

## Power in numbers: a call for analytical generosity toward new political strategies

Trina Hamilton

Department of Geography, State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo, 105 Wilkeson Quad, North Campus, Buffalo, NY 14261, USA; e-mail: trinaham@buffalo.edu

Received 2 January 2008; in revised form 18 May 2008

**Abstract.** This paper is a methodological and epistemological reflection on the power of numbers to contribute to the debate over the potential and limitations of market politics as a regulatory force in the global economy. Informal regulatory networks, including transnational corporate campaigns, form a new sphere of politics which leap-frogs the state and targets corporations directly concerning their social and environmental impacts. I describe my statistical analysis of corporate campaigns targeting US multinationals to argue in favor of analytical generosity when evaluating these new political forms. I argue that a reflexive and critical quantification can provide new insights into stakeholder power and contemporary political processes.

“Quantification brings with it some heavy baggage.”

Mattingly and Falconer-Al-Hindi (1995, page 428)

“I would like us to devise methods and methodologies that maximize the chance that we will see things we were not expecting to see, that leave us open to surprise, that do not foreclose the unexpected.”

Hanson (1997, page 125)

“We need, in short, a critical geography animated by both anger and hope.”

Blomley (2007, page 62)

### Introduction

This paper is a methodological and epistemological reflection on my use of statistics (in addition to in-depth interviews) to evaluate the potential and limitations of corporate campaigns as means of regulating multinational corporations' social and environmental performance. Corporate campaigns are a form of market politics waged by (often transnational) networks of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), unions, local communities, shareholders, and consumers. They target corporations directly over social and environmental issues such as climate change, ecosystem and cultural preservation, labor standards, and product safety. For the most part, these new regulatory networks rely on market power and persuasion rather than the legal sanctions available to nation-states. Moreover, they operate within a continuously shifting landscape of stakeholder alliances and corporate vulnerabilities and defense mechanisms, making it difficult to move beyond competing case studies of campaign successes and failures. At the 2006 Association of American Geographers (AAG) meetings someone commented that they appreciated the generosity of my approach to corporate campaigning as a political strategy. There is often a critical urge to dismiss certain political strategies without much analysis of their actual outcomes, and I argue that analytical generosity—which in this case means embracing numbers—is particularly important when researching new political strategies because we have yet to develop adequate theories of stakeholder power and network governance that can fully capture their potential and limitations.

This reflection is part of a broader self-examination by geographers attempting to straddle critical and quantitative identities (eg Kwan, 2004). 'Quantifier' is not an identity that I naturally adopt: economic, political, feminist, and critical geographer slip more easily off my tongue. Yet my research is driven by dual impulses to develop and query databases on the one hand, and to extract and triangulate stories from interviewees on the other. This special issue and the AAG session that preceded it encouraged me to be more self-reflective about my quantification. In their call for papers, the session organizers charged us with exploring "how critical/qualitative and analytical/quantitative geographies may enrich each other and how quantitative methods may be used to address issues informed by critical geographies." I have been asked several times whether the statistical component of my research actually taught me anything new or simply confirmed my intuition going into the project, prompting me to think through strategic versus integrative quantification by critical geographers. I argue in this paper that the numbers were critical to the theory and narrative-building process of my project and not simply relegated to support status. I propose the idea of 'analytical generosity' as a framework for assessing new political strategies, as well as a broader framework for methodological experimentation within critical geography. This approach incorporates several forms of generosity. First, I propose an outcome-based and large-dataset-driven analysis of new political strategies in order to provide room for new forms of political power and possibility to assert themselves. Second, I advocate a postpositivist and self-reflexive reading of the numbers produced by such analysis in order to accommodate individual agency, relationality, and indeterminacy. Finally, I recognize the need to engage alternative, potentially contradictory results and conceptualizations of these political processes (both academic and popular) in order to check my own biases and to build robust theory. Analytical generosity should not be equated with a methodological or epistemological free-for-all. Rather, it reflects a conscious effort to give new forms of agency their due while also illuminating the continuously shifting opportunities for, and barriers to, political agency that are central to the social justice and social change tenets that unite the critical geography community. Despite its considerable baggage, I hope to show how quantification can contribute to the creation of critical geographies of both anger and hope, and perhaps a surprise or two along the way.

I start with a brief discussion of the politics of counting within critical geography, paying particular attention to the debates within feminist geography and regional studies. I then describe what the case studies in the literature have to say about the potential and limitations of corporate campaigns. Then, using the results of my own statistical analysis, I explain what quantification can add to our understanding of these campaigns. I pay particular attention to questions of agency versus structural impediments, as well as to the overlapping of new and traditional political spheres. I also attempt to lay bare some of the myriad decisions (about the variables and data sources used, the boundaries of my analysis, etc) that affected the numbers I came up with and my reading of them. In doing so, I hope to show how important it is not only to count, but to count critically.

### **The politics of counting**

Blomley recently asserted that "the articles [from a recent sampling of *Antipode*] reflect critical geography's commitment to theory and the rejection of empiricism" (2006, page 90). While some may argue with his sample, I think it is fair to say that critical geography has long had an uneasy relationship with quantification. That said, there have been several strands of debate urging a rethinking of the methodological divides within critical geography and the discipline more generally. Kwan (2004) proposes

hybridity as a metaphor for “geographical practices (or ‘boundary projects’) that challenge the boundary and forge creative connections between social–cultural and spatial–analytical geographies” (page 758). Epistemological divides remain even when methods cross-pollinate, however, and it is essential to keep epistemological debates alive. Two such debates, from the feminist geography and regional studies literatures, are particularly relevant to my own work. One of the earlier feminist geography debates, in a 1995 issue of *The Professional Geographer*, was devoted to the question “Should women count?”. Two particular aspects of that debate—the role of quantification in a mixed methods approach, and the differences between positivist and poststructural approaches to quantification—shape my own statistical analysis in this paper.

There is clearly a strong strategic motivation for generating numbers. As McLafferty notes, quantitative analysis can “situate qualitative research in a broader context” (1995, page 439). This broader context is often necessary to influence policy makers, the media, or other target audiences. Numbers can be used to counter claims that specific instances of injustice or wrongdoing are merely irregularities, for instance. Yet the value of quantification extends beyond the strategic. Rocheleau (1995) describes the surprises generated by what she intended to be a strategic deployment of numbers:

“We assumed that the formal questionnaire survey would simply confirm our results and make them real to natural resource managers and biological scientists. However, the quantitative data, as well as the random sample itself, yielded important new insights for the research team” (page 462).

She argues that the results of their survey contradicted prevailing assumptions about the role played by women’s organizations in the local social forestry regime, and that the stratified random sampling methodology was integral to uncovering this contradiction (Rocheleau, 1995, page 462).

