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# Security, Privacy & Trust in Internet of Things: the road ahead

S. Sicari<sup>a,\*</sup>, A. Rizzardi<sup>a</sup>, L.A. Grieco<sup>b</sup>, A. Coen-Porisini<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> “DISTA, Dep. of Theoretical and Applied Science”, University of Insubria – v. Mazzini 5  
– 21100, Varese, Italy.

<sup>b</sup> “DEI, Dep. of Electrical and Information Engineering”, Politecnico di Bari – v. Orabona  
4 – 70125, Bari, Italy.

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## Abstract

Internet of Things (IoT) is characterized by heterogeneous technologies, which concur to the provisioning of innovative services in various application domains. In this scenario, the satisfaction of security and privacy requirements plays a fundamental role. Such requirements include data confidentiality and authentication, access control within the IoT network, privacy and trust among users and things, and the enforcement of security and privacy policies. Traditional security countermeasures cannot be directly applied to IoT technologies due to the different standards and communication stacks involved. Moreover, the high number of interconnected devices arises scalability issues; therefore a flexible infrastructure is needed able to deal with security threats in such a dynamic environment. In this survey we present the main research challenges and the existing solutions in the field of IoT security, identifying open issues, and suggesting some hints for future research.

*Keywords:* Internet of Things, Security, Privacy, Trust

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\*Corresponding author: [sabrina.sicari@uninsubria.it](mailto:sabrina.sicari@uninsubria.it)

Email addresses: [sabrina.sicari@uninsubria.it](mailto:sabrina.sicari@uninsubria.it) (S. Sicari),  
[alessandra.rizzardi@uninsubria.it](mailto:alessandra.rizzardi@uninsubria.it) (A. Rizzardi), [a.grieco@poliba.it](mailto:a.grieco@poliba.it) (L.A. Grieco),  
[alberto.coenporisini@uninsubria.it](mailto:alberto.coenporisini@uninsubria.it) (A. Coen-Porisini)

## 1. Introduction

During the last decade, Internet of Things (IoT) approached our lives silently and gradually, thanks to the availability of wireless communication systems (e.g., RFID, WiFi, 4G, IEEE 802.15.x), which have been increasingly employed  
5 as technology driver for crucial smart monitoring and control applications [1] [2] [3].

Nowadays, the concept of IoT is many-folded, it embraces many different technologies, services, and standards and it is widely perceived as the angular stone of the ICT market in the next ten years, at least [4] [5] [6].

10 From a logical viewpoint, an IoT system can be depicted as a collection of smart devices that interact on a collaborative basis to fulfill a common goal. At the technological floor, IoT deployments may adopt different processing and communication architectures, technologies, and design methodologies, based on their target. For instance, the same IoT system could leverage the capabilities  
15 of a wireless sensor network (WSN) that collects the environmental information in a given area and a set of smartphones on top of which monitoring applications run. In the middle, a standardized or proprietary middleware could be employed to ease the access to virtualized resources and services. The middleware, in turn, might be implemented using cloud technologies, centralized overlays, or peer to  
20 peer systems [7].

Of course, this high level of heterogeneity, coupled to the wide scale of IoT systems, is expected to magnify security threats of the current Internet, which is being increasingly used to let interact humans, machines, and robots, in any combination. More in details, traditional security countermeasures and privacy  
25 enforcement cannot be directly applied to IoT technologies due to their limited computing power; moreover the high number of interconnected devices arises scalability issues. At the same time, to reach a full acceptance by users it is mandatory to define valid security, privacy and trust models suitable for the IoT application context [8] [9] [2] [10] [11]. With reference to security, data  
30 anonymity, confidentiality and integrity need to be guaranteed, as well as au-

thentication and authorization mechanisms in order to prevent unauthorized users (i.e., humans and devices) to access the system. Whereas, concerning privacy requirement, both data protection and users personal information confidentiality have to be ensured, since devices may manage sensitive information (e.g., user habits). Finally, trust is a fundamental issue since the IoT environment is characterized by different devices which have to process and handle the data in compliance with user needs and rights.

Note that adaptation and self-healing play a key role in IoT infrastructures, which must be able to face normal and unexpected changes of the target environment. Accordingly, privacy and security issues should be treated with a high degree of flexibility as advocated in [12] [13]. Together with the conventional security solutions, there is also the need to provide built-in security in the devices themselves (i.e., embedded) in order to pursue dynamic prevention, detection, diagnosis, isolation and countermeasures against successful breaches, as underlined in [14].




Figure 1: Main security issues in IoT

Our work analyzes the most relevant available solutions related to security (i.e., integrity, confidentiality, authentication), privacy, and trust in IoT field. We also focus on proposals regarding security middlewares and secure solutions

for mobile devices, as well as ongoing international projects on this subject. The  
50 main topics analyzed are shown in Fig. 1. In literature, other surveys deal with  
issues related to the IoT paradigm: [1] analyzes the IoT enabling technologies  
and existing middlewares, also from an application point of view, and presents  
security and privacy open issues together with standardization, addressing, and  
networking ones; [8] considers the security and privacy challenges only under a  
55 legislative point of view, with particular attention to the European Commission  
directives; [2] discusses the main research contexts (i.e., impact areas, projects,  
and standardization activities) and challenges in IoT, dealing also with data  
confidentiality, privacy, and trust as regards security requirements; [15] is on In-  
ternet of Underwater Things and presents only few hints to security issue; [10]  
60 investigates the advantages and disadvantages of centralized and distributed  
architectures in terms of security and privacy in IoT with an analysis of the  
principal attack models and threats; [16] provides a general overview on various  
IoT aspects, such as the involved technologies, the applications, the cloud plat-  
forms, the architecture, the energy consumption and security issues, the quality  
65 of service and data mining implications; [17] focuses only on the specific issue  
of trust management in IoT.

The contribution of this paper is compared in Table 1 with respect to the  
aforementioned surveys: it clearly embraces with a broadened breath all security-  
related facets and of course it includes more recent references on the subject.

70 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the available  
approaches regarding confidentiality and access control in IoT. Sections 3 and  
4 deal with privacy and trust issues, respectively. Section 5 shows the security  
and privacy policies enforcement in IoT applications. Security frameworks and  
middlewares are discussed in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 addresses security in  
75 mobile IoT devices; Section 9 refers to the ongoing international projects on IoT  
security. Section 10 ends the paper and draws the road ahead.

Table 1: Contribution of available surveys on IoT security

	[1]	[8]	[2]	[15]	[10]	[16]	[17]	<i>Our work</i>
<i>Security</i>	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
<i>Privacy</i>	yes	yes	yes	no	yes	yes	no	yes
<i>Trust</i>	no	yes	yes	no	yes	no	yes	yes
<i>Middleware</i>	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes
<i>Mobile</i>	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	yes
<i>Projects</i>	no	no	yes	no	no	no	no	yes

## 2. IoT security requirements: authentication, confidentiality and access control

This section analyzes in depth three key security requirements: authentication, confidentiality, and access control, with a special focus on IoT systems. IoT, in fact, enables a constant transfer and sharing of data among things and users in order to achieve particular goals. In such a sharing environment, authentication, authorization, access control and non-repudiation are important to ensure secure communication. In this context, the lack of computing resources (i.e., processing power, storage) and ad-hoc nature of such networks requires to tailor existing techniques to this new environment. In particular, the seminal contributions in such a field will be illustrated together with a critical review of open issues that deserve further investigation [10].

### 2.1. Authentication and Confidentiality

As regards authentication, the approach presented in [18] makes use of a custom encapsulation mechanism, namely smart business security IoT application Protocol - intelligent Service Security Application Protocol. It combines cross-platform communications with encryption, signature, and authentication, in order to improve IoT applications development capabilities by establishing a secure communication system among different things.

In [19] it is introduced the first fully implemented two-way authentication security scheme for IoT, based on existing Internet standards, specifically the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol, which is placed between transport and application layer. This scheme is based on RSA and it is designed for IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs) [3]. The extensive evaluation, based on real IoT systems, shows that such an architecture provides message integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity with enough affordable energy, end-to-end latency, and memory overhead.

As regards confidentiality and integrity, in [20] it is analyzed how existing key management systems could be applied to the IoT context. It is possible to classify the Key Management System (KMS) protocols in four major categories: key pool framework, mathematical framework, negotiation framework, and public key framework. In [20] the authors argue that most of the KMS protocols are not suitable for IoT. In fact, key pool ones suffer insufficient connectivity; mathematical ones make use of the deployment knowledge to optimize the construction of their data structures, but such an approach cannot be used in IoT since client and server nodes are usually located in different physical locations; combinatorics-based KMS protocols suffer both connectivity and scalability/authentication; negotiation ones make use of the wireless channel and its inherent features to negotiate a common key, however they cannot be suitable for IoT because client and server nodes usually belong to different networks and they should route the information through the Internet in order to be able to talk with each other. Hence, the KMS protocols which might be suitable for some IoT scenarios are the Blom [21] and the polynomial schema [22], whose computational overhead is quite low in comparison to a Public Key Cryptography (PKC) operations (i.e., public key framework). However for such schemes, several countermeasures are required in order to manage device authentication and face man-in-the-middle attacks. For example, [23] and [24] present a framework for IoT based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

A more practical approach, as [25], proposes a transmission model with signature-encryption schemes, which addresses IoT security requirements (i.e.,

anonymity, trustworthy and attack-resistance) by means of Object Naming Service (ONS) queries. Root-ONS can authenticate the identities and platform creditability of Local ONS servers (L-ONS) by a Trusted Authentication Server (TAS), and the TAS gives a temporary certificate to validated L-ONS, which  
130 can apply for inquiry services many times with the certificate in the validated time. A security ONS query service with anonymous authentication provides credentials only to authorized and trusted L-ONS, preventing the illegal ONS to enquire information from things. In the transmission process, Remote Information Server of Things (R-TIS) wraps the information of things into multiple  
135 encryption layers with the routing node's public key. The encrypted data are decrypted at each routing node, until the Local Information Server of Things (L-TIS) receives the plain text. Meanwhile, the nodes can check the integrity of received data and the creditability of routing path in the transmitting procedure. Such a transmission model results very weak in terms of attack-resistance  
140 due to the adoption of hop-by-hop encryption/decryption behavior.

