The applicability of modern political science aproaches to the study of Chinese politics

Lucian W. Pye

The Applicability of Modern Political Science Approaches to the Study of Chinese Politics

by

Lucian W. Pye

Merely to raise the question of the appropriateness of the social sciences for the study of China is to suggest that China is somehow different from all other societies. It is, of course, the pretension of the social sciences that they are a true science and hence universal in scope, unbounded by time or place. Needless to say it is also the pretension of China-admirers, if not the Chinese themselves, that China is unique, sui generis, among all cultures. What are the limits of the social sciences, and how different is China?

Therefore, before we can ever confront substantive questions about what might be some interesting and frontier advancing questions in the study of China which can be dealt with by the newer techniques of the social sciences, we must first respond to the basic issue of the appropriateness of combining the social sciences and China studies by analyzing three propositions:

(1) Sinology is the most valid approach to understanding China, and since Sinology is a humanistic discipline, developed before the advent of modern social science, the approach of the social sciences to the study of China must be inferior and represent a lower grade

of scholarship.

(2) The social sciences are preeminently empirical disciplines, and since it is impossible to obtain extensive or accurate data with respect to contemporary China, it is inappropriate even to attempt to apply the methods of modern social science to the study of China.

(3) The concepts of the social sciences, developed in Western, liberal societies, have an inherent "conservative" bias, and hence cannot treat objectivity, or more importantly, with true understanding the "revolutionary" processes basic to Communist China.

To the extent that any of these propositions are valid we must recognize the limited applicability of the social sciences for studying Communist China. But before we deal with these three propositions or arguments, it may be helpful to pause briefly in order to dispense with the question of definitions; at least to the extent of clarifying what we mean by the modern social sciences. For some people the social sciences mean no more than clear and disciplined thinking about human problems, while for others the social sciences demand at the least a quantitative approach and explicit theoretical formulations. That is to say, some are expansive in welcoming all to the fraternity while others want to be exclusive and have high expectations of great pay offs if rigor and sophistication are properly combined.[1] There is no end to such a debate, and therefore for the sake of maximum relevance for what we shall be dealing with in this analysis

we should settle on a notion of the social sciences that falls between these two extremes. If we were too generous with our definition, we would probably be able to fudge most of the issues with which we want to cope seriously; if we are too demanding and take a perfectionist's view of the social sciences, then we will also be able to avoid all issues by noting that nothing in practice can meet our theoretical or abstract standards.[2]

Therefore, to resolve all these questions and ensure that we are confronting serious questions let us use a pragmatic definition and say that by the social sciences we have in mind that which meets the standards of respectability in the discipline of political science, sociology, economics, and social psychology. This means that our basic question is whether scholars working on China can meet the standards conventional to the disciplines and conversely whether the respected methods widely employed in these disciplines can be effectively applied with respect to China. In this way we can be modest in our claims for what are the social science methods while still insisting on meaningful standards, and thus pose the problem as far as China studies at the most difficult level.

Let us now turn to the three propositions or arguments.

Sinology is the Only Road to Understanding

This is not the appropriate place for a recounting of the intellectual history of the remarkable discipline of Sinology. We need only note a few distinctive features in the development

of that field of study. First of all, Sinology, more than any of the other esoteric fields of study defined by geography and a distinct history, was influenced by what scholars in that area did. Whereas neither Africanists nor Egyptologists were influenced by indigenous "scholarship" in their respective areas, the early Western Sinologists did feel that they had, as a start at least, to meet the requirements which the Chinese placed on themselves. Aside from scholarship defined by a religion, such as Islamic and Buddhist studies, Sinology was remarkable in the degree to which as a Western discipline took its early cues for defining scholarship from the culture that was being studied. Traditional Chinese scholarship was impressive, and Western students easily accepted the idea that they too ought to become fully knowledgable in the Chinese classics and in command of traditional Chinese philosophy, literature and history.[3]

In time, however, it turned out that Chinese scholarship, while highly demanding and almost impossible to completely master, did not, in fact, contain within it the intellectual structure generally associated with a modern academic discipline. Or at least not a scientific discipline. As this became increasingly clear, the tendency, at the same rate, was to define Sinology in terms of linguistic competence. He who knew the Chinese language was accepted as a Sinologist. This was not entirely unreasonable because at one time language training did mean not only a command of contemporary Chinese, but also classical Chinese, and in the process of learning these two languages the student could be expected to learn a great deal more

about Chinese philosophy, history, culture and social practices. Anyone who was so dedicated as to learn such difficult languages could be assumed to be a reasonable expert on anything dealing with China.