Despite the broad support for quantitative techniques espoused in the “Should women count?” issue, Lawson (1995) cautions that “conflating descriptive uses of counting with statistical inference *is* problematic” (page 454, original emphasis). She concurs with many other feminist (and indeed other critical) geographers that “Counting in historically and geographically specific contexts, and for particular groups of people, can be used to *describe* relations of power ... or to *illustrate the results* of the exercise of power ... [and] to reveal patterns in places for further research” (page 454, original emphasis). But she warns that statistical inference denies “the role of history, context, and the positions of subjects within webs of social relations that constitute the meaningful subjects of feminist studies” (page 454). Lawson develops an adamantly postpositivist and poststructural approach to quantification, wary of the potential to deny agency, yet cognisant that statistical description can highlight critical injustices. As I describe below, these cautions informed my own research design, yet, following Rocheleau (1995), I found quantification to be a useful tool for illuminating rather than obfuscating certain forms of agency.

The debate over traditional and critical theory was taken up more recently in the pages of *Regional Studies*. In her original critique, Markusen lamented that “The term ‘theorist’ is often applied to those who deal mainly in abstractions and abjure empirical verification, rather than those who take up knotty problems, hypothesize about their nature and causality, and marshal evidence in support of their views” (1999, page 872). I am sympathetic to Markusen’s desire for more data. Indeed, my own research project was born partly out of a frustration with the lack of empirical data on the operation and outcomes of corporate campaigns. I also sympathize with her desire to specify “agents and responsibility” (page 880), and her push for more “transparency in methodology” (page 879). Yet, Hudson (2003) and Peck (2003)

subsequently charged Markusen with advocating not only number crunching and specification but a particular, positivist mode of theory building. According to Hudson (2003) and Peck (2003), this epistemological debate pits positivist statistical inference, predictive power, and replicability against alternative measures of theoretical value, including “analytical plausibility” (Peck, 2003, page 731) and the ability “to change the underlying structures that generate socially unacceptable and politically regressive outcomes” (Hudson, 2003, page 745).<sup>(1)</sup> Peck (2003) argues that “for Markusen, multi-faceted concepts ... are fuzzy *because* they are multi-faceted. ... I would accept this as a fact of life, though for Markusen it undermines the theories themselves” (page 732, original emphasis). He argues that the world of “contingent interactions” (page 731) and “blurred boundaries” (page 738) that form his research terrain necessitate postpositivist, intensive case-study approaches. Yet, he subsequently asserts that “The field’s methodological pluralism is healthy” (page 730) and that we need to “acknowledge the continuing role of ‘thinking’ applications of *both* qualitative *and* quantitative methods” (page 736, original emphasis). Rather than reinforcing strict methodological boundaries, then, this debate reinforces the need for epistemological reflexivity in our choice of research methods and throughout the analytical process.

Moss’s “mediated objectivity” (1995, page 446) seems to me a useful way to enhance our reflexivity about the production of numbers. She advocates a “feminist epistemology ... that explicitly locates objectivity where human cognition is acknowledged within people’s multiple power positionings in society, polity, and economy and where counting is a tool, not to strengthen a claim or privilege a position, but rather to contextualize and ascertain structural relations of everyday life” (1995, page 445).

Mattingly and Falconer-Al-Hindi (1995) describe this feminist objectivity as one that “foregrounds, rather than obscures, the relations of knowledge production” (page 433). As McLafferty (1995) notes, “The very acts of framing a research problem, collecting data, deciding on a set of methods, and interpreting or presenting findings are colored by our beliefs, theories, and experiences” (page 437). Beyond the call for reflexivity, however, it is telling that Moss still refers to the “structural relations of everyday life” (1995, page 445). While she rejects universal truth claims, she, along with Lawson and others, accept that there are indeed structural imperatives that need uncovering.

The debate over structure and agency is obviously not defined by methodology: it is not a question of quantitative versus qualitative methods. Yet it is another critical determinant of how we read numbers (and qualitative data). We might call this debate the politics of who and what counts for theory building. One of the more recent incarnations of this debate, which reflects my own struggles with the concepts of limits and possibility, is the 2005 debate in the *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* between Gibson-Graham and a set of commentators, including Kelly. Gibson-Graham’s (2005a) description of their community economy action-research project in the Philippines drew both admiration and cautions from their commentators. Kelly, for instance, explained that his own experience with community development in the Philippines “provokes me into a cautiousness bordering on pessimism that is largely absent from their [Gibson-Graham’s] account” (2005, page 39). He focuses in particular on “limits to possibilities” such as “The power of the state apparatus to allow or disallow, and even to appropriate this community economy” (Kelly, 2005, page 42). In their subsequent response, Gibson-Graham counter that they are “more concerned to theorise *conditions* of possibility than *limits* to possibility” (2005b, page 123, original emphasis). They posit “a divergence

<sup>(1)</sup> It is important to note here that Markusen herself shied away from epistemological debate in her critique; therefore, her epistemological orientation is adopted from Peck and Hudson’s responses.

in theoretical orientation between Kelly and ourselves” (Gibson-Graham, 2005b, page 123), taking issue with what they see as a “structural/systemic view of economic determination” (2005b, page 123). Yet, they concede that perhaps it is useful to “acknowledge and theorise limits but to treat them as ‘positively charged’—in other words, contributing to energies and prompting strategies that may transcend/transform them” (2005b, page 123). My theoretical and political sympathies tend to lie with the politics of possibility approach of Gibson-Graham, and yet this debate also got me thinking about opportunity costs. In this paper I show how my analysis is shaped by a desire to uncover and celebrate political possibility and agency, yet how I consciously balance this with an awareness of the potential opportunity costs of certain political strategies—such as their impact on other possible futures.

### **The corporate campaign: evidence to date**

Corporate campaigns are one example of a new breed of nonstate governance mechanisms that either leapfrog or network traditional state authority into new regulatory geometries (Anderson, 2001; Angel et al, 2007; Evans, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Market politics includes shareholder and consumer pressure (Barnett et al, 2005; Clark and Hebb, 2004; Clarke et al, 2006; Emel, 2002; Hartwick, 2000), transnational union campaigns (Herod, 1995; Wills, 1998), as well as multistakeholder transnational campaigns and nonstate regulatory institutions (Angel et al, 2007; Hughes et al, 2007; Johns and Vural, 2000; Sadler, 2004a; 2004b). Manheim, author of one of the most comprehensive accounts of modern corporate campaigns, defines a corporate campaign as “a coordinated, often long-term, and wide-ranging program of economic, political, legal, and psychological warfare ... directed against a corporation that has ... refused to yield on some issue of great importance to the organization launching the campaign” (2001, page xiii). Whereas Manheim and others have tended to emphasize the warfare side of these campaigns, I uncovered a broad range of strategies, including negotiation and cooperation. Rather than warfare, then, I would characterize campaigns as a form of social regulation. Social regulation, also referred to variously as ‘informal’, ‘civil’, or ‘civic’ regulation, consists of “non-statutory regulatory frameworks governing corporate affairs” (Zadek, 2001, page 56). Although corporate concessions are often achieved through “activist campaigning which aims to damage companies’ market performance by undermining their reputation” (page 55), Zadek argues that “Underlying the noisy campaigning is in reality a normalization process taking place in the relationship between NGOs and much of the business community” (2001, page 78).

