

Automation of the Principia Metaphysica in HOL: Part I

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1 Introduction

We present a formalisation and partial automation of an initial part of the (third authors) Principia Metaphysica [6] in Isabelle/HOL [5].

The Principia Metaphysica, which is based on and extends the Theory of Abstract Objects [?], employs a modal relational type theory as logical foundation. Arguments defending this choice against a modal functional type theory have been presented before [7]. In a nutshell, the situation is this: functional type theory comes with strong comprehension principles, which, in the context of the Theory of Abstract Objects, have paradoxical implications. When starting off with a relational foundation, however, weaker comprehension principles are provided, and these obstacles can be avoided.

Isabelle/HOL is a proof assistant based on a functional type theory, more precisely, Church's theory of types [4]. Recently, it has been shown that Church's type theory can be elegantly utilized as a meta-logic to encode and automate various quantified non-classical logics, including modal functional type theory [2, 3]. This work has subsequently been employed in a case study in computational metaphysics, in which different variants of Kurt Gdel's ontological argument [1] were verified (respectively, falsified).

The motivating research questions for the work presented below include:

- Can functional type theory, despite the problems pointed at by Zalta and Oppenheimer, be utilized to encode the Theory of Abstract Objects when following the embeddings approach?
- How elegant and user-friendly is the resulting formalization? To what extent can Isabelle's user interface be facilitated to hide unpleasant technicalities of the (extended) embedding from the user?
- How far can automation be pushed in the approach? How much user interaction can be avoided in the formalization of the (first part) of the Principia Metaphysica?
- Can the consistency of the theory be validated with the available automated reasoning tools?
- Can the reasoners eventually even contribute some new knowledge?
- Suggestions for improvements in Isabelle? Any particular problems detected in the course of the study? ...

δ	$::= a_1, a_2, \dots$	δ	individual constants
ν	$::= x_1, x_2, \dots$	ν	individual variables
$(n \geq 0)$	$\Sigma^n ::= P_1^n, P_2^n, \dots$	Σ^n	n -place relation constants ($n \geq 0$)
$(n \geq 0)$	$\Omega^n ::= F_1^n, F_2^n, \dots$	Ω^n	n -place relation variables ($n \geq 0$)
α	$::= \nu \mid \Omega^n \ (n \geq 0)$	α	variables
κ	$::= \delta \mid \nu \mid \iota \nu \varphi$	κ	individual terms
$(n \geq 1)$	$\Pi^n ::= \Sigma^n \mid \Omega^n \mid [\lambda \nu_1 \dots \nu_n \varphi^*]$	Π^n	n -place relation terms ($n \geq 0$)
Π^0	$::= \Sigma^0 \mid \Omega^0 \mid [\lambda \varphi^*] \mid \varphi^*$	φ^*	propositional formulas
φ^*	$::= \Pi^n \kappa_1 \dots \kappa_n \ (n \geq 1) \mid \Pi^0 \mid (\neg \varphi^*) \mid (\varphi^* \rightarrow \varphi^*) \mid \forall \alpha \varphi^* \mid (\Box \varphi^*) \mid (\mathcal{A} \varphi^*)$	φ	formulas
φ	$::= \kappa_1 \Pi^1 \mid \varphi^* \mid (\neg \varphi) \mid (\varphi \rightarrow \varphi) \mid \forall \alpha \varphi \mid (\Box \varphi) \mid (\mathcal{A} \varphi)$	τ	terms
τ	$::= \kappa \mid \Pi^n \ (n \geq 0)$		

Figure 1: Grammar of Modal Relational Type Theory. Note that two kinds of (complex) formulas are introduced: ones that may have encoding subformulas and ones that do not. The latter are designated as propositional formulas, the former ones simply as formulas.

The encoding of modal functional type theory in functional type theory as explored in previous work [2, 3] is simple: modal logic formulas are identified with certain functional type theory formulas of predicate type $i \Rightarrow \text{bool}$ (abbreviated as io below). Possible worlds are explicitly represented by terms of type i . A modal logic φ formula holds for a world w if and only if the application $\varphi \ w$ evaluates to true. The definition of the propositional modal logic connectives is then straightforward and it simply realizes the standard translation as a set of equations in functional type theory. The approach has been successfully extended for quantifiers. A crucial aspect thereby is that in simple type theory quantifiers can be treated as ordinary logical connectives. No extra binding mechanism is needed since the already existing lambda binding mechanism can be elegantly utilized.