It appears that an unique and well-defined solution able to guarantee confidentiality in a IoT context is still missing, as also asserted in [26]. It is worth to note that many efforts have been conducted in the WSN field [27] [28] [29]  
145 [30] [31] [32], but several questions arise:

- Are the WSN proposals adaptable to the IoT environment, considering both the heterogeneity of the involved devices and the different application contexts?
- How and at which network layer to handle authentication?
- 150 • Is it feasible to reuse the traditional security mechanisms (e.g., encryption algorithms) or it is better to start from new solutions?
- How to handle the different keys?
- Which kind of key distribution mechanism is the most suitable?
- How to ensure an end-to-end integrity verification mechanism in order to  
155 make the system more resilient to malicious attacks?



Very recent works started addressing such questions. For example, an authentication protocol for IoT is presented in [33], using lightweight encryption method based on XOR manipulation for anti-counterfeiting and privacy protection, in order to cope with constrained IoT devices.

160 Starting from WSN context, an user authentication and key agreement scheme for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks is also proposed in [34]. It enables a remote user to securely negotiate a session key with a sensor node, using a lean key agreement protocol. In this way, it ensures mutual authentication among users, sensor nodes, and gateway nodes (GWN), although GWN is never  
165 contacted by the user. In order to apply such a scheme to resource-constrained architectures, it only uses simple hash and XOR computations, as in [33].

The authentication and access control method presented in [35] aims at establishing the session key on the basis of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), another lightweight encryption mechanism. This scheme defines attribute-based  
170 access control policies, managed by an attribute authority, enhancing mutual authentication among the user and the sensor nodes, as well as solving the resource-constrained issue at application level in IoT.

These preliminary answers partially address afore-listed questions because they specifically target the problem of lightweight cyphering in pervasive envi-  
175 ronments. Further efforts are required to complement these lean mechanisms with stardadized protocols for authentication and a clear definition of one or more authorities aimed at guaranteeing the expected confidentiality within the IoT infrastructure.

## *2.2. Access control*

180 Access control refers to the permissions in the usage of resources, assigned to different actors of a wide IoT network. Two subjects are identified in [36]: the data holders and the data collectors. Users and things, as data holders, must be able to feed data collectors only with the data regarding a specific target. At the same time, data collectors must be able to identify or authenticate users  
185 and things as legitimate data holders, from which the information are collected.

In IoT we have also to deal with processing of streaming data and not, as in traditional database systems, with discrete data. The main critical issues in this context refer to performance and temporal constraints, since access control for a data stream is more computational intensive than in traditional DBMS (DataBase Management System). In fact, queries have to be directly executed on incoming streams, which can be made of large volumes of data that might arrive at unpredictable rates. Several works deal with these aspects.

In [37] the attention is focused on the layer responsible for data acquisition, which is the direct responsible for the information collection. In such a layer, a large amount of nodes are required to sense a wide range of different data types for authorized users in accordance with privacy and security levels. Therefore [37] presents a hierarchical access control scheme for this layer. The scheme considers the limited computational and storage capacity of the nodes, in fact only a single key is given to each user and node; the other necessary keys are derived by using a deterministic key derivation algorithm, therefore increasing the security (since the keys exchange is limited) and reducing lots of the nodes storage costs.

Starting from the consideration that in emergency situations (e.g., an accident occurs, and a doctor is needed), the location of the user can be made available, while under normal circumstances, the user's location information is confidential, [38] presents an identity based system for personal location in emergency situations. It consists of: registration, users authentication, policy, and client subsystems. The system confirms the identity of the user through the user authentication subsystem and gets the level of the emergency through the policy subsystem. Then it can make sure that user's location information can be accessed only by some authorized user and only when it is needed.

In [39] a security architecture is developed, which aims at ensuring data integrity and confidentiality, starting from a prototype query processing engine for data streams, called Nile [40]. Such a mechanism is based on FT-RC4, an extension of the RC4 algorithm, which represents a stream cipher encryption scheme, to overcome possible decryption fails due to de-synchronization prob-

lems. [40] is focalized on shared processing of window joins over data streams, in order to enhance the performance and the scalability of the DBMS.

An approach which addresses the authentication problem of outsourced data streams can be found in [41] and in [42] with CADS (Continuous Authentication on Data Streams). In this scenario it is assumed the presence of a service provider that collects data from one or more data owners, together with authentication information, and at the same time processes queries originating from many clients. The service provider returns to the clients the query results, as well as verification information, which make them able to verify the authenticity and the completeness of the received results, on the basis of the authentication information provided by the data owner.

[43] also focuses on the data outsourcing. In particular, due to the large amount of streaming data, companies may not acquire the resources for deploying a Data Stream Management Systems (DSMS). Therefore they could outsource the stream storage and delegate its processing to a specialized third-party with strong DSMS infrastructure. Naturally, this arises the trust issue: the third-party may act maliciously to increase profit. The solution is to adopt a method for stream authentication, in order to enable clients to verify the integrity and the freshness of the streaming results received from the server. Such a solution has to be very lightweight for all parties involved (e.g., WSN applications). [43] represents streams as linear algebraic queries and it is able to authenticate dynamic vector sums and dot products, as well as dynamic matrix products, by means of hash operations, modular additions/multiplications and cryptographic security functions. Such techniques may be very suitable for IoT entities, which are characterized by resources constraints in terms of energy consumption, computation and storage.

[44] proposes a semi-distributed approach. More in details, in [44] it is proposed a security framework and an access control model to secure the so called DSMSs, which extends the Borealis data stream engine [45] with security requirements. The framework exploits an owner-extended version of RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) [46], called OxRBAC. Users have to prove their

identity through a login process, consequently a session is created and a role is established for the user to perform authorized tasks. As a result, the authorization is checked by analyzing the couple user-session. It is the system itself which provides each user with the access permissions to objects, therefore users can see only the catalogue of the objects they are allowed to view. Since there can be many output streams, the system filters the tuples in order to give to the users only permitted results. Such an approach does not consider the adoption of any encryption algorithms for data streams. Note that this framework uses a single node system and not a totally distributed data stream engine. Clearly, a distributed approach would arise new issues: the output streams might be on different nodes and the currently use of ids to uniquely identify and filter the tuples have to be managed without conflicts.

Whereas, two works, [47] and [48], exploit metadata in order to guarantee the security of the tuples in the stream. In [47] it is proposed a stream-centric approach, in which the security constraints are directly embedded into data streams and not stored on the DSMS server. More in details, security metadata tuples are interleaved with the data tuples in the streams, in order to reduce the overhead. In this work, no new access control model is defined, but an enforcement mechanism suitable for streaming data, exploiting query processing. Note that, either RBAC, DAC (Discretionary Access Control) or MAC (Mandatory Access Control) can be casted in such a solution. In [47] policies on a data streams are stated by the user owning the device producing the data streams itself. This makes a user able to specify how the DSMS has to access his/her personal information (i.e., location, health conditions,...).

In [48] an extended approach is proposed, which enriches data streams with metadata called streaming tags. In this way, users are able to use a free vocabulary to add information to reported events. It supports a variety of tagging granularities, therefore users could tag streams, tuples, attributes or specific data values. A framework based on CAPE engine [49] is implemented and tested, after the definition of a proper and novel tag query language, but this solution may present some overhead and memory issues, as reported by simula-

tion results.

280 The work in [50] presents an enforcement to the solution provided in [51] as regards access control of streaming data, based on the Aurora data model [52]. This framework supports two types of privileges, named read and aggregate, and also two temporal constraints, named general and window. The subjects (i.e., the users) are specified according to a role-based approach, therefore per-  
285 missions are associates with roles and not directly with subjects, as in RDBMS (Relational DataBase Management System). Another idea taken from RDBMS is the definition of a language independent representation for the managed object, similarly to the view concept, in order to model the high granularity levels requested by IoT applications. Queries are registered into the stream engine and continuously executed on the incoming tuples. Whenever a user submits  
290 a query, a specific component, called Query Rewriter, checks the authorization catalogues, where permissions are specified, to verify whether the query can be partially or totally executed or should be denied. In case of partially authorized queries, it is rewritten in such a way that it only contains authorized data. In  
295 order to support the query rewriting task, a set of secure operators is defined, which filters out from the results of the corresponding not-secure operators those tuples/attributes that are not accessible according to the specified access control policies.

