Chapter 2

A Perspective-driven analysis of Evidentials and Evidential-like markings

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As wider and more in-depth documentation of evidentiality is undertaken, it becomes clear that the clear-cut evidential paradigms given and reproduced (justifiably) as basic illustrative examples in much of the fundamental literature on evidentiality (paradigms such as Wintu (Aikhenvald 2004: 60, 2018: 1, San Roque 2019: 355), Tariana (Aikhenvald 2004: 2, Aikhenvald 2006, Song 2018: 441)) are in the minority, and that the actual picture is often not so simple (Aikhenvald 2004: 23). There are many cases reported of languages containing formal paradigms that mark not only evidentiality, but also other related features such as egophoricity, epistemic modality, mirativity, and engagement. For instance, the perfective verbal paradigm in Kurtöp (East Bodish: Bhutan) contains five forms, with individual meanings falling into the traditionally distinct categories of mirativity, egophoricity, evidentiality, and engagement (Hyslop 2014, 2017, 2018). The basic three-way distinction in Lhasa Tibetan (Tibetic: PRC) verbal marking similarly has been analysed within the frameworks of evidentiality (DeLancey 2018, among many others), egophoricity (as discussed in Gawne (2017)) and mirativity (DeLancey 1997). The precise boundaries between (or very existence of) these cross-linguistic categories are often blurry at best. The Lhasa Tibetan existential copula 'dug has been opposingly (and quite heatedly) described as both a direct evidential (Hill 2012) or a mirative (see DeLancey 1997, 2012, Hengeveld & Olbertz 2012) and there have been numerous discussions on the theoretical relationship between egophoricity and evidentiality (see Garrett 2001, Hill & Gawne 2017, Loughnane 2018, Widmer 2020). As such, it might not be feasible to consider and analyse instances of evidentiality discretely and independently from other related categories. A potential supplementary approach to these mixed systems and paradigms, presented in this article, is one that views all of these categories from the point-of-view of point-of-view. That is, it considers the specific nature of the subjective (speaker origo) and intersubjective (listener origo) perspectives explicitly grammatically marked by the speaker in various structures and interactional contexts. This article presents a model for

such analysis with specific reference to the Trans-Himalayan language family as a case study. While it will not replace the insights gained through a more traditional approach, such an analysis is able to consider the nature of a whole formal paradigm where the meanings of individual forms are spread across the boundaries of multiple conceptual cross-linguistic categories.

1 Introducing (Inter)Subjectivity

The term *subjectivity*, broadly, denotes reference to the state-of-mind or the perspective of the speaker. Conversely, *intersubjectivity* denotes a reference to both the state-of-mind or perspective of the addressee, and that of the speaker. Together, these terms will be referred to hereafter as *(inter)subjectivity* when referring to the general concept of perspective reference. While this general meaning is found across the literature, there are a variety of fields of linguistic study in which they have been employed.

Finegan (1995) establishes two key schools in which these terms are used. The first, originating with Lyons (1982), fits closely with the above description, and has been developed into a field of diachronic study focussing on the development of subjectivity through grammaticalisation by Traugott (1995). The other school was initiated by Langacker (1985), who approaches the problem of subjectivity synchronically through a Cognitive Grammar lens. Despite the different specific uses of the terms in these bodies of work, a clear common core meaning to *(inter)subjectivity* is that of the aforementioned reference to the perspective of the speaker and addressee, and the idea that these perspectives are not necessarily in alignment.

Perspective here specifically refers to the internal state-of-mind of a given individual. This individual can be a speech act participant (the speaker or an addressee), or alternatively could be a third-party not directly involved in a conversation. An individual's perspective can include aspects of their state-of-mind such as their knowledge of some given idea, opinions, as well as the focus of their attention and current sensory awareness. Specifically, these are all factors of the individual's internal experience, and cannot be precisely known by any other individuals. That is, when a speaker makes an assessment of whether or not their interlocutor is aware of some object in a room, they are making an assessment of that interlocutor's perspective. If, however, they were assessing that interlocutor's social standing in relation to themself, or how near or far away an interlocutor was standing, for example, they would not be referencing

the *interlocutor's* perspective. In both of these latter cases, the knowledge being polled by the speaker is either based on their own social knowledge (the individuals' relative social standing), or on information that is directly accessible to the speaker (the interlocutor's physical position), and as such both cases reference only speaker perspective.[1]

Tied closely to perspective is the concept of the *origo*. The origo refers to the owner of the perspective being taken in a given utterance. While the main clause of an (inter)subjectively marked utterance will have a given agent or subject, and while this is, in many cases, equivalent to the holder of the perspective being referenced (in particular with many forms of egophoricity, discussed in Section 2.1), there are also many cases where a speaker might be, for instance, polling their own knowledge of a third-person event, or that of their addressee. In these cases, the origo of the marking would be speaker or addressee respectively, and not necessarily an individual actually involved in the event. If, however, in reported speech or narrative, a speaker references the perspective of a character or third party though a direct quote, the character would then be the origo of the marking.

This chapter specifically focuses on situations in Trans-Himalayan languages where (inter)subjecivity is, in some form, marked grammatically. (Inter)subjective meaning is, whether grammatically or otherwise expressed, theoretically present universally in language[2]. Inasmuch as language acts as a platform for communication between individuals, a speaker will always both be cognisant of their own perspective, as well as of taking into account that of their addressee, when speaking. The universality of some degree of subjectivity – attention to one's own mindset – is a result of the fact that in order to communicate one's own knowledge, one must assess what that knowledge is. The prevalence of intersubjectivity is, however, less self-evident. Relevance Theory (Wilson & Sperber 2004) suggests that any given utterance will be presupposed by an assessment of the relevance of said utterance *to the addressee*. This is an extension of the Gricean Maxim of relevance (Grice 1989, Horn 2004), which suggests that, generally speaking, making comments that are relevant to a conversation at hand is

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[1]There are possible circumstances in which forms primarily referencing the physical position speaker and addressee could involve an assessment by the speaker on the addressee's state of mind. For instance, one can imagine a form marking both speaker and addressee position, as well as a mirative meaning. While, assuming the mirative meaning covered both the speaker and addressee's perspectives, there would be such an assessment, it would be purely in order to determine the acceptability of the mirative meaning, and not of the spatial component of the proposed form

[2]This is by no means a new idea. It reflects the ideas formulated by Kamio (1997) in terms of the Territory of Knowledge, and is discussed at length in Heritage (2012).

a core part of cooperative conversation. Simply, if a speaker wishes to strive for sufficient relevance (or at least to communicate in a system where relevance is the expectation), they must pay some attention to the perspective of the addressee.

In Question-Answer pairs, a more salient contrast between the known perspective of the speaker and an assessment of the perspective of the addressee is what Hill (2020) refers to as the "conversational presumption". In discussing the nature of egophoric marking (which will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2), Hill suggests that by the very nature of asking a question, a speaker is ceding authority over the conversation and seeking the perspective of the addressee, while in statements the speaker retains said authority and remains grounded in their own perspective. In seeking the addressee's perspective on a given topic through questioning, a speaker is also making an assessment of the existence of any such perspective on the part of the addressee. That is, unless the question is rhetorical or otherwise pragmatically marked against this, a caveat which will be discussed in Section 2.1, a speaker asking a question of a specific addressee has made the assessment that said addressee might have some answer.