Thus in time Sinology evolved in a paradoxical manner: The sole criteria of admission to the discipline was the attainment of linguistic competence, but once accepted into the fraternity, the Sinologist was assumed to be equally knowledgeable about all aspects of China and its history. Increasingly, over recent years the relevance of classical Chinese has become less and less for understanding contemporary developments. As the Chinese moved away from their classical traditions the need to know both classical and contemporary Chinese languages declined. Since it is not so difficult to learn modern Chinese, particularly with newer methods of training, this left Sinology without a clear basis for claiming to be a discipline. After all, how is it possible to have a discipline based on criterion that the millions of Chinese routinely fulfill.

Once the mystique of language competence was challenged, Sinology had difficulty asserting itself as a separate field of study.[4] It was universally agree in American universities that at the level of the doctorate there could be no field of Sinology, but rather China specialists would have to meet the standards of an established discipline. This requirement for specialization has ended all pretensions that anyone can be uniformally competent ir all aspects of China. At the most, Sinology has had to settle on being only one among many disciplines dealing with China, and

and therefore courtesy if not prudence sets limits on how far afield a Sinologist can properly go in criticizing the work of other specialists on China.

The shrinking domain of Sinology is thus a function of the increasing specialization of knowledge which is universal in all fields. At one time there were only "natural scientists" who could speak with authority about matters of biology, botany, chemistry and physics, but no more. And so it is with the study of China. This is not to deny that in their time a few Sinologists were truely remarkable intellectuals with a broad grasp of many facets of a great civilization. But if at present someone were to appeal to that tradition in order to pass judgments on the work of other specialists, he would only be making a fool of himself.

In general, therefore, there has been a maturing of outlooks on the study of China so that at present there are recognized as valid many approaches, and each must show the tolerance and respect for each other that is the essential spirit of civility which makes a modern university possible. In short, the history of China studies very nearly matches that of the evolution of the modern university. At one time the Western university was built around philosophy and theology, then gradually the humanities and speculative fields emerged, and finally there came the additions of science and engineering. So has the work on China progressed from an attraction with philosophy, literature and history, to work in sociology, political science, economics, and psychology. Each field can benefit from work done in the other,

but certainly we are past the point of speaking about some as being "superior" to others.

Therefore, on the grounds of how knowledge tends to grow through specialization, we can dismiss as inappropriate, inaccurate, and even uncivil the suggestion that there is no place for social science methods because of the impressive earlier traditions of Sinology.

Social Science Without Empirical Data

A second argument that has been raised about the appropriateness of social science methods for the study of contemporary China is based on the two undeniable facts that (1) the social sciences are empirical in nature, and (2) it is hard to be sure of any facts for such a secretive and isolated country as China is. Is there enough evidence to test hypotheses or more elaborate models of aspects of Chinese society and economy? On the face of it it might seem that there is much truth in such an objection. When scholars are not free to go about, observe, collect data, and fully trust the integrity of others who collect data it would seem that the environment necessary for the practice of the social sciences does not exist. Certainly scholars should always be vigilant in doing all they can to see that the spread of such negative conditions for their work does not take place.

Yet, the test of whether conditions with respect to China are so bad as to make any social science attempts questionable is in fact an empirical matter. And on this score the evidence is, in my judgment, that through great efforts and much patience

it is possible to obtain critical data and hence engage in social science work on China. Generally we are unable to do ideal forms of study, but with ingenuity it has been possible to use second, third, and even lower orders of quality of information to obtain results which over the years have proved to be remarkably accurate.[5]

No doubt this problem of lack of access and the need to select information that has been filtered through official government channels has had some biasing effects on scholarship about China. Other developing countries in Asia and Africa that are more open have in recent years begun to wonder whether their image might not be greatly improved if they were to force Western scholars to rely more upon the kinds of sources which China scholars have been using. It is debatable what our picture of India, for example, would be if we were limited to statements of the Government of India, interviews with refugees, and reports of tours; it is not debatable that many governments such as that of India believe that their interests are better served by increasing the restrictions on foreign scholars.