The challenge here is to appropriately ‘restrict’ this embedding for modal relational type theory.

To achieve this we provide means to explicitly represents and maintain information and constraints on the syntactical structure of modal relational type theory, in particular, we provide means to distinguish between propositional formulas, formulas, terms and erroneous (disallowed) formations. This clearly creates some technical overhead. However, we exploit facilities in Isabelle/HOL’s user interface, and other means, to hide most of these technicalities from the user in applications.

2 Preliminaries

We start out with some type declarations and type abbreviations. Our formalism explicitly encodes possible world semantics. Hence, we introduce a distinguished type i to represent the set of possible worlds. Consequently, terms of this type denote possible worlds. Moreover, modal logic formulas are associated in our approach with predicates (resp. sets) on possible worlds. Hence, modal logic formulas have type $(i \Rightarrow \text{bool})$. To make our representation in the remainder more concise we abbreviate this type as io .

typeddecl i

type-synonym $io = (i \Rightarrow \text{bool})$

Entities in the abstract theory of types are represented in our formalism by the type e . We call this the raw type of entities resp. objects. Later on we will introduce means to distinguish between abstract and ordinary entities.

typed e

To explicitly model the syntactical restrictions of modal relational type theory we introduce a (polymorphic) datatype $'a \text{ opt}$ (where $'a$ is a polymorphic variable in Isabelle) based on four constructors: $ERR \ 'a$ (identifies erroneous term constructions), $P \ 'a$ (identifies propositional formulas), $F \ 'a$ (identifies formulas), and $T \ 'a$ (identifies terms, such as lambda abstractions). The embeddings approach will be suitably adapted below so that for each language expression (in the embedded modal relational type theory) the respective datatype is identified and appropriately propagated. The encapsulated expressions realize the actual modeling of the logic embedding analogous to previous work for modal functional type theory.

datatype $'a \text{ opt} = ERR \ 'a \mid P \ 'a \mid F \ 'a \mid T \ 'a$

The following operators support a concise and elegant superscript annotation with these four syntactical categories for our language constructs.

abbreviation $mkP::io \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \ (-^P \ [109] \ 110) \ \text{where} \ \varphi^P \equiv P \ \varphi$
abbreviation $mkF::io \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \ (-^F \ [109] \ 110) \ \text{where} \ \varphi^F \equiv F \ \varphi$
abbreviation $mkT::'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ opt} \ (-^T \ [109] \ 110) \ \text{where} \ \varphi^T \equiv T \ \varphi$
abbreviation $mkE::'a \Rightarrow 'a \text{ opt} \ (-^E \ [109] \ 110) \ \text{where} \ \varphi^E \equiv ERR \ \varphi$

Some language constructs in the Principia Metaphysica, e.g. the actuality operator \mathcal{A} ("it is actually the case that"), refer to a (fixed) given world. To model such a global world reference we introduce a constant symbol (name) cw of world type i . Moreover, for technical reasons, which will be clarified below, we introduce further (dummy) constant symbols for various domains. Since we assume that all domains are non-empty, introducing these constant symbols is obviously not harmful.

consts $cw :: i$
consts $de::e \ dio::io \ da::'a$

3 Embedding of Modal Relational Type Theory

The language constructs of modal relational type theory are introduced step by step.

