

HEADQUARTERS
SECOND UNITED STATES ARMY
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND

8 JUN 1961

ALABA-S

SUBJECT: Army Safety Program - Report of Aircraft Accident

TO: Director
US Army Board for Aviation Accident Research
Fort Rucker, Alabama

1. Attached Accident Report, DA Form 285 (Reports Control Symbol CSGPA-147 (R-1)), with supporting papers, for aircraft TL-19-D, Serial Number 57-2793, assigned to U. S. Army Armor Center, Fort Knox, Kentucky, that was involved in a major accident on 5 April 1961, and piloted by 1st Lieutenant James R. Jensen, (b) (6), Aviation Company, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, Kentucky, is transmitted in accordance with provisions of paragraph 37, AR 385-40, and changes thereto.

2. This headquarters concurs in the findings and recommendations of the board.

3. This correspondence is marked FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY solely because of the addition of Inclosure #1. When this inclosure is removed, protective markings will be cancelled.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
DA Form 285
Acft Acc Rpt (dupe)

(b) (6)



ONLY

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

X

DA

DIR USABAAR FT HUCKER AIA

CG USAARMC FT KNOX KY

INFO: CG USARMYTWO FT GEOMEADE MD

UNCLAS BAAR-AR 5-16/03279

1. REF YOUR MESSAGE AIBKT-AV 2121 REGARDING ACIT REQ
FOR TL-19D 57-2793 FT KNOX, KY. PT JENSEN, DUD 5 APRIL 61.

2. EXTENSION GRANTED AS REQUESTED. USABAAR REQ REPT
AS SOON AS FINDINGS ARE COMPLETED. TECHNICAL DATA OR REPORTS
NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS MAY BE
FORWARDED AT A LATER DATE.

15 2000Z
MAY 1961

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

1 UNCLAS

NNNN

052UA2221C-050

MM 'RUEADM

DE RUEEPFK 31

ZNR

M 131430Z

FM CG USAARMC FTKNOX KY

TO RUEADM/DIR USABAAR FTRUCKER ALA

INFO RUEPFG/CGUS ARMY TWO, FT GEORG MEADE MD

DA GRNC

BT

UNCLAS FROM AIBKT-AV 2121. REF YOUR MSG BAAR-AR 5-8/03279.

REQ EXTENSION FOR SUBMISSION SUBJ REPT TIL 29 MAY 61. LOCAL
ACTION NOT COMPLETE. EXTENSION APPROVED BY HQ SECOND US ARMY

BT

CFN 2121 5-8/03279 29 61

13/1502Z

5 Apr -

5 729

131740²⁰

UNCLAS

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

X DA

DIR USABAAR FT RUCKER ALA

CG USA ARMC FT KNOX KY

INFO: CG 2ND US ARMY FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

UNCLAS BAAR-AR 5-8/03279

1. REQ ACT ACCT INVOLVING TI-19D 57-2793 FT KNOX, KY
PLT JENSEN, DTD 5 APRIL 1961.

2. REQ CY OF SUBJ ACCT REPT IAW PARA 37a (1) CHARGE 2,
AR 385-40.

10 2030Z
May 1961

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

REPORT NO.

CODE

(2) DA 2 K N

REPORT RECORDED ON

REPORT RECORDED

CROSS-REFERENCED WITH 301

6. DIAGRAM OF ACCIDENT (Indicate vehicles, aircraft, persons, railroad tracks, signs, direction of travel before and after the accident by appropriate symbols. Indicate NORTH by arrow in following circle)

See Tab 6

7. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (Reasons for accident and investigating)

a. PRIMARY UNSAFE ACT (and by whom). Pilot entered IFR conditions with insufficient altitude to assure terrain clearance. (VFR pilot, not a member of the VFR group continuing) If you provide your name or the name of the officer you will have less risk. Your name has been checked in the VFR group continuing. Autocorrected via VFR group's ROLF MUOK.

b. UNSAFE PHYSICAL CONDITION (Or, mechanical or material failure). If any physical condition exists which would contribute to low altitude flying. Low ceilings in mountainous terrain.

c. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 1. Pilot failed to maintain VFR flight before obtaining an IFR clearance (Ref par 15b, AR 95-2). 2. Inadequate and improper flight planning (Ref par 26 b&d, AR 95-1). 3. Inexperience as evidenced by above. 4. Inadequate supervision and training.

(8. recommended)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

(b) (5)

b. RECOMMENDED FURTHER ACTION (And, by whom). See continuation sheet. (See cont sheet)

9. REPORT PREPARED BY (Supervisor, Investigation Board, etc.)

(b) (6)

10. STATEMENT OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL (Whether corrective action is considered adequate to prevent recurrence, recommended action by higher authority, etc.)

See continuation sheet.

DATE
18 MAY 1961

(b) (6)

11. Approved

DATE
27 May 61

(b) (6)

5. Description of Accident (Continued)

The aircraft first contacted the trees on an approximately 180 degree heading, in a level flight attitude, with little or no degree of bank. As the aircraft proceeded through the trees it started to assume a left wing low attitude as the left wing contacted trees larger than those contacted by the right wing. At this point the fuselage started a slight turn to the left. This turn was stopped as the right wing contacted larger trees. Both wings were torn free of the aircraft and folded back, thus absorbing a considerable amount of forward momentum of the fuselage. Just prior to coming to rest, the fuselage contacted trees in the right forward section and settled almost vertically, coming to rest with the fuselage rolling slightly to the left. Distance from first contact with trees to final rest was approximately 200 feet. Altitude of the crash was approximately 3600' MSL. Both fuel cells were ruptured. Fire was confined to the cockpit and engine area. The engine was moved forward approximately four inches from the engine mounts. (b) (5)

[REDACTED] One blade of the propeller was broken off approximately 8 inches from the tip and was found 50 feet from the wreckage. The bending of this blade was forward and indicated power was applied to the propeller on impact. This was the only blade that indicated any appreciable contact with terrain. A black light reading of the tachometer further substantiates the fact that power was present upon impact. (See Tab 3). In attempting to reconstruct last moments of the flight, it was determined from a recording on tape and interviews with Tri-City towers operators that the pilot of the aircraft first made contact with Tri-City Tower at 1847 EST to obtain weather for the Tri-City area. At approximately 1907 EST the pilot again contacted the tower at Tri-City and requested an IFR (instrument flight rules) clearance to the omni station. He further stated that he had encountered VFR (visual flight rules conditions. (b) (5)

(b) (5)

[REDACTED] . The crash took place as he was saying "conditions". The transmission ended abruptly before the last syllable was completed. The pilots watch was stopped at 1909 hours EST.

(b) (5)

8a. Action Recommended to prevent further similiar accidents. (Continued)

(b) (5)

[REDACTED]

10. STATEMENT OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL.

a. Concur in recommendations and findings of the board (b) (5)

(b) (5)




b. Corrective action has been completed by the Airfield Operations to preclude the acceptance of improperly prepared flight plans. Additionally, provisions have been incorporated in the operational procedure at the airfield to detect, and advise aviators of lapse of weather briefings and voided clearances.

c. Corrective action has been initiated to comply with the remaining recommended actions in 8a above.

d. Corrective actions as recommended above are considered adequate to prevent recurrences of future violations and accidents of this nature.

(b) (6)



CG, US ARMY ARMOR CENTER, FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

4. PILOT- JENSEN, J 1/LT. (b) (6) 6th ARMORED CAV, FORT KNOX,
KENTUCKY

PASSENGER- PERRY, H. MAJ. (b) (6) ARMOR BOARD, FORT KNOX,
KENTUCKY.

5. UNK

6. UNK

7.A. ESTIMATED TIME ENROUTE TO TRI-CITY'S AIRPORT 1+35. - ETA
2341Z. 2347Z (b) (6) CONTROLLER AT TRI-CITY REPORTED
FOLLOWING CONTACT WITH R-72793: " R-72793 CALLED FOR TRI-
CITY WX. REPORTED AS FOLLOWS 2000 FEET BROKEN- 1,000 OVER
CAST, VISIBILITY 7 MILES, LIGHT RAIN."

7.B. AT 0007Z R-72793 REQUESTED IFR CLEARANCE INTO TRI-CITY APT.
CONTROLLER REQUESTED R-72793 ALTITUDE, REPLY WAS " CANCEL
IFR REQUEST WE ARE BREAKING OUT." LAST COMMUNICATION WITH
R-72793. TRI-CITY ATTEMPTED AN ALL CIRCUIT COMMO CHECK -
WITH NEGATIVE RESPONSE. TOTAL FUEL ON BOARD 3+00.

8. UNK

9. UNK

10. UNK

11. UNK

12. SUBSEQUENT REPORT WILL FOLLOW.

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
AIBKT-AV	2	.2	UNCLASSIFIED	-

CG, USAARMC, FT KNOX, KY

1961 FEB - 1961

6. PASSENGER - PERRY, HARRISON, MAJOR (b) (6) US ARMY ARMOR
BD, FT KNOX, KY. KILLED.

7. WHILE ATTEMPTING A VFR APPROACH TO THE TRI-CITY APT THE
AIRCRAFT STRUCK THE SIDE OF HILL 4350 AND BURNED UPON IMPACT.

8. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DISCLOSES THAT WEATHER WILL
PROBABLY PROVE A FACTOR, IN THAT THE PILOT HAD REQUESTED AN IFR
CLEARANCE TO TRI-CITY.

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NO. OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
AIBKT-AV	2	2	UNCLAS	

DD FORM 173-1
MAY 55

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961-242-6

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO:

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY AVIATOR CENTER
Fort Knox, Kentucky

LO 293

6 April 1961

SUBJECT: Bd of Off

TO: Off Concerned

VOCG 5 Apr 61 cfm as fol: UP para 45a and b(2) AR 385-40 a Bd of Off is apt to meet at call of senior member thereof four inves and rept on circ surrounding Army acft accdt involving TL-19D S/N 57-2793 only which occurred in vicinity of Bristol Tenn OA 5 Apr 61. Bd will be govt by prov AR 15-6, AR 385-40, and Second USA Memo 385-1 24 Mar 60. Rept will be sbm to this Hq in 7 copies. Pres of the Bd will rept to the Safety Dir for instr.

