

On the dynamics of update

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Some starting assumptions

- ▶ Semantic interpretation depends on context
- ▶ Common ground is an element of that context
- ▶ Dynamic theories conceive of expression meanings as function that can change context (Context Change Potentials, aka CCPs)
- ▶ In particular, dynamic theories suppose some expression meanings can update the common ground

(Some of these assumptions will be questioned later)

Goals

- ▶ Skepticism of grammar updating the common ground
- ▶ Slogan (Egan and Sundell): all update is goat update
- ▶ Research question: to what extent can dynamic theories give up modifying the common ground?

Preview: completely

Inspo: Harris 2020

*According to a popular family of theories, assertions and other communicative acts should be understood as attempts to change the context of a conversation. Contexts, on this view, are publicly shared bodies of information that evolve over the course of a conversation and that play a range of semantic and pragmatic roles. I argue that this view is mistaken: **performing a communicative act requires aiming to change the mind of one's addressee, but not necessarily the context.***

The title of Harris' paper: We talk to people, not contexts

Wait a minute, CCPs are not crazy

- ▶ Good model of computer programming languages (explicit inspiration for DPL)
- ▶ Performatives (Szabolcsi 1982)

(1) You're fired!

That is, performatives are insightfully modelled as functions that map a context set to a context set in which the action expressed by the utterance has taken place

And dynamic theories do important work!

Presupposition projection:

- (2) John's children are smart.
- (3) John has children, and • his children are smart.

Donkey anaphora:

- (4) If a^1 farmer beats a^2 donkey, • she_1 owns it_2 .

Epistemic coherence:

- (5) #It is raining, and • it might not be raining.

Verum focus (Granchelli p.c.: vf must be locally unsettled):

- (6) #If it's raining, • it IS raining.
- (7) If it's raining—and • it IS raining—we'll get wet.
- (8) If it's raining, we'll get wet. And • it IS raining.

Strategy

- ▶ Give up on thinking of meanings as changing context
- ▶ Keep the key idea: the evaluation of one expression can explicitly influence the later evaluation of another expression

Defining common ground

A proposition p is **common ground** for a group G iff

1. Every member of G believes p
2. (1) is common ground for G

(Cf. Harmon 77, Clark and Marshall 81, Yalcin 2024)

Variants:

- ▶ Instead of belief,
 - ▶ acceptance (Stalnaker 2014, Schiller 2025)
 - ▶ knowledge (Yalcin 2024)
- ▶ Instead of infinitely iterated mutual belief,
 - ▶ Finite levels (Bach and Harnish: 2)
 - ▶ One-sided (see Clark and Marshall): $x \in G$ believes...
 - ▶ Alternating belief (Harris and Rubio-Fernandez):
speaker believes the listener believes...

Happy to discuss any of these that don't get addressed

What motivates assuming common ground?

- ▶ Meaning: Grice, Schiffer: recognition of intentions
- ▶ Presupposition: Karttunen 77: the set of propositions the speaker and addressee can take for granted at that point in the discourse
 - ▶ Hypothesis: a speaker can felicitously presuppose p only if it is common ground at the point in the discourse at which it is presupposed
- ▶ Reference: Clark and Marshall 81 (descriptions)
“under what conditions does [the speaker] have good reason to believe that [the addressee] won’t get the wrong referent or have to ask for clarification?”
 - ▶ *Monkey Business* scenario

No doubt common ground is *sufficient* for these purposes.

Claims

Stalnaker 1970: *it is important that the participants in a single context have the same set of presuppositions **if misunderstanding is to be avoided**. This is why presupposition involves not only taking the truth of something for granted, but also assuming that others do the same...*

*The shared presuppositions of the participants in a linguistic situation are perhaps **the most important constituent of a context**.*

Schiller 2024: *The basic idea is something like the following: conversations are **goal-directed activities of joint inquiry**, and the function of assertion is to contribute to an information register of which we avail ourselves in collaborating on a common question. Call this set of information the conversational common ground.*

Simple dynamic semantic theory (Heim 1983)

- Model the common ground as the **context set**: the set of worlds compatible with all propositions in the common ground

Heim 1983:400: What are CCPs? Intuitively, they are instructions specifying certain operations of context change. The CCP of "It is raining," for instance, is the instruction to conjoin the current context with the proposition that it is raining. (If we construe propositions as sets of possible worlds, as we will here, "conjoin" means "intersect.")

