THE MARKET, TRADITION AND PEASANT REBELLION: THE CASE OF ROMANIA IN 1907*

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Two models of peasant rebellion are examined using historical census data relevant to the Romanian peasant rebellion of 1907. One model synthesizes the arguments of Wolf, Moore, Hobsbawm and Tilly. The other is Stinchcombe's. Each model is operationalized and tested using multiple regression techniques on county level data. The first synthetic model works well and shows that the most important variable explaining the intensity of the rebellion is the interactive effect of peasant traditionalism and the penetration of market forces in agriculture.

Some historians (particularly Mousnier, 1970) have claimed that every peasant uprising must be explained in purely particularistic terms. But actually there is some agreement among recent theoreticians about the general causes of peasant rebellions that have taken place in the last several centuries. Hobsbawm (1959), Tilly (1967), Moore (1967), Wolf (1969) and Stinchcombe (1961) have developed explanations that have a great deal in common.

Hosbawm (1959:67) writes:

> The irruption of modern capitalism into peasant society, generally in the form of liberal or Jacobin reforms (the introduction of a free land-market, the secularism of church estates, the equivalents of the enclosure movements and the reform of common land and forest laws, etc.) has always had cataclysmic effects on that society. *When it comes suddenly . . . its effect is all the more disturbing* (our emphasis).

Though Tilly's *The Vendee* is not exclusively about peasants, his general thesis is the same. The Vendee revolted against the Jacobin reforms of the French Revolution because it was an area that had been subjected to relatively rapid and recent commercial market forces, chiefly through the growth of a textile industry. This came in a region that had less commercial agriculture than neighboring regions, and therefore it had a profoundly disturbing effect. Neighboring regions that had long been engaged in commercial agriculture and had well-established commercial towns were not upset by the post-1789 changes and did not rebel against the Republican government (Tilly, 1967: particularly 114-9).

Moore, taking a much broader historical view than either Hobsbawm or Tilly, agrees with their general interpretation and rejects another widely held view, that the "revolution of rising expectations" had much to do with peasant unrest, at least in many of the most important cases of rebellion. He argues (Moore, 1967:474):

> In any event, one of the greatest dangers for an *ancien regime* during the earliest phases of transition to the world of commerce and industry is to lose the support of the upper crust of the peasantry. One common explanation is a psychological one, to the effect that limited improvements in the economic position of this stratum leads to greater and greater demands and eventually to a revolutionary

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> outbreak. This notion of a "revolution of rising expectations" may have some explanatory power. It will not do as a general explanation. For both Russia and China, even in the twentieth century, it strains the evidence beyond recognition.... The timing of changes in the life of the peasantry, including the number of people simultaneously affected, are crucial factors in their own right. I suspect that they are more important than the material changes in food, shelter, clothing, except for very sudden and big ones. Economic deterioration by slow degrees can become accepted by its victims as part of the normal situation. Especially when no alternative is clearly visible, more and more privation can gradually find acceptance in the peasants' standards of what is right and proper. What infuriates peasants (and not just peasants) is a new and sudden imposition or demand that strikes many people at once and that is a break with accepted rules and customs.

Wolf generally agrees with Moore and takes up the theme of what he calls "middle peasants" (Moore's upper crust of the peasantry, middle in relation to large landowners). He stresses the fact that sudden creation of a large-scale market in land has profoundly unsettling effects on peasants long used to considering land as community or family property whose utilization ought to be subject to many social ties and requirements. Since impersonal market forces strip the land of these social obligations, and consequently render life insecure for many of the peasants, "... capitalism necessarily produces a revolution of its own" (Wolf, 1969:277-8). But at the same time, "The poor peasant or landless laborer who depends on the landlord for the largest part of his livelihood or the totality of it, has no tactical power" (1969:290). He is therefore less likely to initiate a rebellion. Wolf feels it is the middle peasant who is both able to initiate rebellion and who is most frightened by the growth of market forces. Further, the "... middle peasant forms a ... culturally conservative stratum ... which ... most depends on traditional social relations of kind and mutual aid between neighbors." It is the middle peasant's attempt "... to remain traditional which makes him revolutionary" (1969:291-2).

Stinchcombe reaches similar conclusions, but by a different route. He explains peasant unrest ahistorically in terms of comparative rural stratification. His basic thesis is that among all types of land tenure systems in agrarian societies in which there exist markets for agricultural produce, those systems characterized by family-sized tenancy will prove most volatile. The family-size tenancy system is one in which much or most of the land is owned by a relatively small number of owners who do not cultivate their lands as unified estates. Rather, small peasant tenants sharecrop or lease plots from landlords and farm them as they would ordinary small peasant plots. Thus, small peasant techniques and habits prevail in a society dominated by large landlords. The situation is volatile for five reasons.

First, there is a clear conflict of interest between the peasant and the *rentier* capitalist who tries to squeeze as much rent as possible from his tenants. Second, there is a conflict over risks to the peasant. Third, there tends to be little social contact between the landlord, who usually lives in a town, and the tenants who live in peasant villages. The landlord is thus an outsider. Fourth, there tends to develop a small class of prosperous, independent peasants. Though they do not suffer from the prevailing system as much as their poorer fellow peasants, they see the *rentier* class blocking their upward mobility, and being members of the village community, they form a class of natural leaders within the village against the urban landlords. Fifth, the peasants perform their work without supervision, and generally, without landlord investment or managerial skills. They therefore know that if the landlords could be excluded, there would be no loss of needed capital or technology. The peasant would simply get to keep a much higher proportion of his produce (Stinchcombe, 1961). This combination of facts makes family-sized tenancy agrarian systems exceptionally prone to peasant rebellion, and Stinchcombe documents this quite well, citing, among other examples, the case of Romania before World War I.

Thus, two general arguments exist: an historical argument (synthesizing Hobsbawm, Tilly, Wolf and Moore) stressing the survival of peasant traditionalism following the intrusion of capitalist market forces; and a structural argument (Stinchcombe) emphasizing comparative rural stratification. Both arguments stress the importance of the middle

peasantry, but in the more historical argument, the concern is with middle peasants as a bastion of traditionalism rather than as a class.

