


Hash Functions and Message Authentications

University of Birmingham

Outline of This Lecture

- ▶ Error Detection and non-cryptographic solutions
- ▶ Cryptographic Hash Functions
- ▶ Security of Hash Functions
- ▶ Message Authentication

Model



- ▶ Alice and Bob needs to communicate “correctly”.
- ▶ Example: Downloaded software may be corrupt.

101 → ? tag checksum


Error Detection in Communication

- ▶ Communications are prone to error as the channel is untrusted

Error Detection in Communication

Qn! Eve could change the checksum! What happens with more than 1-bit?

- ▶ Communications are prone to error as the channel is untrusted
- ▶ IDEA: Add a checksum after the string
- ▶ Parity Bits: 1-bit error detection
- ▶ Cyclic Redundancy Check: Algebraic Error Detection




Hash Functions

A Hash function is a function from $\{0, 1\}^*$ $\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, where n is a fixed integer.



Hash Functions




A Hash function is a function from $\{0, 1\}^*$ $\rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, where n is a fixed integer.

- ▶ Practical hash functions have an upper bound μ on input message length with $\mu \gg n$.

Hash Functions in Cryptography

Access
control
/ login

- ▶ **Collision Attack.** If adversary could find *distinct* messages, m and m' such that $H(m) = H(m')$.
- ▶ **Preimage Attack.** Given a random $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$, if the adversary could find a message m such that $H(m) = y$.



Hash Functions in Cryptography

- ▶ **Collision Attack.** If adversary could find *distinct* messages, m and m' such that $H(m) = H(m')$.
- ▶ **Preimage Attack.** Given a random $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$, if the adversary could find a message m such that $H(m) = y$.

The idea of *Length Extension Attack* is also attributed to hash function.

Hardness of Collision Attack

Q


$$2^{100}$$

if $n > 100$

$$> 2^n$$


Hash Functions have collisions

- For a secure hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$, finding collision should take approximately $2^{n/2}$ computations.



$m \gg n$
collisions in
 $2^{n/2}$
many
computations

$$\underline{N = 2^n}$$



for ($i = 1$ to length)

compute $H(i)$

For what q, there will
be a repetition

$$\left| \begin{array}{c} i=2 \\ Z \\ \hline Z \end{array} \right| \left| \begin{array}{c} i=3 \\ Z \\ \hline Z \end{array} \right| \left| \begin{array}{c} i=2 \\ Z \\ \hline Z \end{array} \right| \left| \begin{array}{c} i=1 \\ Z \\ \hline Z \end{array} \right|$$

No collision in any of the
 q samples.

$$= \Pr[\overline{\text{coll}}_2] \times \Pr[\overline{\text{coll}}_3] \times \dots \times \Pr[\overline{\text{coll}}_q] = \frac{N(N+1)}{2^{1+2+\dots+N}}$$

$$= \left(1 - \frac{1}{N}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{2}{N}\right) \times \dots \times \left(1 - \frac{q-1}{N}\right) = \frac{(q-1)!}{(N-q+1)!} = \frac{(q-1)! \cdot q!}{(2^q) \cdot N!}$$

$$\approx \prod_{i=1}^{q-1} \left(1 - \frac{i}{N}\right) \approx \left(1 - \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{q-1} i}{N}\right) = \left(1 - \frac{\frac{q(q-1)}{2}}{N}\right) = \left(1 - \frac{q^2}{2^{q+1}}\right)$$

$\Pr[\text{collision}]$

$= 1 - \Pr[\text{no collision after } q \text{ samples}]$

$$= 1 - \left(1 - \frac{q^2}{2^{n+1}}\right) \quad \left| \begin{array}{l} \frac{q^2}{2^{n+1}} = 1 \text{ when} \\ q \approx 2^{\gamma_2} \end{array} \right.$$

$$= \frac{q^2}{2^{n+1}} \Rightarrow \Pr[\text{evaluation before collision}] = 2^{\gamma_2}$$

Usage of Cryptographic Hash Functions


- ▶ Hash functions are useful where only the message (without the checksum) is transferred via the channel, and the receiver can compute and compare the checksum

example: file download checksums.


Design of Cryptographic Hash: SHA3

$$m = m_0 \parallel m_1 \parallel m_2 \parallel m_3 \dots \parallel m_t$$


Here $t=3$




Message Authentication Codes



Message Authentication Codes: Security




MAC design:HMAC




MAC design: CBC-MAC

$$m = m_0 || m_1 || \dots || m_{t-1}$$



$$\tau(k, m) = \underbrace{\varepsilon_{(k, IV \oplus m_0)} || \varepsilon_{(k, m_1 \oplus c_0)} ||}_{c_0} \dots$$

Authenticated Encryption:CCM



A_1 is auxiliary data, initialized to 0^n .

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