



Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects

Author(s): Virginia Page Fortna

Source: *World Politics*, Jul., 2004, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Jul., 2004), pp. 481-519

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054273>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *World Politics*

JSTOR

INTERSTATE PEACEKEEPING

Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects

By VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA*

Maintaining peace in the aftermath of war is a difficult endeavor, and the international community is often called on to help. Arguably the most important innovation in international conflict management since World War II is the practice of peacekeeping: the deployment of international personnel to monitor a cease-fire or to interpose themselves between belligerents to keep peace after a war.¹ During most of its history, peacekeeping was used to help maintain peace after interstate wars. Since the end of the cold war, the practice has been adapted to the context of civil wars, taking on new tasks such as election monitoring, police training, and even providing an interim administration. This article analyzes whether and how peacekeeping stabilizes peace in its traditional interstate setting.

Traditional peacekeepers are either unarmed or at most lightly armed, they are mandated to use force only in self-defense, and they operate with the consent of the belligerents. How does their presence prevent the resumption of war? The literature does not spell out explicitly how peacekeepers might keep much larger and better armed forces from fighting. Nor has there been much systematic empirical analysis of whether interstate peacekeeping works. This article explores the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers might affect the durability of peace, and it examines empirically whether peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present than when they are not. Using duration analysis and taking selection effects into account, the article demonstrates that peacekeeping helps even the most deadly of adversaries to avoid war. A brief overview of cases illustrates how it does so.

*The author owes debts of gratitude to more people than can be listed here for help and feedback with the project of which this article is a part. She thanks, in particular, Nisha Fazal, Hein Goemans, Lise Howard, Bob Jervis, Bob Keohane, Lisa Martin, Jack Snyder, Alan Stam, Barb Walter, and Suzanne Werner. This research was made possible by grants from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

¹ Although this is usually done by the UN, it is sometimes done by regional organizations or by an ad hoc group.

Despite the blossoming of a vast literature on the topic in the last fifteen years, peacekeeping remains undertheorized and undertested. In particular, two very conspicuous gaps remain. Very little has been done to spell out systematically and explicitly the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace; and there has been little empirical testing of whether peace is more likely to last after interstate war when peacekeepers are present than when they are absent.

The vast majority of the works on peacekeeping are descriptive and prescriptive and relatively atheoretical. They list the functions and principles of peacekeeping and describe its practices but do not spell out a causal argument about how it is supposed to work. Critics have decried the failure of the peacekeeping literature to explain the connection between peacekeeping and “positive peace,” that is, the resolution of fundamental issues, as opposed simply to maintaining a cease-fire.² But the gap in the theory is much wider than that. An implicit sense of some of the ways peacekeepers make a difference emerges from many of the case studies of peacekeeping missions, but the literature never spells out explicitly how the presence of lightly armed or unarmed peacekeepers changes the situation facing the belligerents such that another war becomes less likely. The causal connection between peacekeeping and even negative peace has not been fleshed out and made explicit.³

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the peacekeeping literature is the dearth of attempts to assess empirically whether peacekeeping keeps peace. Much of the literature consists of case studies of individual missions, which if they address this issue at all can make only counterfactual assessments. There is comparative work on the success and failure of peacekeeping, but this work takes peacekeeping missions as its universe of cases and so cannot assess the value added of peacekeeping.⁴

Such testing as there has been on the effectiveness of peacekeeping has focused on civil wars, not on traditional peacekeeping between sov-

² A. B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

³ On the disconnect between peacekeeping practice and theory, see Stephen Ryan, “The Theory of Conflict Resolution and the Practice of Peacekeeping,” in Edward Moxon-Browne, ed., *A Future for Peacekeeping?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). Perhaps the most theoretical works are the classics: Alan James, *The Politics of Peace-keeping* (New York: Praeger, 1969); and Indar Jit Rikhye, *The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1984).

⁴ Duane Bratt, “Assessing the Success of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *International Peacekeeping* 3 (Winter 1996); William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Lise Moréjé Howard, “Learning to Keep the Peace? United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping in Civil Wars” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2001); Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C. F. Daniel, eds., *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003); John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-Israeli Interface* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

ereign states.⁵ This emphasis on internal conflicts is understandable, given that civil wars, and therefore peacekeeping missions within states, have recently outnumbered interstate wars and operations to maintain peace between states. But as recent interstate wars (between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and between the United States and both Afghanistan and Iraq) remind us, interstate conflict remains relevant. Moreover, the policy debate about peacekeeping's expansion into internal conflicts is based on a comparison, often implicit, with "the good old days" of interstate peacekeeping.⁶ To get a baseline, therefore, it is important to know how well peacekeeping works in its traditional context.

While there are no rigorous studies of whether peace is more likely to last after interstate wars when peacekeepers are present than when they are not, there have been a few studies of general UN involvement in interstate crises, including the use of discussion and resolutions, fact finding, mediating, and peacekeeping. Ernst Haas and his coauthors produced a substantial body of work assessing conflict management by international organizations.⁷ In a study both of interstate disputes referred to the UN and regional organizations and of nonreferred disputes, Haas finds that UN military operations, including peacekeeping, are almost always moderately or greatly successful.⁸ His measures of success do not allow a direct comparison of disputes involving the UN with nonreferred disputes, however, because "success" is measured only for referred disputes. His measures are based on an implicitly counterfactual assessment, presumably relative to no UN involvement.

Wilkenfeld and Brecher find that the involvement of the UN makes it more likely that a crisis will end in an agreement than when the UN is not involved. But they also find that the UN has no effect on the likelihood that the parties will experience another crisis within five

⁵ See, for example, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 94 (December 2000); Amitabh Dubey, "Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlements" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, March 24–27, 2002); Virginia Page Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (June 2004); Caroline Hartzell, Mathew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, "Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War," *International Organization* 55 (Winter 2001).

⁶ The conventional wisdom is that peacekeeping is less effective in internal conflicts than in its traditional setting between sovereign states. For a preliminary comparison of peacekeeping's effects in the two types of war, see Virginia Page Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars," *International Studies Review* 5 (December 2003).

⁷ For example, Ernst B. Haas, Robert L. Butterworth, and Joseph S. Nye, *Conflict Management by International Organizations* (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972).

⁸ Ernst B. Haas, *Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945–1985* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1986).

years.⁹ Surprisingly, however, the authors do not consider the endogeneity they have identified in the first part of their article, namely, that the UN tends to get involved in the most serious cases in terms of violence, gravity of threat, and several other indicators.

In a similar but more quantitatively sophisticated study, Diehl, Reifsneider, and Hensel also examine the effects of UN involvement on the recurrence of conflict. They also control for other factors that might make recurrence more likely, such as the level of violence, history of conflict, relative power, and crisis outcome. Oddly, they also “control” for the level of UN involvement, which seems to be the very thing they are assessing. They too find that the UN has no significant effect on preventing the recurrence of conflict.¹⁰

The literature on traditional interstate peacekeeping does not compare peacekeeping cases with nonpeacekeeping cases. The literature on UN involvement in general not only lumps peacekeeping in with other forms of UN action but also reaches contradictory findings—Haas finds positive effects, while Wilkenfeld and Brecher and Diehl, Reifsneider, and Hensel find no significant effects.¹¹

This study builds on the existing peacekeeping literature and on a growing set of systematic analyses of war termination and the duration of peace.¹² Walter argues that unlike belligerents in interstate wars, contestants in civil wars require outside help, in the form of third-party guarantees, to reach peace. I argue that interstate belligerents may also require assistance to maintain peace, with peacekeeping being one form this assistance might take.¹³ Such help is not a necessary condition for peace, as Walter argues it is for civil wars, but it nonetheless contributes to the likelihood that interstate peace will last.

⁹ Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher, “International Crises, 1945–1975: The UN Dimension,” *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (March 1984).

¹⁰ Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifsneider, and Paul R. Hensel, “UN Intervention and Recurring Conflict,” *International Organization* 50 (Autumn 1996).

¹¹ The results of recent studies on civil wars are similarly contradictory. Doyle and Sambanis (fn. 5) find that some forms of peacekeeping lead to “peacebuilding success”; Dubey (fn. 5) finds that peacekeeping has no significant effect on the duration of peace; while Fortna (fn. 5) finds peacekeeping to have a significant positive impact in the post-cold war era.

¹² On war termination see, for example, Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” *International Organization* 51 (Summer 1997); idem, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). On the duration of peace, see Suzanne Werner, “The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement and Renegotiating the Terms,” *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (July 1999); Virginia Page Fortna, “Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace,” *International Organization* 57 (Spring 2003); idem, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

¹³ For an analysis of third-party mediation and security guarantees after interstate wars, see Fortna (fn. 12, 2004).

This analysis differs slightly, however, from the work of both Walter and Goemans—it asks not when warring parties reach peace but, rather, once they have achieved a cease-fire, what determines whether the peace lasts or falls apart? In other words, the dependent variable here is the duration of peace rather than war termination. As such, this article builds on work by Werner and Fortna. Werner argues that changes in states' relative capabilities after peace breaks out are the most important cause of the resumption of war. She finds that third-party enforcement, including peacekeeping, increases rather than decreases the chances that war will resume but also notes that this finding may be spurious since third parties are more likely to guarantee peace when it is most precarious.¹⁴ In previous work I examined a number of mechanisms by which interstate belligerents might maintain peace, and in this study I explore the role of one of these mechanisms in more detail: peacekeeping, as the most relevant policy tool for outsiders hoping to stabilize peace.

CAUSAL MECHANISMS OF PEACEKEEPING

The literature on traditional peacekeeping identifies two main functions: observation and interposition.¹⁵ First, by observing and reporting the parties' behavior, peacekeepers ensure that no one is violating the agreement. Observers also help resolve minor violations of the cease-fire before they escalate.¹⁶ Second, by interposing themselves between armies, peacekeepers create a buffer to help prevent incidents and accidents. International monitors perform the first function; armed peacekeeping forces perform both functions—observation and interposition.¹⁷ The presence of peacekeepers is also thought to provide a moral barrier to hostile action, alleviate tensions, and cool tempers.¹⁸ Practitioners would likely emphasize the mediation and day-to-day conflict resolution roles of international personnel.

¹⁴This notion is tested directly below. Werner's study (fn. 12) covers a much longer time period (1816–1992). However, peacekeeping was “invented” only after World War II, making the time period examined here a better test of its effects.

¹⁵Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 53.

¹⁶Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 9; Durch (fn. 4, 1993), 4.

¹⁷Monitoring missions typically range in size from a few dozen observers to several hundred; they are unarmed (though observers are military personnel). Peacekeeping forces are lightly armed for “defensive purposes.” In interstate cases, these missions have ranged from about twelve hundred to thirteen thousand troops. I use the general term *peacekeeping* to refer to both types of missions; I use the terms *monitoring* and *peacekeeping forces* or *armed peacekeepers* to distinguish between them.

