

Radicalisation and higher education: Students' understanding and experiences

Catherine McGlynn & Shaun McDaid

To cite this article: Catherine McGlynn & Shaun McDaid (2016): Radicalisation and higher education: Students' understanding and experiences, *Terrorism and Political Violence*, DOI: [10.1080/09546553.2016.1258637](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1258637)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2016.1258637>



Published online: 05 Dec 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)




View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Radicalisation and higher education: Students' understanding and experiences

Catherine McGlynn and Shaun McDaid 

Division of Criminology, Politics & Sociology, University of Huddersfield, Queensgate, UK

ABSTRACT

Since 2015 universities have been placed under a legal duty of “due regard to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”¹ This reflects the belief in UK counter-terrorism policy that radicalisation exists and can be countered. Advice to universities is largely silent on how this duty applies to teaching. Yet many degree programmes generate lectures and seminar discussions where views of an allegedly radicalised nature could be aired. This article presents focus group research which elicits students' understanding of radicalisation, and provides insights into their experience of debating contentious issues such as identity, community cohesion, and the causes of terrorism. We argue that students' understanding of radicalisation is conflated with extremism and we explore students' anxiety about debating these issues and reliance on educators to create the right environment for such discussions. Finally, the data presented here challenges some of the assumptions underpinning contemporary counter-radicalisation policy in the domain of higher education, which are premised on ideas of active grooming. We argue that this does not accord with students' own experiences, as they regard themselves as discerning, critical thinkers rather than inherently vulnerable to manipulation by those espousing violent extremist views.

KEYWORDS

Counter-terrorism;
education; Islam;
radicalisation; UK

Introduction

Since the passing of the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, universities, along with several other educational and public bodies, have been placed under a legal duty of “due regard to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism” (HM Government, 2015). This duty has been formulated in the context of the current acceptance in UK government counter-terrorism that radicalisation exists and that policies can be designed to identify and deter those vulnerable to radicalisation. Radicalisation as a concept has become more and more central not just to counter-terrorist strategy in the U.S and Europe but to media coverage of threats posed by contemporary terrorist actors since the 2000s.² The ubiquity of the term would suggest common and immediate understanding of what it implies, but it remains an elusive concept without an agreed meaning.³

The legislative response to contemporary counter-terrorism, although premised on theoretical frameworks developed in the period after the 9/11 attacks, has been significantly affected by the rise of the Islamic State (IS), initially in Iraq and Syria. Since the declaration of an Islamic caliphate by IS's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in June 2014, thousands of

foreigners have travelled to the Middle East in order to fight jihad or to participate in the development of the proto-state.⁴ The majority of those who have gone to the Middle East are males who seek to engage in violent jihad, but those who have travelled have also included women and girls mostly with the intention of marriage, whose presence IS regards as crucial to the success of the caliphate.⁵

Whilst the greater number of those emigrants come from North Africa, several hundred have moved to Syria from Western Europe, including the United Kingdom. Their numbers have included several British young people, of which the former IS executioner, Mohammed “Jihadi John” Emwazi, is perhaps the most notorious example.⁶ The fact that he and a number of people identified as perpetrators of violence in the service of Islamic State had been through the British higher education system acted as a stimulus to debates concerning the university’s role in how individuals are drawn into terrorism (discussed below). However, this was not a completely new development: concerns about campus radicalisation have been evident over the course of the past decade.⁷

Despite the significance of this issue, which has potential implications for security well beyond the UK, there is still a dearth of research about how this legislative framework is impacting students within the university environment. This is crucial if we are to better understand the ways in which environmental factors may, or may not, contribute to the development of extremist views.

This article explores students’ understanding and experiences of radicalisation in the context of the growing legislative framework that is springing up around higher education. It draws upon focus group research conducted with students attending university in one of the United Kingdom’s Prevent “Priority Areas”—geographical areas designated by government as requiring the most resources to prevent people being drawn into terrorism based on demographics and other risk factors.⁸ The study is based on two focus groups comprising either students who had studied terrorism at university ($n = 6$) or those who had not ($n = 5$). We acknowledge that a sample of this size will not be representative of university students in all settings and in all parts of the country, particularly those areas which may not be deemed Prevent priority areas. Nevertheless, we believe it provides a useful first step in examining student experiences of counter-radicalisation policy, and helpfully highlights some potential weaknesses in the ideological assumptions underpinning contemporary counter-radicalisation policy in university settings.

In this article, we elucidate the tension between an emphasis on safeguarding that casts students as passive with their own more active approach to citizenship on campus, leading us to recommend that those in charge of directing higher education policy both within institutions and at the level of the state need to engage more with students themselves in order to gain an understanding of how they interact and learn at that particular level.

After providing an overview of academic debate about the uses and flaws of radicalisation as a tool for preventing political violence, we will set our own research in the context of counter-radicalisation initiatives as they apply to higher education in the UK, although the findings, we argue, have implications well beyond a singular geographical setting. This will serve as a backdrop to our key findings; namely that students’ understanding of what radicalisation is shows they have absorbed contemporary coverage of the term and that this understanding replicates what have been identified as pitfalls associated with the concept, but that despite this they are capable of critical self-reflection upon the challenges that new legislation poses for them as active and engaged learners. We will also explore how personal

experience of threat and security is affected not just by one's identity as a student but by other markers of identity such as locality and ethnicity.

Radicalisation and counter-radicalisation

The term *radicalisation* emerged as an accepted cause of political violence in American and European policy-making circles in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on American soil. Further attacks in Europe, such as the Madrid bombings of 2004 and London's 7/7 attacks, intensified the desire to create strategies of "upstream prevention" of the disaffection and grievance fuelling potential recruitment to Islamist networks.⁹ Terrorism, to utilise a metaphor offered to professionals in the UK looking for guidance on radicalisation, "isn't just the attack, that's the tip of the iceberg." At the bottom of this iceberg would be found a person searching for answers or identity.¹⁰ This person would have been radicalised, with radicalisation understood as "the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism."¹¹

Radicalisation in models developed by academic researchers and utilised by those seeking to implement counter-radicalisation policies have made a major contribution to this understanding of radicalisation as processes or pathways. Within these dominant models, there is considerable emphasis on the role of active grooming in enticing a vulnerable individual into terrorism.¹² From these models, it follows, and has been suggested, that intervention as individuals took their first steps down the path, in the form of counter-radicalisation or countering violent extremism initiatives,¹³ could prevent their sense of grievance and/or desire for change leading to an extremist worldview that would tempt them into support for violent extremism and then actual violence, either as part of a group or as a lone wolf. Thus there would be benefits not just for potential victims but for those liable to be the instigators of terrorism.