The major elements of the first argument include (1) the rapid penetration of market forces and (2) strong residual peasant traditionalism. This may be contrasted with the second argument to see which explains peasant rebellion better. We will also argue that a proper synthesis of Hobsbawm, Tilly, Wolf and Moore (for lack of a more precise term, we can label this the "transitional society" argument) must take into account the interaction between these elements, not simply the additive effects of all of them together. None of the authors would claim that any one element alone, no matter how strong, can explain peasant rebellion. A highly traditional peasantry in a non-market economy will not be more prone to rebellion than a somewhat traditional peasantry in a somewhat commercialized economy. It is the combined effects of traditionalism and of market forces that produces the potential for rebellion. In other words, the multiplicative interaction effects must be taken into account in order to test the theory.

In order to test these arguments, we shall look at one particularly intense but brief peasant uprising which took place in Romania in March, 1907. In a few weeks some 11,000 peasants were killed by the army (two of every 1,000 rural inhabitants). Though brief, the intensity of the uprising traumatized Romania and eventually became a major factor in producing a land reform some ten years later (Roberts, 1951:3-4, 21; for rural population in 1907, see Ministerul Industrii, 1909:40).

PRELUDE TO REBELLION

The agrarian history of Romania is quite complex; for our purpose it can be outlined very briefly.

In the middle ages Romania consisted of two distinct principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia. Rural inhabitants were agro-pastoralists who relied more on their animals than on the limited amounts of farming in which they engaged. The states were ruled by the princes and court aristocracies who derived most of their revenues from taxes they levied on the international trade that transited through the principalities. Thus, villages were taxed quite lightly; they were also free (there were few serfs); and they were communal (land belonged to the community, not to individuals, and it was not alienable to outsiders). The situation changed in the 16th century with the Turkish conquest of Romania and the decline of the international Black Sea trade. The states needed huge new revenues to pay the Turkish tribute and they had to tax the villages to get them. Flight from the villages became endemic to avoid taxes, and to stop it, serfdom was decreed. But not all villages were affected. In some areas, a free peasantry persisted. (For details on early Romanian states and their decline see Chirot, 1974.) It proved impossible, however, to turn a largely pastoral population into serfs. Flight remained common. Finally, in the mid-18th century serfdom was abolished, but villagers continued to have to pay six days of corvee obligations to lords. This was, however, a very light load. By comparison, in mid-18th century Russia the peasant corvee amounted to two or three days per week (Blum, 1964:445). Even later, when Romanian villagers were obliged to pay 12 days of corvee labor, this was hardly a crushing burden. Further, it was generally paid in kind or cash, rarely in labor. And in some areas, villagers retained many of their old freedoms (Mihordea, 1971:202-37).

The situation changed quite dramatically with the conversion from a primarily pastoral to a primarily cereal economy in the 19th century. In 1829 the Black Sea was opened to international commerce and Romania shifted to a wheat export economy. The lords gradually became true landowners instead of mere tax collectors; the villagers became cereal growing peasants rather than pastoralists. Further, because the land was so lightly populated and because there was a consequent labor shortage, the peasants were turned into serfs. By the middle of the 19th century, the peasants owed an average of 56 days of corvee labor per year. From the early 1830s to the mid-1840s wheat production and planted hectares of wheat went up some two and one half times. (Corfus, 1969:302-79; Emerit, 1937:229-36; for a discussion of the labor-scarcity theory of serfdom, see Domar, 1970 and Chirot, 1975.)

In 1859 the Romanian principalities were united *de facto* into a single country that became fully independent as a monarchy in

1878. In 1864 there occurred a land reform which ushered in the age of full capitalist agriculture and serfdom was abolished once more. Land was turned into private property and the communal village that had persisted in many ways since the middle ages was destroyed. The peasants received their own land, but the lords received the best lands and the peasants were left with too little on which to survive. They were therefore obliged to enter into sharecropping arrangements with the lords, and in this way the vital wheat exports could be produced (Garoflid, 1938:578-9). Tracing the growth of wheat production and exports in Romania reveals the impressive nature of the transformation which took place. (If precise figures existed from 1830, the change would seem even more dramatic.)

In the 1860s some 700,000 to 900,000 hectares of wheat were cultivated each year. By 1901-1904 the annual average was 1,600,000 hectares, and in 1905 and 1906 it reached 2,000,000 hectares. From 1880 to 1885 an annual average of 342,000 tons of wheat were exported. In 1905 and 1906 over 1,700,000 tons were exported (60% of the total wheat crop in 1905 and 55% in 1906). In the period from 1900 to 1904, wheat took up an average of 31% of all land cultivated in Romania. In 1905 and 1906, that proportion went up to about 39% of all cultivated land (Ministerul Industrii, 1909:146-7, 159). In 1906, cereals (mostly wheat) formed 82.5% of the value of Romania's total exports – the rest consisted almost entirely of lumber, petroleum, meat and vegetable products (Ministerul Industrii, 1909:495). It is quite clear that the intrusion of capitalism was both abrupt and intensive. The production of the key export crop rose dramatically, and the rate of growth seems to have taken an even sharper upturn in the early years of the 20th century. This had important consequences on the peasant way of life and on the entire rural social structure. Hobsbawm's description of the "irruption of modern capitalism into peasant society" might as easily have been written about Romania as about rural Spain or Italy.

The agrarian system that evolved has been called neo-serfdom (Mitrany, 1951:27). The unit of cultivation was chiefly the peasant family, not the large estate. Peasants owned land, but on the average, they did not have enough of their own land and they had to sharecrop the lords' lands to survive. Peasants were generally required to work first on the lord's portion, then on their own portion from which they took their share of the produce. This meant that in times of intense labor needs, particularly at harvest time, they had to work directly for the lord's benefit, and with whatever time was left, on their own portion before a frost or severe rain damaged the harvest (Creanga, 1907). The peasants used their own tools, took most of the risks and usually had to borrow cereal for food and seed in the spring. This was done at usurious rates such that peasants tended to fall farther and farther behind, never quite able to catch up to the previous year's debts (Roberts, 1951:14-6).

