



Fall 2014 Political Science 50: Introduction to Comparative Politics






Comparative Authoritarianism


Outline for Mo, Oct 27, 2014

- What is an authoritarian regime?
- How do authoritarian regimes differ?
 - How they rule
 - Who rules
 - The Selectorate
- Differences in outcomes by regime type
 - Policy differences
 - Authoritarian Breakdown (\neq democratization)



Some vocabulary

- Regimes: “sets of formal and informal rules and procedures for selecting national leaders and policies” (Geddes 2003: 70)
- Institutions: “the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991)
 - Include informal constraints and formal rules



Regime typologies

Democracy vs. Non-democracy

- **Democracy:**
 - a competitive struggle for the people's vote (Schumpeter 1947)
 - regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials (Lipset 1959)
 - governments can lose elections (Przeworski and Limongi 1991)
- **Non-democracy:** not so much



Non-democracy regime typologies

How they rule

- Totalitarian Regimes

- Ideology
- Command economy
- Highly mobilized
- Single party



- Authoritarian

- Usually Low Mobilization
- More freedoms than totalitarian regimes, but...
- Economic policy can vary widely




*Juan Perón, 1895-1974
Dictator of Argentina*

Differentiating Regimes in terms of how they rule

SUMMARY TABLE

State–Society Relations in Different Political Regimes

	Democracy	Non-Democracy	
Key Characteristic			
Use of ideological indoctrination	None	Limited	Extensive
Extent of coercive mobilization	None	Limited or minimal; de-mobilization emphasized	Extensive
Degree of Social or political pluralism permitted	Extensive	Limited	None
Examples	Canada, Japan, Israel	Brazil (1964–1985), Mexico (1929–2000), Greece (1967–1974), Egypt, Iran	USSR (1917–1991), Nazi Germany (1933–1945), Italy (1922–1943), North Korea



Non-democracy regime typologies

Who rules?

- Monarchy – rule by kings/royal families

Reigning monarchs



Queen Elizabeth of UK



King Letsie III of Lesotho



King Bhumibol of Thailand



Queen Maxima of Netherlands



Emperor Akihito of Japan



King Philippe of Belgium

Ruling monarchs



King Mohammed VI
of Morocco




King Mswati III
of Swaziland



King Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia



Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah
of Brunei



Institutional constraints on monarchies

- Persian Gulf monarchies
 - dynastic family
 - Oil wealth
- Other monarchies
 - legislature & parties
- Monarchies with no institutional constraints have not generally survived into the modern era

Nondemocracy regime typologies

Who rules?

- Monarchy – rule by kings/royal families
- Theocracy – rule by clerics




Pope Francis
of Vatican City



Ayatollah Khamenei
Of Iran




al-Baghdadi
of IS



Nondemocracy regime typologies

Who rules?

- Monarchy – rule by kings/royal families
- Theocracy – rule by clerics
- Military regime – rule by military



Identifying military regimes

- The Military is the principal,
- The chief executive is the military's agent

Military Regimes


Some with reigning monarchs or “civilian” presidents



Brazil 1964



Greece 1967




Thailand 2014




Egypt 2014






Coups d'Etat (putsch)

- Breakthrough coup: Reform of oligarchic society
 - Long-term military rule common (often “personalistic”)
 - Often led by junior officers
- Stabilizing Coup: Arbitration in developing society
 - Often preceded by demonstrations repressed (or not) by military
 - Short-term military rule common, followed by elections
 - Generally led by senior officers
- Veto coup: Prevent revolution from mass mobilization
 - Mid/long-term military rule (sometimes indirect) common
 - Generally led by senior officers



Recent Coups in Egypt


- 1952: Breakthrough coup
 - Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk
- 2011: Stabilizing coup
 - Military allows protests to undermine Mubarak
 - Elections held within 6 months; Morsi (Muslim Brotherhood) wins presidency
- 2013: Veto coup
 - Islamists (MB) control civilian government
 - Military violently represses protests, removes Morsi
 - General al-Sisi is “elected” president



Non-democracy regime typologies


Who rules?