In tandem with the embrace of counter-radicalisation as a means of understanding and combatting terrorism, a critique of the concept and the strategies based upon it has developed. The models and pathways advanced, it became apparent, lacked empirical foundation and testing against control groups.¹⁴ Furthermore, the conflation of the term with extremism overrode nuanced distinctions drawn in the literature between radicalisation and violent radicalisation,¹⁵ and the lack of delineation in the definitions of radicalisation meant it didn't provide the focus required for a counter-terrorist strategy.¹⁶ This elusive concept was further stretched by the propagation of competing versions of radicalisation, either as a product of ideology or the outcome of social alienation.¹⁷ The predominance of ideology/values explanations over means-based explanations for why people are radicalised arguably simplifies the complex reasons why people support or engage in violence as well as relieving states of any culpability in regards to their foreign policy. Whether values- or means-based approaches were chosen by policy-makers, the relentlessly monocultural focus on Islam¹⁸ meant that radicalisation encouraged the identification of Muslims as monolithic communities of inherently suspect individuals.¹⁹

These criticisms have not dislodged radicalisation from the firmament of contemporary counter-terrorism, and defenders of the concept's uses argue that whilst there is a need to introduce rigour into the theoretical underpinnings and empirical practice of counter-radicalisation, the difficulties apparent in employing radicalisation as a mode of counter-terrorism have been overblown to discredit the existence of a real problem.²⁰

Within the UK setting, as we will now outline, adherence to the idea that pathways to (violent) radicalisation exist and people can be lured on or off them remains a vital pillar of contemporary counter-terrorism. It is acknowledged, however, that many regard the UK's current Prevent policy as straying well beyond the realms of counter-terrorism, venturing into the "broader realms" of ideological threats to the state itself.²¹

Counter-radicalisation and higher education in the UK

The counter-radicalisation (and by extension counter-terrorism) duties imposed upon HEIs by the 2015 legislation could have been formulated without any reference to the concept of radicalisation. For example, the requirement that universities screen out potentially inflammatory speakers is part of a denial of platform approach that was utilised in other situations before the concept of radicalisation was even in embryonic form, most notably in the British broadcasting ban of representatives of the Irish Republican movement in the late 1980s.²² However, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 cannot be seen in isolation from the wider UK counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) of which a key pillar is the counter-radicalisation strategies contained under the heading of Prevent.²³

Prevent has comprised a mixture of educational and community initiatives conceived with the aim of building capacities within communities to deter radicalisation as a pathway to violence. It is buttressed by Channel, a multi-agency monitoring process of individuals reported by concerned professionals in settings such as schools and prisons as at risk of being radicalised into extremism and then violent extremism. Under the Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, Prevent was rolled out very quickly under the banner of Preventing Violent Extremism with the money spent on projects that were not always directly relevant to counter-radicalisation.²⁴ The government responded to criticisms that it had only focused on Islamic extremism by widening the scope of initiatives to include means of deterring white working class communities from support for a resurgent far-right making a bid for mainstream respectability through electioneering. This broadening of scope meant that the policy became increasingly enmeshed in policies based around community cohesion, leading to what Paul Thomas calls mission creep.²⁵

Prevent was reviewed by the Coalition Government with a view to narrowing the focus to the effective deterrence of violent extremism and with the intention of curtailing of funding entryism to Prevent initiatives by those whose ideas it was meant to be combatting.²⁶ An attempted "divorce" from community cohesion was achieved in part by cutting the budget for community cohesion in general,²⁷ but also by focusing only on Muslim communities (the designated "at-risk" areas being defined largely by demographic headcount).²⁸

The decentralised initiatives of the Labour-era Prevent policy allowed for both means and values versions of counter-radicalisation underpinning the work on offer. Since 2011, the revamped project has been limited to a values-based approach, principally encouraging adherence to "British values" and tackling opposition to those values. British values are defined as, "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas."²⁹ While this could arguably clarify what radicalisation is and how it occurs, the privileging of "bad ideology" explanations encourages reductionist checklist approaches that are easier and cheaper and which shift blame from

government and society towards the individual.³⁰ It also encourages what is actually a very broad focus on ideas and ideology generally rather than agitation for violent acts which allows for the ongoing conflation of radical, extreme, and violent.³¹ For example, the Home Office's e-learning package aimed at professionals wishing to familiarise themselves with individuals' counter-radicalisation journey is clear that the training offered, "addresses all forms of terrorism *and non-violent extremism*" (emphasis added).³²

Given the relatively young demographic involved in undertaking acts of violence at home and now signing up as foreign fighters in Asia and the Middle East, it was inevitable that educational settings would come under scrutiny as a potential site for radicalisation, alongside (and often in interaction with) the online world. The vision of educational institutions as a potential battleground where the "wrong" ideas can emerge but where they can also be neutralised, challenged, or at least observed and reported is therefore central to the legal duties now imposed upon Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and other public bodies. An attempt to challenge or supplant controversial ideas has not simply occurred since the rise of IS, but has been part of a gradual process taking place since the period after 9/11, and in particular the 7/7 bombings in London during 2005, in tandem with the increasing public acceptance of radicalisation as a mechanism for explaining engagement in terrorism and political violence. This initially took the form of attempts to develop a sense of common British values particularly in schools. For example the Ajegbo report³³ was commissioned with a view to incorporating British social and cultural history into the citizenship curriculum directly as a result of the anxiety about division and extremism provoked within the Labour Government by the 7/7 bombings.³⁴ The rise of IS, and the persistence of the (often "home-grown") threat posed to the West by individuals linked to Al Qaeda affiliated groups, has legitimised further moves towards more expansive counter-radicalisation initiatives across aspects of public life, particularly educational institutions.

