

Does the market model provide a good counterfactual for event studies in finance?

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Abstract

We provide a common framework that relates traditional event study estimation methods in finance with a modern approach for causal event studies. This framework is called synthetic portfolio and is a particular case of synthetic control methods. We provide simulation exercise and an empirical application to evaluate the performance of the method. In addition, synthetic control methods provide a reliable framework for test based on the abnormal returns that overcomes some difficulties in the traditional test. We conclude that the market model provides a counterfactual as good as a synthetic control.

Keywords: event studies, synthetic control methods, portfolio optimization, merger announcements.

1. Introduction

Event studies is one of the most widely used methodologies in accounting and financial research ([1]), and in certain legal proceedings. The timeline structure of an event study, determined by the estimation and event window has not changed dramatically since its introduction in the late sixties ([2]). There are important number of contributions that have focused specially on providing better tools for statistical inference, see [3] for a recent discussion. A recurrent element in event studies is the use of the market model to estimate the so call normal returns. In fact, [3] argues that the popularity of event studies stems from a coincidence of developments in financial market

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11 research in the late 60s: CAPM, the CRSP data and more sophisticated and
 12 accessible statistical software. The author also concludes, that due to the
 13 size of research output using event studies published in the major finance
 14 journals, accounting journals and the use in other fields, the methodology
 15 continues to be popular and will continue to be an important element in
 16 empirical capital market research.
 17 In the field of accounting in particular, and finance there is a recent interest
 18 in using the tools in empirical microeconomics to address classical issues in
 19 accounting research. The claim is that better research designs and statisti-
 20 cal methods, in empirical microeconomics, have increased the credibility of
 21 the implications obtained in these studies. [4] provide an analysis of the use
 22 and potential of causal inference methods in the field of accounting research.
 23 Their main conclusions are as follows: accounting research does primarily
 24 address problems that are causal in nature; there is an increase in the use
 25 of quasi-experimental methods in addressing causal questions in accounting
 26 research; there is still a lot to be done in the field to use the tools that are al-
 27 ready available and have been successfully used in empirical microeconomics;
 28 the authors emphasize the use of causal diagrams and structural models in
 29 accounting research. The potential outcome framework for causal inference
 30 has also been used in empirical finance in recent years. The potential out-
 31 comes are generally considered as missing variables in the causal inference
 32 literature because it is not possible to observe all the instances of the variable
 33 of interest simultaneously. In many financial event studies the researcher only
 34 observes the treated observation. Estimation of potential outcomes in obser-
 35 vational studies is usually performed using one of the following techniques
 36 or a combination of some of them ([5]): model based-imputation, weighting,
 37 blocking and matching methods. In model based imputation, a model is build
 38 in order to predict the missing potential outcome of unit that is not treated.
 39 This is exactly what traditional event studies do when they define the nor-
 40 mal return model as the constant return model or the market model. For the
 41 causal inference literature [5] model based imputation is not recommended
 42 to estimate treatment effects because a proper fit can only be accomplished
 43 by specifying the post-event outcomes. Weighting and blocking use different
 44 methods (being propensity score one of the most popular) to combine the in-

45 formation of the control units in order to build a proper counterfactual². Using
46 the propensity score achieves a balance between treated and control groups
47 in order to estimate an unbiased treatment effect. Matching techniques find
48 direct comparisons or matches for each unit. For a given treated unit with
49 a particular value for the covariates, one searches for a control unit with
50 similar values in the covariates. A distance metric is needed to implement
51 a matching technique so as to assess the trade-off in choosing between dif-
52 ferent units and/or controls. The use of propensity score for balancing and
53 estimating causal effects has already been used in event studies in finance
54 for example [6] use propensity score matching to re-examine the long-run
55 underperformed anomaly of stocks after seasoned equity offerings. The au-
56 thors find that under-performance could be due to incorrect matching. Once
57 issuers and non-issuers are matched using propensity score they find that
58 under-performance is economically and statistically non-significant. [7] uses
59 propensity score matching to adjust for selection bias when comparing public
60 and private equity acquisitions. The author finds no significant difference in
61 the premiums between what public acquires pay for acquisition relative to
62 private equity acquirers (after controlling for target and deal characteristics).
63 The results is a sharp contrast to established results. This small sample of
64 results show that re-examining event studies in finance with different causal
65 approaches can lead to different results.

66 The synthetic control method ([8]), has received a lot of attention in compar-
67 ative case studies on different subjects: terrorism, natural disasters, tobacco
68 control programs. As opposed to competing methods, synthetic control
69 method's strength relies in the use of a combination of units to build a more
70 objective comparison for the unit exposed to the intervention, rather than a
71 choosing a single unit or a *Ad hoc* reference group. The authors advocate for
72 the use of data drive procedures to build the reference group. The synthetic
73 control method is a weighted average of the available control units, that
74 makes explicit: the contribution of each unit to the counterfactual of interest
75 and the similarities (or lack thereof) between the unit affected by the event
76 or the intervention of interest and the synthetic control in terms of the pre-
77 intervention outcomes and other predictors of post-intervention outcomes.
78 More recently synthetic control methods have been the focus of intense re-

²The propensity score is the average unit assignment (for a particular treatment) prob-
ability for units that share the same specific characteristic

search and it is considered as the most important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years according to [9]. The most recent literature has been addressing some limitations of the method: [10] and [11] provide generalization of the synthetic control method that address dimension reduction prior or during the estimation of the weights. In the former the author also illustrates the relationship between an interactive fixed effects model and synthetic controls methods under which Difference-in-Difference method is a special case. [11] also relaxes some of the restrictions imposed by the estimation of the synthetic controls. [12] and [13] propose complementary approaches to perform statistical inference on the estimated average treatment effects from synthetic control methods, these are important contribution because the limiting properties of the estimator were not known for a broad set of data generating process and testing was based on a placebo randomization. The developments of these methods has also motivated by the use in macroeconomic oriented research questions [14].

