Transnational Militancy:

Diaspora Influence over Electoral Activity in Latin America

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What makes migrants valuable to political parties in their countries of origin? Outreach efforts by parties to citizens residing in other countries indicate that parties believe winning the support of migrants does pay off in some form of electoral advantage. In the United States alone, within the past five years, candidates from Mexico, Guatemala, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, El Salvador, and Peru have visited and campaigned among diaspora communities residing in Miami, Los Angeles, New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Chicago, and Washington, DC; many parties have designated representatives and, in some cases, permanent offices in the U.S. and other countries.

Notably, parties invest in these diaspora campaign activities and party infrastructures despite the fact that diaspora voter turnout is uniformly low: in Mexico's 2012 presidential election, only 40,737 out of an estimated 4.2 million eligible Mexican voters residing abroad voted, a turnout rate of less than 1 percent.[1] Among the top migrant-sending countries to the U.S., measured by the ratio of U.S.-residing diaspora to home country population, in some of the most active cases of diaspora campaigning—Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, and El Salvador prior to 2014—citizens do not have the right to vote outside of the country at all.[2] There is no apparent pattern to diaspora campaigning; parties campaigning in the U.S. include left, right, and center, incumbent and opposition parties.

Given the high cost to parties engaging in diaspora campaigning and small to nonexistent electoral payoff in terms of direct votes from abroad, such behavior by parties is puzzling.[3] Specific cases of politicians in non-external voting countries campaigning in the U.S. suggest politicians see an indirect benefit from diaspora campaigning. In Mexico's 2000 election, before Mexico's establishment of external voting rights, Vicente Fox visited Mexican migrant neighborhoods in Los Angeles and passed out phone cards to supporters, encouraging them to call relatives in Mexico and tell them to vote for him.[4] My interviews with forty-five politicians, party officials, and appointees in the top three Latin American migrant-sending countries to the U.S., Mexico, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic,[5] support the theory that parties

Table 1 Campaign Activity in U.S. by Parties in Top 10 Migrant-Sending Countries, 2011–2015

Country	Election Year	Major Candidates Campaigning in U.S.	External Vote	Diaspora-to-Population Ratio	Most Active Parties Campaigning in U.S.
Guatemala	2015	2 of 2	No	5.0%	FCN (opposition, right)
Panama	2014	0 of 3	Yes	2.9%	n/a
El Salvador	2014	2 of 2	Yes	17.2%	FMLN (incumbent, left)
Honduras	2013	1 of 3	Yes	5.7%	PNH (incumbent, right)
Ecuador	2013	0 of 2	Yes	2.7%	n/a
Mexico	2012	2 of 3*	Yes	10.0%	PAN (incumbent, right) and PRD (opposition, left)
Dominican Republic	2012	2 of 2	Yes	7.5%	PLD (incumbent, center) and PRD (opposition, left)
Jamaica	2011	1 of 2	No	23.1%	JLP (incumbent, right)
Guatemala	2011	0 of 3	No	5.0%	n/a
Nicaragua	2011	0 of 3	Yes	4.1%	n/a
Haiti	2011	5 of 19	No	5.2%	RDNP (opposition, right)

*Officially pre-candidates; Mexican election law prohibits declared candidates from campaigning abroad.
Source for candidate visits: News archive searches of candidate visits to U.S. in English and Spanish-language press.

engage in diaspora campaigning not for the votes they expect to receive from diaspora voters, but from those voters' relatives in the home country. Nearly all party officials independently volunteered their belief that U.S.-residing migrants hold significant influence over the voting preferences of relatives in the home country, particularly those to whom those migrants send remittances. When pressed for evidence however, whether from party research or independent polling, that such influence exists, or of its magnitude, the officials offered no data, only affirmed this belief as a matter of faith.

Thus, it would be of interest to such parties whether this perception is grounded in reality, or if such activity is a waste of time and money for them (and, in countries with public financing of elections, taxpayers). This question dovetails with ongoing debates within those countries' media over the value of extending voting rights to diaspora citizens at all, given the cost of registering voters, mailing ballots or setting up voting centers abroad, and low rates of participation among diaspora voters.

This study tests whether migrant citizens residing in the diaspora have some effect on the political activities of family members residing in their countries of origin. I hypothesize that migrants do have some influence over the preferences and behaviors of family members at home. However, this influence affects some political activities more than others. Specifically, because there is often a common party sympathy

shared among family members that predates migration, this influence is unlikely to manifest itself in basic questions over whether and for whom to vote. Thus, migrants are unlikely to have much effect on basic-level behavior such as voting, but instead will have more of an effect on higher-level behaviors typical of party militants: being active in a political party or other political organization and advocating on behalf of a candidate or party.

I conduct a series of multi-level tests with a dataset created from polling data supplemented with country-specific socioeconomic data in order to control for both individual and country-level variables. These models test whether both basic-level (such as registering to vote and voting) and higher-level political behaviors (party militant activity, such as being active in a political party and proselytizing for candidates) vary based on whether respondents report being in contact with a close family member residing in the U.S. The results indicate that Latin American migrants in the U.S. do in fact have positive and significant influence over the political behaviors of their relatives in their home countries, but only for higher-level partisan political activity typified by party militants. Further, migrants do not simply buy this influence through their remittances, as remittances are not conditioned on votes. Rather, it is communication with relatives in the diaspora that influences family political behavior, even in the absence of remittances.