¹⁸Diehl (fn. 16), 10; James (fn. 3); Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

Peacekeepers are meant to help keep the peace by their presence and their ability to observe. But how exactly does this work? How do lightly armed or unarmed personnel, whose presence is based strictly on the consent of the belligerents, prevent the resumption of war? It would seem that peacekeepers would be powerless in the face of determined aggression, while they would be unnecessary if the belligerents intended to observe the cease-fire anyway. What are the causal mechanisms linking peacekeeping to the maintenance of a cease-fire? What does their presence change for the “peacekept” such that renewed fighting becomes less likely?

Cease-fires operate on the basis of reciprocity. The belligerents agree to stop hostilities simultaneously, each side commits to maintaining the cease-fire as long as the other does, and if one side attacks, the other promptly responds in kind. Fundamentally, it is the prospect of this response that deters either side from defecting from the agreement. But for reciprocity to work, several things have to be true: the long-term gains of peace must outweigh the short-term benefits of attacking; both sides must believe that the other intends to maintain peace, or that violations of the cease-fire will be reliably detected in time for it to respond before being overrun; and accidents or unauthorized violations must be prevented or controlled lest they spiral back to full-scale war.

Peace is difficult to maintain in the immediate aftermath of war. The parties to a cease-fire agreement are by definition deadly enemies and almost certainly have strong incentives to take advantage of each other. One or both sides may have agreed to the cease-fire in order to rebuild and attack again later. If one side sees an opportunity for a quick or relatively cheap victory, it will likely forgo the cease-fire for advantage on the battlefield. Both sides have good reason to suspect the other of just such malign intentions. Levels of tension and mistrust are extremely high in the immediate aftermath of war, creating incentives to react quickly and forcefully to any hint of a cease-fire violation rather than waiting for a possible attack to unfold. Uncertainty about intentions or misperception of them can easily create a security dilemma. If accidental or unauthorized violations occur, reciprocity itself can quickly drive spiraling retaliation back to full-scale war.¹⁹ Even if leaders suspect that a violation occurred by mistake, it may be too risky not to respond. And if the original incident is publicly known, there may

¹⁹ For a fuller discussion of these difficulties and mechanisms that can be used to overcome them, see Fortna (fn. 12, 2004).

be strong domestic pressure to respond with force.²⁰ Cease-fires are fragile.²¹

In short, war may resume through deliberate aggression, through a security dilemma spiral driven by uncertainty about the enemy's actions and intentions, by accident, or most likely, through some combination of these. Peacekeeping helps if it can disrupt any of these causal pathways to war and thereby make peace more durable. It can contribute to reciprocal arrangements in several ways: by increasing the costs of attack, by reducing uncertainty about actions and intentions, and by preventing and controlling accidental violations and skirmishes.

Peacekeeping might alter the costs and benefits of maintaining the cease-fire or of attacking. In theory, a large international military force could physically deter an attack by either side. Part of the effort of retaliating against an attack could thus be delegated to the international force. Alternatively, the force might serve as a trip wire, with any attempt to violate the cease-fire triggering the intervention of outside military forces. In practice, however, the role of peacekeeping as a physical constraint after interstate wars is quite limited. The forces are not large or well-armed relative to national armies. Nor has the UN usually responded with force against violations of a cease-fire.²² Lightly armed forces operating on the basis of consent and the nonuse of force cannot present a strong deterrent. Nonetheless, the presence of a buffer force may raise the cost of an attack slightly simply by being in the way; and by observing military activity along a cease-fire line, peacekeeping may make surprise attack more difficult by detecting preparations for war.

Peacekeepers may also affect the cost of attack by bringing in international opinion: the "spotlight of international attention" may help to deter violations of the agreement. Blatant violations of a cease-fire

²⁰It is rare for states to be drawn into war purely by accident; it requires deliberate action to decide to retaliate. But the familiar dynamic of the security dilemma suggests how accidents might set off an escalatory cycle of clashes that can lead back to full-scale war. Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

²¹Note, however, that some might argue just the opposite, that peace should be most stable in the immediate aftermath of war. According to the informational perspective on war, it is states' inability credibly to reveal their intentions and capabilities that leads to war. James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49 (Summer 1995). The fighting of the war itself, however, credibly reveals this information. The danger of renewed war should therefore be lowest when one has just been fought. This argument does not hold up well empirically, however. Rather, peace has been found to be most precarious just after fighting ends, becoming more stable over time. Fortna (fn. 12, 2004), 171–72; Werner (fn. 12), 927.

²²The development of more robust "peace enforcement" missions in civil conflicts, increasingly common after the mid-1990s (for example, the NATO mission in Bosnia or the UN mission in Sierra Leone) represents a significant departure from traditional peacekeeping and may enhance the deterrent effects of peacekeeping.

often have diplomatic costs in the Security Council and can entail tangible losses in economic or military aid.²³ In other words, peacekeepers may induce international audience costs by publicizing infractions. The more a given state is dependent on outside political, economic, or military support, the more susceptible it is to adverse international attention. These increased costs may not outweigh the benefits of an attack, but they make it relatively more costly to reinitiate war.

The second requirement of reciprocity is that violations be reliably detected. Retaliation is possible only if cheating is caught. In the tense atmosphere of mistrust found in the aftermath of war, belligerents may not feel they can wait until after an attack is well under way to react. If there is an advantage (real or perceived) to striking first, uncertainty about each other's intentions may lead to war even when neither side is eager to attack. The presence of peacekeepers or international observers can help reassure both sides that the other is complying in good faith with the cease-fire agreement.

States will rely for the most part on their own intelligence to detect impending attack, and cease-fire violations are by their nature very obvious events for the receiving side.²⁴ The peacekept often do not need monitors to tell them whether the other side is complying; in fact, peacekeepers generally respond to complaints about violations lodged by the parties. How, then, does their presence provide reassurance? Because of the diplomatic costs associated with breaking a cease-fire, aggressors have a strong incentive to blame the other side for provoking retaliation. Claims of being the victim of attack are therefore not necessarily credible, and as in any playground squabble there are likely to be disputes over "who started it." In such cases, monitors can serve as neutral referees. Investigation of incidents gives credible information on compliance and is important for distinguishing unprovoked aggression from legitimate retaliation. Accurate and unbiased monitoring therefore works in tandem with the audience costs discussed above. In this capacity, observers provide information not only to the belligerents themselves, but also to the international community. In doing so, states may be reassured that if they are victims of an unprovoked attack, the world will know about it.

Peacekeeping may also prevent uncertainty about intentions from driving a spiral toward war by serving as a signaling device. To the de-

²³ Even for states with a powerful ally in the Security Council willing to veto any UN sanctions, blatant violations can temper that ally's diplomatic support.

²⁴ Direct effects of monitoring may be more important in civil conflicts, particularly for rebel groups without sophisticated intelligence-gathering capability.

gree that peacekeeping increases the military or political costs of attacking, it ties belligerents' hands. States that are simply biding their time with a cease-fire, intending to attack when the opportunity presents itself, will be less willing to accept an intrusive peacekeeping force than will those with more benign intentions. Consenting to a peacekeeping mission therefore provides a credible signal of intention to maintain the cease-fire. Conversely, withdrawing this consent sends a clearly hostile signal.

The contribution of peacekeeping to the third requirement of reciprocity may be the most important. Reliance on reciprocity makes cease-fire agreements very vulnerable to accidents, misunderstandings, or small incidents. Because violations are met with immediate retaliation in a reciprocal arrangement, if troops stray over the cease-fire line or if leaders do not command full control over their troops and an unauthorized attack takes place, the other side will respond in kind, setting off a vicious cycle of retaliation. Much of peacekeepers' day-to-day work involves activities to prevent such violations from spiraling out of control. This work operates on two levels, local and state to state.

Peacekeepers often respond to skirmishes or isolated incidents by meeting with local military commanders and engaging in dispute resolution to restore the cease-fire and thus snuff out sparks before they ignite a conflagration. Peacekeepers also often work preventively, for example, by making local arrangements for both sides to pull forces back from a cease-fire line that leaves them dangerously close to each other. While it is not impossible for local military commanders to resolve disputes or work out preventive arrangements on their own, bilateral communication is usually difficult in the tense atmosphere following a war. Local commanders' primary concern, after all, is military security, not necessarily avoiding a spiral toward war, whereas an impartial actor, immune from the security dilemma, can take the initiative to bring commanders together or to arrange mutual consent for restoration of a cease-fire in a way that leaves no one looking weak or losing face. Interpositional peacekeeping forces that patrol a demilitarized zone help prevent accidents and skirmishes simply by separating combatants who would otherwise be dangerously close to one another. This, too, can help prevent a spiral to renewed warfare.

At the state-to-state level, the machinery of lodging formal complaints of violations with peacekeepers, who then investigate, can take governments off the hook for not responding with force to minor violations. If this mechanism did not exist, leaders might feel pressure to retaliate so as to maintain a show of resolve—either to deter the enemy

lest it be testing for weakness or for domestic political reasons (or both). In the face of a firing incident or a small incursion, leaders can use the peacekeeping apparatus for dispute resolution to avoid the unhappy choice between ignoring the incident and appearing weak or responding with force and risking escalation. Lodging a complaint through the “proper channels” allows the party to take the moral high ground through its restraint and keeps arguments about who started what, when, and how on the level of verbal diplomatic battles rather than actual battles.

The preceding discussion has specified a number of causal mechanisms by which international peacekeepers might help to keep peace in the aftermath of interstate war. Peacekeepers can increase the costs of breaking a cease-fire at the margins by making it more difficult to launch a surprise attack and by physically being in the way. They may also add significant international diplomatic costs to violating a cease-fire. Peacekeepers can reassure belligerents about each other by serving as a neutral referee distinguishing violations of the cease-fire from legitimate and provoked retaliation and by providing a credible signal of intentions. By providing local mediation and a mechanism for dispute resolution of complaints and investigations, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents or skirmishes from spiraling back to war. While these effects can sometimes be observed in individual cases, as discussed below, the presence of peacekeepers is likely to have probabilistic rather than determinative effects. It may make war less likely without making it impossible. Statistical analysis is therefore best suited to evaluating the overall effect of peacekeeping.

ASSESSING EMPIRICAL EFFECTS

It is by no means obvious that peacekeeping works. Interstate peacekeeping is used quite frequently: international personnel have deployed to try to keep peace between almost three-quarters of the warring dyads since World War II. But a quick bivariate look at the numbers would suggest that peacekeeping is not associated with stable peace. Quite the opposite in fact: when peacekeepers are present, war appears much more likely to resume. Another war between the same states eventually breaks out in over half of the cases where peacekeepers were keeping watch, compared with only one-fifth of the cases where no international personnel were present.²⁵

²⁵ To be exact, of the forty-eight cease-fires analyzed in this article, peacekeepers are present in thirty-four. Of these, war resumes in eighteen, or 53 percent. Of the fourteen with no peacekeepers, war resumes in only three, or 21 percent.