Synthetic matching techniques applied for event studies in finance are not common, we are only aware of their application in a recent paper, [15]. In this paper the authors measure the effect of personal connections on the returns of financial firms. The study is based on the connections of Timothy Geithner to different financial institutions prior to his nomination as Treasury Secretary at the end of 2008. The synthetic matching methodology is used as a complement to the usual approach in event studies of capturing the difference between a treatment and control group using for the latter the mean return model or the fitted market model. In addition we have an earlier paper using synthetic matching to measure the effectiveness of volatility actions with intra-day stock market data ([16])

In this paper we provide a detailed analysis of the synthetic matching technique, which we denote as synthetic portfolio method. The notion of a synthetic portfolio provided a common framework that relates traditional event study techniques, in particular the use of the market model, and synthetic control method, which is has been gaining popularity in the causal event literature in recent years. A common framework is important so as to evaluate the benefits of new methodologies with regards to the traditional approach that has been in use since the late sixties. We provide explain the framework, as series of estimators and their relationship to the traditional methods and more recent approaches, such a difference-in-difference which is a special case of synthetic portfolio. These alternative methods are able to

117 handle the high-dimensional challenge brought by the large asset space in the
 118 US stock market. We provide simulation results to evaluate the performance
 119 of the different method and provide an empirical application using as event
 120 merger announcements. In addition this new methodological framework that
 121 we claim encompasses traditional approaches provides additional and valu-
 122 able insights to perform statistical inference over the individual abnormal
 123 returns (the treatment effects) that was hardly possible with the traditional
 124 testing framework . This is made possible by the recent work on statistical
 125 inference for synthetic control methods by [12] and [13].
 126 The simulations exercise evaluates how well does each of the method is able
 127 accommodate the evolution of the asset in question before in the estimation
 128 window and also how well does it estimate the true treatment effect. The
 129 results indicate that the performance of the market model and the synthetic
 130 portfolio approach are quite similar in terms of biases and variance.
 131 The empirical application reexamines effects of merger announcements on
 132 the value of the firm in the short run, that is in the immediate days after the
 133 announcement. As in the literature these affects are measured along differ-
 134 ent sub-samples, for example, deals that affects publicly trades firms versus
 135 private, deals that are finances by stocks or cash. The results indicate that
 136 the estimated effects of the merger announcements are similar across the dif-
 137 ferent estimation approaches, both in terms of the point estimates as well as
 138 the variance. In addition the introduction of a feasible testing framework for
 139 short term studies over each individual event provides a more through analy-
 140 sis of the effects so as to determine the cases where the effects are non existent
 141 versus the cases where the effect is strictly positive or strictly negative. This
 142 opens the possibility to explore empirically in a second stage the different
 143 determinants of the cumulative abnormal returns taking into account this
 144 significant variation. Overall both the simulation results and the empirical
 145 application indicate that the market model fairs well with respect to compet-
 146 ing approaches that have surfaces within synthetic control methods. One of
 147 the reasons is that the market model is also a portfolio that tracts the asset
 148 of interest and is able to provide a reliable potential outcome, in particular
 149 when the beta of the assets tends to one, as one would expect. However, we
 150 believe that this is a particular property of the large sample of equities in the
 151 US and that some of these results might not be true in markets with very
 152 few liquid trades stocks where the synthetic portfolio approach might be a

153 better option³. This is a subject of further research.
 154 The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 discusses how the potential out-
 155 come approach can be introduced to the traditional event studies approach.
 156 Section 3 presents the synthetic portfolio approach. Section 4 presents the
 157 simulation exercise and the results comparing synthetic portfolio to tradi-
 158 tional event studies. Section 5 discuss the data and empirical applications
 159 for merger announcements and seasoned equity offerings. Finally, Section 6
 160 concludes.

161 2. Potential outcomes in event studies

162 Traditional Event studies in finance have a standard setup in terms of
 163 the the time leading up to the event and the outcome variable of interest, in
 164 many cases the holding period returns of the stock. Let $t = T_0$ denote the
 165 moment of time when the event takes place. If we are performing an event
 166 study on daily returns then is is customary to define the event window as
 167 an interval around the event $[T_0 - d, T_0 + d]$ where d denotes the number of
 168 days around the event. For short term event studies d is usually 10, 5 or 1
 169 day(s). Accounting for a gap between the event window and the estimation
 170 window is also recommended. The reason for the gap is that noisy infor-
 171 mation regarding the event might become available to market participants
 172 some days before and therefore the stock price could start to deviate from
 173 some "normal" behavior in the month before the event. The gap is around a
 174 month, m , or two before the event window $[T_0 - d - m, T_0 - d]$. The estima-
 175 tion window has usually a length of one year (250 days to approximate the
 176 number of days in a calendar year) of market returns before the start of the
 177 gap window. To avoid any confusing notation from this point on we will con-
 178 sider two excluding time intervals (figure B.1): the estimation window $[T_1, T_3]$
 179 and the event window $[T_4, T_5]$. Note that the event window is centered in
 180 the actual time of the event. For completeness the gap is the interval (T_3, T_4) .

181
 182 A recurrent element in event studies is the use of the market model to
 183 estimate the so call normal returns. Let $R_{1,t}$ denote the holding period
 184 returns of the stock price of the firm that is affected by the event (without

³One of the complications of stock markets with very few assets is the over represen-
 tation of one or more assets in the market index. This creates an endogeneity problem in
 the process of estimation a counterfactual using the market model, see [16].

185 loss of generality firm 1 is the only firm affected by the event). There is
186 no formal definition for the "normal" returns, however the implementation
187 of an event study requires the researcher to disentangle the effects of two
188 types of information on stock prices ([17]): the information that is specific
189 to a firm (the event) and the information that is likely to affect stock prices
190 marketwide (or a subset of interchangeable stocks). The disentanglement
191 requires a way to control for the latter using the "normal" expected behavior
192 of returns. In traditional event studies the most common approach to define
193 the normal returns, is to use a market model or another factor model (Fama-
194 French three factor or Carhart four factor model) ⁴. In finance, factor models
195 are used in many application, and although there is an extensive literature,
196 there is also an important discussion on the validity of the factors used to
197 explain the cross section of returns ([18]). Event studies consider mainly the
198 one factor market model.

$$R_{1,t} = \hat{\alpha}_i - \hat{\beta}_i R_{m,t}, t \in [T_1, T_3] \quad (1)$$

199 where $R_{m,t}$ denotes the market return. The parameters of the market model
200 are estimated using the information from the estimation window.
201 In traditional event studies ([19]), the effect of a particular event on a stockss
202 price is measured by the abnormal returns (ARs).

$$AR_{1,t} = R_{1,t} - E[R_{1,t}|R_{m,t}], t \in [T_4, T_5] \quad (2)$$

203 where $R_{1,t}$ is the actual return and $E[R_{1,t}|R_{m,t}]$ is the expected normal return.
204 In the market model, the normal return is given by, $E[R_{1,t} | R_{m,t}] = \hat{R}_{1,t}$,
205 therefore the expected return is the fitted value obtained in 1. The abnor-
206 mal returns measure the effect of the event on the return of the firm that
207 have been affected by that particular event⁵. Therefore the notion of normal
208 returns tries to measure the expected behavior of the returns in the absence
209 of the event.