Diaspora Political Behavior in the Literature

Among scholars of transnationalism, diaspora political activity has been most frequently presented as a phenomenon of "globalization from below" and "denationalized citizenship" by which migrant communities exercise agency free from, and sometimes in opposition to, their sending country governments.[6] Thus, the central questions are whether diaspora political activity bolsters or undermines state authority in the sending country and how the state expands or restricts such activities—such as through granting or withholding external voting rights—to suit its own interests.[7] However, the dichotomy of two independent actors, migrants and the state, vying for relative power in a zero-sum game, does not reflect the interplay between migrants and the state.[8] Sending country governments frequently view diaspora communities in an instrumental manner and see diaspora enfranchisement as a means to amplify official foreign policy and commercial goals.[9] However, if the diaspora community is largely seen as hostile to the sending country government, as when it is largely made up of exiles from an authoritarian regime, motivation to extend political rights to them can be low.[10]

Within sending countries, there is evidence of relatively greater levels of civic engagement on the local level by both migrants[11] and family members[12] that contrast with low levels of participation in official state channels, suggesting direct voting paints an incomplete picture of the impact migration may have on sending country politics. There is evidence that exposure to receiving countries' political processes impacts migrants' political attitudes,[13] which motivates discussions with family

members and friends.[14] Levitt describes the diffusion of political values from migrants to their relatives as "social remittances," parallel to monetary remittances migrants may send home.[15]

Much of the scholarship on diaspora value transmission focuses on the diffusion of democratic values and its benefit for migrant-sending countries with weak democratic institutions.[16] However, there exists a variety of political activities which may be impacted by diaspora value transmissions that go beyond basic-level democratic behaviors such as voting. Powell frames voter participation as both voting and "other forms of political activity": discussion, persuasion, and party work, respectively, communicating about political issues with others, persuading others to support a preferred candidate, and working on behalf of a political party during an election.[17] It is expected that the incidence of voting as well as these other activities should trend in the same direction with influences—including family and other personal linkages—that positively affect voter turnout. Thus, individual-level factors associated with increased voting—being older, being male, having attained post-secondary education, and having higher incomes[18]—should also increase higher-level political behaviors.

Migration may, however, have a negative impact on voter participation if "in-between identities" can divide migrants' loyalties and attention and thus cause them to become less engaged in both sending- and receiving-country politics.[19] If so, and if migrants act as enforcers of civic duties for relatives in sending countries, transnational communication with diaspora relatives may demotivate political activities among voters at home, contrary to the assumptions stated by Mexican, Dominican, and Salvadoran party officials.

How Diasporas Impact Elections at Home: Interviews with Party Officials

It is intuitive that migrants carry some weight in elections in their home countries, given the steady expansion of voting and citizenship rights to diaspora citizens and the frequency of diaspora campaigning. Politicians and party officials whom I interviewed nearly unanimously affirmed their belief that migrant citizens affect elections and, specifically, that they do so through their relatives at home. Across all three countries and party lines, forty-four of the forty-five party officials interviewed independently stated that their primary reason for campaigning overseas was not to win the votes of migrants themselves, or to seek campaign contributions, but rather to win the votes of those migrants' relatives in the sending country. The same interview subjects all stated the primary mechanism by which migrants influence the voting preferences of their relatives is through remittances.

Interviews with party officials were conducted in person in Mexico, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic in 2013 and 2014 and semi-structured around questions regarding subjects' perceptions of diaspora political activity. Responses varied by both country and party in several areas:

What diasporas demand of candidates Mexican respondents most commonly expressed views that Mexican migrants demand easier voter registration, better and more attentive services at Mexican consulates, and better advocacy on behalf of migrants through Mexico-U.S. relations, particularly with regard to immigration reform. Salvadoran respondents had similar responses but mentioned immigration advocacy most frequently, specifically with regard to renewing Temporary Protected Status (TPS) that affects many Salvadoran migrants in the U.S. Dominican respondents uniquely mentioned diaspora demands for better representation in the Dominican Congress, which reserves seats for representatives of Dominicans abroad, as well as for patronage jobs at Dominican consulates in U.S. cities.

Whom the diaspora favors Respondents were asked whether they viewed the diaspora as comprised of swing voters whose support is up for grabs, or base voters supporting their party. In Mexico and El Salvador, where diasporas disfavor certain parties (PRI for the Mexican diaspora; ARENA for the Salvadoran diaspora) disproportionate to their level of support at home, those parties tend to express the view that migrants are swing voters and may be persuaded to support their parties. Those parties which already gain disproportionate support from the diaspora (PAN and, to a lesser extent, PRD for Mexicans; FMLN for Salvadorans) tend to express confidence that the diaspora favors their parties as a reliable base. Only Dominican party respondents were equally in unison in believing the support of the Dominican diaspora is up for grabs.

What parties gain from diaspora support The only universally held attitude among interview subjects was in response to what parties stand to gain from diaspora support, which nearly all respondents said was influence over family members. The question of campaign fundraising as a secondary benefit varied by country, according to campaign finance law: In Mexico, where overseas campaigning and fundraising are prohibited, no respondents suggested parties raise money abroad. Diaspora fundraising potential was minimal according to Salvadoran respondents, limited mostly to in-kind donations by business sponsors during campaign events, but was mentioned more frequently by Dominican respondents, reflective of that country's relatively lenient campaign finance laws.

Interview responses point to a broadly held view among party officials that diaspora citizens wield influence over their relatives. However, I propose that diaspora citizens do not make relatives who are nonvoters into voters, or relatives who are opponents into sympathizers. Rather, they make relatives who are already sympathizers into more active sympathizers. In other words, they turn nonmilitants into militants. This hypothesis is informed by general observations from party official interviews in all three countries:

Observation 1: The diaspora does not have the capacity to swing elections through direct votes, thus their impact is primarily through family members at home. Where external voting laws exist, many restrictions nevertheless greatly hinder direct voting by diaspora citizens. In Mexico, prior to 2016, citizens could not register to vote outside

of Mexico, so they would have to travel to Mexico for a process that takes several weeks, longer than the short trips migrants typically make for holidays and family occasions.[20] For those applying for a new voter identification card, they are required to show proof of citizenship such as a passport or birth certificate, which many migrants may not have.[21] In El Salvador and the Dominican Republic, citizens may register outside of the country, but within a narrow window many months before the election, and must also provide proof of citizenship, which not all migrants carry. Thus, in all three countries, despite having an enormous diaspora population, the number of migrants who successfully registered and voted was miniscule, less than 10 percent of citizens residing abroad who qualified to vote based on government estimates. Consequently, no subject believed that the diaspora represented a wealth of likely votes; rather, it represented a wealth of influence over more likely voters at home, which they hoped to tap.

