

Literature Review:

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02/02/25

Title: 'Compare censorship experienced in Ireland with another country'

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Introduction

The purpose of this document is to establish an understanding of how internet censorship has and is being conducted. Emphasis will be given to Ireland and Israel as these are the countries to be compared in the thesis, as well as more egregious examples worldwide. In conducting background research, we hope to learn more about censorship methodology, circumvention techniques, points of control and the global situation regarding freedom of information, press and speech.

In collaboration with Griff Steinman, censorship in Ireland will be researched. Due to this overlap, work will be divided to avoid redundant efforts. Therefore, this literature review is less concerned with Ireland and focuses primarily on the historical context required to understand censorship methods and how it is conducted across the globe. A broad scope was deemed acceptable for now.

The importance of establishing a quantitative approach to measuring internet censorship cannot be overstated as users are unaware of invisible content in most cases. As a result, the state has a large influence over what ideas can propagate within its borders. Various open source and community projects aimed at addressing this issue. Notable examples include the Tor project, OONI, Tails OS and others. However, it is coming to light that in some cases this technology is becoming deprecated. In 2022, German police were able to make an arrest after deanonymizing Tor traffic using timing analysis. [1]. This highlights the large dichotomy between what users believe governments are capable of, and reality.

Abstract

Since its foundation, the internet has served a vast userbase that wishes to communicate with one another and seek out information. By design, the internet is a platform that should serve to

provide unfiltered information to users, inaccessible by more traditional media sources like radio. It is for this reason that the increasingly pervasive censorship done by governments around the world is so concerning. Now, more than ever, individuals rely on the internet for ground truth. The thesis looks to investigate this using online data collection tools (OONI probe) as well as virtual machines in the locale (Ireland & Israel).

It is important to make a distinction between censorship and surveillance. Though the two are inherently linked, the focus of the dissertation is on censorship and thus surveillance will only be touched on. This is largely due to surveillance going undetected for the most part, with historical cases having been researched to exhaustion.

Background [From my project plan]

Internet users across the globe experience varying levels of censorship, reflecting cultural norms, local customs and tradition, and government policy. For this project our concern is focused on the suppression of information at a government level. The project is not concerned with CSAM or similar illegal content, but rather how, (and to what extent), a government influences the content consumed by individuals in the jurisdiction. The goal of the project is to compare the censorship situation faced in Ireland against another country.

Analysis of the censorship experienced in Ireland will be conducted in collaboration with another student assigned the same project, Griffin Steinman (steinmag@tcd.ie).

My supervisor and I have agreed that Israel would be a compelling comparison. Reasons for this include the country's complex ongoing international relations, an interesting overlap in cultural norms when compared to Ireland and a detailed history of conducting censorship on the internet. The country's uniqueness and distinct abundance of neighbouring adversaries have made national security an issue that Israel must always stay ahead of. Israel ranks quite poorly in the World Press Freedom Index (WPFI) at 88, further evidence that it would make for an interesting comparison. [2]

Though some censorship is widely considered appropriate, (for example explicit content), there are far reaching consequences on free speech and an individual's capacity to seek out 'undesirable' information when this is commonplace. In the worst of cases, information can be weaponised and used as propaganda. For reasons such as this, it is important to hold governments accountable to the internet experience given to their users.

The data collection will be done using the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) primarily. The OONI probe, originally launched under the TOR project, is an open source community lead project aimed at quantifying censorship on the internet globally. Each probe runs a litany of internet connectivity tests to do this, and thus the project is community driven. [3] Once a large enough set of data has been collected, a comparative analysis will be conducted. This comparative analysis strives to highlight the different targets, methods, and extents of censorship in the two countries.

Ethical considerations will be paramount due to the sensitive nature of the thesis. Running these tests in certain regions could pose significant risk so care must be taken to adhere strictly to ethical and legal frameworks highlighted by my advisor or otherwise. GDPR and privacy considerations will also be critical to the project's successful completion.

Internet Censorship Historically

Experts suggest that censorship on the internet is increasing at an alarming rate. “The majority of countries that censor content do so across all four themes, although the depth of the filtering varies. The study confirms that 40 percent of these 2,046 websites can only be reached by an encrypted connection (denoted by the "HTTPS" prefix on a web page, a voluntary upgrade from "HTTP").” [4] It is also clear that more and more countries are viewing this as a necessary solution to the unique problems they have. Whether this is appropriate or not, it is happening, and users should be aware of this.

