative to its peers by the end.
- **Longitudinal UAM (L-UAM):** This metric answers the question, "How does the system compare to modern standards of human rights and agency?" When the 1980s are measured against a fixed 2025 baseline, they score poorly on issues of social agency (e.g., rights and recognition for women, minorities, and LGBTQ+ individuals) but comparatively well on measures of economic agency (lower levels of household and student debt). Conversely, when 2025 is measured against the same baseline, it scores higher on some measures of social inclusion but catastrophically worse on economic precarity, political cohesion, and institutional trust. The gains in social agency for some groups have been offset by a systemic erosion of economic and political agency for the majority. The overall L-UAM trend is therefore judged to be negative, as the accumulation of systemic debt and fragility outweighs the progress in specific areas.

## Quantifying Systemic Debt

The core of the diagnosis lies in the two forms of systemic debt the nation has accrued.

- **Agency Debt:** This is the quantifiable claim against future agency. It includes the more than \$35 trillion in national debt, which will necessitate future taxes or

reduced services <sup>62</sup>; the nearly \$1.75 trillion in student loan debt, which constrains the life choices of 43 million Americans <sup>43</sup>; the trillions in household debt, which reduces economic resilience <sup>12</sup>; and the unquantified but massive "health deficit"—the future economic and social costs of an exploding chronic disease burden.<sup>23</sup> The diagnosis is a multi-trillion-dollar liability that severely limits the nation's future capacity for action.

- **Epistemic Debt:** This is the societal cost of the collapse in institutional trust and the rise of polarization.<sup>51</sup> It manifests as a national inability to engage in evidence-based, good-faith deliberation to solve collective problems. When a society cannot agree on basic facts, it loses its capacity for moral computation and effective governance. The diagnosis is that this debt has reached a critical level, threatening the foundational operating system of the democracy and making it nearly impossible to address the nation's staggering Agency Debt.

## Final Diagnosis

The United States in 2025 is a nation of contradictions. It remains a high-agency country in the aggregate, possessing immense wealth, military power, and technological prowess. However, it is characterized by a negative net agency flow for its median citizen, an extreme and growing inequality in the distribution of agency, and critical levels of systemic Agency and Epistemic Debt. The core systems meant to cultivate agency—economic, health, educational, and political—are instead producing stagnation, debt, and division. The system is fundamentally unhealthy, unstable, and unprepared for the challenges of the 21st century.

Agency Domain	Key Trend (1980-2025)	Net Agency Flow (Median Citizen)	Key Calculus Diagnosis
<b>Economic</b>	Decoupling of GDP growth from median income; rising inequality.	<b>Negative</b>	Massive accumulation of <b>Agency Debt</b> (household, student). Systemic <b>Epistemic Debt</b> (reliance on flawed GDP metric).
<b>Health</b>	Skyrocketing costs with stagnant/declining life expectancy.	<b>Negative</b>	<b>Negative Productivity</b> (high inputs, poor outcomes). System acts as a vector for economic agency reduction.
<b>Educational</b>	Rising attainment funded by exploding debt; stagnant K-12 outcomes.	<b>Negative</b>	The <b>Credential Trap</b> and <b>Agency Debt Anchor</b> . System functions as an agency extractor, violating the <b>Moral Delta Principle</b> .
<b>Political</b>	Collapse of institutional trust; extreme polarization; mass incarceration.	<b>Negative</b>	Critical <b>Epistemic Debt</b> (paralysis of governance). <b>Agency Annihilation</b> (incarceration) and violation of the <b>Vulnerability Amplifier</b> .
<b>Social</b>	Collapse of upward mobility; fracturing of social cohesion.	<b>Negative</b>	Dissolution of unifying narrative; construction of <b>Othering Barriers</b> . Failure of the <b>Two-Fold Test</b> for Bounded Communities.

**Table 5: U.S. Agency Scorecard (1980-2025) - A Qualitative Synthesis.** Source: Synthesis of all previous sections and the Agency Calculus 3.0 framework.<sup>1</sup>

**Part II: A Predictive Analysis of U.S. Agency (2025–2060)**

## Section 7: Projecting the Core Trajectories

The predictive component of this analysis begins by establishing a baseline forecast, extrapolating the dominant trends identified in Part I from 2025 to 2060. This "business as usual" projection assumes no radical policy interventions or unforeseen exogenous shocks. It serves as the foundation upon which more complex risk analysis can be built.