Observation 2: The Diaspora has more influence over some electoral activities than others In some Latin American countries, voting is mandatory, though voter participation rates vary and never reach full participation. Thus, it is less likely that the influence of migrant family members over their relatives at home would manifest itself in higher voter participation rates. Other decisions, such as the degree to which one might choose to participate in the political process beyond voting, are less certain and are more likely to be influenced by others, and those with clout are more likely to convince those who look up to them. Scholarship finds that diaspora influence on home countries varies. Diaspora ties tend to favor local over national-level political activity,[22] and non-electoral over electoral forms of participation.[23]

Subjects in all three countries maintained their belief that families vote in blocs. However, such families often have a party loyalty that is unchanging and predates any family member's migration.[24] In countries where diaspora support disproportionately skews against one party—usually the party in government during the greatest period of migration—as in Mexico and El Salvador, the scenario of a family switching their votes from one party to another from election to election is less likely. A more plausible scenario is that families that are more likely to vote in blocs are already on the same page politically. If this is the case, diaspora influence is less a matter of proselytizing and more a matter of motivation: to convince relatives to do at home what the migrant cannot do from afar.

Observation 3: Diaspora influence works through remittances, but is not dependent on them Politicians also uniformly volunteered remittances as the mechanism by which migrant family members influence relatives. Migrants send money home to support their families; therefore, they are the breadwinners and their opinion carries weight because of this. However, the importance of remittances is counterintuitive since remittances are seen as unconditional and thus devoid of an enforcement mechanism: migrants continue to send money back to their families regardless of who wins elections. Further, family members may conceal how they

voted from one another. No interview subject proposed the scenario of migrants "punishing" family members to vote the "wrong way" by withholding remittances. It is, however, possible for remittances to serve as a reward. Remittance inflows have been found to increase during election years and especially during competitive elections,[25] and one FMLN official said that Salvadoran migrants are known to include extra money in remittances to relatives before elections.[26] This is consistent with the literature on the effects of remittances on political participation, which proposes that remittances weaken clientelist voting patterns by providing recipients with a source of income alternative to patronage.[27] Remittances can therefore be expected to reinforce migrants' influence, independent of sending country governments and existing patronage networks.

Remittances are thus more of a magnifying force than a quid pro quo. Rather than buying votes or other specific behavior, they buy something more general: a position of status that will make the migrant's voice carry weight. This weight is less likely to change opinions entirely than it is to reinforce or augment existing family political preferences. Thus, the migrant is not calling home in order to make specific demands, political or otherwise, under threat of withholding money; rather, families communicate to keep one another informed. Evidence suggests political communication between migrants and their relatives is frequent; in the case of Mexico, Pérez-Arméndariz found that 85 percent of survey respondents engage in political discussion with relatives at home.[28] Therefore, while money facilitates this relationship, the key factor in diaspora influence is the migrants themselves and their communication with relatives back home.

The hypothesis, therefore, proposes that diaspora electoral influence works indirectly, through relatives in sending countries, and that it serves to reinforce rather than change those relatives' attitudes and behaviors. This better accounts for the role remittances play, as they are an imperfect enforcement mechanism for voting but a more likely reinforcement mechanism for encouraging partisan behavior. Should this hypothesis hold, migrants should be perceived as having a significant effect on the political behaviors of voters back home; this effect should be independent of that of remittances. Further, the effect should vary among different types of political activities, having a greater impact on higher-level activities that reflect the reinforcement of shared, preexisting partisan sympathies.

The Dataset For the purposes of this project, I focus on a series of political activities of voting-age adults in all available Latin American and Caribbean countries, as self-reported by respondents of the AmericasBarometer poll, conducted by Vanderbilt University's Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), for 2008 and 2010, the years available for the key independent variable of interest, family communication.[29] The polls are not panel data; samples were weighted according to each country's census to reflect geographic distribution of population, and surveys were administered in person through household visits.[30] I have added to this dataset additional, country-level variables: GDP per capita from the World Bank's World Development Indicators

(WDI), a democratic governance score from the Polity IV survey, and migration inflow data to the United States by country from the Migration Policy Institute. These variables control for country levels of political and economic development as well as the impact of migration flows on the country as a whole.

Dependent Variables

I test the effect of having close relatives living in the United States on seven measures of political activity, as reported by LAPOP poll respondents. Consistent

Table 2 Dependent Variables

Variable	Question	Type	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.
Basic level (voting) activities					
Voter	"Are you registered to vote?"	Dummy (0/1)	66,882	0.892	0.310
Voted	"Did you vote in the last presidential/PM elections?"	Dummy (0/1)	64,854	0.744	0.436
Higher level (nonvoting) activities					
Political Interest	"How interested are you in politics?" none/little/some/a lot	Ordinal (0 - 3)	66,350	1.043	0.958
Persuade	"How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate?" never/infrequently/sometimes/frequently	Ordinal (0 - 3)	66,040	0.563	0.912
Meetings	"How often do you attend meetings of a party or political movement?" never/infrequently/sometimes/frequently	Ordinal (0 - 3)	66,263	0.229	0.595
Party ID	"At this moment, do you sympathize with a political party?"	Dummy (0/1)	65,657	0.331	0.471
Campaign	"Did you work for a party or candidate in the last presidential/PM election?"	Dummy (0/1)	65,799	0.111	0.314

with LAPOP coding, three are ordinal variables and four are dummies. Variables are chosen to represent both basic-level and higher-level ("militant") political activities.

Independent Variables

I created a dichotomous variable, Family Communication, based on two questions in the LAPOP survey. One question asks respondents whether they have close relatives, who used to live in the household, now living in the U.S. A second question asks, for those who indicated that they do, how often they communicate with them, if at all. The Family Communication variable is coded as yes if the respondent answered yes to having a close relative in the U.S., and indicates some (non-zero) degree of communication with that relative.

A second related variable is Remit, whether the respondent received remittances. This variable is included as a control and also serves as an alternative independent variable of interest, to compare with the explanatory power of having a family member in the U.S. independent of whether that relative sends money. The competing dynamics represented by including both measures can be thought of as whether citizen behavior is affected by migrant relatives primarily through communication or through remuneration. Both individual-level and country-level variables were added as controls. For country-level variables, it would be expected that richer countries with established democratic traditions would have higher rates of political involvement, as more prosperous citizens are generally more politically engaged, and citizens would be more likely to exercise their political rights in systems where those rights are guaranteed and the electorate has faith that elections are clean.

Selected Characteristics of Respondents Communicating with Relatives in the U.S.

