

IPv6 Ready Logo

Phase-2 Test Specification
IPsec

Technical Document

Revision 1.11.0d

IPv6 Forum

<http://www.ipv6forum.org/>

IPv6 Ready Logo Committee

<http://www.ipv6ready.org/>



MODIFICATION RECORD

- Version 1.11.0 May 10, 2011
- Added Section 5.3.6 to verify that End-Node can process a tunneled ICMPv6 Packet Too Big Message and correctly reassemble/fragment packet
 - Modified Section 5.1 End-Node Transport Mode Packet Too Big Reception to fragment inbound Echo Request.
 - Removed ESP Null Authentication Tests
 - Typos and bug fixes
- Version 1.10.0 May 31, 2010
- Support Authentication Algorithm HMAC-SHA-256 in RFC 4868 (Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec) (Section 5.2.8, and 6.2.8)
 - Added the description to Section 6.1.6 Possible Problems
- Version 1.9.2 February 03, 2010
- Corrected pre-shared key at subsection 5.1.5
 - Corrected packet format of dummy packet at subsection 6.1.7
 - Clarified relationship between steps in procedure and judgment at all subsections.
- Version 1.9.1 January 07, 2009
- Support the passive node which doesn't have ping6 application (as Possible Problems in Section 5.1.2)
- Version 1.9.0 December 09, 2008
- Support RFC 4312 (The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec) (Section 5.2.7, 6.2.7)
 - Use IPv6 prefix defined in RFC 3849 for the documentation
- Version 1.8.1 October 11, 2007
- Remove ESN test cases (Section 5.1.12, 6.1.14)
- Version 1.8.0 April 27, 2007
- Support IPsec v3
- Version 1.7.7 April 6, 2006
- Correct 5.3.4 Category
- Version 1.7.6 December 22, 2005
- Correct expected MTU value in ICMP Packet Too Big message for 6.1.5 Packet Too Big Forwarding.
- Version 1.7.5 September 20, 2005
- Correct the maximum MTU value for 6.1.4 Packet Too Big Transmission.
- Version 1.7.4 June 13, 2005
- Fix typos.



Version 1.7.3	June 7, 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Removed test for Packet Too Big Forwarding (Known Original Host) for SGW.
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Version 1.5	November 26, 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Change packet description of 5.1.4
Version 1.4	November 19, 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Change Host to End-Node,• Default algorithms changed to (3DES-CBC, HMAC-SHA1) for Architecture test.• Editorial fix
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Commentators:

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INTRODUCTION

The IPv6 forum plays a major role in bringing together industrial actors, to develop and deploy the next generation of IP protocols. Contrary to IPv4, which started with a small closed group of implementers, the universality of IPv6 leads to a huge number of implementations. Interoperability has always been considered as a critical feature in the Internet community.

Due to the large number of IPv6 implementations, it is important to provide the market a strong signal proving the level of interoperability across various products. To avoid confusion in the mind of customers, a globally unique logo program should be defined. The IPv6 logo will give confidence to users that IPv6 is currently operational. It will also be a clear indication that the technology will still be used in the future. To summarize, this logo program will contribute to the feeling that IPv6 is available and ready to be used.

The IPv6 Logo Program consists of three phases:

Phase 1:

In a first stage, the Logo will indicate that the product includes IPv6 mandatory core protocols and can interoperate with other IPv6 implementations.

Phase 2:

The "IPv6 ready" step implies a proper care, technical consensus and clear technical references. The IPv6 ready logo will indicate that a product has successfully satisfied strong requirements stated by the IPv6 Logo Committee (v6LC).

To avoid confusion, the logo "IPv6 Ready" will be generic. The v6LC will define the test profiles with associated requirements for specific functionalities.

Phase 3:

Same as Phase 2 with IPsec mandated.



REQUIREMENTS

To obtain the IPv6 Ready Logo Phase-2 for IPsec (IPsec Logo), the Node Under Test (NUT) must satisfy following requirements.

Equipment Type:

We define two possibilities for equipment types, they are as follows:

End-Node:

A node who can use IPsec only for itself. Host and Router can be an End-Node.

SGW (Security Gateway):

A node who can provide IPsec tunnel mode for nodes behind it. Router can be a SGW.

Security Protocol:

A NUT is required to pass all of the ESP tests regardless the equipment type. The IPv6 Ready Logo Program does not focus on AH.

Mode:

The mode requirement depends on the type of NUT.

End-Node:

If the NUT is an End-Node, it must pass all the Transport mode tests. If the NUT



supports the Tunnel mode, it also must pass all the Tunnel mode tests. (i.e., Tunnel mode is ADVANCED functionality for End-Node)

SGW:

If the NUT is a SGW, it must pass all the Tunnel mode tests.

Encryption Algorithm:

IPv6 Logo Committee had defined 2 encryption algorithm categories: BASE ALGORITHM and ADVANCED ALGORITHM. All NUTs must pass the BASE ALGORITHM tests to obtain an IPsec Logo. A NUT which supports algorithms listed as ADVANCED ALGORITHM, must pass all corresponding tests.

The algorithm requirement is independent from NUT type.

BASE ALGORITHM:

- 3DES-CBC

ADVANCED ALGORITHM:

- AES-CBC
- AES-CTR
- NULL
- CAMELLIA-CBC

Authentication Algorithm:

IPv6 Logo Committee had defined BASE ALGORITHM and ADVANCED ALGORITHM.

All NUTs have to pass all the test of BASE ALGORITHM to obtain the IPsec Logo.