These assessments happen, however, in the background, and their outcomes are established by the very act of speech. If a speaker chooses to say or ask something, they have come to the conclusion that it is either relevant to, or (in interrogatives) potentially known by, the addressee. In other cases, where a nonfulfilment of pragmatic expectations is the speaker's intention (such as for humor), the speaker chooses to ignore said conclusion, but will still have made such an assessment. There is no universal method through which the outcomes of these assessments are explicitly stated. That is not to say, however, that explicit markings of these (inter)subjective assessments do not occur. There are many cases cross-linguistically in which they do.

The most common explicitly marked instance of addressee-perspective is the logical result of Hill's conversational presumption, wherein speaker-origo subjective marking (perhaps most saliently, evidentiality) shifts from speaker to addressee-perspective in interrogative structures. This has long been documented for evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2018: 20, San Roque et al. 2017), and despite not being totally universal (Chelliah 1997: 296), is considered a standard function for evidential marking cross-linguistically (San Roque 2019: 363).

This common perspective shift, in its relation to Hill's conversational presumption, can as such be seen as a result of a pragmatic conversational process. In much the same way then, the less common but still widely described presence of explicit grammatical marking of intersubjectivity in declarative structures (rather than only in interrogatives as discussed above) can be seen theoretically

as an extension of the fundamental attention of the speaker to the addressee's perspective presented above with reference to Relevance Theory and the Gricean Maxims – that is, as a grammatically-marked realisation of another pragmatic process. This declarative intersubjectivity, or engagement, has been discussed in depth by Evans et al. (2018a,b), which will provide a foundation for this chapter.

This chapter will suggest that, in many cases, marking that is traditionally described as a specific category (specifically evidentiality, epistemic modality, egophoricity, mirativity, or engagement), does not fit into any single one of these categories, but rather can be viewed as a method of coordinating meta-information about a given proposition between the speaker and addressee in order to facilitate smoother communication from a social perspective. This can be seen in the fact that, in being conditioned by factors spread across multiple of the aforementioned categories, speakers are consistently attentive to not only, for instance, their source of evidence, but also the addressee's relationship to that source, the speaker's authority to make a claim with relation to that of the addressee, and so on.

Section 2 contains an overview of literature on the cross-linguistic categories of evidentiality, epistemic modality, egophoricity, mirativity, and engagement, looking specifically at common definitions, as well as overlaps in scope that can be seen theoretically and in actual data. Section 3 presents some general theoretical challenges that can arise from analysis using the model of five discrete categories discussed in Section 2, and presents case studies of predicative systems in Kurtöp, Eastern Geshiza, and Amdo Tibetan as examples of cases where a different approach could be useful. Section 4 gives some insights that can be gained from approaching the data from a more general level, as well as some challenges faced with this approach.

2 Previous Literature

2.1 General Definitions

Instances of grammaticalised (inter)subjectivity readily appear in Trans-Himalayan languages across a number of variously well-established cross-linguistic categories; evidentiality, egophoricity, mirativity, engagement, and to an extent, epistemic modality. Specific definitions of these terms are in no short supply, and do not always totally agree with each other. This section will provide an overview of these definitions, highlighting disagreements and differences in various sources. It will also discuss the substantial overlap in functions between these categories, specifically looking at forms carrying meanings in more than one category, as

well as discussing literature that highlights theoretical similarities between these categories. This chapter will focus on these categories specifically in the Trans-Himalayan language family, in which they are notably prevalent. Together these categories and their overlapping functions are referred to as *epistemic*, a decision which is discussed in Section 2.2.1.

The terms DIRECT and INDIRECT are widely used throughout the literature on evidentiality and epistemic marking with a substantial amount of variation in meaning. Generally, the forms exist defined against each other, in the sense that the direct form will have a stronger evidential foundation than the indirect. The exact boundaries of these forms is, however, varied from analysis to analysis and language to language. In Lhasa Tibetan (Tibetic: PRC), forms described as direct/indirect (Garrett 2001, DeLancey 2017 inter alia) broadly represent a contrast between sensory evidence (direct) and either inferential or hearsay evidence (indirect). Hill & Gawne (2017) use the terms EXPERIENTIAL and FACTUAL to refer to these forms. Tribur (2019) also uses the terms direct and indirect to describe two evidential bases for Amdo Tibetan, though the exact boundaries for the forms in terms of their usage does not appear to be the same in Lhasa and Amdo Tibetan. This of course is no surprise, and is reflective of a wider trend. In this chapter, the terms will be used contrasted against each other without any specific definition of their boundaries and exact conditions of use. That is, the term direct will refer to a form that marks greater level of evidence than an alternative, indirect form, with the two forms centred around visual or sensory evidence for the direct forms, and inferential evidence for the indirect forms.

At its broadest, evidentiality as a category refers to the encoding of the source of (and access to, per Tournadre & LaPolla (2014)) an individual's information or knowledge. An important distinction that is made in much (though not all) of the literature is the limitation of evidentiality to grammatical marking to the exclusion of periphrastic or lexical strategies of presenting information source (Aikhenvald 2004, San Roque 2019). While limited to grammatical marking, an evidential system need not be limited to a single paradigm. Aikhenvald (2004) describes so-called "scattered" evidential marking, where grammatical forms marking some evidential meaning appear across different parts of the language's grammar. For example, evidentiality in Meithei (Potential Internal Isolate: Manipur, India) can be marked with a verbal suffix, a series of "attitude" enclitics, or through the speaker's choice of nominaliser (Chelliah 1997). These different strategies are illustrated in Example (1), the use of the nominaliser *ǰat* as a marker of indirect evidentiality, the inferential marker *-ləm* which is part of the language's derivational morphology system, and the attitude marking enclitic *=ne*, which marks

information as shared between the speaker and addressee.[3]

(1)   Meithei (Chelliah 1997: 296, 221, 254)

    a.   Nomionaliser
      məsi phúrə́bəĵatni
      mə-si   phú-lə́bə-**ĵat**-ni
      NM-PDET beat-HAVING-**TYPE**-COP
      'It looks like it might have been beaten'[4]

    b.   Verb derivational morphology
      məhák čárəmkhre
      mə-hák čá-**ləm**-khi-lə-e
      3P-here eat-**EVD**-STILL-PERF-ASRT
      'He has obviously already eaten'[5]

    c.   "Attitude marker" enclitic
      Kakčiŋdənine
      Kakčiŋ-tə-ni-**ne**
      Kakching-LOC-COP-**SI**
      '(As I'm sure you know), it is to Kakching (that I am going).'[6]

Egophoricity is defined by San Roque et al. (2018: 2) as "the grammaticalised encoding of the personal or privileged knowledge or involvement of a potential speaker (the primary knower) in a represented event or situation." Egophoric markers archetypically, though not totally consistently, follow a pattern whereby statements with a first-person subject and questions with a second-person subject are marked egophorically, while first-person questions, second-person statements, and all third-person reference is marked otherwise. The term "egophoric" was originally coined by Tournadre (1992) to refer to a number of evidential forms in Tibetan, while Hill & Gawne (2017) credit the term "egophoricity" to Post (2013). The term "egophoricity" is further predated by the term "Conjunct/Disjunct"

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[3]This does not, on the surface, appear to fit the definition of evidentiality very well, but rather the definition of engagement given below. It has been included here as Chelliah gives it as an example of Meithei's evidential marking. The marking of multiple categories and its implications are discussed in detail in Section 4.

