

zkLedger: Privacy-Preserving Auditing for Distributed Ledgers

- Reference: <https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi18/presentation/narula>

1. Contributions

- the first distributed ledger system to support strong transaction privacy, public verifiability, and practical, useful auditing
- do not require trusted setup and only rely on widely-used cryptographic assumptions

2. Overview

1. System Participants

- Bank
 - issue transactions to transfer digital assets
 - should not be able to hide assets from the Auditor
- Auditor
 - verifies certain operational aspects of transactions performed by the participants
 - should not be able to see individual bank transactions
 - should be able to detect an incorrect answer
- Depositor
 - use and withdraw assets from the system

2. Building Blocks

- Pedersen Commitment
- Public-Key Encryption
 - a secret key sk_i
 - public key $pk_i = h^{sk_i}$
- Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs

3. Security Model

- does not assume that banks will behave honestly
- assume banks can arbitrarily collude
- does not protect against an adversary who observes traffic on the network

3. Design

- Commitment
 - each transaction has an entry for each Bank
 - each entry includes a commitment to a value the amount of the asset that is being debited or credited to the bank
 - the sum of every entry should be zero

- uses Pedersen commitments to commit to the value
- Audit Token
 - $T_i := (pk_i)^{r_i}$
 - to answer audits without knowing the randomness used in the commitment
 - To sum of values in a bank's column, $\prod cm_i = g^{\sum v_i} h^{\sum r_i}$
 - a bank does not necessarily know all the commitment randomnesses r_k
- Zero-Knowledge Proofs
 - the spender can create to prove the invariants are maintained
 - Proof of Asset
 - a new commitment cm'_i is a re-commitment of cm_i or $\prod cm_i$
 - cm'_i is in range $[0, N)$ where N is the size of message space
 - Proof of Balance
 - the committed values satisfy $\sum v_i = 0$
 - Proof of Consistency
 - cm_i and T_i are generated by the same random r_i for each i
 - $\prod cm_i$ and $\prod T_i$ are generated by the same random $\sum r_i$