The NUTs, which support the algorithms that are listed as ADVANCED ALGORITHM, have to pass all the corresponding tests.

The algorithm requirement is independent from NUT type.

BASE ALGORITHM:

- HMAC-SHA1

ADVANCED ALGORITHM:

- AES-XCBC-MAC-96
- NULL
- HMAC-SHA-256

Category:

All NUTs are required to support BASIC. ADVANCED is required for all NUTs which support ADVANCED encryption and/or authentication algorithms. Each test description contains a Category section which lists the requirements to satisfy the test.



REFERENCES

This test specification focus on the following IPsec related RFCs.

- [RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998.
- [RFC2410] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 2410, November 1998.
- [RFC2451] Pereira, R. and R. Adams, "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms", RFC 2451, November 1998.
- [RFC3566] Frankel, S. and H. Herbert, "The AES-XCBC-MAC-96 Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 3566, September 2003.
- [RFC3602] Frankel, S., Glenn, R., and S. Kelly, "The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec", RFC 3602, September 2003.
- [RFC3686] Housley, R., "Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Counter Mode With IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 3686, January 2004.
- [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
- [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 4303, December 2005.
- [RFC4305] Eastlake, D., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 4305, December 2005.
- [RFC4312] A. Kato, S. Moriai, and M. Kanda, "The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec", RFC 4312, December 2005.
- [RFC4443] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
- [RFC4868] S. Kelly, and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC4868, May 2007.





TABLE OF CONTENTS

MODIFICATION RECORD	1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	3
INTRODUCTION.....	4
REQUIREMENTS.....	5
REFERENCES.....	8
TABLE OF CONTENTS	10
1. Test Details.....	13
2. Test Topology	15
For End-Node: Transport and Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test.....	15
For End-Node: Tunnel Mode with SGW Test	16
For SGW: Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test.....	17
For SGW: Tunnel Mode Test	18
3. Description.....	20
4. Required Tests	21
For End-Node:.....	22
For SGW:	23
5. End-Node Test	24
5.1. Architecture.....	24
5.1.1. Select SPD	25
5.1.2. Select SPD (ICMP Type)	30
5.1.3. Sequence Number Increment.....	35
5.1.4. Packet Too Big Reception.....	39
5.1.5. Receipt of No Next Header.....	45
5.1.6. Bypass Policy.....	50
5.1.7. Discard Policy.....	55
5.1.8. Transport Mode Padding	60
5.1.9. Transport Mode TFC Padding	64
5.1.10. Non-Registered SPI	68



5.1.11. ICV.....	72
5.2. Algorithm Test.....	76
5.2.1. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	77
5.2.2. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	81
5.2.3. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL.....	85
5.2.4. Transport Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	86
5.2.5. Transport Mode ESP= AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1.....	90
5.2.6. Transport Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1.....	94
5.2.7. Transport Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	98
5.2.8. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256.....	102
5.3. Tunnel Mode.....	106
5.3.1. Tunnel Mode with End-Node	106
5.3.2. Tunnel Mode with SGW	110
5.3.3. Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW.....	114
5.3.4. Tunnel Mode Padding.....	120
5.3.5. Tunnel Mode TFC Padding	125
5.3.6. Tunnel Mode with SGW Fragmentation.....	129
6. SGW Test	141
6.1. Architecture.....	141
6.1.1. Select SPD	142
6.1.2. Select SPD (ICMP Type)	149
6.1.3. Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW.....	156
6.1.4. Sequence Number Increment.....	163
6.1.5. Packet Too Big Transmission	167
6.1.6. Packet Too Big Forwarding (Unknown Original Host).....	172
6.1.7. Receipt of No Next Header.....	178
6.1.8. Bypass Policy.....	183
6.1.9. Discard Policy.....	188
6.1.10. Tunnel Mode Padding.....	193
6.1.11. TFC Padding	198
6.1.12. Non-Registered SPI	202



6.1.13. ICV	206
6.1.14. Tunnel Mode with End-Node	210
6.2. Algorithm Test.....	214
6.2.1. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	215
6.2.2. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	219
6.2.3. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL	223
6.2.4. Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	224
6.2.5. Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1.....	228
6.2.6. Tunnel Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1	232
6.2.7. Tunnel Mode ESP= CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	236
6.2.8. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA256	240
Appendix-A annex-5.1.2 for the passive node	244
1.1. using UDP application to invoke ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port unreachable).....	245
1.2. invoking Neighbor Unreachability Detection.....	250



1. Test Details

This chapter contains detailed information, including terminology, which is described below.

Terminology:

TN : Tester Node

NUT : Node Under Test (Target Implementation)

SGW : Security Gateway

Required Application:

All tests use ICMP Echo Request and Echo Reply messages by default. ICMP is independent from any implemented application and this adds clarity to the test. If the NUT can not apply IPsec for ICMPv6 packets, it is acceptable to use other protocols rather than ICMPv6. In this case, the device must support either ICMPv6, TCP or UDP. The application and port number are unspecified when TCP or UDP packets are used. The test coordinator should support any ports associated with an application used for the test. Applicants must mention the specific protocol and port that was used to execute the tests.

IPsec Configuration:

Manual key configuration is used by default and is a minimal requirement. IKE is an acceptable alternative to use when IPsec is tested. When IKE is used, the encryption key and authentication key are negotiated dynamically. In that case, dynamic keys are used rather than the static keys specified in this document.



The tester should support the alternative of using IKE with dynamic keys to execute the tests.

Topology:

In "2. Test Topology" the network topology for the test is shown.

2. Test Topology

These logical Network Topologies are used for test samples.