[4]HAVING refers to a morpheme carrrying the equivalent meaning of English "having Ved", TYPE refers to a specific nominaliser, which here also carries evidential meaning (Chelliah 1997: xxiv).

[5]EVD refers specifically to an "indirect" or inferential evidential marker (Chelliah 1997: xxiii).

[6]SI refers to marking of shared information (Chelliah 1997: xxv).

coined to describe the egophoric system in Kathmandu Newar (Nepal) by Hale (1980).

Mirativity as a cross-linguistic category was first described by DeLancey (1997), referring to forms in a number of the world's languages marking the information presented as new or surprising to the speaker. This definition has since been clarified and revised to also include information surprising to the addressee (DeLancey 2012, Hengeveld & Olbertz 2012). Other similar terms that have been used to describe this sort of marking include a distinction between assimilated, expected, or old, and new, non-expected, or immediate knowledge (DeLancey 1997), as well as potentially terms such as counterexpective (Aikhenvald 2012), as seen in languages such as Galo (Post 2007) or Kham (Watters 2002).

Engagement was coined as a term by Landaburu (2007) to refer to grammatical marking that indicates the perspective of both the speaker and addressee, and was presented cross-linguistically by Evans et al. (2018a,b). While categories such as evidentiality and egophoricity mark the perspective of a single speech act participant, engagement marking addresses both. Unlike evidentials, egophorics, or miratives, engagement marking, Evans et al. (2018a,b) both propositional scope (on verbs, marking knowledge of the event in question as with evidentials) and nominal scope (on nouns, marking access to or awareness of a specific nominal referent). While Evans et al. (2018a,b) predominantly give examples where engagement systems exist as full engagement paradigms with no other functions, engagement markings have been found to occur in mixed paradigms alongside evidentiality (Honkasalo 2019: 592).

Epistemic Modality is defined by Boye (2012: 21) as the marking of a speaker's degree of certainty, commitment, or confidence in or to a given proposition, which he summarises with the notion of *epistemic support*. That is, a speaker can mark from neutral to full support (either for or against a proposition) on a gradual scale, with the specific assignment of terms along this scale varying from language to language.

2.2 Overlaps and Issues in Definitions

The boundaries between the categories presented in Section 2.1 are not always well defined in every language. There is substantial overlap between categories such as evidentiality and epistemic modality (Boye 2012), evidentiality and egophoricity (Gawne 2017, Widmer 2020), evidentiality and mirativity (Hill 2012), and evidentiality, engagement and egophoricity (Bergqvist & Kittilä 2020b).

Boye (2012) argues that evidentiality and epistemic modality are two subcategories of a larger category "epistemicity". As Boye reports from the outset, a re-

lationship of some form between evidentiality and epistemic modality has been widely discussed (see also Behrens (2012) for support of the overlap between evidentiality and modality). He presents a number of possible analyses of this relationship, a "disjunction"[7] whereby the two categories are related but separate, an "overlap" view whereby they are separate but overlapping, and an "inclusion" view whereby one category is a subcategory of the other (Boye 2012: 1-2). Epistemicity, then, constitutes a fourth, new analysis, whereby the two categories are sisters under a separate supercategory. Importantly, Boye does not limit his definitions of evidentiality and epistemic modality to grammatical forms, but includes lexical or periphrastic strategies of encoding evidentials. The theoretical overlap is clear. Consider the periphrastic construction in English *"it SEEMS that we've just missed him"*, a line one might read in a detective novel in which the characters have arrived at a crime scene to see a cigar still smoking. Here our detective is remarking firstly that she has come to this conclusion based on inference from evidence, and not by witnessing him leave. At the same time, however, she is also marking only partial commitment to this statement. This potentially contrasts with "we MUST have just missed him", which implies a higher commitment while maintaining the inferential evidential.[8]

This joint meaning can also be seen in languages with grammatical evidentiality. Watters (2002: 289, 296) reports two contrasting morphemes in Kham (Magaric: Nepal). The mirative *oleo* is evidentially neutral but marks high support along with the mirative meaning, while the reportative *di* marks a specific evidential value as well as limited epistemic support. These forms are contrasted in Example (2). The selection of either form is not governed solely by the source of the information, but also by the speaker's commitment to that information. Hearsay information, specifically, can be marked with either *oleo* or *di*, but the former can only be used if the speaker is committing to the truth of the statement, while the latter can be used without this full commitment (Watters 2002: 300).

(2)   Kham (Magaric; Watters 2002: 297)

    a.   o-ba-zya-o   oleo
        3S-go-CONT-NML MIR
        'He's going!' (based on first-hand evidence, inference, or hearsay)

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[7]Not to be confused with the terms *conjunct/disjunct* when discussing egophoricity.

[8]As noted by a reviewer, there is also a contrast in the eventual source of the inference itself, with *seems* restricted to inferences based on visual cues, while *must* does not appear to have such a restriction. The overlap between epistemic modality and evidentiality is yet clearer in this, as the evidentially more restricted form aligns with the form marking lower modal commitment.

b. ba-zya   di
   go-CONT-NML RSP
   'He's going.' (or so it is said)

Boye specifically excludes mirativity from his epistemicity on the grounds that it does not mark "justificatory support" in any sense (Boye 2012: 31), though he does not make any comment on egophoricity or engagement.

The term egophoricity and its related forms (egophoric, egophor, or even just ego) have been used with the same core meaning of marking speaker involvement or authority over a given proposition in at least two different ways. As mentioned above, possibly the first reference to a separate paradigm marking authority or involvement of the origo is in Hale's (1980) work on Kathmandu Newar, which he refers to as a "conjunct/disjunct" system. Today the term *egophoricity* is more widely used to refer to the cross-linguistic category of which the Kathmandu Newar example was the first to be widely cited (San Roque et al. 2018). In its original usage, Tournadre (1992) used the term *egophoric*[9] to refer to the copulas *yin*, *yod*, and *byung*. Each of these forms, notably, can be described as one side of an equipollent contrast in many Tibetic languages. Here, *yin* contrasts with NON-EGO *red*, *yod* with direct evidential *'dug*, and *byung* with the non-speaker-directed form *song*. That being said, the latter of these are, at least in Lhasa Tibetan, often presented as being members of a single larger paradigm (De-Lancey 2017). The existence of evidential paradigms with egophoric bases such as *yod*, and *byung* has been documented throughout the Himalayas (Gawne 2017), as well as New Guinea (San Roque & Loughnane 2012). In this sense, egophoric forms can be defined as marking personal experience or personal involvement as the source of information in an evidential sense, contrasted with forms such as visual or inferential, an analysis which some linguists suggest ought to be applied to all egophoric forms cross-linguistically (Hill & Gawne 2017, Hill 2020). In fact, an analysis of the "conjunct/disjunct" system in Kathmandu Newar as carrying true evidential meaning was first published by Bendix (1974), before Hale's widely cited 1980 paper. There is a slight difference here in the conceptualisation of forms as egophoric or evidential, between one marking personal authority to make a statement, and one marking personal involvement as a source of information. That is, systems that mark an equipollent egophoric distinction have been construed as marking a speaker's claim to, or relinquishment of, authority to make a statement (as in Milang (Modi 2017)), while languages with egophoric evidentials have been construed as marking personal involvement and volition

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[9]*Égophorique* in the original French.

as an alternative information source to witnessing or inference etc., without any claim of authority.