The actuality operator \mathcal{A} when applied to a formula or propositional formula φ evaluates φ wrt the fixed given world cw . The compound expression $\mathcal{A}\varphi$ inherits its syntactical category F (formula) or P (propositional formula) from φ . If the syntactical category of φ is ERR (error) or T (term), then the syntactical category of $\mathcal{A}\varphi$ is ERR and a dummy entity of appropriate type is returned. This illustrates the very idea of our explicit structure and constraints and this scheme will be repeated below for all the other language constructs of modal relational type theory.

abbreviation $Actual::io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \ (\mathcal{A} - \ [64] \ 65) \ \text{where} \ \mathcal{A}\varphi \equiv \text{case } \varphi \text{ of}$
 $F(\psi) \Rightarrow F(\lambda w. \psi \ cw) \mid P(\psi) \Rightarrow P(\lambda w. \psi \ cw) \mid - \Rightarrow ERR(dio)$

The Principia Metaphysica distinguishes between encoding and exemplifying, ... say more ... Encoding $\kappa_1 \Pi^1$ is noted here as $\llbracket \kappa_1, \Pi^1 \rrbracket$. Encoding yields formulas and never propositional formulas. In the embedding encoding is identified with predicate application.

n-ary lambda abstraction $\lambda^0, \lambda, \lambda^2, \lambda^3, \dots$, for $n \geq 0$, is supported in the Principia Metaphysica only over propositional formulas. ... say more about λ^0 ... Their embedding is straightforward: λ^0 is mapped to identity and $\lambda, \lambda^2, \lambda^3, \dots$ are mapped to n-ary lambda abstractions, that is, $\lambda(\lambda x. \varphi)$ is mapped to $(\lambda x. \varphi)$ and $\lambda^2(\lambda xy. \varphi)$ to $(\lambda xy. \varphi)$, etc. For pragmatical reasons we restrict ourselves here to the cases where $n \leq 3$. Binder notation is introduced for λ (... unfortunatley, I don't know yet how binder notation can be achieved also for $\lambda^2, \lambda^3, \dots$... need to find out.).

abbreviation $\text{lam}0::io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\lambda^0)$ **where** $\lambda^0 \varphi \equiv \text{case } \varphi \text{ of}$
 $P(\psi) \Rightarrow P(\psi) \mid - \Rightarrow \text{ERR } dio$

abbreviation $\text{lam}::(e \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow (e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt} (\lambda)$ **where** $\lambda \Phi \equiv \text{case } (\Phi \text{ de}) \text{ of}$
 $P(\varphi) \Rightarrow T(\lambda x. \text{case } (\Phi x) \text{ of } P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi) \mid - \Rightarrow \text{ERR}(\lambda x. dio)$

abbreviation $\text{lamBinder}::(e \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow (e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt} (\text{binder } \lambda [8] 9)$ **where** $\lambda x. \varphi x \equiv \lambda \varphi$

abbreviation $\text{lam}2::(e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow (e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt} (\lambda^2)$ **where** $\lambda^2 \Phi \equiv \text{case } (\Phi \text{ de de}) \text{ of}$
 $P(\varphi) \Rightarrow T(\lambda x y. \text{case } (\Phi x y) \text{ of } P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi) \mid - \Rightarrow \text{ERR}(\lambda x y. dio)$

abbreviation $\text{lam}3::(e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow (e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt} (\lambda^3)$ **where** $\lambda^3 \Phi \equiv \text{case } (\Phi \text{ de de de}) \text{ of}$
 $P(\varphi) \Rightarrow T(\lambda x y z. \text{case } (\Phi x y z) \text{ of } P(\varphi) \Rightarrow \varphi) \mid - \Rightarrow \text{ERR}(\lambda x y z. dio)$

The Principia Metaphysica supports rigid definite descriptions. Our definition maps $\iota(\lambda x. \varphi)$ to $(THE x. \varphi cw)$, that is Isabelle's inbuilt definite description operator THE is utilized and evaluation is rigidly carried out with respect to the current world cw . Moreover, application of ι to Φ is allowed only if the body of Φ , computed by clause $(\Phi \text{ de})$, is a propositional formula. In this case a term is returned and otherwise an ERR-term is returned. We again introduce binder notation for ι .