It is depressing, even if understandable, that some Asian and African scholars have been developing theories about the "neo-colonialist" character of modern social science research in their countries. (The charge is, of course, that foreign scholars come and "extract" data, with the help of local "accomplices" or "compradores," which is then taken back to the "mother country" to be "processed" and then the finished "product" is "exported" back to the "victimized" country -- the same model presumably as went with economic colonialism.) Aside from the questionable applicability

of the analogy, such critics generally overlook the basic fact that these very Western social scientists are usually the best friends that such countries have abroad, and even though at times what they write may be painful, they are generally, on balance, the most sympathetic spokesmen for the various Afro-Asian countries in the West. If these ideologically oriented, nationalist scholars should have their way and reduce the international character of social science research, it is hard to imagine who would be left to say a credible good word for such countries. It is, on the other hand, an ironic fact that scholars working on China, who have been denied all access to field research or to solid data, have shown possibly more "understanding" of the problems of that government than scholars working on other developing areas have shown toward their respective governments, and this no doublt feeds the theory of the "anti-neocolonial struggle in the social sciences." But we must return to the basic issue of the possibility of doing effective social science research in spite of the difficulties of obtaining data. A case can be made that the very shortage of data has, paradoxically, encouraged more realistic work on China than often takes place when scholars, inundated with a surfeit of "data" engage in elaborate "manipulations" with little regard to what may be the reality behind their "data." Precisely because of the problem of limited access to information scholars have had to weigh with great care the plausibility of all data they receive. For the student of contemporary China the first matter of importance is to arrive at a solid sense of what is "reality" in China; he cannot engage in merely the testing of isolated hypotheses or the unthinking manipulations of large bodies

of data.[6]

In more open societies questions about the general dimensions of "reality" are taken for granted. Yet even under such conditions studies seem, to the more critical eye, to be dealing with abstractions because the "data" does not seem to be related to what others understand as "reality." In the case of Chinese studies there may be sharp differences as to what are the "realities" in China, but there is a uniform concern with getting at "reality" before engaging in more elaborate speculative studies.

Hence a strange paradox: one might have expected that given the shortage of solid data for China the tendency in Chinese studies might have been to accentuate speculative theories and avoid more descriptive analysis, while in other more open developing countries one might have expected more immediate empirical analysis and less imaginative theory building. Yet in fact the record of recent years has been precisely the opposite. Social science work on China hs not yielded much in the way of theoretical contributions to social science, while work on the new states has contributed greatly to the growth of a more theoretically sophisticated comparative politics.[7] My suspicion as to why this should have been the case is that the student of China has felt that he could not indulge in theoretical speculations before he discovers what are the basic "facts" about Communist China.

In any case, what is impressive has been the skill with which students of China have over the last decades pieced together information about China which has provided a general picture of conditions and processes which have proved to hold up very well in the

light of more recent travellers' reports.[8] There has to some degree been a danger that working with limited information scholars would begin to create their own plausibility model of China reconfirming each other's views and discounting possibilities that did not confirm with their consensus. This danger has not been entirely avoided and novel interpretations have not been as welcomed as possibly they should have been.

Yet, in sum, the evidence is that it has been possible to have a lively and highly realistic social science about Chinese questions and therefore the shortage of data has not eliminated the relevance of social science methods for the study of China.

Revolutionary Society and "Conservative" Social Science

The third major objection to the value of modern social science methods for work on China is that Chinese society is involved in a profound revolution while the social sciences contain within them an inherently conservative bias. The logic for this argument is, first, that the dominant concepts of the social sciences stress the understanding of stability and order rather than revolutionary change -- such concepts as "consensus," "culture," "equilibrium," "legitimacy," and the like are most frequently cited.[9] The second, and less impressive, argument is that those who dominate the sociology (and the politics) of the social sciences belong to the "establishment" in that they have a vested interest in their positions and thus either consciously or unconsciously they have built their theories upon anti-revolutionary assumptions. This view is usually the self-serving nonsense of

self-proclaimed revolutionaries who have not demonstrated their capacity to do effective social science studies on any problem. Such attacks on the presumed unconscious biases of an entire group of people, particularly when no specific evidence is presented, is unworthy of discussion.

