

# Policy Overlay Networks

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# Outline

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# Introduction

Distributed enterprise computing systems are facing a troubling future. They are:

- *Expensive* — They do not use current commercial resources and use costly partitioning schemes
- *Unreliable* — Too reliant on outmoded security approaches
- *Slow* — Sensitive information is manually reviewed too often leading to the right people being unable to get the right information in time

They need to be re-imagined to take advantage of radical shifts in computational provisioning.

*Federal computer systems are a prime example of these kind of problematic distributed systems, and demonstrate the difficulty in implementing new technical solutions.*

## The Problems — Customer Perspectives

Current policy-centric systems are being forced to move to cloud environments and build much more open systems. Usage management is a key problem in this domain — information needs to be delivered to those who need it as soon as possible:

"...It is imperative to effectively exchange information among components, Federal agencies, coalition partners, foreign governments and international organizations as a critical element of our efforts to defend the nation and execute national strategy..." [1]  
— *DoD Information Sharing Strategy*

"...The CIO of the National Security Agency is focusing on IT architecture and a cloud-centric approach to sharing information..." [3]  
— *Informationweek*

# The Problem — Characteristics

Cloud systems may save money, provide more flexibility, but they also [7]:

- *Are Not Private* — User data control in SaaS is lacking, causing policy concerns for agencies; Data owners have no technical control over secondary use; providers may use offshore development; data can be routed across sensitive countries or secondarily stored on CDNs; data privacy on bankruptcy is ill-defined
- *Are Less Secure* — Controlling data access, data may not be wiped in all XaaS scenarios, availability/backup leads to possible data proliferation, lack of standardization in intercloud communication and data transfer, multi-tenancy and side-channel attacks, difficult logging/auditing
- *Cannot Be Trusted* — Trust relationships, consumer trust

## Current Solutions

How are these problems being addressed by impacted organizations?

They're just starting to be actively addressed and are an open research question [2].

Cross-domain architectures are currently the standard for monitoring and information dissemination in an effort lead by the *Unified Cross Domain Management Office*, associated with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Security Agency (NSA).

# Current Solutions — NSA

Legacy cross-domain notional architecture [5]




Figure: NSA Legacy Model

*Domain A* — Private cloud managed by the Air Force

*Domain B* — A public operational network

## Current Solutions — NSA (SoA)

Future cross-domain notional architecture [5]




Figure: NSA Service-Oriented Model

*GiG* — Global Information Grid; a large public cloud operated by the DoD

*DSCDS* — Distributed Service-oriented Cross Domain Solution



# Current Solutions — Raytheon

Raytheon's notional architecture supporting cross-domain information flow [6]:




Figure: Raytheon Model

*...still uses a single perimeter guard...*

# Current Solutions — BAH

Booz—Allen—Hamilton presented a service-centric cross domain solution in 2009 [4]:




Figure: Booz—Allen—Hamilton Model

*...still uses a single perimeter guard (called a filter segment)...*

## Future Solution

Organizations are falling back on what they know in the scope of new problems.




Figure: NSA Legacy Model

Even though we know they don't work [8].

## Characteristics of Current Solutions

- *Centralized Policy* — They use centralized policy injection into communication flow. Note that in each sample model, policy is *only* evaluated at guard points.
- *Physical to Compartment Mapping* — In each of these cases, users are only allowed to exchange one type of information per domain. The physical domain systems are locked (by operational policy) to a single classification level limit. Users cannot, for example, have *Top Secret* material on a network accredited for *Secret* material.
- *Perimeter Protection* — The use of a single policy enforcement point at domain interconnects supplies a crunchy exterior to the creamy interior data filling.

## What's Wrong with Current Solutions?

- *Centralized Policy* — A centralized policy enforcement system simplifies infrastructural attacks. Adversaries know exactly where to focus efforts to compromise policy enforcement, lowering overall system trustworthiness and reliability.
- *Physical to Compartment Mapping* — The traditional model for multi-level security, enforced in this scheme, is that the network is classified at the level of the most sensitive data that transits it. Ergo, those that have clearances at a level to view sensitive data are unable to view that data generally without extensive swivel-chair integration.
- *Perimeter Protection* — Perimeter protection is a necessary but not sufficient security approach. By itself, it doesn't work [8].

## Characteristics of Future Solutions

- *Decentralized Policy* — Policy management is decentralized and integrated within the fabric of the system. The system is both more secure and resilient as a result, better able to control information and operate under stressful conditions.
- *Infrastructure Reuse* — Multi-tenancy can lower costs and increase reliability and is furthermore a common attribute of cloud systems. An appropriately secured system facilitates integration of computing resources into multi-tenant environments.

## Characteristics of Future Solutions

- *Cloud Integration* — The ability to handle multi-tenant environments and to reliably secure both data at rest and data in motion leads to computational environments deployable in cloud systems.
- *Security in Depth* — Systems must operate under *all* conditions, including when they are under attack or compromise [8]. Ergo, they must provide protection to sensitive data in depth.

## Related Work

TBD



# System Architecture

What would this kind of overlay system look like?

- *Meta-Model*
- *Non-Hierarchical Overlays*
- *Hierarchical Overlays*
- *Ontologies and Taxonomies*

# System Architecture - Level 0

Level 0 system

Current generation solutions  
Perimeter Security  
Physical Networks Only  
Centralized Policies

# System Architecture - Level 1

Level 1 system

Decentralized Policy  
Management

# System Architecture - Level 2

Level 2 system

Integrated Policy Awareness

## System Architecture - Level 3

Level 3 system

Fully Integrated Policy Aware  
Decentralized System

# Conclusions

## Contribution of Work

The unique contribution of this work is a quantitative analysis of policy-centric overlay network options, associated taxonomies of use, and prototypical technology prototypes.

- *Overlay Options* — This includes various types of overlay networks and associated strengths and weaknesses addressing centralized and decentralized models
- *Taxonomies of Use* — Depending on the specific usage management requirements and context, different overlays have different applicability; this work will provide guidance on suitability
- *Prototypical Technologies* — Examples and proofs-of-concept will be required to appropriately analyze various architectural alternatives

**Questions?**

- [1] DoD Information Sharing Strategy.  
<http://cio-nii.defense.gov/docs/InfoSharingStrategy.pdf>, May 2007.
- [2] Assured Information Sharing in Clouds.  
<http://www.zyn.com/sbir/sbres/sttr/dod/af/af11-bt30.htm>, August 2011.
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<http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/cloud-saas/229401646>, April 2011.
- [4] Booz, Allen, and Hamilton. Distributed service oriented architecture (soa) compatible cross domain service (dscds). Presented at the Unified Cross Domain Management Office Conference, 2009.
- [5] NSA. Distributed service oriented architecture (soa)-compatible cross domain service (dscds) dscds overview. Presented at the Unified Cross Domain Management Office Conference, 2009.
- [6] J. Ostermann. Raytheon dscds intro. Presented at the Unified