Policy-makers have a more pervasive influence in terms of curriculum and strategy over compulsory levels of education and as the age to stay in education or training now stands at eighteen those at school or in post-16 provision are conceptualised as children. However, the imposition of the duty to prevent does not represent a new interest in the voluntary and higher sectors of education. For example, when Prevent was revamped in 2011 university campuses were listed in the strategy as an example of a public place that came under the heading of radicalising locations.³⁵ Therefore, the provisions of the Act as regarded higher education meant that what had previously been guidance is now "legally mandated" rather than that HEIs were receiving attention for the first time.³⁶ Recent evaluations of the performance of Further Education (FE) Colleges in implementing their Prevent duties have been carried out by the Office for Standards in Education.³⁷ It is conceivable that universities may face similar reviews by the forthcoming Office for Students (OfS) as part of the government's overhaul of the HE sector. The OfS will be responsible for regulating the HE sector, which includes oversight of the Prevent policy within the sector.³⁸

The idea that universities may be sites that create the opportunities for protest and engagement that can escalate into political violence is something that predates debates about radicalisation. The observation that "the terrorist is fundamentally an altruist"³⁹ because they are championing a cause chimes with the idealism and activism of young people on campus and was reflected, for example, in the new left wave of violence and its campus roots that produced groups such as the Red Army Faction and the Weather Underground.⁴⁰ What is different now about the presentation of universities as an arena

for fomenting terrorism is that understanding this as radicalisation encourages policy-makers to view students as passive and vulnerable, rather than active and engaged. The Association of Chief Police Officers issued advice to universities on radicalisation in 2012. This advice, while it acknowledged that “British terrorists linked to universities” (including the “underpants bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and Roshanara Choudhry who stabbed Stephen Timms MP) had not been radicalised at university, “the vulnerability to being radicalised of current and future students could be identified by staff and students with interventions created which could reduce their vulnerability.”⁴¹

As with the wider critique of radicalisation, the disproportionate and potentially alienating impact on Muslims students is advanced by those engaged in analysis of counter-radicalisation in UK higher education.⁴² Another key strand of criticism of the interaction between radicalisation and higher education in terms of counter-terrorism is concerned with this issue of passivity. Against a backdrop of market-led reforms that encourage universities (and students themselves) to understand the student as a passive consumer of education,⁴³ countering extremism is presented as an issue of safety and protection that HEIs should be carrying out on students’ behalf, thus cementing the idea of the “vulnerability” of students.⁴⁴ This touchstone of vulnerability is exemplified in the language borrowed from approaches to sexual exploitation of the young of grooming, removing autonomy, agency, and possibly inadvertently accountability from students.⁴⁵

Such understandings of how forces that radicalise might impact upon these passive recipients of ideas and processes show up neatly in the advice given to universities by ACPO which makes use of the consumerist trope of “the student experience” when it acknowledges that “attending student demonstrations are part of the culture of British HEIs and for many students, attending a student ‘demo’ is part of their university experience” and then goes on to warn that students may be lured into unlawful action during a protest that they may regret when it has an impact on a job application or an attempt to travel to the U.S.: thus, protecting the student from the consequences of actions while allowing them to act out a safe registering of their right to freedom of speech can be achieved if guidance is followed.⁴⁶ In addition, e-learning resources for those professionals looking to familiarise themselves with their new Prevent duties provide a clear example of the grooming dynamic of the radicaliser and radicalised with statements from young people about their interaction with their potential guide down the path to terrorism.⁴⁷

In light of this increasing body of official guidance of how radicalisation and counter-radicalisation occurs in a university setting (and the academic critique of these assumptions), the question arises of how the subjects of these anxieties and initiatives experience them and whether or not they are the passive conduits of manipulation and wider social forces. In undertaking research to find out what radicalisation means to students and assess its implications for these policies it is to be acknowledged that while the hypothesis that students might be capable of much more critical self-reflection than these models allow would fit with the critique of the new duty to prevent and to the assumptions of counter-radicalisation more widely. However, challenging notions of student passivity does not in itself discount the worth of some of these approaches or the value of using radicalisation as a means of understanding the roots of contemporary political violence. This also needs to be borne in mind when analysing student reactions and engagement.

Methodology

The data that this paper utilises comes from two focus groups conducted with undergraduate students on social science courses earlier this year. It has been recently noted that focus groups are a particularly useful method for studying “everyday narratives” and that a number of previous such studies have allowed scholars to appreciate “how a particular population or group process and negotiate meaning around a given situation.”⁴⁸ Since the point of the research was to ascertain student experiences and understandings, the use of focus groups engaging directly with the core demographic seemed particularly apposite. Furthermore, focus group methods are gaining increasing traction in the field of terrorism studies, having recently been deployed successfully in the study of terrorism, to elicit opinions on how terrorism should be countered, or explore “lay discourses” about terrorism.⁴⁹ One group were enrolled on a module about terrorism as part of their studies whereas members of the other group had received very little class material on topics related to terrorism and political violence. Of the twelve students (five female and seven male) who volunteered to take part, ten had grown up and been educated within a thirty-mile radius of the university, reflecting the localised recruitment pattern of a new university. Although new universities are also active in recruiting mature students, the groups also reflected the domination of the undergraduate cohort by recent school leavers with only one student over 25 taking part. The wider student body is an ethnically diverse one but only one non-white student, of South Asian heritage, participated in the project. Another student from a similar background failed to attend their scheduled focus group after initially agreeing to participate.