Corporate campaigns are not necessarily new. For instance, in the early 1960s, the desegregation campaign against Woolworth’s united consumers and activists at lunch counters and outside storefronts both in northern and in southern states (Vogel, 1978). During the Vietnam War, the Medical Committee for Human Rights waged a shareholder and reputational campaign against Dow Chemical over their production of napalm (Monks and Minnow, 1991; Vogel, 1978). And, in the early days of organizing drives in the South, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union’s campaign against manufacturer JP Stevens pioneered the power-mapping model of campaigning, with secondary targets such as MetLife and Manufacturers Hanover Trust (Manheim, 2001; Rogers, 1999). In terms of outcomes, Woolworth’s lunch counters were eventually desegregated, Dow ceased producing napalm for the US government, and 3000 garment workers at JP Stevens gained union representation (Manheim, 2001; Monks and Minnow, 1991; Vogel, 1978). Contemporary campaigns draw on the strategic developments of their historical predecessors, but they find themselves targeting a new kind of corporation, one with a new set of vulnerabilities

created by their considerable reliance on brand and reputational assets, as well as new defense mechanisms arising from the flexibility of globally dispersed commodity chains.

The evidence from contemporary case studies is mixed. Several studies document campaigns against multinational mining and oil companies over community development and environmental degradation in the developing world. Concessions include community investments by Shell in Nigeria (Boele et al, 2001; Watts, 2005), a “\$150 million out of court compensation pay out” to affected communities by BHP in Papua New Guinea (Phillips, 2002, page 186), US\$1 million in community compensation from Rio Tinto in Indonesia (Phillips, 2002, page 189), and “marginal adjustments to [Freeport’s] ecological and social practices” in West Papua (Emel, 2002, page 840). In a more radical victory, a transnational network of activists aided Peruvian farmers in halting the slated development of a copper and gold mine by Manhattan Minerals (Haarstad and Floysand, 2007). Yet, an equally sweeping defeat resulted in no concessions from Aurora Gold to the Dayak community in Indonesia (Phillips, 2002).

Other studies highlight new developments in transnational union organizing, such as the international coalition of unions, workers, and shareholders that helped induce Rio Tinto back into collective bargaining with Australia’s Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (Sadler, 2004a). Similarly, the United Steelworkers of America succeeded in pressuring Ravenswood Aluminium by aggressively targeting one of its major shareholders and his other billion dollar ventures around the globe (Herod, 1995). The National Consumers League and Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees’ joint antisweatshop campaign aimed at Disney and other companies has had more mixed results, with concern over defensive factory closures and supply-chain reorganization tempered by encouragement that “some retailers and manufacturers have at least tacitly admitted that they bear responsibility for conditions in the contracting shops that they use” (Johns and Vural, 2000, page 1211).

Although not exhaustive, these examples are illustrative of the broader literature. They suggest that corporate campaigns have been successful in eliciting concessions from many of their targets, yet the authors almost universally question the broader potential of corporate responsibility initiatives to meaningfully redistribute the costs and benefits of the global economy. They worry in particular that short-term or partial successes may engender unforeseen negative consequences, such as creating obstacles for other types of political interventions or causing corporations to shift their production networks defensively. It is difficult to paint a general portrait of corporate–stakeholder power dynamics because of the contingencies that affect campaign success. The case studies illustrate how differences in media attention, personal relationships, commodity-chain organization, public sympathies, and a range of other factors, including the nature of the campaign network itself, can affect campaign success. So we are left wondering whether these case studies are representative of a broader resurgence of countervailing power, or if the bulk of campaigns are unsuccessful in gaining any concessions. Moreover, the relationship between the traditional regulatory sphere and new forms of market politics, including the opportunity costs of choosing one particular political strategy over another, is unclear. These difficulties in trying to theorize stakeholder power in this new and rapidly shifting landscape led me to statistics.

### **The corporate campaign by numbers**

In this section I present a series of rather innocuous and simplistic statistics tables. We know from the methodological and epistemological debates described above, however, that numbers are never innocent. Indeed, each time I present these numbers, I find myself adding additional scribbles to my presentation notes so that they bear very little resemblance to the neat tables projected onto the screen for the audience. The goal of

this section is to explain what the numbers have added to my understanding of the regulatory power of stakeholder networks while also reflecting on the process of knowledge production behind the numbers themselves. Both analytical generosity and unrelenting reflexivity (about how the numbers are produced, read, and possible alternative narratives) are essential components of the critical quantitative methodology I am advocating here.

To start, let me explain the full methodology for this research project. This research found me conducting interviews on the floor of a storage space in Brooklyn and, alternately, in comfortable executive offices overlooking the port of Miami. I also found myself sitting at my computer compiling data for hours, weeks, and finally months on end. The goal of the quantitative component of my research was to document the issues covered, corporations targeted, stakeholders involved, strategies used, and success rates of as many campaigns as possible. I also wanted to generate some hypotheses about the main drivers of corporate responsiveness. I recognized from the outset that the statistics could only tell me so much. Aside from the limitations on data collection, I felt that participant observation at corporate social responsibility (CSR) conferences and in-depth interviews both with campaign proponents and with executives of the targeted corporations were the only means to understand the relational, dynamic, and contingent power relationships behind the statistical trends. For instance, I wanted to understand how stakeholder networks formed, the division of labor among stakeholder groups, and the relationship among corporate campaigning and stakeholders' other political strategies and goals. Over the course of approximately 18 months, ending in late 2004, I collected data on 179 campaigns, conducted 41 interviews with campaign proponents and corporate executives involved in a subset of six campaigns,<sup>(2)</sup> and attended three conferences (each geared toward a different stakeholder group). I started with the campaign identification and participant observation in order to get a general lay of the land before starting the interviews, and then continued with secondary data collection in parallel with the interviews. The final statistical analysis was done after the interviews. Overall, I think this staging allowed me to integrate insights better, from both the quantitative and the qualitative components, into the narrative-building process. Although the focus of this paper is the quantitative component of my research, I will briefly interweave some insights that the interviews and participant observation provided, as they were integral to my interpretation of the statistical results.