Similar questions have been posed about the validity of mirativity as a cross-linguistic category. Specifically, Hill (2012) calls into question whether the miratives identified in DeLancey (1997) truly carry the meanings suggested by De-Lancey, or are simply misconstrued visual evidentials. In particular, Hill cites DeLancey's analysis of Lhasa Tibetan *'dug* as evidence of this. A further example of potential crossover between the categories can be seen in Tribur's (2019) account of Amdo Tibetan, where in some dialects, the presence of an optional direct evidence marker, when compared with an evidentially unmarked sentence, carries mirative meaning. It is clear that there is some basis for the argument that direct evidentials can carry mirative meanings, potentially analogously to the epistemic modal meaning carried by evidentials. That being said, there are other cases, such as in Magar (Grunow-Hårsta 2008: 495), where the mirative marker is totally separate from the evidential system, as well as languages with mirative markers but no evidential system such as Atong (van Breugel 2014: 425).

Bergqvist & Kittilä (2020a) provide an in-depth analysis of the overlap between engagement and categories such as egophoricity and evidentiality, as do a number of the chapters in that volume. A construal of engagement in which it can be seen as a functionally similar category to evidentiality is harder to conceptualise than with egophoricity, discussed above. That is, while evidentiality and egophoricity can both be viewed as strategies through which a speaker can encode "justificatory support" (Boye 2012: 3) (a speaker is claiming authority to make a statement either based on some specific evidence, or based on a general egophoric authority), engagement marks whether or not the speaker and addressee have "access" (Evans et al. 2018a), either in terms of awareness, knowledge, attention, perception. This, especially when the use of engagement marking across propositional scope and in demonstratives is considered, seems to work less as a strategy for providing justificatory support for a given statement, but rather to coordinate the shared attention of the speaker and addressee to the matter at hand. That being said, there have been documented examples of languages encoding both engagement and evidentiality in a single paradigm, with forms marking both the source of information as well as whether or not the given information is known to both interlocutors (see Evans et al. (2018b): 151-153) for a number of examples in the languages of New Guinea). Additionally, the epistemic-marking paradigm in Eastern Geshiza (Honkasalo 2019: 583) has forms marking evidential and egophoric meanings, as well as at least one form marking non-shared information, or information known to the speaker but not the addressee, as opposed to any specific information source. Notably this engagement marker does

not occur in first-person statements, where an egophoric evidential is used instead, which Honkasalo notes is not surprising due to the internal nature of first-person statements and egophorics. These paradigms suggest that while engagement may seem theoretically distinct from evidentiality and egophoricity, they are functionally similar enough to have developed in some cases either as two functions of a single form, or as two forms in a single paradigm.

While these cross-linguistic categories can be separately defined, as is seen in Section 2.1, it is also clear that there is a high level of overlap both in their functions from a theoretical standpoint, and in their actual usage in the world's languages. The overlaps can be seen in paradigms marking multiple categories, or single forms with meanings across multiple categories, both of which will be exemplified in Section 3.2.

2.2.1 Epistemic Marking as a General Term

With the overlap between the categories discussed in the preceding section, and foreshadowing the case studies presented in Section 3.2 where grammatical subsystems present meanings across these categories, a general term to refer to these meanings will be useful. As such, without intending on coin a term that ought to be used in wider literature, this chapter will use the term *epistemic* to refer to the meanings and paradigms discussed here at a general level. One factor that, at a theoretical level, unites the categories discussed above is their reference not to the content of an event or proposition (in the sense that, for instance, tense marking has scope over the actual event discussed inside a proposition), but to the deictic ground of the speech act. That is, these meanings carry deictic meta-information about a proposition. Within this, they all specifically make reference to the nature of the speaker's knowledge. This could be, in the case of subjective or speaker-perspective meanings, simply the nature of the speaker's knowledge of the proposition, or intersubjectively the speaker's assessment of the addressee's knowledge. Boye (2012) makes a similar assessment for epistemic modality and evidentiality, using the term *epistemicity*. As mentioned in Section 2.2 however, he does not include mirativity in this group, and does not consider the other two categories in question. That said, purely at a level of marking meta-information about a speaker's knowledge, miratives, egophorics, and engagement markers do still fit into an *epistemic* umbrella.

3 Challenges in Conventional Approaches

3.1 General Challenges

The lack of agreement in definitions of these cross-linguistic categories and the overlap in scope in many definitions creates challenges in analyses of evidential and evidentiality-adjacent (depending on one's definitions) systems. By conventional approaches or conventional analyses, I refer specifically to the analysis of epistemic forms through the lenses of the established cross-linguistic categories introduced in Section 2.1. That is, the practice of comparing these forms to the definitions of the established cross-linguistic categories and searching for a best fit. By highlighting some of the gaps in knowledge in this approach of siloing forms into single categories, this section will show the benefits of an analysis informed by perspective marking and social context.

This section will discuss a number of general challenges, while Section 3.2 will discuss a number of case studies to highlight these challenges in practice. The uncertainty around definitions can lead to forms that ostensibly appear very similar to a given category but are referred to by a different name, as they do not fit closely enough to any of the strict definitions discussed in Section 2.1. For instance, Grollmann (2020: 231) avoids referring to a form in Bjokapakha as egophoric, but rather uses the term *subjective*[10], seemingly as it does not fit perfectly in the traditional definition of egophoricity. In Tribur (2019) however, forms that similarly fit only loosely to a canonical definition of egophoricity *are* labelled egophoric.