In 1905, 0.6% of all landowners owned 48.7% of the land, while 95.4% of the owners owned 40.3% of the land (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907: Table 11, Part III). In other words, a few thousand families, the crown and monasteries owned close to 50% of the land while the million or so small peasant households owned 50%. By 1900 a system very close to that described by Stinchcombe prevailed. Indeed, Romania was characterized by a typical "family-sized tenancy system."

There were other aspects to the system. A large number of estate owners leased their estates out to estate farmers who paid a global rent for the property and then tried to recover their investments by squeezing a maximum out of the peasants. All of the crown lands and most monastery lands were also handled in this way. Thus, true "capitalists" (in the sense of being motivated purely by market forces and the profit motive) were in charge of much of the best estate lands. By 1902, 59% of all the arable lands in estates were being managed by these estate farmers (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907:Table 9, Part III). To make matters more explosive, a large portion of these farmers were not Romanian. In Moldavia 40% were Jews (the use of "Court Jews" and other aliens in a somewhat different, but analogous context has been discussed by Coser, 1972) and about 10% were "other foreigners" (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907: Table 9, Part III).

The final complicating factor was that throughout the 19th century the peasant population increased rapidly as new lands were turned from pasture to cereal. From 1800 to 1860 the population probably dou-

bled, and from 1859 to 1899 it increased 54% (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907:18). In 1899, 81% of the population was rural (Ministerul Industrii, 1909-23). Thus, along with rapid commercialization of agriculture there was also overcrowding of the land. This played into the hands of the landowners who could thereby extract harsher tenancy contracts from the peasants.

By and large, Romanian peasants were still highly traditional. Among rural males over seven years old, the literacy rate was 26% in 1899. Among females, it was 4.5%. In the cities, by comparison 60% of all males and 38% of all females were literate (Ministerul Industrii, 1909:34–5). Even in the 1930s sociological studies of Romanian villages revealed great adherence to old traditions (Warriner, 1965:116–20). The crucial thing is that there existed a large gap between the rapidly changing economic circumstances and the continued adherence of the rural population to old ways of perceiving society. The low rate of literacy indicates a slow rate of change in that perception. Thus, while Romanian agriculture was being drawn ever more tightly into the world market and while demands on the peasants were increasing, the outlook of the peasantry remained bound to old patterns. This is a perfect example of Moore's statement about the nature of "new and sudden" impositions that seem to be "a break with accepted rules and customs."

The growth of the market, the retention of traditional attitudes, the rapid rise in demands placed on the peasantry, the transformation of property relations that created full private property in land and destroyed the commons, and finally, the emergence of a "family-sized tenancy system" should have provoked a peasant rebellion. It did. But it should be emphasized that the traits predicted to provoke rebellion were not evenly distributed throughout the country. Generally, wheat grew best in the plains, not in the hills and mountains. The large estates predominated in the plains. By and large, the plains peasants were also less traditional than those in the hills. But the dichotomy between hill areas and plains areas is a gross oversimplification, since these traits were not that simply distributed. In some hill areas there were rich valleys with cereal cultivation. Some plains areas did have highly traditional villages. Some plains areas had a more egalitarian distribution of land than some of the hill counties even though this was not generally the case. The concentration of middle peasants varied a great deal as well. There is therefore no overwhelmingly clear geographic pattern that explains these differences particularly when the country is examined on a county by county basis.

The intensity of the rebellion of 1907 also varied greatly from county to county. Some counties had virtually no outbreakes, while in others there was a great deal of violence. Nor was the pattern neatly constrained by geographic area even though, on the whole, the plains districts were more prone to rebellion. Still, some plains districts experienced no rebellion and some hill districts did. This high degree of variation from county to county is fortunate for our purposes since it makes a comparative analysis possible.

THE REVOLT OF 1907

There were local peasant uprisings in 1888, 1889 and 1900. But in March, 1907, a massive rebellion occurred (Roberts, 1951:4). In describing peasant violence in Andalusia, Hobsbawm has written (1959:79):

> . . . social movements tended to reach peak intensity during the worst months of the year–January to March, when farm labourers have least work, March-July, when the preceding harvest has been exhausted and times are leanest.

The same was true in Romania. The revolt began in Northern Moldavia and was first directed primarily against Jews who controlled over 40% of all estate lands and about 25% of all the land (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907:Table 9, Part III). The government was caught unprepared. The revolt spread quickly and became focused against absentee landlords and estate farmers. The army was sent in, but to little effect. Bands of peasants threatened the cities. Soon, all Moldavia was in uproar, the hill counties as well as those in the plains, even though the intensity of protest was smaller than in the northern counties where the rebellion began. In all this, few people were killed even though houses were set on fire, Jews were mistreated and the peasants called for more land (Rosetti, 1907:611-4).

In Bucharest, the government was dismissed by the king because of its failure to crush the rebellion. One hundred twenty thousand men were placed under arms and the capital was ringed with troops. In Moldavia the rebellion soon lost steam. But as things were quieting down in that part of the country, in the south, in Wallachia, a more dangerous situation arose. Whole armies of insurgent peasants engaged in pitched battles with the army. In one county, not very far from Bucharest, a poorly armed peasant army of 10,000 was mowed down and dispersed. In whole counties the majority of villages arose, and flying columns of regular troops with cannons systematically demolished rebellious villages. In other counties, the rebellion was much more localized, but where it erupted, there was also bloodshed. After reaching a paroxysm of violence in the southern and western parts of Wallachia, the rebellion was brought under control (Rosetti, 1907:614-21; Hurezeanu, 1962:355-9; Seton-Watson, 1963:385-8).

All of those who have studied this rebellion (including Tucker, 1972 and Eidelberg, 1974) agree that in Wallachia it was far more violent than in Moldavia. In part, this may have been because the army was better organized and the government firmer by the time the rebellion spread there from Moldavia. But even at the very start, there had been some minor bloodshed. And in Wallachia, those counties that rebelled weakly also experienced only minor bloodshed. There were other factors at work, and in many counties of Wallachia the peasants seemed better organized than their Moldavian counterparts as well as more purposeful in destroying estates and murdering lords' agents. It was in these counties that there was the most severe repression and the most killing by both sides (Eidelberg, 1974:1-2).