210

⁴Another approach is the the constant mean model where the normal return is the time-series average return over the estimation window

⁵Abnormal returns can also be interpreted as the event-adjusted performance of a particular stock, that is, the difference between the observed performance and the "normal" expected performance. This definition is more closely related to the calendar-time approach used to investigate events of financial relevance.

211 In order to determine a causal impact of the event on the performance
 212 of the stock, first, we must see the "normal" expected as a mechanism to
 213 provide a measure of the expected behavior of the returns in the absence of
 214 the event and hence, the market model is a framework that provides a model
 215 based potential outcome. Second, if we note that event studies in finance are
 216 observational studies rather than perfectly randomized experiments, then we
 217 can use the potential outcome approach (also known as the Rubin Causal
 218 Model) to come up with an identification strategy for causal event studies.
 219 One of the key insights of the Rubin Causal Model is to think of potential
 220 outcomes as missing variables. In the event study we observe the returns
 221 before the event in the estimation window, but in the event window we only
 222 observed the returns that are already affected by the event $R_{1,t}^I := R_{1,t}$ for
 223 $t \in [T_4, T_5]$. This is equivalent to the notion that the stock price of firm
 224 1 in the event window is subject to a treatment and the treatment is the
 225 event. For example, if the event is a merger announcement then there are
 226 two firms directly affected by this event the acquiring firm and the target firm
 227 (for simplicity let firm 1 be only the acquire firm). Once the announcement
 228 happens or the event then we cannot observe the state of the world where
 229 this event did not take place, therefore the missing potential outcome is $R_{1,t}^N$;
 230 that is the returns of firm 1 in the event window if the event had not taken
 231 place. The effect of the event (or treatment) will be equivalent to the notion
 232 of abnormal returns,

$$AR_{1,t} = R_{1,t} - R_{1,t}^N, t \in [T_4, T_5] \quad (3)$$

233 As mentioned in the introduction the causal inference literature provides
 234 various identification strategies to estimate causal effects using the potential
 235 outcomes approach (see [9], for a recent survey) we will now only focus on
 236 synthetic matching techniques base on the synthetic control method proposed
 237 in [8].

238 3. Synthetic portfolio

239 In the potential outcome approach we have units of analysis that are
 240 partitioned into a treatment and a control group; borrowing an ideal exper-
 241 imental setup from randomized control trials. For financial event studies we
 242 consider one firm that is affected by an event and the outcome variable, over
 243 which we want to measure the effect of the event is the returns of the stock

244 of that firm. In addition we have a larger universe of stocks for other firms
 245 (other units of analysis) that are trading at the same time. These other firms
 246 as long as they are not directly or indirectly affected by the event of interest
 247 can be used to create a control group of firms. The fact that the firms in the
 248 control group are not affected by the event of interest is very important as-
 249 sumption in the potential outcome framework. The methodology we propose
 250 is to use the returns of the firms in the control group to build a synthetic
 251 portfolio and use the returns of this portfolio as a potential outcome or a
 252 measure of the "normal" returns; that is the returns that we would observe
 253 had the event not taken place.

254 We arrive at this synthetic portfolio by applying synthetic control methods
 255 introduced by [8] to the problem at hand. The authors propose a weighted
 256 average of the units of analysis in the control group as a way to come up with
 257 a synthetic counterfactual. The weights are obtained by using a minimum
 258 distance estimator applied to a series of restrictions on the outcome variable
 259 and a set of exogenous variables.

260 Again we let $R_{1,t}$ denote the return of the stock of interest where we want to
 261 measure the effect of the event (the stock that has been treated). Conversely,
 262 the synthetic portfolio is built using the other stocks (that are not involved
 263 in a similar event and that are trading during the same days) to replicate
 264 the performance of the security of interest. These set of stocks make up the
 265 control group, $(R_{2,t}, \dots, R_{J,t})$. The methodology is very simple since we only
 266 need to estimate w_j^* required to estimate the effect of the intervention by
 267 solving the optimal tracking problem. Therefore we have to solve,

$$\underset{w}{\text{minimize}} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} \left(R_{1,t} - \sum_{j=2}^J w_j R_{j,t} \right)^2 \quad (4)$$

268 for the estimation window $t \in [T_1, T_3]$. It is possible to include in this
 269 optimization problem restrictions on the estimated weights, for example non-
 270 negativity constraints ($w_j \geq 0, j = 2, \dots, J$), constant weights ($w_j = \bar{w}, j =$
 271 $2, \dots, J$) or that the weights sum to one ($\sum_{j=1}^J w_j = 1$). A proper tracking of
 272 the stock of interest $R_{1,t}$ in the estimation window $[T_1, T_3]$ would guarantee
 273 that the synthetic portfolio can provide a potential outcome for the latent
 274 variable $R_{1,t}^N$ in the event window $[T_4, T_5]$. The goodness of fit of the matching
 275 can be established by estimating the Mean Square Error in-sample in the
 276 estimation window, or out-of-sample by splitting the estimation window into
 277 a training $[T_1, T_2]$ and a testing window $[T_2, T_3]$ (figure B.2). In traditional

278 events studies goodness of fit is not explicitly mentioned, although inference
 279 on the cumulative abnormal returns in the estimation window is considered.
 280 The effect of the intervention is equivalent to the abnormal returns of the
 281 asset of interest,

$$\hat{\alpha}_{1,t} = AR_{1,t} = R_{1,t} - R_{1,t}^N = R_{1,t} - \sum_{j=2}^J w_j^* R_{j,t}, t \in [T_4, T_5] \quad (5)$$