Respondents who most frequently reported communicating with close relatives living in the U.S. are, in both absolute numbers and as a proportion to the country's population, mostly from Mexico, Central American, and Caribbean countries. They are, compared to the population as a whole, more likely to be male, slightly older, earn more, have attained a higher level of education, and are less likely to live in an urban area.

Two controls, one individual-level (Remit) and one country-level (Migrants to U.S.), are closely related to the primary independent variable of interest, Family Communicate. Though risking some degree of multicollinearity in the final model, particularly between Family Communicate and Remit, I include both to determine whether communication with relatives in the U.S. has a unique effect on an individual's political behavior, independent of (on the individual level) receiving remittances from them, and (on the country level) migration being an issue impacting politics in general.

Table 3 Independent Variables

Variable	Question	Type	N	Mean	St. Dev
Family Communication	"Do you have close family members who used to live in the household and now live in the U.S.?" and "Do you communicate with him or her?"	Dummy (0/1)	67,113	0.162	0.369
Female	Respondent is female	Dummy (0/1)	67,113	0.509	0.500
Age	"How old are you?"	Integer	66,914	38.746	15.728
Education	"What was the last year of education you completed?"	Integer	66,592	8.977	4.406
Income	"In which of the following monthly income ranges do you fall?" 0 - 10, 10 highest income	Ordinal (0-10)	57,588	3.878	2.213
Ideology	"How left or right wing are you?" 1 - 10, 10 farthest right	Ordinal (1-10)	50,588	5.644	2.482
Urban	Respondent lives in an urban area	Dummy (0/1)	67,113	0.624	0.484
Remit	"Do you or someone in your household receive remittances from abroad?"	Dummy (0/1)	66,406	0.147	0.355
Polity	Country's Polity IV Score	Ordinal (5-10)	62,305	7.748	1.518
GDPpc	Country's GDP per capita	Integer	64,110	3,178.556	2,394.640
Migrants to US	Country's annual migration outflow to the U.S.	Integer	67,113	19,455.620	36,481.750

Test: Hierarchical Model using GLLAMM

The variables of interest present two challenges to OLS regression analysis: the dependent variables are dichotomous or four category ordinal, and the covariates vary at both the individual and country level, as well as by a time dimension. Normally the first condition would necessitate an ordered logit or probit test and the second condition would necessitate a two way fixed effects model. The shortcomings of a two way fixed effects OLS regression are considerable for the purposes of analysis: treating dichotomous variables as continuous variables creates an imperfect fit, country-level

variables cannot be included, and covariates with a high degree of collinearity must be dropped from the model. The latter is a particular challenge for this study, as I wish to compare two independent variables of interest, which are moderately correlated with one another, and determine if they have an effect independent of one another.

An ordered logit/probit model provides for a better fit, and while one cannot be run with fixed effects, some estimator programs can approximate such a model. Rather than hold country-level effects fixed at the same level, hierarchical models allow for individual-level covariates to vary nested within variation at the country level. The Stata program GLLAMM (Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models) allows for models that meet both desired conditions: estimates for responses of mixed type including dichotomous and ordered categorical responses and multilevel factors, in which latent, or unobserved, variables are assumed to be discrete or have a multivariate normal distribution. Such variables can be interpreted as random effects or common factors specific to each country, as lower-level units (here, individuals) are nested within higher-level units (here, countries). It is also understood that individual-level variables are conditionally independent of both country-level variables and the dependent variables.[31]

For a two-level linear model, the level-1 model for individual *i* within country *j* has the form:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}x_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where x_{ij} is the individual-level covariate and $\eta_{0j} + \eta_{1j}$ are the intercept and slope for the *j*th country. These coefficients are regressed on level-2 (country-level) covariates. The level-2 model, which shows the variance of the intercept and slope between countries, has the form:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\omega_j + \zeta_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}\omega_j + \zeta_{1j}$$

For a two-level logistic model, the level-1 model has the form:

$$logit_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{ij}x_{ij}$$

while the level-2 model has the form:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}\omega_j + \zeta_{0j}$$

$$\zeta_{0j} \sim N(0, \tau_{00})$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}$$

I ran seven GLLAMM tests, one for each of my measures of individual political behavior, for all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, with individual-level variation nested within the country level. The results are as follows:

The tests show a significant, positive effect of communication with relatives in the U.S. on some measures of political behavior by voting-age Latin American citizens. Notably, those activities for which having U.S.-residing relatives has a significant effect are all higher level activities: persuading others to vote for a favored candidate, identifying with a political party, paying attention to politics, attending meetings of a political organization, and volunteering for a political campaign. In contrast, for voting activities—registering to vote or voting—communicating with a U.S.-residing relative fails to have a statistically significant result at a level of $p<0.05$ for a two-tailed test.

The non-significance of migrant family communication on basic level participation suggests migrants are unlikely to turn nonvoters into voters. It is apparent that there is no pattern of whether voting-age Latin American citizens choose to register to vote or vote that differs among those with migrant relatives and those without. This may be because U.S.-residing relatives make no effort to convince family members in their home countries to be engaged in elections; or, if they do, their opinion on these matters has no impact either way. Mean response rates for basic level behavior are quite high: 90 percent of respondents reported registering to vote, and 75 percent reported having voted. Thus, a lack of a pattern of variance between families with migrant relatives and families without seems likely, as is the likelihood of the question of whether to vote being a moot question not worth discussing, particularly in those countries with mandatory voting laws.

Registering to vote and voting contrast with the remaining five variables—identifying with a party, paying attention to politics, convincing others to support a favored candidate, attending political organization meetings, and volunteering for an electoral campaign. Mean responses for these variables are significantly lower; e.g. only 11 percent reported volunteering for a campaign. And, while the mean response to "how interested are you in politics" is between "a little" and "somewhat," the mean responses to "how often do you try to persuade others to vote for your preferred candidate," "how often do you attend meetings of a political organization," and "how much do you identify with a party" all fall between "none at all" and "a little." Thus, a clear minority answered in the affirmative for each of the higher level political behaviors, allowing for greater likelihood of patterns of variance between migrant-relative and non-migrant-relative families.