After the rebellion, records were destroyed by the government to conceal the extent of bloodshed. It is therefore impossible to get a precise breakdown of deaths and property damage. But reliable accounts have been put together from county records, from newspaper accounts of that time and from telegrams sent to Bucharest by county administrators. From 1945 to 1967, Romanian historians put together all of the existing documents to produce the most comprehensive account of the events (Otetea et al., 1967).

MEASURING THE INTENSITY OF REBELLION

The intensity of rebellion varied according to the extent of its diffusion and according to the degree of violence associated with the rebellion.

The spread, or extent, of the rebellion in each county could be measured either by counting the number of rebellious events, or by counting the proportion of villages in which events took place. Both methods are problematic. If events are counted, there is the problem of villages in which multiple events took place and where, in many instances, separating events is very difficult, and somewhat arbitrary. If arrest records were available, this might solve the problem, but they were largely destroyed by the government and many arrests were never recorded at all. On the other hand, simply counting villages is somewhat misleading since in some villages the entire population was involved, while in others, only a few individuals were involved. Further, all of the data are not available. What is available is a compendium of events, narrated on a county by county basis, put together by 16 of Romania's leading historians (Otetea et al., 1967). We found counting events an impossible task because it often proved impossible to separate one event from another. But counting the villages in which events took place was not problematic. The Otetea account is extremely thorough and it includes an index of villages in which events took place (1967:868-907). The 1909 Statistical Abstract provides a count of the number of villages per county (Ministerul Industrii, 1909:11). The proportion of villages involved varied from 4% to 46%. It is clear that the Otetea account does not include all villages in which events took place and it describes some events that were so trivial as to be marginally relevant. Nevertheless, this single source is the best available, and the best that will ever be produced given the destruction of many documents by the old government.

The amount of violence associated with the rebellion is harder to measure. But there are approximate numbers of deaths recorded for each county. In particular, the Otetea group scanned all newspaper accounts and all available government reports and it provides many specific accounts of deaths. In most counties, there were fewer than 25 reported deaths. In

these counties, local newspapers reported most if not all of the deaths. In one county 74 deaths were reported. In six counties, there were hundreds of deaths, and here, newspaper accounts are not much help since even local news reports lost track of the number of people killed. But the Otetea account (1967:155-562) states that in four of the counties, there were many hundreds of deaths, and more probably over 1,000 per county. In two others, there were somewhat fewer deaths, but well over 100. A logical coding system therefore presented itself:

Code	*Deaths*
1	less than 25 (25 counties)
2	25 to 100 (1 county)
3	between 100 and 500 (2 counties)
4	over 500 (4 counties)

There is no absolute proof that this coding is perfect. But aside from the most widely accepted estimate of 11,000 deaths, there are a number of other estimates by reliable observers that permit some sort of comparison between the coding scheme and the total number of deaths. The French Embassy in Bucharest in 1907 estimated that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 deaths, and the Austrian Embassy estimated that there were from 3,000 to 5,000 deaths (Eidelberg, 1974:1). Taking our coding scheme into account, the lowest possible number of deaths would have been on the order of about 2,500. The highest possible number (assuming 4,000 deaths in each of the four principal centers of rebellion, 500 in the two other counties with intense rebellion, 75 in the county labelled "2," and 25 each in the other 25 counties) of deaths would have been a bit under 18,000 deaths. A more reasonable estimate, using the mid-points offered in the coding scheme, estimating about 2,000 deaths in each of the four main counties, yields about 9,000 deaths. Since greater precision is impossible and since this procedure yields reasonable results, we used it.

In defense of our procedure, we might point out that these estimates are based on the best judgment of 16 historians, not on the basis of a single author. They also correspond very closely to the subjective evaluation of the seriousness of the rebellion on a county by county basis in the other leading accounts (Eidelberg, 1974; Tucker, 1972; Seton-Watson, 1963:385-8; Hurezeanu, 1962:355-73; Rosetti, 1907:611-23).

Granting that the coding procedure is historically reasonable, however, does not explain why we used the values 1, 2, 3, 4 instead of the actual estimated number of deaths. There are two reasons for this. First, the estimates, while grossly correct, are not sufficiently reliable to justify a claim that the numbers should be used as if this were a continuous variable. Second, and more important, raw numbers of deaths are not adequate expressions of violence. Most of the killing, after all, was done by the army, not by the peasants. Most killings occurred where the peasants rebelled more strongly, but the act of repression magnified the number of deaths in these counties. The army did not create violence where there was none to begin with, but where 1000 peasants were killed, it is unlikely that the rebellious peasants were 100 times more violent than where 10 peasants were killed. (What does 100 times more violent mean in any case?) It is only certain that where 1000 were killed, the peasants were *more* rebellious than where 10 or 100 were killed. On these grounds, our coding system seems like the only way of quantifying violence, at least in this particular case.

To measure the overall intensity of the rebellion, we added the measures of spread and violence (after standardizing them).

THE ANALYSIS OF THE INTENSITY OF THE REBELLION

Rather complete census data exist for Romania because a series of nationwide censuses were taken between 1896 and 1905. Jormescu and Popa-Burca (1907) report the results of the various agricultural censuses (land distribution, amount of cultivated land by crop, etc.) while the Statistical Abstract of Romania for 1909 (Ministerul Industrii, 1909) reports some of the same data as well as others relating to population, literacy, foreign trade, agricultural production, etc. The availability of this data, organized at the county level, makes a statistical study of the various models of rebellion possible.

The counties are relatively homogeneous ecologically (that is, they are similar with respect to size and population and all but one are predominantly rural); the possibility of spurious ecological correlation is therefore

minimal. County size and population were entered into all the regressions tested and no significant biases were discovered. The small number of cases, 32 counties, does make statistical examination awkward, but not impossible. We could either assume that we had the universe of Romanian counties and that all statistical results would be significant, or we could apply the usual tests of significance. While we did have data on the universe of counties, we decided to apply the usual tests of significance to help us judge the relative importance of the various explanatory variables. Also, given the probability of measurement error in historical census data, this procedure contributes to the strength of our argument.