282 The optimization problem formulated in expression 4 provides a initial pro-
 283 posal for a a synthetic matching technique. However, this approach is only
 284 feasible if the the number of stocks in the control group are of moderate
 285 size with respect to the size of the estimation window (the number of pre-
 286 treatment outcomes) $J \ll T_3 - T_1$. In other words we need sufficient time
 287 series observations to be able to estimate the J -dimensional vector of port-
 288 folio weights. If the requirement is not met then we have overdetermined
 289 system, more weights than observations. In addition, even if the size of the
 290 control group of stocks is reasonable the un-restricted optimization problem
 291 could favor solutions where there is larger extrapolation effect in the tracking
 292 performance of the portfolio than we would desire. [8] already mention the
 293 risk of excessive extrapolation when using synthetic control method. The au-
 294 thors suggest that the optimization problem used to find the optimal weights
 295 incorporate restrictions so as to avoid excessive extrapolation. Therefore in
 296 their method they restrict to non-negative weights and that the weights have
 297 to sum to one. In addition they use exogenous variables for the treated vari-
 298 able and the control group variables so as to match the behavior of the unit
 299 of interest to the behavior of the control set not only on the dimension of the
 300 variable of interest but also on the other exogenous variables. This approach
 301 has some similarities the propensity score based matching as a way to bal-
 302 ance estimated causal effect ([5]). Although, synthetic control methods could
 303 provide a solution to the extrapolation problem we still have to deal with the
 304 large dimensional problem that we face when we use a high dimensional asset
 305 space for the control group. This is precisely the case when we look at event
 306 studies in the US stock market where we have historical information on more
 307 than 5,000 stocks for building a control group.

308 High-dimensional problems are not new in portfolio optimization an there a
 309 couple of techniques that we explore to deal with both the high-dimensional
 310 issues but also the extrapolation problems.

311 Traditional optimal portfolio problems are formulated explicitly using the

trade-off between return and risk, that is the mean-variance problem ([20]).

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{w}{\text{minimize}} && \frac{1}{2} V_t[\mathbf{R}_{p,t+1}] = \mathbf{w}' \Sigma \mathbf{w}, \\ & \text{subject to} && E_t[R_{p,t+1}] = w' \mu = \mu_p \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

where μ_p is the target expected portfolio return and Σ is the variance covariance matrix of the universe of expected returns, μ . The optimization problem has a tractable analytical solution

$$\mathbf{w}^* = \frac{\mu_p}{\mu' \Sigma^{-1} \mu} \Sigma^{-1} \mu \quad (7)$$

Well documented ill-posed problems arise when we plug-in the sample counterparts of μ and Σ , for medium to large size problems in terms of the number of assets considered. Many regularization techniques have been proposed to deal with this problem ([21]; [22]; [23]; [24]). The use of regularization techniques also point to different ways to writing up the optimization problem that will be specially useful to the synthetic portfolio framework ([25]). We can write the variance covariance matrix as the outer product of the returns, and squared first moment, $\Sigma = E[\mathbf{R}_t \mathbf{R}_t'] - \mu \mu'$. Then the empirical counterpart of the expectation of the mean-variance problem is equivalent to the sample mean of the squared l_2 norm,

$$\begin{aligned} & \underset{w}{\text{minimize}} && E[|\mu_p - \mathbf{w}' \mathbf{R}|^2] \\ & && \frac{1}{T} \|\mu_p \mathbf{1}_T - w' R\|_2^2 \\ & \text{subject to} && E_t[R_{p,t+1}] = w' \mu = \mu_p \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

This same setup can be used to find a solution for the optimal tracking problem as a special case of the optimal portfolio problem where instead of targeting a particular return (scalar) for the portfolio μ_p we are interested in tracking over time a particular stock, in our case the first stock in the asset space, $R_{1,t}$. Let $\mu_p \mathbf{1}_T := R_{1,t}$ and $\mathbf{R} := [R_{2,t}, \dots, R_{J,t}]$ denote the subspace of assets that excludes asset 1, then we get the optimal tracking problem in expression 4. This optimization problem is not very different from minimizing the sums of square residuals if we let, $Y := R_{1,t}$ and $X' \beta := \mathbf{R}'_{\forall j \neq 1} w$, then we can use ordinary least squares to obtain the portfolio weights. This is a first step toward one solution to the high-dimensional problem by applying regularization to the optimization problem. The least absolute shrinkage and

selection operator (LASSO) regularization technique introduced by [26] is the l_1 -penalized version of the optimal tracking problem that gives the solution to the synthetic portfolio. The Lasso regularized solution is obtained by solving,

$$\underset{w}{\text{minimize}} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} \left(R_{1,t} - \sum_{j=2}^J w_j R_{j,t} \right)^2 + \tau \sum_{j=2}^J |w_j| \quad (9)$$

The optimization problem for LASSO provides a long-only portfolios $w_i \geq 0$ or impose an specific penalty (τ) only in the short positions (Brodie et al. 2009). This solution has been recently explored in [11] for a generalization of synthetic control methods. The authors propose the use of LASSO and Elastic net as a way to generalize synthetic control methods. This generalization looks into regularization techniques as a way to improve on the original approach proposed by [8] both in terms on the restrictions on the weights and the introduction of exogenous covariates. The authors propose a class of estimators that can be used depending on the size of the estimation window $T_3 - T_1$ (the number of pre-treatment outcomes) and the number of stocks in the control group J . In other words theses estimators leverage the use of regularization methods and restrictions in the optimization/estimation problem to deal with the challenges of a high-dimensional problem. They proposed an elastic net type penalty for regularization,

$$\underset{w}{\text{minimize}} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} \left(R_{1,t} - \sum_{j=2}^J w_j R_{j,t} \right)^2 + \tau \left(\frac{1-\alpha}{2} \sum_{j=2}^J w_j^2 + \alpha \sum_{j=2}^J |w_j| \right) \quad (10)$$

The elastic net is a regularized regression method that linearly combines the l_1 and l_2 penalties of the lasso and ridge methods. In addition to the penalty τ we introduce a parameter for the optimal linear combination α . Therefore, in this case we have two tuning parameters (τ, α) . The authors illustrate the methods using the data for three seminal studies in causal inference.