For those higher level political behaviors, the tests show a significant, positive effect of communication with family residing in the U.S. on relatives at home. Those communicating with U.S.-residing relatives are more likely to pay attention to politics, identify with and be active in a party, political organization, or campaign, and to try to convince others to vote for their preferred candidate. They are, in other words, more likely to engage in political persuasion typified by party militants. Although coefficient estimates produced by GLAMM, essentially the same as those for logistic regressions, make it difficult to quantify the estimated impact of each independent variable on each

Table 4 GLLAMM Tests: Impact of Migrant Family Communication on Voter Behavior in Latin America

	Basic Level Behaviors		*Higher Level Behaviors*				
	Register to Vote	**Voted**	**Political interest**	**Persuade**	**Attend meetings**	**Identify with party**	**Volunteer for campaign**
Family Communication	0.088	-0.024	0.083**	0.222***	0.159***	0.017***	0.145**
	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.414)	(0.035)	(0.047)
Female	-0.087	0.010	-0.345***	-0.254***	-0.311***	-0.191***	-0.356***
	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Age	0.061***	0.061***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.019***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.091***	0.076***	0.068***	0.028***	0.029***	0.023***	0.066***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Income	0.036***	0.016	0.060***	0.055***	0.003	0.045***	-0.034***
	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.008	0.012	0.004	-0.008	0.016**	0.004	-0.020**
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	0.004	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Urban residence	-0.133**	-0.112***	-0.113***	-0.090***	-0.350***	-0.058	-0.107**
	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Receive remittances	-0.116	-0.189***	0.057	0.048	0.098	0.254***	0.180***
	(0.059)	(0.043)	(0.032)	(0.035)	0.044	(0.160)	(0.050)
Country Polity score	-0.137***	-0.170***	0.014	-0.115***	0.043***	0.160***	0.079***
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.014)
Country GDP per capita	0.006***	0.007***	0.006***	0.009***	-0.005***	0.006***	-0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Country Migration to US	0.002**	-0.002***	0.002***	-0.002***	0.002***	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant 1	-0.024	0.686	0.316	0.443	2.112	3.094	3.457
Constant 2			1.955	1.297	4.153		
Constant 3			3.392	2.543	4.553		
Observations	39,679	38,195	39,495	39,395	39,375	39,261	39,236

* $p \leq 0.05$ ** $p \leq 0.01$ *** $p \leq 0.001$.

dependent variable in a comparable manner, one can observe a positive, significant impact across all four higher-level behaviors: the log odds of engaging in some form of party militant behavior increases by up to 0.22 when one talks to a close relative residing in the U.S. compared to someone who does not.

As for the controls, standard SES variables generally had significant estimates in the directions predicted by correlations, with the exception of Urban. All else equal,

urban dwellers were, surprisingly, less likely to engage in the selected political behaviors than citizens residing in rural areas. Ideology had almost no discernible effect; it can be assumed that left-leaning and right-leaning citizens are roughly equally predisposed to being politically active. Also notable is that Polity scores, when significant, had a negative coefficient estimate: having less-well-established democratic institutions appears to slightly encourage political participation. Having gone through a wave of democratization a generation ago, there should be much less variation with regards to measurements of democratic rule in Latin America and the Caribbean today. Indeed, while Polity IV's scale goes from -10 to 10, among the countries included in the LAPOP survey, the Polity scores only ranged between 5 and 10, indicating little variation. As predicted, the remaining country-level covariates, GDP per capita and rate of out-migration to the U.S., had mostly positive, significant effects on political behavior.

Finally, Remit is included in this model as a potential proxy for Family Communication, though it is hypothesized to have a unique effect, as a mechanism for Family Communication rather than a perfect substitute. Specifically, I hypothesize that Latin American citizens who have family members in the U.S. stay in contact with those relatives, and those migrant relatives influence their political behavior through personal communication. The fact that those migrant relatives usually support their families at home through remittances gives them a status of respect within the family and thus gives their political opinion added weight. Should this be true, I would expect to see receiving remittances to have a positive, significant effect apart from that of simply being in touch with U.S.-residing relatives.

That expectation was mostly borne out in the models. However, variation across models was greater for Remit than for Family Communication: coefficient estimates were positive and significant at a 95 percent level for a two-tailed test for proselytizing and attending political meetings. For voter and voted, they were negative and significant, also at a 95 percent level. Thus, the estimated change in log odds for the selected behaviors from receiving remittances varied widely compared to family communication, from -0.19 (Voted) to 0.25 (Party ID). The lack of a consistent and unidirectional pattern for Remit in comparison to Family Communication suggests the bulk of the impact of migration on political behavior is taken up by Family Communication, leaving little power for Remit independent of Family Communication.

Does Family Influence Exist without Remittances? Testing with Interactions

Should the presence of family members outside the country have the power to sway voter behavior that is independent of remittances, we should still be able to see an effect of migrant relatives even when remittance levels are zero. To isolate the diaspora family effect on the observed behaviors, I include a series of interactions between Family Communication and the Remit covariates.

The independent impact of family presence in the diaspora on higher level behaviors is clearer when interactions are included. The estimated effect of family communication on relatives' voting activities is statistically insignificant. For all five higher level behaviors—persuasion, attention, attending meetings, identifying with a party, and campaigning—the estimated effect is positive and significant. Thus, even when family members receive no remittances from them, the unique effect of family communication is positive for higher level behaviors only.[32] It is the very act of intrafamilial communication that has an impact on party militant behavior, even when remittances are negligible. As no evidence suggests militants withhold remittances based on the voting behavior of their relatives, a much more likely role remittances play is to reinforce the general sense of importance and influence migrants have over their relatives. As migrants often skew more to one party than the sending country electorate as a whole, they are therefore more likely to be a base vote for a particular party than a swing vote. Thus, migrants are more likely to transmit party militant, base voter attitudes to relatives through personal communication and make their relatives more active than they would otherwise be.

Conclusion

From interviews with Mexican, Salvadoran, and Dominican party officials, a consensus opinion emerges that migrants wield political power through their family members, and to sway a migrant to one's corner—particularly one in a richer country like the U.S., especially one who supports their family monetarily—is to sway an entire family. "If we get one Salvadoran living in D.C., that translates into five votes in El Salvador," according the director of the FMLN's 2014 presidential campaign in the Washington, D.C. metro area.[33]

The results presented in this article suggest that party officials are half right: engaging in transnational campaigning does have a payoff, but it is more indirect than they believe. By reaching out to migrants, they are not winning votes from their relatives at home (who likely already favor the same party), but votes from other voters at home who may in turn be convinced by those relatives. Diaspora electoral engagement is more a matter of turning out the base than winning over swing voters, and parties who stand to gain the greatest payoff from diaspora engagement will engage in base-building strategies abroad.