Is peacekeeping really a hindrance to stable peace, making war more likely to resume? A moral hazard argument, often made in reference to Cyprus, suggests that peacekeeping can impede long-term conflict resolution. By keeping a lid on the violence, peacekeepers may remove the incentive for enemies to settle their differences.²⁶ However, according to this argument, it is precisely the fact that peacekeeping missions are so successful at preventing political violence—that is, that they prevent the recurrence of war—that gets in the way of reconciliation. So the moral hazard argument cannot explain why war seems more likely when peacekeepers are present.

A more logical explanation for the apparent negative relationship is that it is driven by a selection effect: peacekeepers do not get sent to a random selection of conflicts that are otherwise more or less equal. Just as more police officers are sent to high-crime neighborhoods, peacekeepers may get sent where they are most needed—to places where peace is most likely to break down. Of course the selection bias may go the other way as well. If peacekeepers are only deployed “where there is peace to keep” or when the belligerents show strong “political will for peace” (both prescriptions have become almost clichés in the policy literature on peacekeeping), then peacekeepers may be deployed to the easiest cases rather than the hardest ones.²⁷

To judge the effectiveness of peacekeeping, therefore, we first need to know where peacekeepers tend to be deployed, particularly with respect to factors that affect the difficulty of maintaining peace. The field of international relations does not have a highly predictive model for when peace is likely to break down, but we can use existing studies to identify some variables that affect the durability of peace. These include the decisiveness of military victory, the history of conflict between the belligerents before the war, contiguity, the balance of power between states and especially changes in relative power over time, the cost of war, the issues at stake, particularly whether the conflict threatens the very existence of one side, and whether the war was a contest between just two states or was multilateral.²⁸ If any of these factors also affect

²⁶ Luttwak's more general argument is similar—that intervening to set up and maintain a cease-fire too early, before war “burns itself out,” only postpones the war-induced exhaustion that will lead to accommodation and stable peace; Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance,” *Foreign Affairs* 78 (July–August 1999).

²⁷ For a related argument, see George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom, “Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” *International Organization* 50 (Summer 1996).

²⁸ Stuart A. Bremer, “Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36 (June 1992); Fortna (fn. 12, 2004); Scott Sigmund Gartner and Randolph M. Siverson, “War Expansion and War Outcomes,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40

the likelihood that a peacekeeping mission is deployed, we need to take them into account to test the effectiveness of peacekeeping. As most peacekeeping is conducted by the UN, and therefore authorized by the Security Council, we might expect peacekeeping deployment to be less likely if one of the belligerent states is a permanent member of the Security Council wielding veto power. If the involvement of such a great power in the fighting affects the duration of peace, then we also need to control for this.²⁹

In the empirical analysis below, I begin by treating peacekeeping as a dependent variable, exploring the effects of these factors on the likelihood that international personnel will be sent to keep peace. In the following section, I treat these factors as control variables so as to test the independent effect of peacekeeping on the durability of peace.³⁰

DATA AND METHODS

To assess both where peacekeepers get deployed and their effects, we need to examine the universe of cases in which peacekeeping might have been used. I have compiled a data set of all cease-fires in interstate wars ending between 1946 and 1997 (see the appendix). Each of the forty-eight cases is a cease-fire between a pair of principal belligerents in the Correlates of War Version 3 (COW) data. A cease-fire is defined as an end to or break in the fighting, whether or not it represents the final end of the war. Wars that stop and start again are therefore split into separate cases. To avoid selecting on the dependent variable, it is

(March 1996); Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries," *International Interactions* 18, no. 2 (1992); idem, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (June 1993); Paul R. Hensel, "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816–1986," *Journal of Peace Research* 31 (August 1994); idem, "The Evolution of Interstate Rivalry" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1996); idem, "Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict," in John A. Vasquez, ed., *What Do We Know about War?* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Paul K. Huth, "Territory: Why Are Territorial Disputes between States a Central Cause of International Conflict?" in Vasquez, *What Do We Know about War?*; Alexander Kozhemiakin, "Outcomes of War and the Durability of Peace Settlements" (Manuscript, Olin Institute, Harvard University, 1994); Zeev Maoz, "Peace by Empire? Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816–1976," *Journal of Peace Research* 21 (September 1984); Douglas M. Stinnett and Paul F. Diehl, "The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavioral and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development," *Journal of Politics* 63 (August 2001); Werner (fn. 12).

²⁹ As noted above, this study builds on my previous work (see fn. 12), examining in greater depth one of a number of mechanisms used to maintain peace. Others of these mechanisms, particularly demilitarized zones and arms control measures, are somewhat correlated with peacekeeping. Because these other mechanisms are not causally prior to peacekeeping, I do not include them in the analysis presented below, but I have checked whether the results hold up when these correlated mechanisms are controlled for. They do. The hazard ratios remain the same, although, as we would expect when multicollinearity is introduced, the standard errors become somewhat larger, in some cases missing the conventional 0.05 standard for significance.

³⁰ For a similar approach to evaluating the effectiveness of peacekeeping in the context of civil wars, see Fortna (fn. 5).

important to include cease-fires that failed so quickly that the next round of fighting was considered by COW as part of the same war. It is possible that the data miss some very short-lived cease-fires. However, any resulting selection bias will work against the argument that peacekeeping makes peace more likely to last. Because of the peacekeepers' monitoring function, we are much more likely to be aware of failed cease-fires that occurred when they were present than we are to know about short cease-fires when no international personnel were involved.

Because some wars involve multiple dyads or more than one cease-fire and because some dyads fight more than once, not all of the cases are independent of one another. I correct for the statistical problem of autocorrelation by calculating robust standard errors, with cases clustered by conflict (for example, all of the dyads in the Korean War are in one cluster, all of the wars between India and Pakistan are in another). Because the Arab-Israeli conflict is both multilateral and has led to several wars, the Middle East wars dominate the data set. In the tests below, I include a control variable for the Arab-Israeli wars to see whether they are significantly different from other wars.³¹

There are two versions of the data. The first captures a snapshot of each case at the time of the cease-fire. I use this version when the dependent variable is whether or not peacekeepers are deployed. The second version, more appropriate for testing the effects of peacekeeping, allows for duration analysis with time-varying covariates. In this version, each cease-fire case is divided into observations spanning a length of time.³² This allows me to record changes over time, such as shifts in relative power or whether peacekeeping missions are deployed or depart. Note that using a time-varying measure of peacekeeping likely underestimates its effects. Peacekeeping is not given credit statistically for peace that continues to hold after a successful mission has departed, that is, for creating self-sustaining peace. If despite this underestimation, we find that peacekeeping has a positive effect on the duration of peace, we can be especially confident in the result.

Peacekeeping is coded with a dummy variable (any versus none) and with a categorical variable distinguishing between mission types (none, monitoring mission, armed peacekeeping force). The number of peacekeepers deployed is also recorded. Because peacekeepers do not have a perfect record but do not always depart when war resumes, there are

³¹ For more detailed information on the Cease-Fires Dataset, see Fortna (fn. 12, 2004). The data are available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~vpf4/research.htm>.

³² The time periods run consecutively from the cease-fire to the outbreak of another war, or until the data are censored (see fn. 37) in 1998.

several cases in which peacekeepers are “left over” from an earlier cease-fire. Peacekeepers, that is, were deployed after one war, peace subsequently failed, and then the original peacekeepers are still present when peace is restored. In analyzing peacekeeping as a dependent variable, I use two measures: one that captures all peacekeeping missions and one that records only newly deployed peacekeeping missions.

Two dummy variables capture the military outcome of the war (whether it ended in a tie—twenty cases—or a military victory for one side—twenty-five cases) and distinguish the most decisive outcomes (whether it ended with the elimination of one side or a foreign-imposed regime change—three cases). These data are from COW, Stam, and Werner.³³ The cost of war is measured as the natural log of battle deaths (from COW). The measure of belligerents’ ante bellum history of conflict is based on the number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) over the course of their shared history. This variable ranges from zero to over three disputes per year, with a mean of slightly less than one dispute per year. Dummy variables denote whether the belligerents are contiguous (thirty-seven dyads are) and whether the war was a multilateral contest rather than a war between only two states (thirty-two are multilateral). COW capability data are used to measure both the balance of power at the time of the cease-fire and, following Werner, shifts in relative capabilities over time.³⁴ Further dummy variables indicate whether a permanent member of the Security Council (U.S., USSR or Russia, China, France, and the U.K.) fought in the war (true of seventeen cases) and whether it was an Arab-Israeli war (nineteen cases). The coding of whether the war threatened the existence of either side (seventeen cases) is from the International Crisis Behavior data set.³⁵

In the first part of the statistical analysis, the dependent variable is peacekeeping. There are monitoring missions in twenty-six cases (seventeen of them new for that cease-fire), armed peacekeepers in another eight (six of them new). I use logistic and multinomial logistic regressions to investigate where peacekeepers are most likely to be deployed. In the second part, where peacekeeping is the main independent variable of interest, the dependent variable is the duration of peace. Peace is considered to fail if and when the dyad fights another war meeting the COW criteria. For example, the 1949 cease-fire between Israel and

³³J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Correlates of War Project: International and Civil War Data, 1816–1992” (ICPSR 9905, 1994); Allan C. Stam, *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Werner (fn. 12).

³⁴Werner (fn. 12).

³⁵Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, “International Crisis Behavior Project, 1918–1988” (ICPSR 9286, 1992).

Egypt fails in October 1956 with the Sinai War, while the cease-fire between Israel and Syria falters in June 1967. If no new war occurs between the belligerents before January 1, 1998, the data are censored at that point.³⁶ War resumes before this date in twenty-one cases. For this analysis, I use a Weibull model.³⁷ The results are substantially the same if the less restrictive Cox proportional hazards model is used, but the Weibull produces more precise estimates in a small data set such as the one used here.³⁸ Note that while the N is relatively small, the data cover the full universe of cases, not a sample thereof.

The two-part analysis used here, evaluating first where peacekeepers go and then their effects, is not the ideal way to study a process in which a key explanatory variable is endogenous to other independent variables. A model that estimates the selection process and the effect of the key variable simultaneously, such as a two-stage model, would be better. Such a solution is not possible here, however, for two reasons. First, two-stage models require at least one instrumental variable, that is, a variable that is a good predictor of peacekeeping but is not correlated with the duration of peace. Unfortunately, most of the things that are likely to determine whether or not peacekeepers are deployed may also shape the prospects for peace. Second, to my knowledge, two-stage models have not yet been developed for duration analysis.³⁹ The method used here is a somewhat clumsier version of a two-stage model.

WHERE DO PEACEKEEPERS GO?