My first decisions were about what to count. Ideally, I would have evaluated the full global, historical population of corporate campaigns. This was unfeasible for a variety of reasons, yet I was cognisant of Lawson's entreaty, discussed above, that relying on sampling disregards the agency and contingency of individual circumstances. I chose instead to limit this study to a smaller unit of analysis, but to try to generate a full population census of campaigns targeting publicly traded, US-headquartered corporations since 1990. I focused on publicly traded US corporations in order to ensure access to important secondary sources (annual reports, etc) and to hold the corporate governance framework within which the corporations were operating somewhat constant. I chose 1990 as the start date because there seems to have been a qualitative shift in the nature of corporate campaigns since then. Not only have there been technological advances, such as the increasing importance of the Internet as an

<sup>(2)</sup>I tried to select a breadth of campaigns covering different industries, stakeholders, issues and locations of concern, and outcomes. My response rate for the interviews was approximately 50%, resulting in 41 interviews. The interviewees included 11 shareholder activists, 11 large NGO representatives, 7 local organization representatives, 8 strategists/consultants, and 4 corporate executives.

organizing tool, but it is also widely perceived as an era within which many corporate campaigns came to focus on regulating corporate practices for their own sake, rather than using them to affect state policies beyond the corporate sphere, as with the campaigns against the war in Vietnam and apartheid in South Africa. My working definition of a 'corporate campaign' was: a structured effort by stakeholder groups to change a social or environmental impact of a particular corporation. There are, in reality, varying degrees of interconnection among stakeholder groups in different campaigns. In some cases stakeholder groups working on similar issues are highly coordinated, while in others they are aware of each other but working separately. One of my goals was to uncover the dynamics among the disparate stakeholder pressures, whether explicitly coordinated or not.

Since most corporate campaigns now rely on some form of Internet organizing or promotion, I started with a Google search for 'corporate campaign' and followed the links from campaign websites to the websites of the organizations involved in the campaign. From there I found more campaigns which the organizations were involved with, and the sample snowballed. Additionally, I found other campaigns from newspaper and magazine reports, as well as academic studies.<sup>(3)</sup> It would be misleading to say that this search was exhaustive. Despite my efforts to develop a full population census, I continue to find references to new campaigns but I chose to stop my search when I found that I was being directed back to the same campaigns, unearthing 179 campaigns before deciding to call it quits.

Identification was simply the beginning, of course. I gathered data on a number of variables identified by case studies and the literature on corporate responsiveness as being determinants of campaign success, including information about broader market pressures, the sociopolitical climate, characteristics of the campaign itself, and characteristics of the corporation being targeted.<sup>(4)</sup> Table 1 lists the variables that I used in my statistical analysis, organized by the theories of corporate responsiveness and responsibility that they relate to. I attempted to include as many of these contingencies as possible, although some information ended up being beyond the reach of this particular study. For instance, I had originally planned to use dollars spent on advertising as a measure of the corporation's brand or reputational capital, but found that such information was too difficult to find and was not uniformly reported in company financial reports. Eventually I found a brand-rating agency, CoreBrand, that ranks the brand value of over 1100 corporations, but their numerical rankings were unsuitable for statistical analysis, although they do deserve consideration for future research and could possibly be developed into a categorical variable.

In order to measure campaign success, I separated the demands or goals of the campaigns into three categories: (1) policy changes, (2) operational changes, and (3) reporting changes. I wanted to measure corporate responses relative to the actual campaign demands in order to separate 'greenwashing' from changes that reflected campaign goals. Second, since most campaigns include multiple proposals, and sometimes competing demands from different stakeholders, I wanted to be able to measure the corporate response to each proposed change, allowing for a more in-depth analysis of the types of corporate changes generated. One of the most time-consuming tasks was identifying all of the stakeholder groups involved in each campaign, as some campaigns included well over a dozen different organizations. Although many of these campaigns were

<sup>(3)</sup> I incorporated information from Manheim's (2001) appendix of 196 campaigns, although not all of them fell within my unit of analysis.

<sup>(4)</sup> Sources included media reports, NGO websites, press releases, corporate annual reports, corporate websites, academic studies, and data purchased from KLD Research & Analytics, a well-respected, socially responsible investment research firm.



**Table 1.** Independent variables used for discriminant analysis.

Theory	Variable	Description
Evolutionary theory	campaign length	total number of months or months to date
	number of resolutions	number of shareholder resolutions filed on the campaign issue
Market signals	competitor changes	competitor implementation of demands
	consumer brand	targeted corporation has consumer-brand identity
	consumer action	campaign organized consumers
Regulatory pressure	social indexes	targeted corporation is listed on social indexes
	impending regulations	in US or other relevant jurisdictions
Corporate culture and capacities	regulatory enforcement	campaign leveraging of existing regulations
	change of chief executive officer	during length of campaign
	number of employees	direct employees (as a measure of size)
	corporate policy	specific policy regarding campaign issue
	vertical integration	corporate operations include production and retail
Stakeholder attributes	stakeholder types	types of stakeholders involved in campaign
	stakeholder diversity	number of different stakeholders involved
Other factors	strategies	strategies used in campaigns
	campaign issue	general issue of concern
	competing issues	number of campaigns against same corporation
	location of concern	general location of concern

spearheaded by a few high-profile groups, one of my stated goals was to investigate the roles played by all of the different actors in the network, rather than simply focusing on the loudest voices, therefore I spent a lot of time tracking down smaller organizations and supporting players. I believe this is important in order to fully uncover the campaign dynamics, as well as to evaluate the broader impacts of the campaign, such as its potential influence on local political struggles.

The first sets of numbers I want to discuss are some simple descriptive statistics about stakeholder group participation and campaign strategies. Table 2 reveals that large NGOs are involved in the majority (84%) of campaigns. This is not surprising, as campaigns require a significant number of resources, and, as others have written, there has been a global population explosion in the number of NGOs operating worldwide. It is also not surprising that shareholder activists were involved in the majority (67%) of campaigns, since my unit of analysis consisted of publicly traded corporations, although the extent to which shareholder activists are involved in social and environmental justice issues might be surprising to many. What was of some surprise

**Table 2.** Stakeholder group participation in campaign networks.

Stakeholder group	Number of campaigns	Percentage of campaigns
Large nongovernmental organization	150	84
Shareholders	120	67
Local organization	86	48
Workers/unions	38	21
Strategist/consultant	27	15

to me was the rather limited participation of unions in these campaigns. While the modern corporate campaign is often traced to union battles such as the JP Stevens campaign discussed above, Sadler (2004a) points out that “past precedent suggests that unions do not always reciprocate the solidarity they themselves have sought” (page 45), a sentiment echoed by some of my interviewees. While strategists and consultants (a category which includes both corporate and campaign consultants) were only involved in 15% of the campaigns, there is reason to believe (see Sadler and Lloyd, forthcoming), that their influence is on the rise. These numbers are not a perfect representation of reality, however. One source of potentially significant bias is that I relied on the Internet and media reports to identify campaigns when, in fact, there may be many more that did not have such a strong media presence and were therefore excluded. This may explain the bias toward well-funded NGOs and shareholder activists in table 2. Moreover, each campaign generally includes a vast network of groups and individuals who may or may not be represented in the sources I scoured, despite my best attempts to identify as many players as possible. In addition, it is important to note that my categories do not capture (for practical, rather than epistemological, purposes) the range of multiple identities that may influence the perceptions, and hence power and influence, of these groups. For instance, the ‘shareholder’ category includes religious shareholders, foundations, public and private pension funds, and socially responsible mutual funds offered by mainstream as well as specialized financial service providers. Through my interviews I learned that these specificities, not to mention others such as educational backgrounds and personal networks, can affect stakeholders’ ability to gain access to top executives, their portrayal in the media, and other facets of their relative power and influence.