INITIALS FOR THIS BD

(b) (6)

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b) (6)

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - G1
- 7 - AG (1-Files, 1-Off Br, 5-Orders & Typing Br)
- 2 - Safety
- 3 - Ireland AH Ft Knox
- 3 - 6th Armd Cav
- 25 - USAARMC Avn Comd

FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO:

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY ARMOR CENTER
Fort Knox, Kentucky

LO 307

11 April 1961

SUBJECT: Bd of Off

TO: Off Concerned

VOCG 5 Apr 61 cfm as fol: [REDACTED] (b) (6) A (Weather Off)
Det 5 16th Weather Sqdn is dtl as a non-voting member of a Bd of Off
apt by LO 293 this Hq cs fpur inves and rept on circ surrounding Army
acft acdt involving TL-19D S/N 57-2793 only.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b) (6)

DISTRIBUTION

- 1 - G1
- 7 - AG (1-Files, 1-Off Br, 5-Orders & Typing Br)
- 2 - Safety
- 25 - USAARMC Avn Comd
- 2 - 784th AC&W Sqdn

INDIVIDUAL FLIGHT RECORD—ARMY AVIATOR
(AR 95-64)

1 PERIOD COVERED
17 Sep 60 - 30 Nov 60

2 SHEET NO.
2 52

3. LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE INITIAL JENSEN, James R.					4. SERVICE NO. (b) (6)	5. GRADE AND COMPONENT 1st Lt RA		6. Active Duty <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
6. ORIGINAL RATING AND DATE ARAV 24 June 1960			7. PRESENT RATING AND DATE ARAV 24 June 1960			8. TYPE INSTRUMENT CERTIFICATE Standard 31 July 1961		

9. ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND STATION Aviation Company, 6th Armored Cavalry Fort Knox, Kentucky					10. SIGNATURE AND TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OPERATIONS OFFICER s/James R Jensen t/JAMES R JENSEN, 1st Lt OGARO			
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SECTION I—RECORD OF FLYING TIME

DATE	AIR-CRAFT MODEL SERIES	MISSION SYM	NUM- BER OF LAND- INGS	FIRST PILOT FLYING TIME					COPILOT FLYING TIME					CROSS COUNTRY FROM-TO		
				INSTRU- CTOR PILOT	FIRST PILOT	DAY		NIGHT		HOOD	CO- PILOT	DAY		NIGHT		
						VFR	WEATHER INST	VFR	WEATHER INST			VFR	WEATHER INST	VFR	WEATHER INST	
SEPTEMBER																
19	C-182	T	1	1.2				1.2								
20	C-182	T	2	2.7				2.7								
21	C-182	T	1	1.8				1.8								
22	C-182	T	2	1.9				1.9								LEX-FTK
23	C-182	T	2	0.8				0.8								
26	C-182	T	1	1.8				1.8								
27	C-182	T	1	2.0				2.0								
28	C-182	T	2	2.9				2.9								
29	C-182	T	1	1.3				1.3								
30	C-182	T	1	1.8				1.8								
OCTOBER																FTK-IND-FTK
3	C-182	T	2	2.8				2.8								
4	C-182	T	1	1.6				1.6								
5	C-182	T	1	1.7				1.7								
6	C-182	T	2	2.3				2.3								FTK-EVV-CWB-FTK
7	C-182	T	1	1.6				1.6								
11	C-182	T	3	2.8				2.8								
12	C-182	T	3	2.4				2.4								FTK-EVV-FTK
13	C-182	T	2	2.6				2.6								
14	C-182	T	4	4.2				4.2								
17	L-19A	T	3	5.3				5.3								
18	C-182	T	1	2.0				2.0								
20	L-19A	T	4	1.0	1.0											
26	L-19A	S	1	1.7	1.7											
35	261	RC														
NOVEMBER																
1	L-19A	T	4	2.0	2.0			2.0								FTK-IND-FTK
3	L-19A	S	5	2.1	2.1			2.1								
10	L-19A	T	3	1.5	1.5			1.5								
16	L-19A	T	4	3.8	3.8			3.8								FTK-BWG-CWB-FTK
16	L-19A	S	1	1.0	1.0			1.0								
21	T119D	S	3	5.2	5.2			5.2								FTK-HOP-MEM-FTK
23	L-19A	S	5	2.0	2.0			2.0								
25	L-19A	T	14	4.3	4.3			4.3								
26	T119D	S	2	2.7				2.7								FTK-LOZ-FTK
27	L-1A	S	2													FTK-FLV-FTK
28	L-19A	T	1	0.8	0.8			0.8								
29	L-19A	S	1	0.7	0.7			0.7								
30	L-19A	S	1	0.8	0.8			0.8								
11.	TOTALS THIS SHEET			1377	27			3	47	9	9					
12.	TOTALS BROUGHT FORWARD FROM SHEET NO. 1			65	38			4	23	2	2					
13.	TOTALS TO DATE			142	65			7	70	11	11					

SECTION II—SUMMARY OF PILOT EXPERIENCE

DUTY	SINGLE ENGINE	MULTIENGINE	HELICOPTER	OTHER	TOTAL
14. INSTRUCTOR PILOT	38				
15. FIRST PILOT	142	53	3	3	142
16. COPILOT	11				11
17. MILITARY STUDENT PILOT	202	0			202
18. CIVILIAN PILOT	0	0			0
19. FOREIGN MIL PILOT	0	0			0
20. TOTAL PILOT TIME	355		0	0	355
21. PILOT COMBAT TIME (Includes totals above)	0	0			0
22. PILOT TRAINING TIME	355				355

SECTION III—SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINER

SECTION IV—ARMY AIRCRAFT IN WHICH CURRENTLY QUALIFIED

(Includes check rides, transition, or other qualification training)

DATE	TYPE	TIME	ACFT TYPE MODEL SERIES	DATE
31 Sep 60	C-3	2.0		
21 Sep 60	C-3	2.0	L-19A, D, E	24 Jun 60
22 Sep 60	C-3	1.3		
26 Sep 60	C-3	2.0		
27 Sep 60	C-3	1.5		
29 Sep 60	C-3	1.6		
30 Sep 60	C-3	1.8		
4 Oct 60	C-3	1.9		
5 Oct 60	C-3	2.0		
7 Oct 60	C-3	2.0		
12 Oct 60	C-3	4.4		
13 Oct 60	C-3	2.0		
2 C-TS	TOTAL THIS SHEET	25		
2 C-TS	TOTAL BROUGHT FORWARD FROM SHEET NO. 1	49		
30 Oct 60	TOTAL TO DATE	74		

25. REMARKS (Includes suspensions and restrictions, violations, accidents statement of compliance)

Successfully completed Second US Army Contract Instrument Flying Course No. 61-2 on 18 Oct 60.

Successfully completed the Annual Instrument Written Examination on 10 Oct 60.

Standard Army Instrument Certificate issued on 14 Oct 60. Expiration date 31 Jul 61.

Type of Aircraft	DATE	CC	ILS
I-5			
C-182	20 Sep 60		2
C-182	21 Sep 60	PEX-LJK	2
C-182	22 Sep 60		1
C-182	26 Sep 60		1
C-182	27 Sep 60		2
C-182	30 Sep 60		2
C-182	4 Oct 60		3
C-182	5 Oct 60		3
C-182	6 Oct 60		1
C-182	12 Oct 60		2
C-182	13 Oct 60		3
C-182	14 Oct 60		2
C-182	18 Oct 60		1

GOLF WING COMPANY
AVIATION CONTRACT OF THE UNITED STATESFLYING 6 PERIOD
C-182

NAME IN FWD

NAME IN FWD

Total Fwd	31 Oct 60	25
Total brought fwd. 5	5	X 0
GRAND TOTAL FOR 05		5 25

SECTION II—SUMMARY OF PILOT EXPERIENCE

DUTY 5	SINGLE ENGINE S TS	MULTIENGINE M	HELICOPTER H ST ST	OTHER O	TOTAL T
14 INSTRUCTOR PILOT					
15 FIRST PILOT	191	16	3	2	191
16. COPILOT	32				32
17 MIL STUDENT PILOT	202				202
18 CIVILIAN PILOT					
19 FOREIGN MIL PILOT					
20 TOTAL PILOT TIME	425				425
21. PILOT COMBAT TIME (Included in above totals)					

SECTION III—SYNTHETIC INSTRUMENT TRAINER

SECTION IV—ARMY AIRCRAFT IN WHICH CURRENTLY QUALIFIED

(Includes check rides, transition, or other qualification training)

25 REMARKS /Includes suspensions and restrictions, violations, accidents, statement of compliance

USA & Friends

JCA & ILS					
JO	P-106	L	2	5.0	5.5
JO	Summary of Flying Time	W	1.1		
J2	LITD	2	3	5.8	1.3
J4	P-3 Night	3	Instr	XC	Link
J5	LITD	2	5	3.0	3.6
J3	P-J Local	4,5	Local	160.6	99.4
J5	XC	15,0	XC	10.9	
Total	304	19.5		71.5	99.4
				74.0	1.2
					1.3

DIXIE-SEES

Եղանակ պահպանի մասին օրենքը

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29819745

35 2025 DEC 0

Total brought fwd.

GRAND TOTAL 5 25

S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T

14 Apr 1961

Flying time of 1st Lt. JAMES R. JENSEN in type of aircraft involved.

Instructor Pilot	0.0
First Pilot (TL-19)	27.2
Total Time (TL-19)	33.5
First Pilot Time Last 6 Months	103.3
Total Time L-19 Series	127.2

(b) (6)



S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T

14 Apr 1961

Aviation Courses Attended by 1st Lt. JAMES R JENSEN.

Name of Course	Date of Completion
Officers Fixed WAC 60-3	24 Jun 1960
Second Army Contract Instrument Flying Course, 61-2	18 Oct 1960

(b) (6)

AIBKL-A

17 April 1961

SUBJ^{FCT}: Disposition of Crashed Aircraft TL-19D # 57-2793

S T A T E M E N T

Above aircraft was inspected by a representative of the Second U S Army Transportation Aircraft Field Maintenance, (b) (6) [REDACTED] [REDACTED], and determined to be completely destroyed. In accordance with AR 750-1500-4 this aircraft was considered demolished to the extent that it was abandoned at crash site.