Intellectually there can be a legitimate question as to whether the concepts basic to social science have not emerged out of settings so different from that of revolutionary China as to be inappropriate and hence misleading. This is a part of the more general argument which says that "Western" social science concepts cannot be effectively employed in studying non-Western societies which are based on quite different assumptions and operate according to different concepts from those of the West.[10]

Whether the charge is that the social sciences are not adequate to study revolution or that they cannot cope with non-Western cultures, the underlying assumption is that the social sciences are more parochial then they presume to be. In some degree this charge is probably valid in that while most social scientists conceive of themselves as dealing in universalistic terms, they more often than not are in practice generalizing from their more immediate experiences which tend to be of a parochial nature, bound by Western and relatively stable society.[11] Granted this limitation, the question is what are the viable alternatives. The rhetoric of revolution quite properly is not precise and thus not appropriate for disciplined analysis. Even professional revolutionaires in their esoteric communications and their serious analysis of realities do not allow themselves to be blinded by the rhetoric of propaganda.[12] Similarly those who argue philosophically that the concepts of contemporary social science are ethnocentric still have to end up by casting their case in the language of the social sciences because there seem to be no other body of rigorous and precisely defined concepts which can be employed in social analysis.

The suggestion that the social sciences are inherently "conservative" is of very recent origin, and may not be long enduring. The more traditional charge, endlessly made by state legislators and trustees responsible for funding universities, has been that the social scientists have consistently opposed rather than supported the status quo, and that the guise of scientific neutralism, which goes back, of course, to the writings of Karl Marx, has been used primarily as a way of disguising attacks on existing social conventions.[13]

Such recent debates aside, the facts of contemporary research on China suggest that social scientists have not had troubles with their concepts as far as understanding change and continuity in China. The Chinese vacillated greatly in their policies and their system has gone through periods of violent upheavals and relative stability. The concepts of Western students of China have been able to keep up, and at times get ahead of, this pattern of change and stability. Frequently Western concepts as applied to China have turned out to be more "revolutionary" than Chinese realities. For example, during the Cultural Revolution some Western observers were saying that the Chinese view of economic development did not include the "Western" concepts of expanding GNP and increasing levels of production, but

NO!

Fn to Gurley incorrect

rather a goal of equality and non-material concerns.[14] Yet as soon as order was restored the Chinese were anxious for all the world to learn about their accomplishments in raising production in all fields. Like most cases where forecasts about China have gone wrong there is nothing in this example to suggest that it was the inadequacy of Western thinking that was at fault; it was only that the Chinese, as so often, had changed their emphasis and their apparent policies.

Prospects for the Future

Hopefully the discussion of the above three questions has brought some reassurance for those concerned with the application of social science to the study of China. For those strongly opposed to the social sciences for whatever reasons, there is probably little that can be said which would alter their views. Needless to say, the test of the utility of the social sciences has to be the quality of work done on China, and on this score I believe any impartial evaluation would suggest that contemporary scholarship on China is the equal to all and superior to most other area studies. And what is more important, quality seems to be going up at an impressive rate.

Let us therefore in the space that remains seek to identify promising trends for future social science work on China.

First a few comments about the role of economics. In the 1950's when the Chinese were publishing "figures" to help describe their claimed accomplishments, Western scholars began to review the "statistics" first with skepticism, but then with greater

conviction, partly on the grounds that the Chinese officials would need figures and they probably would not be inclined to create a second set purely for the purpose of propaganda -- this in spite of the proverbial Chinese businessman's practice of keeping a second set of books for the tax collector. In any case, just when the economists were sucessful in convincing foundation sources of the possibilities of major research based on Chinese data, the Chinese, in the Great Leap aftermath, decided to withhold publication of all future figures. Consequently, the economists spent the decade of the 1960's working over the 1950's materials, which are now pretty well exhausted.[15]

Ironically, as China opens up more to the world she both wants more foreign trade and great need for secrecy on economic matters, if not for conventional Communist reasons, then for commercial barganing reasons. Thus, at a time when China is becoming more involved in world trade, the prospects for detailed analysis of the Chinese economy do not look bright. The fact that more visitors can go to China means that we shall have more impressionistic statements about the state of the Chinese economy, many of which will reflect mainly the predisposition of the observer. The desire not to offend the Chinese, whether by traders seeking more business, or by scholars desiring another visit, may also color the reports on observable conditions. In the meantime, the Chinese authorities should have no difficulty in keeping to themselves critical information.[16]

On the other hand, the increased involvement of the Chinese in foreign trade will mean that they will have to show their hand in limited areas. What they are ready to buy and sell, in what amounts and under what terms can provide us with significant information about many of their practices and policy dispositions. Trade practices have shown already that they are prepared to compromise their long standing pronouncements about "self-sufficiency" and the avoidance of all "indebtedness."

