

# STRICT PROPRIETY IS WEAK

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**ABSTRACT.** Considerations of accuracy—the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values—have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on particular ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measure should be strictly proper. However, the main argument for strict propriety only supports weak propriety. But, strict propriety follows from weak propriety given strict truth-directedness (which is non-negotiable) and additivity (which is both very common and plausible). So no further argument is necessary.

## 1. OUR MAIN POINT

Considerations of accuracy—the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values—have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms, including probabilism (Joyce, 1998, 2009), conditionalization (Greaves and Wallace, 2006; Briggs and Pettigrew, 2018), the Principal Principle (Pettigrew, 2016), and the Principle of Indifference (Pettigrew, 2014).

For these arguments to succeed, accuracy-theorists need to tell us how to measure the accuracy of credences at a world, where accuracy is a function just of credences and truth-values. I.e.:<sup>1</sup>

$$\text{Acc} : \text{Credences} \times \text{Worlds} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$$

Instead of directly arguing for a particular measure, accuracy theorists typically argue for constraints on what counts as a legitimate measure of accuracy.

One fundamental constraint simply encodes the idea that the higher your credences in truths, and the lower your credences in falsehoods, the more accurate your credences are:

### STRICT TRUTH DIRECTEDNESS.

If  $c(\phi) \leq c'(\phi)$  for all  $\phi$  true at  $w$ , and  $c(\phi) \geq c'(\phi)$  for all  $\phi$  false at  $w$ , with at least one strict inequality, then  $\text{Acc}(c, w) < \text{Acc}(c', w)$ .

This says that when a credence function  $c$  is modified by increasing the credence assigned to some propositions that are true in  $w$ , or reducing the credence to some propositions false in  $w$ ,  $\text{Acc}(c, w)$  is strictly increased.

A further constraint, which is still very plausible, says that the accuracy of your entire credence function at a world is just the sum of the accuracy of each of your credences in individual propositions at that world.<sup>2</sup>

### ADDITIVITY.

There is a  $a : [0, 1] \times \{t, f\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\}$ , with  $\text{Acc}(c, w) = \sum_{\phi} a(c(\phi), w(\phi))$ .<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> We include  $-\infty$  because a common accuracy measure, the log score, gives an accuracy value of  $-\infty$  when you have credence 0 in a true proposition or credence 1 in a false proposition.

<sup>2</sup>For a defence, see Pettigrew (2016, §4.1).

<sup>3</sup>  $w(\phi) = \begin{cases} t & \phi \text{ is true in } w \\ f & \phi \text{ is false in } w \end{cases}$ .

The constraint of present focus, which is vital for the validity of the accuracy-theorists' results, is strict propriety, which says that a probabilistic credence function expects itself to be more accurate than any other credence function.<sup>4</sup>

#### STRICT PROPRIETY.

If  $b$  is probabilistic then  $\text{Exp}_b \text{Acc}(c)$  is *uniquely* maximised at  $c = b$ . ( $\text{Exp}_b \text{Acc}(c)$  denotes the expected accuracy of credence function  $c$  according to  $b$ .)

This needs much more justification than our previous constraints. The main style of argument for strict propriety runs something like the following (Joyce, 2009: 277-9; Gibbard, 2007; Oddie 1997: 537-8; Greaves and Wallace, 2006: 621): Firstly, rational agents should be immodest, i.e. should expect their own credences to be doing best at the pursuit of accuracy. After all, if your credence function expects something else to be doing better, then your own credence function advises you (even in the absence of further evidence) to adopt an alternative credence function instead; so, you can't rationally rely on it. Secondly, all probability functions could be rational given the right circumstances.<sup>5</sup> This then, it is claimed, justifies the principle of strict propriety.

However, as has been noticed by Pettigrew 2011, §4.1; Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler 2016: 65),<sup>6</sup> this argument only supports *weak* propriety:

#### WEAK PROPRIETY.

If  $b$  is probabilistic then  $\text{Exp}_b \text{Acc}(c)$  is maximised (possibly non-uniquely) at  $c = b$ .

So long as your credences are amongst the best, they are not self-undermining. If a measure of accuracy mandated that you change your credence to a different one regardless of what evidence you possessed, then it seemingly causes needless and capricious doxastic changes and forbids perfectly rational views. But merely thinking that some other credences are equally as good does not lead to this irrationality. Moreover, these authors claim that this argument cannot naturally be extended to obtain strict propriety.<sup>7</sup>

But, it turns out that strict propriety is a mathematical consequence of weak propriety given our two additional principles of strict truth directedness and additivity. Merely weakly proper additive accuracy measures will thus fail to be strictly truth directed; in fact they will be constant on some region.<sup>8</sup>

So, no further argument for strict propriety is necessary. One just needs to argue for weak propriety, and strict propriety comes for free.