(b) (6)

[REDACTED]

AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT AND MAINTENANCE RECORD AIRCRAFT INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE										1. PAGE / OF / PAGES				
2. DATE	3. CREW CHIEF	4. ORGANIZATION	5. LOCATION	6. AIRCRAFT DATA			11. INSPECTION STATUS							
	(b) (6)	USA TGA	ET. Knox, Ky.	TYPE, MODEL, SERIES	SERIAL NO.		NEXT PERIODIC DUE NO.	15						
7. ASSIGNMENT (Command)				ASSIGNMENT (Code)				TYPE	COMPLETED	DUE				
8. POSSESSION (Command)				POSSESSION (Code)				PREFLIGHT	() APRIL					
9. STATUS TODAY	EXCEPTIONAL RELEASE										THRU-FLIGHT			
1	5	1	5	6	2	6	7	8	9	POST-FLIGHT				
2	6	2	6	7	3	7	8	9	10	PERIODIC	15 APR 61 1543:40			
3	7	3	7	8	4	8	9	10	11	3 FEB 61	1600:15			
4	8	4	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	CALENDAR INSPECTION STATUS				
12. HOURS AT LAST REFUELLING	AIRCRAFT TIME AND ENGINE DATA										TYPE	DATE DUE		
NEW	RECONSTRUCTED FROM PREVIOUS 781-2, DTG 4 APR 61, AND MEMORY										PO	11 APR 61		
TIME SINCE NEW OR REFUELLED	AIRCRAFT	ENGINE NO.1	ENGINE NO.2	ENGINE NO.3	ENGINE NO.4	ENGINE NO.5	ENGINE NO.6	ENGINE NO.7	ENGINE NO.8	SPN	PE	4 APR 61+60		
TIME TODAY	1533:40	332:20												
TOTAL TIME														
OIL CHANGE DUE	330:30										(b) (6)			
TOTAL GROUND AND TAXI TIME	357:20													
14. PREV. IN FLYING MOTOR BURNED TIME	PREV. TODAY										NUMBER OF CLUTCH ENGAGEMENTS (Helicopter)	PREVIOUS TODAY		
TOTAL											TOTAL			
15. JET ENGINE HOT STARTS	PREVIOUS													
	TODAY													
	TOTAL													
16. MAXIMUM														
FUEL (Gallons)	80/87	OCTANE	SERVICED	IN TANKS	NO.1	NO.2	NO.3	NO.4	NO.5	NO.6	NO.7	NO.8	17. SERVICED	20. OXYGEN CHECKED
SERVICE NO.	80/87		42	9	SER. IN	SER. IN	SER. IN	SER. IN	SER. IN	SER. IN	SER. IN	SER. IN	BY	STATION
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INFO COPY ONLY

**AIRCRAFT FLIGHT REPORT AND MAINTENANCE RECORD
DELAYED CORRECTION DISCREPANCY LIST**

AIRCRAFT TYPE	TF-19D
---------------	--------

SERIAL NO.
59-2793

MEDICAL REPORT OF AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT

Use this form in accordance with AF Reg. 62-14 and AF Manual 62-5, "Aircraft Accident Prevention-Investigation-Reporting." Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s) and identify by proper section letter and subsection number.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. BASE INVESTIGATING ACCIDENT Fort Knox, Kentucky	2. ASSIGNED BASE OF AIRCRAFT Fort Knox, Kentucky	3. APPROXIMATE DISTANCE OF ACCIDENT FROM INVESTIGATING BASE (Miles) <u>185</u>	
4. PLACE OF ACCIDENT Elizabethton, Tenn.	5. AIRCRAFT TYPE, MODEL, SERIES SERIAL NUMBER TL 19D	6. TIME OF ACCIDENT (local) 1908 EST	7. DATE OF ACCIDENT 5 Apr 61

8. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF FACTORS AND EVENTS LEADING TO ACCIDENT

A/C departed Ft Knox 1606 for Knoxville, Tenn. At London, Ky. radioed position report. At Tri-City Apt, Tenn. radioed for weather. 17 minutes later radioed for IFR clearance to Tri-City - weather had deteriorated - time 07 - Time pilot's watch stopped 09 - Evidently had flown into mountain.

Section B—EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT STRUCTURES (USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

1. FIXED SEATS: Nr. <u>2</u> Nr. occupied <u>2</u> Nr. failed <u>?</u>	6. PROTECTIVE HELMET: Available to all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u>X</u> Type (e. g. P-1, P-1A, P-3, etc.) <u>APH 5</u> Used by all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u>X</u> Nr. used <u>1</u> Failed? Yes <u>X</u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u>1</u>
2. EJECTION SEATS: Nr. Avail. (armed) <u>N/A</u> : Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. used in downward ejection <u> </u> Nr. used in upward ejection <u> </u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u> </u>	7. ANTI G SUIT: Available to all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Type (e. g. G-3, G-4, etc.) <u> </u> Used by all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. used <u> </u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u> </u>
3. CABIN PRESSURIZATION: Available to all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Used by all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u>	8. PARACHUTES: Available to all pers.? Yes <u>X</u> No <u> </u> Type (e. g. back pack, seat pack, etc.) <u>Back</u> Used by all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u>X</u> Nr. used <u>0</u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u> </u>
4. OXYGEN SYSTEM: Available to all pers.? Yes <u>X</u> No <u> </u> Type (e. g. high pressure, low pressure, etc.) <u> </u> Used by all pers.? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Date serviced <u> </u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Time used this flight <u> </u> Amount used this flight <u> </u> Did mask(s) fit? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. poorly fitted <u> </u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u> </u> Nr. used <u> </u>	9. AUTOMATIC LAP BELT RELEASE: Available for all pers. Yes <u>X</u> No <u> </u> Used by all pers.? Yes <u>X</u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u> </u> Failed? Yes <u> </u> No <u> </u> Nr. failed <u> </u>
10. OTHER PERSONAL EQUIP-MENT (SPECIFY) <u>Shoulder harness</u>	Type (e. g. pressure suit) <u> </u> Nr. Used <u>2</u> Nr. Failed <u>2</u>

11. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal or aircraft equipment details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)

Failure of shoulder harness
Rupture of both fuel cells

12. SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE DAMAGE TO			
Cockpit IN CINERATED			
Seats, shoulder harness, safety belt	INCINERATED		
Crew stations (other than cockpit)	INCINERATED		
Emergency exits, hatches, canopies	INCINERATED		
Passenger cabin	INCINERATED		

Section C—PERSONNEL INVOLVED—(Note: List all personnel aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident including passengers)

¹Use following code numbers and letters for position of body: Seated (1); Standing (2); Prone (3); Supine (4); Crouched (5); Facing forward (F); Facing rear (R); Facing inward (I); Facing outward (O). Examples: 2F means Standing Facing Forward; SR means Crouched Facing Rear, etc.

*** Use following code numbers to specify result to personnel: (1) No injury; (2) Minor injury; (3) Major injury; (4) Fatal; (5) Missing. (See AFR 62-14.)**

Section D—MEDICAL OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

(b) (5)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

MIGRATION

[NAME AND GRADE]

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AFR 62-14 and AFM 62-5. If additional space is needed, use Section I, hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Jensen, James R.	FIRST NAME (b) (6)	MIDDLE NAME	2. SERVICE NR.	3. DATE OF ACCIDENT (Day, Month, Year) 5 April 1961	4. CURRENT RATING AND DATE 3:2 12 Apr 61	5. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Pilot
6. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, Mo, Yr.) (b) (6)	7. PILOT'S AFSC Primary 1980 Duty 1980	8. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DATE GRANTED ---	FOR WHAT DEFECT?		
9. DATE OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING Class I 8 November 1960 Class II Defects (Specify) Deviated nasal septum			10. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT Actual N/A Estimated Explains			
11. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Est. N/A Actual _____ (If none indicate) DAYS IN QUARTERS: Est. _____ Actual _____			12. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH (Indicate 24 hr. time, day, mo., yr.) 1908 EST 5 Apr 61		13. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Report fully in Section I.	
14. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (b) (6)			15. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY Dog tags			
Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)						
Give in comprehensive detail an account of this individual's physical and mental condition prior to and subsequent to the accident.						
16. PERSONAL FACTORS PRECEDING OR CONTRIBUTING TO ACCIDENT:						
Give a narrative statement concerning individual's ability or competence (experience), his mental orientation for the flight concerned and the presence or absence of any physical, physiological, or psychological adversities (anxiety, fatigue, medication, etc.). If applicable, include comment concerning any action on the part of supervisors, tower personnel and others which may have had a bearing on the individual's performance. (b) (6)						

SECTION C—PERSONAL EQUIPMENT

<p>18. OXYGEN MASK: Available? Yes <u>N/A</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No _____ Type (e.g. A-13, Pressure demand, etc.) _____ Did mask fit properly? Yes _____ No _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>	<p>22. PRESSURE SUIT: Available? Yes <u>N/A</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No _____ Type (e.g. MC-3, MC-4, etc.) _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>
<p>19. PROTECTIVE HELMET: Available? Yes <u>X</u> No _____ APHS Used? Yes <u>X</u> No _____ Type (e.g. P-1, P-3, P-4, etc.) _____ Failed? Yes <u>X</u> No _____ Chin strap not fastened or failed</p>	<p>23. FLYING CLOTHING: Specify type worn (e.g. K-2B coveralls, A-11 Trousers, B-15 or MA-1 Jacket, etc.) <u>Suits</u> In case of fire or other environmental conditions such as cold, windblast, etc., include all pertinent information regarding the protection or lack of protection afforded by flying clothing:</p>
<p>20. ANTI G SUIT: Available? Yes <u>N/A</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No _____ (Type e.g. G-3, G-4, etc.) _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>	
<p>21. PARACHUTE: Available? Yes <u>X</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No <u>X</u> Type (e.g. back pack, seat pack, etc.) Back Failed? Yes _____ No <u>X</u></p>	<p>24. OTHER PERSONAL EQUIPMENT (Specify) <u>None</u></p>

25. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal equipment or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.)


Helmet came off head - chin strap was not tight or failed.