What all this means is that we are likely, in the next few years ahead, to learn a great deal about features of the Chinese economy, some of their policies and practices; but we are less likely to be able to conduct the kind of macro-economic analyses which lies at the heart of much of modern economic theory building. Even if the Chinese should begin again to tease us with some figures, it would probably not be prudent to reignite our ambitions of the late 1950's and seek to do large scale studies of the economy. Rather the more promising course at this time would seem to be institutional or sector studies which can take advantage of descriptive information about planning processes and changes in substantive policies.[17]

In recent years there has been a significant increase in sociological studies which focus on particular localities.[18] It is interesting that whereas Soviet studies have concentrated more on leadership matters and produced the art of Kremlinology, Chinese studies have dealt more with local matters. In part this has been due to the fact that until the Cultural Revolution there seemed to be little in the way of leadership issues in China; in part the

difference must also be attributed to the fact that China watchers and researchers located in Hong Kong have been able to obtain far more data on the effects of policies than on the politics of decision-making.[19] Refugees come predominately from Kwangtung and their perspective on the system is largely a parochial one.

The availability of rich local data extends to before the Communist period and thus it is not surprising that one of the most recent developments has been the historic study of particular towns and cities.[20] By limiting analysis to the history of a specific community, it is possible for the analysts to gain both a greater sense of concreteness and better control over variables. The careful observation of how the same community, with the same resource base and the definite tradition of social organization, has reacted to industrialization and revolution offers great promise for the advancement of both China studies and social science theory.

Running through most social science studies have been the two great themes of modernization and revolution. For some time there have been very loosely defined themes and there has been a great deal of casual and undisciplined writing about the Chinese "revolution." More recently there have been some major efforts to make more precise the exact dynamics of social change and "revolution." Chalmers Johnson paved the way with his study which suggested that nationalism was more important than social or economic conditions.[21] Mark Sheldon has sought to demonstrate that economic changes and class tensions were more important in the Communist's rise to power.[22] Roy Hofheinz has indicated that the relationships of all the "revolution producing variables" is

far more complex and differs from place to place.[23] Although controversy still reigns, these and other efforts have placed the social science analysis of change in China at the very forefront of disciplined studies of social and political change. I believe that it is safe to say that for no other society have we as rigorous and detailed studies as we have for China.

As the Chinese revolution became the Communist revolution, social scientists were faced with the issue of trying to determine what is "Communist" and what is "Chinese" in Communist China. We had for a brief period much discussion over how original was Mao Tse-tung.[24] The difficulty in much of this work has been the awkward tendency of the Chinese to vacillate and present quite different faces to the world from year to year. Thus, for example, just as Franz Schurmann[25] finished his major work which dwelt on the organizational and bureaucratic achievements of the Chinese, Mao initiated the Cultural Revolution and denounced as quite reprehensible the very practices which Schurman thought of as giving the regime unique powers. Then, just as soon as Schurman was able to bring out a revised edition in which he retracted some of his analyses and praised the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese ended the Cultural Revolution and went back to many of their old organizational practices. To date Schurman has not responded.

The Chinese themselves in speaking of the depth of their revolution and their goal of producing the "new Maoist man" have challenged the social scientist to determine exactly how far traditions have been broken and a new psychology created. Several studies have sought to deal with "continuity and change," but

generally it has been hard to measure such matters because it is difficult to determine what are the true political sentiments of the Chinese masses. In the early years of the regime there was much interest in the Chinese practices of "thought reform" and "brain washing." The most detailed and chilling analysis which came close to, but did not fully utilize psychoanalytic theory was the work of Robert Jay Lifton.[26] Since then there have been more interviews with former Communists which suggest that experiences are more complicated and less "totalitarian."

This brings us to the type of innovative study of political culture which employs psycho-cultural concepts. There has been some confusion over the nature of such studies since they bring together the relatively novel approaches of political culture and psychoanalytically oriented cultural analysis. Richard H. Solomon's Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture is the outstanding example of this approach, and in the minds of some it is the most important social science study relating to Communist China.

Since the psychologically oriented political culture approach is slightly controversial and since it no doubt provokes the question behind this paper, that is the applicability of modern social science methods to the study of China, it may be appropriate to conclude our review of the issues by identifying what such an approach does and does not purport to accomplish.