How CCPs get useful work done

The **local context** of an expression is the global (utterance) context updated with the net at-issue commitments of some relevant portion of the utterance.

Karttunen 1974, Heim 1983, Schlenker 2009, inter alia:

- ▶ Notation: $c + S$: ‘ c updated by the CCP of S ’, where c is a context set and S is a clause
- ▶ $c + \lceil A \text{ and } B \rceil = (c + A) + B$
- ▶ First update with the left conjunct, then with the right
- ▶ The *local context* for the evaluation of B is $c + A$

(9) John’s children are tall.

(10) John has children, and • John’s children are tall.

Objections to CCPs

- ▶ Lore: if embedded clauses denote CCPs, how does that work exactly?

(11) Amy doubts [that it's raining]_{CCP}.

Glanzberg (p.c.): “Who could have an attitude towards *that*??”

Well-explored engineering solution: compute dynamic effects in a way that is cleanly separated from the truth conditional content (Shan 2001, Barker and Shan 2014, Mandelkern 2024, Bumford and Charlow 2025)

Dynamic discontent: Mandelkern 2024

Mandelkern famously argues against dynamic semantics.

- ▶ desirable logical validities are lost (e.g., *If p , then p*)
- ▶ dynamic semantics incorrectly “predicts” order asymmetries in epistemic incoherence judgments (much discussed earlier this week)
- ▶ Pragmatics:
 - ▶ p. 85 “A natural thought about the pragmatic theory that should go with dynamic semantics is simply that, when p is asserted and accepted at a context c , we apply $[p]$ to c , so that the posterior context is $c[p]$ ” [in our notation $c + p$].
 - ▶ Assume $c + \lceil \Box p \rceil = \{w \in c \mid \forall w \in c : p(w)\}$
 - ▶ Then if p is unsettled in c , $c + \Box p = \{\}$
- ▶ The simple treatment of conditionals for donkey anaphora is material implication (thanks, Paolo)

Mandelkern's 2024 pragmatics

p. 216: [U]pdating a file [= context] κ with a sentence p results in a subsequent file which comprises exactly the points in κ where p is true and satt , relative to κ : that is, the points $\langle g, w \rangle \in \kappa$ such that p is true at $\langle g, w \rangle$ and satt at $\langle \kappa, g, w \rangle$.

- So $\kappa + \Box p = \{\}$ still for any κ in which p is unsettled?

Lederman 2014:43-4: “dynamic” semanticists argue that the common ground plays an even more central role in communication than Stalnaker believes it does. These theorists have developed the hypothesis that the value of a sentence is **a function from common grounds to common grounds** (often in this setting called “contexts”).

CCPs do not output a common ground!

- ▶ Say the input context set doesn't entail that it's raining
- ▶ After an utterance of *It's raining*, the output does
- ▶ If the output were common ground, it would entail that the speaker and the listener believe that it is raining, and that they believe that they believe it, and so on
- ▶ Most input context sets will not entail these beliefs
- ▶ The content of the utterance does not entail them
- ▶ So the derived output context doesn't entail them either

Pace Mandelbaum 2013. Thinking is believing. *Inquiry* **57.1**:55-96: “the mere activation of a mentally represented truth-apt proposition leads to immediately believing it.”

How to get to common ground

- ▶ The beliefs of the participants must change
- ▶ Normally, this happens as a result of the speech act
- ▶ If things go according to plan, the new beliefs make the proposition that it's raining common ground
- ▶ Technically, this means making non-rain worlds inaccessible to every participant's doxastic accessibility relation
- ▶ Since this is not part of the CCP, it must be accomplished through some independent update mechanism

If there is a general update mechanism at play, why not let it add the content of the utterance too? That is, why have CCPs adjust the context set at all?

Should local contexts be common grounds?

If CCPs routinely added metabeliefs, we would expect them to affect presupposition behavior.

- (12) John has children, and you believe that he has children.
- (13) John has children, and your belief that he has children will be helpful.

