## **Functional Encryption**

- ullet encryption is a method to send a message or data to a single entity holding sk
- access to the encrypted data is all or nothing
  - one can decrypt and read the entire message
  - one can learn nothing at all almost message

**Goal** want to *only* give access to a function of the message

• e.g., decrypt the target face from the encrypted images

**Def.** A functional encryption (FE) for a functionality F defined over  $(\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{X})$ :

- Setup $(1^{\lambda}) \rightarrow (pp, msk)$
- ullet KeyGen(msk,k) o sk for  $k\in\mathcal{K}$
- $\mathsf{Enc}(pp,x) o c \, \mathsf{for} \, x \in \mathcal{X}$
- $\mathsf{Dec}(sk,c) \to y$  where y = F(k,x) with probability 1

Note that one functional encryption only supports the specific function

### Example.

- Searchable Encryption (SE)
  - o allows encryption while still enabling search for keywords
- Order-Preserving Encryption (OPR)
  - o ciphertexts that preserve the order of plaintexts

$$m_1 < m_2$$
 if and only if  $c_1 < c_2$ 

- Order-Revealing Encryption (ORE)
  - the cipher texts are no longer numerical
  - o provides another public (keyless) algorithm that compoares the ciphertexts
- Inner-Product Encryption (IPE), etc.

# **Order-Revealing Encryption**

introduced by Boneh et al. [BLR+15] @ Eurocrypt'15

**Goal** given the ciphertexts, determine the order of messages being encrypted

allows for efficient range queries, sorting, threshold filtering

**Def.** An order-revealing encryption (ORE) is defined by:

- ullet Key $\mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda) o sk$
- ullet  $\operatorname{Enc}(sk,m) o c$
- $\mathsf{CMP}(c_1, c_2) \to b \in \{0, 1\}$ 
  - b = 1 if  $c_1 < c_2$
  - $\bullet \ b = 0 \text{ if } c_1 \geq c_2$

## **Security of ORE**

- Provable Secure
  - should reveal no more than ordering of plaintexts
- Short Ciphertext Size
  - o should be about the same as the size of the plaintexts
- Stateless and Non-Interactive
  - o encryption should be able to compute in parallel and independently of one another
- Practical
  - o should rely on simple, reliable and efficient cryptographic primitives

#### **Recent Works**

- [BLR+15] @ Eurocrypt'15
  - based on multilinear maps which is a impractical cryptographic primitive
- [CLWW16] @ FSE'16
  - the first different bit is revealed
- [LW16] @ CCS'16
  - the first different *block* is revealed

## **Construction of [CLWW16]**

Let  $\mathcal K$  be the key space and  $[n]=\{1,2,\ldots,n\}$ .

Define a secure PRF  $F:\mathcal{K} imes ([n] imes\{0,1\}^{n-1}) o \mathbb{Z}_M$  with  $M\geq 3.$ 

- KeyGen $(1^{\lambda})$ ;
  - $\circ$  Output  $sk \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$
- $\operatorname{Enc}(sk, m)$ ;
  - $\circ$  Let  $b_1b_2\cdots b_n$  be the binary representation of m
  - For each 1 < i < n,

$$u_i = F(sk, (i, b_1 \cdots b_{i-1} || 10^{n-i})) + b_i \mod M$$

• Output the tuple  $c = (u_1, u_2, \dots, u_n)$ 

- $CMP(c_1, c_2)$ ;
  - $\circ$  Let  $c_1=(u_1,\ldots,u_n)$  and  $c_2=(u_1',\ldots,u_n')$
  - $\circ~$  Find the smallest index i such that  $u_i 
    eq u_i'$
  - If no such index exists, output 0
  - o If exists,
    - lacksquare output 1 if  $u_i'=u_1+1 mod M$
    - output 0 otherwise

#### Remark.

[DCC16] "What Else is Revealed by Order-Revealing Encryption?" @ CCS'16

- almost half bits of a plaintext are revealed
- leakage of concrete ORE schemes on *non-uniform* data leads to more accurate plaintext recovery than suggested