The models in this study suggest that this influence does exist. Latin American citizens who have close family members living in the U.S. are more likely to engage in a range of political activities than those who do not, specifically, those which go beyond basic participation of voting: joining a political party, attending meetings, and campaigning for candidates. Thus, because migrants have little apparent impact on relatives' political behaviors which are matters of civic duty (whether socially or legally enforced), family communication is unlikely to convince a non-voter to become a voter. However, among those citizens who have already reached a basic

Table 5 GLLAMM Tests with Communication-Remittance Interactions

	Basic Level Behaviors		***Higher Level Behaviors***				
	Register to vote	**Voted**	**Political interest**	**Persuade**	**Attend meetings**	**Identify with party**	**Volunteer for campaign**
Family Communication	0.028	-0.034	0.092*	0.252***	0.254***	0.141***	0.223***
	(0.075)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.043)	(0.058)
Female	-0.086	0.012	-0.341***	-0.251***	-0.312***	-0.191***	-0.357***
	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Age	0.062***	0.060***	0.006***	0.005***	0.005***	0.012***	0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.091***	0.072***	0.068***	0.028***	0.029***	0.023***	0.064***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Income	0.034***	0.027***	0.068***	0.063***	0.002	0.045***	-0.032***
	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Right-leaning ideology	-0.008	0.014	0.004	-0.007	0.016**	0.004	-0.023***
	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Urban residence	-0.133***	-0.143***	-0.119***	-0.129***	-0.350***	-0.058	-0.112**
	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Receive remittances	-0.171	-0.288***	0.090	0.079	0.229***	0.213***	0.261***
	(0.73)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.066)
Country Polity score	-0.136***	-0.104***	0.011	-0.100***	0.042***	0.160***	0.102***
	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.016)
Country GDP per capita	0.006***	0.004***	-0.001*	0.006***	-0.005***	0.006***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Country Migration to US	0.002***	-0.001***	0.001***	-0.001***	0.001***	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Communicate* Remit	0.152	0.207**	-0.058	-0.010	-0.297***	0.093	-0.196*
	(0.120)	(0.084)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.075)	(0.010)
Constant 1	-0.240	0.782	0.305	0.530	2.106	3.097	3.523
Constant 2			1.942	1.386	3.147		
Constant 3			3.376	2.633	4.548		
Observations	39,679	38,195	39,495	39,395	39,375	39,261	39,236

* $p \leq 0.05$ ** $p \leq 0.01$ *** $p \leq 0.001$.

level of electoral participation, communication with migrant relatives may convince them to move from being a passive to an active participant, by reinforcing shared partisan political identities.

This tendency fits with observations that diaspora-residing citizens often (but not always[34]) have a distinct political profile in comparison to their home countries characterized by a strong political identity that clearly favors one party and rejects another, often the party in office at the time they emigrated: in the case of Salvadoran migrants who left during the civil war, favoring the FMLN and rejecting ARENA; in the case of Mexican migrants who left under the first period of PRI rule, favoring the PAN (and, to a lesser extent, the PRD) and rejecting the PRI. These diaspora partisan identities often become frozen in the moment of emigration, given a relative insulation from whatever political changes that take place in their home countries. For example, Diaspora Salvadorans, many of them exiles from the most violent period of the civil war, "have the luxury of radicalism" from their perch outside of the country, complained one former FMLN guerrilla and now centrist politician.[35]

Having migrant family members has a significant and positive impact on becoming a party militant. Militancy is a crucial factor in any race. Although militants are rarer than regular voters and less susceptible to changing their minds about politics, they can change the minds of others. They can contribute money and volunteer labor, and they can make a difference in election-day turnout. If voters with transnational family ties are indeed more engaged and more partisan citizens, winning over their migrant relatives is indeed a smart strategy on the part of politicians, even when those relatives do not, or cannot, vote. Their family members may not be as amenable to being swayed to switch sides, but they may be more amenable to get involved in such a way as to sway others.

NOTES

Thanks to Matthew Carnes, Diana Kapiszewski, Peggy Levitt, David Crow, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous versions of this work.

1. Mexican Federal Election Institute, District Voting by Mexican Citizens Residing Abroad, 2012.

2. Campaign visits by overseas candidates are largely (but not entirely) confined to top migrant-sending countries to U.S. Top 10 migrant-sending countries to U.S., measured by U.S. diaspora-to-home country population ratio, are Jamaica (23.1%), El Salvador (17.2%), Mexico (10%), Dominican Republic (7.5%), Honduras (5.7%), Haiti (5.2%), Guatemala (5%), Nicaragua (4.1%), Panama (2.9%), and Ecuador (2.7%). Excludes Cuba (8.5%), which does not hold contested elections, and countries with populations smaller than 2 million. Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006–2009 American Community Surveys (ACS), Table B05006, "Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population"; Decennial Census 2000, Summary File 3, Table QT-P15, "Region and Country or Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population: 2000."

3. As an example of transnational party expenditures, Dominican parties maintain permanent offices in New York City. Both the PRD and PRSC recently announced closing their New York offices due to high cost of rent: the PRD was spending $6,000 per month on rent, and the PRSC $2,500. See "En medio de crisis cierran local PRD en NY por deuda en renta de mas de US $60,000," *El Nuevo Diario*, Feb. 11, 2013; and Miguel Cruz Tejada, "Cierran local del PRSC en Nueva York por atraso en pago de la renta," *Diario Libre*, Dec. 1, 2014.

4. To this day, Mexican voters residing outside of Mexico overwhelmingly support the PAN, Fox's party. In the two presidential elections following the extension of voting rights to Mexicans residing abroad, 57.4% of Mexicans abroad voted for PAN candidate, Felipe Calderón, compared to 35.9% of Mexican voters overall in 2006, and 42.2% of Mexicans abroad voted for PAN candidate, Josefina Vázquez Mota, compared to 25.4% overall in 2012. Mexican Federal Election Institute, District Voting by Mexican Citizens Residing Abroad, 2006 and 2012.