For End-Node: Transport and Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test

1. Set global address to NUT by RA (NUT_Link0)
2. Set MTU to NUT by RA (MTU value is 1500 for Link0)
3. Make IPsec transport mode between NUT and HOST1 and HOST2




Fig. 1 Topology for End-Node: Transport and Tunnel mode with End-Node



For End-Node: Tunnel Mode with SGW Test

1. Set global address to NUT by RA (NUT_Link0)
2. Set MTU to NUT by RA (MTU value is 1500 for Link0)
3. Make IPsec tunnel mode between NUT and SGW1.




Fig. 2 Topology for End-Node: Tunnel mode with SGW



For SGW: Tunnel Mode with End-Node Test

1. Set global address to NUT manually (NUT_Link0, NUT_Link1)
2. Set routing table to NUT manually (ROUTER1_Link1 for Link2)
3. Set MTU to NUT manually for Link0 and Link1 (MTU value is 1500 for Link0 and Link1)
4. Make IPsec tunnel mode between NUT and HOST2.




Fig. 3 Topology for SGW: Tunnel mode with End-Node



For SGW: Tunnel Mode Test

1. Set global address to NUT manually (NUT_Link0, NUT_Link1)
2. Set routing table to NUT manually (ROUTER1_Link1 for Link2, Link3 and Link4)
3. Set MTU to NUT manually for Link0 and Link1 (MTU value is 1500 for Link0 and Link1)
4. Make IPsec tunnel mode between NUT and SGW1 and SGW2




Fig. 4 Topology for SGW: Tunnel mode with SGW



3. Description

Each test specification consists of following parts.

Purpose:	The Purpose is the short statement describing what the test attempts to achieve. It is usually phrased as a simple assertion of the future or capability to be tested.
Category:	The Category shows what classification of device must satisfy the test.
References:	The References section contains some parts of specification related to the tests. It also shows the document names and section numbers.
Initialization:	The Initialization describes how to initialize and configure the NUT before starting each test. If a value is not provided, then the protocol's default value is used.
Packets:	The Packets describes the simple figure of packets which is used in the test. In this document, the packet name is represented in <i>Italic style font</i> .
Procedure:	The Procedure describes step-by-step instructions for carrying out the test.
Observable Results:	The Judgment describes expected result. If we can observe as same result as the description of Judgment, the NUT passes the test.
Possible Problems:	This section contains a description of known issues with the test procedure, which may affect test results in certain situations.



4. Required Tests

The following table lists which tests a device is required to pass based on category.



For End-Node:

Test Title	Category	Note
5.1.1 Select SPD	BASIC	
5.1.2 Select SPD (ICMP Type)	ADVANCED	IPsec v3 Must be tested by ICMP
5.1.3 Sequence Number Increment	BASIC	
5.1.4 Packet Too Big Reception	BASIC	
5.1.5 Receipt of No Next Header	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.1.6 Bypass Policy	ADVANCED	Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required
5.1.7 Discard Policy	ADVANCED	
5.1.8 Transport Mode Padding	BASIC	
5.1.9 Transport Mode TFC Padding	ADVANCED	IPsec v3 Must be tested by UDP
5.1.10 Non-Registered SPI	BASIC	
5.1.11 ICV	BASIC	
5.2.1 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	BASIC	
5.2.2 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	ADVANCED	
5.2.3 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL	ADVANCED	
5.2.4 Transport Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
5.2.5 Transport Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.2.6 Transport Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
5.2.7 Transport Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
5.2.8 Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256	ADVANCED	
5.3.1 Tunnel Mode with End-Node	ADVANCED	
5.3.2 Tunnel Mode with SGW	ADVANCED	
5.3.3 Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW	ADVANCED	
5.3.4 Tunnel Mode Padding	ADVANCED	
5.3.5 Tunnel Mode TFC Padding	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
5.3.6 Tunnel Mode with SGW Fragmentation	BASIC	



For SGW:

Test Title	Category	Note
6.1.1 Select SPD	BASIC	
6.1.2 Select SPD (ICMP Type)	ADVANCED	IPsec v3 Must be tested by ICMP
6.1.3 Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW	BASIC	
6.1.4 Sequence Number Increment	BASIC	
6.1.5 Packet Too Big Transmission	BASIC	
6.1.6 Packet Too Big Forwarding (Unknown Original Host)	BASIC	
6.1.7 Receipt of No Next Header	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
6.1.8 Bypass Policy	ADVANCED	Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required
6.1.9 Discard Policy	ADVANCED	
6.1.10 Tunnel Mode Padding	BASIC	
6.1.11 Tunnel Mode TFC Padding	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
6.1.12 Non-Registered SPI	BASIC	
6.1.13 ICV	BASIC	
6.1.14 Tunnel Mode with End-Node	BASIC	
6.2.1 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1	BASIC	
6.2.2 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC	ADVANCED	
6.2.3 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL	ADVANCED	
6.2.4 Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
6.2.5 Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	IPsec v3
6.2.6 Tunnel Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
6.2.7 Tunnel Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1	ADVANCED	
6.2.8 Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256	ADVANCED	



5. End-Node Test

This Chapter describes the test specification for End-Node. The test specification consists of 2 sections. One is regarding "IPsec Architecture" and another part is regarding "Encryption and Authentication Algorithms".

5.1.Architecture

Scope:

Following tests focus on IPsec Architecture.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that a node properly process and transmit based on the Security Policy Database and Security Association Database.



5.1.1. Select SPD

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) selects appropriate SPD
(End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)
SGW : N/A


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I

source address	HOST2_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x3000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I

source address	HOST2_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link1
SPI	0x4000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request with SA2's ESP


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1's ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. Host2 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA2's ESP"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA1's ESP"*.