The best available indicator of traditionalism is the rural literacy rate. Many authors who have dealt with modernization have stressed the crucial nature of rising literacy in breaking down traditional ways of viewing the world and in promoting a more impersonal and rational outlook toward the modern economy and society. (In particular, see Levy, 1966:758-60.)

Literacy is not always a good measure of traditionalism. In highly literate societies, a low literacy rate within a particular segment of the population may simply indicate poverty. In some societies, where the literacy rate is almost zero, comparative literacy rates mean very little. But in transitional societies, where the literacy rate (particularly the rural literacy rate) remains low even while it is increasing, this rate is a good indicator of the relative penetration of new ideas (Huntington, 1968:32-3, 72-3).

The indicator of the spread of capitalist market forces is perfectly straightforward. Since wheat was by far the main cash crop, we measured this construct by taking the percent of the cultivated land in each county over a five-year period (1900-1904) devoted to wheat (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907:152).

The relative strength of middle peasants was measured by taking the percent of the rural households that owned between 7 and 50 hectares. This fits with the economic analysis available for Romania (Warriner, 1965:117-8) which shows that an average household needed anywhere from three to five hectares of land to survive without leasing extra land. Seven hectares provided a safe margin. Fifty hectares was the conventional sized unit used in Romanian censuses to distinguish between peasants and small landlords. Peasants owning 20, 30 or 40 hectares were quite prosperous indeed (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907:Tables 1 and 2, Part III).

The relative strength of the family-sized tenancy system can be represented by a Gini index of inequality of landowning. This was calculated according to the formula provided by Duncan and Duncan (1955:211). The number of households and the amounts of arable land held by them were computed for the categories 0-3 hectares, 3-7, 7-50, 50-100, and 100+ hectares from the census data (Jormescu and Popa-Burca, 1907:Tables 1, 2, 10, 11, Part III). The Gini coefficient represents the relative predominance of a certain type of tenurial system. In counties where inequality of landownership was greater, there were more peasants who held insufficient land of their own to survive. These were the peasants who were partly or entirely tenants, sharecropping landlord estates. In counties with a more egalitarian pattern, there were relatively fewer peasants who were partly or entirely dependent on sharecropping as more peasants had enough land of their own. (This indicator works for Romania, where there was little or no real plantation land. In plantation societies, a high Gini coefficient would indicate the relative preponderance of plantation land and of salaried workers, not of sharecropping tenants.)

OPERATIONALIZED TESTS OF THE TWO MODELS

The first, or "transitional society" model, synthesizes Wolf, Moore, Tilly and Hobsbawm. The basic argument is that peasant rebellion is most likely when there has been extensive, recent commercialization of agriculture in a traditional peasant society. Three versions were tested using the three dependent variables, Intensity of rebellion (I), Violence of rebellion (V) and Spread (S). One more variation was added. The models were first tested with Commercialization (C) and Traditionalism (T) entered additively. Then, the interaction of the two (T multiplied by C) was added. The expectation was that if this model worked, C and T would have a strong effect in the additive formulation, but this would be due to their joint presence. Adding the interactive term, the true predictor of rebellion, would greatly weaken or negate the separate

Table 1. Data by County

Northern Romania (Moldavia)	Rural Population in 00's	C	T	M	G	S	V	I
Bacau	1340	13.8	86.2	6.2	.60	9	1	-1.37
Botosani	1039	20.4	86.7	2.9	.72	32	1	0.67
Covurlui	629	27.6	79.3	16.9	.66	46	1	1.90
Dorohoi	1084	18.6	90.1	3.4	.74	23	1	-0.13
Falciu	612	17.2	84.5	9.0	.70	15	1	-0.84
Iasi	863	21.5	81.5	5.2	.60	26	1	0.13
Neamtu	980	11.6	82.6	5.1	.52	19	1	-0.48
Putna	948	20.4	82.4	6.3	.64	15	1	-0.84
Roman	753	19.5	87.5	4.8	.68	22	1	-0.22
Suceava	953	8.9	85.6	9.5	.58	16	1	-0.75
Tecuci	839	25.8	82.2	10.9	.68	22	1	-0.93
Tutova	727	24.1	83.5	8.4	.74	7	1	-1.55
Vaslui	797	22.0	88.3	6.2	.70	19	1	-0.48
South Central Romania (Muntenia or East Wallachia)								
Arges	1472	24.2	84.9	6.1	.62	7	1	-1.55
Braila	680	30.6	76.1	1.3	.76	19	1	-0.48
Buzau	1510	33.9	85.5	5.8	.70	12	1	-1.10
Dambovita	1560	28.6	84.2	2.9	.58	11	1	-1.19
Ialomita	1344	36.5	78.1	4.3	.72	11	1	-1.19
Ilfov	2004	40.9	84.4	2.3	.64	15	1	-0.84
Muscel	796	6.8	76.3	3.6	.58	9	1	-1.36
Olt	1058	41.9	89.7	6.6	.66	25	4	2.83
Prahova	1890	25.4	83.2	2.5	.68	13	1	-1.02
Ramnicu-Sarat	955	30.5	80.2	4.1	.76	32	2	1.59
Teleorman	1543	48.2	91.0	4.2	.70	42	4	4.33
Vlasca	1488	46.0	90.5	3.7	.68	36	4	3.80

Table 1. (Continued)

South West Romania (Oltenia or West Wallachia)	Rural Population in 00's	C	T	M	G	S	V	I
Dolj	2415	45.1	85.5	5.1	.64	36	4	3.80
Gorj	1303	12.5	83.8	7.2	.50	5	1	-1.72
Mehedinti	1789	39.3	85.6	4.9	.60	13	3	0.84
Romanati	1417	47.7	87.6	5.2	.58	33	3	2.61
Valcea	1376	15.2	87.3	10.8	.42	15	1	-0.84
Eastern Romania (Dobrodgea)								
Constanta	833	11.7	82.3	81.7	.42	4	1	-1.81
Tulcea	645	25.6	80.1	68.4	.26	4	1	-1.81
Mean	1175	26.3	84.3	10.2	.63	19	1.53	0
Standard deviation	447	11.9	3.8	17.4	.31	11	1.08	1.78

Explanations for Table 1:

C = commercialization of agriculture, measured by % of arable land devoted to wheat

T = traditionalism, measured by % of rural population illiterate

M = middle peasant strength, measured by % of land owned in units of 7 to 50 hectares

G = gini coefficient of inequality of landownership

S = spread of rebellion, measured by % of villages in which rebellious events took place, as reported in Otetea et al.

