Table 1 Baseline Results

	Growth at $t + 2$ (Last Year = 100)					
	(1) Overall	**(2)** Overall	**(3)** Overall	**(4)** Agriculture	**(5)** Manufacturing	**(6)** Service
Connected to provincial secretary	0.389*	0.749**	0.382**	0.009	0.740*	0.210
	(0.191)	(0.199)	(0.126)	(0.207)	(0.315)	(0.153)
City and province-year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City economic controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
City leader controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Adjusted R^2	0.45	0.48	0.51	0.25	0.36	0.40
Number of cities	326	326	326	326	326	326
Observations	3,907	3,891	3,693	3,691	3,691	3,691

Note: This table presents the effects of patronage ties to provincial secretaries on economic growth. The dependent variables are overall and sector-specific GDP growth rates at $t + 2$. City economic controls include *Net Transfer*$(t + 1)$ and the following pairs of variables evaluated at both the city secretary's and the mayor's predecessors' final year of service: *GDP Growth*, *Log GDP*, *Log Population*, and *Log Investment*. City leader controls include the following variables (for both the city secretary and the mayor): *Age, Education, Gender*, and dummies for having served for less than 1 year, between 1 and 3 years, and between 3 and 5 years (with more than 5 years being the reference group) in one's current position. Robust standard errors clustered at city level are reported in parentheses. FE = fixed effects.
*$p < .05$, **$p < .01$ (two-tailed test).