Table 3 identifies the strategies used in the campaigns. Of course, the same caveats about data collection apply to these numbers. Nonetheless, there are some interesting revelations. Shareholder resolutions,<sup>(5)</sup> protests, consumer actions, lawsuits, and government enforcement of existing regulations are all predictable elements of the ‘death of a thousand cuts’ style of campaigning described by Manheim (2001) and others. Indeed, Manheim argues that “corporate campaigns are always about power. ... They are solidly based in sophisticated research—into the network of interests that sustain the corporation and give it power, into the public image of the corporation, into its strengths and vulnerabilities” (quoted by Greven, 2003, page 499). Yet I was struck by the fact that almost half (44%) of the campaigns also engaged in dialogue with their corporate targets. Again, this may reflect a selection bias because of the prominence of shareholder involvement (since executives have fiduciary duties to their shareholders, they are generally believed to be more likely to engage them than other so-called

**Table 3.** Campaign strategies.

Strategy	Number of campaigns	Percentage of campaigns
Shareholder resolution	107	60
Protests	106	59
Consumer action	86	48
Dialogue	79	44
Lawsuit	38	21
Government enforcement of existing regulations	29	16

<sup>(5)</sup> In the United States, shareholders who own more than US\$2000 of stock for a minimum period of one year have the right to introduce a nonbinding shareholder resolution for vote at the annual general meeting.

‘external’ stakeholders). On the other hand, it also reflects the fact that there is a complex interplay of strategies involved in most campaigns, and that we need to factor dialogue into our understanding of campaign dynamics rather than relying exclusively on transactional (that is, buying and selling) or ‘warfare’ representations of market politics. Also of note is that even though these campaigns are generally classified as a form of market politics, they still rely on state involvement through the court system and through the enforcement of existing regulations. The state, then, is not completely removed from these conflicts, and government decisions about what to require a company to report, for instance, can also greatly affect campaign success rates. Overall, these simple descriptive statistics reveal that a whole new range of stakeholder synergies are being formed around social and environmental justice issues, and that they are being advocated both publicly and privately in a range of spaces of contention and engagement.

One of the key reasons for doing the quantitative research on these campaigns was to get a better sense of the depth and breadth of corporate responsiveness. So, the next set of numbers I want to discuss are campaign success rates. My numbers show that 74% of the 179 campaigns were successful. Of course, we need to start by defining terms. What do I mean by ‘success’? I labelled a campaign ‘successful’ if at least one of the campaign demands was addressed. This does not mean that all of the stakeholders in the campaign would necessarily label it a success. Indeed, there are often strong disagreements among proponents over campaign goals and demands. That said, the focus of my study was on evaluating corporate campaigns as regulatory mechanisms, therefore my definition of campaign success reflected the ability of the campaign to renegotiate (or enforce) a new social contract with the corporation. I did, however, break down this general success rate further to try to reveal potential patterns of uneven development of corporate responsibilities.

Tables 4 and 5 detail campaign success rates by general campaign issue and location of concern (that is, the location of the desired change). Table 4 shows that labor rights campaigns were the most successful, followed by environmental campaigns, consumer protection campaigns, and finally community welfare campaigns. There are a number of possible explanations for these differential success rates. Based on my interviews and the existing literature, it is clear that some issues have an easier time gaining traction than others. The campaigns would have to be further segmented into subcategories in order to be more revealing of the uneven development of stakeholder concerns, however.<sup>(6)</sup> For instance, the ‘labor’ category includes demands for the institution of antidiscrimination policies related to sexual orientation and, from an employee recruitment perspective, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify not

**Table 4.** Campaign success rates by general issue.

General issue	Number of campaigns	Success rate (%)
Labor	59	82
Environment	78	72
Consumer protection	23	70
Community welfare	19	63

<sup>(6)</sup> I use the term ‘uneven development’ here to refer to systemic unevenness in corporate responses to different stakeholders concerns. Stakeholders can be categorized in a variety of ways, including the nature of their relationship to the corporation (as shareholders, consumers, workers, etc), their specific concerns, and their relative distance from corporate decision makers. Further research is necessary to specify this unevenness.

**Table 5.** Campaign success rates by location of concern.

Location of concern	Number of campaigns	Success rate (%)
Global	96	78
Industrialized country	28	75
Developing country	55	65

adopting such policies. Such a change may be much easier to achieve (which is not to that it is say easy) than calls for increasing wages in subcontracted farms or factories. Such a level of detail would also provide additional insights into the data on success rates by location of concern presented in table 5. The high success rate for global issues may be the result of the same dynamics discussed above. Indeed, strong business cases have been developed for addressing many of the issues within the global category, including the adoption of antidiscrimination policies and the development of action plans for addressing climate change. There is an additional element to the uneven development of corporate responsibilities which is not reflected in these numbers. Of the 72 successful campaigns demanding operational changes in more than one location (these may be included in the global, industrialized, or developing-country categories), 81% saw changes implemented in some locations and not others. It would be unfair to expect that global production networks could be reinvented overnight, and this unevenness could, therefore, be the result of ongoing capacity building and the diffusion of new technologies and best practices. Yet, when coupled with the differential success rates for industrialized versus developing country concerns (75% versus 65%), the unevenness seems more systemic and suggests that geography still matters a great deal, despite the development of transnational networks. Although it requires more analysis, my interviews indicate that distance from corporate executives as well as NGOs and other influential stakeholders affects the perceived urgency of a particular community’s concerns, the place-based risk calculations that affect corporate conduct, and the development of personal relationships upon which dialogue is built. The distance effect is not necessarily direct, however, and is mediated by other issues such as cultural (versus geographic) distance, media attention, communications technologies, etc. Moreover, disparities in local civil society pressures, state regulatory enforcement, industrial organization, and other contextual factors are all likely to affect the patterns of responsibility and change resulting from these campaigns. As Angel et al (2007) note, with reference to environmental standards, one particularly important area for future research is to evaluate “the actual pattern of coverage as well as whether the existing gaps are structural or temporal in nature (for example, a systematic lack of participation by developing countries that has consequences for the creation of pollution havens or for the distortion of patterns of trade and industrial activity)” (page 4.7).