SECTION D—MISCELLANEOUS

<p>26. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING FOR OCCUPANTS OF JET AIRCRAFT: Date last course completed (if unk. explain) _____ Command requirements current? Yes _____ No _____ Date last mask fitting _____ Fitted by whom _____</p>			
<p>27. MARITAL STATUS: Single _____ Married <u>X</u> Divorced _____ Engaged _____</p>			
<p>28. POST ACCIDENT TESTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Blood CO (Percent Saturation) <u>X</u> Blood Other (specify) _____ Visual Tests Other Tests X — Rays Other (specify) _____ 	<p>ACCOMPLISHED HOW LONG AFTER ACCIDENT (in hrs.)</p> <p>36 hours - obtained Lactic acid Glucose Drugs Sent to AFIP with tissues</p>	<p>RESULTS (Specify names of tests used)</p> <p>Not reported</p>	

29. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

(b) (6)



Section G—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

1. Shoulder harness failed due to cable tie down with the wing structure, which moved forward on impact. (b) [REDACTED]
2. Rupture of both fuel cells causing post crash fire. (b) [REDACTED] (b) (5)

Section H—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

None

Section I—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

See attached autopsy report.

(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

DATE

(b) (6)

12 Apr 61

**MEDICAL REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN
AF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT**

Use this form in accordance with AFR 62-14 and AFM 62-5. If additional space is needed, use Section I, hereof and/or additional sheet(s) as necessary identifying by proper section letter.

Section A—GENERAL INFORMATION

1. LAST NAME Perry, Harrison	2. FIRST NAME Harrison	3. MIDDLE NAME (b) (6)	4. SERVICE NR. (b) (6)	5. DATE OF ACCIDENT (Day, Month, Year) 5 April 1961	6. CURRENT RATING AND DATE Passenger	7. FLIGHT DUTY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT Passenger
8. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, Mo., Yr.) (b) (6)	9. PILOT'S AFSC N/A	10. WAS PILOT ON FLYING STATUS WITH WAIVER? Yes N/A No N/A	11. DATE GRANTED N/A	12. FOR WHAT DEFECT? N/A		
13. CLASS OF LAST PHYSICAL EXAM. FOR FLYING Class I _____ Class II _____ Defects (Specify) N/A	14. NUMBER OF DAYS RESTRICTED FROM FLYING AS RESULT OF THIS ACCIDENT Actual N/A Estimated _____ Explain _____					
15. DAYS HOSPITALIZED: Est. _____ (If none indicate) N/A DAYS IN QUARTERS: Est. _____ Actual _____	16. IF FATAL, TIME AND DATE OF DEATH (Indicate 24 hr. time, day, mo., yr.) 1908 EST 5 Apr 61	17. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? Yes X No _____ Report fully in Section I.				
18. SPECIFY PRIMARY INJURY OR PRIMARY CAUSE OF DEATH (b) (6)	19. MEANS USED TO IDENTIFY BODY Dental comparison					

Section B—PERSONAL FACTORS (Pilot or Crew Member Only)

Give in comprehensive detail an account of this individual's physical and mental condition prior to and subsequent to the accident.

16. PERSONAL FACTORS PRECEDING OR CONTRIBUTING TO ACCIDENT: N/A

Give a narrative statement concerning individual's ability or competence (experience), his mental orientation for the flight concerned and the presence or absence of any physical, physiological, or psychological adversities (anxiety, fatigue, medication, etc.). If applicable, include comment concerning any action on the part of supervisors, tower personnel and others which may have had a bearing on the individual's performance.

17. PERSONAL FACTORS SUBSEQUENT TO THE ACCIDENT: N/A

Give a narrative statement concerning behavior or reaction of survivor subsequent to accident. (Presence of post-accident amnesia, disorientation, anxieties, etc.)

SECTION C—PERSONAL EQUIPMENT


<p>18. OXYGEN MASK Available? Yes <u>N/A</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No _____ Type (e.g. A-13, Pressure demand, etc.) _____ Did mask fit properly? Yes _____ No _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>	<p>22. PRESSURE SUIT Available? Yes <u>N/A</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No _____ Type (e.g. MC-3, MC-4, etc.) _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>
<p>19. PROTECTIVE HELMET Available? Yes _____ No <u>X</u> Used? Yes _____ No _____ Type (e.g. P-1, P-3, P-4, etc.) _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>	<p>23. FLYING CLOTHING: Specify type worn (e.g. K-2B coveralls, A-11 Trousers, B-15 or MA-1 Jacket, etc.) <u>None</u> In case of fire or other environmental conditions such as cold, windblast, etc., include all pertinent information regarding the protection or lack of protection afforded by flying clothing.</p>
<p>20. ANTI G SUIT Available? Yes <u>N/A</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No _____ (Type e.g. G-3, G-4, etc.) _____ Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>	<p>24. OTHER PERSONAL EQUIPMENT (Specify) <u>None</u></p>
<p>21. PARACHUTE Available? Yes <u>X</u> No _____ Used? Yes _____ No <u>X</u> Type (e.g. back pack, seat pack, etc.) <u>Back</u> Failed? Yes _____ No _____</p>	
<p>25. SPECIAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO OR PREVENTED INJURY: (List any items of personal equipment or aircraft equipment, details of structure, incidents such as being trapped in plane, or any other factors which aided or impeded escape from aircraft.) Shoulder harness failed when anchor points shifted with wing structure. Instrument panel in rear seat struck with head.</p>	

SECTION D—MISCELLANEOUS

<p>26. PHYSIOLOGICAL TRAINING FOR OCCUPANTS OF JET AIRCRAFT: Date last course completed (if unk. explain) _____ Command requirements current? Yes _____ No <u>N/A</u> Date last mask fitting _____ Fitted by whom _____</p>			
<p>27. MARITAL STATUS Single <u>X</u> Married _____ Divorced _____ Engaged _____</p>			
<p>28. POST ACCIDENT TESTS</p> <p>Blood <u>X</u> CO (Percent Saturation) <u>X</u> X-Rays Other (specify) _____ Visual Tests Other Tests X — Rays Other (specify) _____</p>	<p>ACCOMPLISHED HOW LONG AFTER ACCIDENT (in hrs.) <u>36 hours</u> Sent to AFIP</p>	<p>RESULTS (Specify names of tests used) Not reported</p>	

29. ADDITIONAL PERSONAL FACTORS:

(b) (6)



Section G—STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT

Describe fully all aircraft structures or equipment which contributed to the injuries identified in Sections C and D hereof. Include any recommendations for changes leading to prevention of similar injuries.

Shoulder harness anchor failed when wing structure failed. Head struck instrument panel.

Ruptured fuel cells.

Section H—TREATMENT AND COMPLICATIONS

Describe treatment given, i. e., repair of lacerations, open reduction of fractures, etc. Describe any complications and list any significant sequelae.

Section I—USE THIS SPACE FOR REPORT OF AUTOPSY OR FOR ANY EXTENSIONS OF PRECEDING SECTIONS

Attached copy


(USE ADDITIONAL SHEETS AS NECESSARY)

DATE 12 Apr 61	GRADE (b) (6)	FLIGHT SURGEON OR AAF	SIGNATURE
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
LABORATORY
IRELAND ARMY HOSPITAL
Fort Knox, Kentucky

NAME:	PERRY, Harrison, Major	LAB NR:	A-21-61
AGE:	35 years	HOSP NR:	451-176 $\frac{1}{2}$
ADMITTED:	DOA, 1505 hrs, 7 Apr 61	SEX:	Male
AUTOPSIED:	0900 hrs, 8 April 1961	RACE:	Caucasian
COMPLETED:	8 April 1961	STATUS:	USA Armor Board

(b) (6)



(b) (6)




O 3279


1st Lt James R. Jensen
Total Flying Time - 425
This Model - 127.2
Previous Accidents - None

NAME:	JENSEN, James R., 1st Lt	LAB NR:	A 20-61
AGE:	30 years	HOSP NR:	451-177 $\frac{1}{2}$
ADMITTED:	DOA, 1505 hrs, 7 Apr 61	SEX:	Male
AUTOPSIED:	0730 hrs, 8 April 1961	RACE:	Caucasian
COMPLETED:	8 April 1961	STATUS:	Avn Co, 6th Armd Cav

(b) (6)



(b) (6)



S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T

7 April 1961

At approximately 1400 hours on 5 April 61, (b) (6), US Army Armor Board, called to request assistance in getting one officer to Fort Bragg the same evening, remain overnight and return to Fort Knox the following morning upon accomplishment of the mission. (b) (6) stated the Aviation Section of the US Army Armor Board did not have an aircraft nor pilot available. I informed (b) (6) that I would determine the availability of aircraft for the flight and inform him by return call if the Aviation Command could provide the needed assistance. Upon checking the schedule of flights for 5 and 6 April and requesting the availability of aircraft from the Maintenance Officer I was informed that there was a TL-19D available and uncommitted during this period. I then proceeded to the weather office and checked with the duty forecaster as to the forecast weather conditions between Fort Knox and Fort Bragg for the proposed flight. The duty forecaster informed me that VFR (visual flight rules) flight conditions existed along the route and would remain so during the period of time in question. I then contacted the Aviation Command S-3 and informed him of the request and the availability of the aircraft for the mission. He approved the flight request and instructed me to schedule the flight as requested. At approximately 1410 hours I called (b) (6) and informed him that we could take the mission. He stated that per diem funds were available and that I could forward the pilot's name when known so that necessary orders could be published. In addition he stated that he would make the necessary arrangements for BOQ accommodations for the pilot at Fort Bragg. He asked what time the flight could depart and I informed him that it would take at least one hour to locate a pilot and make flight preparations. He stated Major Perry, the passenger, would be ready to go by 1515 hours and would proceed to the airfield.

I then instructed the Maintenance Officer to ready the aircraft for the flight and proceeded to locate a pilot. I contacted (b) (6), Operations Officer, 6th Armored Cavalry and asked if he had a pilot available for the flight. He stated that he did not have anyone in operations at the time that could take it but would check and call back. He returned the call in a few minutes and stated he could not locate anyone for the flight, however, he thought Lt. Jensen might desire to take it but that he was unable to find him. I then contacted the Operations Officer of the 90th Transportation Company and asked if he had a qualified F/W (fixed wing) pilot that would like to take the flight. He stated there was no one available. I then contacted the Maintenance Officer, 64th Transportation Company and was informed that other plans prevented him from taking the flight and he knew of no other F/W pilots in the company that would be available. I then called (b) (6), CO, Aviation Company, 6th Armored Cavalry to determine if he or Lt Jensen would like to take the flight. He stated that Lt Jensen was in his office at that time and put him on the phone. I outlined the mission to Lt Jensen and he stated that he would take the flight but it would be necessary to go by his

quarters to change uniform and pick up his overnight gear. This conversation occurred at approximately 1430 hours.