- **Economic Trajectory:** The trend of slow real wage growth for the median household is projected to continue, while the concentration of wealth and income at the top persists or worsens. The immense overhang of Agency Debt—particularly sovereign debt held by the public, which is on a path to exceed 118% of GDP by 2035<sup>64</sup>, and student loan debt—will act as a powerful brake on economic dynamism. This debt will constrain both public investment and private consumption, leading to an economy characterized by low growth, high inequality, and persistent financial precarity for the majority.
- **Health Trajectory:** The demographic reality of an aging population, combined with the unaddressed epidemic of chronic disease, projects a grim future for health agency. Life expectancy is likely to remain stagnant or decline further relative to peer nations. The healthcare system will consume an ever-increasing share of GDP, crowding out other forms of public and private investment without delivering commensurate improvements in outcomes. The "negative productivity" of the health sector will become an even greater drain on national agency.
- **Educational Trajectory:** The "credential trap" is likely to reach a breaking point. As the cost of higher education continues to outpace inflation and the debt burden becomes more severe, the return on investment for a college degree will become negative for an increasing number of students. This could lead to a crisis of confidence in the higher education system, with declining enrollments and a search for alternative credentialing paths. The failure to improve K-12 outcomes will persist, leaving a large portion of the population without the foundational cognitive agency needed to adapt to a changing economy.
- **Political and Social Trajectory:** The forces of polarization and institutional distrust show no signs of abating. The political system is projected to remain mired in gridlock, further accumulating Epistemic Debt and eroding its capacity for effective governance. The **Othering Barriers** between political tribes will become more entrenched, leading to increased social friction, a continued decline in social cohesion, and a greater risk of political instability and violence.

## Section 8: Systemic Risk Analysis – Amplifiers and Preemptive Diagnosis

Moving beyond simple extrapolation, the Agency Calculus 3.0 provides predictive tools to analyze how the system's accumulated vulnerabilities will interact with future shocks. The diagnosis of high Agency Debt, high Epistemic Debt, and entrenched Othering Barriers points to a system with dangerously low resilience.

### Applying the Vulnerability Amplifier

The **Vulnerability Amplifier** principle states that the evil of an agency-reducing act is magnified in proportion to the victim's pre-existing vulnerability.<sup>1</sup> The U.S. system has spent decades systematically increasing the vulnerability of its median citizens and its core institutions. This analysis will model the amplified impact of two plausible future shocks:

- **Scenario: A Major Climate Shock (e.g., "Mega-Drought" in the Southwest).** A prolonged, multi-year drought, consistent with climate model projections, strikes the American Southwest.
  1. *Initial Shock:* Forcible reduction of agency through loss of water resources, agricultural collapse, and increased risk of wildfires.
  2. *Amplification by Agency Debt:* Low- and middle-income households, already burdened by mortgage and consumer debt, have no financial cushion to adapt. They cannot afford rising water and food prices or the cost of relocation. Many face foreclosure and bankruptcy, a cascading loss of economic agency.
  3. *Amplification by Epistemic Debt:* The polarized political system is incapable of a coherent, science-based response. Federal and state governments are paralyzed by infighting over resource allocation, leading to delayed and inadequate relief. Misinformation flourishes, blaming scapegoats and preventing collective action.
  4. *Amplified Outcome:* What could have been a manageable regional crisis becomes a national catastrophe, leading to mass internal displacement, the collapse of regional economies, and a permanent, irreversible loss of agency for millions.

- **Scenario: A Geopolitical/Economic Shock (e.g., A Global Financial Crisis 2.0).** A major financial crisis originating abroad triggers a global recession and disrupts supply chains.
  1. *Initial Shock:* Job losses, inflation, and a stock market crash reduce the economic agency of the population.
  2. *Amplification by Agency Debt:* Highly leveraged households and corporations are wiped out. The federal government, already carrying massive debt, has limited fiscal capacity to respond with stimulus without triggering a sovereign debt crisis of its own.
  3. *Amplification by Epistemic Debt:* The public, deeply distrustful of financial and government institutions, does not believe official narratives. Political actors exploit the crisis to deepen polarization, blaming either "corporate greed" or "government spending" without offering viable solutions.
  4. *Amplified Outcome:* The recession is deeper and longer than it otherwise would be. Social unrest becomes widespread as economic despair intensifies. The crisis is used as a pretext to further erode democratic norms and civil liberties.