Clearly, more number-crunching needs to be done to illuminate the patterns of campaign success. One further classification that I have made so far is to calculate the success rate for each campaign demand. Table 6 displays the results of these calculations, and the numbers paint a slightly less successful picture than those described above. If we calculate an overall success rate per demand, rather than per campaign, the rate falls to 58% from 74%. Moreover, as shown in table 6, operational and policy changes have much higher success rates (64% and 60%, respectively) than reporting changes (45%). Reporting a commitment, and being required to document progress regularly, is in some ways a much more significant corporate transformation than ad hoc operational changes or abstract policy commitments. First, reporting on an issue (particularly on the corporation’s 10K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission) sends a message to

**Table 6.** Campaign success rates by type of demand.

Demand type	Number of demands	Success rate (%)
Operational change	171	64
Policy change	40	60
Reporting change	76	45

shareholders that it is material to shareholder value. Anything material to shareholder value could have at least intermediate consequences for a corporation’s stock price or credit rating, and it does not provide an exit strategy should the corporation decide to cut costs by eliminating a social or environmental initiative. If it is material to shareholder value, it is not expendable; but if it is philanthropy, it is subject to the chopping block. Second, reporting could leave a corporation open to both increased legal and reputational liabilities. Many concerns have been raised about the lack of accountability inherent in informal or nonstate regulatory mechanisms, and the evidence from my data on trying to institute reporting suggests that these are not unfounded. Accountability mechanisms are clearly the most difficult to negotiate. I do not agree, however, with the tendency to conceptualize market and traditional state-centered politics as separate and competing spheres. My interviews suggest that some campaigns are consciously trying to use market politics to reinvigorate the traditional political sphere, by, for instance, sponsoring shareholder resolutions calling for reporting of corporate political campaign contributions. Vogel argues that the most significant outcome of the corporate campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s was their role

“in setting the agenda of governmental process. Through the filing of proxy resolutions, the questioning of corporate executives at annual shareholder meetings, and the release of various research studies, corporations have become forums for injecting new issues onto the political process and for discussing and reviving old ones” (1978, page 13).

It remains to be seen whether the same is true of current corporate campaigns, but more analysis needs to be done to separate out movements toward a self-regulating sphere of corporate responsibility from strategies that seek to create new mechanisms for ongoing input into corporate decision making and for simultaneously reinvigorating traditional (state-centered) politics.

The descriptive statistics evaluated above do not provide any means of distinguishing the relative contributions of different variables to the success or failure of the campaigns. The literatures on corporate social responsibility, corporate environmental management, and stakeholder theory provide some hypotheses about the process of corporate change, however. There are five main foci within this literature: evolutionary trajectories; regulatory pressure; market signals; corporate culture and capacities; and stakeholder power.<sup>(7)</sup> One of the difficulties in evaluating my interview results is that there is anecdotal evidence to support each of these models for different campaigns, and contradictory evidence belying any universal trends. For the second phase of my quantitative analysis, therefore, I used discriminant analysis to generate hypotheses about the factors that contribute to campaign success. Discriminant analysis is a technique used to identify variables that best discriminate between members of different groups. The general goal of discriminant analysis is to generate a function with a set of weighted variables that can be used to predict group membership of additional cases outside of the sample. My intention was to test my assumptions (and those found

<sup>(7)</sup>These literatures provided the conceptual framework for the variables and the various models of corporate change listed in table 1.

in the literature) about the factors which differentiate successful and unsuccessful campaigns. I do not treat the functions generated by my analysis as predictive functions, however. As described above, I do not believe that the outcomes of dynamic, relational processes such as corporate campaigning and other informal governance processes can be adequately predicted through statistical inference. On the other hand, I believe that these techniques can enhance theory building by challenging our assumptions, adding to an ongoing reflexivity about possible alternative narratives.

I ran a series of discriminant analyses, one for each of the groups of variables described in table 1 (based on the different theoretical orientations in the literature), as well as one that included all of the variables. These analyses identified three variables—consumer brand, corporate policy and dialogue—as discriminators between successful and unsuccessful campaigns.<sup>(8)</sup> Each of these variables is positively correlated with the final function, meaning that the presence of a direct connection to consumers, a corporate social or environmental policy related to the campaign issue, and a dialogue between corporate executives and campaign proponents each contributes positively to campaign success. Based on the analysis, the rest of the variables were not statistically significant predictors of success. Table 7 summarizes the goodness of fit for the four different discriminant functions returned by the analysis, including the results of the significance tests and predictive success rates of the functions. The table shows that the chi-square tests for all of the functions are significant at the standard 0.05 level, suggesting that each of the functions is statistically significant. Moreover, for the discriminant function which encompasses all of the variables, the values at the group centroids are  $-0.623$  for the unsuccessful campaigns and  $0.224$  for the successful campaigns. It is important for the group centroids to be far apart in order to show that the function does indeed capture group differences. That said, the Wilks’s lambda values range from  $0.953$  (for the reputational risk function) to  $0.876$  (for the risk-and-access function), suggesting that all of the functions are fairly weak discriminators (the closer the Wilks’s lambda value is to 0 the better), and that none of the functions captures all of the differences between the groups. I also ran some tests to see if the functions did better than chance at predicting group membership (based on maximum and proportional chance criteria); the functions proved at best to be slightly better than chance.

**Table 7.** Summary of discriminant functions

Function name	Variables included	Wilks’s lambda	$\chi^2$	Significance	Correctly classified (%)	Successful correctly classified (%)	Unsuccessful correctly classified (%)
Reputational risk	consumer brand	0.953	8.442	0.004	71.9	85.5	34.0
Corporate policy	corporate policy	0.927	13.171	0.000	59.8	53.0	78.7
Stakeholder access	dialogue	0.950	9.048	0.003	57.0	50.8	74.5
Risk and access	consumer brand corporate policy dialogue	0.876	20.506	0.000	66.9	64.1	74.5

<sup>(8)</sup> For this analysis I used the broad definition of ‘campaign success’ described above (that is, at least one of the campaign demands was addressed) in order to create a binary dependent variable, although other classifications could be explored in the future.