There has been considerable legitimate confusions over whether political culture statements represent (a) absolute generalizations about national character, (b) the identification of attitudes and values that are highly representative of the population, or (c)

characterization of the values and attitudes which, regardless of quantative distribution, are most critical in determining the performance of the political system. Part of the difficulty stems no doubt from the fact that different "political culture" studies have used all three types of statements, and readers are easily confused as to which type of statement is being used at any time.

There is also at times difficulties because of differences with respect to the meaning or significance of each type. Hopefully there is no one capable of reading sophisticated social science who is so literal minded as to take a type (a) statement to mean that all people who are called "Chinese" must share in common to the same degree precisely the same sets of values and attitudes. The purpose, of course, of such statments is to reveal what the anthropologists would call the "model personality type."[27] Type (a) statements belong to the same class of scientific discourse as the statements used by historians to periodize history and of art historians to identify "periods." When the art historian speaks of the "impressionist period" no one assumes that all artists at that chronological period followed the same style -- very few did -- or that even most artists did, for they did not; what is indicated is that what was significant, distinctive and outstanding of that period was the work of a particular school.

Type (b) statements have become possible because of advances in sample survey analysis. We can now make quantitative distinctions about the relative distribution of different attitudes, as measured

by set questionnaires, among different populations.[28] Such statements are generally limited by what can be discovered by the technology of survey instruments. In general type (b) statements are useful in arriving at first approximations of politically significant differences or similarities, but unfortunately they cannot usually reveal the relationship between distribution of attitudes and the distribution of power in the society. In the case of China it is hard to use type (b) statements because we have no national surveys and in any case what is politically significant is the attitudes of the few with power and not the many who are more subjects than citizens.

Type (c) statements are possibly the least understood, but also the most significant for understanding politics. Here the assumption is that the performance of any political system is shaped by key attitudes and values, which, of course, must exist in the population but they may or may not be those readily reached by survey methods or even if they are accessible to measurement they may not be critical in determining system performance. Type (c) statements utilize psychological insights and evidence in order to explain system performance, and therefore the focus of the analysis is on the political system and not random individuals. One important reason why it is necessary to adhere to Harold Lasswell's original warning about the need to begin with macro-analysis when applying psychology to politics is that the individual personality is more complex than a political system.[29] All people have far more subjective feelings and fantasies than the few which guide their actual political behavior.

Type (c) statements thus take the form of "as if" hypotheses in the sense that they suggest that a political system behaves "as if" certain values and attitudes were the most critical in giving the collectivity its distinctive character. In this sense they are no different from hypotheses that historians routinely use when they say that certain events must have happened because it is most plausible to assume certain motivations and attitudes.[30]

All that has happened in type (c) statements is that the test of "plausibility" has in fact been made more demanding by (1) the more rigorous and explicit statements used in such political culture analysis -- when they tend to provoke challenge rather than seduce the reader into acceptance, and (2) a willingness to accept as plausible psychoanalytical propositions -- something which is not universally accepted.

We have moved somewhat away from the subject of Communist China, but hopefully we have contributed to a better understanding of the relationship between China studies and the social sciences. For we have been seeking to show that the tension may not be entirely between China studies on the one hand and social science on the other, but rather there may also be disagreement about aspects of social science irregardless of its application to China.

Since this is the case, I would like to conclude by stressing the view that there is nothing inherent which should in any way suggest any incompatability between the study of China and the uses of social science methods; to the extent that there are any problems they are within the domain of the social sciences themselves, and this means that we have arrived at the happy point

where Chinese studies have become an integrated part of the general intellectual development of social science knowledge.

FOOTNOTES

1. Possibly the best general introduction and discussion of the character of social science inquiry is Abraham Kaplin, The Concept of Inquiry (San Francisco: Chandler Publishers, 1964). See also: C. A. Hempel, "Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Sciences," in International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, vol.2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); and A. M. Rose, Theory and Method in the Social Sciences (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1954).

2. For a discussion of the elastic character of the word "science" as used in "social science" see: Lucian W. Pye, "Description, Analysis, and Sensitivity to Change" in Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and Public Policy (Chicago: Markham, 1968) pp.239-262.

3. The extent to which Chinese traditions of scholarship were reflected in early Western work on China can be see in: Charles S. Gardner, Chinese Traditional Historiography (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938); A. Wylie, Notes on Chinese Literature (Shanghai: 1902); and G. Margoulies, Le Kou-Wen Chinois (Paris, 1926).

