Dyadic Deontic Logic of Carmo and Jones

Docent: Prof. Christoph Benzmüller. Speaker: Alexey Gonus.

Standard Deontic Logic: definition

$\Box$	$\longrightarrow$	$\bigcirc$	“it is obligatory that”
$\neg\Box\neg$	$\longrightarrow$	$\mathcal{P}$	“it is permitted that”
$\Box\neg$	$\longrightarrow$	$\bigcirc\neg$	“it is forbidden that”

Standard Deontic Logic: its paradoxes and problems

"Ross paradox" $\vdash \bigcirc A \to \bigcirc(A \vee B)$

"Free Choice Permission paradox" $\nvdash \mathscr{P}(A \vee B) \to (\mathscr{P}A \wedge \mathscr{P}B)$

"Good Samaritan paradox" $\vdash \bigcirc(A \wedge B) \to \bigcirc B$

"Deontic/epistemic paradox" $\bigcirc A \to A$

"Any tautology is obligatory"

"Impossibility of consistent expression of a conflict of obligations"

Standard Deontic Logic: conditional obligations

(option 1) $\bigcirc(B/A) =_{df} A \rightarrow \bigcirc B$

(option 2) $\bigcirc(B/A) =_{df} \bigcirc(A \rightarrow B)$

(UN) $\vdash \bigcirc B \leftrightarrow \bigcirc(B/\top)$

(SA) $\vdash \bigcirc(B/A) \rightarrow \bigcirc(B/A \wedge C)$

Desirable Deontic Logic features

- Minimum requirements of consistency
- Logical independence of the sentences
- Applicability to timeless and actionless CTD-scenarios
- The assignment of logical form to every norm in the set should be independent of the other norms in it
- Capacity to derive actual obligations
- Capacity to derive primary obligations
- Capacity to represent the violation of obligations

Contrary-to-Duties Scenario: Dog & Warning Sign



(a) There ought to be no dog

(b) If there is no dog, there ought to be no warning sign

(c) If there is a dog, there ought to be a warning sign

(d) There is a dog

Contrary-to-Duties Scenario: fixity of facts

Temporal

Casual

Agent's decisions

"Considerate assassin"

(a) You should not kill Mr. X

(b) ———

(c) If you kill Mr. X, you should offer him a sigarette

Contrary-to-Duties Scenario: Dyadic Deontic Logic

1) $\Box_a A \longrightarrow \Box_a dog$

2) $\Diamond_p A \longrightarrow \Diamond_p \neg dog$

3) $\bigcirc_a A$ $\qquad\qquad$ $\bigcirc(\neg dog / \top)$

4) $\bigcirc_p A$ $\qquad\qquad$ $\bigcirc(\neg sign / \neg dog)$

5) $\bigcirc(B/A)$ $\qquad\qquad$ $\bigcirc(sign/dog)$

1)-4) *factual component* **5)** *deontic component*

Contrary-to-Duties Scenario: interpretation

Context — *"set of worlds"*

actually open *potentially open*

$$\bigcirc(B/A)$$

$$ob(X) : \wp(W) \rightarrow \wp(\wp(W))$$

Contrary-to-Duties Scenario: final considerations

$$dog \wedge \Box_a dog \wedge \Diamond_p \neg dog$$

$$\Diamond_p sign$$

$$\downarrow$$

$$\bigcirc_a sign$$

$$\bigcirc_p \neg dog$$

Violation: $\bigcirc_p \neg dog \wedge dog$

Language of DDL

$q, q_i \in Q$	*countable set of propositional symbols*
$\neg A$	*classical negation*
$A \vee B$	*classical disjunction*
$\Box A$	*in all worlds*
$\Box_a A$	*in all actual versions of the current world*
$\Box_p A$	*in all potential versions of the current world*
$\bigcirc(B/A)$	*binary dyadic deontic operator*
$\bigcirc_a A$	*monadic deontic operator for actual obligations*
$\bigcirc_p A$	*monadic deontic operator for potential obligations*