Radicalisation was only one element of our focus group. Our project is concerned more broadly with developing effective strategies for teaching terrorism as an emotive and controversial topic and supporting lecturers in facilitating open and productive discussion of the issues that surround the topic. However, although within advice that has been issued to HEIs on complying with counter-radicalisation initiatives the focus is on screening speakers and IT systems, there has been little said about how new legal duties might apply to teaching.⁵⁰ This has the potential to make both staff and students even more concerned about the implications of expressing opinions or asking and answering questions about contemporary threats, actors, and strategies. Therefore looking at what radicalisation means to students and how they perceive the role of universities in countering it, or possibly facilitating it, became a central element of the research. This paper develops this aspect by drawing out an analysis of three key themes: the understanding of radicalisation and counter-radicalisation among the student body; the potential impact of the radicalisation debate on the students as citizens of the university; and the potential impact of radicalisation of students based on other important aspects of their identity.

Students’ understanding of radicalisation

Talking to the students about what radicalisation meant to them, it was apparent that although the group varied in confidence when it came to articulating their understanding of the concept, the word had immediate resonance, which demonstrates its current pervasiveness. The definitions had obvious overlap with the way in which the concept has been presented by academic and policy-making proponents. For example, the sense of radicalisation as a path or process featured in the definitions that students offered:

It means having, being persuaded and taught by an extreme opinion to the point where they take it on board and reject any other opinion around it and then use that opinion in a very extreme and sometimes even violent way. (A9, male, 19)

I think it's just what I've heard in the news really, like people you know, being swayed by the wrong things on the internet and ... felt like they needed a thing to, to break away to, so they've gone radical to prove a point. (A2, female, 21)

Many of the definitions exhibited clear border issues with extremism, fitting Lipset and Raab's classic understanding of extremism as a monist worldview, which conceded no ground to more pluralist understandings of issues.⁵¹

I'd just say very extreme, like people, who to the point where people can be violent and they don't understand or listen to anyone else's ideas or opinions, they're just dead-set on their ideas and opinions and they don't listen to anyone else and they're not open. (A8, female, 20)

For me, it's the point on which someone's taken the viewpoint and which they're no longer able to formulate what the other side thinks in their own mind. And I wouldn't say like indoctrination but to the point where they can no longer see any other side but their own. (A5, male, 22)

Although there was some awareness of the need to separate extremism and violent extremism, this was not in itself enough to distance the concept from a general association with extremism.

I think for me like a radical is someone, they're not necessarily going to go and commit a violent act but they hold strong sympathy with people who do commit violent acts and they may try to egg people on and so that for me is a radical. (A4, male, 25)

Radicalisation as conceived in this discussion thus did represent a very broad understanding of the term which could bring those not engaging in violence into its orbit.

Another way in which the students' exploration of the term radicalisation mirrored debates elsewhere was a divide between values and means understanding of the roots of the process. Those following the means-based explanations (where wider social forces have exposed people to alienating experiences) were in the minority but the idea that radicalisation had a wider context beyond the individual was clear in their responses.

Nobody sits at home and just says oh, I'm gonna become radical. Like we said before it's how and what leads these people, was it issues of inequality, or racial issues or what led these people in the first place to decide that I don't want to be part of the democracy and I want to create something whether on the far right or Islamist tendencies, what would go from there and how to create this. (A6, male, 20)

I think it's very much like they feel a sense of injustice at something, a strong sense of injustice and because of that they have a massive backlash against a society or against, if you see what I'm saying, because they feel they've been either they've been treated unjustly or the people that they identify with have been treated unjustly. (A4, male, 25)

Those who laid emphasis on ideology/values presented an understanding of the process that mirrored more closely the "grooming" dynamics relied upon within UK policy-making around counter-radicalisation, in contrast with the greater agency attributed in the means-based explanations outlined above. In this, the students' understandings echo some of the key attributes within dominant academic models explaining pathways into terrorism, particularly those which place significant emphasis on active recruitment.⁵²

This holds true even for those students who have studied terrorism, and are aware of cases where there is little evidence of such active recruitment having taken place.

I think said very bluntly it's when a person is subject to more-or-less brainwashing, because I've yet to see a case where somebody just spontaneously was radicalised. It's often the case that there was a person or several people there, to sort of lead them into a certain direction and constantly bombard them with their concepts and ideas. (A10, female, 20)

I would say it's somebody who has been tempted or coaxed into some form of ideology that they otherwise wouldn't have ordinarily have considered and it, once they're in, within that ideology they, they ignore everything else around them and they concentrate on that one thing. And, you know, it can lead to behavioural changes in that person. (A7, female, 43)

When it came to counter-radicalisation policy, again the students varied in their knowledge of the topic but all had some broad awareness that this was an inherent part of contemporary UK counter-terrorism.

I know there are processes of deradicalisation but I don't actually know what they entail. I've just heard the name for them but I know that there's infiltrations into far-right and far-left groups as well as by policy and security forces. (A11, male, 20)

It's also worth mentioning that as well, there's a lot of informal things that have gone on to tackle deradicalisation like mosque leaders have often tried to make speeches to try and coax people away from radical ideas and coax people away from the having a good perspective on, you know, things like ISIS or terrorism or anything like that, so it's just like getting people away from that idea. (A9, male, 19)

While the overall discussion showed that students had picked up, regardless of whether or not radicalisation had been a formal topic of study for them, on the application of the concept to political ideologies (notably the far-right) and Islamism, as the discussion developed the awareness that Islamism was the principal focus of contemporary counter-radicalisation became clear.