Despite the limited predictive powers of the functions,<sup>(9)</sup> as a hypothesis-generating exercise I found the results instructive. It is noteworthy that the reputational risk function is a much better predictor of successful (85.5%) than unsuccessful (34.0%) campaigns (see table 7). It seems that, while reputational risk forms the foundation for campaign success, it is clearly not, in and of itself, sufficient. The other functions described in table 7 have slightly lower overall classification success rates, but are much better at classifying unsuccessful campaigns. The policy variable could be seen as reinforcing reputational risk since corporate policies provide leverage points for contrasting brand images with operational realities. Additionally, the policy variable could signal the importance of corporate culture and capacities. A corporation that has a CSR policy is more likely to have created a chain of accountability for its social and/or environmental performance, facilitating meaningful dialogue about possible solutions to social and environmental problems. The results also suggest that campaign success is predicated upon dialogue, a highly relational and contingent process. Whereas stakeholder theory tends to divide stakeholders into a hierarchy of salience with shareholders at the peak, these results suggest that access to dialogue is more important than preordained salience. Indeed, no single stakeholder group was positively correlated with campaign success. Overall, the results of the discriminant analysis challenged my own assumptions about the primacy of shareholder and consumer strategies in the informal governance process. They focused my qualitative analysis on multiple possible trajectories toward dialogue, and they sensitized me to my interviewees' discussions of the mediating role played by a wide range of CSR industry players, including organizations such as RiskMetrics Group, KLD Research & Analytics, and Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, which report and interpret corporations' social and environmental performance for different audiences. Moreover, they pose a particular challenge to recent attempts to develop transactional models of campaign success, pointing instead to the need for more in-depth study both of reputational risk formation and of dialogue-building processes.

## Conclusions

After all the caveats and couching, what do the numbers reveal in the end? The numbers reveal that there are significant synergies among stakeholder groups around a broad range of social and environmental issues. They suggest that the majority of corporate campaigns have been successful in regulating corporate behavior, but that consumer brands are more vulnerable to this form of social regulation than are corporations which do not sell directly to the consumer. Moreover, they indicate that this form of regulation is a distinctly relational process, requiring dialogue and corporate capacity building. In addition, they reveal that there are limitations to the stakeholder concerns which can be addressed through these campaigns; however, more analysis needs to be done to understand what appears to be a systemic unevenness in regulatory coverage of campaigns.

The case studies in the literature on corporate campaigns provide a narrative of campaign success and limitations that is similar to the one I have presented here, but the numbers provide evidence that case studies of campaign success are not mere anomalies. Yet, the numbers counter recent theoretical focus on warfare tactics and market transactions as the sources of stakeholder power within the realm of market politics. For instance, Baron and Diermeier (2005) recently developed a mathematical model to try to capture campaign dynamics, but they based the model on an inherently

<sup>(9)</sup> Here I refer to the ability of the functions to predict the outcomes of the research population, not additional or future campaigns.

antagonistic relationship between campaigners and their corporate targets, noting that “Although the activist and the target could bargain over resolving the issue, to simplify the model the demand is assumed either to be accepted or rejected” (page 6). They admit that their model still needs to be tested on empirical data, but my own analysis suggests that bargaining and dialogue are integral to campaign outcomes and should not be sidelined in any theoretical model. The problem with a dialogic theory of regulation is that it is very hard to predict broader outcomes because the dialogue is shaped by a multiplicity of contingencies. As noted above, my interviews revealed that one key area for future research is the influence of information mediators (consultants, media, etc) on the nature of corporate–stakeholder dialogues. This mediation creates a dynamic and shifting backdrop, however, and suggests to me that numbers have an important place in the critical evaluation of market politics. I would argue that ongoing outcome-based analysis of large numbers of campaigns is the best means of determining the regulatory potential of a political process within which power is a relational, contingent, and dynamic property.

Clearly, my analysis leaves a lot of loose threads. The numbers (and the interviews) have a lot more to reveal, and yet there is only so much that this one population and one time period *can* reveal. Let me return to the attributes of analytical generosity that I specified above, namely, building room for individual agency, relationality, and indeterminacy into the analysis. For this particular project I felt a mixed methods approach was essential for accommodating individual agency. I assumed from the outset that the diversity of campaign issues, targets, and strategies would not be conducive to predictive, causal modeling; and the in-depth interviews were indeed instructive in uncovering ways in which multiple subjectivity, personal relationships, and individual decisions affected the outcomes of specific campaigns. They also revealed considerable self-reflection and strategic evolution among my interviewees, suggesting that the future of campaigning is being actively reshaped. I also took a consciously postpositivist approach to the numbers themselves, reading them as Lawson (1995) entreats us to read numbers: as illustrative of the processes and outcomes of this particular set of campaigns without necessarily being predictive of others. Relationality, or what Peck (2003) might refer to as ‘blurred boundaries’, was built into my analysis from the very definition of a campaign. I chose to include all stakeholders targeting a corporation on the same issue, whether explicitly coordinated or not, in order to uncover relational outcomes. Moreover, my interviews both with campaign proponents and with corporate executives led me to develop an even broader definition of campaign networks which encompasses corporate executives and external consultants as well as the direct campaign proponents. In addition, I tried to embrace indeterminacy and to use it to my creative advantage by reflecting throughout the project (and as my project narratives continue to develop) on possible alternative readings of my results, additional questions that I have yet to ask of the data, and additional data that I did not collect. This is partly self-reflection as well as critical engagement with other research on the topic. For instance, my analysis of campaign success is clearly limited by the broad categories of campaign issues and outcomes that I have analysed to date, and my geographical positioning outside of the actual spaces of contention and harm may very well lead to irrational exuberance about the regulatory potential of this political strategy.

Savage and Burrows (2007) argue that in an age of “knowing capitalism” (Thrift, 2005), in which social data are routinely gathered and produced outside of academia, we should inhabit industry-led methodological innovations and turn our energies to “exposing these descriptions, challenging them, and presenting our own descriptions” (Savage and Burrows, 2007, page 896). While they were speaking to sociology and social network analysis in particular, their appeal seems equally relevant in relation to



the rapidly expanding CSR industry. Critical quantification can engage the myriad CSR ranking and ratings schemes and generate alternative metrics for judging CSR—metrics which take account of potential contradictions among stakeholder interests and the relative access of different stakeholder groups to these informal political processes.<sup>(10)</sup> Future research, both quantitative and qualitative (and, hopefully, in combination), should focus on more fine-grained analysis of campaign outcomes by issues, locations, and types of demands. Moreover, outcomes and strategies should be evaluated based on the type of regulatory architecture they generate. It is important to know whether the tendency is toward self-regulating or toward participatory mechanisms. Additionally, studies of the relationship between market and state-centered politics are needed. While predictive, causal models may be inappropriate, by combining descriptive and analytical techniques we can begin to theorize the regimes of responsibility that result from (and shape) the regulatory power of corporate campaigns. Although I argue in this paper that we should not prematurely dismiss market politics as a means of regulating the social and environmental impacts of the global economy, I leave myself open to evidence that the opportunity costs outweigh the benefits. In the meantime, however, my critical bias tends toward hope.

**Acknowledgements.** Research presented here was generously supported by a National Science Foundation (NSF) Dissertation Research Improvement Grant (award number 0327425). I would like to thank Jody Emel, David Angel, Susan Hanson, Yuko Ayoma, and Phil O'Neill for commenting on earlier versions of this work. I also thank Nick Clarke for inspiring the term 'analytical generosity' with his comments on my paper at the 2006 AAG meetings. Finally, I thank Mei-Po Kwan, Tim Schwanen, Nigel Thrift, and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. All opinions and errors remain my own.