Finally, since in portfolio optimization it is important to compare any methods to a computationally inexpensive benchmark we can define a naive synthetic portfolio as the solution to the optimization problem where the weights are constant (and sum up to 1) across the members in the control group, $w_j = \bar{w} := \frac{1}{J-1}, j = 2, \dots, J$. The effect of the intervention is the

366 (naive) abnormal returns,

$$\hat{\alpha}_{1,t}^{\bar{w}} = AR_{1,t} = R_{1,t} - R_{1,t}^{\bar{w}} = R_{1,t} - \frac{1}{J-1} \sum_{j=2}^J R_{j,t}, t \in [T_4, T_5] \quad (11)$$

367 The naive synthetic portfolio is the cross sectional simple average of all of
 368 the available stock that are not affected by the event. The naive synthetic
 369 portfolio can be seen as a special case of the difference-in-difference method
 370 (DID). The average cumulative abnormal returns is the simple time average
 371 of the estimated abnormal returns over the event window for the firm affected
 372 by the event, $ACAR_1 = \frac{1}{T_5-T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} \hat{A}R_{1,t}$.⁶ In the DID method the average
 373 cumulative abnormal returns for firm 1 (over the event window) is a function
 374 of different time series and cross sectional averages over the the returns of firm
 375 1 and the returns of the control group in the estimation and event windows.
 376 Let D_1 denote the difference in the returns before and after the event,

$$D_1 = \frac{1}{T_5 - T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} R_{1,t} - \frac{1}{T_3 - T_1} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} R_{1,t}. \quad (12)$$

377 It is important to note that expression 12 is equivalent to the constant mean
 378 model in the traditional event study literature. Let D_{co} denote the difference
 379 in the returns before and after the event (where every element in the control
 380 group has an equal weight) for the control group,

$$D_{co} = \frac{1}{J-1} \sum_{j=2}^J \left[\frac{1}{T_5 - T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} R_{j,t} - \frac{1}{T_3 - T_1} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} R_{j,t} \right]. \quad (13)$$

If we denote $\bar{R}_{1,(T_1,T_3)} = \frac{1}{T_3-T_1} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} R_{1,t}$ and $\bar{R}_{co,(T_1,T_3)} = \frac{1}{T_3-T_1} \sum_{t=T_1}^{T_3} \left[\frac{1}{J-1} \sum_{j=2}^J R_{j,t} \right]$ as the average returns during the estimation window for firm 1 and the control group (taking a simple average over the cross-section), respectively. Then we can show that the DID average treatment effect using the Difference in

⁶In order to avoid confusion it is important to note that in the traditional event study literature the average cumulative abnormal returns the average is over the cross-section of firms affected by the event. This is the main object of interest in applications to determine if a particular event has an impact on the value of the firm. For the moment we deviate from that purpose because we only consider the event on one firm.

Difference method is,

$$ACAR_1^{DID} = \frac{1}{T_5 - T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} [R_{1,t} - R_{1,t}^{\bar{w}}] - (\bar{R}_{1,(T_1,T_3)} - \bar{R}_{co,(T_1,T_3)}) \quad (14)$$

$$= \frac{1}{T_5 - T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} [R_{1,t} - \frac{1}{J-1} \sum_{j=2}^J R_{j,t}] - (\bar{R}_{1,(T_1,T_3)} - \bar{R}_{co,(T_1,T_3)}) \quad (15)$$

381 This implies that the DID estimator is equivalent to the naive synthetic port-
 382 folio estimator with an adjustment to the average return difference between
 383 the treated and the control group in the estimation window. This adjustment
 384 acts as an intercept correction for the forecast in the event window.

385
 386 To test for the statistical significance of the average treatment effect over
 387 the event window we use the end-of-sample instability test of [27] following
 388 recent work by [13]. [13] provides tests statistics and the distribution for
 389 average treatment effects estimated by synthetic control methods for two
 390 different cases based on the relative size of the events window with respect
 391 to the estimation window. Since, short term financial event studies have a
 392 small event window $(-1, 1)$ we can use the tests statistics provided by [13]
 393 for synthetic control methods. Recall that in expression 5 we noted that the
 394 treatment effect on firm 1 is equivalent to the abnormal return of firm 1,
 395 $AR_{1,t}$; taking the average over the event window we can obtain the average
 396 treatment effect,

$$AAR_1 = \frac{1}{T_5 - T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} AR_{1,t} = \frac{1}{T_5 - T_4} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} R_{1,t} - \hat{R}_{1,t}^N. \quad (16)$$

397 Recall that $\hat{R}_{1,t}^N$ is estimated using the market model or the synthetic portfolio
 398 weights. We want to test the null hypothesis, $H_0 : AR_{1,t} = AR_{1,0}$ for all
 399 $t = T_4, \dots, T_5$, against a strictly positive treatment effect alternative, $H_a :$
 400 $AAR_1 = E[AR_{1,t}] > AR_{1,0}$. The test statistic for such a test,

$$\hat{B}_{T_5-T_4} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{T_5 - T_4}} \sum_{t=T_4}^{T_5} R_{1,t} - \hat{R}_{1,t}^N - AR_{1,0} \quad (17)$$

401 We derive the empirical distribution of the statistic by block sampling the
 402 estimation and gap window using the length of the event window; first we

403 compute,

$$\hat{B}_{T_5-T_4,j} := \frac{1}{\sqrt{T_5-T_4}} \sum_{t=j}^{T_5-T_4+j-1} R_{1,t} - \hat{R}_{1,t}^N, \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, T_4 + 1 - (T_5 - T_4). \quad (18)$$

404 As mentioned in [13], the empirical distribution of $[\hat{B}_{T_5-T_4,j}]_{j=1}^{T_4+1-(T_5-T_4)}$ can
 405 be used to obtain critical values for the test statistic $\hat{B}_{T_5-T_4}$ under the null
 406 hypothesis. If $\hat{B}_{T_5-T_4}$ is at the tail of the empirical distribution then we reject
 407 the null hypothesis, $H_0 : AR_{1,t} = AR_{1,0}$ for all $t = T_4, \dots, T_5$. This hypothe-
 408 sis test and the statistic is only valid for treatment effects that are constant
 409 across the event window, note that this might be true for short term event
 410 studies but not necessarily for long term event studies. The main advantage
 411 of the test is that by considering the event as a structural change in the
 412 end of the sample then it is possible to use the abundant information in the
 413 estimation window to obtain re-sampled values of the statistic and perform
 414 inference. One of the biggest obstacles that the traditional framework of
 415 short term events studies faces is the very few observations available in the
 416 event window for individual events. With these few number of observations
 417 (3, 11 or 21 days) individual test on abnormal returns have such small degrees
 418 of freedom such that they are hardly ever considered; therefore most of the
 419 reported inference is based on pooling the events. Andrews's end-of-sample
 420 stability test provides a simple framework to overcome this problem in finan-
 421 cial event studies. As far as we are aware of although Andrews test is not
 422 specifically designed within the framework the causal inference literature
 423 we find that it has not been previously considered as a viable alternative to
 424 individual test on average cumulative abnormal returns, [3] and [1].