Intuitions:

- ▶ In (12), the right conjunct is not entailed by its local context
- ▶ In (13), the local context of the right conjunct does not entail the presupposition triggered by the possessive

So: NO!

More data: disjunction

- ▶ $c + \lceil \neg A \rceil = c - (c + A)$ where ‘ $-$ ’ is set subtraction
- ▶ $c + \lceil A \text{ or } B \rceil = (c + A) + ((c + (\neg A)) + B)$

- (14) Either this building doesn't have a bathroom, or it's upstairs.
- (15) Either this building doesn't have a bathroom, or you believe it does have a bathroom.
- (16) Either this building doesn't have a bathroom, or your belief that it has a bathroom will be helpful.

cf. $p \vee q \equiv p \vee (\neg p \vee q)$

More data: conditionals

(17) If John has children, then his children are smart.

(18) If John has children, then you believe that he has children.

(19) If John has children, then your belief that he has children will be helpful.

(18) is not a tautology, and (19) presupposes the listener believes John has children whether he does or not!

CCPs compute compositional commitments

- ▶ They **do** compute net commitments of the starting context set with the incremental at-issue truth conditions of the part of the expression evaluated so far.
- ▶ They do **not** add the beliefs and meta beliefs required to turn a set of worlds into a common ground.

Why 'at-issue'? It's complicated. Presuppositions versus appositives. Ok, just add them in too.

Some terminological consequences

- ▶ The output of a CCP is not (and should not be) a common ground.
- ▶ To the extent that an utterance context is supposed to contain a common ground, the output of a CCP is not a context.
- ▶ So the objects that CCPs deliver during composition are not 'local contexts'.
- ▶ More generally, we do not evaluate embedded expressions with respect to contexts.
- ▶ They are contexts updated with local entailments.
- ▶ So we can accurately call them contexts extended with local entailments.

Let's just call them bounds

Can we separate meta beliefs from content?

Maybe...

- ▶ CCPs update the information under discussion
- ▶ Meta beliefs about the information under discussion are managed separately

Unlikely:

- ▶ Other information about the discourse situation affects evaluation (and so is presumably common ground)
 - ▶ The manifest occurrence of the utterance
 - ▶ Goats
 - ▶ Vague standards

Evidentials, appositives

Maybe only some content gets automatically added to the common ground

- ▶ Simons et al. 2010:
 - ▶ content is at-issue only if the speaker intends for that content to address the Question Under Discussion
 - ▶ projection correlates with at-issueness
 - ▶ If entailment-cancelling operators (negation, epistemics, etc.) have traction on a piece of content, it's at-issue

Murray 2014, AnderBois et al. 2015

Deniability test for at-issueness

- (20)
- a. A: Sue doesn't know that it's raining.
 - b. B: You're wrong, look, she's carrying an umbrella.
 - c. B': #You're wrong, look, the ground is dry.
- (21)
- a. A: Sue, who is a genius, can solve the problem.
 - b. B: You're wrong, no one can solve this problem.
 - c. B': #You're wrong, Sue is not that smart.

Murray 2009: “the at-issue component of an assertion, which is negotiable, is treated as a proposal to update the common ground. The not-at-issue component of an assertion, which is not negotiable, is added directly to the common ground.”

Non-negotiable update? No.

(22) It's raining, I hear.

- ▶ Add to directly to the common ground:
Someone told the speaker that it's raining.
- ▶ Proffer for consideration:
It's raining.
- ▶ Hypothesis: "undeniability" means "automatically added to the common ground"

Hmm...

- ▶ If the reportative fact is non-negotiable
- ▶ And common ground is mutual belief
- ▶ then use of a reportative compels belief in the occurrence of an unobserved speech act

Motivating acceptance instead of belief

- ▶ First step: suggestion: it is natural for not-at-issue content to not be challenged
- ▶ Perhaps to varying degrees
 - ▶ Presupposition: Hey, wait a minute...
 - ▶ Appositives: By the way, actually...
 - ▶ Evidentials: [maximally unobjectionable]
- ▶ Perhaps evidentials are automatically enrolled in a common ground that is grounded in **acceptance** (e.g., Stalnaker 2014): acceptance for the purposes of the conversation (does not entail belief)

Acceptance? No.