The classic or introductory examples given for evidential, egophoric, engagement, etc., systems in the literature are, understandably, often as simple and clear-cut in terms of analysis as possible. This is, of course, to easily illustrate the theoretical notions of these categories in use. Examples of this include data from Wintu (Aikhenvald 2004: 60, 2018: 1, San Roque 2019: 355) and Tariana (Aikhenvald 2004: 2, Aikhenvald 2006, Song 2018: 441) for evidentiality, Kathmandu Newar and Awa Pit (San Roque et al. 2018, Bergqvist & Knuchel 2017, Post 2007) for egophoricity, and Andoke (Evans et al. 2018a) for engagement. The existence of these paradigms marking the full possibility of the category in question, and only the category in question, is useful for introducing a given category. However, it is becoming clearer that these systems, at least in the case of evidentiality, are not the norm for epistemic marking paradigms (Aikhenvald 2014: 23). Two ways in which evidential or epistemic systems can diverge

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[10]The term *subjective* is also used in the Mongolist tradition for egophoric-like marking, see Slater (2018)

from archetypal examples are in "scattered" paradigms (as discussed in Section 2.1 based on Aikhenvald (2004)), and *mixed* paradigms. While the scattered evidentials show a single cross-linguistic category spread across multiple domains, mixed paradigms show multiple cross-linguistic categories within a single paradigm. That is, a single set of potentially mutually exclusive and compulsory markers might have not only evidential, but also egophoric, mirative, epistemic modal, or engagement-type meanings. These mixed paradigms cannot be fully analysed or understood through the lens of a single category without creating challenges for the definition of that and other categories. This breadth of function can to some extent be consolidated by taking a broad definition of a category, or taking other meanings as secondary (see Hill (2012), Hill & Gawne (2017) for analyses of the arguably mixed paradigm in Lhasa Tibetan as evidential, LaPolla (2003), Aikhenvald (2004) for examples and discussion of epistemic modal meanings taken as secondary meanings of evidentials), though this approach has not had universal support (see DeLancey (2012)).

In addition to the above-mentioned challenges in definiton, there is a potential difficulty in the suggestion, as is discussed above, that the origo-shift from speaker to addressee in interrogatives is an expected and natural process, reflecting core factors in the very nature of conversation (Hill 2020). However, Hill's observation fails to account for some exceptions to this rule. While we can view many forms of (inter)subjective marking as speaker-origo in declaratives and addressee-origo interrogatives, not all cases follow this structure. Some exceptions include forms that mark both speaker and addressee perspective in both declarative and interrogative (as in archetypal engagement marking discussed in Section 2.1), as well as forms that do not show a shift in origo as would be predicted by the conversational presumption (as in some engagement-marking systems, as well as some evidential systems, see Chelliah (1997: 296), given here in Example (1)).[11] With the possibility of these forms, analysis with the view that the conversational presumption is a pragmatic universal will not properly capture the nature and function of a given form. With these two alternatives (following the conversational presumption or not), we can describe these forms using a two-dimensional matrix of characteristics, single-perspective vs multiple-perspective (see Evans (2005)), and origo-shifting vs non-origo-shifting, as illustrated in Table 1.

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[11]There are also further exceptions to Hill's (2020) observation outside epistemic-marking paradigms. Verbal agreement with person typically marks the second person in second-person questions and the first person in their responses, rather than marking the first person in the question, as it would were it to mirror patterns observed, for instance, egophoric markers.

Table 1: Matrix allowing for the characterisation of perspective-marking forms according to the number of perspectives and shifting of perspectives.

	Origo-Shifting	Non-Origo-Shifting
Single-Perspective	archetypal evidentials and egophorics	some evidentials and miratives
Multiple-Perspective	some engagement marking	archetypal engagement marking

The top left cell in Table 1 represents forms that mark the outcome of an assessment of the perspective of a single individual which also shift origo in interrogative structures. To the best of my knowledge, these only exist as forms that are speaker-origo in declaratives and addressee-origo in interrogatives, as opposed to forms that are addressee-origo in declaratives and speaker-origo in interrogatives. As is indicated in the table, archetypal evidentials and egophorics fit here. The second cell on the top row represents the same categories, but for languages which do not change their origo in interrogatives. These forms can be either speaker or addressee-origo, but do not change origo with the conversational presumption. Evidentials which do not change origo in interrogatives (which can be seen in Chelliah (1997)) fit here, as well as at least some miratives. It is worth noting that miratives have been documented to reference both speaker and addressee-perspectives (Hengeveld & Olbertz 2012), both of which would fit in this cell assuming they do not shift in interrogatives (or, if they do not occur at all in interrogatives). Examples of this group of miratives can be found in Grunow-Hårsta (2008: 483).

The second row of Table 1 includes many engagement markers, such as in Andoke or Kogi (Evans et al. 2018a,b) where each form in a paradigm references perspectives of both speaker and addressee, as well as forms with similar meanings but in mixed paradigms. Here, because both speaker and addressee perspectives are already being references, forms often do not shift in origo in interrogatives. It is not clear in available literature which of these two lower cells the non-shared information marker in Eastern Geshiza, discussed in Section 3.2.2, would fit into, however engagement forms with a shifting origo have been documented for Jaminjung/Ngaliwurru, a Mirndi language from the northeastern Northern Territory

in Australia (Schultze-Berndt 2017)[12].

By examining mixed paradigms through an (inter)subjective lens, that is, taking specific note of the interactions between speaker and addressee-perspective and the assessments made by the speaker of these perspectives, insights into epistemic marking in languages can be attained without the challenges faced when trying to separate and silo epistemic marking into discrete categories. Three case studies will be discussed below to demonstrate these mixed paradigms, the ways these paradigms challenge conventional classification, and the analyses that can be gained from the (inter)subjectivity lens. These case studies will present data from Kurtöp (East Bodish: Bhutan, Hyslop 2017), Eastern Geshiza (rGyalrongic: PRC, Honkasalo 2019), and from the Tibetic family, with specific reference to the Amdo Tibetan varieties (Tibetic: PRC) discussed in Simon (2019), Tribur (2019).

3.2 Case Studies

3.2.1 Kurtöp

Epistemic marking in Kurtöp is managed by a number of separate domains of the language's grammar: verbal morphology with separate paradigms for the perfective and imperfective aspects, a series of copulas, and a small set of particles and clitics. The epistemic marking paradigm in the perfective aspect is the largest, having five forms, each encoding a different epistemic meaning (Hyslop 2017: 299). This paradigm, given in 2, will be the focus of the description and discussion below. Specifically, the function and definition of the form *-shang* will be discussed, arguing that it is closer to the canonical definition of an engagement marker than an egophoric marker, but also that the possibility for the form to be discussed in either frame is further evidence for the blurred lines between the categories. Additionally, the fact that a single paradigm marks so many different traditional categories will be used as evidence that a general view assessing (inter)subjective marking is necessary to properly characterise the epistemic system of Kurtöp.

As is immediately visible, the five forms in the Kurtöp perfective paradigm do not address a single cross-linguistic category, but rather have meanings that would traditionally be categorised into a number of different categories. It is worth noting that Hyslop (2017) does not describe the forms *-pala* and *-shang* as evidential, but rather as egophoric, a decision which I will discuss below. There is an argument to be made that this paradigm could be seen as an evidential paradigm, given that three of the five forms appear to carry at least in part an eviden-

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[12]This data was brough to my attention by an anonymous reviewer.

Table 2: Perfective paradigm in Kurtöp (East Bodish: Bhutan, Hyslop 2017) with the closest cross-linguistic category.

Form	Meaning	Cross-linguistic Category
-para	Low certainty/Low epistemic support	Epistemic modality
-mu	Indirect evidence	Evidentiality
-na	Mirative	Mirativity
-pala	Direct evidence	Evidentiality?
-shang	Direct evidence non-shared	Evidentiality and engagement?

tial meaning. It has been suggested (Hill 2012) that forms described as mirative can be better analysed as sensory evidentials, which would support this, but this leaves the form *-para* unaccounted for. Additionally, the analysis of the mirative *-na* as a sensory evidential following Hill's (2020) argument against mirativity is hardly compatible with a paradigm where there are already two direct/sensory evidentials. Finally, the mirative is found not only in situations where the speaker does have sensory evidence, but also in fictional narratives. Hyslop (2017: 304) provides an example of this, showing a character-origo construction in which the mirative is reflective of the perspective of a character in the narrative.