425 4. Simulation

426 In the previous sections we provide an overview of traditional event stud-
 427 ies and four alternative methods for causal events studies in finance based
 428 on the synthetic portfolio approach and its relationship to DID in this con-
 429 text. We mention in the introduction the importance of a causal approach to
 430 event studies, but in addition these alternative methods are able to handle
 431 the high-dimensional challenge brought by the large asset space in the US
 432 stock market. The main reason that we want to consider a large asset space
 433 is to provide a matching technique that avoids any *Ad hoc* choice of which

434 stock should be in the control group. This is a desired property since the
 435 abnormal returns (estimated effects of the intervention) will be more robust
 436 and less sensitive to the choice of the researcher. These regularized estima-
 437 tors have the advantage that they provide automatic punning of the units
 438 within the control group and hence they avoid any manipulation in favor
 439 of a particular hypothesis; this is desired property of the estimator and the
 440 research design ([28]).

441 From a statistical point we can test the viability of the alternative methods
 442 by looking at the biased and variance of the proposed estimators for the av-
 443 erage treatment effects. In addition, we measure the mean square error of
 444 the synthetic portfolio in-sample and out-off-sample in the estimation win-
 445 dow. For this reason split the estimation window into a training and testing
 446 window (B.2). Although we have argued that with the synthetic portfolio
 447 approach there could be less model risk than accepting the market model
 448 to build the potential outcome, there could potentially be the risk of over-
 449 fitting by the best synthetic tracking portfolio. The mean square error and
 450 the estimated treatments effect will give us an idea of the possible trade-off
 451 regarding over-fitting, bias and variance of the proposed estimators.

452 We now setup a simulation exercise in order to determine the statistical and
 453 financial merits of the alternative methods for event studies. The simulation
 454 considers a large dimensional asset space of five hundred assets $J = 500$.
 455 We consider a short term financial event study where cumulative abnormal
 456 returns are measured one day before and after the event $(-1, 1)$ for the stock
 457 return that is affected by the event, $R_{1,t}$. In event studies with daily data
 458 the estimation window has a length of 150 trading days. We consider these
 459 150 trading days as the training data and introduce 50 trading days for the
 460 testing window. In addition we consider a gap window with a duration of 25
 461 trading days. Therefore the training window $[T_1, T_2)$ will cover trading days
 462 $[-226, -76)$ and the testing window will cover trading days $[-76, -27)$. We
 463 perform 10,000 simulations.

464 The data generating process for all of the stocks is a one-factor model (a
 465 CAPM model with estimated β 's) or a stationary first order autoregressive
 466 process. For the one factor model,

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (19)$$

467 we first simulate the market return $R_{m,t} \sim N(0, 1)$, fix a value for $\alpha = 0.1$
 468 and set a value for $\beta = 0$ for the first hundred stocks, for $\beta = 0.2$ for the
 469 next hundred stocks and so on until the last hundred assets with $\beta = 1$. The

470 idiosyncratic component for each stock is simulated as, $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim N(0, 1.5)$. We
 471 use this data generating process to simulate the behavior of all of the stocks
 472 and during the entire time line. However, for the stock 1 affected by the
 473 event we simulate the effect of the event at the event time $T_4 + 1$ such that,
 474 $R_{1,t}^N = R_{1,t}$ for $t > T_4$ is the latent potential outcome, in other words the
 475 realization where the event does not take place. The observed outcome (the
 476 event takes place) is given by $R_{1,T_4+1} = R_{1,t} + \gamma$, where $\gamma = -0.035$ implies a
 477 drop in the returns of 3.5% once the event takes place, for example a merger
 478 announcement.
 479 For the first order autoregressive process,

$$R_{i,t} = \alpha + \phi R_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (20)$$

480 we simulate the idiosyncratic component $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ as we did in the previous case
 481 and start the recursion with $R_{i,0} = 0$. We consider different values for ϕ
 482 consistent with stationarity and $\alpha = 0.1$. The effect of the event on stock 1
 483 is modeled as in the previous case. An important difference from the previ-
 484 ous case is that we do not have an explicit simulation of the market returns
 485 $R_{m,t}$, required to estimate the market model. In this case we use as the
 486 market return the ex-post equal weighted portfolio (excluding the stock 1),
 487 $R_{m,t} := \frac{1}{J-1} \sum_{j=2}^J R_{j,t}$. After simulating the returns using each of the data
 488 generating process we estimate the abnormal return at the event date $T_4 + 1$
 489 which is equivalent to the treatment effect, $\hat{\gamma}$. We look at the average treat-
 490 ment effect over all the simulations and compare across the different models.

491
 492 The results are summarized in tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. The mean square
 493 error in the training and testing window indicates that there is some degree
 494 of over-fitting in synthetic portfolio method, specially using Elastic-Net. The
 495 overall performance of the Elastic-Net estimator is above all other estimators
 496 in the training window but not in the testing window. On the other hand
 497 the performance for the naive synthetic and the difference-in-difference esti-
 498 mator is rather stable at both in and out-of-sample. The Market model also
 499 shows good performance, specially when the the asset of interest $R_{1,t}$ has a
 500 true β that approaches one ($\beta = 0.8$ and $\beta = 1$). This is to be expected be-
 501 cause this is the situation where the market model provides the best tracking
 502 performance. When the data generating process is an autoregressive model
 503 and the process has a strong autocorrelation the performance of all of the
 504 methods is rather poor.
 505 In table A.3 we look at the estimated treatment effect and the variance (in

parenthesis). The true treatment effect is $\gamma = -0.035$ and hence we are interested in the performance of the estimators that indicate the lowest bias. The lowest bias is obtained by the Elastic-Net estimators for $\beta = 0.5, 0.8$, the synthetic naive estimator for $\beta = 0.2$ and the market model for $\beta = 1$. With respect to the variance all of the estimators indicate a large uncertainty around the point estimates and it is not clear which is preferable in terms of the variance, therefore relative performance can only be based on the bias. When the data generating process is an autoregressive model with either a strong persistence or driven only by noise performance of all of the estimators is poor.