In [53] the authors extend these two previous works in order to make their  
300 solution independent from the stream engine. Note that in general each DSMS adopts its own language; to overcome such an issue and to allow the interaction among different DSMS, in [53] a common query model is defined and then the most used operations are translated by the Deployment Module into the specific engine query language. The results of this work have been compared with other  
305 proposals. For example, with respect to [44], which has the drawback of wasting computation time when unauthorized queries are performed, it represents a better solution. [47], as [53], focuses on access control requirement for data streams, however, in [47] access control is considered from a different point of view: the privacy protection. This is due to the fact that in [47] the privacy

310 policies on data streams are stated by the user who owns the device which  
generates the data stream itself, allowing the user to specify how the DSMS  
has to access his/her personal information (e.g., health conditions, location);  
while in [53] policies are specified by the system administrator. Moreover, in  
[47] access control policies are not stored in the DSMS, but they are encoded via  
315 security constraints and embedded directly into data streams: this represents  
also a main difference with respect to [53]. In [48] a set of operators is defined,  
able to enforce security constraints, but it implements them only into the CAPE  
engine [49]; in contrast, [53] proposes a framework able to work among a wide  
range of different DSMSs.

320 While the previous works propose extended versions or acquire some fea-  
tures of RBAC, in [54] the authors affirm that authorization frameworks like  
RBAC and ABAC (Attribute Based Access Control) do not provide sufficient  
scalable, manageable, and effective mechanisms to support distributed systems  
with many interacting services and the dynamic and scaling needs of IoT con-  
325 text. A problem common to ACLs (Access Control Lists), RBAC and ABAC is  
that in these systems it is hard to enforce the principle of least privilege access.  
Within the European FP7 IoT@Work project [55], a Capability Based Access  
Control (CapBAC) was developed, which can be used to manage the access  
control processes to services and information with least-privilege operations. In  
330 CapBAC it is the user that has to present his/her authorization capability (and  
demonstrate he/she is the owner of it) to the service provider, while in a tra-  
ditional ACL system it is the service provider that has to check if the user is,  
directly or indirectly (e.g., via a role owned by the user), authorized to perform  
the requested operation on the requested resource. The authorizations are given  
335 by the owner of a certain resource/service to the desired users, which as a con-  
sequence can prove their capability to access to the resource or benefit of the  
service. It is stressed the relevance of security mechanisms usability and access  
rights delegation and the need to take into account that they have to be under-  
standable and usable by non ICT-skilled users. It is also important to grant the  
340 principle of least privilege by default and to make possible to revoke capabilities

and to set a validity condition under which the authorization is available.

From the discussion about these works the major challenges related to access control in an IoT scenario which emerge are:

- How to guarantee the access permission in an environment where not only  
345 users, but also things could be authorized to interact with the system?
- It is more effective to exploit a centralized or distributed approach or a semi-distributed one in order to manage the scalable IoT architecture?
- How to handle the huge amount of transmitted data (i.e., in the form of stream data) in a common recognized representation?
- 350 • How to support the identification of entities?

In fact, as regards identification, one of the principal changes today is the increase in mobility of portable and powerful wireless devices. Identity requirement is not yet adequately met in networks, especially given the emergence of ubiquitous computing devices. Addressing identity issue requires to reformulate  
355 the architecture for naming, addressing and discovery and the development of specific identity management framework for IoT [56]. Only few solutions have been proposed related to such an issue. Furthermore:

- To manage access control, how could IoT system deal with the registration of users and things and the consequent issuance of credentials or  
360 certificates by authorities?
- Could the users/things present these credentials/certificates to the IoT system in order to be allowed to interact with the other authorized devices?
- Could a following step be the definition of specific roles and functions within the IoT context, in order to manage the authorization processes?

365 As regards the raised questions, few new solutions have been recently proposed, suggesting a subscriber method and a group membership scheme to deal with the access control of heterogeneous devices. [57] addresses authentication

and access control in the IoT framework. The proposed authorization scheme for constrained devices combines Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) with Embedded Subscriber Identity Module (eSIM). The former provides cheap, secure, tamper-proof secret keys to authenticate constrained M2M devices. The latter provides mobile connectivity guaranteeing scalability, interoperability and compliance with security protocols.

Multicast communication are secured in [58] by adopting a common secret key, denoted as group key, shared by multiple communication endpoints. Such keys are managed and distributed with a centralized batch-based approach. Note that such a mechanism reduces the computational overhead and network traffic due to group membership changes, caused by users joins and leaves, as happens in a typical IoT context. Such a protocol can be applied to two several relevant scenarios: (i) secure data aggregation in IoT and (ii) Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communications in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs).

Finally, in [59] a general UML conceptual model suitable for all the IoT applications and architectures is defined. It specifies both involved entities and their relationships within the IoT infrastructure, pointing out their roles and functions. Also an application case-study is described, in which users and nodes interact with an IoT platform in order to obtain and/or provide customized services. Such a model takes into account the registration phase carried out by users towards the IoT platform, the consent acquisition for handling their personal data, and the exchange of the credentials for future interactions. This represents a further step towards the management of registered users and things and the relative credentials, but considerable efforts are still required to establish a standardized and globally accepted solution.

### 3. Privacy in IoT

IoT finds application in many different fields, for example: patients remote monitoring, energy consumption control, traffic control, smart parking system, inventory management, production chain, customization of the shopping at the



supermarket, civil protection. For all of them, users require the protection of their personal information related to their movements, habits and interactions with other people. In a single term, their privacy should be guaranteed. In  
400 literature, there are some attempts to address such an issue.

In [60] a data tagging for managing privacy in IoT is proposed. Using techniques taken from the Information Flow Control, data representing network events can be tagged with several privacy properties; such tags allow the system to reason about the flows of data and preserve the privacy of individuals.  
405 Although exploiting tagging within resource-constrained sensor nodes may not be a viable solution because tags may be too large with respect to the data size and sensitivity, therefore they generate an excessive overhead. Clearly, in this case it is not suitable for IoT.

In [61] a user-controlled privacy-preserved access control protocol is proposed, based on context-aware k-anonymity privacy policies. Note that privacy  
410 protection mechanisms are investigated: users can control which of their personal data is being collected and accessed, who is collecting and accessing such data, and when this happens.

In [62] it is presented Continuously Anonymizing STreaming data via adaptive cLustEring (CASTLE). It is a cluster-based scheme which ensures anonymity,  
415 freshness, and delay constraints on data streams, thus enhancing those privacy preserving techniques (e.g., k-anonymity) that are designed for static data sets and not for continuous, unbounded, and transient streams. More in details, [62] models k-anonymity on data streams and defines k-anonymized clusters exploiting the quasi-identifier attributes of tuples in order to preserve the sensitive  
420 data privacy.

In [63], the traditional privacy mechanisms are divided into two categories: Discretionary Access and Limited Access. The former addresses the minimum privacy risks, in order to prevent the disclosure or the cloning of sensitive data;  
425 whereas the latter aims at limiting the security access to avoid malicious unauthorized attacks.

[64] analyzes the privacy risk that occurs when a static domain name is

assigned to a specified IoT node. In this work the authors propose a privacy protection enhanced DNS (Domain Name System) for smart devices, which  
430 can authenticate the original users identity and reject illegal access to the smart device. The scheme is compatible with widely used DNS and DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) protocols.

In [36] it is presented a fully decentralized anonymous authentication protocol for privacy-preserving target-driven IoT applications. Such a proposal is  
435 based on a multi-show credential system where different showings of the same credential cannot be linked together, therefore avoiding the generating keys to be discovered. The system defines two possible roles for participant nodes: users, which represent the nodes originating the data and data collectors, which are responsible for gathering the data from authorized users. Users can anonymously  
440 and unlinkably authenticate themselves in front of data collectors proving the owning of a valid Anonymous Access Credential (AAC) encoding a particular set of attributes, established by the system itself. The protocol is divided in three phases: set-up, user registration, during which users obtain Anonymous Access Credentials, and Credential Proving, during which users prove the possession of  
445 a valid AAC to a data collector. Such a protocol guarantees: user anonymity, AAC unlinkability (no Data Collector or set of colluding Data Collectors can link two transactions to the same User), resistance to user impersonation, faulty and selfish nodes, nodes hindering the efficiency, and adversary controlling the Data Collectors. Moreover, such a system relies on a fully distributed approach,  
450 thus avoiding single point of failure issues.

[65] analyzes in depth the performances of the two major types of Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE): Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CP-ABE). Simulations are carried on different classes of mobile devices, including a laptop and a smart-  
455 phone, in order to establish under what conditions ABE is better suited for IoT. ABE provides a public key encryption scheme which enables a fine-grained access control, a scalable key management, and a flexible data distribution.

Another approach which uses an attribute-based signature scheme to guar-

antee privacy in IoT is presented in [66]. Here a novel Attribute-Based Signature  
460 (ABS) scheme, named ePASS, uses an attribute tree and expresses any policy  
consisting of AND/OR, which are unforgeable for the computational Diffie-  
Hellman assumption. In fact, users cannot forge signatures with attributes they  
do not own, and the signature provides assurance that only a user with ap-  
propriate attributes satisfying the policy can endorse the message. Moreover,  
465 the legitimate signers remain anonymous and are indistinguishable among all  
users whose attributes satisfy the policy, which provides attribute privacy for  
the signer.