Table 1 shows the results of logistic regressions testing the effects of variables on the probability that some form of peacekeeping mission

³⁶ Note that the failure of peace between India and Pakistan in 1999 with the Kargil War, and between the U.S. and Iraq in 2003 occur after the data are censored.

³⁷ Duration or survival models such as the Weibull have several desirable properties. They do not require an arbitrary specification of "successful" peace (such as a five-year cutoff) but can treat the stability of peace as a continuous variable. They are also adept at handling censored data, in which observation ends before peace has failed. While we know, for example, that the Korean armistice has held to date, we do not know for certain that it will continue to hold in the future. Duration models incorporate this uncertainty into their estimations. For a technical discussion, see William H. Greene, *Econometric Analysis* (New York: MacMillan, 1993).

³⁸ Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier and Bradford S. Jones, "Time is of the Essence: Event History Models in Political Science," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (October 1997). The results for peacekeeping are, if anything, stronger in the Cox model, but analyzing goodness of fit by plotting the empirical Aalen-Nelson cumulative hazard function against Cox-Snell residuals suggests that the Weibull model fits the data better than the Cox model.

³⁹ For work in this direction, see James Raymond Vreeland, "Selection and Survival" (Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Yale University, 2002). His solution is not applicable here because the assignment of peacekeeping is static, not dynamic; that is, it is determined at the beginning of a spell of peace not at independent intervals over the spell of peace. See also Frederick J. Boehmke, Daniel Morey, and Megan Shannon, "Selection Bias and Continuous-Time Duration Models: Consequences and a Proposed Solution" (Manuscript, University of Iowa, July 2004).

TABLE 1
WHERE DO PEACEKEEPERS GO?^a

	<i>Logistic Regression Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors)</i>	
	<i>All Peacekeeping</i>	<i>New Peacekeeping</i>
Tie	1.96 (1.34)	5.53*** (0.93)
Cost of war	0.20 (0.26)	0.99* (0.55)
History of conflict	1.44 (1.84)	0.43 (0.70)
Contiguity	−0.51 (1.19)	−0.15 (0.51)
Multilateral war	0.90 (1.30)	3.71** (1.89)
Preponderance of power	1.78 (2.03)	−4.33*** (1.54)
Permanent Security Council member	0.15 (1.60)	1.53 (1.78)
Arab-Israeli war	−0.17 (2.47)	1.96 (2.61)
Existence at stake	1.38** (0.65)	−3.18*** (0.95)
Constant	−4.07 (2.54)	−11.54*** (4.13)
N	45	45
pseudo R ²	0.30	0.54
log likelihood	−17.60	−14.27

* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; two-tailed tests

^aThe three cases of elimination or foreign-imposed regime change are dropped to control for the most decisive military outcomes.

(whether unarmed monitors or armed peacekeeping forces) will be deployed. The multinomial logit results in Table 2 distinguish between these two types of missions, allowing us to investigate whether different forms of peacekeeping are more likely in some situations than in others. The tables show results for all peacekeeping and for the measure that codes only new peacekeeping operations. While the latter is more useful for learning about where peacekeepers tend to be deployed, the former is important for evaluating variables that we should control for when we test the effects of peacekeeping. As we might expect, the predictive power and fit of the models in Tables 1 and 2 are better for new peacekeeping deployments alone than for the measure that mixes in new missions with those left over from a previous conflict.

TABLE 2
WHERE DO PEACEKEEPERS GO?^a
(BY MISSION TYPE)

	<i>Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients (Robust Standard Errors)</i>			
	<i>All Peacekeeping</i>		<i>New Peacekeeping</i>	
	<i>Monitoring</i>	<i>Armed Forces</i>	<i>Monitoring</i>	<i>Armed Forces</i>
Tie	2.73*** (0.99)	2.18** (0.95)	9.99*** (3.77)	4.22*** (1.21)
Cost of war	0.44 (0.30)	-1.25** (0.59)	4.01* (2.22)	0.56 (0.69)
History of conflict	1.68 (1.53)	3.75*** (1.15)	-1.41 (1.51)	2.11* (1.12)
Contiguity	-0.04 (0.82)	-1.21* (0.72)	0.01 (1.08)	-2.42** (1.02)
Multilateral war	2.30* (1.19)	1.91* (1.07)	6.59** (3.05)	-0.03 (1.18)
Preponderance of power	0.82 (1.89)	4.93* (2.72)	-4.07* (2.17)	-0.79 (2.14)
Permanent Security	-0.18 (1.56)	2.28 (1.63)	-6.57 (4.24)	23.32*** (3.70)
Council member				
Arab-Israeli war	-0.10 (2.31)	-2.13 (2.25)	-2.04 (2.26)	21.61*** (3.53)
Constant	-7.34*** (2.80)	2.33 (4.18)	-38.13** (18.92)	-29.89
N	45		45	
pseudo R ²	0.33		0.61	
log likelihood	-29.02		-17.31	

* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; two-tailed tests

^aThe three cases of elimination or foreign imposed regime change are dropped to control for the most decisive military outcomes

Not surprisingly, there is a clear relationship between the decisiveness of victory and the likelihood that peacekeepers will be deployed. Military outcomes can take one of three values: elimination or foreign-imposed regime change, victory short of this, and military tie. There are no cases of peacekeeping after the most lopsided military outcomes. While elimination or victor-imposed government is rare (occurring only between North and South Vietnam, the USSR and Hungary, and Uganda and Tanzania), it is statistically unlikely that the negative relationship with peacekeeping would occur by chance in our data ($P(\chi^2) = 0.02$). In Tables 1 and 2 these cases are dropped to control for the ef-

fects of these most lopsided outcomes.⁴⁰ The positive coefficients for the variable "tie" indicate that peacekeepers are much more likely to be deployed after wars that end in a draw than after wars that end in a military victory for one side. This relationship is statistically significant in all but one of the models in Tables 1 and 2, and even there it comes close ($p = 0.14$). There is thus a very strong negative relationship between decisiveness and peacekeeping.

New peacekeeping operations, especially monitoring missions, are most likely to be deployed after more costly wars; but when both old and new missions are considered, this effect falls away and armed peacekeepers are less likely to be present after costly wars. Peacekeeping missions seem more likely when belligerents have a long history of conflict, though this finding is not statistically significant when both types of peacekeeping missions are lumped together (as in Table 1). The results in Table 2 suggest that when there is a long history of conflict, peacekeeping is more likely to take the form of an armed mission than an unarmed observer mission.

Surprisingly, the relationship between contiguity and peacekeeping is negative. It is not significant for both mission types together, but armed peacekeeping is significantly less likely between neighbors, as reflected by the presence of peacekeepers after wars among noncontiguous states such as Egypt and both France and Britain (as well as Israel) as the latter withdrew from the Sinai. However, this finding is not robust to different model specifications (for example, it falls away if the Mideast dummy is omitted from the analysis). Peacekeeping, and especially monitoring, is more likely after multilateral wars. Peacekeepers are less likely to be deployed after wars between states with unevenly matched capabilities, although this relationship does not hold when older peacekeeping missions are considered as well. There is no significant relationship between peacekeeping and permanent membership in the UN Security Council when mission types are lumped together, but as Table 2 makes clear, armed peacekeepers are much more likely than monitors when one side can veto the mission. This is somewhat counterintuitive but seems to reflect the fact that a stronger mission will be required to keep the peace when a great power is involved. The practice of deploying armed peacekeepers as opposed to monitors was first developed for a war including two permanent members of the Security

⁴⁰ In other words, the relationship shown holds constant the fact that neither side has been eliminated or has had a new government imposed on it. Because there is no variation in peacekeeping in the few cases with such extreme military outcomes, this variable cannot be included in the multinomial logit analysis.

Council (in the Sinai). The control variable for the Arab-Israeli wars is not significant except for new armed peacekeeping missions, which are much more likely in the Middle East.

While peacekeepers are more likely to be present after wars that threaten the existence of one side, this is often because they are still in the region after an earlier war. New peacekeeping is less likely in such high-stakes wars. There are no cases of armed peacekeepers when the war threatened one side's very survival.⁴¹ The relationship between peacekeeping and territorial conflict (results not shown) is similar but somewhat weaker.

In sum, while the relationship between situational variables at the time of a cease-fire and the probability that peacekeepers will be deployed is fairly complicated, there is some evidence that peacekeepers are more likely to be sent to more difficult cases, rather than to ones in which peace will likely last in any case. The clearest finding to this effect is that the more indecisive the military outcome, the more likely it is that peacekeepers will be deployed. As we shall see, the more indecisive the outcome the more fragile the peace. New deployments of international personnel are also more likely between evenly matched opponents, and after complicated wars with many belligerents. Armed peacekeeping forces are more likely when the belligerents have a long history of conflict, and when one side is a great power wielding a veto in the Security Council. All of these findings suggest that peacekeeping deployments respond to need: they are more likely when they are most necessary. This trend is mitigated somewhat by the finding that peacekeepers are less likely between neighbors and after wars that threaten one side's very survival.

DOES PEACE LAST LONGER WHEN PEACEKEEPERS ARE PRESENT?

While not all of the situational variables have a clear or consistent effect on the likelihood of peacekeeping, I include all of them as controls when testing the effects of peacekeeping on the durability of peace so as to avoid omitted variable bias. I also include a measure of change in the belligerents' relative capabilities over time, as Werner found this to have a significant effect on the duration of peace.⁴²

⁴¹This makes it impossible to include the stakes variable in the multinomial logit. The negative relationship is statistically significant in a cross-tabulation between stakes and peacekeeping ($P(\chi^2) = 0.02$).

⁴²Werner (fn. 12). It is not clear, however, whether changing capabilities affect the resumption of war or whether the resumption of war (or its anticipation) changes measures of material capabilities. See Fortna (fn. 12, 2003), 353.

The results in Tables 3 and 4 show the effects of peacekeeping and the control variables on the duration of peace or, more technically, on the hazard of another war breaking out in a given period if peace has lasted up to that period.⁴³ The tables report hazard ratios, which are interpreted relative to one (1.0). Ratios greater than one indicate an increase in the hazard, or the risk of another war, ratios less than one indicate a decrease in this hazard. For example, a dummy variable with a hazard ratio of 2.0 means that the variable doubles the risk of war, while a hazard ratio of 0.75 indicates a 25 percent reduction.

The hazard ratios for peacekeeping provide clear evidence that this policy tool is effective. The results in Table 3, column 1, show that when peacekeepers are present, the risk of another war drops by more than 85 percent relative to cases in which belligerents are left to their own devices after a war. The size of the peacekeeping mission does not make a difference, however (column 2). The effect of mission size is small in part because of the unit of the analysis (the estimated effect of adding a single monitor or soldier), but it is also statistically insignificant.

Table 4 shows the effect of peacekeeping broken down by mission type. Unarmed monitoring missions reduce the risk of another war by 85 percent relative to no peacekeeping, armed peacekeeping missions, by 90 percent. The effects are jointly significant. The hypothesis that peace lasts longer when peacekeepers are present is strongly supported.