Insinuation (Camp 2018):

(23) Can't we take care of this right here?

- ▶ The participants in a bribery attempt mutually believe that the speaker is offering to bribe the listener.
- ▶ But that fact is not put on the official record, i.e., not part of the official common ground
- ▶ This preserves some measure of deniability
- ▶ Decisions about what to say and how to interpret it depend both on what is accepted as common ground and what the participants believe
- ▶ We need both acceptance and belief

Double-tracking: Berstler 2025 talks

Knowledge? No.

- ▶ Yalcin 2024 argues that common ground is grounded on knowledge, not belief.
- ▶ This takes us even farther from an account of evidentials and insinuation
- ▶ Gettier case:
 - ▶ Ann thinks the person talking to her is Bill, but it's actually Mal. Mal says, 'I'm tired.'
 - ▶ Bill thinks he's talking to Ann, but he's actually talking to a mop. Bill says, 'I'm tired.'
 - ▶ Ann and Bill have all the beliefs required for the proposition that Bill is tired to be common ground.
 - ▶ But a mistake has been made: communication has not occurred.

Abandoning common ground?

- ▶ Yalcin: if communication requires common ground, then common ground must be based on knowledge, not belief.
- ▶ Yes. But only if we're modeling communication.
- ▶ Most conversation is mind-reading, with lots of lucky guesses
- ▶ Ann and Bill did not communicate, yet their beliefs and dispositions are exactly as they would want them to be if communication had occurred.

A minor role for common ground

*Simons 2025: Perhaps surprisingly, an interpretation of contexts as common ground, if ever even adopted, **plays no role** in the workings of context change theories.*

(24) Ann is sick.

(25) It is clear that Ann is sick.

- Clarity presupposes some body of evidence is common ground

The multiple-perspectives view

Heller and Brown-Schmitt 2014, Simons 2025

- ▶ The speaker guesses at the beliefs of the listeners
- ▶ The listeners guess at the beliefs of the speaker
- ▶ In complicated situations, the speaker may need to guess at what the listener believes are the speaker's beliefs... [and so on up the hierarchy]
- ▶ If things go wrong, negotiate
- ▶ Master questions:
 - ▶ Why did the speaker chose to say what they said?
 - ▶ Why did the listener interpret what the speaker said in the way that they did?

Additional element: dispositions

- ▶ The participants also model each other's intentions and linguistic dispositions (Lewis 2014, MacFarlane 2016)
- ▶ Insinuation and double-tracking are situations in which the speaker judges that the listener intends to behave as if their belief state is different than it actually is
- ▶ With the right motivation, the speaker will choose to say something that appears to conform to what the listener pretends to believe, at the same time the speaker is actually targeting the genuine beliefs

Yalcin case resolved

- ▶ There *is* mutual belief
- ▶ There is no communication
- ▶ That is not a problem, because common ground (and therefore mutual belief) is not an essential element of communication
- ▶ Accurate guesses about others' beliefs (and dispositions) is sufficient to explain lx behavior
- ▶ In any case, allows accurate predictions about why speakers say what they say, and how listeners interpret what they hear

Anaphora

Anaphora leads a double life:

- ▶ half in the mental world (attention, intention)
- ▶ half in the world of experience: existence must be locally entailed
- ▶ Linguistic factors promote, impeded, force, or forbid

(26) Enzo doesn't have a BLACK Maserati. It's RED.

- ▶ For presupposition, we have a natural way of representing both mental states and states of affairs, namely, set of worlds
- ▶ Harris (p.c.): We need a way of grammatically representing anaphoric potential that spans both the mental world and the world of experience

Hofmann, Elliott, Mandelkern, Chatain, Loder

Anaphora 2

Assignment functions:

$$(27) \quad \llbracket \text{He}_i \text{ sat} \rrbracket^g = \mathbf{sat}(g(i))$$

- ▶ Evaluation relative to an assignment function g
- ▶ g can model some agent's referential intentions