You might be in danger of being accused of racially profiling people because terrorism as far as I'm aware isn't just a Middle-Eastern man in a bomb jacket blowing up a university, it can be the I[rish] R[epublican] A[rmy]⁵³ for example. So what if somebody says I support the IRA would you have to intervene and do something or if somebody says, you know, I support a neo-Nazi movement would you still intervene in that or does it not include it, if that makes sense. (A9, male, 19)

This awareness of Prevent's main focus can be found in comments by two different students revealing awareness of reasons for the extent of their knowledge. The students lived within ten miles of each other but they knew that community experience and knowledge of counter-radicalisation was related to living (or not living) in an area with a large number of Muslims and being (or not being) Muslim, which chimes with some of the findings of earlier research⁵⁴ on "suspect communities":

In real terms, other than learning about them in class, I've never seen any terrorist strategy in [home town] per se by the government and especially where I live in that we rarely ever see a police officer so terrorism in the real sense and those Prevent strategies are virtually non-existent because I've never seen or been affected, but I guess they wouldn't target the area that I live in per se. (A6, male, 20)

Well the big one in our area is Prevent. I think there's great disdain towards government schemes in our area especially, no-one really trusts any of 'em, which is yeah. Everyone just thinks they're out to victimise us. (A1, male, 21)

Radicalisation and the student community

When the students were asked about the potential impact of counter-radicalisation legislation on campus, there was some unease and references to Orwellian societies and lecturers being forced to police their students. However, there was in many ways a degree of surprise that such duties of care were being articulated and imposed because the assumption was that threat and risk was something academic authorities and students themselves should be managing as a matter of course.

I'm not sure I understand the specifics of Prevent because if someone say, you're in a classroom or whatever, that they're gonna go commit violence, my understanding is even if Prevent was not there you'd be kind of obligated to report them anyway or I'd be obligated to report them. (A4, male, 25)

Yeah, yeah, yeah. If somebody stood up in the class and said you know I want to attack people, the first thing you're gonna do is go to the police because you're in danger yourself. (A6, male, 20)

When students looked for the positives around the new "due regard" duty they immediately latched onto the theme of vulnerability which is one of the foundations upon which UK counter-radicalisation is now firmly built. The figure of "Jihadi John" was invoked and his social isolation ("he didn't really have much friends or a girlfriend so that kind of led him to go to somewhere where he feels like he has a place") was advanced as someone exhibiting indicators that could alert someone to the potential for radicalisation. There was little evidence of detailed knowledge of "Jihadi John's" personal circumstances, least of all the fact that he had two failed attempts at marriage before his departure for Syria, so was less isolated than many of his counterparts who have gone on to engage in terrorism.⁵⁵ And this idea of identifying and protecting the vulnerable seemed central to any positive slant on counter-radicalisation.

I think you've obviously got a lot of people who come to university who have left home, a lot of them they have, you know, vulnerabilities about them that may draw them into, or be more prone to being drawn into something and so I think that if there is some kind of safeguarding, coz everybody's different, you know it might be helpful to some people if they're feeling particularly vulnerable ... I'm not an expert but a lot of things that I've heard have drawn people into being radicalised have run along the fact that it's not just that they're evil people that they've, some of them are very vulnerable and obviously you have vulnerable people everywhere, whether it's at the university or in the workplace and so I think some kind of safeguarding would be good. (A7, female, 43)

The students will be protected from an ideology that might potentially be dangerous, so let's say a student is radicalised, they need to get to the centre of that radicalisation, help cut the ties between the student and that radicalisation centre and put something in place as an alternative, which will leave a positive impact as students won't want to be radicalised any more. (A9, male, 19)

When students were asked for their opinions of the possible negative impact of the new legislation, it became apparent that they did not characterise themselves as passive and

vulnerable. Instead, they were active and engaged with strong capacity for self-reflection and so should not be subjected unfairly to the curtailment of their intellectual curiosity.

I'm doing criminology and politics, I'm gonna be looking up stuff on terrorism. I'm gonna be looking up stuff on radicalisation and I would feel very annoyed if I couldn't, wasn't allowed to use the resources to find out the information because I want to make an informed decision on things... . Who's to say that the people who are deciding on this process will be able to sort the propaganda from, you know, the facts and realistically I think as a fairly bright person, you know, I should be able to make my own informed decision. I don't want someone else doing that for me. (A7, female, 43)

This gap between the passive and vulnerable recipient of radicalising forces, as depicted in Home Office Prevent training,⁵⁶ and students' self-perception of themselves as sceptical and discriminating suggests that it is easy to ascribe threat to someone experiencing a sense of dislocation from the community of active and confident citizens of the campus (thus, ironically, encouraging others to disassociate from people who are already finding university life difficult). It's also possible that as this picture of the passive lost soul is not based upon the complexity of the real lives of those who turn to violence, that it could be counter-productive in encouraging students to feel confident that there is no-one they interact with who fits the pattern of the person on their way to "pulling the trigger." This does tend to further undermine the theoretical basis underpinning contemporary models of radicalisation which are often highly deterministic.

What is interesting about the dichotomy between the passive-victim and the active-student is that the students who put themselves in the latter category feel that the university framework enables this agency and enquiry because it is already a safe place to face extreme and radical ideas.

I just think that university is supposed to feel like it's a safe place for you to be doing this kind of broadening of thoughts and reading and learning. (A3, female, 20)

I was just gonna mention about potential development and then sort of being exposed to different views in a safe environment, sort of helps you develop your own views and it sort of tempers both extremes I guess and if you censor it people like ISIS, social media accounts, they control the argument, they control the debate. (A1, male, 21)

I was gonna say that there are ways that academics can present kind of very extreme information to you like I say, even ideologies, very extreme ideologies, they can present those to you without endorsing them and then presenting kind of critiques to them. (A4, male, 25)

The idea that new legislation could create a surveillance culture online and in the classroom was seen as detrimental to this active engagement. Students who had completed coursework on the module for terrorism and conflict resolution spoke of the potential implications of researching groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or terrorism in general. The initial sense of the university as a hallowed space where controversial material can be accessed and debated was challenged, with specific reference to Mohammed Umar Farooq, the University of Staffordshire student who was flagged up as a cause for concern after a member of staff engaged him in conversation while he was reading textbooks on terrorism in the university library.

They'll only look at certain people's browsing history though, again like, obviously if they looked at us they'll be like oh, you're just doing it as research like, you wouldn't ... (A2, female, 21)

But then if you mention the case study of a university researcher who got pulled aside which sort of, cos I was doing exactly the same thing as him, I was cooped up in the library with a bunch of terrorist books just ... (A1, male, 21)

Looking around (A3, female, 20).