The results in Tables 3 and 4 also shed light on other variables that affect the duration of peace. Decisive military victories are much more stable than are less decisive outcomes,⁴⁴ and peace is more fragile between states with a prior history of conflict. Multilateral wars are less likely to resume, but note the large (though not significant) hazard ratio for the Arab-Israeli wars, which are all multilateral. When this control is dropped, the hazard ratio for multilateral wars is not statistically significant. Changes in relative capabilities after the war are associated with the resumption of war. A preponderance of power by one side at the time of the cease-fire may lead to less stable peace, while, if anything, more deadly wars lead to more stable peace, but these effects are not always statistically significant, so we should treat the findings with caution. The risk of war may be higher when the conflict threatened

⁴³ These peacekeeping measures include both newly deployed missions and those left over from an earlier conflict. The results are the same or stronger if the measure including only new missions is used.

⁴⁴ As noted above, war outcomes fall into three categories: ties, which are shown here to have the highest risk of resumption; decisive victories short of elimination or regime change, which is the omitted category in Tables 3 and 4; and elimination or foreign-imposed regime change, shown to be the most stable.

TABLE 3
EFFECTS ON THE DURABILITY OF PEACE^a

	<i>Hazard Ratios</i> <i>(Robust Standard Errors)</i>	
Peacekeeping	0.13** (0.11)	
Number of peacekeepers		0.9995 (0.0006)
Tie	355.04** (918.42)	327.88 (1198.03)
Elimination / imposed regime	0.00005*** (0.0001)	0.00003*** (0.00009)
Cost of war	0.90 (0.30)	0.82 (0.21)
History of conflict	4.47*** (2.03)	2.71* (1.39)
Contiguity	0.50 (0.23)	0.92 (0.25)
Multilateral war	0.12*** (0.07)	0.14** (0.11)
Preponderance of power	10.13** (11.40)	3.14 (3.67)
Permanent Security Council member	0.29 (0.23)	1.23 (1.34)
Arab-Israeli war	157.93 (549.09)	610.21 (2957.77)
Existence at stake	5.20*** (1.49)	1.19 (0.76)
Change in relative capabilities	1.60 (0.48)	2.96** (1.38)
Shape parameter p	1.11 (0.54)	1.13 (0.64)
Subjects	48	48
N	770	770
log likelihood	-38.03	-37.82

* $p \leq 0.10$; ** $p \leq 0.05$; *** $p \leq 0.01$; two-tailed tests

^aHazard ratios are interpreted relative to 1. Ratios greater than 1 indicate an increased hazard (that is, peace falls apart more quickly). Ratios less than 1 indicate a decreased hazard (that is, peace lasts longer).

one side's very existence and lower when one side is a great power, but neither finding is consistent across model specifications.

In sum, once we control for other factors that affect the ease or difficulty of maintaining peace, it is clear that interstate peacekeeping is effective. All else equal, peace lasts longer when international personnel are present to help maintain it than when warring states are left to their own devices after a cease-fire.

TABLE 4
EFFECTS ON THE DURABILITY OF PEACE^a
(BY MISSION TYPE)

	<i>Hazard Ratios</i> <i>(Robust Standard Errors)</i>	
Peacekeeping: monitoring	0.15*	js** (0.16)
Peacekeeping: armed forces	0.10	js** (0.27)
Tie	368.02** (1108.28)	
Elimination / imposed regime	0.00005*** (0.0001)	
Cost of war	0.90 (0.30)	
History of conflict	4.40*** (1.84)	
Contiguity	0.53 (0.42)	
Multilateral war	0.12*** (0.10)	
Preponderance of power	8.84 (19.25)	
Permanent Security Council member	0.34 (0.65)	
Arab-Israeli war	204.72 (1165.59)	
Existence at stake	4.20 (7.14)	
Change in relative capabilities	1.69** (0.38)	
Shape parameter p	1.12 (0.63)	
Subjects	48	
N	770	
log likelihood	-37.99	

* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01; js = joint significance; two-tailed tests.

^aHazard ratios are interpreted relative to 1. Ratios greater than 1 indicate an increased hazard (that is, peace falls apart more quickly). Ratios less than 1 indicate a decreased hazard (that is, peace lasts longer).

EVALUATING CAUSAL MECHANISMS

While the quantitative analysis presented above is suitable for testing whether peacekeeping helps to maintain peace, statistics cannot speak to the causal mechanisms of the effect. For this only qualitative analysis will do. In order to begin to evaluate causal mechanisms, this section provides a brief overview of several cases in each of three categories: those with no peacekeepers, those with monitoring missions, and those with armed peacekeeping forces. For a number of reasons, of course, it is difficult to test causal mechanisms definitively, as we cannot observe causality directly but must infer it. Without getting inside the heads of leaders as they make decisions about war or peace, it is impossible to know exactly how the presence or absence of peacekeepers affected their calculations of costs, benefits, and risks. In individual cases we must make counterfactual assessments of whether and how things would have been different had peacekeepers been present or absent. What follows should therefore be taken not as a rigorous test of the causal mechanisms spelled out in the first section of this paper but as a less definitive illustration of the ways in which peacekeepers keep peace and the limits on their ability to do so.

NO PEACEKEEPING

Consistent with the statistical findings above, most of the cases that saw no peacekeeping deployment are wars that ended with very clear victories for one side (North and South Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Hungary, Tanzania and Uganda, Britain and Argentina, and China and India). The stability of peace in these cases is best accounted for by the decisiveness of the military outcome. Of the no peacekeeping cases, those that ended with less-decisive outcomes have not enjoyed stable peace. A look at two of these cases sheds some light on what happens when belligerents are left to their own devices.

The 1972–78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia concerned the disputed Ogaden region, owned by Ethiopia but home to ethnically Somali tribes and claimed by Somalia. Somalia's regular forces fought alongside rebels in the region and had occupied the Ogaden by 1977. Aided by Cuban troops, Ethiopia then repelled Somalia's forces. The war ended in March 1978 when Ethiopia regained the territory.⁴⁵ So-

⁴⁵ For a brief summary of the war, see Jacob Bercovitch and Robert Jackson, *International Conflict: A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management, 1945–1995* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997), 148–49.

malia withdrew its troops in response to a U.S. peace proposal.⁴⁶ No international peacekeepers were deployed.

Tensions remained extremely high between the two countries and there were intermittent clashes and low-level fighting along the border in the years after the cease-fire. These skirmishes escalated, leading to serious fighting in February 1987.⁴⁷ Because this resumption of fighting does not qualify as a full-scale war in the COW definition (it killed only some three hundred people), it is not included as a failure of peace in the quantitative analysis above. This case suggests, however, that when peacekeepers are absent, low-level incidents and clashes can escalate to fairly severe fighting.

The same is true in the Sino-Vietnamese case. Long-standing tensions between China and Vietnam boiled over after serious border incidents in January 1979. China invaded but encountered unanticipated resistance and withdrew to the border by March, ending the war. Skirmishes continued along the border, however. These clashes escalated in 1983 and again in 1984, becoming particularly intense in 1986 and 1987. This renewed fighting qualifies as a full-scale war, as it claimed approximately three thousand lives.⁴⁸

Whether the presence of monitors or armed peacekeepers providing a buffer along the Ethiopia-Somalia or the China-Vietnam borders could have prevented renewed fighting is a counterfactual question. But in both cases, in the absence of any peacekeeping mission, low-level incidents and skirmishes increased tensions and escalated to more serious fighting, including full-scale war in the Sino-Vietnamese case. In cases in which there is neither a very decisive victory for one side nor a peacekeeping mission, peace proves to be very unstable.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 104–5.

⁴⁷ Bercovitch and Jackson (fn. 45), 230–31. In 1988 Ethiopia and Somalia signed a peace agreement pledging among other things to stop aiding rebel armies fighting the other. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, *Arms for the Horn: US Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953–1991* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991); Samuel M. Makinda, “Security in the Horn of Africa,” *Adelphi Papers* 269 (Summer 1992). Somalia was engulfed in its own civil war soon after, and its claim to the Ogaden has lain dormant.

⁴⁸ For an overview of the repeated rounds of fighting between China and Vietnam, see Bercovitch and Jackson (fn. 45), 188–89, 212, 216–17. The interstate conflict eventually wound down with the resolution of Cambodia’s civil war in 1991.

⁴⁹ The short-lived cease-fire reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1992 provides another example. An Iranian-brokered cease-fire halted the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh in March 1992, but the war resumed only three weeks later. The war ended in 1994 only after Armenia had occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and almost 20 percent of the rest of Azerbaijan. Patricia Carley, “Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution,” in *USIP Roundtable Report* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1998).

MONITORING

Most of the peacekeeping after interstate wars has entailed unarmed monitoring missions rather than lightly armed peacekeeping forces.⁵⁰ UN monitors oversaw cease-fires during and after the first Arab-Israeli war, after India and Pakistan's wars over Kashmir, after the Iran-Iraq War, and after the Gulf War. The OAS sent monitors to El Salvador and Honduras after the Football War. Small contingents of monitors from ad hoc groups of neutral nations were sent to Korea as part of the armistice agreement in 1953,⁵¹ and to Vietnam after the Paris Peace Agreement in 1973. Monitors left over from earlier missions were also present, though largely inactive, after the Six-Day War and the Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, and after India and Pakistan's war over the secession of Bangladesh.

A closer look at the monitoring missions in Palestine, Kashmir, and Central America suggests some of the ways in which monitoring missions stabilize peace.⁵² The prospects for stability in the immediate aftermath of these cease-fires were relatively poor. In each case at least one side refused to accept the de facto outcome as the settlement of the dispute, and each left the adversaries' forces in very close proximity. With troops positioned eyeball-to-eyeball, firing incidents were almost inevitable, and tensions tended to remain very high.

United Nations monitoring got off to a rough start. The new organization's first mission was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) sent to Palestine during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. A small group of UN monitors was originally sent to observe a four-week

⁵⁰ By contrast, most peacekeeping missions in civil wars have included at least some armed troops, often along with sizable civilian components.

⁵¹ The UN-flagged force that fought *during* the Korean War is not considered a peacekeeping mission here; the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee deployed *after* the war is. It consisted of monitors from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia operating in twenty teams of at least four observers. *Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea* (Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953).