abbreviation $\text{that}::(e \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow e \text{ opt} (\iota)$ **where** $\iota \Phi \equiv \text{case } (\Phi \text{ de}) \text{ of}$
 $F(\varphi) \Rightarrow T(\text{THE } x. \text{case } (\Phi x) \text{ of } F \psi \Rightarrow \psi cw) \mid P(\varphi) \Rightarrow T(\text{THE } x. \text{case } (\Phi x) \text{ of } P \psi \Rightarrow \psi cw) \mid - \Rightarrow \text{ERR}(de)$

abbreviation $\text{thatBinder}::(e \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow e \text{ opt} (\text{binder } \iota [8] 9)$ **where** $\iota x. \varphi x \equiv \iota \varphi$

lemma $\langle \langle F1^T, (\iota x. \{x^T, Q1^T\}) \rangle \rangle = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is a propositional formula as intended

4 Further Logical Connectives

Further logical connectives can be defined as usual. For existential quantification we here prefer a native introduction, even though a definition based on \neg and \forall is also possible (but syntactically not more elegant). For pragmatic reasons it eventually makes sense to prefer native introductions for all connectives.

abbreviation $\text{conj}::io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\text{infixl } \wedge 53)$ **where** $\varphi \wedge \psi \equiv \neg(\varphi \rightarrow \neg \psi)$

abbreviation $\text{or}::io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\text{infixl } \vee 52)$ **where** $\varphi \vee \psi \equiv \neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi$

abbreviation $\text{equivalent}::io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\text{infixl } \equiv 51)$ **where** $\varphi \equiv \psi \equiv (\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \wedge (\psi \rightarrow \varphi)$

abbreviation $\text{diamond}::io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\Diamond - [62] 63)$ **where** $\Diamond \varphi \equiv \neg \Box(\neg \varphi)$

abbreviation $\text{exists}::('a \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\exists)$ **where** $\exists \Phi \equiv \text{case } (\Phi \text{ da}) \text{ of}$

$P \varphi \Rightarrow P(\lambda w. \exists x. \text{case } (\Phi x) \text{ of } P \psi \Rightarrow \psi w)$

$\mid F \varphi \Rightarrow F(\lambda w. \exists x. \text{case } (\Phi x) \text{ of } F \psi \Rightarrow \psi w) \mid - \Rightarrow \text{ERR } dio$

abbreviation $\text{existsBinder}::('a \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} (\text{binder } \exists [8] 9)$ **where** $\exists x. \varphi x \equiv \exists \varphi$

5 Meta-Logic

Our approach to rigorously distinguish between proper and improper language constructions and to explicitly maintain respective information is continued also at meta-level. For this we introduce three truth values *tt*, *ff* and *err*, representing truth, falsity and error. These values are also noted as \top , \perp and $*$. We could, of course, also introduce respective logical connectives for the meta-level, but in our applications (see below) this was not yet relevant.

datatype *mf* = *tt* (\top) | *ff* (\perp) | *err* ($*$)

Next we define the meta-logical notions of validity, satisfiability, countersatisfiability and invalidity for our embedded modal relational type theory. To support concise formula representations in the remainder we introduce the following notations: $[\varphi]$ (for φ is valid), $[\varphi]^{sat}$ (φ is satisfiability), $[\varphi]^{csat}$ (φ is countersatisfiability) and $[\varphi]^{inv}$ (φ is invalid). Actually, so far we only use validity.

abbreviation *valid* :: *io opt* \Rightarrow *mf* ($[-]$ $[1]$) **where** $[\varphi] \equiv$ *case* φ *of*

$P(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\forall w.(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp
| $F(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\forall w.(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp | $- \Rightarrow *$

abbreviation *satisfiable* :: *io opt* \Rightarrow *mf* ($[-]^{sat}$ $[1]$) **where** $[\varphi]^{sat} \equiv$ *case* φ *of*

$P(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\exists w.(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp
| $F(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\exists w.(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp | $- \Rightarrow *$

abbreviation *countersatisfiable* :: *io opt* \Rightarrow *mf* ($[-]^{csat}$ $[1]$) **where** $[\varphi]^{csat} \equiv$ *case* φ *of*

$P(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\exists w.\neg(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp
| $F(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\exists w.\neg(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp | $- \Rightarrow *$

abbreviation *invalid* :: *io opt* \Rightarrow *mf* ($[-]^{inv}$ $[1]$) **where** $[\varphi]^{inv} \equiv$ *case* φ *of*