Yeah, like. But it could happen to any of us, it could've been like three of us with piles of terrorist books and someone could've gone off and been like what are those three planning? (A2, female, 21)

This sense of threat to the qualities of intellectual enquiry and critical self-reflection that students felt was central to how university facilitated their personal development presented a challenge to the student community as a whole. However, while the students dealt with the subject humorously there was clear acknowledgement that other markers of identity made student engagement with research into terrorism more problematic for some than others.⁵⁷ The conversation started with the British Asian participant from a Muslim background stating:

I usually do reading on the train and I could never do that with any of the terrorism books. That's just ... (A1, male, 21)

You'd get quite a few funny looks. I wouldn't do it on the underground or anywhere like that, you'd be like, everyone'd be off, you'd be ... (A2, female, 21)

With a briefcase as well. (A6, male, 20)

You'd be by yourself, it'd be the SWAT team coming in. (A2, female, 21)

I might get a seat though. (A1, male, 21)

[all laugh]

Miles of carriage empty. (A6, male, 20)

[all laugh]

For this student who started this conversation, knowing people who were wanted or had been convicted of terrorism offences, including a teenager for whom "it was his browsing data that got him convicted," the confidence that the student identity of keen and critical researcher was a shield against intrusion and judgement was clearly lower than other group members, even though the anxiety about monitoring and surveillance was shared.

There were other ways that issues of identity and how students felt their identities were perceived undermined their vision of a student community able to engage with a thorny issue such as contemporary terrorist threats because it was bounded by principles of openness and activism. In the opening section of the focus group, we explored with students issues and topics that they would define as controversial. Whilst it may have been expected that IS and Al Qaeda would emerge as among the more controversial subjects, it was the much more complex issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict which emerged as the topic that generated among the greatest unease about the tension that could be unleashed by full and frank discussion. One student remarked:

I often carry books around Uni as I'm reading it but I'm doing my dissertation on Israel and Palestine, well Israel and Zionist identity and I deliberately never carry books around to do

with Israel and Zionist identity and I deliberately never carry books around that have, you know, like say the Star of David on, the Israeli flag, I never carry those things around 'cos I know there's some people around who would not take kindly to these kinda things so I do deliberately modify my behaviour in that particular case. (A4, male, 25)

Whilst we did not get an opportunity to tease out the sense of threat and who presented the perceived threat in this case, it is clear that once other identities are overlaid on what is at first a general and clear discussion about security versus freedom, it becomes more problematic once the students involved take on less abstract characteristics. Furthermore, whilst policy-makers may focus on seeking to identify those on campus who access or seek to access publications linked to IS and Al Qaeda, fearing they may be “vulnerable” to radicalisation, the students themselves tend to see the Israel-Palestine conflict as the issue which may evoke strong, or indeed, extreme views among their colleagues though this did not mean they necessarily conflated that with violent threat.

Conclusion

The implementation of counter-radicalisation strategies has proved to be hugely controversial and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act's “due regard” duty has highlighted why there is so much unease about government policy. Guidance to those looking to familiarise themselves with the duty highlights the nature of the wide net cast with its checklist of indicators problematizing everyday behaviours in young people from “becoming disrespectful” to “absenteeism” and the use of the grooming model with its emphasis on predators offering easy solutions to the lost.⁵⁸

As Saeed and Johnson point out, vigilance against groups in order to disrupt their plans for using university students and spaces to meet violent ends is a good aim but alienating academics and stigmatising Muslim students is most likely to estrange potential allies.⁵⁹ Furthermore, Richards argues that Prevent's ideological focus turns any activity in pursuit of an extremist cause into the problem, writing off lots of people unjustly as a threat.⁶⁰ It has to be said, however, that the effect of the Act and the due regard duty may not be the imposition of an iron fist on campus life and academic ideals. As Durodié has suggested, this may well turn out to be the latest initiative where governments act in order to be seen to act and universities audit in order to be seen to comply.⁶¹

What our research with students themselves suggests is that they hold universities in high esteem because they regard them as spaces for intellectual enquiry and development. Any external interference in this would be resented, especially as it is clear that students actually take it for granted that figures of authority within universities should and already do take responsibility for threats to their welfare. There does not appear to be any evidence of the feared “chilling effect” regarding students' desire to engage in discussions about terrorism.⁶² Neither does it appear to have instilled in them a fear of risky intellectual inquiry which may, including by overzealous counter-terrorism professionals, be viewed as exhibiting the signs of vulnerability to radicalisation. The tendency, in this sample, to seek to avoid or tread carefully around certain topics has less to do with counter-radicalisation initiatives, and more to do with the controversy and emotive nature of debate around issues, such as Israel and Palestine, which have long preceded the introduction of radicalisation as a concept, and attempts to prevent it in practice.

Even a larger scale project of qualitative research would not by itself challenge the current dominance of radicalisation in policy-making circles, but what those interested in

understanding contemporary terrorist threats should take away from this research is that the grooming model approach insults the wider body of students and is indeed alienating and counter-productive. Even for those who take on board the language of vulnerability, they are conceptualising a threat that may not be found in real life. Whilst more research in this area is needed before reaching a definitive judgement, our results suggest that the focus on, and fears about, university students as part of an all-encompassing counter-radicalisation strategy may be based more on instinct than empirical evidence.

As our student based in a Prevent Priority Area said of near neighbours who had gone to fight in Syria, “They didn’t seem that radical in all honesty, they were just normal teenagers to a large extent.” This, in turn, calls into question the government’s own Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+) which seek to identify those who may be at risk of radicalisation.⁶³ Indeed, the vast majority of some of these supposed indicators such as “a need for identity meaning and belonging” or the desire for “status” or “adventure” are so broad as to be potentially useless in distinguishing a “normal teenager” from a proto-extremist.

Recently, there have been calls on the government to publish the evidence behind its Prevent strategy. One such call, in a report from the Royal College of Psychiatrists, has demanded that the evidence which underpins counter-radicalisation policy be published and subjected to rigorous peer-review. The report points out that no tools “have been developed that can reliably identify people who have been radicalised, who are at risk of radicalisation or who are likely to carry out a terrorist act.”⁶⁴ This, it is feared, can result in some individuals erroneously being referred to the Channel programme, in cases where there is no actual risk to public security. If that is so, there is surely a risk that further such erroneous referrals might result from the imposition of the due regard duty in institutions of higher education, despite a paucity of evidence that students are particularly vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism. If anything, our research suggests that such students may be more resilient to the case made by extremists than some policy makers have supposed.