⁵² The other cases in this category provide less insight. While monitors in Korea may have helped stabilize the armistice to some extent, nuclear deterrence makes the case overdetermined. Monitors deployed in Vietnam in 1973 were quickly overtaken by events. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) deployed at the end of the Gulf War is an unusual case in that, having sanctioned the war against Iraq, the UN could not claim impartiality as observers. This mission was later converted into an armed peacekeeping mission. The UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) operated much like UNTSO and UNMOGIP. UNIIMOG is credited with keeping a number of serious skirmishes from escalating out of control in the first months of the cease-fire after the Iran-Iraq War and with helping to keep peace until Iraq's more pressing security concerns in the Gulf War prompted reconciliation with Iran in January 1991. Brian D. Smith, "United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group," in William Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); see also United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, 3rd ed. (New York: United Nations, 1996), 669–78.

temporary truce in June 1948. Interestingly, both sides complied with this truce right through the day it expired, even though attacking as the end of the truce neared would presumably have been advantageous.⁵³ After another short stint of fighting, a cease-fire ordered by the Security Council went into effect on July 18. Although it was meant to be permanent and a larger team of 572 observers was deployed, fighting resumed when Israel launched an offensive in the Negev and then in the western Galilee. The cease-fire had lasted only three months, during which the UN was a target; UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte was assassinated by a Jewish terrorist organization. And the presence of monitors failed to keep peace.

Cease-fires along the various fronts and a series of general armistice agreements between Israel and each of the frontline Arab states finally ended the war in 1949. After its initial failure, UNTSO monitors observed the peace for almost eight years between Israel and Egypt until Israel attacked with British and French support during the Suez crisis, and for almost twenty years between Israel and both Syria and Jordan. The UN's second mission was the UN Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to monitor the cease-fire after the First Kashmir War in 1949. UNMOGIP helped keep the peace between India and Pakistan for almost seventeen years until the outbreak of war in 1965. Both UNTSO and UNMOGIP are still in place today, though they are largely inactive.

How one judges these results depends in part on the counterfactual. The strife between Arabs and Israelis, and that between India and Pakistan have been the two most intractable interstate conflicts since World War II. Does the fact that these wars reerupted while observers kept watch mean that monitoring was ineffective? Or was renewed war inevitable and the fact that peace lasted as long as it did testament to the effect of monitoring?

To get at the effects of monitoring, it helps to examine the day-to-day operations over time. Both of these missions served mostly to deal with skirmishes and incidents and to keep them from escalating out of control. Monitors acted as impartial referees over "who started it," provided on-the-spot investigation and mediation, worked out small troop withdrawals to stabilize cease-fire lines, and worked to reestablish cease-fires when clashes took place. These missions did not generally provide early warning (although UNMOGIP did inform India of Pakistan's preparations for war in 1965),⁵⁴ nor were they large enough to

⁵³ Sydney D. Bailey, *Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process* (London: MacMillan, 1990).

⁵⁴ Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), 239, 320.

serve as any kind of buffer. As the examples below indicate, they were much more about dispute resolution and preventing accidental spirals.

In the early years of its operation, UNTSO was relatively effective at putting out sparks—and there were many sparks to put out. Along the armistice demarcation line between Israel and Syria, for example, there were numerous incidents and armed clashes over fishing rights in Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), between Arab and Jewish farmers in the demilitarized zones, and over Israel's civil engineering projects in the demilitarized areas. Israel intended to exert its sovereignty over the demilitarized areas, while Syria claimed the territorial issue was unresolved and contested Israel's actions, often by force. These disputes and clashes, and others like them on Israel's other fronts, were investigated on the spot by UNTSO observers and discussed in the military armistice commissions (MACs) set up between Israel and each of its neighbors. Investigation and mediation of cease-fires during clashes were quite effective in keeping the level of violence along the cease-fire lines to a minimum.⁵⁵

The armistice agreements of 1949 were meant to be very temporary arrangements while a political settlement was worked out. As it became clear that settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was not possible, the machinery set up in the agreements to try to keep the peace began to break down.⁵⁶ The dispute resolution procedures of the MACs, for example, became forums more for mutual accusation and recrimination than for resolving problems. The MACs were largely defunct by the mid-1950s, and after the Six-Day War in 1967 Israel stopped cooperating with the UN dispute-resolution machinery altogether. Thus, monitors were still present, but they were much less active in terms of day-to-day operations and investigations. Peace was much less stable after the 1967 war. Clashes along the Israeli-Egyptian front reached full-scale war in the War of Attrition in 1969, and the whole region was again at war in 1973. Monitors could not have prevented the 1973 war.

⁵⁵ For detailed accounts of UNTSO and its operations, see Pablo de Azcarate, *Mission in Palestine* (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1966); David Brook, *Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Armistice System* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964); General Odd Bull, *War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experiences and Views of a U.N. Observer* (London: Leo Cooper, 1976); Lt. General E. L. M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969); E. H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956); Lucien Lee Kinsolving, "The Israeli-Syrian Demilitarized Zones: The UN Security Council Record" (Master's thesis, American University, 1967); Nathan A. Pelcovits, *The Long Armistice: UN Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–1960* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993). For specific examples, see N. Bar-Yaacov, *The Israel-Syrian Armistice: Problems of Implementation, 1949–1966* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1967); Fred J. Khouri, "Friction and Conflict on the Israeli-Syrian Front," *Middle East Journal* 17 (Winter–Spring 1963), 21.

⁵⁶ Azcarate (fn. 55), 100; Bull (fn. 55), 54, 62; Burns (fn. 55), 27.

And it is impossible to say whether an active monitoring operation might have helped prevent the escalation between Israel and Egypt three years earlier. Many other factors were at work, of course, but it is notable that the period between 1967 and 1973, which might have been expected to be relatively stable after Israel's decisive victory, was the only period without active UN monitors or peacekeeping forces and was the least stable period in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In Kashmir we see a similar pattern: monitors were very effective early on but after years of negotiations failed to settle the conflict, tensions rose, and Pakistan and India were again at war in 1965. In its first sixteen years UNMOGIP "fulfilled its basic prophylactic task of helping to maintain local calm and to defuse such incidents as occurred."⁵⁷ UNMOGIP's presence and investigations helped India and Pakistan to contain the inevitable clashes and to avoid war for years.⁵⁸ Pakistan's decision to instigate guerrilla attacks, thus triggering war in 1965, was not prevented by the monitors, though the decision to sponsor guerrillas covertly rather than conduct an outright invasion reflects Pakistan's desire not to be seen as the aggressor and its concern with international opinion. This strategy worked; the world initially condemned India for its response and for being the first to attack across the cease-fire line and the international border. After the Second Kashmir War in 1965 a distinct UN monitoring mission (the UN India-Pakistan Observer Mission, or UNIPOM) was sent to the international boundary between India and Pakistan (as opposed to the disputed line within Kashmir) to oversee the tense cease-fire and later, after the Tashkent Agreement in January 1966, the withdrawal of forces to the status quo ante bellum. This mission of ninety observers helped ensure a smooth transfer of territory held by each side on the wrong side of the border. As it was no longer needed after the withdrawals, it was terminated in March.⁵⁹ Meanwhile UNMOGIP was still in place in Kashmir. India, never a big fan of UN involvement in the dispute, became very mistrustful of the international organization after its failure to condemn Pakistan publicly for initiating the 1965 war and no longer participates fully in UNMOGIP dispute resolution.⁶⁰ UNMOGIP continues to try to mediate day-to-day

⁵⁷ Pauline Dawson, *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir* (London: Hurst and Company, 1994), 304.

⁵⁸ Brines (fn. 54); Joseph Korbel, *Danger in Kashmir* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Alastair Lamb, *The Kashmir Problem* (New York: Praeger, 1966); idem, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846–1990* (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books, 1991).

⁵⁹ United Nations (fn. 52), 138–39.

⁶⁰ India's wariness of UN involvement reflected reluctance to hold the plebiscite promised in Kashmir in 1949 as part of UN Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions, as well as a desire to settle issues with Pakistan bilaterally. It also stemmed in large part from the sovereignty concerns of a rela-

skirmishes. Even without full Indian cooperation, it is given credit for stabilizing the cease-fire line (known as the “line of control” after 1971) in Kashmir to some extent. One Pakistani general noted that despite its diminished role, “UNMOGIP’s investigations and reports have ‘a dampening effect’ on any incident that starts.”⁶¹ UNMOGIP observers are stationed in the Vale of Kashmir, however, and therefore were not able to prevent clashes on the Siachen Glacier or, more recently, the serious fighting in the mountainous terrain of Kargil in 1999.

The UNMOGIP case highlights a bind the UN is in when a cease-fire it is monitoring is violated, not through accidental or small incidents but deliberately (though covertly in this case). Historically, the UN has been highly concerned with maintaining the perception of impartiality. If it publicly condemns the initiator as an “aggressor,” it jeopardizes its ability to mediate reinstatement of the cease-fire, which is the organization’s highest priority. Stopping the immediate killing often takes precedence over longer-term considerations of credibility. In 1965, UNMOGIP observers reported Pakistan’s actions to New York, and U Thant considered going public with reports of Pakistan’s violation of the cease-fire. He issued a draft report to both India and Pakistan; Pakistan of course objected, and U Thant decided to keep quiet:

Weighing carefully all considerations, I came to the conclusion that a public statement by the Secretary-General at that time would serve no constructive purpose and might well do more harm than good. My first and primary objective had to be to see the fighting end rather than indicting or denouncing any party for starting and continuing it.⁶²

With the UN unwilling to condemn aggression publicly, international audience costs have little effect. Indeed, throughout the cold war the UN was very cautious about condemning states for violating the cease-fires it monitored. When major violations did break out, the international organization usually issued even-handed statements and called for a new cease-fire. Constrained by the permanent members of the Security Council, the UN was often not free to blame either side for violations of the cease-fire. But on top of this constraint there developed an organizational reluctance to do or say anything that might

tively new state. As is often the case, states that have newly won independence from colonial powers are reluctant to allow international forces back on their soil, thus constraining UN involvement.

⁶¹ General (ret.) Jehangir Karamat of the Pakistan Army (Presentation at CISAC, Stanford University, May 19, 1999).

⁶² United Nations, Security Council, *Report by the Secretary-General on the Current Situation in Kashmir with Particular Reference to the Cease-Fire Agreement, the Cease-Fire Line and the Functioning of UNMOGIP* (S/6651), September 3, 1965, 7.

jeopardize "impartiality." This unfortunately undermined the organization's ability to use the spotlight of international attention to help maintain peace. The UN often seemed to be in the position of a watchdog who fears that barking might offend the robber (or the robber's patrons). Ironically, in the India-Pakistan case, reluctance to condemn Pakistan led India to conclude the UN could not be relied upon in the conflict, so impartiality was compromised in any case.

The tension between credibility and impartiality continues to create dilemmas for UN peacekeeping,⁶³ but reevaluations of peacekeeping policy after the cold war have changed UN culture on this point considerably. The UN has become much more willing to take diplomatic and even military action against spoilers of the peace.⁶⁴

Both UNTSO and UNMOGIP were quite effective in mediating, restoring local cease-fires, and generally keeping tense situations from spiraling out of control. In neither case, however, could unarmed monitors prevent or deter deliberate decisions to attack. Observers could do nothing but watch as war broke out in 1956 over Suez, for example. Nor could they prevent (though they might have condemned) Pakistan's instigation of guerrilla war across the cease-fire line in Kashmir. And while both missions are in place to this day, they are largely inactive, as neither Israel nor India cooperates with the missions.