$P(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\forall w.\neg(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp
| $F(\psi) \Rightarrow$ *if* $\forall w.\neg(\psi \ w) \longleftrightarrow \text{True}$ *then* \top *else* \perp | $- \Rightarrow *$

6 Some Basic Tests

Question: What are the next two lemmata expected to return? So far they return truth. If that should be disabled (I guess that should then happen in the definition of implication), then we might run into a problem with the definition of $x =_E y$ below. Discuss.

lemma $[(\forall x. (\llbracket R^T, x^T \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket))] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[(\forall x. \llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket \rightarrow (\llbracket R^T, x^T \rrbracket))] = \top$ **apply simp done**

6.1 Verifying Necessitation

The next two lemmata show that necessitation holds for arbitrary formulas and arbitrary propositional formulas. We present the lemma in both variants.

lemma *necessitationF*: $[\varphi^F] = \top \longrightarrow [\Box \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *necessitationP*: $[\varphi^P] = \top \longrightarrow [\Box \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

6.2 Modal Collapse is Countersatisfiable

The modelfinder Nitpick constructs a finite countermodel to the assertion that modal collapse is valid. Nitpick's countermodel consists of four worlds i1, i2, i3 and i4. Moreover, it defines φ to hold only in world i3 and it suggests i3 as the actual world in which to evaluate the conjecture formula. This countermodel is not minimal.

lemma *modalCollapseF*: $[\varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick

lemma *modalCollapseP*: $[\varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick

6.3 Verifying S5 Principles

\Box could have been modeled by employing an equivalence relation r in a guarding clause. This has been done in previous work. Our alternative, simpler definition of \Box above omits this clause (since all worlds are reachable from any world in an equivalence relation). The following lemmata, which check various conditions for S5, confirm that we have indeed obtain a correct modeling of S5.

lemma *axiom-T-P*: $[\Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-T-F*: $[\Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-B-P*: $[\varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-B-F*: $[\varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-4-P*: $[\Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**

lemma *axiom-4-F*: $[\Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**

lemma *axiom-D-P*: $[\Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \Box \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-D-F*: $[\Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \Box \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-5-P*: $[\Diamond \varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *axiom-5-F*: $[\Diamond \varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \Diamond \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *test-A-P*: $[\Box \Diamond \varphi^P \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *test-A-F*: $[\Box \Diamond \varphi^F \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *test-B-P*: $[\Diamond \Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**

lemma *test-B-F*: $[\Diamond \Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**

lemma *test-C-P*: $[\Box \Diamond \varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick

lemma *test-C-F*: $[\Box \Diamond \varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick

lemma *test-D-P*: $[\Diamond \Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma *test-D-F*: $[\Diamond \Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

6.4 Relations between Meta-Logical Notions

lemma $[\varphi^P] = \top \iff [\varphi^P]^{csat} = \perp$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[\varphi^P]^{sat} = \top \iff [\varphi^P]^{inv} = \perp$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[\varphi^F] = \top \iff [\varphi^F]^{csat} = \perp$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[\varphi^F]^{sat} = \top \iff [\varphi^F]^{inv} = \perp$ **apply simp done**

However, for terms we have:

lemma $[\varphi^T] = *$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[\varphi^T]^{sat} = *$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[\varphi^T]^{csat} = *$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[\varphi^T]^{inv} = *$ **apply simp done**

6.5 Testing the Propagation of Syntactical Category Information

lemma $\exists X. (\llbracket R^T, a^T \rrbracket = X^P \wedge \neg(\exists X. (\llbracket R^T, a^T \rrbracket = X^F) \wedge \neg(\exists X. (\llbracket R^T, a^T \rrbracket = X^T) \wedge \neg(\exists X. (\llbracket R^T, a^T \rrbracket = X^E))$ **apply simp done**

lemma $\exists X. (\llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket = X^F \wedge \neg(\exists X. (\llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket = X^P) \wedge \neg(\exists X. (\llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket = X^T) \wedge \neg(\exists X. (\llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket = X^E))$ **apply simp done**

Most importantly, we have that the following language constructing is evaluated as erroneous at validity level.

