

Homework 2

Anthony Weems

September 22, 2015

1. Truthfulness in Stable Marriage

A preference list exists such that a woman can lie and achieve a better outcome. Such a list is as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \mathbf{m_1}: & (w_a, w_b, w_c) & \mathbf{w_a}: & (m_2, m_1, m_3) \\ \mathbf{m_2}: & (w_b, w_a, w_c) & \mathbf{w_b}: & (m_1, m_2, m_3) \\ \mathbf{m_3}: & (w_a, w_b, w_c) & \mathbf{w_c}: & (m_1, m_2, m_3) \end{array}$$

Normally, this would result in the set:

$$\{(m_1, w_a), (m_2, w_b), (m_3, w_c)\} \quad (0.1)$$

However, w_a can claim (m_2, m_3, m_1) , resulting in the set:

$$\{(m_1, w_b), (m_2, w_a), (m_3, w_c)\} \quad (0.2)$$

The set of stable marriages contains the pair (m_2, w_a) , which is w_a first choice of partner.

2. Running Times

With 10^{12} ops / sec, we can run $\gamma = 3.6 * 10^{15}$ ops / hour.

- (a) $n = \sqrt{\gamma} = 6 * 10^7$
- (b) $n = \sqrt[6]{\gamma} = 391$
- (c) $n = \sqrt{\gamma/5555} = 805024$
- (d) $n^3 * \log_2 n \rightarrow n = 60955$ (assuming log base two)
- (e) $n = \log_2 \gamma = 51$

3. Efficiency

- (a) Yes, No, No, A_1
- (b) No, Yes, No, A_2
- (c) Yes, No, No, A_1
- (d) Yes, Yes, Yes, A_2
- (e) Yes, No, No, A_1