4. Note the sense of frustration over what should constitute appropriate "standards" of scholarship in, F. W. Mote, "China's Past in the Study of China Today," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XXXII, No.1, Nov. 1972, pp. 107-20.

5. The series of studies sponsored by the Subcommittee on Chinese Government and Politics of the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council certainly meets the standards of excellence of any other committee of either the A.C.L.S. and the S.S.R.C.

6. One of the reasons for the current interest in the revival of "phenomonology" in the social sciences is the rather mindless character of "data manipulating" in some versions of empirical social science. The contrast between fad and serious philosophy is illustrated in Herbert Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry: A Historical Introduction (Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1972.)

7. Possibly the most dynamic division of political science in the last two decades has been the field of comparative politics and political development, much of which was inspired by Gabriel A. Almond and the Committee on Compara-

Politics of the Social Science Research Council. The American Political Science Association has recently tabulated the distribution of courses offered in political science departments in American universities shows that political development and area courses on the non-Western countries have had the greatest increase in the last decade.

economics?

8. Indeed, so far, there has been no published information based on visits to China which has added to our understanding of Chinese politics, and in a sense, it was not surprising that John Service did not learn about the fall of Lin Piao, which took place while he was in China, until he arrived in Hong Kong.

9. The best recent discussion of the relationship of social science theory and revolution is the special issue on "Revolution and Social Change" of Comparative Politics (Vol. V, No. 3, April, 1973), and see in particular, Stanley Kochanek, "Introduction: Perspectives on the Study of Revolution and Social Change" which is the lead article.

10. This argument has been advanced by numerous non-Western scholars and also by Joseph R. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the study of Society," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 72, Jan. 1967, pp.351-362; T.G. McGee, Urbanization of the Third World (London, Nelson, 1970) especially Chap. III, "Western Theory and Third World Reality." Also F.W.Frey, "Cross Cultural Survey Research in Political Science," in R. Holt and J. Turner, eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York, Free Press, 1971).

11. See: Harry Eckstein, "Introduction: Toward the Theoretical Study of Internal War," in H. Eckstein, ed., Internal War (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964)

12. Note the contrast in style between Lenin and Mao on the one hand and the writers of the New Left on the other.

13. Noam Chomsky has been one of the leading spokesmen for the notion that "scientific objectivity" is in practice a cover for a status quo bias, but who in his own writings seeks to suggest "objectivity." See his, The New Mandarins, (New York, 1971.)

14. See, for example, John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, April-July, 1970.

15. Possibly the best general review of what economists banned from the 1950's data is, Alexander Eckstein, Walter Galenson, and Ta-chung Liu, eds., Economic Trends in Communist China (Chicago: Aldine, 1968); see also, C. Liu and K. Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965); Audrey Dannithorne, China's Economic Systems (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), and Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966).

16. John Kenneth Galbraith, A China Passage (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1973) demonstrates the case of Chinese authorities in "briefing" distinguished Western economists without revealing new information.

17. Possibilities for such studies are demonstrated by Dwight H. Perkins, Market Control and Planning in Communist China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

18. See in particular, Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism - Program and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

19. Note, for example, that generalized studies of Party politics, such as John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1963), lack empirical content; while the more empirically oriented, such as A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) tend to focus on Kwantung politics.

20. An outstanding example is the Stanford project,under the leadership of John W. Lewis, on Tangshan, Hopei.

21. Chalmers W. Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962).

22. Mark Sheldon, The Yenan Way (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1972).

23. Roy M.Hofheinz, The Peasant Movement and Rural Revolution: Chinese Communism in the Countryside, 1923-1927) (unpublished dissertation, Harvard, 1966, soon to be published by the Harvard University Press).

24. After the experience of the Cultural Revolution it is almost impossible to recapture the significance of the debate between Karl A. Wittfogel, in "The Legend of the "Legend of Maoism'", ibid (1960) no. 2, pp. 35-42.

25. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

26. Robert J. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China (New York: Norton, 1961).

27. Among the best statements of this concept and the methodology of this form of psychological analysis are: Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts," World Politics, I (October 1948), pp. 102-19; Abram Kardiner, The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945); and David Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1954).

28. The pioneering study of this type is Gabriel A. Almond, and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

29. Harold D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

30. For a more detailed exposition of this form of political culture analysis see: Lucian W. Pye,'Culture and Political Science: Problems in the Evaluation of the Concept of Political Culture," in Social Science Quarterly, September, 1972.