Quantificational binding:

$$(28) \quad \llbracket \text{Everyone}^i \text{ says he}_i \text{ sat} \rrbracket^g \\ = \forall u. \mathbf{says}(\llbracket \text{he}_i \text{ sat} \rrbracket^{g[i \mapsto u]})(u)$$

- ▶ Standard first order logic technique:
the quantifier *shifts the local context* of its scope

Indefinites and donkey anaphora (briefly)

- ▶ Contexts contain pairs $\langle w, g \rangle$ of worlds and assign's.
- ▶ Assignments are sequences of objects: $\llbracket x_2 \rrbracket^{abcd} = c$.
- ▶ Concatenation: $ab \cdot cd = abcd$
- ▶ Length: $/abcd/ = 4$

$$(29) \quad c + \ulcorner [a P] Q \urcorner = (\{ \langle w, g \cdot u \rangle \mid \langle w, g \rangle \in c \} + \ulcorner P(x_{/g/}) \urcorner + \ulcorner Q(x_{/g/}) \urcorner$$

$$(30) \quad c + \ulcorner \text{if } A, B \urcorner = \{ \langle w, g \rangle \in c \mid \forall h. (\langle w, g \cdot \boxed{h} \rangle \in c + A) \rightarrow \exists h'. \langle w, g \cdot \boxed{h} \cdot h' \rangle \in (c + A) + B \}$$

$$(31) \quad c + \text{if someone knocked, they}_0 \text{ left} = \\ \text{all points } \langle w, g \rangle \in c \text{ such that if } g \text{ can be extended} \\ \text{with an individual } u \text{ who knocked in } w, u \text{ left in } w.$$

(This is a mash up of Heim 83 and Dekker 94.)

What donkey anaphora (traditionally) shows

- ▶ In (30), h is a set of witnesses for the indefinites in the **antecedent**, and h must also be available for pronominal reference in the **consequent** (see boxes)
- ▶ So in some cases, *local anaphoric context* must reflect updates from an earlier expression
- ▶ Notably, for donkey anaphora
 - ▶ from the antecedent of a conditional to its consequent
 - ▶ from the restriction of a quantificational determiner to its nuclear scope (*every farmer who owns a donkey...*)
- ▶ This is required merely in order to get the truth conditions right

NB, there are excellent theories of donkey anaphora that arguably do not involve explicit regulation of an anaphoric stance, including Elbourne 2005.

Pulling back

- ▶ Quantificational binding shows that pronoun evaluation must sometimes be grammatically controlled [Reader]
- ▶ Donkey anaphora shows that grammatical control over anaphora must persist in a way that affects downstream evaluation [State]

(32) Every farmer who owns a donkey treats **her donkey** well.

- ▶ Likewise, per case grammatical control over local presupposition satisfaction.

Update does not track CCP

Update can be partial:

- (33) I've appointed a wonderful person to my cabinet.
[listener withholds belief wrt the adjective]
- (34) That brilliant genius is coming to lunch.
[speaker intends a subconstituent to be sarcastic]

Update can happen mid-utterance:

Stalnaker 73: If one asserts a proposition using a conjunctive sentence ... the presuppositions will change in the middle of the assertion. The first conjunct will be added to the initial presuppositions before the second conjunct is asserted.

And—goats!

Asymmetric acceptance

- ▶ Assume verum focus must be locally unsettled

- (35) a. This chili might contain beans.
b. This chili DOES contain beans!
- (36) a. This chili definitely contains beans.
b. This chili DOES contain beans!
- (37) a. This chili is tasty.
b. This chili IS tasty!

Interpretation: for predicates of personal taste, even when an assertion is accepted, it can justify updating the beliefs of the speaker without settling the beliefs of the listener.

Proposal for context update

- ▶ All update is goat update
- ▶ Update whenever you want to
- ▶ As you see fit
- ▶ Try to be rational (norm)
- ▶ Or not


Issue: unit of composition: utterance? speech act?

Conclusion

- ▶ CCPs do not track mutual belief or common ground
- ▶ Better to use one-sided beliefs to characterize pragmatic choices anyway
- ▶ We do need to track incremental entailments during composition
- ▶ Dynamic theories, e.g., bounds, do this superbly
- ▶ All update is goat update

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