Hyslop (2014, 2017, 2018) characterises the forms *-pala* and *-shang* as marking egophoricity, with evidential meanings as secondary. It is worth noting that this analysis predates Evans et al. (2018a) and the establishment of engagement as a cross-linguistic category. Hyslop (2018) suggests that the egophoric distinction between these forms is in the exclusivity of information, whereby the speaker claims sole authority over the information with *-shang*. This aligns with the construal of egophoricity as it is presented in analyses such as Modi (2017), Post (2007), where egophoric constructions mark 'speaker authority' rather than 'the self as a source of evidence'. These forms, however, do not appear in the same distribution as archetypal egophorics, in that they can both be used with third person constructions. While *-pala* is typically used in unmarked third-person declaratives and *-shang* in first-person declaratives (Hyslop 2018: 129), in cases where the speaker knows that the addressee is not already aware of the content of the statement, *-shang* can also be used in third- and even second-person declaratives. These forms are more common in situations where the speaker is the patient or O argument, though cases for both second- and third-person-subject uses

of *-shang* with no speaker involvement have been attested (Hyslop 2018: 131). For this reason, it appears that the main conditioning factor as to the use of *-pala* or *-shang* is whether or not the addressee is believed to have access to the information rather than whether or not the speaker is claiming authoritative access to the information. The subtle difference between these construals is that the latter does not necessarily preclude the addressee from access to the given knowledge. As such, these forms appear to be closer to an engagement distinction than egophoricity, not dissimilar in nature to the "non-shared information" marker in Eastern Geshiza (Honkasalo 2019) discussed below. The fact that this distinction between egophoricity and engagement is so thin here is further evidence of the challenges present in typological analysis of paradigms of this nature.

Viewing this paradigm through the lens of the discrete categories is useful for the purpose of an initial description. That is, by describing individual forms in terms of cross-linguistic categories, they can be more easily characterised. The initial challenge here arises when, as is the case here, the forms do not perfectly fit with the definition of the category. This leads some analysts to label a form as, to paraphrase, 'egophoricity, but...' (Chirkova 2008, Widmer 2014), while others use separate terms entirely, as is discussed above with Grollmann (2020) as an example. This is also the case in the Kurtöp example, in relation to Hyslop's use of egophoricity to label a pair of forms whose functions are not particularly closely aligned with traditional definitions of the term.

A second challenge with this arises when attempting to compare paradigms of this sort cross-linguistically, as they do not quite fit into any of the boxes for a full paradigm of a given category. That is to say that by analysing it using the framework and typological characteristics established in Aikhenvald's (2004) evidentiality monograph, one would not be able to represent the non-evidential meanings in the paradigm, while comparing the paradigm to egophoricity as described in San Roque et al. (2018) would not represent, for instance, the epistemic modal meaning of *-para*. While all these analyses, and one in which the full paradigm is explained and discussed in relation to all these typological sources, are of course able to bring valuable insights into the perfective paradigm, in its own terms and in terms of its typology, there is a dimension that is not available.

To specifically compare this paradigm with the typology laid out in Aikhenvald (2004), it would initially seem that this is an A1 system, that is, a system with a binary distinction between firsthand (in *-pala* and *-shang*) and non-firsthand evidence (in *-mu*). Extending this to the rest of the evidential marking in Kurtöp (that is, how evidentiality is marked in non-perfective speech), there are still no further dedicated evidential distinctions aside from a reportative clitic *=ri* (Hyslop 2017: 320), which suggests a B1 system instead. This classification, in which

all 'B' languages have a three-way evidential distinction, on the surface seems to suggest that these are the three options when marking evidentiality on a proposition. The mirative, engagement, and epistemic modal distinctions are ignored.

There is a well-established correlation between the degree of support in the epistemic modal sense encoded by a given form and the closeness of the form's meaning to an egophoric or participatory meaning (with visual evidence being closer than inferential evidence) (Boye 2012: 146). That is, direct or visual evidentials, where they carry epistemic modal meaning, will typically also show fuller positive epistemic support, while indirect or inferential evidentials will typically show partial support. Kurtöp provides an interesting counterexample to this trend, with the copula form *naki*, which is described in Hyslop (2017): 311) as requiring direct evidence, but also low or partial epistemic support from the speaker. The example sentence presented by Hylsop suggests that this situation might occur when a longer time has passed since a given piece of information was witnessed.

The Kurtöp epistemic system has a limited relationship with interrogative constructions. In situations where the verb-marking paradigms would be used in declaratives (in both the perfective and imperfective aspect), the epistemic forms are replaced by nominalisers and question markers. While these interrogative constructions do follow the conversational presumption and carry addressee-perspective meaning, the exact paradigm and set of functions given in 2 for the perfective, is replaced by a separate system. Additionally, we see at least two cases of intersubjectivity in the declarative epistemic marking. The use of the engagement-marking suffix *-shang*, as discussed above, is informed by the speaker's assessment of the addressee's state of mind. Hyslop (2018) also describes the use of the various mirative forms (across the various paradigms of epistemic marking) in narratives. While it is not explicitly stated that these forms have an addressee-origo, miratives in narrative can to some extent be seen as necessarily intersubjective. By virtue of a narrative containing a series of events already known to the speaker, said speaker cannot find a proposition in a narrative they are recounting from memory surprising or unexpected in the moment of speaking, leaving only the addressee (or a character within the narrative) as a possible origo. Speakers report that these narrative miratives create more interest for the addressee, which seems to support this conclusion (Hyslop p.c. 2022).

3.2.2 Eastern Geshiza

Eastern Geshiza is a rGyalrongic language spoken in Sichuan province, China. The language's epistemic system, as described by Honkasalo (2019), has seven

forms in a single paradigm of verb suffixes. The paradigm is a compulsory part of the verbal complex, with forms attached to the verb root after any person marking. It is, however, not always actually visible as the egophoric form is zero-marked. The paradigm is given in full in 3. The epistemic paradigm in Eastern Geshiza is another example of a paradigm marking which spans a number of traditional categories, and which cannot be fully described through a single category or lens, as is discussed again with specific reference to the framework set out in Aikhenvald (2004).

Table 3: Epistemic paradigm in Eastern Geshiza with meaning and closest cross-linguistic category (Honkasalo 2019: 584).