At 1515 hours I went to the dispatch desk and there met Major Perry and informed him that Lt. Jensen, the pilot, would be a few minutes late due to the lateness of the notification of the mission. He then awaited Lt. Jensen's arrival in the VIP lounge. I then called the Operations Office, 6th Armored Cavalry and informed them that Lt. Jensen's passenger had arrived and was waiting at the dispatch desk. When Lt. Jensen arrived I introduced him to Major Perry and they made final preparations for their departure.

(b) (6)

S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T

7 April 1961

Approximately 1400 hours on Wednesday, 5 April 1961, (b) (6) came into operations (6th Armored Cavalry) asking if we had a pilot that could make a 1515 hours take off to Fort Bragg for an RON (remain over night). I called our Company orderly room and asked if Lt. Jensen was back for duty and was told by the Company Clerk that Lt. Jensen would not be available for about three more days. I then asked for the supply room, the Supply Sgt. told me (b) (6) would be back in a few minutes. I left word for (b) (6) to call me back. I then called the motor park for (b) (6), he was not in either, I left word for him to call me. I told (b) (6) I would let him know if we could furnish a pilot as soon as these people called back. (b) (6) left.

About 1430 hours (b) (6) called me and said (b) (6) had called him for a pilot for this same flight and that Lt. Jensen had been with (b) (6) at the time and would be taking the flight. (b) (6) then asked that I check the weather and if it was below VFR (visual flight rules) to call Lt. Jensen at his home, as he was going there to get his gear. I told him I would do this.

I went downstairs and picked up a DD Form 175, Aircraft Clearance, went back and got the aircraft number from (b) (6), I then filled in enough of the DD Form 175 to be able to get a weather briefing. After getting the weather I returned to the 6th Armored Cavalry Operations Office.¹

I was not in when Lt. Jensen arrived, however I came in while he was arranging his charts. I talked over the weather with him. I mentioned the void time and reminded him to get a re-briefing if he wasn't going to make it.

Lt. Jensen left very shortly after this.

¹At this time I figured his time enroute and saw that it was too long to make without a fuel stop, even with the good tail wind. I asked if anyone had been down there and what was a good stop. I believe it was (b) (6) who suggested Tri City. This was half-way and looked O.K. I put this on the route portion of the DD Form 175.

(b) (6)

S-T-A-T-E-M-E-N-T

5 April 1961

The following is a statement obtained from two Tennessee Conservation Department Employees.

"We were engaged in conservation work in Little Pond Mountain (approximately 6 air miles south from the scene of the crash) all day of 5 April 1961. Weather from 1630 hours up till the time of the crash started deteriorating steadily with low ceilings, rain, fog and light wind. Elevations at which we were working was from 3000 to 3800 feet. We left the mountain at approximately 1930 hours and arrived in Elizabethton, Tenn. There was evidence of low hanging clouds and fog and light rain in that city at an elevation of 1600 feet."

(b) (6)

Certified Copy

(b) (6)



PIEDMONT Airlines

STANDIFORD AIRPORT
LOUISVILLE, KY.

April 11, 1961

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

On April 5, 1961 at 0013Z I was the pilot of Piedmont Airlines flight 305. I reported over the omni station at this time on instruments and reported over the Emmett Beacon approximately 0015Z for a ILS approach. I continued the descent and reported over the Outer Marker at 2740 Feet M. S. L. at 0019Z still in the clouds. Approximately 30 seconds later I began to break out at approximately 2600 Feet MSL with a visibility of at least 5 miles and light rain. I overheard the TRI CITY Radio attempting to contact an Army Aircraft, but do not recall the identification number. I informed the tower that I broke contact at 2600 ft. M. S. L.

(b) (6)

WM/BEP

S T A T E M E N T

7 April 1961

A search of Army Aircraft TL-19D, Serial Number 57-2793 was made to collect all flight and engine instruments that would assist in furnishing information with reference to the engine operations, flight altitude, and attitude of the aircraft at time of impact. The tachometer was the only instrument found in a condition, whereby it could be checked to gather any information. A black light inspection of the tachometer dial face revealed the following:

- a. A few scratches on the dial face between 1500 and 2000 RPM's.
- b. More pronounced scratches in the vicinity of 2350 RPM which indicates that the engine was operating at this approximate RPM upon impact.

A check of the aircraft inspection and maintenance records (DD Form 781-2 and 781-3) do not indicate any malfunctioning within the communication and navigation equipment installed in this aircraft.

(b) (6)



FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Combined Station/Tower
Tri-City Airport
Tennessee

TRANSCRIPTION: Aircraft Accident - Army 4-18 R72793

DATE: APRIL 5, 1961. TIME: 2345 CDT to 0010 GM

Agencies making transmissions: Tri-City CS/T (R72793); Army 72793 (R72793); and Loaf 59 (Loaf 59).

I hereby certify that the following is a true transcription of the recorded conversations pertaining to the subject accident.

(b) (6)

R72793 Tri-City Radio this is Army seven two seven nine three - over.

Loaf 59 Loaf five nine is passing Tri-City at the present time.

Tri CS/T Loaf five nine is passing Tri City VFR at four five.

Loaf 59 Roger - nine thousand - estimating Hickory on the hour and Yaddin intersection next.

Tri CS/T Roger - Tri-City altimeter two minor eight one.

R72793 Tri-City Radio this is Army seven nine (unintelligible) seven two seven nine three on two five five four - over.

Tri CS/T Army calling Tri-City Radio on two five five point four - say again.

R72793 (Signals fading badly) over.

Tri CS/T Army seven two seven nine three - Tri-City Radio - go ahead.

R72793 (Signal intermittent) - weather and ceiling.

Tri CS/T Army seven two nine three - you are breaking up on two five five point four - say again.

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT CONTACT RECORD

STATION LOZ

DATE 6-2-61

AIRCRAFT IDENTIFICATION	POSITION	TIME	ALTITUDE	VFR	IFR	ETOV	NEXT CHECK POINT	TIME OF CONTACT	TOO ATC	INITIALS
R72793	<u>LOZ</u> REMARKS	19	45	X	TRI	55	FTL-J30	2320	TOO	DM

SQUALL LINE ENO THROUGH LOZ 18 MSL

(LONDON ALTITUDE 29,000)

CLEARANCES OR ADVISORIES								TOC
								TOO

R72793	REMARKS	X						2320	TOO
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CHANGE TRI EST TO 0020

(LONDON ALTITUDE 29,000)

CLEARANCES OR ADVISORIES								TOC
								TOO

	REMARKS								
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CLEARANCES OR ADVISORIES								TOC
								TOO

I CERTIFY that this is a true copy of the original which is on file at this office.

(b) (6)

REMARKS									
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CLEARANCES OR ADVISORIES								TOC
								TOO

Description of Accident

1. Lt Jensen departed Gorman Army Airfield, Fort Knox, Ky, at 1600 CST (2206Z) on 5 April 1961 with a passenger, Maj Harrison Ferry, aboard TL-19D, serial no. 57-2793. Destination of the VFH flight was Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
2. At 2130 CST, 5 April 1961, Gorman Army Airfield was notified by Federal Aviation Agency that TL-19D, serial no. 57-2793 had not made its scheduled fuel stop at Tri-City Airport, Bristol, Tennessee.
3. After locating the wreckage about 12 miles east southeast of Tri-City Airport near the top of a 4300 ft mountain on 6 April 1961, it was apparent the aircraft had hit the side of the mountain and burned on impact. Both occupants were dead and were located in the cockpit area.
4. From the broken trees it was determined that the following crash sequence took place: the aircraft first contacted the trees in a level flight attitude, with little or no degree of bank. Distance from first contact with trees to final rest was approximately 200 feet.
5. Lt Jensen encountered IFR conditions prior to crashing. This can be substantiated by his conversation with Tri-City tower at 1807 CST (0007Z), just prior to the crash. (b)(5)
[REDACTED] He apparently crashed as he was saying "conditions". The transmission ended abruptly before the last syllable was completed.
6. The pilot's wrist watch stopped at 1909 EST (0009Z).

Comments of the USAFMC Staff Weather Officer

1. A weak north-south Cold Front passed Fort Knox, Ky., between 0900 CST (1500Z) and 1000 CST (1600Z) on 7 April 61 moving eastward about 20 knots. See TABS 5-k, 5-L, and 5-K. With this frontal passage there was no marked wind shift nor was there any appreciable change in the ceilings. Light rain did start at 1205 CST (1805Z). See TAB 5-G.
2. Rain to the east of this Cold Front extended to the Appalachian Range. Ceilings were ranging from 3000 ft to 5000 ft to the east of this front with the lowest ceilings around 3000 ft in the vicinity of the front. See TABs 5-H and 5-I. This was the reason the forecaster listed the minimum ceilings at 3000 ft south of Lexington, Ky., in section D of the DD Form 175. See TAB 5-C.
3. At the time of the accident (1809 CST, 0009Z) this Cold Front was just past or possibly still in the vicinity of the accident. No weather reports are available at the time and place of the accident. After a thorough review of available weather reports, a study of the synoptic situation, and evidence presented to the accident board, I believe the ceilings to have been zero and visibility zero on the part of the mountain the aircraft hit. I am also sure there was rain. The nearest Weather Bureau Station to the scene of the accident was at Tri-City Airport, Tenn. Their observation at 1800 CST (0000Z) was as follows: 2000 ft broken, 4000 ft overcast, visibility 7 miles with light rain, winds southwest at 7 knots, temperature 50 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point temperature 47 degrees Fahrenheit. The elevation of Tri-City is 1524 ft. This would mean that the ceilings in the Tri-City area were around 3500 ft above the mean sea level.
4. The actual winds at 3000 ft to 4000 ft MSL from Fort Knox, to Tri-City were about 280 degrees at 25 knots. See TABs 5-P and 5-Q.
5. The forecast for this flight was in line with the Weather Bureau forecast issued by both Cincinnati and Memphis. The one issued by Cincinnati forecast "the weak Cold Front to move to eastern Kentucky by 1900CST (0100Z) with conditions lowering in vicinity of the Cold Front to ceilings 3000 ft to 5000 ft overcast with occasional light rain". See TAB 5-L. The one issued by Memphis forecast frontal passage at 2100 CST (0300Z) for the Tri-City area with 3000 ft scattered, ceilings 6000 ft overcast, winds northwest 15 knots, occasionally ceilings 2000 ft overcast, visibility 3 miles in rain showers. See TAB 5-F.
6. The possibility of aircraft icing is remote. The forecast minimum freezing level of 5000 ft MSL was probably about right. With the cold air advection behind the Cold Front, there was considerable lowering of the freezing level in the Fort Knox area, but very little in the Tri-City area. See TABS 5-K and 5-S.
7. [REDACTED] (b)(6), the duty forecaster, told the Accident and Investigation Board that he had briefed the Capt with the proposed flight plan, DD Form 175, on the following:
 - a. General Synoptic situation [REDACTED]

b. Existing and forecast Route weather for Lexington, London, Pikeville, and Tri-City.

c. Existing and forecast weather for Fort Bragg.