Focusing on the privacy protection in IoT, [67] puts forward a key-changed  
mutual authentication protocol for WSN and RFID systems. Such a protocol  
470 integrates a random number generator in the tag and the reader, and adopts  
the one-way hash function, the key refresh in real time, and the key backup as  
mechanisms to reduce the risks of replay, replication, denial of service, spoofing  
and tag tracking.

[68], starting from the privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) techniques,  
475 aims at minimizing the sensitive data disclosure probability and the sensitive  
content analysis. In such a work, the user privacy awareness issue is addressed,  
proposing a privacy management scheme which enables the user to estimate the  
risk of sharing sensitive data. It also aims at developing a robust sensitivity  
detection system, able to quantify the privacy content of the information.

480 The assessment of privacy requirements of data, provided by different sources,  
is dealt in [69], which defines a layered architecture for IoT in order to estimate  
both the data quality and the security and privacy level. Moreover, such an  
architecture defines an annotated data for providing services, that integrates  
data from different sources, according to customer needs.

485 To summarize, privacy requirement in IoT is currently only partially covered  
and there is a wide space of research issues to be investigated, referring to the  
need to define privacy policies starting from a well-defined model [59] and the  
correspondent development, dealing with the scalability and the dynamic envi-  
ronment which characterizes IoT scenarios. In fact, capturing privacy require-

490 ment in the very early stages of development is essential for creating sufficient public confidence and facilitate the adoption of novel IoT systems.

#### 4. Trust in IoT

The trust concept is used in various contexts and with different meanings. Trust is a complex notion about which no definitive consensus exists in the scientific literature, although its importance is widely recognized. A main problem 495 with many approaches towards trust definition is that they do not lend themselves to the establishment of metrics and evaluation methodologies. Moreover, the satisfaction of trust requirements are strictly related to the identity management and access control issues.

500 Works [70] and [71] focus on trust level assessment of IoT entities. The authors assume that most smart objects are human-carried or human-related devices, so they are often exposed to public areas and communicate through wireless, hence vulnerable to malicious attacks. Smart objects have heterogeneous features and need to cooperatively work together. The social relationships 505 considered are: friendship, ownership and community, since users are friends among themselves (i.e., friendship), users own the devices (i.e., ownership) and the devices belong to some communities (i.e., community). Malicious nodes aim at breaking the basic functionality of IoT by means of trust related attacks: self-promoting, bad-mouthing and good-mouthing. The trust management protocol 510 for IoT proposed in [70] is distributed, encounter-based, and activity-based: two nodes that come in touch to each other or involved in a mutual interaction can directly rate each other and exchange trust evaluation about the other nodes, so they perform an indirect rate which seems like a recommendation. The reference parameters to trust evaluation are: honesty, cooperativeness, and community- 515 interest. Therefore such a dynamic trust management protocol is capable of adaptively adjusting the best trust parameter setting in response to dynamically changing environments in order to maximize application performance.

A similar approach to provide a trustworthiness evaluation is carried out in

[72] in the so called Social Internet of Things (SIoT). This paradigm derives  
 520 from the integration of social networking concepts into IoT, due to the fact that  
 the objects belonging to the IoT infrastructure are capable of establishing social  
 relationships in an autonomous way with respect to their owners. The challenge  
 addressed in [72] is to build a reputation-based trust mechanism for the SIoT  
 which can effectively deal with certain types of malicious behaviors aimed at  
 525 misleading other nodes, in order to drive the use of services and information  
 delivery only towards trusted nodes. A subjective model for the management  
 of trustworthiness is defined, which builds upon the solutions proposed for P2P  
 networks, such as those proposed in [73] [74] [75] [76] [77]. Each node computes  
 the trustworthiness of its friends on the basis of its own experience and on the  
 530 opinion of the common friends. As a consequence, a node chooses the provider  
 of the service it needs on the basis of this highest computed trustworthiness  
 level.

Yet in relation to the social network context, in [78] the authors propose a  
 secure distributed ad-hoc network; it is based on direct peer-to-peer interactions  
 535 and communities creation in order to grant a quick, easy and secure access to  
 users to surf the Web; thus close to the social network concept. Each node (i.e.,  
 device) and community have an identity in the network and modify the trust  
 of other nodes on the basis of their behavior, thus establishing a trust chain  
 among users. The parameters analyzed are: physical proximity, fulfillment,  
 540 consistency of answer, hierarchy on the trusted chain, similar properties (e.g.,  
 age, gender, type of sensor), common goals and warrants, history of interaction,  
 availability, interactions. Chains of confidence will allow the establishment of  
 groups or communities and unique identities (for the communities) for the access  
 to services as well as for the spreading of group information. Therefore security  
 545 is established when the users access the network through the use of the trust  
 chain generated by nodes, which he/she crosses.

In [79] it is considered that the traditional access control models are not suit-  
 able for the decentralized and dynamic IoT scenarios, where identities are not  
 known in advance. Trust relationship between two devices helps in influencing

550 the future behaviors of their interactions. When devices trust each other, they prefer to share services and resources. This is the same idea emerged in [72] and [70]. Such a paper presents a Fuzzy approach to the Trust Based Access Control (FTBAC). The trusts scores are calculated by the FTBAC framework from factors like experience, knowledge and recommendation. Such trust scores  
555 are then mapped to permissions, and access request are accompanied by a set of credentials which together constitute a proof for allowing the access or not.

FTBAC framework is composed by three layers:

- Device Layer: includes all IoT devices and communication among these devices
- 560 • Request Layer: is mainly responsible for collecting experience, knowledge and recommendation information and calculating fuzzy trust value
- Access Control Layer: is involved in decision making process and maps the calculated fuzzy trust value to the access permissions, with the principle of least privilege.

565 The simulation results show that this framework guarantees flexibility and scalability and it is energy efficient. In fact, a solution based on cryptographic protection can achieve access control by increasing the trust level, but it creates extra overhead in terms of time and energy consumption; instead, according to authors, the fuzzy approach is easier to integrate in utility-based decision  
570 making.

In [80] it is presented another fuzzy approach to trust evaluation, based on three layers: sensor layer, core layer, and application layer. The sensor layer includes physical devices (e.g., RFID, WSN and base stations); the core layer mainly includes access network and Internet; the application layer includes  
575 various distributed networks (e.g., P2P, Grid, Cloud Computing), application systems and interfaces. From point of view of users, IoT system is regarded as a Service Provider (SP) and the trust management aims at providing an auxiliary service that assists the IoT to provide more qualified service to any Service

Requester (SR). The relationship is bidirectional as the trust mechanism has  
 580 effects both on the SR (for privacy protection) and SP. Such trust management  
 model mainly includes three steps: trust extraction, trust transmission, and  
 trust decision-making. Requested information service and trust based service  
 coexist in this model. Trust management should act as self-organizing com-  
 585 ponent in order to deal with the information flow and preventing the privacy  
 information from leaking to un-trusted SR. The authors in [80] make use of  
 fuzzy set theory and formal semantics-based language to perform the layered  
 trust mechanism, evaluated by using specific layer attributes (i.e., efficiency,  
 risk, history). The user has access to the IoT only if security credential satisfies  
 security policies, which are defined by means of a decision-making function ac-  
 590 cording to user trust value. Note that, such a work discusses no concrete trust  
 models, but establishes only a general framework, in which the well-defined trust  
 models can be integrated.

[81] and [82] propose a trust model to protect the user security by combining  
 location-aware and identity-aware information and authentication history; as a  
 595 consequence, the users can obtain the trustworthiness for the requested services.  
 Three trust regions are considered, each one having high, medium, and low  
 ranks, respectively. For each rank, the authentication approach is different. In  
 high rank case, no extra key is needed (already sign on the VID). For medium  
 rank, users have to offer their PIN for login. Low rank means that users need  
 600 to provide biometric information, such as face image, fingerprint or iris scan,  
 which may be not convenient for its complexity and hardware constraints. The  
 goal is to make a classification of the provided services in order to evaluate  
 the sensitivity of the trasmitted information (i.e., on the basis of the type of  
 application or the host in which the application is executed); for achieving such  
 605 an issue, a fuzzy approach is exploited.

Other proposals are not based either on the social networking concept nor  
 on fuzzy methods. For example, in [83] the authors propose a hierarchical trust  
 model for IoT, able to effectively detect malicious organizations from the behav-  
 ior of their neighboring nodes. A Verifiable Caching Interaction Digest (VCID)

610 scheme is introduced for the purposes of monitoring object-reader interaction  
and a long-term reputation mechanism is used to manage the trust of organiza-  
tions.

[84] proposes a trust management system for IoT able to assess the trust  
level of a node from its past behaviour, in distinct cooperative services. The  
615 main goal of this solution is to manage cooperation in a heterogeneous IoT  
architecture taking into account the different nodes capabilities by exploiting  
a decentralized approach. Such a model considers both first-hand information  
(i.e., direct observations and own experiences) and second-hand information  
(i.e., indirect experiences and observations reported by neighboring nodes) to  
620 update trust values. Different phases are involved, in which the trust manage-  
ment system: (i) gathers information about the trustworthiness of the available  
nodes; (ii) sets up a collaborative service with the requesting nodes; (iii) learns  
from its past operation by performing self-updates aimed at improving its future  
operations; (iv) assigns a quality recommendation score to each node after each  
625 interaction during the learning phase.