Form	Meaning	Cross-linguistic Category
-∅	Egophoric	Egophoricity/Evidentiality
-ræ	Sensory	Evidentiality
-sʰi	Inferential	Evidentiality
-jə	Reportative	Evidentiality
-wo	Quotative	Evidentiality
-go	Non-shared information	Engagement
-mə	Unclear	Not known

Honkasalo (2019) divides the paradigm into two groups, evidential and engagement markers. While there is a clear divide in meanings, especially if the egophoric form is considered an evidential (a distinction which will be discussed in detail below), they are still members of a single compulsory paradigm. That is, a speaker is still selecting one or more of the forms to use in a given context, and as such the conditions by which a given form is selected must be wider than just the source of information or the shared access of the speaker and addressee to the given information. It is worth noting that the forms do cooccur with each other, other than the quotative, which only occurs independently (Honkasalo 2019: 607). In this case the meanings are hierarchical.[13] For instance, the sensory suffix *-ræ* combined with the reportative *-jə* marks that the current speaker is giving second hand reported information, but that their source had sensory evidence. How this applies to the engagement marking *-go* is not specifically discussed by Honkasalo,

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[13]Honkasalo reports that all combinations of these epistemic markers are possible, though does not give further specifics as to the exact semantics of these combinations, nor does he provide more than two examples.

Draft of February 5, 2024, 17:30

but examples are given both with the suffix by itself (in a case where an alternative analysis of a null-marked ego cooccuring with -*go* would not make sense) and with the inferential -*sʰi*, presumably marking the speaker's own source of knowledge though this is not made explicitly clear (Honkasalo 2019: 593).

The final form -*mə* is given by Honkasalo (2019: 595) as epistemic, but with the specific function of the morpheme not yet known. In some cases, the morpheme seems to mark information as new to the speaker (as opposed to -*go* marking already integrated knowledge), which could be taken to be a sort of mirative, or an engagement marker with an opposite meaning to the non-shared information marker -*go* (speaker non-access and addressee access, or 'you already knew this but I did not'). This analysis cannot however account for all uses of the morpheme, and as such it remains listed as unclear, though it seems likely to be some sort of epistemic marker, and certainly in the epistemic paradigm.

The egophoric form is used in the typical egophoric distribution, and generally requires volition on the part of the marked agent (Honkasalo 2019: 585), though with some limited exceptions (p. 586). It is also used in propositions where the origo (i.e. speaker in declarative, addressee in interrogative) is not the agent but does have intimate knowledge of the agent, and the proposition is referring to the state or habitual actions of the agent. The unmarked nature of the egophoric, as opposed to the sensory evidential -*ræ*, is reminiscent of the egophoric default in Milang (Modi 2017). Generic knowledge in Eastern Geshiza is marked using the sensory form -*ræ*.

Aikhenvald (2004) does not account for evidential systems with an egophoric base, even where they are construed as a possible evidential meaning rather than as a separate category. As such, the closest match for the system in Eastern Geshiza in Aikhenvald's typology is the C3 type system, with a Direct, Indirect, Reported, and Quotative. As with the Kurtöp example above, but perhaps even more clearly, this framework is unable to account for the full evidential or epistemic system in Eastern Geshiza. The question then becomes how to characterise a paradigm that does not seem to have such a clear unified motive, as it is not solely coordinating the shared awareness of or access to information by the speaker and addressee, marking specific authority over a given claim, nor solely giving or expecting a specific source of information.

Unlike Kurtöp, interrogative constructions in Eastern Geshiza are also marked with the epistemic paradigm. As would be expected typologically, the origo of the given marker shifts to the addressee. Honkasalo does not provide details on whether or not the non-shared information marker -*go* is seen in interrogative constructions. If it is, this raises the question of whether or how the perspective of the marker changes, as it is already conditioned by the perspective of the

speaker as well as the speaker's assessment of the perspective of the addressee. It might remain as addressee non-access, or flip to speaker non-access.

3.2.3 Amdo Tibetan

In some dialects of Amdo Tibetan, egophoric markers can be used not just with first-person statements, but also with statements where the subject/agent of the proposition is close to the speaker, such as when talking about family (Tribur 2019). In example (3), the speaker uses the egophoric form *jɪn* (cognate with the *yin* presented in Section 2.1, but transcribed by Tribur in IPA) when referring to a family member.

(3) Amdo Tibetan (Trans-Himalayan; Tribur 2019: 312)
    tə   ŋi   nəwu   jɪn
    DEF 1S.GEN younger.brother EQ.EGO
    'That is my younger brother.'

This is of particular interest here as it shows a social or pragmatic factor in the selection of which evidential form is used in a given proposition. That is, while each form has an evidential or egophoric meaning, a speaker does not use source of information alone to decide which form to use, but also assesses the context in which the utterance is being made in social terms.

Example (3), from the dialect of Amdo Tibetan spoken in rNgaba Prefecture, shows egophoric marking not just for cases of authority by involvement, but also of authority by closeness from the speaker to the subject in a social sense. While it is not given in the example, egophorics of personal involvement use the same *jɪn* form. In other dialects, however, this is not the case. Tribur reports that the construction in example (3) is not grammatical in every village in her research area (Tribur 2019: 312), and Simon (2021) reports in her research area (in Rebkong to the North-East of the rNgaba variety studied by Tribur) that these two form of authority (involvement and social closeness) are both marked separately from non-egophoric markers, as well as separately from each other.

Simon (2021: 300) provides example (4) as an example of what she calls the *ego-authoritative*[14]. In this example, the speaker is a farmer describing traditional breads to a foreigner, who he would not expect to have close access or authority over the information. The copula *jənnəre* marks that the speaker is claiming sole authority over their knowledge, a claim they can only make by assessing their addressee's perspective and knowledge, an assessment which is here informed by the addressee's social status as a foreigner.

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[14] *L'égo-autoritatif*

(4) Amdo Tibetan (Trans-Himalayan; Simon 2021: 300)
     təxe niɕe^F-gə   kore nakko nakko-sək **jənnəre**   ja:
     so   barley.flour-GEN bread black black-INDF EQU.EGO.AUT DISC
     'Barley flour bread, like this, is a black, black one.'

Notably, Simon also reports that *jənnəre* can also be used with a first-person subject, though this is attested much less often. Specifically, an example is given in which a speaker talks about her childhood, a time which she was present for, but also over which the addressee can readily be judged to have no authority (Simon 2021: 302). It is not reported by Simon specifically who the addressee here actually was, though it is likely Simon herself (as in example (4)).

With these forms in mind (and the wide dialectal variation visible in Amdo Tibetan), we can suggest more broadly that even in cases where a paradigm initially appears to have a simpler set of evidential meanings, there might still be a social pragmatic factor that informs an assessment of the addressee's point-of-view. It is possible that this social conditioning on the use of evidentials could be more widespread cross-linguistically. Similar more flexible egophoric-marking systems are discussed in San Roque et al. 2018, though these are not specifically discussed in terms of social conditioning.