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA2's ESP"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.2. Select SPD (ICMP Type)

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) selects appropriate SPD
(End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support
IPsec v3)
SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA1-I
                  <----- SA1-O
                  -----> SA2-I
                  <----- SA2-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x3000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x4000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. NUT sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
5. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-I's ESP"*

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA2-O's ESP"*.

Step-4 (Judgment #2) :

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"*.

Possible Problems:

NUT may be a passive node which does not implement an application for sending Echo Requests. One of the following method to perform this test is required for the passive node.

- a) using UDP application to invoke ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port unreachable) (see Appendix-A Section 1.1)
- b) invoking Neighbor Unreachability Detection (see Appendix-A Section 1.2)



5.1.3. Sequence Number Increment

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) increases sequence number correctly, starting with
1. (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)
SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with ESP


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence	1 st = 1, 2 nd = 2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Sequence	1 st = 1, 2 nd = 2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits an *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"* with an ESP Sequence Number of 1.

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits an *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"* with an ESP Sequence Number of 2.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.4. Packet Too Big Reception

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can fragment and reassemble fragments correctly. (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)
SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1.
Router1's interface to Link1 has an MTU value of 1280.

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```




Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	1240
Fragment Header	Offset	0
	More	1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	116
Fragment Header	Offset	154
	More	0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	1340
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	Router_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0



ICMP	Type	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280
	Data	<i>1232Byte of ICMP Echo Reply with ESP</i>



Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	1240
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	116
Fragment	Offset	154
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Reply with ESP</i>



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends *"Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP1 and 2"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. ROUTER1 sends *"ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)"*
4. HOST1 sends *"Fragmented ICMP Echo Request with ESP1 and 2"*
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1"* and *"Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 2"*

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.5. Receipt of No Next Header

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) process the dummy packet (the protocol value 59) correctly. (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support IPsec v3)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA1-I
                  <----- SA1-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

No Next Header with SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Next Header	no next header (59)
Upper Layer	Data	empty



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/o TFC Padding

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"No Next Header with SA1-O's ESP"*. The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 1
4. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"*. The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 3
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Part B (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/ TFC Padding

6. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP"*
7. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
8. HOST1 sends *"No Next Header with SA1-O's ESP"*. The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 6. The data in upper layer consists of random bytes as the plaintext portion.
9. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with SA1-O's ESP"*. The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 8
10. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP"*.

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP"*.

Part B:

Step-7 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP"*.

Step-10 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.6. Bypass Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Bypass Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly)

SGW : N/A

NOTE: NUT needs to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	1460
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	1460
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED -- except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

1. Set Bypass policy for above ICMP Echo Request to NUT as following example
2. Host1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
3. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
4. HOST2 sends *"ICMP Echo Request"*
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Example 1: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Bypass

source address	HOST2_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	bypass (none)

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Bypass as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	bypass (none)



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply"*

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.7. Discard Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Discard Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly)

SGW : N/A

NOTE: NUT need to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```




Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	1460
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
	Payload Length	1460
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED -- except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

1. Set Discard policy for above ICMP Echo Request to NUT as following example
2. Host1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
3. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
4. HOST2 sends *"ICMP Echo Request"*
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Example 1: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Discard

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	discard

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=Discard as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	in
policy	discard



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.8. Transport Mode Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports padding & padding byte handling
(End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)
SGW : N/A


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	7
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	255
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 ≤ n ≤ 31)
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data Length	7



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.9. Transport Mode TFC Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports TFC Padding
(End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support
IPsec v3)
SGW : N/A


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

*UDP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP * TFC Padded*


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
UDP	Source Port	10000
	Destination Port	7 (echo)

UDP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
UDP	Source Port	7 (echo)
	Destination Port	10000



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"UDP Echo Request with SA1-I's ESP * TFC Padded"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits *"UDP Echo Reply with SA1-O's ESP"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.10. Non-Registered SPI

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can behave when No valid Security Association is configured.

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)
SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2 with non-registered SPI


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x9000 (Different from SA-I's SPD)
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2"*(different SPI)
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.1.11. ICV

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can detect the modification by examining the ICV (End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)
SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"EchoData"

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data	"EchoData"

ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	ICV	aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.....
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"cracked"

ICMP Echo Reply

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 1"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2"* (ICV is modified)
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP 1"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.2. Algorithm Test

Scope:

Following tests focus on Encryption and Authentication Algorithms.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that the NUT properly decrypt the received packets and encrypts the transmitting packets using Encryption algorithms specified in the SAD.

And they verify that the NUT properly processes the authentication algorithms specified in the SAD.



5.2.1. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

- Step-2 (Judgment #1):
- NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.2.2. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support AES-XCBC as an authentication algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC3566]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxin01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxout1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxin01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC-MAC-96
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxout1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED)

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

- Step-2 (Judgment #1):
NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.2.3. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Removed at revision 1.11.0.



5.2.4. Transport Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support AES-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC3602]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readaescin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readaescout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Key	ipv6readaesin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Key	ipv6readaesout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.2.5. Transport Mode ESP= AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP= AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support AES-CTR as an encryption algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC3686]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogaescin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogaescout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Key	ipv6readylogaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Key	ipv6readylogaesout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

- Step-2 (Judgment #1):
- NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.2.6. Transport Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support NULL as an encryption algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2410]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP algorithm key	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP algorithm key	
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Key	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Key	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.2.7. Transport Mode ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support
CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4312]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
Destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
Mode	transport
Protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
ESP algorithm key	ipvcamelliacin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	Any
direction	In
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
ESP algorithm key	ipvcamelliacout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	Any
direction	Out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit)
	Key	ipvcamelliacin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit)
	Key	ipvcamelliacout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

- Step-2 (Judgment #1):
- NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.2.8. Transport Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256

Purpose:

End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA-256

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (A requirement for all End-Node NUTs)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]
- [RFC4868]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	Any
direction	In
protocol	ESP
mode	Transport

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	Transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:


ICMP Echo Request with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA-256
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply with ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA-256
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply with ESP"*

Possible Problems:



None.