In [85] the authors make an attempt to design an attack-resistant trust  
management model for distributed routing strategy in IoT. Such a model can  
evaluate and propagate reputation in distributed routing systems and it is then  
proposed to establish reliable trust relations between self-organized nodes and  
630 defeat possible attacks in distributed routing systems.

[86] starts from WSNs and defines a trust management for IoT, consist-  
ing in an identity-based key agreement; this agreement occurs by means of a  
distributed self-organizing key negotiation process. Such a protocol aims at  
preventing attacks from outside the network and recognizing malicious nodes.  
635 Thus it can reduce communications with malicious nodes to improve security  
and extend network lifetime.

[87] presents an identity-based network protocol aimed at identifying net-  
work nodes which move themselves from a host-to-host during the handover  
processes. Therefore it needs to decouple identifiers and locators in order to  
640 separate the node identification from host addressing. The mutual authentica-



tion of network nodes is achieved by the validation of the identity attributes and then by attaching a signature to each attribute, emitted by a trusted signing entity. Access to non-public identity information is regulated by policies defined by the owner of the information. Thus, it is disclosed only to the authorized  
645 subjects by using the same attribute-based authorization method. Nodes and a Domain Trusted Entity are connected to each other to build a globally trusted infrastructure by the pre-sharing of cryptographic certificates and ensuring the confidentiality and authentication of their exchanges by means of encryption and signature mechanisms.

650 As pointed out in [88], current trust and reputation management approaches usually offer rigid and inflexible mechanisms to compute reputation scores, which hinder their dynamic adaptation to the current environment where they are deployed. At most, they provide certain parameters which are configurable or tunable. This seems not enough for the heterogeneous and dynamic IoT con-  
655 text. Therefore, [88] has designed and prototyped a flexible mechanism to select the most suitable trust and reputation model in heterogeneous environments. Such a mechanism can be applied on-the-fly, amongst a pool of predefined ones, considering the current system conditions (e.g., number of users, allocated resources).

660 A layered IoT architecture for trust management control mechanism is proposed in [89]. The IoT infrastructure is decomposed into three layers, which are: sensor layer, core layer and application layer. Each layer is controlled by a specific trust management under the following purposes: self-organization, routing and multi-service, respectively. The final decision-making is executed by the  
665 service requester (i.e., the user) according to the collected trust information as well as requester policy. A formal semantics-based and the fuzzy set theory are used to realize the trust mechanism.

Another trust system is proposed in [90], based on node behavior detection. The metrics periodically evaluated are recommended trust and history statisti-  
670 cal trust. They are calculated by evidence combination and Bayes algorithm, respectively.

Table 2: Summary of related works on trust assessment

Exploited technique	Works
Social networking	[70] [71] [72] [78]
Fuzzy technique	[79] [80] [81] [82] [89]
Cooperative approach	[83] [84] [85] [90]
Identity-based method	[86] [87]

Such an overview shows that the available solutions exploit different techniques in order to handle the trust issue in IoT scenario. Such proposals include hierarchical model, reputation mechanisms, approaches derived from social networking, fuzzy techniques, mechanisms based on nodes past behavior or on routing strategies (a scheme of analyzed works is showed in Table 2). Literature seems mature enough concerning trust management, but the definition of a fully distributed and dynamic approach suitable for the scalable and flexible IoT context is still missing, as confirmed in the recent survey on trust management in IoT provided in [17]. Further missing items are the definition of globally accepted certification authorities and of a common-accepted trust negotiation language. To sum up, the following issues are still open in IoT-trust management:

- The introduction of a well-defined trust negotiation language supporting the semantic interoperability of IoT context
- The definition of a proper object identity management system
- The development of a trust negotiation mechanism in order to handle data stream access control.

## 5. Enforcement in IoT

Policy enforcement refers to the mechanisms used to force the application of a set of defined actions in a system. More in details, policies are operating

rules which need to be enforced for the purpose of maintaining order, security, and consistency on data. With reference to IoT scenarios, in literature are still present neither viable solutions nor detailed analysis on this subject. Only few  
695 works describe how to manage policies enforcement.

[91] provides an overview of network security, security policies, policy enforcement and firewall policy management systems. As regards policy enforcement, it is proposed to use security services such as authentication, encryption, antivirus software and firewalls, in order to protect the data confidentiality,  
700 integrity, and availability.

In [92] the languages regarding the definition of obligations and policies are classified into two categories. On the one hand, there are policy enforcement languages, which generally simplify the specification and interpretation of policies; however, they lack the formal semantics needed to allow the verification  
705 of the policies themselves by means of formal proofs. On the other hand, there are policy analysis languages, which allow the formal policies analysis and the expression of a large variety of obligations. In this work, it is introduced a policy language which aims at combining the advantages of both policy enforcement and analysis languages. Formalizing policy enforcement has several advantages:  
710 it reduces the gap between the specified policies and their deployment, thus it ensures that the policies are correctly applied in the system. To formalize policy enforcement, the target system should be modeled and then the effects of the application of the policies should be described. More in details, policies are enforced using reference monitors, and a set of active rules specifies that  
715 a set of actions should be executed after the detection of some events, if some conditions are met. However, this language does not provide the operational semantics needed to dynamically enforce and manage obligations in a policy managed system.

[93] pays its attention to the various types of policy languages, such as WS-Policy (Web Services-Policy) and XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup  
720 Language), exploited in different systems. In fact, low-level enforcement mechanisms can vary from system to system. Thus, it is difficult to enforce a policy

across domain boundaries or over multiple domains. Before applying policies across domain boundaries, it is desirable to know which policies can be supported by other domains, which are partially supported, and which are not supported. In [93] it is proposed and implemented a simulation environment using semantic model mapping and translation for policy enforcement across domain boundaries by means of a semantically-rich language: Web Ontology Language (OWL), which can be used to model both policy languages and enforcement mechanisms. For example, in a healthcare environment, the cooperation and communication between pharmacy, hospital and medical school are essential. They have their own policy enforcement mechanisms to protect their own proprietary data and patients records. The problem is that there are more and more collaborations and communications among these domains, therefore a cross-domain policy enforcement becomes an essential component. However, in most cases, these domains use different policy languages to define their policies and these specific policies are executed on their own platforms. When a new cooperation or communication is required between two stranger domains, we do not know how many policy rules from the stranger domain can be enforced by current enforcement mechanisms. So in most cases, the technical departments from these two domains have to work together to evaluate whether or not it is possible to make their systems interoperating. The same problem also exists in social networking environment (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, Linkedin). Most existing social networking sites have privacy configurations based on their own enforcement mechanisms. When two social networking sites or two healthcare domains need to communicate or collaborate with each other, they have to rebuild or reconfigure their systems to make sure these activities are consistent with their own and their partners policies.

Expressing security policies to govern distributed systems is a complex and error-prone task. Because of their complexity and of the different degrees of trust among locations in which code is deployed and executed, it is challenging to make these systems secure. Moreover, policies are hard to understand, often expressed with unfriendly syntax, making it difficult for security administrators

and for business analysts to create intelligible specifications. In [94] it is introduced a Hierarchical Policy Language for Distributed Systems (HiPoLDS), which has been designed to enable the specification of security policies in distributed systems in a concise, readable and extensible way. HiPoLDS design focuses on decentralized execution environments under the control of multiple stakeholders. It represents policy enforcement through the use of distributed reference monitors, which control the flow of information among services (i.e., SOAs) and have the duty to put into action the directives output by the decision engines. For example, an enforcement engine should be able to add or remove security metadata such as signatures or message authentication codes, encrypt confidential information, or decrypt it when it is the case.

In [95] the focus is on the enforcement of privacy issues in e-commerce applications (e.g., eBay). There exist two main paradigms to protect the customer privacy: one relies on the customer trustworthiness; the other one insists on the customer anonymity. The proposed paradigm hides the customer real identity and only data which cover the actual resources he/she is looking for are allowed to circulate. Such data will be orchestrated through the network to raise potential matches, and each node will use certified email to send the customer a matching offer in a standardized format.

[96] introduces a formal and modular framework allowing to enforce a security policy on a given concurrent system. In fact, one of the important goals of the software development process is to prove that the system always meets its requirements. To deal with this problem, two different approaches are proposed. The former is a conservative enforcement: the program should be terminated as soon as it violates the security policy even if the current run could be partially completed. The latter is a liberal enforcement: the execution of the process is not aborted if it could be partially satisfied. With this approach, more properties are enforced than with the conservative one, but the program may terminate without fully satisfying the security policy. Therefore the conservative enforcement will generate fault negative, while the liberal enforcement will generate fault positive and no one of them reach the desired result. In [96] the liberal

785 enforcement is developed, which can be further extended to handle the con-  
servative approach. More in details, an extended version of the Algebra for  
Communicating Process (ACP) [97], designed for specifying concurrent systems  
behavior, and the Basic Process Algebra (BPA) language for the specification  
of security policies are exploited. To achieve the goal, ACP is enhanced with an  
790 enforcement operator, whose actions run in parallel with the system, in order  
to monitor the requests and the satisfaction of the related policies.