4 Insights from an analysis of (inter)subjectivity and perspective

4.1 Benefits and theoretical conclusions

Keeping in mind the case studies presented in Section 3.2, assessments of addressee-perspective can be seen in both declarative and interrogative constructions. While both of these construction types do involve a reflection of the addressee's perspective, they can be seen as distinct in that interrogative addressee-perspective is a reflection of declarative speaker-perspective in light of Hill's "conversational presumption", the pragmatic expectation that speaker-perspective in declarative usage will become addressee-perspective in interrogatives. This is contrasted with declarative intersubjectivity, such as the engagement and mirative markers given in Kurtöp and Eastern Geshiza, as well as the social conditions in Amdo Tibetan, which exhibit addressee-perspective reference outside of where it would be predicted by the conversational presumption. As such, interrogative forms marking addressee-perspective can be seen as canonically speaker-perspective forms that are able to undergo the origo-shift discussed in Table 1. In both cases

here, the forms are marking the perspective of the authoritative speech act participant as per the conversational presumption. It is worth keeping in mind that any assessment of an addressee's perspective by a speaker will be coloured by their own perspective of the matter at hand. As such, while it is useful for analysis to consider some forms as marking sole addressee-perspective (where there is no explicit reference to a speaker's own perspective), it is, cognitively speaking, not possible for a proposition to exclusively reflect addressee perspective. At the same time, as was discussed in Section 1, the Gricean maxim of relevance (or even the decision to act inside or outside of the cooperative principle at all) requires an assessment of the addressee's perspective, meaning that it is not technically possible (or at least very unlikely) for a speaker to completely remove their addressee's perspective. Again, however, this persistent awareness of the addressee's perspective does not pose issues for this analysis as it does not typically condition explicit verb marking. That is to say that, with these two factors in mind, perhaps everything is intersubjective, but only at a level of abstraction that does not hold a strong bearing over the more explicit epistemic-marking systems at issue here.

As can be seen in the case studies in Section 3.2, evidential or evidential-like systems are often more complex than a single cross-linguistic category, and as such they are difficult to represent typologically within the established frameworks and literature. In neither the two examples of 'mixed paradigms' (Kurtöp and Eastern Geshiza), nor in the Amdo Tibetan example, was a speaker's decision of which epistemic form in a paradigm to use conditioned solely by a single defined cross-linguistic category. Additionally, aside from a general notion of 'epistemics', the factors conditioning the selection of forms in these paradigms do not appear to follow a single congruous notion or goal, such as 'encoding source of information' or 'encoding personal authority over information' etc.

It is possible that an examination of the perspective encoding in these mixed paradigms can give insights into their overall functions. The presence of engagement marking or engagement-conditioned marking, as illustrated and discussed in Section 3.2 for Kurtöp, Eastern Geshiza, and Amdo Tibetian, gives weight to the idea that these paradigms exist to coordinate meta-information about a given proposition between the speaker and addressee. This meta-information specifically covers the relationship of the speaker and addressee to the proposition at hand, in a sense not dissimilar to the use of determiners to orient a nominal referent within the knowledge space of the speaker and listener (a function also described within the framework of engagement (Evans et al. 2018a), but which is outside the scope of this chapter). The social conditioning (that is, the speaker's consideration of social structure when selecting a form) of the paradigm of Amdo

Tibetan, as well as potentially in Kurtöp (Hyslop p.c. 2022), further suggests that despite how they might appear on the surface, even seemingly subjective or speaker-origo forms are not absolute, but can also be intersubjectively or contextually conditioned.

While we can look at the declarative intersubjectivity in these paradigms as a factor by which the selection of forms is conditioned, it is worth noting that these paradigms are not entirely intersubjective. That is, in the same sense that not every form in the paradigms marks, for instance, evidentiality, so too does not every form in said paradigm specifically mark the addressee's perspective. In both cases, while this means that some individual forms do not carry this meaning, the fact that the paradigm features these distinctions at all means that, in deciding which form to use, all of these factors play a role even if a form not marking intersubjectivity or evidentiality (as an example) is selected by the speaker.

In addition to the theoretical insights we can gain from viewing epistemic marking through this lens, there are further insights than can be gained in descriptive analysis. As can be seen in Amdo Tibetan (Simon 2019, Tribur 2019), a complete understanding of the usage of evidential forms cannot be acquired without an analysis of the forms' distribution from this social pragmatic perspective. It seems certainly possible that further cases of evidential and evidential-like paradigms with intersubjective and social conditioning could be identified in Trans-Himlayan languages were they specifically assessed for this.

4.2 Limitations and Challenges

Perhaps the largest challenge in assessing (inter)subjectivity and perspective marking in the extant literature for typological surveys, or even in a lot of original descriptive analyses, is the interactional nature of the phenomenon. Without multiple sides to an interpersonal interaction, as well as background information on the context of the speech act participants, it can be hard to assess the extent to which different relationships between speaker and addressee, and different states of mind in the addressee, can have effects on the forms chosen in an epistemic paradigm, mixed or otherwise (Grzech et al. 2020). While this can be reasonably accessible in analysis based on conversation, descriptive corpora often contain large amounts of narrative data, which are less revealing in this regard. Similarly, published grammars less often[15] show the wider context for a conversational utterance when exemplifying it, not giving a response from the

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[15]Of course, many publications, especially articles or chapters discussing a specific topic, are able to give full interactions in examples.

interlocutor or demonstrating how usage of a form can change as the addressee's state-of-mind changes. An illustrative example of an interaction is given in Example (5), reproduced from Honkasalo (2019: 593).

(5) Eastern Geshiza (rGyalrongic; Honkasalo 2019: 593)

    a. e   smæŋa gæ-mdze   æ-lə   ŋuə-go
        DEM girl   ADJZ-beautiful one-CLF.INDEF COP.3-NSI
        'That girl is beautiful'

    b. ŋuə-ræ   ŋuə-ræ   mdze-ræ
        COP.3-SENS COP.3-SENS be.beautiful-SENS
        'Yes, yes. She is beautiful.'

Here the alternation between the non-shared information marker *-go* and the sensory evidential *-ræ* is exemplified. In the example, the speaker notices a girl, who he thinks is beautiful, but he believes has not yet been seen by his addressee. As such, he uses the non-shared information marker *-go*. The addressee, upon looking up and seeing the girl agrees instead using the sensory evidential *-ræ*, as he knows for a fact that the first speaker has already seen the girl and is aware that she is beautiful.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced a number of examples of intersubjectively conditioned epistemic systems, namely from Kurtöp (East Bodish: Bhutan), Eastern Geshiza (rGyalrongic: PRC), and Amdo Tibetan (Tibetic: PRC). These are, in sum, systems such as verbal paradigms marking a much broader epistemic meaning overall than a single category such as evidentiality, engagement, or others, that are also conditioned by the speaker's attention both to their own perspective, as well as to an assessment of the perspective of their addressee. These paradigms, as was demonstrated above, cannot readily be described through a single cross-linguistic category. This chapter has proposed that, as an alternative, a greater understanding of the function of the paradigms can be gained through an analysis in terms of a speaker's attention to both their own perspective, and that of their addressee. This analysis through the lens of intersubjectivity as it is defined in Section 1 is applicable even when only one form in a paradigm clearly references the perspective of the addressee, as that perspective will be taken into account during the process of selecting a form, as was discussed in Section 4.1. As more research in the field focusses on epistemic marking as an intersubjectively or interactionally conditioned phenomenon (see Grzech et al. (2020) for a

discussion of the growing focus on this), this view of these systems falling into a broader *epistemic* category and of intersubjective conditioning of forms occuring across a whole paradigm will only become more relevant.

Abbreviations

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...   ...

Acknowledgements

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