When asked if he had briefed the Capt on any Severe Weather advisories or Pilot reports, he stated there were none applicable. When asked, "In your opinion did you use all available weather data at your disposal to brief the Capt?", (b) (6) [REDACTED] answered, "Yes". (b) (6) [REDACTED] was asked if he had briefed Lt Jensen or anyone else on a proposed flight going east after his initial briefing to the Capt. His answer was that he had not.

8. [REDACTED] (b) (6) 6th Cav Air Operations Officer, filled out the DD Form 175 and took it to the weather station to get the weather briefing. (b) (6) [REDACTED] told the Accident Investigation Board that he had entered an estimated time enroute of 3:30 on the DD Form 175 when he took it to the weather forecaster. He also stated that there was no indication of a stop enroute on the DD Form 175 at this time. (b) (6) [REDACTED] told the board he changed the estimated time enroute to 4:50 and added the stop at Tri-City after he left the weather station. When asked if he had checked back with the forecaster after making these changes, he said that he had not done so.

9. After giving the DD Form 175 to Lt Jensen, (b) (6) [REDACTED], by his own statement, did not brief Lt Jensen on the fact that a Cold Front was between Fort Knox and Tri-City. He also stated that he had not explained the entries in section D of the DD Form 175 which included the minimum ceilings enroute, the minimum visibility enroute, a forecast of moderate turbulence, and rain. See TAB 5-C. I believe that Lt Jensen got the impression from his Operations Officer, (b) (6) [REDACTED], that he was making a "no sweat" flight.

10. Had Lt Jensen got his own weather briefing, he would have been aware of the Cold front and the ceilings and rain associated with it. Then as he encountered the rain and low ceilings, even though his weather briefing was no longer valid, he would have been able to analyze the weather situation in his own mind.

11. Had Lt Jensen departed or schedule at or near 1520 CST (2120Z), the time the forecast was based, the weather at Tri-City would have been 2000 ft scattered, 4000 ft overcast, 8 miles visibility with light rain. This is essentially the same weather condition that existed at 1500 CST (2100Z) at Tri-City. See TAB 5-I.

12. On a VFR flight the forecast is for the Estimated Time of Arrival.

13. While in flight, Lt Jensen called London, Ky., at 1719 CST (2319Z) and stated he was VF at 4500 ft MSL.

14. At 1747 CST (2347Z) Lt Jensen called Tri-City and got the latest weather at Tri-City.

(b) (6)

10th Weather Squadron--Det 5
2d Weather Group (MATS)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
Fort Knox, Kentucky

10 Apr 61

Statement of Duty Forecaster at Fort Knox

1. I filled in Section D of DL Form 175 for the flight of the T-33 Serial #57-2793, on the afternoon of 9 April 1961. I did not brief the pilot who was making the flight. I briefed a Capt and assumed he was the pilot. However, upon leaving the weather station he made the remark that he was getting the clearance for someone else and that he wasn't going on the flight. When I received the DD Form 175 it was incomplete. There was no route listed and no stops listed. I asked the Capt if he were going over Tri-City as I wanted a check point to make the wind aloft forecast. The Capt said he was going over Tri-City but gave no mention of stopping there.

2. I based my forecast for Fort Bragg and the weather enroute on the following weather information:

a. General synoptic situation: There was a cold front east of Fort Knox in the Lexington, Ky., area. With this cold front the ceilings ranged from 3,000 ft to 5,000 ft between Fort Knox and the Tri-City area. East of the mountains the ceilings were 10,000 ft or better.

b. The weather enroute at the time of briefing was as follows:

PTK	2000Z (1400CST)	6000 ft SCTD 10,000ft OVC 7 miles winds ESE 16
LEX	2000Z (1400CST)	3000ft BRKN 9000 OVC 15 miles RAIN SHOWERS
winds W 18/26		
LOZ	2000Z (1400CST)	5000ft BRKN 8000 OVC 10 miles RAIN SHOWERS winds SW 12
PKV	2000Z (1400CST)	3500ft OVC 10 miles RAIN SHOWERS winds CALM
TYS	2000Z (1400CST)	5000ft BRKN 12 miles RAIN SHOWERS winds SW 12
TRI	2000Z (1400CST)	4000ft BRKN 7000ft OVC 15 miles HAIL SHOWERS
winds SW 15/21		
HKY	2000Z (1400CST)	7500ft SCTD 35 miles winds SSW 10
GSO	2000Z (1400CST)	18000ft SCTD HIGH THIN SCTD 15 miles winds SW 12
PTB	2000Z (1400CST)	HIGH THIN SCTD 7 miles winds SW 9/16

c. I referred to the 1500Z (0900C) Pope AFB weather and TFAWS which was: CLEAR 7 miles winds SW 12, TFAWS 4/333 62971 //3// in order to have an idea what their forecasters were forecasting for the destination.

d. I also checked the Weather Bureau forecast for the TYS-TRI area and it was as follows: valid from 1100CST (1700Z) to 2300CST (0500Z) ceilings 10,000 ft BRKN winds WSW 15. 1500EST (2000Z) 4500ft SCTD ceilings 9000ft BRKN winds WSW 15. Occasional light rain showers. Chance of thunderstorms. 2200EST 90300Z: cold frontal passage 3000ft SCTD ceilings 6000ft OVC winds NW 15. Occasionally ceilings 2000ft OVC 3 miles with RAIN SHOWERS.

3. Based on the above information, I gave the following forecast for Fort Bragg for his ETA: 10,000ft bKN 7 miles winds SW 10-20. I forecasted the minimum ceilings enroute as 3000ft from south of Lexington through the Tri-City area (the area of the Cold Front) with the minimum visibility as 5 miles in rain. I forecasted the lowest freezing level to be 5000 ft which was in the Fort Knox area. The freezing level in the Tri-City area was above 6000 ft. I forecasted turbulence to be light, occasionally moderate over the mountains.

4. I believe that the weather briefing and forecast were close to the actual conditions during the proposed flight. Weather ceilings did lower to 2000 ft in the TCI area about an hour after the proposed ETA for that area. If the flight had departed on schedule with a valid weather briefing, ceilings would have been encountered as forecast.

(b) (6)

The following area forecast was issued by Cincinnati Weather Bureau on 05 Apr 61 at 0645CST (1245Z):

Valid period: From 0700CST (1300Z) until 1900CST (0100Z).

Area of forecast: Kentucky, Southern and Central Indiana, Southern and Central Ohio.

Clouds and Weather: Central Indiana, ceilings 3000 ft to 5000 ft overcast, occasional light rain spreading eastward over Central Ohio. Kentucky, Southern Indiana, and Southern Ohio, ceilings 8000 ft to 10,000 ft broken variable overcast. Patchy 5000 ft scattered variable broken occasionally very light rain. Weak north - south Cold Front western Kentucky moving to central Ohio and eastern Kentucky by 2000EST (0100Z) Conditions lowering vicinity Cold Front to ceilings 3000 ft to 5000 ft overcast occasional light rain.

Icing: Occasional moderate icing in clouds and in precipitation above freezing level. Freezing level between 4000 ft and 6000 ft.

Turbulence: Moderate occasionally severe at 20,000 ft to 40,000 ft in Central Indiana and Central Ohio.

(b) (6)


The following forecast was issued for Knoxville, Tenn and Tri-City by Memphis Weather Bureau on 5 Apr 61 at 1045CST (1645Z):

Valid period: 1100CST (1700Z) to 2300CST (0500Z)

For Knoxville, Tenn: Ceilings 10,000 ft broken winds west southwest 15 knots. 1500EST (2000Z) 4500 ft scattered ceilings 9000 ft broken winds west southwest 15 knots occasionally light rain showers chance of thunderstorms. 2200EST (0400Z) Cold Frontal Passage 3000 ft scattered ceilings 6000 ft overcast winds northwest 15 knots occasionally ceilings 2000 ft overcast visibility 3 miles with rain showers.

For Tri-City, Tenn: Same as Knoxville forecast.

(b) (6)



The following weather observations for 5 Apr 61 were extracted from teletype sequences received at Det 5, 16th Weather Squadron (Ft Knox, Ky); AND FROM
OFFICIAL RECORDS AT FORT KNOX AND TRI-CITY (b) (6)

FT KNOX, KY (FIK)

0757C (1357Z) 4000 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles, winds SSW 10
0856C (1456Z) 4000 sctd 9000 brkm 7 miles, winds SW 12
0958C (1558Z) 4000 sctd 9000 brkm 12,000 brkm 7 miles, winds WSW 14
1057C (1657Z) 9000 brkm 12,000 brkm 7 miles, winds W 15
1157C (1757Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles, winds W 15
1205C (1805Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers
1215C (1815Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles
1230C (1830Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers
1244C (1844Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers
1257C (1857Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers, winds WSW 15 gust to 24
1312C (1912Z) 3500 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers
1327C (1927Z) 10,000 ovc 7 miles
1356C (1956Z) 6000 sctd 10,000 ovc 7 miles, winds WSW 16
1458C (2058Z) 3500 brkm 8000 ovc 7 miles, winds WSW 16 gust to 24
1523C (2123Z) 3500 sctd 5500 ovc 7 miles, winds WSW 12 gust to 22
1557C (2157Z) 3500 sctd 5500 ovc 7 miles, winds WSW 14
1656C (2256Z) 3500 sctd 5500 ovc 7 miles, winds WSW 14
1758C (2358Z) 5500 sctd 8000 brkm high ovc 7 miles, winds WSW 13

LEXINGTON, KY (LEX)