5.3. Tunnel Mode

5.3.1. Tunnel Mode with End-Node

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can build IPsec tunnel mode with End-Node correctly.
(End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support
Tunnel Mode)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST1_Link1 ----- NUT
                  -----> SA-I
                  <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

tunnel source address	HOST1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	HOST1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP tunnel"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.2. Tunnel Mode with SGW

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can build IPsec tunnel mode with SGW correctly (End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode)

SGW : N/A


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel


IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.3. Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) can build IPsec tunnel mode with SGW correctly (End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode)

SGW : N/A

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	SGW1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	HOST1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-O

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I

source address	SGW1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x3000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	HOST2_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-O

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x4000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-O

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request from HOST2 within ESP tunnel


IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2 within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2 within ESP tunnel"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*.

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2 within ESP tunnel"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.4. Tunnel Mode Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports padding & padding byte handling
(End-Node Tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support
Tunnel Mode)

SGW : N/A


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel 1

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	sequential
	Padding Length	7
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel 2


IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	sequential
	Padding Length	255
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7



ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 ≤ n ≤ 31)
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data Length	7

Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*.

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply to HOST1 within ESP tunnel"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.5. Tunnel Mode TFC Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (End-Node) supports TFC Padding
(End-Node tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : ADVANCED (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support
Tunnel Mode and IPsec v3)

SGW : N/A


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

*ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel * TFC Padded*


IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST1 within ESP tunnel * TFC Padded"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1) :

NUT transmits the packet *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel"*.

Possible Problems:

None.



5.3.6. Tunnel Mode with SGW Fragmentation

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT can reassemble/fragment packets correctly inside ESP Tunnel

Category:

End-Node : BASIC (This test is required for all End-Node NUTs which support Tunnel Mode and IPsec v3)

SGW : N/A

References:


- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.2

MTU value is 1280 for Link2.

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link1
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link0
source address	Link2
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	SGW1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link1
source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request A within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request A

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply A

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply A within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to NUT2 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e. g., 1240)
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to Host2 within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	1stPL
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request B to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	2ndPL
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request

ICMP Echo Reply B within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Reply B

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Packet Too Big within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_LINK2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ICMP	Type	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280 $\leq n \leq$ 1430 (e. g. , 1280)
	Data	1232Byte of <i>ICMP Echo Reply B</i>



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to NUT2 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e. g., 1240)
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to Host2 within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	1stPL
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request C to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
	Payload Length	2ndPL
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request



Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to NUT2 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
	Payload Length	<i>1stPL</i> (=MTU-40) (e. g., 1240)
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
	Payload Length	<i>2ndPL</i> (=1476-1stPL)
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Reply</i>



Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to Host2 within ESP 1


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
	Payload Length	1stPL
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Reply C to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link2
	Payload Length	2ndPL
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Reply



Procedure:





Part A (BASIC) :

1. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Echo Request from Host1 to NUT within ESP
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Echo Request fragments totaling 1500 Bytes from Host1 to NUT within ESP Tunnel
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
5. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Packet Too Big Message within ESP Tunnel to NUT
6. SGW1 sends ICMPv6 Echo Request fragments totaling 1500 Bytes from Host1 to NUT within ESP Tunnel
7. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits ICMPv6 Echo Reply from NUT to Host1 within ESP Tunnel

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT reassembles ICMPv6 Echo Request and transmits fully assembled ICMPv6 Echo Reply from NUT to Host1 within ESP Tunnel

Step-7 (Judgment #3):

NUT reassembles ICMPv6 Echo Request and transmits fragmented ICMPv6 Echo Reply from NUT to Host1 within ESP Tunnel

Possible Problems:

None.



6. SGW Test

This Chapter describes the test specification for SGW.

The test specification consists of 2 parts. One is regarding "IPsec Architecture" and another part is regarding to "Encryption and Authentication Algorithms".

6.1.Architecture

Scope:

Following tests focus on IPsec Architecture.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that a node properly process and transmit based on the Security Policy Database and Security Association Database.



6.1.1. Select SPD

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) selects appropriate SPD
(SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I

source address	SGW2_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I

tunnel source address	SGW2_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link4
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-O

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW2_Link2
SPI	0x4000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-O

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW2_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link4
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW2_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST4_Link4
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW2_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST4_Link4
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP"*

Step-6 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST4"*

Step-8 (Judgment #4):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.2. Select SPD (ICMP Type)

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) selects appropriate SPD
(SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support IPsec v3)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA1-I
                        <----- SA1-O
                        -----> SA2-I
                        <----- SA2-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x4000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-0's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within SA1-0's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within SA2-0's ESP"*

Step-6 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request within SA1-0's ESP"*

Step-8 (Judgment #4):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply from HOST2"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.3. Select SPD for 2 Hosts behind 1 SGW

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) selects appropriate SPD
(SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)


References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	HOST2_Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-O

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-O

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in02

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	HOST3_Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA2-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x4000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA2-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	HOST3_Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin02
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in02
IP Header	Source Address	HOST3_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST3