5. Empirical application: Merger announcements

We obtain M&A data from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum Financial Securities database. Thomson Reuters SDC collects all M&A transactions in the US that involve at least 5% of the ownership change of a company. We apply several filters to the M&A data that are common practice in the literature [29]. We download all US M&A transactions from 2003 to 2014. After applying these filters and merging the resulting events with the CRSP databases, we identify 5,025 M&A announcements from June 2003 to December 2014.

The theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of merger announcements is extensive and our aim is not to provide an exhaustive overview (there are some very comprehensive reviews, [30] more recently an on-line special issue of financial management).

We focus on identifying the main empirical results and the well established empirical regularities that have been published using predominantly traditional event study methodologies with a large scale sample, that is where the number of events exceeds 1,000 observations. We also look at the more recent literature that has used propensity score matching as a first step toward balancing the treatment and control groups, in particular, [7] and [31].

Table A.4 provides a short summary of the effects of mergers on market value of the firm. This summary is meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive. One important observation is that most of these large scale studies have been performed with data from the 80's and 90's. The literature is concerned not only in a brought measure of impact for all firms but in a quest to determine how these effects change along different dimensions, for

example by taking the point of view of the acquirer/bidder or the target, whether the company is publicly traded or a private company, if the merger is financed using cash or stock, or if there is a diversification motive from the bidder⁷. Some of the empirical regularities are: positive (negative) effects are observed for bidders acquiring private (public) firms; positive effects are observed for target firms when the acquirer is either a public or a private firm, but the value creation is larger for the former; all stock (all cash) financed bids have a negative (positive) effect on stock performance, unless the target is a private firm where stock finances acquisitions create value. The more recent literature has also taken advantage of propensity score matching to rebalanced the sample of treated and control firms, in the first example all stock finances acquisitions still create negative effects as apposed to all cash deal, however by using propensity score matching the difference between the effects for all-cash or all-stocks is smaller. Finally, the observed premium for target public firms versus private firms becomes statistically not significant by after using propensity score.

558

We examine the effects of merger announcements of the firm value in the short term using the competing method, but we reports the findings that used the traditional method (the market model), synthetic portfolio (where estimation is base on Elastic-net version with non-negative portfolio weights), and difference-in-difference (we have shown in section 3 that is related to the naive synthetic portfolio.). We also estimates these effects along different subsets of data that have been well studies in the literature, A.4.

566

The results are presented in figure ?? . The average estimated effects are nominally very similar across the different methodologies. It is important to note that these average are estimated using the cross section of events, and although the averages are similar in magnitude, we reject the null hypothesis that the sample of individual measures are statistically equivalent across the different methodologies. These results are consistent with the simulations where we find close estimates of the true treatment across the different methodologies. The sample specific results are consistent with the literature, for example the effect on the bidders performance is small varying form

⁷This diversification motive takes into account if the target firm belong to a significantly distant industry from the bidding firm.

576 0.52% to 0.71% and for the target the it is quite large varying from 19.4% to
577 20%. In the literature, based on an earlier historical sample, these estimates
578 are around 1.8% and 27.7%, respectively. We also observe the change in the
579 sign, for a bidder acquiring a private firm (0.78% to 1%) versus a public firm
580 (-0.67% to -0.57%). On the other hand with all of the three methods we
581 do not observe that 100% stock financed mergers has a negative affect on
582 the bidder after the announcement, the effect is positive (0.27% to 0.38%)
583 but small than in the case of 100% cash deals (0.5% to 0.66%). For all other
584 cases such as diversified/un-diversified, a single or more than one bidder the
585 signs and the magnitude are within the range of the results in the literature.

586
587 As mentioned in 3 one of the additional benefits of framing traditional
588 event studies within causal inference is the use of Andrews end-of-sample
589 instability test. This test is not affected by the extremely small sample of
590 the event window that makes traditional parametric t-test of non-parametric
591 wilcoxon test, difficult to apply in this context. Therefore we can use the
592 subset of events where we can reject the null hypothesis that the treatment
593 effect is zero and therefore we have events either with strictly positive or
594 negative effects of the merger. That is we are interested in the number of cases
595 where the effects is different form zero, these samples represent anywhere
596 from 8% to 25% of the total sample, for example out of 1,009 events for
597 acquisitions where the announcement involves a public target, there are 144
598 cases where the effect on the bidder is significantly positive and 223 cases
599 where it is significantly negative. This means that overall negative average
600 effect is strongly affected by a number of treatment effects for approximately
601 640 cases where the true effect is statistically non-existent. In figure B.3 we
602 use the sub-samples to get an idea of the magnitude of the effects along the
603 different cases considered in the literature. This provides a way to derive some
604 lower and upper bound for the treatment effect that circumvents that controls
605 for the individual events for which the true effect of the merger announcement
606 is zero. The magnitude of these effects are more or less equivalent across the
607 different methodologies therefore we only report the results based on the
608 traditional market model. The results indicate, that although as we saw
609 before that the overall average effect of merger announcements is negative
610 on the firm value of the bidder if the target is a public company, there are 146
611 events in the sample where the effect is in average 8.4%. Another interesting
612 case is for 100% stock financed mergers, where the literature reports negative
613 effects on the bidder in the magnitude of -3.5% , and we find an overall small

614 but positive effect 0.37% and also a subset of firms where the average effect
615 is significantly positive 16% and significantly negative -9.1% .

616 **6. Conclusions and future research**

617 The methodological framework for events studies was laid out in the late
618 sixties and although the testing framework has evolved, the estimation ap-
619 proach has not change profoundly since it was laid out. Research on methods
620 has also received little attention and even though the estimation of cumu-
621 lative abnormal returns is not the main focus of the papers in empirical
622 finance they still represent an important first in many empirical motivated
623 research questions across the different areas of finance. In the last twenty
624 years research in causal inference methods has introduced more credible tools
625 to re-examine causal effects that are at the core of many questions that mo-
626 tivate empirical research. This paper provides a simple unifying framework
627 between traditional event study estimation methods and modern causal in-
628 ference methods, in particular synthetic control methods. The framework
629 is based on common tool in finance which is an optimal tracking portfolio.
630 Although causal inference methods are already within the toolkit of empiri-
631 cal finance researchers, in particular the use of propensity score matching, a
632 competing method like synthetic control has not been extensively used. The
633 simulation exercise and the empirical application indicate that the market
634 model provides a counterfactual as good as the synthetic portfolio estimators
635 we introduce. Fitting the return of interest through the market model is also
636 based on the idea that a portfolio provides a good potential outcome, there-
637 fore the results are not too surprising. Additional research will eventually tell
638 us if the conditions under which this performance is adequate hold in gen-
639 eral or under specific conditions for example if the asset space for estimating
640 these portfolios is sufficiently large and/or the granularity of the elements in
641 the portfolio.