V = violence, measured by number of deaths, with 1 = 0-24 deaths, 2 = 25 to 100, 3 = between 100 and 500, 4 = 500+

I = intensity, measured by adding standardized S and V

effects of C and T, but the interaction term would be very strong, and the total amount of variance explained would rise above that explained by the simple additive formulations. The inclusion of the multiplicative interaction term is justified on theoretical grounds (it is the effect of both C and T that influence rebellion, not the separate effects of each alone) and on methodological grounds (see Blalock, 1969:156-62). The equations can be represented as follows (where A = a constant, and e = error term):

(1) the "transitional society" model

(a) $I = A_1 + \beta_{11}C + \beta_{12}T + [\beta_{13}CT] + e_1$

(b) $V = A_2 + \beta_{21}C + \beta_{22}T + [\beta_{23}CT] + e_2$

(c) $S = A_3 + \beta_{31}C + \beta_{32}T + [\beta_{33}CT] + e_3$.

The second, or "structural" model is based on Stinchcombe (even though elements of Stinchcombe's model are also found in the writings of the other theorists). In this model the emphasis is on class relations. The stronger the tenancy system (that is, the greater the inequality of land tenure) and the stronger the middle peasants, the greater the tendency to rebel. The model was operationalized as follows (where M = Middle peasant strength and G = Gini coefficient):

(2) the "structural" model

(a) $I = A_4 + \beta_{44}M + \beta_{45}G + e_4$

(b) $V = A_5 + \beta_{54}M + \beta_{55}G + e_5$

(c) $S = A_6 + \beta_{64}M + \beta_{65}G + e_6$.

The expectation was that M and G would have strong positive effects.

Since the two arguments actually approach each other obliquely, we also tested a combined model which included both the "structural" and the "transitional society" model. It is possible, for example, that the variables relating to class relations have a much greater effect when tested in conjunction with the variables relating to the process which takes place in transitional societies. The full model can be operationalized as follows:

(3) the "full" model

(a) $I = A_7 + \beta_{71}C + \beta_{72}T + \beta_{73}CT + \beta_{74}M + \beta_{75}G + e_7$

(b) $V = A_8 + \beta_{81}C + \beta_{82}T + \beta_{83}CT + \beta_{84}M + \beta_{85}G + e_8$

(c) $S = A_9 + \beta_{91}C + \beta_{92}T + \beta_{93}CT + \beta_{94}M + \beta_{95}G + e_9$.

A test of the full model allows a more definitive statement of the relationship between the two perspectives.

Multiple regression techniques were used to test the different models. The raw data are reported for each county in Table 1. The zero order correlation matrix for all variables (except population, which is added only for the information of the readers) is reported in Table 2. The summary of the regression analysis is reported in Table 3.

RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

The "transitional society" model works quite well and the "structural" or more static model works poorly.

Several facts explain the failure of the Stinchcombe model. First, middle peasants were strongest where the tenancy system was least widespread (R = −.685). Second, wheat cultivation tended to be more widespread where the landlords were strongest, that is, where the tenancy system was more widespread (R = +.315). It follows from this that the strength of middle peasants was not correlated with more extensive wheat cultivation (R = −.222). Third, the counties in which the middle peasants were strongest were not the most traditional counties (R = −.206). Since in Romania the middle peasants were stronger where the market *and* tradition were weaker, the "structural" model is the direct antithesis of the "transitional" model *for this case*, and the failure of one is explained by the success of the other. In some ways this is unfair to Stinchcombe since he actually stresses the presence of a tenancy system more than the presence of middle peasants. But even the strength of the tenancy system is a much poorer predictor of rebellion than the degree of commercialization and tradition. G correlates well with the spread of rebellion (+.409), but weakly with the degree of violence (+.137); and overall, G and M together explain 7% of the variance in the intensity of rebellion, none of the variance in the degree of violence and 14% of the variance in the spread of rebellion within each county. (All corrected for small N, see Table 3; correction according to McNemar, 1962.)

Stinchcombe may well have misspecified his variables. (An analogous argument was given by Paige, 1972.) The very existence of a tenancy system that extracts a high proportion of the peasant's produce implies that the landlord can market his share. Given a market

Table 2. Zero Order Correlation Matrix

	I	V	S	T	C	CT	M	G
Intensity	1.000	.889	.889	.454	.714	.776	-.268	.307
Violence		1.000	.582	.497	.756	.852	-.158	.137
Spread			1.000	.310	.514	.528	-.322	.409
Traditionalism				1.000	.294	.766	-.206	.116
Commercialization					1.000	.787	-.222	.315
CT						1.000	-.234	.211
Middle peasants							1.000	-.685
Gini coefficient								1.000

structure, it is in a tenancy system that peasant traditionalism remains strongest because the peasant continues to operate in a traditional family and village setting. Thus, it is quite correct that such systems produce unrest, but not primarily because of the nature of the land tenure system. Presumably, a tenancy system that has been established for a long time and in which the degree of traditionalism is quite low while commercialization of agriculture is quite high would lead to weak unrest. Only where the tenancy system is new, where the market is strong and where tradition remains strong would there be a high degree of unrest. Or, to generalize further, our case study suggests that tenancy systems are highly politically unstable where they are accompanied by high, new demands on the peasants. This was obviously the case in Romania in 1907. But because the tenancy system was an incidental variable, and commercialization and tradition were the key variables, the Stinchcombe model is a far weaker explanation of what happened than the "transitional" model.

The "middle peasant" argument cannot be dismissed so lightly. Both Moore and Wolf stress the importance of this class as a recruiting ground for peasant leaders. There is evidence that in Wallachia, where the rebellion was most intense, middle peasants were in the forefront of the rebellion (Garoflid, 1938:579). But the hypothesis is really meant to apply to individual actors, not to counties or even villages. We have shown that the percent of the land owned by middle peasants (an excellent indicator of their presence and strength) had no influence on the intensity, spread or violence of the rebellion, but county level data simply give no indication of what sorts of individuals were most active. Without individual level data, the hypothesis remains untestable, and while Stinchcombe, Moore and Wolf may be right in stressing it, the argument fails when transformed into an ecological proposition.