### Applying the Principle of Preemptive Diagnosis

The Agency Calculus 3.0 treats the creation of an **Othering Barrier** not as mere speech, but as a **preparatory act** for a future, forcible reduction of agency.<sup>1</sup> The current state of extreme polarization and dehumanizing rhetoric is therefore a primary warning indicator of impending systemic evil.

The analysis forecasts that, if current trends continue, the political and social license is being actively created for future, targeted agency reductions against out-groups. This could manifest in several ways: the passage of discriminatory laws targeting the rights of specific ethnic, religious, or political minorities; the use of state power to suppress dissent and harass political opponents; large-scale, politically motivated purges of the civil service; or the refusal to certify legitimate election results, leading to a constitutional crisis. The Principle of Preemptive Diagnosis requires that these possibilities be treated not as fringe scenarios, but as the logical endpoint of the current trajectory of building and reinforcing Othering Barriers.

## Section 9: Simulated Futures – Three Scenarios for Agency Flow

Synthesizing the baseline projections and the systemic risk analysis, this report models three distinct, plausible scenarios for the United States between 2025 and 2060. These futures are not predictions of what will happen, but simulations of what could happen depending on the choices made in the coming years.

### Scenario A: The Debt Cascade (High-Risk)

This is the crisis scenario, where the accumulated systemic debts come due. The trigger could be a geopolitical shock, a domestic financial crisis, or a severe climate event. The defining feature of this future is that the compounding **Agency Debt** (sovereign, household, student) and **Epistemic Debt** (political paralysis, institutional distrust) create a cascading failure.

In this scenario, a financial shock leads to a spike in interest rates, making the national debt unsustainable and triggering a sovereign debt crisis. The government is forced into a massive austerity program, slashing social safety nets, education funding, and infrastructure investment. Simultaneously, millions of households, already over-leveraged, default on their mortgages and student loans. The political system, crippled by polarization, is completely unable to mount a coherent response. The crisis is weaponized by political actors to deepen divisions, activating the entrenched **Othering Barriers** to blame minority groups or political opponents for the collapse.

The result is a rapid and systemic reduction in net agency across the entire society. The nation experiences a prolonged depression, with high unemployment, collapsing public services, and a dramatic decline in living standards. Social unrest and political violence become commonplace. The U.S. emerges from the crisis a significantly poorer, less stable, and less free society, with its global power shattered and its social contract broken.

### Scenario B: The Stagnation Trap (Moderate-Risk)

This is the "muddling through" or "managed decline" scenario. The U.S. avoids a single, catastrophic collapse but remains trapped by the immense weight of its systemic debts. In this future, the political will to address the fundamental drivers of agency decline is never found.

Economic growth remains anemic, with any gains continuing to flow to the top, while the median citizen's agency slowly erodes under the pressure of debt and rising costs for essentials like healthcare and housing. Political gridlock becomes a permanent feature of the landscape, preventing any meaningful reform in health, education, or campaign finance. The nation slowly falls behind its global competitors in technology, science, and infrastructure.

Life expectancy continues to stagnate, and the chronic disease burden grows. Social mobility remains low, and society becomes more rigidly stratified. The **Othering Barriers** do not lead to open conflict but result in a cold peace, with different segments of the population living in separate and mutually distrustful social and informational worlds. The United States in 2060 is a hollowed-out version of its former self: a high-inequality, low-trust, low-mobility society that has lost its dynamism and its sense of shared purpose. It avoids the fire of the Debt Cascade but succumbs to a slow institutional rot.

### **Scenario C: The Agency Rebound (Optimistic/Low-Probability)**

This is the optimistic but least likely scenario, requiring a fundamental shift in the nation's political and social trajectory. It is likely triggered by a near-catastrophic crisis that is severe enough to break the political stalemate but not so severe as to cause an irreversible collapse. A new political consensus emerges, centered on the principles of agency cultivation.