- Monarchy – rule by kings/royal families
- Theocracy – rule by clerics
- Military regime – rule by military
- Civilian regime – rule by dictator/party
 - Personalist Dictatorship
 - Dominant Party Regime



Identifying personalist regimes


- Chief executive (dictator) is principal, military & party are agents
- Not very institutionalized
 - (Support coalition is family & friends, & perhaps co-ethnics)



Origins of personalistic rulers

- Personalization after democratic election
 - Hitler, Nkrumah, Fujimori, Chavez, Papa Doc Duvalier, Putin
- Personalization after military coup/military regime
 - Rawlings, Mobutu, Pinochet, Qaddafi, Nasser, Trujillo
- Personalization after revolution/establishment of single party dictatorship
 - Mao, Stalin, Saddam Hussein
- Succession of personalist rule from father
 - Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, Faure Gnassingbe (Togo), Bashir al-Assad, Baby Doc Duvalier

Identifying Dominant Party Regimes



The Ruling Party is the principal,
The chief executive & military are agents

- Single party: One party in the legislature
- Hegemonic party: 2 or more parties in the legislature, but the ruling party generally has $> \frac{2}{3}$ seats

Single Party Regimes



China (Communist Party)



Tanzania, 1966-1995 (CCM Party)



Vietnam (Communist Party)



Kenya, 1965-1992 (KANU Party)

Hegemonic Party Regimes



Singapore (People's Action Party)



Tanzania, 1996-present (CCM Party)



Mexico, 1929-2000 (PNR/PRM/PRI)




Malaysia (UMNO)

Summary on non-Authoritarian Selectorates

SUMMARY TABLE

Characteristics of the Selectorate in Non-Democratic Regimes					
Type of Non-Democracy	Size	Membership Criteria	Rules for Leadership Selection	Relationship between Leader and Selectorate	Examples as of 2011
Monarchy	Ruler's family	Family relationship	Family descent	Institutionalized, limited reciprocal accountability	Saudi Arabia, Brunei
Single-Party Regime	Variable	Party membership; rise through ranks	Determined by party rules	Institutionalized reciprocal accountability	Cuba, China, Vietnam
Military Regime	Typically limited to high officer corps	Military member; rise through ranks	Determined by military high command	Institutionalized reciprocal accountability	Myanmar, Fiji, Mauritania
Oligarchy	Small	Informal	Unclear and informal	Informal reciprocal accountability	1990s Russia
Theocracy	Variable	Member of a religious order; rise through the ranks	Variable	Variable	Vatican City, Iran
Personalistic Regime	Limited to ruler's cronies	Leader hand-picks	Unclear and informal	Reciprocal accountability, but unclear and unstable	Libya (until 2011), Burkina Faso, Belarus


Samuels, 2013 *Comparative Politics* p. 113.




Different types → different outcomes

- Provision of public goods
- Economic growth
- Regime stability

Democracy and Material Well-Being




Note: The x-axes measure a country's average level of democracy from 1960 to 1990 as coded by Polity IV. The measure ranges from -10 (most dictatorial) to $+10$ (most democratic). The y-axes vary by graph.



Public Good Provision and Economic Growth

- Legislatures and parties
 - facilitate inclusion and information flow;
 - constrain dictator from extracting;
 - encourage investment and growth (Gandhi 2008, Wright 2008)
 - But not in personalist regimes
- Large winning coalition relative to selectorate
 - more public goods and growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2006)


Susceptibility to Poor Economic Performance



Source: Geddes 2009 “Authoritarian Breakdown” Figure 3


Regime stability / Regime breakdown

- Military regimes most likely to fail/transition
 - Option to return to barracks
 - Can negotiate and enforce benefits such as more military spending
 - ~~Good exit option creates incentives for elite splits~~
- Party-based regimes most durable among non-monarchies
 - Party framework increases incentive and framework for elites to work together
- Personalist regimes less likely to fail, more likely to end violently
 - No good exit option; exile, prison, etc. likely
 - ~~Incentives for elites to stick together~~




Democratization?

- Failed autocratic succession
Monarchy → Oligarchy → Democracy?
- More wealth might help
- Less inequality seems to help
- When power sharing b/w competing groups is possible
- Occasionally: foreign imposition
- Almost never: revolution



Conclusions

- Not all dictatorships are the same
 - Different ways of ruling
 - Different types of rulers
 - Different levels of power-sharing
- Differences among dictatorships result in different outcomes



Extra slides


Personalistic rulers of “military regimes”



Pinochet



Trujillo



Personalistic leaders of “single party regimes”



Personalistic rulers of “hegemonic party regimes”



Russia (under Putin)




Indonesia (under Suharto)




Togo (under Eyadema pere & fils)





Origins of Party Regimes

- Independence movement
- Democratic election followed by consolidation of power by party
- Party participation in military coup or insurrection



W/S by regime type

- Large W, Large S (High W/S):
 - Democracies
- Medium W, Large S (Medium W/S)
 - Party-based dictatorships
- Small W, Medium S (Low W/S)
 - Personalist regimes
- Small W, Small S (High W/S):
 - Military regimes, Monarchies