At this point, it is worth stressing what has been implicit all along. We have exaggerated the dichotomy between the two models for heuristic purposes. Each model is distinct, but the authors we quoted are not as tightly bound to one or another model as we have suggested. The arguments presented support the notion that a "static class" or "structural" model is not as strong as a "transitional society" model, but both models are basically "materialistic." In this respect, they both have much in common.

The "transitional" model proved quite satisfactory. The degree of commercialization of agriculture correlates highly with the degree of spread of the rebellion (+.514), with the degree of violence (+.756) and with the overall intensity of the rebellion (+.714). Tradition correlates more weakly with these, but when the effects of both are added, 56% of the variance in intensity, 64% of the variance in violence and 27% of the variance in spread are accounted for (corrected for small N, see Table 3).

Including the interaction term CT significantly improved the explanation of intensity (63% of the variance explained) and violence (78% of the variance explained). On the other

Table 3. Standardized Regression Coefficients

Regression Equation #	T	C	CT	M	G	R^2	R^2 corrected for small N
1a, additive	.267	.636				.575	.561
1a, interactive	(-.349)	(-.011)	1.053			.651	.627
1b, additive	.301	.668				.654	.643
1b, interactive	-.534	(-.209)	1.426			.793	.779
1c, additive	(.174)	.464				.292	.269
1c, interactive	(-.087)	(.189)	(.446)			.306	.258
2a				(-.108)	(.233)	.101	.072
2b				(-.114)	(.059)	.026	(-)
2c				(-.079)	.355	.171	.144
3a	-.419	(-.124)	1.162	(-.012)	(.142)	.670	.622
3b	-.515	(-.177)	1.395	(-.002)	(-.042)	.794	.764
3c	(-.230)	(-.044)	(.672)	(-.020)	(.294)	.388	.297

Significance level at .05; non-significant terms in ( ).

Equations 1a, 2a, 3a predict intensity; 1b, 2b, 3b violence; 1c, 2c, 3c spread.

1 refers to the "transitional" model; 2 to the "structural" model; 3 to the "full" model.

hand, it did not improve the proportion of the variance explained in the spread of the rebellion. It failed to raise the R^2 by very much, and in correcting for the small N, the inclusion of an extra variable caused an overall drop in explained variance. This is somewhat suggestive because it was only in explaining the spread (but not the amount of violence or the overall intensity) that Stinchcombe's model worked best. Though we do not want to push the argument too far, it may be that "spread" and "violence" of rebellion are really distinct attributes of the phenomenon. In measuring the spread of the rebellion, we included villages in which the only activity was vigorous petitioning of the authorities in order to redress the worse aspects of the tenancy system, namely high rents. But in many counties, such activity led to little or no violence as the peasants petitioning for a redress of wrongs were easily dispersed by police and army troops. Peasants may feel upset because rents are high, or because too large a surplus is being extracted from them, but they are far more likely to resort to violence if they are fully convinced that their claims are legitimate. In areas where tradition was strongest, the legitimacy of the new agricultural system was weakest. Thus, fortified by their stronger claim to a redress of wrongs, the peasants in such areas pushed their demands to the point of violence. The argument should not be overemphasized because even in explaining spread, C and T did better than M and G.

In equations 1a, 1b and 1c the inclusion of the interaction term in the first set of equations made T and C negative or insignificant. This was because CT accounted for such a large portion of the variance in the dependent variables. This fits the "transitional society" model which suggests that if C or T alone explain much variance, this is an essentially spurious correlation due to the fact that the rebellion will be strongest where both are present. In a peasant society in which C and T were not somewhat positively correlated with each other, one would not expect serious peasant rebellions.

As normally happens in interaction terms, both C and T were highly correlated with CT (Blalock, 1972:463-4). But because the theory suggests that the interaction term should be the most important term and because its inclusion significantly raised the explained variance for intensity of rebellion, we were convinced that this did not raise serious problems.

In the "full" model the results were substantially the same. CT remained the most important predictor variable and the inclusion of G and M did not make very much difference. Only in predicting the spread of rebellion did the land tenure system make much difference, and in no case did the relative strength of middle peasants help at all. The total R^2 increased a bit in all equations, but after correction for small N (see Table 3), the "full" model explained intensity and violence less well than the simpler "transitional society" model.

THE ISSUE OF REPRESSION

Snyder and Tilly (1972) and Tilly and Shorter (1974) have recently stressed two major aspects of collective violence which we have ignored. Both of these are related. One is that collective violence is primarily a political act, carried out to gain certain political ends. The second is that those in authority will meet violent political action with force, and that the use of police and troops will diminish the long term likelihood of violence. In other words, effective repression makes a difference.

In the case of Romania in 1907, *repression certainly made an important difference since it crushed the rebellion* and prevented the overthrow of the entire political and economic system. But did it make any difference in any particular county that was different from the effect in other counties? Two facts are important. First, the entire rebellion lasted only a few weeks. It was not a matter of long term organization, protracted civil war, or even long term, active violent class warfare. Secondly, from the very start the government used the army to repress the rebellion, and from the very start there were deaths. Romania is not a large country, and even in 1907 it had a good railway and telegraph system. Troops were shuttled back and forth across the country, sent to the areas of greatest need. Therefore, in a sense, repression was evenly applied throughout the country, though of course there were local variations dependent on the officers in charge of particular detachments (Otetea, 1967:523-53). Most deaths were caused by the army, not by the poorly organized peasants. But all indications are that

extremely violent repression took place in areas where the peasants had begun murdering estate owners and their agents, and the massive killings in Southern Romania occurred where the peasants fought back against the army (Eidelberg, 1974:223, 227). The army did not create violence where there was none, nor did it prevent violence where the peasants were most rebellious. When the government changed in the midst of the rebellion, this did not signal a major policy change. The group in power at the start of the rebellion found itself "... unequal to the task of restoring order ... and the king summoned the Liberals" (Seton-Watson, 1963:386). Even after the change, some counties remained relatively quiet, while in others the rebellion spread and became more violent. It is correct that most of the deaths occurred under the new government, but that was primarily because the rebellion spread to the south after it had started in the north, and in the south the peasants were more violent than in the north.