IP Header	Source Address	HOST3_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply to HOST3


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST3_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST3_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within SA1's ESP*" (originally from HOST2)
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends "*ICMP Echo Reply to HOST2*"
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
5. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within SA2's ESP*" (originally from HOST3)
6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
7. HOST1 sends "*ICMP Echo Reply to HOST3*"
8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within SA1's ESP"*

Step-6 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST3"*

Step-8 (Judgment #4):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within SA2's ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.4. Sequence Number Increment

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) increases sequence number correctly, starting with 1.
(SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Sequence	1 st = 1, 2 nd = 2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request*"
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request*"
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits an "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP*" with an ESP Sequence number of 1

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits an "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP*" with an ESP Sequence number of 2

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.5. Packet Too Big Transmission

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) transmits the ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big) correctly. (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)


References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1460
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280 $\leq n \leq$ 1430 (e.g., 1280)
	Data	1232Byte of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1stPL(=MTU-40) (e.g., 1240)
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	2ndPL(=1476-1stPL)
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>



Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1stPL
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request to Host2 within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	2ndPL
Fragment	Offset	(1stPL-8)/8
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of ICMP Echo Request



6.1.6. Packet Too Big Forwarding (Unknown Original Host)

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) forwards the ICMP Error Message (Packet Too Big) correctly when NUT can not determine the original host. (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4.

Router1's interface to Link2 has an MTU value of 1356.

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1360
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Error Message to NUT (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	ROUTER1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ICMP	Type	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1356
	Data	1232Byte of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>

ICMP Error Message to HOST1 (Packet Too Big)

IP Header	Source Address	ROUTER1_Link2 or NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	2 (Packet Too Big)
	MTU	1280 – 1286
	Data	1232Byte of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 1

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1240
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 2

IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	136
Fragment	Offset	154
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>



ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1360
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1


IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	1240
Fragment	Offset	0
	More Flag	1
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
	Payload Length	136
Fragment	Offset	154
	More Flag	0
Data	Data	Rest of <i>ICMP Echo Request</i>



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. ROUTER1 sends "ICMP Error Message to NUT (Packet Too Big)"
4. HOST1 sends "ICMP Echo Request"
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
6. HOST1 sends "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 1" and "Fragmented ICMP Echo Request 2"
7. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Error Message to HOST1 (Packet Too Big)"*

Step-7 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1"* and *"Fragmented ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2"*

Possible Problems:

The NUT (SGW) may choose to process the ICMPv6 Packet Too Big PMTU information on the ciphertext side of the interface. In this case, the NUT will not generate and send a Packet Too Big Message to Host1, but will instead fragment IPv6 Packets from Host1 after tunneling and applying ESP. Host1 will continue to transmit whole packets. See RFC 4301 Section 6.1.



6.1.7. Receipt of No Next Header

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) process the dummy packet (the protocol value 59) correctly.
(SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support IPsec v3)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA1-I
                        <----- SA1-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

No Next Header within SA1-I's ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Next Header	no next header (59)
Upper Layer	Data	empty



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/o TFC Padding

1. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP*" (originally from HOST2)
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. SGW1 sends "*No Next Header within SA1-I's ESP*" (originally from HOST2).
The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 1
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
5. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP*" (originally from HOST2).
The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 3
6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Part B (ADVANCED): No Next Header w/ TFC Padding

7. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP*" (originally from HOST2)
8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
9. SGW1 sends "*No Next Header within SA1-I's ESP*" (originally from HOST2).
The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 7. The data in upper layer consists of random bytes as the plaintext portion.
10. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
11. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within SA1-I's ESP*" (originally from HOST2).
The ESP sequence number must be incremented than the packet transmitted at step 9
12. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Step-6 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Part B:

Step-8 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Step-10 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Step-12 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST2"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.8. Bypass Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support Bypass Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly)

NOTE: NUT need to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```




Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST2



IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED -- except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

1. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP*"
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. Set Bypass Policy for above ICMP Echo Reply to NUT as following example
4. SGW2 forwards "*ICMP Echo Request from HOST4*"
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Example 1: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=bypass (none)

source address	HOST4_Link4
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	bypass (none)

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=bypass (none) as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	bypass (none)



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"* on Link0

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST4"* on Link0

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.9. Discard Policy

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) select bypass or discard policies

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support Discard Policy, regardless of explicitly or implicitly)

NOTE: NUT need to pass at least either of "Bypass Policy" or "Discard Policy" tests.

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request from HOST4

IP Header	Source Address	HOST4_Link4
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED — except Either of Bypass or Discard Policy is required):

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. Set discard policy for above ICMP Echo Reply to NUT as following example
4. HOST4 sends *"ICMP Echo Request from HOST4"*
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Example 1: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=discard

source address	HOST4_Link4
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	discard

Example 2: Security Policy Database (SPD) for policy=discard as default policy

source address	any
destination address	any
upper spec	any
direction	out
policy	discard



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"* on Link0.

Step-5 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.10. Tunnel Mode Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) supports padding & padding byte handling
(SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link0
Tunnel destination address	HOST1_Link1
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 <= n <= 31)
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data Length	7

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
	Padding	Sequential
	Padding Length	7+8n (0 <= n <= 31)
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)
	Data Length	7



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP*" (Padding Length=7)
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends "*ICMP Echo Reply*"
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
5. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP*" (Padding Length=255)
6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
7. HOST1 sends "*ICMP Echo Reply*"
8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT



Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Step-6 (Judgment #3):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-8 (Judgment #4):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.11. TFC Padding

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) supports TFC Padding
(End-Node transport mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support IPsec v3)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA1-I
                        <----- SA1-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-I

tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA1-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA1-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



None.