5. As measured by diaspora-to-population ratio; see endnote 2 above. Excludes Jamaica (non-Latin American) and Cuba (noncompetitive elections).

6. Miguel Moctezuma Longoria, "Viabilidad del Voto Extraterritorial de los Mexicanos," *Migración y Desarrollo,* 3 (2003), 107–19; Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority and Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

7. Yossi Shain, *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. and Their Homelands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Cecilia Menjívar, *Fragmented Ties: Salvadoran Immigrant Networks in America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Peggy Levitt, *The Transnational Villagers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Peggy Levitt and Rafael De la Dehesa, "Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 26 (2003), 587–611; James F. Hollifield, "The Emerging Migration State," *International Migration Review,* 38 (September 2004), 885–912; Jonathan Fox, "Unpacking 'Transnational Citizenship,'" *Annual Review of Political Science*, 8 (2005), 171–201; José Francisco Parra, "El Voto Extraterritorial y la Cámara de Diputados de México, 1994–2005," *Migración y Desarrollo,* 5 (2005), 86–106; José Itzigsohn and Daniela Villacrés, "Migrant Political Transnationalism and the Practice of Democracy: Dominican External Voting Rights and Salvadoran Hometown Associations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 31 (April 2008), 664–86.

8. Luin Goldring, "The Mexican State and Transmigrant Organizations: Negotiating the Boundaries of Membership and Participation," *Latin American Research Review*, 37 (2002), 55–99; Robert C. Smith, "Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and the Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics," *International Migration Review,* 37 (June 2003), 297–343; Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller, "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants," *American Journal of Sociology,* 108 (May 2003), 1211–48; Alejandro Portes, "Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism," *International Migration Review,* 37 (September 2003), 874–92; Devesh Kapur, *Diaspora, Development and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of International Migration from India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Kathleen Newland, *Voice after Exit: Diaspora Advocacy* (Washington: Migration Policy Institute, 2010); Matthew Lieber, *Elections beyond Borders: Overseas Voting in Mexico and the Dominican Republic, 1994–2008*, Ph.D. dissertation (Brown University, 2010).

9. *Eva Østergaard*-Nielsen, "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices," *International Migration Review,* 37 (September 2003), 760–86.

10. Jean-Michel Lafleur and Leticia Calderón Chelius, "Assessing Emigrant Participation in Home Country Elections: The Case of Mexico's 2006 Presidential Election," *International Migration*, 49 (2011), 99–124; Jean-Michel Lafleur, *Transnational Politics and the State: The External Voting Rights of Diasporas* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

11. Claire L. Adida and Desha Girod, "Do Migrants Improve Their Hometowns? Remittances and Access to Public Services in Mexico, 1995–2000," *Comparative Political Studies,* 44 (January 2011), 3–27.

12. Gary L. Goodman and Jonathan T. Hiskey, "Exit without Leaving: Political Disengagement in High Migration Municipalities in Mexico," *Comparative Politics*, 40 (January 2008), 169–88; Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz and David Crow, "Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behavior in Mexico," *Comparative Political Studies,* 43 (January 2010), 119–48.

13. Roderic Ai Camp, "Learning Democracy in Mexico and the United States," *Mexican Studies*, 19 (Winter 2003), 3–27; Rodolfo O. De la Garza and Muserref Yetim, "The Impact of Ethnicity and Socialization on Definitions of Democracy: The Case of Mexican Americans and Mexicans," *Mexican Studies*, 19 (Winter 2003), 81–104.

14. Romana Careja and Patrick Emmenegger, "Making Democratic Citizens: The Effects of Migration Experience on Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies,* 45 (July 2012), 875–902.

15. Peggy Levitt, "Social Remittances: Migration-Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion," *International Migration Review,* 32 (Summer 1998), 926–48.

16. Larry Jay Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1994); Shain 1999.

17. G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review,* 80 (March 1986), 17–43.

18. Steven J. Rosenstone, "Economic Adversity and Voter Turnout," *American Journal of Political Science,* 26 (February 1982), 25–46.

19. Michael Jones-Correa, *Between Two Nations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

20. New rules issued by the Mexican Electoral Institute (INE) in 2015 now allow Mexican citizens abroad to apply for voting credentials at Mexican consulates without having to travel back to Mexico; however, applicants must still provide passports, birth certificates, or other documentation as proof of citizenship.

21. Under Mexico's 2006 law granting voting rights to Mexicans residing abroad, citizens must have a voting card issued by the Federal Elections Institute (IFE, now INE) to request an absentee ballot. In order to obtain a voting card, citizens must apply in person in their hometown in Mexico and provide an official proof of citizenship such as a birth certificate or passport. Critics of the process have noted that many Mexican citizens residing abroad (98% in the United States) do not have the required proof of citizenship, especially migrants who are undocumented, and undocumented migrants are even less likely to risk traveling back to Mexico in order to obtain proper documentation to vote (Perla Carolina Gris Legorreta, "Voto en el Extranjero: Qué Aprendimos de la Experiencia de 2006?" *Iberoforum*, 9 (June 2014), 103–21).

22. Abby Córdova and Jonathan Hiskey, "Shaping Politics at Home: Cross-Border Social Ties and Local-Level Political Engagement," *Comparative Political Studies*, 48 (March 2015), 1454–87; Goodman and Hiskey, 2008.

23. Jorge Bravo, "Emigración y Compromiso Político en México," *Gobierno y Política*, 1 (2009), 273–310; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow, 2010.

24. The belief that family members vote in blocs and that the breadwinner strongly influences for whom the family will vote was expressed in interviews with several party officials, including Janet Camilo, Eduardo Estrella, and Fidel Santana (Dominican Republic); Joaquin Samaoya, Margarita Escobar, and Alex Nuñez (El Salvador), and Alejandra Reynoso and Augustin Barrio Gomez (Mexico). On the broader question of why parties seek the support of migrants, nearly all (44 of 45) interviewees responded that it was due to the influence they have over family members at home. The only interviewee to suggest a different reason was Oscar Santamaría in El Salvador, who suggested it was for campaign contributions.

25. Angela O'Mahony, "Political Investment: Remittances and Elections," *British Journal of Political Science*, 43 (October 2013), 799–820.