lemma $(\llbracket \lambda x. (\llbracket R^T, x^T \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket, a^T) \rrbracket = *$ **apply simp done**

This is also confirmed as follows in Isabelle: Isabelle simplifies the following expression to $dio^E = X$ (simply move the curse on *simp* to see this).

lemma $(\llbracket \lambda x. (\llbracket R^T, x^T \rrbracket \rightarrow \llbracket x^T, R^T \rrbracket, a^T) \rrbracket = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is dio^E

6.6 Are Priorities Defined Correctly?

lemma $\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P \rightarrow \chi^P \equiv (\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P) \rightarrow \chi^P$ **apply simp done**

lemma $\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P \rightarrow \chi^P \equiv \varphi^P \wedge (\psi^P \rightarrow \chi^P)$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick

lemma $(\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P \equiv \varphi^P \wedge \psi^P) \equiv ((\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P) \equiv (\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P))$ **apply simp done**

lemma $(\varphi^P \wedge \psi^P \equiv \varphi^P \wedge \psi^P) \equiv (\varphi^P \wedge (\psi^P \equiv \varphi^P) \wedge \psi^P)$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick

7 E!, O!, A! and =E

We introduce the distinguished 1-place relation constant: E (read: being concrete or concreteness)

consts $E::(e \Rightarrow io)$

Being ordinary is defined as being possibly concrete.

abbreviation $ordinaryObject::(e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt } (O!) \text{ where } O! \equiv \lambda x. \Diamond(\llbracket E^T, x^T \rrbracket)$

lemma $O! = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda x w. Ex (E x))^T$

Being abstract is defined as not possibly being concrete.

abbreviation $abstractObject::(e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt } (A!) \text{ where } A! \equiv \lambda x. \neg(\Diamond(\llbracket E^T, x^T \rrbracket))$

lemma $A! = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda x w. \forall xa. \neg E x xa)^T$

Identity relations $=_E$ and $=$ are introduced.

abbreviation $identityE::e \text{ opt} \Rightarrow e \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt } (\text{infixl } =_E \ 63) \text{ where } x =_E y \equiv (\llbracket O!, x \rrbracket \wedge \llbracket O!, y \rrbracket) \wedge \Box(\forall F. (\llbracket F^T, x \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket F^T, y \rrbracket))$

lemma $a^T =_E a^T = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \exists x. E a x)^P$

7.1 Identity on Individuals

abbreviation $identityI::e \text{ opt} \Rightarrow e \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt } (\text{infixl } = \ 63) \text{ where } x = y \equiv$

$$x =_E y \vee ((\downarrow A!, x) \wedge (\downarrow A!, y) \wedge \Box(\forall F. \llbracket x, F^T \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket y, F^T \rrbracket))$$

lemma $a^T = a^T = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \text{True})^F$
lemma $(\downarrow A!, a^T) \wedge (\downarrow A!, a^T) \wedge \Box(\forall F. \llbracket a^T, F^T \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket a^T, F^T \rrbracket) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \forall x. \neg E a x)^F$
lemma $(\downarrow A!, a^T) \wedge (\downarrow A!, a^T) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \forall x. \neg E a x)^P$
lemma $\Box(\forall F. \llbracket a^T, F^T \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket a^T, F^T \rrbracket) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \text{True})^F$

As intended: the following two lambda-abstractions are not well-formed/eligible and their evaluation reports in ERR-terms.

lemma $\lambda^2(\lambda x y. x^T = y^T) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda x y. \text{dio})^E$
lemma $(\lambda x. x^T = y^T) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda x. \text{dio})^E$