6.1.12. Non-Registered SPI

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) can behave when No valid Security Association is configured.

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2 with non-registered SPI

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x9000 (different from SA-I's SPD)
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1*"
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. SGW1 sends "*ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2*"
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits "*ICMP Echo Request*"

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.13. ICV

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) can detect the modification by examining the ICV (SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1)

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogshalin01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"PadLen is zero"

ICMP Echo Request


IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"PadLen is zero"

ICMP Echo Request within ESP 2

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence number	2
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogshalout1
	ICV	aaaaaaaaa.....
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)
	Data	"cracked"



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC):

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP 1"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request with ESP 2"* (with INCORRECT ICV)
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT does not transmit any packets.

Possible Problems:

None.



6.1.14. Tunnel Mode with End-Node

Purpose:

Verify that a NUT (SGW) can build IPsec tunnel mode with End-Node correctly, ESP=3DES-CBC

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.3

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2 ----- NUT -- HOST1
              -----> SA-I
              <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	HOST2_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

tunnel source address	HOST2_Link2
tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	HOST2_Link2
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	HOST2_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP algorithm key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
tunnel destination address	HOST2_Link2
source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	HOST2_Link2
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link2
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP tunnel

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link2
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. HOST2 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2. Algorithm Test

Scope:

Following tests focus on Encryption and Authentication Algorithms.

Overview:

Tests in this section verify that the NUT properly decrypt the received packets and encrypts the transmitting packets using Encryption algorithms specified in the SAD.

And they verify that the NUT properly processes the authentication algorithms specified in the SAD.



6.2.1. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : BASIC (A requirement for all SGW NUTs)

References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```




Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (BASIC) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2.2. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC AES-XCBC

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support AES-XCBC as an authentication algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC3566]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxin01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	AES-XCBC
ESP authentication key	ipv6readaesxout1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxin01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readaesxout1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2.3. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC NULL

Removed at revision 1.11.0.



6.2.4. Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=AES-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support AES-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)


References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC3602]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
ESP key	ipv6readaescin01
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
ESP key	ipv6readaescout1
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Key	ipv6readaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CBC(128-bit)
	Key	ipv6readaesout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2.5. Tunnel Mode ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=AES-CTR HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support AES-CTR as an encryption algorithm)

References:

- [RFC3686]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR
ESP key	ipv6readylogaescin01
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	AES-CTR
ESP key	ipv6readylogaescout1
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Key	ipv6readylogaescin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	AES-CTR
	Key	ipv6readylogaescout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2.6. Tunnel Mode ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=NULL HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support NULL as an encryption algorithm)


References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC2410]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP key	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	NULL
ESP key	
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Key	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	NULL
	Key	
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2.7. Tunnel Mode ESP= CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) HMAC-SHA1

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP= CAMELLIA-CBC HMAC-SHA1

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit) as an encryption algorithm)


References:

- [RFC2404]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4312]
- [RFC4443]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
ESP key	ipvcamelliacin01
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC(128-bit)
ESP key	ipvcamelliacout1
ESP authentication algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit)
	Key	ipvcamelliacin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	CAMELLIA-CBC (128-bit)
	Key	ipvcamelliacout1
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

1. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
3. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



6.2.8. Tunnel Mode ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA256

Purpose:

SGW tunnel mode, ESP=3DES-CBC HMAC-SHA256

Category:

End-Node : N/A

SGW : ADVANCED (This test is required for all SGW NUTs which support HMAC-SHA-256 as an authentication algorithm)

References:

- [RFC2451]
- [RFC4301]
- [RFC4303]
- [RFC4305]
- [RFC4443]
- [RFC4868]

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.4

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

```
HOST2_Link3 -- SGW1 ----- NUT -- HOST1_Link0
                        -----> SA-I
                        <----- SA-O
```



Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-I

source address	SGW1_Link2
destination address	NUT_Link1
SPI	0x1000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-I

Tunnel source address	SGW1_Link2
Tunnel destination address	NUT_Link1
source address	Link3
destination address	Link0
upper spec	any
direction	in
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel

Security Association Database (SAD) for SA-0

source address	NUT_Link1
destination address	SGW1_Link2
SPI	0x2000
mode	tunnel
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA-256
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1

Security Policy Database (SPD) for SA-0

Tunnel source address	NUT_Link1
Tunnel destination address	SGW1_Link2
source address	Link0
destination address	Link3
upper spec	any
direction	out
protocol	ESP
mode	tunnel



Packets:

ICMP Echo Request within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	SGW1_Link2
	Destination Address	NUT_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256in01
IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Request

IP Header	Source Address	HOST2_Link3
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMP	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMP Echo Reply


IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

ICMP Echo Reply within ESP

IP Header	Source Address	NUT_Link1
	Destination Address	SGW1_Link2
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	Key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout1
	Authentication Algorithm	AES-XCBC
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogoph2ipsecsha2256out1
IP Header	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST2_Link3
ICMP	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED) :

5. SGW1 sends *"ICMP Echo Request within ESP"*
6. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT
7. HOST1 sends *"ICMP Echo Reply"*
8. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Request"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT transmits *"ICMP Echo Reply within ESP"*

Possible Problems:

None.



Appendix-A annex-5.1.2 for the passive node

This appendix describes alternative methods to perform Test 5.1.2 on the passive node which doesn't have the application to send ICMPv6 Echo Request.



