### **Ring Signature**

A ring singture allows users to sign oin behalf on a group without revealing the signer's identity.

**Def.** Ring signature consists of \$(\mathsf{KeyGen, Sign, Verify})\$:

- \$(vk\_1, sk\_1), \ldots, (vk\_n, sk\_n) \gets \mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, n)\$;
  - Input: a security parameter \$\lambda\$ and a number of ring users \$n\$
  - Output: a verification key \$vk\_i\$ and a signing key \$sk\_i\$ for each ring users
- \$\sigma \gets \mathsf{Sign}(m, vk\_1, \ldots, vk\_n, sk\_i)\$ for some \$1 \le i \le n\$;
  - Input: a message \$m\$, all verification keys \$vk\_1, \ldots, vk\_n\$ and a signing key
    \$sk\_i\$ for some user
  - Output: a signature \$\sigma\$ of \$m\$
- \$b \gets \mathsf{Verify}(m, \sigma, vk\_1, \ldots, vk\_n)\$;
  - Input: a message \$m\$, a signature \$\sigma\$ and all verification keys \$vk\_1, \ldots, vk n\$
  - Output: a bit \$b=1\$ if \$\sigma\$ is a valid siganture of \$m\$ signed by \$sk\_i\$ for \$1 \le i
    \le n\$

Before describing [RST01] ring signature scheme, I will introduce a combining function which is a main technique of the scheme.

#### **Combining Function**

Let \$E\_k\$ be a symmetric encryption with a secret key \$k\$.

Let  $C_{k, v}(y_1, \cdot y_r) = E_k(y_r \cdot y_{n-1} \cdot y_n) \cdot E_k(y_1 + v)) \cdot (y_1, \cdot y_r) = E_k(y_r \cdot y_n)$ 

Then,

- \$C\_{k, v}\$ is a one-to-one mapping from \$y\_s\$ to \$z\$ for \$1 \le s \le r\$ and fixed \$y\_i, i \neq s\$.
- For \$1 \le s \le r\$ and  $y_i$ , i \neq s\$, it is possible to efficiently find  $y_s$  such that  $C_{k, v}$  (y\_1, \ldots, y\_s, \ldots, y\_r) = z\$
- Given k, z and v, it is hard to solve  $C_{k, v}(g_1(x_1), \ldots, g_r(x_r))=z$  for  $x_1$ , d,  $x_r$  if  $g_i$  is are one-way function.
  - Define  $g_i(x) = x ^{e_i} \bmod n_i$  which is actually an encryption of RSA.
  - One can easily obtain \$m\$ if he/she has \$d\_i\$ such that \$e\_i d\_i \equiv 1 \bmod n\_i\$.
  - However, it is hard to obtain \$m\$ without such \$d\_i\$.

#### [RST01] @ Asiacrypt'01

\$\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, r)\$;

- Each member executes \$\mathsf{RSA.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)\$
- Output  $vk_i = {n_i, e_i}$  and  $sk_i = {p_i, q_i, d_i}$  for all i
- \$\mathsf{Sign}(m, vk\_1, \ldots, vk\_r, sk\_s)\$ for a signer \$s\$;
  - Compute \$k := H(m)\$ where \$H\$ is a cryptographic hash function
  - Choose \$v \gets \{0, 1\}^b\$ and \$x\_i \gets \{0, 1\}^b\$ for \$1 \le i \le r, i \neq s\$
  - Compute  $y_i := g(x_i) = x_i^{e_i} \bmod n_i$
  - Solve the equation  $C_{k, v}(y_1, \ldots, y_s, \ldots, y_r) = v$  for  $y_s$
  - Compute  $x_s := g_s^{-1}(y_s) = y_s ^{d_s} \bmod n_i$
  - Output  $\sim (v, x_1, \cdot x_r)$
- \$\mathsf{Verify}(m, \sigma, vk\_1, \ldots, vk\_r)\$;
  - Compute \$y\_i := g\_i(x\_i)\$ for all \$i\$
  - Compute \$k := H(m)\$
  - Compute \$\sigma' := C\_{{k, v}(y\_1, \ldots, y\_r)\$
  - If \$\sigma = \sigma'\$, output 1.
  - Otherwise, output 0.

#### **Remark**

- In Monero (XMR), they use a *linkable* ring signatures
  - anyone can efficiently verify that the signature were generated by *the same* signer without learning who the signer is.

## **Group Signature**

A group signature allows a member of a group to <u>anonymously sign a message</u> on behalf of the group.

There is a group manager who is in charge of adding group members and has ability to reveal the original signer.

**Def.** Group signature consists of \$(\mathsf{KeyGen, Sign, Verify, Open})\$:

- \$(vk, msk, sk\_1, \ldots, sk\_n) \gets \mathsf{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, n)\$;
  - Input: a security parameter \$\lambda\$ and a number of group users \$n\$
  - Output: a verification key \$vk\$, a master secret key \$msk\$, a signing key \$sk\_i\$ for each group users
- \$\sigma \gets \mathsf{Sign}(m, sk\_i)\$ for some \$1 \le i \le n\$;
  - Input: a message \$m\$ and a signing key \$sk\_i\$
  - Output: a signature \$\sigma\$ of \$m\$
- \$b \gets \mathsf{Verify}(m, \sigma, vk)\$;
  - Input: a message \$m\$, a signature \$\sigma\$ and a verification key \$vk\$
  - Output: a bit \$b = 1\$ if \$\sigma\$ is a valid signature of \$m\$ signed by \$sk\_i\$ for \$1 \le
    i \le n\$
- \$i \gets \mathsf{Open}(m, \sigma, msk)\$;

- Input: a message \$m\$, a signature \$\sigma\$ and a master secret key \$msk\$
- Output: a user \$i\$ or \$\perp\$

A construction of a group signature will be given after dealing with zero-knowledge proof.

# **Other Signatures**

- Threshold Signature
- **Multisignature** is a scheme a certain number of signers signs a given message.
  - much shorter than than the set of individual signatures
- **Proxy Signature** allows a delegator to give partial signing rights to other parties called proxy signer.