Policy shifts are guided by a clear-eyed diagnosis of the nation's systemic debts. A major program of **Agency Debt** deleveraging is undertaken, potentially including broad-based student and medical debt forgiveness, to restore the economic choice space of the younger generations. A concerted effort is made to pay down **Epistemic Debt** through ambitious reforms to campaign finance, voting rights, and regulations aimed at curbing disinformation, all designed to rebuild a foundation of institutional trust and shared reality.



The **"Right to Repair Agency"** becomes a guiding principle of social policy, leading to major investments in communities harmed by decades of disinvestment and mass incarceration. Public resources are strategically shifted from low-ROI, agency-reducing systems (like prisons and high-cost, low-outcome healthcare) to high-ROI, agency-cultivating systems (like high-quality early childhood education, preventative public health, and modern infrastructure).

This creates a virtuous cycle. As the agency of the median citizen begins to expand, trust in institutions starts to recover. The **Othering Barriers** begin to break down as a renewed sense of shared purpose and positive-sum opportunity takes hold. The United States in 2060, in this scenario, has begun to reverse the decades of decline, fostering a new era of innovation, social cohesion, and broadly shared prosperity.

## **Section 10: Conclusion and Recommendations – A Blueprint for Agency Cultivation**

The diagnosis rendered by the Agency Calculus 3.0 is severe: the United States, from 1980 to 2025, has presided over a systemic decline in the net agency of its median citizen, accumulating dangerous levels of both Agency Debt and Epistemic Debt. The nation stands at a precipice, facing futures that range from catastrophic collapse to managed decline, with only a narrow and difficult path to a genuine rebound. The choice of which future to pursue remains a human one. The purpose of the Calculus is not to dictate that choice, but to make its moral consequences transparently clear.

The "Positive Imperative" of the framework demands action to actively cultivate agency. A strategic blueprint for reversing the negative trends must be grounded in addressing the systemic debts that are crippling the nation. The following recommendations are derived directly from this imperative:

1. **Deleverage Systemic Agency Debt:** The crushing weight of debt is the single greatest constraint on the future agency of millions. A national strategy must focus on deleveraging this burden. This includes immediate policy considerations for broad-based student loan forgiveness and reforms to cap the future growth of educational debt. It also requires a fundamental restructuring of the healthcare system to break the link between illness and financial ruin, thereby eliminating medical debt as a primary driver of bankruptcy.
2. **Pay Down National Epistemic Debt:** A society that cannot agree on facts

cannot solve its problems. Rebuilding a shared reality is a prerequisite for any other reform. This requires a frontal assault on the sources of Epistemic Debt. Key policy areas include aggressive campaign finance reform to reduce the influence of money and increase the responsiveness of the political system to citizens; federal legislation to protect and expand voting rights to ensure the legitimacy of the democratic process; and exploring new regulatory frameworks for digital media to curb the spread of corrosive disinformation without infringing on core liberties.

3. **Dismantle the Othering Barriers:** The Principle of Preemptive Diagnosis identifies the current state of polarization and dehumanizing rhetoric as a national security threat—a preparatory act for future, forcible agency reduction. Countering this threat requires a conscious, national effort. Leadership from all sectors—political, civic, and corporate—must actively condemn dehumanizing language and promote narratives of shared identity and destiny. Policies should be designed to reduce geographic and economic segregation, which are the physical architecture of the Othering Barriers.
4. **Reallocate Resources to Agency-Cultivating Systems:** The nation's resources must be strategically shifted away from systems that produce negative agency returns and toward those with high agency returns. This means a fundamental re-evaluation of public spending. It involves redirecting funds from low-ROI systems like mass incarceration and high-cost, late-stage "sick care" toward high-ROI investments in agency cultivation. The highest priorities for this reinvestment should be: high-quality early childhood education, which provides the greatest lifetime return on agency; preventative public health, which reduces the future burden of chronic disease; and modern, resilient infrastructure, which creates the physical platform for economic and social opportunity, especially for the most vulnerable communities.

The path forward is difficult and requires a radical departure from the trajectory of the past 45 years. However, the Agency Calculus framework provides a clear compass. By making the cultivation of human agency the central organizing principle of public policy, it is possible to reverse the decay, pay down the systemic debts, and begin the work of building a more just, prosperous, and free future.

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