1.1.using UDP application to invoke ICMPv6 Destination

Unreachable (Port unreachable)


Requirements:

- Must respond to ICMPv6 Echo Request with ICMPv6 Echo Reply
- Must respond to UDP packet toward the closed port with ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable (Port unreachable)

Initialization:

Use common topology described as Fig.1

Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:





- SA1-I

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	HOST1_Link1
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	inbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

- SA2-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



- SA3-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
SPI	0x3000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out3

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link1
upper spec	ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable
direction	outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1

IPv6	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMPv6	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2

IPv6	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
ICMPv6	Type	129 (Echo Reply)

UDP packet toward closed port


IPv6	Source Address	HOST1_Link1
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
UDP	Source Port	Any unused port on HOST1
	Destination Port	Any closed port on NUT

ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable with ESP3

IPv6	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link1
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out3
ICMPv6	Type	1 (Destination Unreachable)
	Code	4 (Port unreachable)



Procedure:



Part A (ADVANCED):

1. HOST1_Link1 sends "*ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1*" to NUT_Link0
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0
3. HOST1_Link1 sends "*UDP packet toward closed port*" to NUT_Link0
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT_Link0 transmits "*ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2*"

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT_Link0 transmits "*ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable with ESP3*"

Possible Problems:

None.




1.2.invoking Neighbor Unreachability Detection

Requirements:

- Must respond to ICMPv6 Echo Request with ICMPv6 Echo Reply

Initialization:

Use following topology



Reboot NUT making sure it has cleared its neighbor cache. Allow time for all devices on Link0 to perform Stateless Address Autoconfiguration and Duplicate Address Detection.



1. Set the global address (NUT_Link0) to NUT by RA if NUT is the host.
Otherwise set the global address (NUT_Link0) to NUT manually
2. Set MTU (1500 bytes for Link0) to NUT by RA if NUT is the host. Otherwise
set MTU (1500 bytes for Link0) to NUT manually.
3. Set NUT's SAD and SPD as following:

(passive node)			
HOST1	----- transport -----	NUT	
----- spi=0x1000 ----->	SA1-I	ICMPv6 Echo Request	
<----- spi=0x2000 -----	SA2-O	ICMPv6 Echo Reply	
<----- spi=0x3000 -----	SA3-O	ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation	
----- spi=0x4000 ----->	SA4-I	ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement	



- SA1-I

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x1000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in01

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Request
direction	inbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

- SA2-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
SPI	0x2000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out2

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Echo Reply
direction	outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



- SA3-O

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
SPI	0x3000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1out3

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	NUT_Link0
destination address	HOST1_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation
direction	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01outbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport

- SA4-I

Security Association Database (SAD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
SPI	0x4000
mode	transport
protocol	ESP
ESP algorithm	3DES-CBC
ESP key	ipv6readylogo3descbcin04
ESP authentication	HMAC-SHA1
ESP authentication key	ipv6readylogsha1in04

Security Policy Database (SPD)

source address	HOST1_Link0
destination address	NUT_Link0
upper spec	ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement
direction	inbound
protocol	ESP
mode	transport



Packets:

ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation (multicast)

IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0 (solicited-node multicast address)
ICMPv6	Type	135 (Neighbor Solicitation)
	Target Address	NUT_Link0
	Source link-layer address Option Link-Layer Address: HOST1_Link0 MAC address	

ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement

IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ICMPv6	Type	136 (Neighbor Advertisement)
	R	false (if NUT is the host) true (if NUT is the router)
	S	true
	O	true
	Target Address	NUT_Link0
	Target link-layer address Option Link-Layer Address: NUT_Link0 MAC address	

ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1

IPv6	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x1000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin01
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in01
ICMPv6	Type	128 (Echo Request)

ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2

IPv6	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x2000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout2
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out2
ICMPv6	Type	129 (Echo Reply)



ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation with ESP3


IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	NUT_Link0
	Destination Address	HOST1_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x3000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcout3
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1out3
ICMPv6	Type	135 (Neighbor Solicitation)
	Target Address	HOST1_Link0
	Source link-layer address Option Link-Layer Address: NUT_Link0 MAC address	

ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement with ESP4

IPv6	Hop Limit	255
	Source Address	HOST1_Link0
	Destination Address	NUT_Link0
ESP	SPI	0x4000
	Sequence Number	1
	Algorithm	3DES-CBC
	KEY	ipv6readylogo3descbcin04
	Authentication Algorithm	HMAC-SHA1
	Authentication Key	ipv6readylogsha1in04
ICMPv6	Type	136 (Neighbor Advertisement)
	R	false
	S	true
	O	true
	Target Address	HOST1_Link0
	Target link-layer address Option Link-Layer Address: HOST1_Link0 MAC address	



Procedure:





Part A (ADVANCED):

1. HOST1_Link0 sends *"ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation (multicast)"* to NUT_Link0
2. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0
3. HOST1_Link0 sends *"ICMPv6 Echo Request with ESP1"* to NUT_Link0
4. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0
5. Observe the packet transmitted by NUT_Link0 for DELAY_FIRST_PROBE_TIME (5) seconds
6. HOST1_Link0 sends *"ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement with ESP4"* to NUT_Link0

Observable Results:

Part A:

Step-2 (Judgment #1):

NUT_Link0 transmits *"ICMPv6 Neighbor Advertisement"*

Step-4 (Judgment #2):

NUT_Link0 transmits *"ICMPv6 Echo Reply with ESP2"*

Step-5 (Judgment #3):

NUT_Link0 transmits *"ICMPv6 Neighbor Solicitation with ESP3"*

Possible Problems:

None.



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