<sup>4</sup>Joyce's (2009) dominance argument for probabilism uses a weaker principle: Coherent Admissibility. But there are similar difficulties motivating the strong version of the principle that is needed for his result. Others (e.g. Pettigrew, 2016; Joyce, 1998) give an alternative collection of axioms which entail strict propriety, but the argument for them is much less direct.

<sup>5</sup>More carefully, for every probability space  $\langle \Omega, \mathcal{F}, \text{Pr} \rangle$ , there is an isomorphic space  $\langle \Omega', \mathcal{F}', \text{Pr}' \rangle$  such that  $\text{Pr}'$  is rationally permissible (in the right circumstances). This formulation is then compatible with further restrictions to probabilism. See Joyce (2009, Footnote 17).

<sup>6</sup>Note that Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) is interested in the imprecise setting where our argument doesn't apply. Fallis (2007: 221) appeals to a similar argument to endorse weak but not strict propriety.

<sup>7</sup>Joyce (2009) in fact argues that, firstly, credences that could be rationally *required* expect themselves to be strictly optimal, and secondly, any probability function could be rationally required. This stronger 'secondly' premiss is less plausible, and arguments that the 'firstly' premiss is only plausible with a *weakly* optimal consequent might similarly hold for Joyce's version. Furthermore, by our argument here, it is sufficient to argue for weak propriety.

<sup>8</sup>This follows from proposition 1 using the fact that weakly proper are weakly truth directed (Schervish, 1989, Lemma 1), and makes the assumption that  $-\infty$  only appears at the endpoints (see Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane, 2009, §4.3). Schervish et al. (2009, Lemma 5) also noted this as a consequence of Schervish's representation result.

## 2. THE RESULT

The first part of our argument works just with  $\mathbf{a}$ . We define:<sup>9</sup>

$$\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y) := x \times \mathbf{a}(y, t) + (1 - x) \times \mathbf{a}(y, f)$$

which is the expected accuracy of adopting credence  $y$  in  $\phi$ , as evaluated according to a probability function  $b$  with  $b(\phi) = x$ . We define truth directedness and propriety as expected for  $\mathbf{a}$ .

**Proposition 1.** *Suppose  $\mathbf{a}$  is weakly proper and strictly truth directed. Then it is strictly proper.*

This result is an immediate consequence of Schervish's theorem on representations of scoring rules (1989, Theorem 4.2) (as Schervish et al. (2009, Lemma 5) note), but we can also show it directly.

*Proof.* We need to show that  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(x) > \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$  for  $y \neq x$ . Consider some  $z$  which lies between  $y$  and  $x$ . We will show that  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) > \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$ ; that is, that  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$  strictly improves as we move  $y$  towards  $x$ . To do this, we compare  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) - \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$  to  $\text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(z) - \text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(y)$ , which we know is  $\geq 0$  by weak propriety at  $z$ .

Consider first the case where  $x > z > y$ .

$$(1) \quad \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) - \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y) = \underbrace{x \times (\mathbf{a}(z, t) - \mathbf{a}(y, t))}_{>0} + \underbrace{(1 - x) \times (\mathbf{a}(z, f) - \mathbf{a}(y, f))}_{<0}$$

$$(2) \quad \text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(z) - \text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(y) = z \times (\mathbf{a}(z, t) - \mathbf{a}(y, t)) + (1 - z) \times (\mathbf{a}(z, f) - \mathbf{a}(y, f))$$

Since  $\mathbf{a}$  is strictly truth directed and  $z > y$ ,  $\mathbf{a}(z, t) - \mathbf{a}(y, t) > 0$  and  $\mathbf{a}(z, f) - \mathbf{a}(y, f) < 0$ . Since  $x > z$ , and thus  $(1 - x) < (1 - z)$ , in equation 1 there is more weight than in equation 2 on something positive, and less on something negative. Therefore (assuming all accuracy values in equations 1 and 2 are finite)

$$\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) - \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y) > \text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(z) - \text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(y).$$

And since  $\text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(z) \geq \text{Exp}_z \mathbf{a}(y)$ ,  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) > \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$ .

The only infinite value we could have in equations 1 and 2 is  $\mathbf{a}(y, t) = -\infty$  (by strict truth directedness and  $x > z > y$ ), in which case  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y) = -\infty < \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z)$ .

For  $x < z < y$ , an analogous argument shows that  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) > \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$ . (The inequalities annotating equations 1 and 2 are reversed.)

We have thus shown that  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z) > \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$ . By weak propriety,  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(x) \geq \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(z)$  and thus  $\text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(x) > \text{Exp}_x \mathbf{a}(y)$ , as required.  $\square$

Additivity then allows us to turn this into a result about accuracy of an entire credal state.

**Corollary 2.** *Suppose  $\text{Acc}$  is weakly proper, additive and strictly truth directed. Then it is strictly proper.<sup>10</sup>*

<sup>9</sup>We let  $0 \times -\infty := 0$  in this definition.

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