The case of El Salvador and Honduras after the so-called Football War in 1969 also provides a glimpse into the empirical effects of monitoring. Thirty-three military observers from the Organization of American States (OAS) were sent to monitor the cease-fire that ended the war and El Salvador's withdrawal to the status quo ante bellum. OAS policy was to pull the observers out as quickly as possible once things settled down, and all but two were pulled out within six months.⁶⁵ Clashes broke out again, however, and the observers were sent back in. They managed to quiet things down but again pulled out quickly—despite a request by the belligerents that the mission continue, it was terminated by December 1971. Serious fighting erupted

⁶³ Adam Roberts, "The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping," in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).

⁶⁴ During the tenure of Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the UN became less reluctant to condemn belligerents; Howard (fn. 4). This trend has continued under Kofi Annan. See, for example, United Nations, General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report)* (A/55/305-S/2000/809), August 21, 2000.

⁶⁵ The OAS secretary-general, Galo Plaza, had been involved in UN peacekeeping in Lebanon and Cyprus and was determined to avoid getting "locked in" and having peacekeepers stay for years. He insisted that "the parties themselves must take over full responsibility." Quoted in David W. Wainhouse, *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 590.

again in 1976 and observers were deployed once more.⁶⁶ This time the OAS consented to leave some of them there until the dispute was eventually sent to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. This on-again-off-again pattern of monitoring makes this a useful case for assessing the effects of peacekeeping. In the case of the Football War the selection effect noted above is clear: observers were sent in only when things got bad. And the stabilizing effect of monitors is also evident: the skirmishes settled down when they were present and flared up when they left.

ARMED PEACEKEEPING

Armed peacekeeping missions have been relatively rare in interstate wars. Peacekeeping forces deployed after the Sinai war, and along both the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian fronts after the Yom Kippur War. More recently, in 2000, the UN sent a mission to help keep peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁶⁷ Armed peacekeeping missions were also present from earlier deployments in civil conflicts in Cyprus when the Turco-Cypriot war broke out, and in Lebanon when Israel and Syria fought there in 1982.

In both the Sinai war and the Yom Kippur War, great power involvement and/or the threat of direct superpower involvement raised the stakes of peacemaking and peacekeeping considerably. The practice of sending large numbers of armed soldiers under the auspices of the international community as a buffer to keep peace was developed to allow the United Kingdom and France to save face as they pulled out after the Suez crisis in 1956⁶⁸ and to oversee Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai. By positioning itself between withdrawing Israeli troops and Egyptian forces, the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) helped to prevent incidents among enemy combatants. Once the withdrawal was complete, UNEF monitored the Israeli-Egyptian border.

UNEF's eventual fate is a classic case of the limits of peacekeeping: peacekeeping operates with the consent of the parties involved. So when Nasser asked the UNEF to leave in 1967, the operation had to withdraw, and Israel launched a preemptive attack. UNEF was deployed only on the Egyptian side of the border. Once Egypt revoked consent,

⁶⁶ Mary Jeanne Reid Mertz, *The Central American Soccer War: Historical Patterns and Internal Dynamics of OAS Settlement Procedures* (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1978), 73–80.

⁶⁷ This last case falls outside the temporal scope of the quantitative analysis above. Adding it, however, would strengthen the finding that peace is more likely to last when peacekeepers are present.

⁶⁸ Britain and France agreed to withdraw as soon as a UN force was in position to ensure that hostilities would not resume; United Nations (fn. 52), 45.

UNEF was powerless to prevent this war.⁶⁹ Agreeing to peacekeeping ties belligerents' hands, but they retain the ability ultimately to untie the knot.

UNEF also clearly shows the effects of peacekeeping, however. First, the fact that Nasser felt it necessary to ask the mission to leave indicates that it was a political if not a military constraint. Nasser withdrew consent for UNEF in part to respond to accusations within the Arab world that he needed UN protection from Israel. But apparently, as tensions mounted toward war, he felt that should he desire to fight Israel, the UN peacekeepers presented a significant obstacle. Second, regardless of whether Egypt intended to strike Israel unprovoked or only in response to an offensive by Israel against Syria (the Soviet Union had erroneously reported that Israel was amassing troops on the Syrian border), Israel took the move as a signal of impending attack.⁷⁰ Just as agreeing to peacekeeping signals benign intent, withdrawing consent signals the opposite. Belligerents can untie their hands, but not in secret.

Third, comparisons across time and across space show UNEF's effects on peace. Across time, we can examine the Israeli-Egyptian border before, during, and after UNEF's deployment. The pattern of hostilities between Israel and its Arab neighbors was largely that of infiltration into Israel (at first often by farmers separated from their land by the cease-fire lines and later by fedayeen) and reprisals by Israel in return. The Egyptian-Israeli front had been volatile before 1956, but was largely quiet while the UNEF buffer force was there. After its departure and the 1967 war, clashes between Israeli and Egyptian forces escalated back to the level of full-scale warfare in the War of Attrition in 1969–70.

Comparing the Israeli-Egyptian front while UNEF was deployed to the Israeli-Syrian and Israel-Jordanian fronts where no peacekeepers were present, we also see a large difference. "There was a marked contrast between the quiet along the Egyptian border and the confrontation situation in other sectors."⁷¹ There was a higher concentration of Palestinian refugees in Jordan, making this front more problematic, but the difference also reflects the effect of UNEF's role as a buffer force, in this case with authorization to apprehend infiltrators crossing from Egypt into Israel.⁷²

⁶⁹ Bailey (fn. 53).

⁷⁰ Up to this point, Israel had viewed aggressive posturing in Egypt as merely political maneuvering; Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, 3rd ed. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 245–48.

⁷¹ United Nations (fn. 52), 54.

⁷² Ibid., 53.

No armed peacekeepers were in place in the Middle East when the 1973 war broke out (and UNTSO was by then completely inactive),⁷³ though it is debatable whether they would have been able to prevent the deliberate Egyptian and Syrian attack. They would presumably have made the surprise attack on Yom Kippur more difficult, however. After the Yom Kippur War armed peacekeepers were deployed both in the Sinai (UNEF II) and in the Golan Heights as a buffer between Israeli and Syrian forces. Not only did UNEF II help maintain the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, but it also made possible the peace process that eventually led to a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. This is an important counterexample to the moral hazard argument (mentioned above), which holds that by maintaining a cease-fire and keeping the costs of conflict low, peacekeepers can hinder peace processes. It is hard to imagine Sadat's visit to Jerusalem or the Camp David negotiations occurring while serious clashes took place along the Egyptian-Israeli front. A non-UN force, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) took over peacekeeping after the peace treaty was signed.⁷⁴ The MFO remains in the Sinai, verifying that neither side is preparing to attack the other.

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) deployed in the Golan Heights after the 1973 war was, like UNEF, a classic buffer or interpositional force stationed in a demilitarized zone separating the two sides.⁷⁵ UNDOF monitors the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian forces, providing some early warning should either side try to seize territory in the strategic heights. It also serves a dispute-resolution function, dealing with alleged violations over "unauthorized crossings" into the buffer zone.⁷⁶ Continued Israeli and Syrian acceptance of UNDOF serves as a signaling device, indicating relatively benign intentions between otherwise deadly enemies.⁷⁷ In the data set used in Tables 3 and 4,

⁷³ UNTSO observers were not even able to tell which side started the Yom Kippur War. Bailey (fn. 53), 308; Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 99.

⁷⁴ Opposition from Arab states and the Soviets to the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace process precluded any continued UN peacekeeping role.

⁷⁵ Israel, previously opposed to strong peacekeeping forces, pushed for a large force of at least three thousand troops. Syria, by contrast, was concerned about infringements on its sovereignty and wanted a nonmilitary operation of only a few hundred monitors. They settled on 1,250 UN troops. The issue was touchy enough politically that even the name of the operation was an issue, with both "observer" and "force" in the title as a compromise. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 1044, 1094.

⁷⁶ Mona Ghali, "United Nations Disengagement Observer Force," in William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St Martin's, 1993).

⁷⁷ A request by either side that the UN mission depart would be seen as a distinctly hostile act by the other side.

the UNDOF mission is coded as a failure with peace lasting eight and a half years because Israel and Syria fought again in Lebanon in 1982. However, peace has lasted remarkably well in the Golan, where the peacekeepers are deployed. The fact that these two adversaries did not fight over this most contested strategic piece of territory even while they were fighting each other in Lebanon (nor when Israel annexed the Golan, extending Israeli jurisdiction and administration to the territory in 1981) is strong testament to UNDOF's peacekeeping effects.

The first section of this article hypothesized that peacekeepers might make peace more stable by (1) raising the cost of returning to war by making surprise attack more difficult and raising the international audience costs of aggression; (2) reassuring each side about the other's intentions by monitoring and by providing belligerents with a credible way to signal their intentions; and (3) preventing accidents or skirmishes from escalating back to war by mediating and investigating alleged violations. What do the cases surveyed here tell us about these causal mechanisms in practice?

Evidence that the presence of peacekeepers raises the costs of aggression is inherently hard to come by. Deterrence is notoriously difficult to evaluate empirically, particularly in individual cases. And its failures are much more obvious than its successes. There are clear cases in which peacekeepers failed to deter aggression, for example, the Israeli offensive breaking the cease-fire in 1948 in the first Arab-Israeli war.⁷⁸ It is much harder to know if leaders who might otherwise have contemplated an attack were dissuaded by the presence of peacekeepers. Decisions about surprise attack are, by their very nature, particularly difficult to observe empirically. It is notable, however, that the most notorious case of a surprise attack in the period surveyed here, the Egyptian and Syrian attack on Yom Kippur 1973, occurred when there were no active peacekeepers in the region.

There are also cases in which peacekeepers' ability to raise the cost of aggression can be seen in the breach. Nasser's request that UNEF withdraw suggests that its presence limited his ability to maneuver militarily and politically. Pakistan's choice of covert aggression, instigating guerrilla attacks against India in 1965 provides another example. An overt attack would have been militarily more effective,⁷⁹ but Pakistan successfully avoided international condemnation by provoking India to

⁷⁸The impotence of peacekeepers in the face of determined aggression is perhaps best exemplified by the case of Lebanon in 1982, when the role of the peacekeepers was reduced to counting Israeli tanks as they rolled by.