In [98] it is proposed a novel access control framework, named Policy Ma-  
chine (PM). It is composed by the following basic entities: authorized users,  
objects, system operations, and processes. Users may be either human beings  
795 or system users; objects specify system entities which are controlled under one  
or more policies (e.g., records, files, e-mails); operations identify the actions that  
can be performed on the contents of objects (e.g., read, write, delete); finally  
users submit access requests through processes. Policies are grouped in classes  
according to their attributes and, therefore, an object may be protected under  
800 more than one policy class, and, similarly, a user may belong to more than one  
policy class. In such a way PM is a general purpose protection machine, since it  
is able to configure many types of access control policies, and it is independent  
from the different operating systems and applications; users need to login only  
to the PM in order to interact with the secure framework. [98] demonstrates the  
805 PM ability to express and enforce the policy objectives of RBAC [46], Chinese  
Wall [99], MAC and DAC models [100]. Moreover, PM is able to face many  
Trojan horse attacks, to which DAC and RBAC are vulnerable.

Hence, [101] introduces a semantic web framework and a meta-control model  
to orchestrate policy reasoning with the identification and access of the sources  
810 of information. In fact, in open domains, enforcing context-sensitive policies  
require the ability to opportunistically interleave policy reasoning with the dy-  
namic identification, selection, and access of relevant sources of contextual in-  
formation. Each entity (i.e., user, sensor, application or organization) relies on  
one or more Policy Enforcing Agents responsible for enforcing relevant policies  
815 in response to incoming requests.

The authors of [102] consider that the application logic, embodied in the system components, should be separated from the related policies. Therefore, they study an infrastructure which can enable policy, representing high-level (i.e., user) or systems concerns, to drive system functionality in a distributed environment. To this end, a middleware is introduced, able to support a secure and dynamic reconfiguration, and to provide a policy enforcement mechanism across system components.

The enforcement solution presented in [103] is based on a Model-based Security Toolkit named SecKit, which is integrated with the MQ Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol layer, a widely adopted technology to enable the communication among IoT devices. In such a work, authorizations and obligations are identified and a specific module (i.e., Policy Enforcement Point) acts as a connector to intercept the messages exchanged in the broker with a publish-subscribe mechanism; the available enforcement actions which can be executed to cope with the received requests are: allow, deny, modify, and delay.

Note that, at the state of the art, except for the work in [103], there are no specific solutions for IoT able to guarantee the enforcement of security and privacy policies, although they are essential to ensure a safe deployment of IoT paradigm. Note that it is important to identify the enforcement mechanisms suitable for the specific IoT context, finding an equilibrium between the guarantee of security and privacy issues and the computing efforts requested by the exploited mechanisms themselves. Some efforts have already been done to define the proper languages for the specification of privacy policies, but a standard which addresses specifically IoT paradigm is still missing.

## **6. Secure Middlewares in IoT**

Due to the very large number of heterogeneous technologies normally in place within the IoT paradigm, several types of middleware layer are employed to enforce the integration and the security of devices and data within the same information network. Within such middlewares, data must be exchanged respecting

845 strict protection constraints. Moreover, in middleware design and development,  
the different communication mediums for wide scale IoT deployments need to  
be considered; in fact, while many smart devices can natively support IPv6 com-  
munications [3] [104], existing deployments might not support the IP protocol  
within the local area scope, thus requiring ad hoc gateways and middlewares  
850 [5].

Both the networking and security issues have driven the design and the de-  
velopment of the VIRTUS Middleware [105], an IoT middleware relying on the  
open eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) to provide secure  
event-driven communications within an IoT scenario. Leveraging the standard  
855 security features provided by XMPP, the middleware offers a reliable and se-  
cure communication channel for distributed applications, protected with both  
authentication (through TLS protocol) and encryption (SASL protocol) mech-  
anisms.

[106] proposes an AmI framework, called Otsopack. This solution provides  
860 two core features: (i) it is designed to be simple, modular and extensible and (ii)  
it runs in different computational platforms, including Java SE and Android.  
The underlying interface is based on HTTP and uses a REpresentational State  
Transfer (REST) interface. Different implementations can provide only certain  
features (e.g., data access) and still interact with each others. In this way it  
865 is possible to embed it in other devices. This gateway platform only supports  
Python and requires a partial ad hoc implementation. It uses a TSC (Triple  
Space Computing), that is a coordination paradigm which promotes the indirect  
communication style and uses semantic data. The way it works is simple: each  
application writes semantically annotated information in a shared space, and  
870 other applications or nodes can query for it. As regards security, given the  
data-centric nature of the framework, there are mainly two core requirements:  
(i) a data provider may only grant access to certain data to a certain set of  
users and (ii) a data consumer may trust only a set of providers for certain set  
of acquired data. A derived issue is how to authenticate each other in such a  
875 dynamic scenario. In order to support the first requirement, an OpenID-based



solution has been built. An Identity Provider securely identifies data consumers to the data providers. Data providers can establish which graphs can be accessed by which users. Therefore, the provider will return a restricted graph only if the valid user is requesting it. In other words, the same application can get  
880 different amounts of information depending on whether it provides credentials or not.

In [107], a framework is proposed for enhancing security, privacy and trust in embedded system infrastructures. The authors suggest the use of lightweight symmetric encryption (for data) and asymmetric encryption protocols (for key  
885 exchange) in Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP). The target implementation of TFTP is the embedded devices such as Wi-Fi Access Points (AP) and remote Base Stations (BS), which should be attacked by malicious users or malwares with the installation of malicious code (e.g., backdoors). [107] emphasizes on finding a solution for strengthening the communication protocol among AP and  
890 BS. To verify this proposal, the authors decided to use UBOOT (Universal Boot loader). In [107] two schemes are implied: AES, used to protect personal and sensitive data, and DHKE (Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange), for exchanging cryptographics keys between two entities that do not know each other.

In [108] is presented a Naming, Addressing and Profile Server (NAPS) as a  
895 middleware to bridge different platforms in IoT environments. Given massive amount of heterogeneous devices deployed across different platforms, NAPS serves as key module at the back-end data center to aid the upstream, the content-based data filtering and matching and the downstream from applications. [108] proposes a novel naming convention for devices and device groups  
900 across different platforms. While previous research efforts only focus on a specific standard or protocol, the authors aim at designing a middleware component serving dynamic application needs. Therefore, an IoT Application Infrastructure (IoT-AI) is designed, which key technical components are: application gateway, service registration portal and Real-time Operational DataBase (RODB)  
905 and protocols like Universal Plug and Play (UPnP). The provided interfaces are based on the RESTful design style where standard HTTP request/response

is used to data transport. When device profile information is registered either manually or automatically from each IoT platform, an identifier is automatically generated. The system deals with Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA). Although it is not the focus of this work, the design can largely  
910 leverage the Network SEcurity Capability (NSEC) SC in ETSI M2M service architecture. Note that the device domain is organized in a tree structure. It uses a key hierarchy, composed of root key, service key and application keys. Root key is used to derive service keys through authentication, and key agree-  
915 ment between the device or gateway and the M2M SCs at the M2M Core. The application key, derived from service key, is unique for M2M applications.

OneM2M [109] proposes a global service layer platform for M2M communications. It aims at unifying the Global M2M Community, by enabling the interoperability of different M2M systems, across multiple networks and topolo-  
920 gies on top of IP. The presented middleware is able to support secure end-to-end data transmissions among the M2M devices and the customer applications. Such a goal is obtained by means of authentication, encryption, connectivity setup, buffering, synchronization, aggregation and device management.

Several recent works tried to address the presented issues. For example [110]  
925 deals with the problem of task allocation in IoT. More in details, the cooperation among nodes have to perform an interoperability towards a collaborative deployment of applications, able to take into account the available resources, such as energy, memory, processing, and object capability to perform a given task. In order to address such an issue, a resource allocation middleware for the  
930 deployment of distributed applications in IoT is proposed. Starting from this component, a consensus protocol for the cooperation among network objects in performing the target application is added, which aims to distribute the burden of the application execution, so that resources are adequately shared. Such a work exploits a distributed mechanism and demonstrates better performance  
935 than its centralized counterpart.

Also middlewares currently lacks an unified vision, able to responding to all the IoT requirements, both in terms of security and privacy and network

performance. Moreover, interoperability is becoming a fundamental challenge, in order to allow an independent development of distributed components, able to interact and cooperate with each other and also to exchange data on the basis of standards. Taking in mind that IoT involves not only data provided by devices/machines, but also by users, besides the interactions are machine-to-machine and also among users and machines and among users and users. Therefore, the design and development of a middleware have an impact on the system architecture (i.e., scalability, coupling among components). To design an effective solution, it occurs to deal with several important questions:

- How heterogeneous devices and users can dynamically interact and agree on the same communication protocols, ensuring also security and privacy?
- How to make the solution suitable for different platforms and therefore not dependent either on the exploited interfaces or protocols?

The work presented in [111] defines a method to deduce the process for the systematical construction of a general-purpose middleware for IoT. The middleware is generated starting from high level algebraic structures, then they are mapped into building components depending on the underlying computing infrastructure, therefore it is adaptable to heterogeneous systems.