7.2 Identity on Relations

abbreviation $\text{identityRel1}:: ((e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow ((e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}$ (**infixl** $=^1$ 63)
where $F1 =^1 G1 \equiv \Box(\forall x. \llbracket x^T, F1 \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket x^T, G1 \rrbracket)$

abbreviation $\text{identityRel2}:: ((e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow ((e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}$ (**infixl** $=^2$ 63)
where $F2 =^2 G2 \equiv \forall x1. (\lambda y. \llbracket F2, y^T, x1^T \rrbracket) =^1 (\lambda y. \llbracket G2, y^T, x1^T \rrbracket)$
 $\wedge (\lambda y. \llbracket F2, x1^T, y^T \rrbracket) =^1 (\lambda y. \llbracket G2, x1^T, y^T \rrbracket)$

abbreviation $\text{identityRel3}:: ((e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow ((e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow e \Rightarrow io) \text{ opt}) \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}$ (**infixl** $=^3$ 63)
where $F3 =^3 G3 \equiv \forall x1 x2. (\lambda y. \llbracket F3, y^T, x1^T, x2^T \rrbracket) =^1 (\lambda y. \llbracket G3, y^T, x1^T, x2^T \rrbracket)$
 $\wedge (\lambda y. \llbracket F3, x1^T, y^T, x2^T \rrbracket) =^1 (\lambda y. \llbracket G3, x1^T, y^T, x2^T \rrbracket)$
 $\wedge (\lambda y. \llbracket F3, x1^T, x2^T, y^T \rrbracket) =^1 (\lambda y. \llbracket G3, x1^T, x2^T, y^T \rrbracket)$

lemma $F1^T =^1 G1^T = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \forall w x. (F1 x w \longrightarrow G1 x w) \wedge (G1 x w \longrightarrow F1 x w))^F$
lemma $F2^T =^2 G2^T = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^F$
lemma $F3^T =^3 G3^T = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^F$
lemma $\llbracket x^T, F1^T \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket x^T, G1^T \rrbracket = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^F$
lemma $\llbracket F1^T, x^T \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket G1^T, x^T \rrbracket = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^P$
lemma $(\lambda y. \llbracket F2^T, y^T, x1^T \rrbracket) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^T$

abbreviation $\text{equalityRel0}:: io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt} \Rightarrow io \text{ opt}$ (**infixl** $=^0$ 63)
where $F0 =^0 G0 \equiv (\lambda y. F0) =^1 (\lambda y. G0)$

lemma $F1^T =^1 G1^T = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\lambda w. \forall w x. (F1 x w \longrightarrow G1 x w) \wedge (G1 x w \longrightarrow F1 x w))^F$

Some further tests:

lemma $[a^T =_E a^T] = \top$ **apply simp nitpick oops** — Countermodel by Nitpick
lemma $[\llbracket O!, a^T \rrbracket \rightarrow a^T =_E a^T] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[(\forall F. \llbracket F^T, x^T \rrbracket \equiv \llbracket F^T, x^T \rrbracket)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
lemma $[\llbracket O!, a^T \rrbracket \rightarrow (\lambda x. x^T =_E a^T, a^T)] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma $[(\exists F. \llbracket a^T, F^T \rrbracket)] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**

lemma $[(\exists \varphi. \varphi^P)] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**
 lemma $[(\exists \varphi. \varphi^F)] = \top$ **apply simp by auto**

8 Axioms

8.1 Axioms for Negations and Conditionals

lemma $a21-1-P$: $[\varphi^P \rightarrow (\varphi^P \rightarrow \varphi^P)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a21-1-F$: $[\varphi^F \rightarrow (\varphi^F \rightarrow \varphi^F)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a21-2-P$: $[(\varphi^P \rightarrow (\psi^P \rightarrow \chi^P)) \rightarrow ((\varphi^P \rightarrow \psi^P) \rightarrow (\varphi^P \rightarrow \chi^P))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a21-2-F$: $[(\varphi^F \rightarrow (\psi^F \rightarrow \chi^F)) \rightarrow ((\varphi^F \rightarrow \psi^F) \rightarrow (\varphi^F \rightarrow \chi^F))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a21-3-P$: $[(\neg \varphi^P \rightarrow \neg \psi^P) \rightarrow ((\neg \varphi^P \rightarrow \psi^P) \rightarrow \varphi^P)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a21-3-F$: $[(\neg \varphi^F \rightarrow \neg \psi^F) \rightarrow ((\neg \varphi^F \rightarrow \psi^F) \rightarrow \varphi^F)] = \top$ **apply simp done**

