

Introduction

This study examines the relationship between the legal and illegal tobacco markets in South Africa. Section discusses the data used and how it was cleaned. Section explains the methodology, where a VECM model is presented. The final section details discussion points (). The appendix contains the full model outputs.

The Illicit Tobacco Market

The health problems associated with tobacco consumption are significant and have been well-documented (Tingum et al, 2020:62). Worldwide, smoking is one of the leading causes of preventable deaths; and in South Africa 23% of the total deaths in 2018 were smoking-related (Statistics South Africa). Given the large and negative impact of smoking, the tobacco market has come under increasing scrutiny by governments and health organizations. A significant component of the tobacco market is the illicit cigarette trade, which the Financial Action Task Force (2012:7) defines as "...the supply, distribution and sale of smuggled genuine, counterfeit or cheap white tobacco products."

The illicit tobacco market gives rise to concern on three main fronts: public health, tax evasion, and criminal activity. From a public health perspective, illicit cigarettes make smoking more affordable and thereby increases tobacco access (van der Zee et al, 2019:242). Cheaper cigarettes may induce non-smokers to smoke, increase the volume of cigarettes consumed by smokers, and decrease the likelihood that smokers will quit smoking (Pechacek et al, 2018:pagenumber; van der Zee et al, 2019:242).

According to the International Agency for Research on Cancer, tobacco use is more prevalent among low socio-economic groups, and the poor are more sensitive to cigarette prices (IARC, 2011:276). Consequently, the health problems linked to smoking are disproportionately higher among the poor, which results in a greater burden on the public healthcare sector (). In South Africa, the healthcare costs associated with smoking amounted to R14.48 billion in 2016, which accounted for 4.1% of health spending (). In addition to the healthcare costs, there are indirect costs linked to smoking such as the loss of productive lives and loss of productive days due to illness (Boachie et al, 2020). In 2016, the total cost of smoking to South Africa was R42.32 billion (0.97% of GDP).

Evidently, the public health and economic costs of tobacco use are extensive. In an effort to reduce tobacco use, many countries have implemented tax and price policies on tobacco products (Chaloupka, Straif, Leon). For a middle-income country, South Africa was considered to be at the forefront of tobacco control policies, including excise duties, for many years (Vellios). From a fiscal perspective, excise tax on cigarettes is a source of government revenue, which is undermined by the illicit tobacco industry. Blah ble estimates the loss of income due to the illicit market to be R123123 The loss of income

Methodology

Theoretical Model

The long-run relationship between the legal cigarette market and the illicit market is modeled as a vector error correction model

Data

The sample period for this study runs from January 2012 to March 2020. Monthly data is used such that there are 99 observation points for each variable in the data set. One of the advantages of using monthly data rather than annual data is that it allows for more degrees of freedom. The data used includes figures for the prices and volumes of cigarettes in South Africa, tobacco excise duties, VAT, and disposable income.

To prepare the data for analysis the most popular price category (MPPC) was identified as the 20-cigarette pack. Then a weighted average of before-tax 20-pack prices was used as a base price. The excise duty per 20's pack and VAT and were then added to the base price to calculate the price of licit cigarettes. The licit, illicit and disposable income amounts were adjusted for inflation, taking December 2016 as the base month and year. All of the variables have been transformed into log form to reduce variability.




Figure 1: Plot for variables at levels

Cointegration

To test whether the series are stationary, three tests were employed: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS), and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests. The results of the ADF tests 1 show that the series are all non-stationary at the 5% level of significance.

The stationarity of the time series was tested using the Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests.^{26; 27} The data were converted into logarithms in order to reduce their variability. Based on the ADF and PP tests, the hypothesis that the log of per capita consumption, the log of real prices and the log of real per capita GDP contain a unit root cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level. However, we fail to reject the assumption of stationarity after first differencing these variables. The critical values for the ADF and PP tests at difference at 5% are -3.497 and -3.496 respectively. Compared to the test-statistic values, the variables are stationary at first differences (see Figures 3 and 4; Appendix 2), and thus, standard statistical inference is validated.²⁸ This suggests that a cointegration approach can be used to test for the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables.

Cointegration was then tested using the Trace and the Maximum Eigenvalue tests.²⁹

Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests

1	statistic	p.value	alternative
Quantity legal cigarettes	-4.67	0.01	stationary
Price ratio	-1.44	0.808	stationary
Disposable income	-3.31	0.0739	stationary

Table 2: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test

1	statistic	p.value	alternative
Quantity legal cigarettes	-119	0.01	stationary
Price ratio	-2.54	0.952	stationary
Disposable income	-12.1	0.412	stationary

Table 3: KPSS Unit Root Test

1	statistic	p.value	alternative
Quantity legal cigarettes	1.89	0.01	non-stationary
Price ratio	1.35	0.01	non-stationary
Disposable income	2.56	0.01	non-stationary

Table 4: Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test for Differenced Series

1	statistic	p.value	alternative
Quantity legal cigarettes	-153	0.01	stationary
Price ratio	-120	0.01	stationary
Disposable income	-40.6	0.01	stationary

Table 5: ADF Test for Differenced Series

1	statistic	p.value	alternative
Quantity legal cigarettes	-6.36	0.01	stationary
Price ratio	-3.43	0.05	stationary
Disposable income	-3.57	0.04	stationary

Table 6: Johansen Trace Test fo Cointegraion

1	Test Statistic	10%	5%	1%
$r \leq 2$	1.74	7.52	9.24	13
$r \leq 1$	10.2	17.9	20	24.6
$r = 0$	44.1	32	34.9	41.1

Table 7: Johansen Eigen Test fo Cointegraion

1	Test Statistic	10%	5%	1%
$r \leq 2$	1.74	7.52	9.24	13
$r \leq 1$	8.48	13.8	15.7	20.2
$r = 0$	33.9	19.8	22	26.8

VECM

The price ratio captures a relative change of the legal price compared to the illicit price. If the ratio shrinks, it indicates that the cost of legal cigarettes decreased relative to the cost of illicit cigarettes. There should be a negative long run relationship between the price ratio and the quantity of legal cigarettes. There should be a positive sign for the cointegrating relationship, which there is. The coefficient for the real disposable income variable should be negative for the long-run relationship (so that the reverse sign is positive); whereas the sign is positive in the Vecm results below.

Table 8:
Long run
coeffi-
cient

r1
1
0.398
1.5

Table 9: Short tunrun coefficient

ECT	Intercept	QDP -1	PRATIO -1	REAL -1
-0.9443(0.1526)***	27.7687(4.4890)***	-0.1910(0.0964).	-0.9964(0.3181)**	2.3116(4.4102)
-0.0077(0.0511)	0.2274(1.5033)	0.0148(0.0323)	-0.1555(0.1065)	0.3575(1.4769)
0.0010(0.0030)	-0.0299(0.0870)	0.0004(0.0019)	0.0019(0.0062)	0.5833(0.0855)***

If the real disposable income variable is excluded then the Vecm results are as follows. The coefficient for

1.00	r1.00
QDP	1.00
PRATIO	0.75

Residual Testing

Analysis

Conclusion

1.00	ECT Intercept		QDP -1.00	PRATIO -1.00
Equation QDP	-0.64(0.14)***	5.05(1.08)***	-0.35(0.09)***	-0.91(0.35)*
Equation PRATIO	0.01(0.04)	-0.07(0.34)	0.01(0.03)	-0.17(0.11)