1400C (2000Z) 3000 brkn 9000 ovc 15 miles light rain showers. winds W 18 gust to 26
1500C (2100Z) 3000 sctd 7000 sctd 10,000 ovc 15 miles, winds WSW 18
1600C (2200Z) 3000 sctd 6000 ovc 15 miles. winds SW 18
1700C (2300Z) 3000 sctd 8000 ovc 15 miles, winds WSW 20
1800C (0000Z) 3000 sctd 8000 ovc 15 miles, winds WSW 18

LONIXN, KY (LOZ)

1400C (2000Z) 5000 brkn 8000 ovc 10 miles light rain showers. winds WSW 12
1500C (2100Z) 5000 brkn 8000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers, winds WSW 12
1600C (2200Z) 5000 brkn 8000 ovc 7 miles very light rain showers, winds WSW 11
1700C (2300Z) 5000 brkn 8000 ovc 10 miles light rain showers, winds W 9
1800C (0000Z) 2500 sctd 7000 ovc 10 miles, winds WSW 9

PIKEVILLE, KY (PKV)

1400C (2000Z) 3500 ovc 10 miles light rain showers, winds calm
1500C (2100Z) 3000 ovc 10 miles light rain showers, winds calm
1600C (2200Z) 3000 ovc 10 miles light rain, winds W 2
1700C (2300Z) 1000 sctd 3200 ovc 10 miles light rain, winds calm
1800C (0000Z) 1000 sctd 3200 ovc 12 miles, winds calm

KNOXVILLE, TENN (TYS)

1400C (2000Z) 5000 ovc 12 miles light rain showers, winds SW 12
1500C (2100Z) 5000 ovc 12 miles, winds WNW 15
1600C (2200Z) 3800 ovc 12 miles, winds NW 10
1700C (2300Z) 4300 ovc 10 miles light rain showers, winds WNW 18
1729C (2329Z) 4300 ovc 10 miles, winds SW 4
1800C (0000Z) 3800 ovc 10 miles, winds W 4

BRISTOL, TENN (TBI)

1400C (2000Z) 4000 brkm 7000 ovc 15 miles very light rain, winds SW 15 gust to 23
1500C (2100Z) 4000 ovc 15 miles light rain showers, winds W 10
1558C (2158Z) 4000 brkm 6000 ovc 10 miles light rain. winds SW 7
1632C (2232Z) 4000 ovc 10 miles light rain
1658C (2258Z) 4000 ovc 10 miles light rain, winds SW 6
1730C (2330Z) 2000 sctd 4000 ovc 8 miles light rain
1758C (2358Z) 2000 brkm 4000 ovc 7 miles light rain, winds SW 7
1830C (0030Z) 2000 brkm 4000 ovc 5 miles light rain

HICKORY, N.C. (HXY)

1400C (2000Z) 7500 sctd 35 miles, winds SSW 10
1500C (2100Z) 10,000 ovc 35 miles, winds SSW 13
1600C (2200Z) 10,000 ovc 35 miles, winds SW 10
1700C (2300Z) 10,000 ovc 35 miles, winds WSW 6
1800C (0000Z) 6000 brkm high ovc 15 miles, winds NNW 5

GREENSBORO, N.C. (GSO)

1400C (2000Z) 18,000 sctd high sctd 15 miles, winds SW 12
1500C (2100Z) 15,000 sctd high sctd 15 miles, winds SW 15 gust to 20
1600C (2200Z) 8500 brkm 15,000 ovc 15 miles, winds WSW 10 gust to 19
1700C (2300Z) 7500 brkm 15,000 ovc 15 miles, winds WSW 6
1800C (0000Z) 7500 ovc 15 miles, winds SW 4

POPE AFB, N.C. (FTB)

1400C (2000Z) High thin sctd 7 miles, winds SW 9 gust to 16
1500C (2100Z) High thin sctd 7 miles, winds SW 8 gust to 15. TFAMS 0/920
6294M 62922 40846
1600C (2200Z) 8000 sctd high sctd 7 miles, winds SW 7 gust to 19
1700C (2300Z) 8000 sctd high brkn 7 miles, winds SW 9 gust to 15
1708C (2308Z) 8000 brkn high brkn 7 miles, winds SW 6
1800C (0000Z) 8000 brkn high ovc 7 miles, winds SSW 5

NOTE: Wind speed in knots.


sctd = scattered


brkn = broken


ovc = overcast


(b) (6)
























KEY TO WEATHER DEPICTION CHARTS



VV = VISIBILITY (ONLY PLOTTED WHEN 5 MILES OR LESS)

WW = PRESENT WEATHER


N = TOTAL SKY-COVER


N_c = SKY-COVER OF LOWEST LAYER BELOW
5000 FT.

h_c = HEIGHT OF N_c IN HUNDREDS OF FEET

• = RAIN

▽ = RAIN SHOWERS






WEATHER DEPICTION

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5-V

06 APR 0000Z
05 APR 1800Z

KEY TO RADAR SUMMARY CHARTS



Ⓐ 1/10 to 4/10 COVERAGE

Ⓑ 5/10 to 9/10 COVERAGE

⊕ OVER 9/10 COVERAGE

+ INCREASING } INTENSITY
- DECREASING }


W WEAK } INTENSITY OF ECHO
V VERY }


↔ AREA OR LINE MOVEMENT (10 KTS PER BARB)


h h h HT. OF ECHO TOPS IN HUNDREDS OF FT.

L h h MAXIMUM HT. OF ECHO TOPS


NE NO ECHOS








(b) (5)



(b) (5)



VOR STATION

EL. 4360', MSL

AREA OF CRASH

EL. 3600', MSL


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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



[REDACTED]

Y

View looking toward
Direction of
Flight






[REDACTED]



[REDACTED] FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY



F



[REDACTED]



NOTE ONLY

REPORT OF BOARD PROCEEDINGS
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
TL - 19D # 57-2793

1. GENERAL. A board was appointed under LO 293, Hq US ARMY Armor Center, dated 6 April 1961 and LO 307, Hq US Army Armor Center, dated 11 April 1961 (see Tab C) for the purpose of investigating the circumstances surrounding an army aircraft accident occurring in the vicinity of Bristol, Tennessee, on 5 April 1961. The Board consisted of the following members:

(b) (6)

The Board was notified of the accident at 1100 CST, 6 April 1961, and departed Godman Army Airfield, Fort Knox, Kentucky, for the scene of the accident at 1230 hours CST, 6 April 1961. The board arrived at the scene of the accident at 1600 hours EST, 6 April 1961 and was met at the scene of the crash by the Flight Safety Officer, USAARMC Aviation Command, (who initially led the ground search for the aircraft). The President of the board was briefed by the Flight Safety Officer.

2. IDENTIFICATION. The type of aircraft involved in the accident was a TL-19D, serial number 57-2793. The pilot of the aircraft was Lieutenant James R. Jensen, (b) (6), Armor, Aviation Company, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Knox, Kentucky. The passenger was Major Harrison Perry, (b) (6), Armor, USA Armor Board, Fort Knox, Kentucky. The accident occurred 13 miles East South East of the Tri-City airport, Bristol, Tennessee, in Carter County, at 1908 hours EST on 5 April 1961. The aircraft was completely destroyed (see Tab G). Pilot and passenger of the aircraft were killed.

3. INVESTIGATION. The Board made a preliminary survey at the scene of the accident on 6 April 1961. The area was thoroughly searched to insure that no evidence was missing. The photographer was supervised in making photographs of the aircraft and the immediate area. The board assisted in the removal and carrying of the bodies and arrived at the top of the mountain during the hours of

darkness, where a helicopter was waiting. Members of the Board returned to the scene of the accident at 0900 hours EST, 7 April 1961, to further conduct an investigation of the crash. Other members of the Board interviewed witnesses and other personnel in contact with the aircraft just prior to the crash. After satisfying itself that no further evidence was available in the area of the crash, the Board returned to Fort Knox, Kentucky, arriving there at 1800 hours, 7 April 1961.

The Board convened at 0830 hours, 8 April 1961 to discuss evidence uncovered at that time and to further plan its conduct of investigation. All members of the Board were present at that time.

The Board again convened at 0800 hours, 13 April 1961, for the purpose of calling before it personnel connected with the mission on which the accident occurred. All members of the Board were present at this time.

(b) (6) [REDACTED], assigned to the US Army Armor Board was the first person called before the Board. (b) (6) [REDACTED] indicated that the mission on which the flight departed was based on a telephone call received from Headquarters CONARC. Although the Armor Board has two pilots assigned to it, (b) (6) [REDACTED] stated that the request for the mission was placed with the Aviation Command, U.S. Army Armor Center. The Armor Board pilots were not available to conduct the mission. When questioned as to the urgency of the mission, (b) (6) [REDACTED] stated that in his opinion he could not say how important it was. He did state that it was important to CONARC since they had received a request from a higher headquarters to obtain the answers to some questions regarding some test equipment located at Ft Bragg, N. C. They (CONARC) were expecting the answers based on a visit by someone from the U.S. Army Armor Board, Ft Knox, to the Airborne Test Board, Ft Bragg.

[REDACTED] (b) (6) [REDACTED], Operations Officer, Aviation Command, USAARMC, next appeared before the board. (b) (6) [REDACTED] was questioned as to the procedure utilized at that time to prevent a pilot from taking off with a voided weather briefing time on his flight plan. (b) (6) [REDACTED] stated that the only [REDACTED]

way to determine this was to catch it at the dispatch desk. He further stated that the tower had no knowledge of expired weather time on flights departing Gooman Army Air Field since the slip sent up to the tower by dispatch did not contain that information. Further questioning of (b) (6) by the Board revealed that while the personnel operating the dispatch desk were required in the performance of their duties, to check flight plans for accuracy, the Flight Plan submitted by Lt Jensen was accepted with numerous errors on it. It was determined from an observation made by (b) (6) prior to the aircraft's departure that the total baggage carried did not exceed 20 pounds.

(b) (6), civilian dispatcher on duty at Godman Army Airfield at the time of Lt Jensen's departure was next called before the board. In the course of questioning (b) (6) stated that he did call Lt Jensen back to insert his serial number and initials on the flight plan. He gave Lt Jensen a Winston - Salem sectional chart at that time. He further stated that other errors that he noted were the lack of a weather forecast for his fuel stop at Tri-City and the fact that the weather void time had expired but that it was too late and was not caught prior to Lt Jensen's take-off. He stated that Lt Jensen did appear to be in a hurry to take off. When asked his procedure in cases where errors are noted on flight plans he stated that he tries to get the pilot to correct them but that sometimes they are in a hurry and walk right out. It was apparent that in the course of further questioning (b) (6) considered himself in an advisory capacity only and had no authority to refuse flight plans that were incorrect.