Finally, [112] proposes a security architecture for an IoT transparent middleware. Its protection measures are based on existing technologies for security, such as AES, TLS and OAuth. In this way, the privacy, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of exchanged data are integrated to provide security for smart objects, services and users.

## 7. Mobile security in IoT

Mobile nodes in IoT often move from one cluster to another, in which cryptography based protocols are required to provide rapid identification, authentication, and privacy protection. An ad-hoc protocol is presented in [113] exploited when a mobile node joins a new cluster. Such a protocol contains a valid

request message and an answer authentication message, which rapidly implements identification, authentication, and privacy protection. It could be robust towards replay attack, eavesdropping, and tracking or location privacy attacks. Compared with other similar protocols such as basic hash protocol, it has less  
970 communication overhead, more security and more privacy protection properties.

[114] analyzes the security challenges for the HIMALIS (Heterogeneity Inclusion and Mobility Adaptation through Locator ID Separation) architecture regarding features from IoT and the ID/Locator management messages, vulnerable to attacks. This work proposes a secure and scalable mobility management  
975 scheme which considers the IoT constraints, solving the possible security and privacy vulnerabilities of the HIMALIS architecture. The proposed scheme supports scalable interdomain authentication, secure location update, and binding transfer for the mobility process.

Furthermore, Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems, based on EPC  
980 (Electronic Product Code) Network Environment, automatically identify tagged objects, using RF signals without direct contact, which is one of the enabling IoT technologies. In [115], it is explained a mobile RFID network based on EPC and are analyzed the threats of the mobile RFID system. Such an architecture guarantees security and efficiency.

Moreover, for the security and privacy of mobile RFID systems, another  
985 security and privacy model is proposed about IoT in [116]. The model does not only take into account the privacy of tags and readers, but also supports tags corruption, reader corruption, multiple readers and mutual authenticated key exchange protocols.

Powered by location based services, IoT systems have the potential to enable a systematic mass surveillance and to violate the personal privacy of users, especially their location privacy. [117] overviews some of the existing location privacy issues found in mobile devices. Particular attention is paid to the current access permission mechanisms used on the Android, iPhone, and Windows  
990 Mobile platforms. Note that the actual privacy issues in mobile platforms should be inherited by IoT and integrated with other static platforms.

In [118] a secure handshake scheme among mobile nodes is proposed in an intelligent transportation system. More in details, a mobile node verifies, over an insecure communication channel, the legitimacy of an ordinary sensor node by a private negotiation of the handshake attributes; in this way, a mobile hierarchy is established in order to query a deployed WSN in a secure manner.

[119] points out that secure healthcare service is a new demand for mobile solutions. To protect the privacy and security of patients in an healthcare context using an IoT infrastructure, a security and privacy mechanism is proposed. From trustworthiness point of view, service providers have to get authentication from a public authority, which is also responsible for handover cryptography credentials to each actor, in order to allow a secure communication among the end-devices and the application brokers; the goal is to establish a trusted IoT application market, where information on end-devices can be exchanged to establish a secure connection among market and users.

In [120], a security architecture deployable on mobile platforms is defined for mobile e-health applications. In particular, RFID tag identification in medical context and structured and secured IoT solutions are combined, in order to enable ubiquitous and easy access to medical related records, while providing control and security to all interactions.

Also in [116] and [121] the mobile RFID technology is exploited to solve the following security and privacy issues: not all existing tags support hash function in designing RFID protocols and channels between readers and server are not always secure in a mobile context. Therefore, a ultralightweight and privacy-preserving authentication protocol for mobile RFID systems is defined, using only bitwise XOR and several special constructed pseudo-random number generators. Such a work provides several privacy properties (e.g., tag anonymity, tag location privacy, reader privacy, mutual authentication) and avoids suffering from a number of attacks (e.g., replay attacks, desynchronization attacks).

In [122] an efficient and secure mobile-Intrusion Prevention Systems (m-IPS) is proposed for business activities using mobile devices for human-centric computing. Such a system checks user temporal and spatial information, profiles

and role information to provide precise access control.

[123] designs a mobile information collection system based on IoT, implementing an access gateway by smart mobile devices. Moreover, besides the authentication of the mobile terminals through the gateway, a key role is played by the collection strategy, which exploits the historical data movement paths, in order to reduce the problem of too long time device connection, improving the efficiency of information transmission.

In [124] special attention is paid to security and mobility in IoT. In fact, people and companies want to secure their data using firewalls, which inevitably leads to a challenging conflict between data security and usability. Since lots of products are becoming increasingly mobile, the authors of [124] design a Quantum Lifecycle Management (QLM) messaging standard in order to provide generic and standardized application-level interfaces to guarantee a two-way communications through any type of firewall, for example to perform real-time control.

A Mobile Sensor Data Processing Engine (MOSDEN) is presented in [125], which is a plug-in-based IoT middleware for resource-constrained mobile devices (until now built on Android platform), which allows to collect and process sensor data without programming efforts. It supports both push and pull data streaming mechanism as well as centralized and decentralized (e.g., peer-to-peer) data communication.

Hence, since a large number of IoT devices is likely to be mobile, a mobility management protocol is required in order to maintain IP connectivity, for example through the 6LoWPAN standard, as proposed in [126]. Other works, such as [127], deals with the efficient video dissemination in mobile multimedia IoT applications, while [128] studies the interaction of smart things with the traditional web technologies by means of a mobile Bluetooth platform. Social relationships in mobile nodes in IoT by means of a cognitive model are investigated in [129], while the use of NFC for payments with mobile devices in the so called Web of Things (WoT) is studied in [130], which proposes a lightweight architecture based on RESTful approaches.

Summarizing, also if the security issues of mobile devices (i.e., devices identification and authentication, key and credential storage and exchange) are under investigation by the scientific community, the available solutions partially address these needs, thus requiring further efforts in order to allow the integration with the other IoT technologies.

## 8. Ongoing Projects

Security and privacy in IoT are object of interest of European Commission. In fact, there are many projects addressing such issues in IoT field.

Butler [131] is an European Union FP7 project; its purpose is enabling the development of secure and smart life assistant applications by means of a context and location-aware, pervasive information system. It focuses on the following scenarios: smart-cities, smart-health, smart-home/smart-office, smart-shopping, smart-mobility/smart-transport. As regards security and privacy requirements, Butler project aims at allowing users to manage their distributed profile; this implies the control of data duplication and of identities sharing over distributed applications. The final purpose is to implement a framework able to integrate user dynamic data (i.e., location, behavior) in privacy and security protocols.

[132] presents an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) framework for IoT systems empowered by IPv6 over low-power personal area network (6LoWPAN) devices, which is a protocol suitable for resource constrained IoT environments. 6LoWPAN devices are vulnerable to attacks inherited from both the wireless networks and Internet protocols. The proposed IDS framework, which includes a monitoring system and a detection engine, has been integrated into the network framework developed within the EU FP7 project EBBITS [55].

The Hydra project [133] develops a middleware for Networked Embedded Systems, based on a Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA). It is co-funded by the European Commission. Hydra contemplates distributed security issues and social trust among the middleware components. Such a middleware allows de-

1090 developers to incorporate heterogeneous physical devices into their applications by offering easy-to-use web service interfaces for controlling any type of physical device without relying on the various network technology involved, such as Bluetooth, RF, ZigBee, RFID, WiFi, etc. Hydra incorporates means for Device and Service Discovery, Semantic Model Driven Architecture, P2P communication and Diagnostics.

1095 The uTRUSTit (Usable Trust in the Internet of Things) [134], EU-funded FP7 project, aims at creating a trust feedback toolkit in order to enhance the user trust perception in a IoT context. uTRUSTit enables system manufacturers and system integrators to express underlying security concepts to users in a comprehensive way, allowing them to make valid judgments on the trustworthiness of such systems.

1100 iCore project [135] provides a management framework as a wider IoT ecosystem, able to be used by different kinds of users and stakeholders and across different applications domains. The iCore proposed solution is a cognitive framework including three levels of functionality: virtual objects (VOs), composite virtual objects (CVOs), and functional blocks, for representing the user/stakeholder perspectives. Of particular importance are VOs, which are cognitive virtual representations of real-world objects (i.e., sensors, devices, everyday objects) and hide the underlying technological heterogeneity. Whereas CVOs are cognitive mashups of semantically interoperable VOs, delivering services in accordance with the user/stakeholder requirements. The difference between a real or digital object and a virtual object is that the former may be owned or controlled by a particular stakeholder, whereas the latter can be owned or controlled by particular service providers. CVOs may be owned or controlled by yet another provider who adds value by combining different virtual objects and providing these combinations to users. This leads to a hierarchical structure and therefore to a complex eco-system, which is hidden from the different stakeholders and opens new opportunities. The iCore solution shall be equipped with essential security protocols/functionalities, which span all levels of the framework and take into account the ownership and privacy of data and the access to ob-



jects. It will guarantee the secure distribution and aggregation of information  
1120 exchanged among the architecture components, as well as between physical and  
virtual world. To test the effectiveness of such proposals, iCore addresses the  
following use-cases: ambient-assisted living, smart-office, smart-transportation  
and supply chain management.