Governments have a vested interest in maintaining control over telecommunications industries and public internet use. Whether protecting state secrets, preventing cybercrime piracy or acts of terrorism, insulating from perceived negative influence, aiding in the creation of propaganda or otherwise; a large majority of governments choose to exercise inordinate control over the information available to its public.

As more governments and entities began to engage in this, it became increasingly important to hold them accountable. As a result, the ‘Enemies of the Internet’ list was devised. It contains the governments and entities that actively engage in the repression of online freedoms. This comes in the form of censorship and surveillance. As of 2014, there were 19 governments who fit this criterion but by now this number has likely increased. [5]

Traditionally, censorship involved monitoring a handful of media and cutting undesirable content, potentially replacing this with a message more in line with the agenda and norms of the locale. However, with the advent of the internet, this distribution of information became decentralised and thus allowed for more expression and freedom in the content consumed by a user. As a result, censorship has become more difficult to conduct, but potentially easier to get away with. Nowadays, governments leverage points of control, network-level filtering and many other techniques to block undesirable content. These methods are described in more detail below.

Internet Censorship Methods

Overt vs. Covert Censorship

ICLab, a censorship measurement tool very similar to OONI, released a paper in 2020 describing the need for their contribution. In this paper, the author highlights an important distinction between covert and overt censorship:

“In overt censorship, the censor sends the user a "block page" instead of the material that was censored. In covert censorship, the censor causes a network error that could have occurred for other reasons, and thus *avoids* informing the user that the material was censored.” [6] This is a concerning capability as it alludes to the potential for censorship to go unchecked.

Points of Control

Key control points are nodes in the internet’s architecture that connect a large userbase to the wider network, making them attractive targets for censorship enforcement. Governments and

institutions use leverage these points in order to restrict user access. Some points of control include ISPs, IXPs, VPNs, national gateways and local networks. Institutions will typically use a combination of legislative pressure, technological and economic means to snuff out content. ISPs and VPNs face significant and constant pressure from legal arms to expose user data and manipulate the content available to a user.

Network-Level Filtering

IP and DNS Blocking:

Prevents access to certain websites by blocking their addresses. This was originally used to prevent email spam but is now used broadly as a censorship technique. DNS tampering falls into a similar category and involves rerouting requests to block domains.

Deep Packet Inspection:

This involves looking into payloads and data within packets, beyond its header. This is usually done as part of a firewall defence and involves making real time decisions about the nature of each packet. DPI functions at the application level and can be used to identify both the sender and recipient of the packet.

Content Manipulation

Keyword Filtering:

Keyword filtering involves detecting flagged words in messages and searches dealing with these as appropriate.

Search Engine Manipulation:

Altering the ranking of websites or totally removing them from search results. This is done by companies like Google to incentivise paying for exposure, to censor content for compliance reasons, improve user experience and more.

Surveillance and Tracking

MITM Attacks:

A man-in-the-middle attack involves intercepting encrypted packets (potentially at a point of control), to potentially alter or block internet traffic. Governments have been seen to pressure VPNs into routing traffic through designated MITM servers. Inevitably this allows for selective content manipulation, deep packet inspection and surveillance. MITM attacks are particularly concerning due to their covert and intrusive nature.

DNS Hijacking/ Injection:

As previously touched upon, DNS manipulation involves redirecting users by returning incorrect IP addresses. This is used to route users to controlled versions of websites or block access entirely.

Legal and Economic Pressure:

Governments can enforce censorship directly through ISPs, tech companies and social media platforms by creating new legislation or simply mandating content be removed. This is used to deplatform individuals and movements during periods of unrest. This is also done in app stores, shutting down entire platforms deemed problematic.

Circumvention Methods

State of the Art

Cases of Interest

Arguably, the most damning case of internet censorship can be seen in China. []

Project goals

- Conduct a literature review to identify and evaluate existing censorship measurement tools with a focus on OONI.
- Understand how and why censorship is conducted in these countries and how it can be measured.
- Collect data using OONI and other sources for both countries. Use historical datasets as well as rerunning tools for up to date data.
- Conduct a comparative analysis between the two countries' datasets.
- Consider ethical implications of the research early so as to ensure compliance.
- Set up VMs in Israel in order to establish ground truth.
- Present high-level findings about the two countries approach to censoring the experience of their internet users, make conclusions about the attitudes and values present in each locale based on the data collected.
- Understand more about the unique situations of both Ireland and Israel, and how censorship is used by the state considering this.

References

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