The Board called (b) (6), Operations Officer, 6th Armored Cavalry Aviation Company. Concerning his responsibility in connection with the flight, (b) (6) said that he had been asked by (b) (6) if any of his pilots wanted to make a flight to Fort Bragg, N. C. (b) (6) stated that after some inquiry Lt Jensen volunteered for the flight. He was informed that Lt Jensen would have to go home to get his flight gear and would be at the airfield in a short while. This was at 1430 hours.

In order to assist Lt Jensen in meeting a projected take off time of 1515 hrs, (b) (6) proceeded to make out a flight plan and obtain weather for him. After obtaining the weather, (b) (6) indicated that he decided that a stop would have to be made at Tri-City for fuel. At this point he stated he changed the time enroute, adding one hour and entered the following in the remarks section of the flight plan: ; time enroute to Tri-City, 1+35 fuel stop of 1 hour and time enroute to Ft Bragg, 1+35. After making these changes in the flight plan he did not return to the weather forecaster to determine if this would make any difference in the original briefing. Concerning this fact, the following questioning took place:

Q. After you decided a stop was in order enroute, why did you not return to the weather station and get a forecast for this point?

A. At this time it was getting late and Lt Jensen had not come out as yet. I don't know really why I didn't go on back down there. Well, if someone had made out a flight plan for me, I still would have gone in and checked the weather. I may have thought he would go in and do this, I don't know.

When he saw that there was a possibility that Lt Jensen's departure would not be within the valid weather briefing time, (b) (6) stated that he called Lt Jensen's attention to the fact that his weather valid time might expire and that he should get a rebriefing, if he was not going to be able to get off in time. (b) (6) stated that while briefing Lt Jensen on the flight, Lt Jensen indicated he knew about the mountainous area, having flown that route on previous occasions. The Board questioned (b) (6) on the status of aviation training for the pilots of the 6th Armored Cavalry Aviation Company. He indicated that the pilots were being utilized within the regiment for duties other than aviation. He further stated that there was very little flight training, technical training, night flight training and ground school training being conducted for the pilots. When asked if the pilots attended certain safety classes conducted within the Aviation Command, he stated that he didn't recall since no records of attendance were kept.

(b) (6) [REDACTED], United States Air Force Weather Forecaster next appeared before the Board. He stated that he gave a weather briefing to a Captain for a flight plan going to Fort Bragg. He stated that the flight plan was incomplete since no routing or passenger stop was indicated thereon. He filled out the clearance on the assumption that the flight was going non-stop to Fort Bragg. He further stated that the amount of fuel carried on board was not entered on the plan. When asked if any pilot came into his office at a later time in the day for a rebriefing for that flight, (b) (6) said that he did not remember rebriefing anyone for a flight in that area. He also stated that he had not extended the weather section of any flight plan for that afternoon.

The Board recessed until 1500 hours. The Board then reconvened and continued its questioning.

(b) (6) Commanding Officer, 6th Armored Cavalry Aviation Company next appeared before the Board. He stated that Lt Jensen had been with him at the time a call came into the orderly room for a pilot to take the mission to Ft Bragg. (b) (6) said that Lt Jensen volunteered to take the flight. He said that this was at 1430 hours. Since the flight was to be an overnight stop Lt Jensen had to go home prior to going to the airfield, to pick up his flight gear and necessary clothing. (b) (6) said that he told (b) (6) to check on the weather and that if it looked bad, he was to call Lt Jensen at his quarters and inform him so that he would not have to make an unnecessary trip to the airfield. The Board questioned (b) (6) (b) (6) as to the weather capability of Lt Jensen. The questioning was as follows:

- Q. You have flown with him before?
- A. I have flown with Lt Jensen on several other occasions.
- Q. Have you flown with him into weather before?
- A. I have flown with him up to, into weather, yes.

Q. On this occasion would you tell us for the record what his reaction to bad weather was?

A. He was flying with me the majority of the time. I remember one flight in particular which we had taken to Ft Meade. This was approximately three months ago in which we ran into bad weather. We were told we would have been between 7,000 and 10,000 feet enroute. This weather did not exist. It actually got down to 3,000 feet just the other side of Lexington and became progressively worse. We ran into a solid front and we also ran into severe snow storms. At our refueling point, Charleston, we had to alter our refueling point to Huntington, West Virginia. We went into Huntington and refueled there and waited for the weather to clear. While we were having coffee at Huntington, Lt Jensen had made the statement "I was wondering just when you would have done your 180".

Q. Were you on a VFR Flight then?

A. Yes.

(b) (6) was asked if he was aware that Lt Jensen was behind in his minimums on a pro rated basis for this period. (b) (6) indicated that he had not been aware of this. It was pointed out by the Board at this time that Lt Jensen had only had 1 hour and 30 minutes of hood time since he had graduated from Instrument School, 5 and 3/4 months ago.

Upon appearing before the Board, (b) (6), a pilot and member of the 6th Armored Cavalry Aviation Company stated that he had discussed the terrain and minimum enroute altitudes along the route of flight with Lt Jensen. He further stated that Lt Jensen had made comments of the maximum elevation of certain mountains including the one on which the crash occurred. (b) (6) said that when he went downstairs from the operations office of the 6th Armored Cavalry Aviation Company to get a drink of water, he saw Lt Jensen at the fountain. Lt Jensen went on into the weather office saying "I am going in to check".
[REDACTED]

Concerning this (b) (6) 's questioning was as follows:

Q. Did you see him after he checked the weather?

A. No, he didn't come back up.

Q. Do you remember what time he went back into the weather office approximately?

A. I would say approximately 1545 sir, or around that time.

Q. Do you know whether he had a 175, flight plan with him at that time?

A. No I didn't physically see a 175, but he did have something in his hand.

Q. But you don't know what it was?

A. No sir, he was also carrying his helmet at the same time.

Q. Do you know whether or not when he went into the office (Weather Office) if his flight plan had been filed or not, and he only had his copy?

A. No sir, I would not.

After discussing the testimonies brought before them, the Board adjourned at 1600 hours to reconvene at such time as the President would direct.

The Board reconvened at 1300 hours, 14 April to discuss evidence obtained thus far. All members were present. It was determined at this time that no further action could be taken by the Board until the typed evidence of the testimonies obtained on the prior day could be studied by all members. The Board adjourned to meet at such time as determined by the president.

The Board convened at 1400 hours, 24 April 1961. All members were present. All testimony and evidence was reviewed by the members.

4. FINDINGS. The board, having carefully considered all the evidence finds:

a. The mission was an authorized one, the responsibility therefore assumed by the Aviation Command, USAARMC.

b. Weather as forecast on the DD Form 175 was a valid forecast for the original estimated time enroute of 3 hours and 30 minutes and for the estimated time of departure of 2120Z hours.

c. Weather briefing as given by the weather forecaster was not received by the pilot of the flight. Weather briefing was given to him by the Operations Officer, 6th Aviation Company, 6th Armored Cavalry Regiment.

d. The pilot, Lt Jensen, did not prepare his own flight plan as required by regulations. The flight plan utilized by him contained numerous errors as follows:

- (1) Radio call sign and aircraft type transposed.
- (2) Estimated time of departure was listed as 2120Z yet he departed at 2206Z.

- (3) Instrument rating was listed as 3-1 instead of 3-2.
- (4) Instrument card expiration date was not entered.
- (5) NOTAMS not indicated as checked.
- (6) Remarks did not list Tri-City as a fuel stop when weather was obtained.

- (7) No weather given for fuel stop.
- (8) ETE changed from 3+30 to 4+30 after weather briefing had been received.

- (9) On board equipment not checked.
- (10) Destination let downs not checked.

e. Improperly prepared Flight Plan was accepted by the Operations section, USAARMC Aviation Command.

f. Although not fully substantiated by facts that Lt Jensen did not receive a weather briefing by the forecaster prior to take-off, the void time was not changed on the flight plan.

g. Lt Jensen was permitted to take-off from Godman field with an expired void time for his weather.

h. Lt Jensen encountered IFR conditions while attempting to remain VFR immediately prior to the crash.

i. Lt Jensen initiated a request for an IFR clearance to the Tri-City Omni at 0007Z upon entering IFR conditions.

j. Although qualified and current in the aircraft, Lt Jensen had flown only 1½ hours of hood time since graduation from instrument school on 16 October 1960, an elapsed time of five and three quarter months.


k. Lt Jensen had not had any actual instrument time since his graduation from instrument school.

l. Since there were no survivors or eye witnesses to the accident, certain factual evidence is lacking to prove beyond a doubt that certain events took place, during the course of the flight and the eventual crash. In lieu of this the Board has, by reasonable assumptions, attempted to reconstruct the flight of Lt Jensen from the time of take-off up to the time of the crash. From the time Lt Jensen took off from Godman Army Airfield, until he reported over London, Ky., radio (see Tab 4), 1 hour and 13 minutes had elapsed (T/O time 2206Z - report time over London, 2319Z). The distance from Godman AAF to the London radio is 105 nautical miles. (b) (5)


(b) (5)



(b) (5)




(b) (5)




(b) (5) Contributing factors were:

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


- a. Pilot failed to maintain VFR flight before obtaining an IFR clearance. (Ref par 15b, AR 95-2).
- b. Inadequate and improper flight planning (Ref par 26, b&d, AR 95-1).
- c. Inexperience as evidenced by above.
- d. Inadequate supervision and training.

(b) (5)



(b) (6)



CAMERA OPERATOR'S REPORT AND AUTHENTICATION <small>(TM 12-257)</small>			JOB NUMBER PO 558	
			REEL NUMBER #73	
PRODUCTION DATA		INDEXING DATA		CHECK
STARTED	DATE 31 Oct 68	HOUR 9:00 AM	BEGINS WITH Accident Reports APRIL 1961	
	FINISHED 31 Oct 68	3:30 PM	'1 APRIL 61 — #266	
TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS 1:30		2		
TOTAL NUMBER OF IMAGES 28 Reports		4		
(b) (6)		ENDS WITH 28 APRIL 61 — #356		
AUTHENTICATION				
THE MICROPHOTOGRAPHS APPEARING ON THIS REEL OF FILM ARE TRUE COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE.				
DATE 31 Oct 68	(b) (6)			