Also beyond Europe, other countries concur with several projects to deal  
1125 with security issues in IoT. In US, in 2012 DARPA announced the High As-  
surance Cyber Military Systems program (HACMS) [136], which is trying to  
patch the security vulnerabilities of IoT. The agency wants to make sure that  
military vehicles, medical equipment, and even drones cannot be hacked from  
the outside. HACMS aims at providing the seeds for future security protocols,  
1130 allowing IoT to get off the ground, achieving sufficient standardization and  
security. In the future, some of the software tools emerged from the HACMS  
program could be reverted to civil usage. Another institute interested in se-  
curity in the cyber-physical systems is the National Science Foundation (NSF)  
[137]. Its financed Roseline project [138] aims at finding robustness solutions  
1135 for cyber-physical systems to accurately and securely interact with time; in  
fact, the coordination of the activities within the infrastructure, the control  
of communications and the knowledge of time to infer location emerge criti-  
cal issues for real-time security. Roseline project will be implemented across  
a variety of sectors, such as smart grids, aerospace systems, safety systems  
1140 and autonomous vehicles. Other multi-institutional projects included in the  
NSF Future Internet Architectures (FIA) program, are: XIA-NP (Deployment-  
Driven Evaluation and Evolution of the eXpressive Internet Architecture) [139],  
NDN-NP (Named Data Networking Next Phase) [140], NEBULA [141], and  
MobilityFirst-NP (Next-Phase MobilityFirst-NP Project) [142]. They aim at  
1145 exploring novel network architectures and networking concepts, such as new  
communications protocols, able to extend beyond current networking compo-  
nents, mechanisms and application requirements. They also consider the larger  
societal, economic and legal issues which arise from the interplay between Inter-  
net and society, providing support for mobility and enhancing the cyber-security.

1150 More in details, XIA-NP [139] addresses the growing diversity of network mod-  
els, the need for trustworthy communication, and the growing set of stakeholders  
who coordinate their activities to provide Internet services. XIA-NP defines the  
application programming interface (API) for communication and the network  
communication mechanisms, guaranteeing the integrity and the authentication  
1155 of communication. In fact, XIA-NP enables flexible context-dependent mecha-  
nisms for establishing trust among the communicating devices. NDN-NP [140]  
addresses the technical challenges, including routing scalability, fast forward-  
ing, trust models, network security, content protection and privacy. NEBULA  
[141] provides an architecture dealing with cloud computing; in such a project  
1160 the data centers are connected by a high-speed, extremely reliable and secure  
backbone network, aiming at developing new trustworthy data, control and  
core networking approaches to support the emerging cloud computing model of  
always-available network services. The architecture proposed by MobilityFirst-  
NP [142] uses generalized delay-tolerant networking (GDTN) to provide robust-  
1165 ness even in presence of link/network disconnections. GDNT is integrated with  
self-certifying public key addresses, providing a trustworthy network. Dealing  
with mobility, MobilityFirst-NP allows functionalities like context and location-  
aware services to fit naturally into the network. Such a project focuses on the  
tradeoffs between mobility and scalability and on opportunistic use of network  
1170 resources to achieve effective communications among mobile endpoints.

Furthermore, the National Basic Research Program of China [143] raises  
the problem of security protection during the interaction process among the  
network entities, focusing on the information representation and balancing be-  
tween efficiency and energy consumption. Europe collaborates both with China  
1175 and Korea in the realization of an IoT architecture within the Future Internet  
Research and Experimentation (FIRE) project [144] [145], which aims at find-  
ing solutions for the deployment of IoT technologies in several application areas  
(e.g., public safety, social security, medical and health services, urban man-  
agement, people livelihood) with particular attention to information security,  
1180 privacy and intellectual property right. Also the EU-Japan ICT Cooperation

Table 3: Contribution of ongoing European projects on IoT security

	<i>Butler</i>	<i>EBBITS</i>	<i>Hydra</i>	<i>uTRUSTit</i>	<i>iCore</i>	<i>HACMS</i>	<i>NSF</i>	<i>FIRE</i>	<i>EUJapan</i>
<i>Authentication</i>	x			x	x	x	x	x	
<i>Confidentiality</i>	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
<i>Access Control</i>	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	
<i>Privacy</i>	x				x		x	x	x
<i>Trust</i>				x	x		x		
<i>Enforcement</i>									
<i>Middleware</i>		x	x		x				
<i>Mobile</i>	x						x		

[146] carries on a collaboration between Europe and Japan as regards the so called Future Internet; its key drivers are: the establishment of common global standards to ensure seamless communications and common ways to store and access information, the guarantee of highest security, and energy efficiency standards.

As regards worldwide projects, there are several attempts which address IoT requirements in terms of security, privacy and trust in order to develop an unified framework or middleware. In Table 3 the IoT security open issues faced by each project are summarized. At the moment the efforts are aimed at specific application contexts and the impact of these proposals on a mass-scale market still needs to be checked.

## 9. Conclusions

The real spreading of IoT services requires customized security and privacy levels to be guaranteed. The broad overview provided with this survey arises many open issues, and shed some light on research directions in the IoT security field. More in details, a unified vision regarding the insurance of security and privacy requirements in such an heterogeneous environment, involving different technologies and communication standards is still missing. Suitable solutions need to be designed and deployed, which are independent from the exploited platform and able to guarantee: confidentiality, access control, and privacy for users and things, trustworthiness among devices and users, compliance with

defined security and privacy policies. Research efforts are also required to face the integration of IoT and communication technologies in a secure middleware, able to cope with the defined protection constraints. Another research field is that of IoT security in mobile devices, increasingly widespread today. Much efforts have been (and are being) spent by the worldwide scientific community to address aforementioned topics, but there are still many open issues to be faced. We hope that this paper will be helpful in suggesting the research road ahead, in order to allow a massive deployment of IoT systems in real world.

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Sabrina Sicari is Assistant Professor at  
Universita' degli Studi dell'Insubria (Italy).

1640 She received her master degree in Electron-  
ical Engineering in 2002 and her Ph.D. in  
Computer and Telecommunications Engineer-  
ing in 2006 from Universita' degli Studi di  
Catania (Italy). From September 2004 to  
1645 March 2006 she has been a research scholar  
at Politecnico di Milano. Since May 2006 she



works at Universita' degli Studi dell'Insubria in the software engineering group.  
Her research interests are on wireless sensor networks (WSN), risk assessment  
methodology and privacy models. She is a member of the Editorial Board of  
1650 Computer Network (Elsevier). She is the general co-chair of S-Cube'09, a steer-  
ing Committee member of S-Cube'10, S-Cube'11, S-Cube'13 and S-Cube'14,  
guest editor for the ACM Monet Special Issue, named "Sensor, system and  
Software" and AD Hoc Special Issue on Security, Privacy and Trust Manage-  
ment in Internet of Things era (SePriT), TPC member and reviewer for many  
1655 journals and conferences.

Alessandra Rizzardi received BS and MS degree in Computer Sciences with 110/110 cum laude at University of Insubria (Italy) in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Since 2011 for her MS thesis, she began working in the research group of Prof. Alberto Coen-Porisini and Dr. Sabrina Sicari. From November 2013 she is a Ph.D. student at the University of Insubria under the guidance of Dr. Sabrina Sicari. Her research activity is focused on issues related to wireless sensor networks, in particular on security and privacy issues in IoT.



Luigi Alfredo Grieco received the Dr. Eng. degree (with honors) in Electronics Engineering from Politecnico di Bari, Italy, in October 1999 and the Ph.D. degree in information engineering from Università di Lecce, Italy, on December 2003. During 2004, he worked as research assistant at the Telematics lab. Dipartimento di Elettrotecnica ed Elettronica, Politecnico di Bari. Since January 2005, he has been an Assistant Professor in telecommunications with the Dipartimento di ingegneria Elettronica e dell'Informazione, Politecnico di Bari. From March to June 2009, he has been a Visiting Researcher with INRIA (Planete Project, Sophia Antipolis, France), working on the topic of Internet Measurements. From October to November 2013, he has been a Vis-



1685 iting Researcher with LAAS-CNRS (Toulouse, France), working on the topic  
of Information Centric Cyber Physical Systems. He has authored more than  
100 scientific papers published in international journals and conference pro-  
ceedings of great renown. His main research interests include congestion control  
in packet-switching networks, quality of service in low power lossy networks,  
1690 Internet multimedia applications, Internet measurements, information centric  
networking, Internet of Things, and Machine to Machine systems. Currently,  
he serves as Editor for the IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology (for  
which he won the prize as Top Associate Editor 2012) and as Executive Edi-  
tor for the Transactions on Emerging Telecommunications Technologies (Wiley).

1695

Alberto Coen Porisini received his Dr. Eng.  
degree and Ph.D in Computer Engineering from  
Politecnico di Milano (Italy) in 1987 and 1992, re-  
spectively. He is Professor of Software Engineer-  
1700 ing at Universita' degli Studi dell'Insubria (Italy)  
since 2001, Dean of the the School of Science  
from 2006 and Dean of the Universita' degli Studi  
dell'Insubria since 2012. Prior to that he was As-  
sociated Professor at Universita' degli Studi di  
1705 Lecce (1998-2001), Assistant Professor at Politec-  
nico di Milano (1993-2001) and Visiting Researcher with the Computer Security  
Group at University of California, Santa Barbara (1992-1993). His main re-  
search interests are in the field of specification and design of real-time systems,  
privacy models and wireless sensor networks.