Encouraging students to feel comfortable to challenge and explore issues around terrorism in terms of both its social and its ideological context does not have to run counter to encouraging people to identify and understand threats. Despite the increasing emphasis on “campus radicalisation,” in the UK and beyond, there is little evidence that contemporary counter-radicalisation policy is particularly well-designed to identify those at risk of becoming involved in terrorism. The implications for counter-terrorism policy makers across the globe are obvious, and suggest a re-assessment of some of the core assumptions underpinning contemporary practice would be timely and relevant. As one student concluded:

One of the problems with theories of radicalisation is that none of them can really fully explain a kind of complex social world so they’re all kind of slight over-simplifications and then the policies are based on those. I would just say it would be better for the government to focus on, you know, maintaining its status as a kind of liberal democracy (A4, male, 25)⁶⁵

Funding

This research was funded by University of Huddersfield.

ORCID

Shaun McDaid  <http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8015-6475>

Notes on contributors

Catherine McGlynn is Senior Lecturer in Politics, affiliated with the Division of Criminology, Politics & Sociology at University of Huddersfield in Queensgate. *Shaun McDaid* is Lecturer in Politics, affiliated with the Division of Criminology, Politics & Sociology at University of Huddersfield in Queensgate.

Notes

1. HM Government, *Counter-Terrorism and Security Act* (London, UK: HMSO, 2015).
2. The literature on radicalisation, and pathways into political violence, is broad, but among the most commonly cited scholarly works include Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33; Max Taylor and John Horgan, "A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18 no. 4 (2006): 585–601; Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011): 7–36; Fathali M. Moghaddam, "The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration," *American Psychologist* 60, no. 2 (2005): 161–9.
3. For the elusiveness of the concept, see Rik Coolsaet, *All Radicalisation Is Local: The Genesis and Drawbacks of an Elusive Concept* (Brussels, Belgium: Egmont Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016); Mark Sedgwick, "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22, no. 4 (2010): 479–94.
4. For accounts of the rise of Islamic State, see e.g., Patrick Cockburn, *The Jihadis Return* (New York, NY: OR Books, 2014); Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2015).
5. Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror* (London, UK: William Collins, 2015), 78–93.
6. Robert Verkaik, *Jihadi John: The Making of a Terrorist* (London, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2016).
7. Rod Thornton, "Counterterrorism and the Neo-liberal University: Providing a Check and Balance?," *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 3 (2011): 421–29; Quilliam Foundation, *Quilliam Briefing Paper, Radicalisation on British University Campuses: A Case Study* (London, UK: Quilliam Foundation, 2010).
8. HM Government, *Prevent Strategy* (London, UK: HMSO, 2011), 95.
9. Coolsaet, *All Radicalisation Is Local* (see note 3 above), 16; Arun Kundnani, "Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept," *Race & Class* 54, no. 2 (2012): 3–25.
10. Home Office, "E-learning on Prevent," www.elearning.prevent.homeoffice.gov.uk (accessed June 1, 2016).
11. Home Office, *Prevent Strategy* (see note 8 above), 108.
12. See e.g., Taylor and Horgan, "A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist" (see note 2 above); McCauley and Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization" (see note 2 above); Fathali M. Moghaddam, *From the Terrorists' Point of View* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Mitchell D. Silber, Arvin Bhatt, and Senior Intelligence Analysts, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat* (New York, NY: New York Police Department, 2007).
13. Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism" (see note 2 above); Michael J. Williams, John G. Horgan, and William P. Evans, "The Critical Role of Friends in Networks for Countering

- Violent Extremism: Toward a Theory of Vicarious Help-Seeking,” *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 8, no. 1 (2016): 45–65.
14. R. K. Cragin, “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 2 (2014): 337–53.
 15. John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism* (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2009).
 16. Anthony Richards, “From Terrorism to ‘Radicalisation’ to ‘Extremism’: Counterterrorism Imperative or Loss of Focus,” *International Affairs* 91, no. 2 (2015): 371–80.
 17. Coolsaet, *All Radicalisation Is Local* (see note 3 above); Floris Vermeulen, “Suspect Communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin and London,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no. 2 (2014): 286–306.
 18. Paul Thomas, “Divorced but Still Co-habiting? Britain’s Prevent/Community Cohesion Policy Tension,” *British Politics* 9, no. 4 (2014): 472–93.
 19. Vermeulen, “Suspect Communities” (see note 17 above).
 20. Peter R. Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalisation,” *International Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2013): 873–93.
 21. Richards, “From Terrorism to ‘Radicalisation’” (see note 16 above).
 22. Robert Savage, *The BBC’s Irish Troubles: Television, Conflict and Northern Ireland* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2015).
 23. HM Government, *CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism* (London, UK: HMSO, 2011).
 24. Lorenzo Vidino and James Brandon, *Countering Radicalisation in Europe* (London, UK: International Centre for Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2012).
 25. Paul Thomas, “Failed and Friendless: The UK’s Preventing Violent Extremism Programme,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 12, no. 3 (2010): 442–58.
 26. Vidino and Brandon, *Countering Radicalisation in Europe* (see note 24 above).
 27. Thomas, “Divorced but Still Co-habiting” (see note 18 above).
 28. For a critique see, e.g., Arun Kundnani, *Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism* (London, UK: Institute of Race Relations, 2009).
 29. Cabinet Office, *Tackling Extremism in the UK: Report from the Prime Minister’s Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism* (London, UK: HMSO), 1.
 30. Coolsaet, *All Radicalisation Is Local* (see note 3 above).
 31. Richards, “From Terrorism to ‘Radicalisation’ to ‘Extremism’” (see note 16 above).
 32. Home Office, “E-learning on Prevent” (see note 10 above).
 33. Department for Education and Skills, *Curriculum Review: Diversity and Citizenship* [Ajegbo Report] (London, UK: HMSO, 2007).
 34. Audrey Osler, “Citizenship Education and the Ajegbo Report: Re-imagining a Cosmopolitan Nation,” *London Review of Education* 6, no. 8 (2008): 11–25.
 35. Home Office, *Prevent Strategy* (see note 8 above).
 36. Bill Durodié, “Securitising Education to Prevent Terrorism or Losing Direction?,” *British Journal of Educational Studies* 64, no. 1 (2016): 24.
 37. Ofsted, *How Well Are Further Education and Skills Providers Implementing the ‘Prevent’ Duty?* (Manchester, UK: Ofsted, 2016).
 38. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, *Success as a Knowledge Economy: Teaching Excellence, Social Mobility & Student Choice* (London, UK: HMSO, 2016), 85.
 39. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 37.
 40. For the Red Army Faction see Stefan Aust, *The Baader-Meinhof Complex* (London, UK: Random House, 2008); for comparisons of the RAF with the Weather Underground, see Jeremy P. Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
 41. Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), *Prevent, Police and Universities: Guidance for Police Officers Staff to Help Higher Education Institutions Contribute to the Prevention of Terrorism* (London: ACPO, 2012), 30. For more on Choudhry, see Elizabeth Pearson, “The