As for the long term conclusions about the organization of collective violence and its repression in Snyder and Tilly and Tilly and Shorter, these are basically irrelevant in explaining spontaneous outbursts by relatively disorganized peasants. On the other hand, had the rebellion of 1907 not been crushed and had it lingered on as a peasant "war of liberation," then, certainly, long-term political acts and the pattern of repression would have had to be entered into any explanation of events. In that case, it is likely that our original formulation would have remained valid (that is, those counties that had the most intense outbreaks of rebellion would have become the centers of the peasant war), but further variation in rebellious activity would have occurred according to various political and military factors.

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

We should begin by noting what we have not done. We have made no attempt to explain the exact timing of the rebellion (why 1907 and not 1906 or 1908). Given the fact that the counties in Romania were contiguous, that they existed within a single polity, and given that the rebellion started in one particular county, it is easy to account for its spread throughout the country, and it is possible to explain why the intensity varied from county to county. But with the data at hand, an explanation of why it started when it did is not possible. Certainly, the "transitional" model would predict that such a rebellion could not have begun before the spread of wheat cultivation. Nor could it have begun after traditional peasant ways had been eradicated. But this still leaves decades during which rebellion would have been likely. As stated at the start of the paper, there were, in fact, sporadic rebellions throughout the late 19th century. Why the rebellion of 1907 was so much more serious than the rebellion of 1888 remains an open question until someone discovers data from 1888 that pertain to the extent of commercialization of agriculture at that time, and to the extent of literacy. Unfortunately, no such data are likely to turn up.

We cannot overgeneralize from our single case study. At a minimum, however, the study is a solid confirmation of some of the leading theories of peasant rebellion. At a more general level, it specifies the most important variables that must be studied to explain the phenomenon of peasant unrest. As such, it is at least suggestive.

Our general conclusion is that in a rapidly modernizing society there is an optimal period in which peasant rebellion may occur, before traditional peasant ways and attitudes are destroyed. Once that point has passed, the likelihood of peasant rebellion decreases markedly. The theoretical explanation of this point lies at the very heart of our argument, and it therefore requires fuller explanation.

The issue of peasant traditionalism has led to numerous debates. In Romania a traditional outlook made the peasants expect a certain economic structure that was relatively undemanding, that is, that extracted a relatively low surplus from their production. It also led them to expect a certain amount of security. In the centuries preceding the intrusion of capitalist forces, that security existed in the form of a large reservoir of common lands that could be used by those who needed it. Peasants who remained more traditional held these expectations more strongly (Stahl, 1969). The commercialization of agriculture contradicted these expectations. Common farmland, forest and pasture vanished as landlords gained private property rights over the land and as cereal farming took over increasing amounts of land. A highly commercialized

agrarian economy did not produce unrest by itself, any more than did traditionalism by itself. It was only when these two were present together, where the effects of one magnified the effects of the other, that there was a high degree of unrest. This is not an argument about "relative deprivation" because it has little to do with actual wealth. The gap was one between expected level of security, and the actual high insecurity of a rural economy in which world prices and the impersonal market determined the availability of land and the actual reward received by the peasant producers.

This does not answer the question of why certain areas remained more traditional than others. We are not in a position to explain that without going into a county by county history of social change from at least 1700 to 1900. The varying levels of traditionalism were connected to the varying patterns of lord-villager interaction, to the position of various counties relative to trade routes, with migration patterns and with the geographic nature of each county. Specifying all these variables, and finding out how they interacted, is work for a whole monograph on Romanian rural society.

In a sense, then, our use of the concept "traditionalism" may be misleading. We are not suggesting that Romanian peasants were "primitive," but only that the rate of economic change was much more rapid than the rate of change in the peasantry's outlook on society in certain counties. Presumably, along with low literacy levels there also existed a host of other attitudes perpetuated by a certain kind of social structure. It would have been interesting had we been able to measure other relevant attitudes more directly, particularly those relating to feelings about the propriety of heavy rents and the alienation of common lands. But data were not available. It would also have been interesting had we been able to describe the kinds of village institutions which perpetuated old attitudes.

Our theoretical argument leads to a paradoxical conclusion, but one that has been prominent in the development literature (e.g., Huntington). The quicker the rate of economic change, the more difficult it will be for social forms and attitudes to change at the same rate. Thus, the danger of peasant unrest will be particularly acute. But at the same time, if economic change is very rapid it will destroy old social forms and attitudes more quickly, and the period in which peasant unrest might occur will be shorter. If economic change is slow, the period of potential unrest will be correspondingly longer because old social forms and attitudes will persist longer. But the danger of unrest will be less acute. That seems to be the choice, a short period of extreme unrest or a long period of low but persistent unrest. A brief outline of Romanian agrarian history after 1907 will illustrate this conclusion.

After World War I there was a land reform. Land was more equitably distributed, and even though population growth kept the peasants poor, the pressure of the market greatly decreased (Mitrany, 1930; Warriner, 1965:153). By 1934, only 1,300,000 hectares of wheat were being cultivated in "old Romania" (that part of post-war Romania that had formed the pre-1918 kingdom). This was only 65% of the surface devoted to wheat in 1906. In 1935, the number of hectares of wheat rose to 1,600,000 hectares, but this was still considerably below the highs of 1905 and 1906. Yields per hectare fell from pre-war levels as peasants were no longer forced to produce for the lords. Exports never attained pre-war levels (Institutul Central de Statistica, 1936:182-4, 312-5). For all the poverty in rural Romania between 1920 and 1944, there were no peasant uprisings (Roberts, 1951).

Since World War II Romanian agriculture has been extremely commercialized (by socialism rather than capitalism). But collectivization, massive industrialization, a large scale literacy campaign and migration to the cities has broken the traditional Romanian village (see Montias, 1967). The peasants may have many reasons to be discontented, but the probability of a peasant uprising is minimal. As in the rest of Europe, the *jacquerie* is a subject of historical analysis, not a present threat to contemporary stability.

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