

A New Type of Cipher

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Abstract

We will define a new type of cipher that doesn't use neither an easy to calculate and hard to invert mathematical function like RSA nor a classical mono or polyalphabetic cipher.

Our cipher will use an intrinsic and not syntactic property of a sequence. The core idea of this cipher is a process that is close to changing the measurement units of the input sequence.

1 Introduction

As known a cipher is an algorithm that takes as input some binary sequence and gives back a ciphered sequence as output. This process is supposed to be simple to compute but difficult to reverse unless the key is known (this is known as a one way trapdoor mechanism).

The problem of most known ciphers (except the one-time-pad [2][3][7][8]), is that their ciphertexts preserve some kind of structure which can be used from some cryptanalyst to obtain the plaintext they originated from.

Many kind of cryptoanalysis use this strategy. Therefor we shall eliminate this problem. To be unaffected by this pathology we shall mold our cipher around an intrinsic non syntactic property of the information sequences, i.e. its measurability as we will explain.

We are going to define a process (the measurement) that will be something like a input sequence "weighing", the ciphertext spawned by our cipher isn't a

simple encoding in the classical meaning, but an allocation function of its value, called from now ∇ .

Im going to explain in this article, some possible implementations of this idea. These implementations will help on clarifying how we use ∇ in our process.

2 The Idea

The property we shall be using in our cipher, is a redefinition of a measure of the input sequence. To give an idea of what we mean by a measure of sequence we start with a simple example. The following base two sequence

$$101000001$$

is written base ten, giving exponents in reverse sequence, as shown in the following example:

$$2^0 + 2^2 + 2^8 = 261.$$

Now we define ∇ as a set of positive integer such that every element of set will be smaller than previous and such that last element will be 1.

We call measure by nabla, a set of integer values. The first one is the result of integer division between decimal value of input sequence and the value of the first element of ∇ . Next value of the set is the result of integer division between decimal value of the previous element of set (first one in this instance) multiplied by the value of the element of ∇ previously used, and so on.

Now, we will be able to define a first cipher pseudo-code.

3 The cipher

To show a first example of how the cipher works, we can propose the pseudocode below, there we take in input a binary sequence and translate it in its decimal value. after that we take in input an array of integral value as ∇ and encode it. The output will be an array of measures by ∇ .

Function Cript:

```
begin
    Sequence = (int) Input (BinarySequence);
    /* plaintext input as decimal value */
    /* input array of  $\nabla$  */
    Nabla[] = Input (MeasureUnit);
    Output[ leght(Nabla) ];
    Index = 0;
    Forall Value in Nabla[ ](
        Output[ Index ] = Sequence / Value;
        Sequence = Sequence - ((Sequence Mod Value) * Value);
        Index ++;
    )
    Return Output[ ];
end
```

Here is the decoding function using ∇

Function Decrypt:

```

begin
  InputSequence[ Nabla ] = (int) Input(BinarySequence);
  Nabla[ ] = Input(MeasureUnit);
  Output[leght(Nabla)];
  Index = 0;
  Forall Value in Nabla[ ](
    Output[ Index ] = InputSequence[ nabla ] * Value;
    Index ++;
  )
  Return Output[ ];
end

```

This algorithm is simply to force, but there is a way to improve this encoding.

4 Improve the security

To improve the security of this cipher we change something; Let now ∇ , DeltaQ and DeltaR three simple set of N random integer, and let P_0 a random integer; Now we can explain a new cipher.

Function Cript:

```

begin
  Sequence = (int) Input (BinarySequence);           /* plaintext input as decimal value */
  Int Nabla[] = Input (Setofinteger);                 /* input array of  $\nabla$  */
  Int DeltaQ[] = Input (Setofinteger);                 /* input array of DeltaQ */
  Int DeltaR[] = Input (Setofinteger);                 /* input array of DeltaR */
  Int P0 = Input (Integer);                           /* input  $P_0$  */
  Output[ leght(Nabla) ];                             /* Output array with leght of Nabla */
  Int Index = 0;
  Int Tmp = 0;
  Int Value = 0;
  Sequence = Sequence * P0;
  for ( Index = 0; Index < lenght( Nabla[ ]; Index ++ ) (
    Tmp = ( Sequence / Nabla[ Index ] ) * DeltaQ[ Index ];
    Output [ Index ] = Tmp;
    Sequence = ( Sequence Mod Nabla[ Index ] ) * DeltaR[ Index ];
    Index ++;
  )
  Return Output[ ];
end

```

How we can see, our algorithm is a simple arrangement of divisions and subtractions. So it's really easy to calculate, even if impossible to come back to

original input. Difficulty doesn't matter about complexity, but it comes from the possibility to find a potentially infinite set of significative results by using wrong ∇ , DeltaQ, DeltaR and P_0 values.

5 Conclusions

We introduced, in a very informal manner, the notion of measurement by an allocation scheme and three processes to cipher a sequence. It can be proved that both ciphers are secure, as long as the key is used only once.

It's important to say that, we can cipher a ciphered text with a new ∇ improving security.

In next article [1] we going to explain a communication protocol to use this cipher for secure transfer of data, using only one security key. We will show also mathematical proof of endurance of this cipher.

See you soon and thanks.

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6 Reference

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