- Case of Roshonara Choudhry: Implications for Theory on Online Radicalization, ISIS Women, and the Gendered Jihad,” *Policy and Internet* 8, no. 1 (2016): 5–33.
42. See Tania Saeed and David Johnson, “Intelligence, Global Terrorism and Higher Education: Neutralising Threats or Alienating Allies,” *British Journal of Educational Studies* 64, no. 1 (2016): 37–51; Katherine E. Brown and Tania Saeed, “Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation at British Universities: Muslim Encounters and Alternatives,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 38, no. 11 (2015): 1952–68.
 43. Mike Molesworth, Elizabeth Nixon, and Richard Scullion, “Having, Being and Higher Education: The Marketisation of the University and the Transformation of the Student into Consumer,” *Teaching in Higher Education* 14, no. 3 (2009): 277–87.
 44. Aislinn O’Donnell, “Securitisation, Counterterrorism and the Silencing of Dissent: The Educational Implications of Prevent,” *British Journal of Educational Studies* 64, no. 1 (2016): 53–76; Brown and Saeed, “Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation” (see note 42 above).
 45. Durodié, “Securitisating Education” (see note 36 above), 27.
 46. ACPO, *Prevent, Police and Universities* (see note 40 above), 31.
 47. Home Office, “E-learning on Prevent” (see note 10 above).
 48. Liam Stanley, “Using Focus Groups in Political Science and International Relations,” *Politics* 36, no. 3 (2016): 236–49.
 49. See, e.g., Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, “What Would You Do? Everyday Conceptions and Constructions of Counter-terrorism,” *Politics* 36, no. 3 (2016): 277–91; Richard Jackson and Gareth Hall, “Talking about Terrorism: A Study of Vernacular Discourse,” *Politics* 36, no. 3 (2016): 292–307.
 50. Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), *Monitoring of the Prevent Duty*, <http://www.hefce.ac.uk/reg/prevent/framework/> (accessed May 20, 2016).
 51. Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, *The Politics of Unreason: Right-wing Extremism in the USA* (London, UK: Heinemann, 1971).
 52. The notion of grooming into terrorism is prominent explicitly or implicitly in accounts such as McCauley and Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization” (see note 2 above) and Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism” (see note 2 above).
 53. The IRA fought an almost thirty-year separatist campaign to take Northern Ireland out of the UK and into a united Ireland. See Richard English, *Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA* (London, UK: Pan Macmillan, 2003).
 54. Mary J. Hickman, Lynn Thomas, Henri C. Nickels, and Sara Silvestri, “Social Cohesion and the Notion of ‘Suspect Communities’: A Study of the Experiences and Impacts of being ‘Suspect’ for Irish Communities and Muslim Communities in Britain,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5, no. 1 (2012): 89–106; for the term as originally applied to the Irish community in the UK during the 1970s and 1980s, see Paddy Hillyard, *Suspect Community: People’s Experience of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain* (London, UK: Pluto Press, 1993).
 55. See Verkaik, *Jihadi John* (see note 6 above); Sami Moubayed, *Under the Black Flag: At the Frontier of the New Jihad* (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 2015), 139–42.
 56. Home Office, “E-learning on Prevent” (see note 10 above).
 57. For discussion of Muslim students’ experiences on British university campuses, see Peter Hopkins, “Towards Critical Geographies of the University Campus: Understanding the Contested Experiences of Muslim Students,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36, no. 1 (2011): 157–69.
 58. Home Office, “E-learning on Prevent” (see note 10 above).
 59. Saeed and Johnson, “Intelligence, Global Terrorism and Higher Education” (see note 42 above).
 60. Richards, “From Terrorism to ‘Radicalisation’ to ‘Extremism’” (see note 16 above), 148.
 61. Durodié, “Securitisating Education” (see note 36 above).
 62. See, e.g., David Miller, Tom Mills, and Steven Harkins, “Teaching about Terrorism in the United Kingdom: How It Is Done and What Problems It Causes,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 2, no. 3 (2011): 405–20.

63. Institute for Race Relations, "Prevent and the Children's Rights Convention," http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IRR_Prevent_Submission.pdf (accessed July 14, 2016).
64. Royal College of Psychiatrists, "Counter-terrorism and Psychiatry," Position Statement (PS04/16), (September 2016), 5–6.
65. This student's observation echoes much earlier arguments concerning the efficacy of counter-terrorism policy in liberal democracies, despite claims by some scholars of a stark divide between "orthodox" and "critical" terrorism studies approaches. See, e.g., Paul Wilkinson, "Pathways out of Terrorism for Democratic Societies," in Eric Moonman, ed., *The Violent Society* (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 138–54. See also John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle, "A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies,'" *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008): 51–64.