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Estimator	DGP: 1 factor model				DGP: Autoregressive model	
	$\beta = 0.2$	$\beta = 0.5$	$\beta = 0.8$	$\beta = 1$	$\phi = 0$	$\phi = 0.9$
Market	8.89	8.88	8.88	8.88	12.18	57.20
Syn.Lasso	8.78	8.72	8.68	8.64	9.21	5.98
Syn.Elastic-Net	6.84	6.52	6.24	6.07	5.27	3.74
Syn.Elastic-Net $\hat{\beta}^*$	6.86	6.55	6.26	6.09	5.57	6.05
Syn.naive	9.12	9.02	9.11	9.27	12.49	66.19
Dif-in-Dif	9.12	9.02	9.11	9.27	12.49	66.19

Note: The mean square error is estimated in-sample using the information in the testing subset of data from the estimation window, $t \in [T_1, T_2)$. All of the estimators that use regularization impose non-negative weights. The estimator Syn.Elastic-Net $\hat{\beta}^*$ includes a constant in the estimation of the weights.

Table A.1: Mean square error in training window

721 Appendix A. Tables

Estimator	DGP: 1 factor model				DGP: Autoregressive model	
	$\beta = 0.2$	$\beta = 0.5$	$\beta = 0.8$	$\beta = 1$	$\phi = 0$	$\phi = 0.9$
Market	9.11	9.12	9.10	9.09	11.01	17.83
Syn.Lasso	9.05	9.23	9.49	9.72	9.81	38.59
Syn.Elastic-Net	9.40	9.47	9.57	9.70	9.69	68.01
Syn.Elastic-Net*	9.39	9.47	9.57	9.70	9.69	60.81
Syn.naive	9.10	9.01	9.09	9.24	10.06	21.47
Dif-in-Dif	9.10	9.01	9.09	9.24	10.06	21.47

Note: The mean square error is estimated out-of-sample using the information in the testing subset of data from the estimation window, $t \in [T_2, T_3)$. All of the estimators that use regularization impose non-negative weights. The estimator Syn.Elastic-Net* includes a constant in the estimation of the weights.

Table A.2: Mean square error in testing window

Estimator	DGP: 1 factor model				DGP: Autoregressive model	
	$\beta = 0.2$	$\beta = 0.5$	$\beta = 0.8$	$\beta = 1$	$\phi = 0$	$\phi = 0.9$
Market	-0.030 (2.97)	-0.053 (3.03)	-0.028 (3.02)	-0.056 (2.97)	0.001 (1.01)	-0.001 (1.02)
Syn.Lasso	0.060 (2.96)	0.030 (3.06)	0.049 (3.09)	0.003 (3.07)	0.001 (1.00)	-0.002 (1.08)
Syn.Elastic-Net	-0.022 (3.02)	-0.045 (3.09)	-0.038 (3.11)	-0.081 (3.07)	0.001 (1.00)	-0.002 (1.08)
Syn.Elastic-Net*	-0.021 (3.01)	-0.044 (3.09)	-0.039 (3.11)	-0.082 (3.07)	0.001 (1.04)	-0.002 (1.08)
Syn.naive	-0.036 (2.96)	-0.054 (3.02)	-0.032 (3.02)	-0.065 (2.99)	0.001 (1.00)	-0.001 (1.04)
Dif-in-Dif	-0.037 (2.97)	-0.053 (3.03)	-0.031 (3.03)	-0.061 (3.00)	-0.001 (1.00)	-0.001 (1.03)

Note: Average treatment effects are reported for the simulation exercise along with the variance in parenthesis. The true treatment effect is $\gamma = -0.035$ and the number of simulations is 10,000. All of the estimators that use regularization impose non-negative weights. The estimator Syn.Elastic-Net* includes a constant in the estimation of the weights.

Table A.3: Simulated treatment effect

Study	ACAR %	sample and results		
M&A Announcement-induced ACAR to U.S. Bidders, large sample (1980-2002)				
		all	public ¹	private
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002)	(-2,2)	1.80	-1.00	2.10
Bradley and Sundaram (2006)	(-2,2)	1.40	-0.70	1.90
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009)	(-1,1)	-1.20		
			undiv. ²	div.
Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003)	(-2,1)		1.20	1.10
			stocks ³	cash
Savor (2006)	(-1,1)		-3.50	1.00
			public ⁴	private
Moeller, Shlingemann and Stultz (2007)	(-1,1)	0.80	-2.30	3.40
M&A Announcement-induced ACAR to U.S. Bidders, large sample (1985-2009), Propensity Score				
		all	stocks ³	cash
Golubov, Petmezas, Travlos (2015)	(-2,-2)	-1.31	-2.29	0.50
		0.91		
			No PSM ⁵	PSM
diference all-stock, all-cash			2.79	1.53
M&A Announcement-induced ACAR to U.S. Target, large sample (1980-2002), Propensity Score				
			public ⁶	private
Svetina (2012)	(-1,1)		27.79	17.69

Note: 1) public and private target firms in the merger. 2) underspecified or diversified deals, meaning that the target firms belongs or does not belong to the same sector. 3) The merger is finance completely by cash or by stocks form the point of view of the acquirer. 4) The target firm is public or private and the acquirer is financing the bid using stocks. 5) propensity score matching is used to balance the treatment and control sample in the estimation of the treatment effects. 6) public and private bidding firms in the merger (in this particular result the difference becomes statistically insignificant once propensity score is used).

Table A.4: Review of the literature




Figure B.1: Timeline for an event study.







Figure B.2: Timeline for an event study with a training and testing window.



(a) Average cummulative abnormal returns, market model.



(b) Average cummulative abnormal returns, elastic net.



(c) Average cummulative abnormal returns, difference-in-difference. Note: The numbers in italic along the x-axis indicate the number of events that are considered for each case.




Figure B.3: Average cumulative abnormal returns, for events where the treatment effect is statistically above or below zero, using Andrews end-of-sample stability test.