## References

- Anderson J, 2001 *Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings* (Routledge, New York)
- Angel D, Hamilton T, Huber M, 2007, "Global environmental standards for industry" *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* **32** 4.1–4.22
- Barnett C, Cloke P, Clarke N, Malpass A, 2005, "Consuming ethics: articulating the subjects and spaces of ethical consumption" *Antipode* **37** 23–45
- Baron D P, Diermeier D, 2005, "Strategic activism and nonmarket strategy", RP 1909, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=791006>
- Blomley N, 2006, "Uncritical critical geography" *Progress in Human Geography* **30** 87–94
- Blomley N, 2007, "Critical geography, anger and hope" *Progress in Human Geography* **31** 53–65
- Boele R, Fabig H, Wheeler D, 2001, "Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A study in unsustainable development: II. Corporate social responsibility and 'stakeholder management' versus a rights-based approach to sustainable development" *Sustainable Development* **9** 121–135
- Clark G, Hebb T, 2004, "Why do they care? The market for corporate global responsibility and the role of institutional investors", WP 04-15, School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford, <http://www.geog.ox.ac.uk/research/wpapers/economic/wpg04-15.pdf>
- Clarke N, Barnett C, Cloke P, Malpass A, 2006, "Globalising the consumer: doing politics in an ethical register" *Political Geography* **26** 231–249
- Emel J, 2002, "An inquiry into the green disciplining of capital" *Environment and Planning A* **34** 827–843
- Evans P, 2000, "Fighting marginalization with transnational networks: counter-hegemonic globalization" *Contemporary Sociology* **29** 230–241
- Gibson-Graham J K, 2005a, "Surplus possibilities: postdevelopment and community economies" *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* **26** 4–26
- Gibson-Graham J K, 2005b, "Traversing the fantasy of sufficiency: a response to Aguilar, Kelly, Laurie and Lawson" *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* **26** 119–126
- Greven T, 2003, "Transnational 'corporate campaigns': a tool for labour unions in the global economy?" *The International Journal of Comparative Law and Industrial Relations* **19** 495–513

<sup>(10)</sup> Savage and Burrows make a more expansive argument about the appropriateness of different methodologies for contemporary social network analysis, but I focus here on the basic appeal to engage the number-crunchers of 'knowing capitalism'.

- Haarstad H, A Floysand, 2007, "Globalization and the power of rescaled narratives: a case of opposition to mining in Tambogrande, Peru" *Political Geography* **26** 289–308
- Hanson S, 1997, "As the world turns: new horizons in feminist geographic methodologies", in *Thresholds in Feminist Geography: Difference, Methodology, and Representation* Eds J P Jones, H Nast, S Roberts (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD) pp 119–128
- Hartwick E, 2000, "Towards a geographical politics of consumption" *Environment and Planning A* **32** 1177–1192
- Herod A, 1995, "The practice of international labor solidarity and the geography of the global economy" *Economic Geography* **71** 341–364
- Hudson R, 2003, "Fuzzy concepts and sloppy thinking: reflections on recent developments in critical regional studies" *Regional Studies* **37** 741–746
- Hughes A, Buttle M, Wrigley N, 2007, "Organisational geographies of corporate responsibility: a UK–US comparison of retailers' ethical trading initiatives" *Journal of Economic Geography* **7** 491–513
- Johns R, Vural L, 2000, "Class, geography, and the consumerist turn: UNITE and the Stop Sweatshops Campaign" *Environment and Planning A* **32** 1193–1213
- Keck M E, Sikkink K, 1998 *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY)
- Kelly P, 2005, "Scale, power and the limits to possibilities" *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* **26** 39–43
- Kwan M, 2004, "Beyond difference: from canonical geography to hybrid geographies" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* **94** 756–763
- Lawson V, 1995, "The politics of difference: examining the quantitative/qualitative dualism in post-structuralist feminist research" *The Professional Geographer* **47** 449–457
- McLafferty S L, 1995, "Counting for women" *Professional Geographer* **47**(4) 436–442
- Manheim J D, 2001 *The Death of a Thousand Cuts: Corporate Campaigns and the Attack on the Corporation* (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ)
- Markusen A, 1999, "Fuzzy concepts, scant evidence, policy distance: the case for rigour and policy relevance in critical regional studies" *Regional Studies* **33** 869–884
- Mattingly D J, Falconer-Al-Hindi K, 1995, "Should women count? A context for the debate" *Professional Geographer* **47** 427–435
- Monks R, N Minnow, 1991 *Power and Accountability* (Harper Business, New York)
- Moss P, 1995, "Embeddedness in practice, numbers in context: the politics of knowing and doing" *The Professional Geographer* **47** 442–449
- Peck J, 2003, "Fuzzy old world: a response to Markusen" *Regional Studies* **37** 729–740
- Phillips R, 2002, "Engagement or confrontation?", in *Moving Mountains: Communities Confront Mining and Globalisation* Eds G Evans, J Goodman, N Lansbury (Zed Books, London) pp 181–194
- Rocheleau R, 1995, "Maps, numbers, text, and context: mixing methods in feminist political ecology" *The Professional Geographer* **47** 458–466
- Rogers R, 1999, "How a corporate campaign defeated J. P. Stevens" *The Labor Educator* **8**(2), <http://www.laboreducator.org/stevens.htm>
- Sadler D, 2004a, "Trade unions, coalitions and communities: Australia's Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union and the international stakeholder campaign against Rio Tinto" *Geoforum* **35** 35–46
- Sadler D, 2004b, "Anti-corporate campaigning and corporate 'social' responsibility: towards alternative spaces of citizenship?" *Antipode* **36** 851–870
- Sadler D, S Lloyd, forthcoming, "Neo-liberalising corporate social responsibility" *Geoforum*
- Savage M, Burrows R, 2007, "The coming crisis of empirical sociology" *Sociology* **41** 885–899
- Thrift N, 2005 *Knowing Capitalism* (Sage, London)
- Vogel D, 1978 *Lobbying the Corporation: Citizen Challenges to Business Authority* (Basic Books, New York)
- Watts M J, 2005, "Righteous oil? Human rights, the oil complex, and corporate social responsibility" *Annual Review of Environment and Resources* **30** 373–407
- Wills J, 1998, "Taking on the CosmoCorps? Experiments in transnational labor organization" *Economic Geography* **74** 111–131
- Zadek S, 2001 *Civil Corporation: The New Economy of Corporate Citizenship* (Earthscan, London)

**Conditions of use.** This article may be downloaded from the E&P website for personal research by members of subscribing organisations. This PDF may not be placed on any website (or other online distribution system) without permission of the publisher.