⁷⁹Brines (fn. 54), 310.

be the first to cross the cease-fire line openly. The presence of UN monitors thus constrained Pakistan's war options, though it did not foreclose them. However, the UN's failure to call Pakistan to task for provoking this war illustrates the limited use peacekeepers have made of the "spotlight of international attention." In general, while states may care very much about international opinion,⁸⁰ there is only scant evidence that the presence of peacekeepers invokes these concerns. The combination of cold war politics and an organizational reluctance to condemn aggression publicly served to undermine this potential causal mechanism of peacekeeping. With the cold war over and the UN's organizational culture changing, invoking international audience costs has likely become more important, but evaluating its effectiveness in more recent cases, particularly in civil wars, is beyond the scope of this paper.

The evidence that peacekeepers reassured belligerents about each other's intentions is stronger. Whether or not peacekeepers actually deterred surprise attack, there are a number of cases in which their presence served to mollify each side's concerns about such an attack from the other. Historians credit UNMOGIP, for example, with reassuring India and Pakistan that the other was not preparing a surprise attack.⁸¹ Since the Yom Kippur War, the presence of UN and then MFO peacekeepers and their verification technology have served to reassure both Israel and Egypt that neither is mobilizing to attack the other across the Sinai.⁸² The same could be said for UNDOF in the Golan, although neither Israel nor Syria is likely to rely heavily on UN peacekeepers for intelligence about the other's military.

There is also evidence that acceptance of and continued cooperation with peacekeepers serves as a credible signal of benign intent. That Israel and Syria continue to countenance UNDOF signals that, despite their mutual hostility, neither intends to attack the other directly. Once again, however, this effect can be best observed in the breach. Increasing reluctance to cooperate with UNTSO inspectors and the MAC dispute-resolution procedures both reflected and signaled rising hostility between

⁸⁰ Israel has always been concerned with U.S. opinion, often waiting for a green, or at least a yellow, light from Washington before acting militarily. Khouri (fn. 70), 244; Ma'oz (fn. 73), 100–101. India also delayed military action against Pakistan in 1971 because of concerns about international reaction to a precipitous attack; Sumit Ganguly, *The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), 120.

⁸¹ This is true both of scholars generally inclined to see the peacekeeping as efficacious, such as Wainhouse (fn. 65), chap. 3, and of a skeptic on the UN's role like Brines (fn. 54).

⁸² E. D. Doyle, "Eyewitness: Verification in the Sinai," *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 1 (Autumn 1994); Nathan A. Pelcovits, *Peacekeeping on Arab-Israeli Fronts: Lessons from the Sinai and Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984).

Israel and its neighbors during the 1950s, and Nasser's request that UNEF leave was interpreted by Israel as a signal of impending attack.

The effects of peacekeepers' mediation and investigation on the likelihood that small skirmishes will escalate to more serious hostilities can be seen in a number of cases. While they did not make peace last forever, missions such as UNTSO and UNMOGIP stabilized cease-fire lines in the immediate aftermath of war by arranging local cease-fires when fighting broke out. By submitting complaints for UN investigation, India and Pakistan and Israel and its neighbors were able to respond to perceived violations without escalating their conflicts. Variation in the presence and activity level of peacekeepers both across time periods and across fronts in the Middle East indicates the effectiveness of peacekeepers in subduing the level of hostilities and preventing escalation. The on-again off-again nature of OAS peacekeeping between El Salvador and Honduras provides more evidence that cease-fire lines remain calmer and escalation is less likely when peacekeepers are present. The fate of peace in those cases in which there was neither a decisive victory nor deployment of a peacekeeping mission, as between Ethiopia and Somalia or between Vietnam and China, further indicates that the presence of peacekeepers helps to prevent relatively low-level skirmishing from escalating back to war.

For the reasons given above, this overview does not provide a definitive test of the causal mechanisms of peacekeeping. Some tentative conclusions can be reached, however. Peacekeepers have some ability to raise the cost of aggression, but this ability is limited. Their presence makes surprise attack more difficult, but they have not historically been effective in invoking the international audience costs of resuming war. There is stronger evidence that peacekeepers have served to reassure belligerents about the other's intentions, both by monitoring and, perhaps more important, by providing a credible signal of intentions. And there is fairly clear evidence that peacekeepers serve to minimize the risk of accidents or skirmishes from escalating to full-scale fighting.

CONCLUSION

Recent scholarship on peacekeeping has focused on its adaptation to internal conflict, but traditional peacekeeping between states has not been well theorized; nor has it been rigorously tested. This article has explored the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers make interstate war less likely to resume and has tested the effect of peacekeeping over its half-century history.

On the face of it, it is not immediately obvious how unarmed or relatively lightly armed international personnel, deployed with, and therefore dependent on, the consent of the warring parties can reduce the chances of another war. While the brief survey of cases given here is not a definitive test, it suggests that peacekeepers can disrupt the processes that might otherwise lead back to war in several ways. At the margins at least, they may make deliberate aggression physically more difficult, and they can make surprise attack less likely. Peacekeepers have the potential to raise the international costs of aggression, bringing tangible losses in terms of military support and aid, as well as, perhaps, less tangible losses in reputation and support, but cold war constraints and the organizational culture of the UN thwarted that potential. Peacekeepers can help disrupt security dilemma spirals of misunderstanding and uncertainty that can lead to unwanted war by monitoring compliance and serving as a neutral referee for the inevitable charges of cease-fire violations. Peacekeeping can also serve as a credible signal of intentions among belligerents who otherwise have difficulty making their aims known. And last but not least, peacekeepers can help prevent accidents and small skirmishes from leading back to war. On-the-spot mediation can restore calm, while formal investigative mechanisms give belligerents an alternative either to doing nothing and appearing weak in the face of perceived provocations or to responding and escalating the situation dangerously.

Unlike causal mechanisms, the overall effects of peacekeeping can be tested definitively. Here the results are quite clear. Peacekeepers are not deployed at random. Rather, they are most likely to be used in cases where peace is relatively difficult to maintain, particularly when there has been no decisive military victor. It is therefore important to control for factors that shape both where peacekeepers go and whether peace lasts. All else equal, peace lasts substantially longer when international personnel deploy than when states are left to maintain peace on their own. In short, peacekeeping works. It is not a panacea; peacekeeping alone will not stop deliberate aggression. But at a time when the relevance of international organizations and the UN in particular is being questioned, it is important to acknowledge the utility of conflict-management tools such as peacekeeping.

APPENDIX: CEASE-FIRES, THE RESUMPTION OF WAR, AND PEACEKEEPING (1946-98)^a

<i>War</i>	<i>Between</i>	<i>Cease-Fire</i>	<i>War Resumes</i>	<i>PK</i>	<i>Mission</i>
Palestine 1	Israel	Iraq	Jul 18, 1948	Oct 15, 1948	1 UNTSO
Palestine 1	Israel	Egypt	Jul 18, 1948	Oct 15, 1948	1 UNTSO
Palestine 1	Israel	Syria	Jul 18, 1948	Oct 15, 1948	1 UNTSO
Palestine 1	Israel	Lebanon	Jul 18, 1948	Oct 15, 1948	1 UNTSO
Palestine 1	Israel	Jordan	Jul 18, 1948	Oct 15, 1948	1 UNTSO
Palestine 2	Israel	Iraq	Oct 31, 1948	Oct 6, 1973	1 ^c UNTSO
Palestine 2	Israel	Egypt	Jan 7, 1949	Oct 29, 1956	1 ^c UNTSO
Palestine 2	Israel	Syria	Oct 31, 1948	June 5, 1967	1 ^c UNTSO
Palestine 2	Israel	Lebanon	Oct 31, 1948	Apr 11, 1982	1 ^c UNTSO
Palestine 2	Israel	Jordan	Oct 31, 1948	June 5, 1967	1 ^c UNTSO
Kashmir 1	India	Pakistan	Jan 1, 1949	Aug 5, 1965	1 UNMOGIP
Korean	USA	China	Jul 27, 1953		Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
Korean	USA	N. Korea	Jul 27, 1953		Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
Korean	S. Korea	China	Jul 27, 1953		Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
Korean	S. Korea	N. Korea	Jul 27, 1953		Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
Russo-Hungarian	USSR	Hungary	Nov 14, 1956		Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee
Sinai	UK	Egypt	Nov 6, 1956		0 UNEF 1
Sinai	France	Egypt	Nov 6, 1956		2 UNEF 1
Sinai	Israel	Egypt	Nov 6, 1956	June 5, 1967	2 UNEF 1
Sino-Indian	China	India	Nov 22, 1962		0 Ad hoc monitoring mission
Vietnamese	N. Vietnam	USA	Jan 27, 1973		1
Vietnamese	N. Vietnam	S. Vietnam	Apr 30, 1975 ^b		0
Kashmir 2	Pakistan	India	Sep 23, 1965	Dec 3, 1971	1 UNMOGIP, UNIPOM
Six Day	Israel	Egypt	June 10, 1967	Mar 6, 1969	1 ^c UNTSO (inactive)
Six Day	Israel	Syria	June 10, 1967	Oct 6, 1973	1 ^c UNTSO (inactive)
Six Day	Israel	Jordan	June 10, 1967	Oct 10, 1973	0

War of Attrition	Israel	Egypt	Aug 7, 1970	Oct 6, 1973	1 ^c
Football	El Salvador	Honduras	Jul 18, 1969		1
Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Dec 17, 1971		1 ^c
Yom Kippur	Israel	Egypt	Oct 24, 1973		2
Yom Kippur	Israel	Syria	Oct 24, 1973	Jun 5, 1982	2
Yom Kippur	Israel	Jordan	Oct 24, 1973		0
Turco-Cypriot 1	Turkey	Cyprus	Jul 29, 1974	Aug 14, 1974	2 ^c
Turco-Cypriot 2	Turkey	Cyprus	Aug 16, 1974		2 ^c
Ethiopia-Somalia	Cuba	Somalia	Mar 14, 1978		0
Ethiopia-Somalia	Ethiopia	Somalia	Mar 14, 1978		0
Uganda-Tanzania	Tanzania	Uganda	Apr 12, 1979		0
Uganda-Tanzania	Tanzania	Libya	Apr 12, 1979		0
Sino-Vietnam 1	China	Vietnam	Mar 10, 1979	Jan 5, 1987	0
Iran-Iraq	Iran	Iraq	Aug 20, 1988		1
Falklands	UK	Argentina	Jun 20, 1982		0
Lebanon	Israel	Syria	Sep 5, 1982		2
Sino-Vietnam 2	China	Vietnam	Feb 6, 1987		0
Gulf War	USA	Iraq	Apr 11, 1991		1
Gulf War	Saudi Arabia	Iraq	Apr 11, 1991		1
Gulf War	Kuwait	Iraq	Apr 11, 1991		1
Azeri-Armenian 1	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Mar 21, 1992	Apr 11, 1992	0
Azeri-Armenian 2	Armenia	Azerbaijan	May 12, 1994		0

^aPeacekeeping: 0 = none; 1 = unarmed monitors; 2 = armed forces.

^bCensored immediately.

^cDenotes cases in which the only peacekeeping mission present was "left over" from an earlier cease-fire.