26. Interview with Sonia Umanzor, Community Affairs Liason, Embassy of El Salvador, Washington DC, March 2013.

27. Tobias Pfutze, "Does Migration Promote Democratization? Evidence from the Mexican Transition," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 40 (2012), 159–75; Roy Germano, "Migrants' Remittances and Economic Voting in the Mexican Countryside," *Electoral Studies*, 32 (2013), 875–85.

28. Clarisa Pérez-Armendáriz, "Cross-Border Discussions and Political Behavior in Migrant-Sending Countries," *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 49 (2014), 67–88.

29. All Latin American and Caribbean countries surveyed in the Americas Barometer included, including those not listed in table 1 of top migrant-sending countries, to account for diaspora electoral activity independent of campaign visits by candidates, largely confined to top migrant-sending countries, as well as null cases within the region.

30. See LAPOP, "2012 AmericasBarometer Sample Design and Design Effects," available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2012/AB-2012-Tech-Info-12.18.12.pdf

31. Sophia Rabe-Hesketh, Anders Skrondal, and Andrew Pickles, GLLAMM Manual, University of California Berkeley Division of Biostatistics Working Paper 160 (2004).

32. The coefficient estimates for Remit are largely meaningless because in the interacted model, they would represent the effect of receiving remittances without having any family in the U.S., an unlikely scenario.

33. Alex Nuñez, interviewed in Washington, DC, March 2013.

34. Cristina Escobar, Renelinda Arana, and James A. McCann, "Assessing Candidates at Home and Abroad: A Comparative Analysis of Colombian Expatriates," *Latin American Politics and Society*, 56 (Summer 2014), 115–40.

35. Joaquin Samaoya, interviewed in San Salvador, November 2013.

APPENDIX

List of Interview Subjects

Mexico interviews conducted in Mexico City between June-August 2013 and February 2014; Dominican Republic interviews conducted in Santo Domingo between August-October 2013; El Salvador interviews conducted in Washington, DC between February-June 2013 and in San Salvador between October 2013-March 2014. Interviews lasted approximately 1 hour and were all conducted in person.

Name	Party	Position	Location
Natividad Gonzalez Paras	PRI	Ex Governor of Nuevo Leon	Mexico
Augustin Barrios Gomez	PRD	Member of Chamber of Deputies	Mexico
Luis Carlos Ugalde	PAN appointment	Ex Director of Federal Election Institute	Mexico
Lorena Buzon	PRI	Office of the Presidency	Mexico
Juan Rebolledo	PRI	Ministry of Finance	Mexico
Yomara Guerra	PRI	Office of the Presidency	Mexico
Francisco de la Torre	PRI appointment	Executive Director, Institute for Mexicans Abroad	Mexico
Patricio Ballados	PRI appointment	Ex Coordinator, Overseas Voting for Federal Election Institute	Mexico
Lazaro Cardenas	PRD	Ex Governor of Michoacan	Mexico
Dalia Moreno	PRI appointment	Ex Coordinator, Overseas Voting for Federal Election Institute	Mexico
Carlos Heredia	PRD	Ex Member of Chamber of Deputies	Mexico
Fernando Rodriguez Doval	PAN	Member of Chamber of Deputies	Mexico
Alejandra Reynoso	PAN	Member of Chamber of Deputies	Mexico
Gabriel Farfan Mares	PRD	Ex Policy Adviser of 2006 Lopez Obrador presidential campaign	Mexico
Melvin Manon	DxC	Member of party executive committee	Dominican Republic
Olaya Dotel	PRD	Political analyst and radio show host	Dominican Republic
Pedro Catrain	DxC	Former Candidate, Chamber of Deputies	Dominican Republic
Orlando Jorge Mera	PRD	Secretary General of party	

Appendix. (continued)

Name	Party	Position	Location
			Dominican Republic
Janet Camilo	PRD	Vice President of party, Director of Women's Section	Dominican Republic
Guillermo Moreno	PRD	Ex Presidential Candidate	Dominican Republic
Fidel Santana	FA	Ex Presidential Candidate	Dominican Republic
Marcos Villaman	PLD	Director, FUNGLODE	Dominican Republic
Eduardo Estrella	DxC	Ex Presidential Candidate	Dominican Republic
Modesto Reynoso	PRD	PRD Section Chief	Dominican Republic
Alfonso Urena	PLD	Campaign Director for Danilo Medina	Dominican Republic
Jorge Feliz Pacheco	PLD	Director, PLD youth wing	Dominican Republic
Gustavo Estrella	PRSC	Director, PRSC youth wing	Dominican Republic
Carlos Morales	PRSC	Ex VP and Ex president of PRSC	Dominican Republic
Jose Morel	PRD	Overseas member of Chamber of Deputies	Dominican Republic
Minou Tavarez Mirabal	ex-PLD, now APD	Presidential Candidate	Dominican Republic
Gerardo Muyshondt	ARENA	Campaign strategist and publicist	El Salvador
Amalia Espinal	ARENA	Vice President of Ideology and Director of Sector 8	El Salvador
Joaquin Samayoa	none (ex-FMLN)	Political analyst	El Salvador
Rafael Alfaro	GANA	Director of International Affairs	El Salvador
Margarita Escobar	ARENA	Member of Legislative Assembly	El Salvador
Jaime Edgardo Juarez	FMLN	Coordinator of Overseas Voting, Supreme Electoral Tribunal and member of FMLN National Board	El Salvador
Blanca Flor Bonilla	FMLN	Director of International Relations	El Salvador
Karina Sosa	FMLN	Member of Legislative Assembly	El Salvador
Sofia Flores	ARENA		El Salvador

Appendix. (continued)

Name	Party	Position	Location
		Attorney, Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (FUSADES)	
Pedro Monterrosa	none	Magistrate, Supreme Electoral Tribunal	El Salvador
Oscar Santamaria	ARENA	Director of Foreign Relations	El Salvador
Ana Roque	FMLN	FMLN Secretary General for Maryland	Washington, DC
Sonia Umanzor	FMLN	Community affairs director, Salvadoran Embassy	Washington, DC
Alex Nunez	FMLN	FMLN Secretary General for Washington, DC	Washington, DC
Agustin Arevalo	FMLN	Base committee activist	Washington, DC