8.2 Axioms of Identity

todo

8.3 Axioms of Quantification

todo

8.4 Axioms of Actuality

lemma $a31-1-P$: $[\mathcal{A}(\neg \varphi^P) \equiv \neg \mathcal{A}(\varphi^P)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-1-F$: $[\mathcal{A}(\neg \varphi^F) \equiv \neg \mathcal{A}(\varphi^F)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-2-P$: $[\mathcal{A}(\varphi^P \rightarrow \psi^P) \equiv (\mathcal{A}(\varphi^P) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}(\psi^P))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-2-F$: $[\mathcal{A}(\varphi^F \rightarrow \psi^F) \equiv (\mathcal{A}(\varphi^F) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}(\psi^F))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-3-P$: $[\mathcal{A}(\forall x. \varphi^P) \equiv (\forall x. \mathcal{A}(\varphi^P))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-3-F$: $[\mathcal{A}(\forall x. \varphi^F) \equiv (\forall x. \mathcal{A}(\varphi^F))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-4-P$: $[\mathcal{A}(\varphi^P) \equiv \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}(\varphi^P))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a31-4-F$: $[\mathcal{A}(\varphi^F) \equiv \mathcal{A}(\mathcal{A}(\varphi^F))] = \top$ **apply simp done**

8.5 Axioms of Necessity

lemma $a32-1-P$: $[(\Box(\varphi^P \rightarrow \varphi^P)) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \Box \varphi^P)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a32-1-F$: $[(\Box(\varphi^F \rightarrow \varphi^F)) \rightarrow (\Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \Box \varphi^F)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a32-2-P$: $[\Box \varphi^P \rightarrow \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a32-2-F$: $[\Box \varphi^F \rightarrow \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**

lemma $a32-3-P$: $[\Box \Diamond \varphi^P \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a32-3-F$: $[\Box \Diamond \varphi^F \rightarrow \Diamond \varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a32-4-P$: $[(\forall x. \Box \varphi^P) \rightarrow \Box((\forall x. \varphi^P))] = \top$ **apply simp done**
 lemma $a32-4-F$: $[(\forall x. \Box \varphi^F) \rightarrow \Box((\forall x. \varphi^F))] = \top$ **apply simp done**

The following needs to be an axiom; it does not follow for free: it is possible that there are contingently concrete individuals and it is possible that there are not:

axiomatization where

$a32-5-P$: $[\Diamond(\exists x. (\Box E^T, x^T)) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\Box E^T, x^T))] \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\exists x. (\Box E^T, x^T) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\Box E^T, x^T))))] = \top$

A brief check that this axiom is well-formed, i.e. does not return error

lemma $[\Diamond(\exists x. (\Downarrow E^T, x^T)) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\Downarrow E^T, x^T)) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\exists x. (\Downarrow E^T, x^T) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\Downarrow E^T, x^T))))] \neq *$ **apply simp done**
lemma $\Diamond(\exists x. (\Downarrow E^T, x^T) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\Downarrow E^T, x^T))) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\exists x. (\Downarrow E^T, x^T) \wedge \Diamond(\neg(\Downarrow E^T, x^T)))) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^P$

8.6 Axioms of Necessity and Actuality

lemma $a33-1-P: [\mathcal{A}\varphi^P \rightarrow \Box\mathcal{A}\varphi^P] = \top$ **apply simp done**
lemma $a33-1-F: [\mathcal{A}\varphi^F \rightarrow \Box\mathcal{A}\varphi^F] = \top$ **apply simp done**
lemma $a33-2-P: [\Box\varphi^P \equiv \mathcal{A}(\Box\varphi^P)] = \top$ **apply simp done**
lemma $a33-2-F: [\Box\varphi^F \equiv \mathcal{A}(\Box\varphi^F)] = \top$ **apply simp done**

8.7 Axioms for Descriptions

... here I still run into some problems, need to analyze why the simplifier gets stuck both with both formulas ...

lemma $(x^T = (\iota x. \Downarrow x^T, R^T)) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^F$
lemma $(\forall z. (\mathcal{A}(\Downarrow x^T, R^T) \equiv (z^T = x^T))) = X$ **apply simp oops** — X is $(\dots)^F$

For the following two lemmata the simplifier does not get back.

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