Semantics of DDL

Model $M = \langle W, av, pv, ob, V \rangle$

$W -$ *set of possible worlds* $w, v, \ldots$

$V -$ *function assigning a truth set* $V(q_i) \subseteq W$

$av : W \to \wp(W), \ \ av(w) -$ *set of actual versions of the world w*

$pv : W \to \wp(W), \ \ pv(w) -$ *set of potential versions of the world w*

Semantics of DDL

$ob(X) : \wp(W) \to \wp(\wp(W))$ – *obligatory sentences in the context X*

$$\varnothing \notin ob(X)$$

$$Y \cap X = Z \cap X \implies (Y \in ob(X) \iff Z \in ob(X))$$

$$((Y, Z \in ob(X)) \;\&\; (Y \cap Z \cap X \neq \varnothing)) \implies Y \cap Z \in ob(X)$$

$$((Y \subseteq X) \;\&\; (Y \in ob(X)) \;\&\; (X \subseteq Z)) \implies ((Z \backslash X) \cup Y) \in ob(Z)$$

$$((Y \subseteq X) \;\&\; (Z \in ob(X)) \;\&\; (Y \cap Z \neq \varnothing)) \implies Z \in ob(Y)$$

Rules of Inference. Axiomatization

$\Box$ $\qquad$ $\Box_p$ $\qquad$ $\Box_a$

normal modal operators of type

S5 $\qquad$ **KT** $\qquad$ **KD**

$$\Box A \rightarrow \Box_p A \qquad\qquad \Box_p A \rightarrow \Box_a A$$

Rules of Inference. Axiomatization

$\bigcirc(B/A) \rightarrow \Diamond(B \wedge A)$

$\Diamond(A \wedge B \wedge C) \wedge \bigcirc(B/A) \wedge \bigcirc(C/A) \rightarrow \bigcirc(B \wedge C/A)$

$\Box(A \rightarrow B) \wedge \Diamond(A \wedge C) \wedge \bigcirc(C/B) \rightarrow \bigcirc(C/A)$ **(SA)**

$\Box(A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow (\bigcirc(C/A) \leftrightarrow \bigcirc(C/B))$ **(RE-A)**

$\Box(C \rightarrow (A \leftrightarrow B)) \rightarrow (\bigcirc(A/C) \leftrightarrow \bigcirc(B/C))$ **(RE-C)**

$\bigcirc(B/A) \rightarrow \Box\bigcirc(B/A)$

$\bigcirc(B/A) \rightarrow \bigcirc(A \rightarrow B/\top)$

Rules of Inference. Axiomatization

$$\Box_{a(p)} A \rightarrow (\neg \bigcirc_{a(p)} A \wedge \neg \bigcirc_{a(p)} \neg A)$$

$$\Box_{a(p)} (A \leftrightarrow B) \rightarrow (\bigcirc_{a(p)} A \leftrightarrow \bigcirc_{a(p)} B)$$

$$\bigcirc(B/A) \wedge \Box_{a(p)} A \wedge \Diamond_{a(p)} B \wedge \Diamond_{a(p)} \neg B \rightarrow \bigcirc_{a(p)} B$$

+

2 rules to consistently add conditional obligation sentences

Dog & Warning Sign

$$dog \Longrightarrow \Box\, dog \Longrightarrow \Box_p\, dog \Longrightarrow \Box_a\, dog \Longrightarrow \Diamond_a dog$$

$$\Diamond_p \neg dog$$

$$\Diamond_p dog$$

$$\neg \Box_a \neg sign \iff \Diamond_a \neg sign$$

$$\neg \Box_a\, sign \iff \Diamond_a sign$$

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{l} \bigcirc(\neg dog/\top) \wedge \Box_p \top \wedge \Diamond_p \neg dog \wedge \Diamond_p dog \rightarrow \bigcirc_p \neg dog \\ \bigcirc(sign/dog) \wedge \Box_a dog \wedge \Diamond_a \neg sign \wedge \Diamond_a sign \rightarrow \bigcirc_a sign \end{array}}$$

$$\bigcirc(B/A) \wedge \Box_{a(p)} A \wedge \Diamond_{a(p)} B \wedge \Diamond_{a(p)} \neg B \rightarrow \bigcirc_{a(p)} B$$

Some Results

Axiomatization

Sound

Complete

Consistent

Logic

Decidable

Thank all for attention.