We thank the reviewers for their extensive and helpful comments. We are sympathetic to these comments and understand the perspective from which they were made. However, we also think that many of these comments do not address the major contributions of our paper, which we attempted to explicitly state at the outset:

"..our primary objective is to describe the hypothesized biologically-based mechanism for predictive error-driven learning, contrast it with other existing proposals regarding the functions of this thalamocortical circuitry and other ways that the brain might support predictive learning, and evaluate it relative to a wide range of existing anatomical and electrophysiological data. We provide a number of specific empirical predictions that follow from this functional view of the thalamocortical circuit, which could potentially be tested by current neuroscientific methods. Thus, this work proposes a clear functional interpretation of this distinctive thalamocortical circuitry that contrasts with existing ideas in testable ways.

A second major objective is to implement this predictive error-driven learning mechanism in a large-scale computational model that faithfully captures its essential biological features, to test whether the proposed learning mechanism can drive the formation of cognitively-useful representations....

It is important to emphasize that our objectives in this work are \emph{not} to produce a better machine-learning (ML) algorithm \emph{per se}, but rather to test the computational properties of our biologically-based, scientific theory for how the mammalian brain might learn. **Thus, we explicitly dissuade readers from the inevitable desire to evaluate the importance of our model based on differences in narrow, performance-based ML metrics: it should instead be evaluated on its ability to explain a wide range of data across multiple levels of analysis, just as every other scientific theory is evaluated**."

Despite this explicit attempt to emphasize the theoretical contributions of the work, and dissuade a ML-focused evaluation, the reviewers described the theory as "literature review", with no specific comments about the detailed ideas, data, proposed experimental tests, and important contrasts with existing frameworks contained therein. Furthermore, many of the comments were consistent with the standard ML approach, concerned with performance on different standard benchmark tasks, etc.

Our intention in submitting this paper to eLife, and not a ML-focused journal, was specifically to engage with a readership that we thought would care primarily about how the brain works, and would thus take seriously our very detailed, novel proposal for how the brain might perform this powerful form of learning. This theory is the primary contribution of the work, and in this context, the computational model serves as a demonstration of how it works, and a proof-of-concept that it works at a computational level. Furthermore, it addresses a critical question which we have not seen so directly addressed in other predictive-learning models (the ability to develop abstract representations that go beyond the surface similarity structure).

Is it reasonable to require that our neuroscience-based model also perform on par with state-of-the-art ML techniques on a range of current large-scale benchmark tasks? We argue that this work makes a strong contribution to science, even if it does not meet this engineering-based criterion.

A number of the comments are requests for further details (despite the simultaneous request for significant shortening), which we had originally referred off to other sources. We would be happy to include as much detail as we are allowed to fit, under suitable guidance from the Editor regarding these issues. There is an extensive published literature on the foundations upon which this model builds, including a freely-available online textbook, which goes into full detail. The earlier version of this textbook has nearly 1,500 citations on google scholar, and recent work on the biological basis of error-backpropagation discusses these ideas at length (e.g., Lillicrap et al, 2020; Wittington & Bogacz, 2019). While we recognize that it is unfortunate to refer readers to other work, it is also an inevitable consequence of a long process of cumulative science attempting to understand the complexities of learning in the brain.

In any case, we hope we can figure out the most critical missing points that, when specified, will provide the most leverage in understanding how the model works. It is always difficult to overcome our own familiarity with the models, so we must rely on the reviewers for these insights, and the existing comments provide some guidance, but we would always appreciate more specific pointers to where the gaps are.

Within the context of these general reactions, our more detailed reactions to the reviewer’s comments are below. We would be happy to revise the paper to address the issues raised, along the lines of the points made below.

### Reviewer 1:

My biggest concern with this work is that it was very difficult to evaluate. The introduction is written like a review paper rather than a research manuscript. Also, the introduction is fully focused on reviewing different aspects of pulvinar biology (which is great), but then the result section seems to be quite disconnected with no clear focus on how the pulvinar is wired up to the cortical model and how exactly the weights or selectivity of its connections change with learning.

We are unsure how else to advance a novel biological theory, without a sufficient discussion of the relevant data. This is not a “review” in the sense that it is all focused around evaluating the central theoretical claims, rather than just reviewing data for its own sake.

Figures 1, 2 & 3 and associated text represent our best attempt to show how the pulvinar interacts with the cortex to produce a prediction error as a temporal difference signal. Figure 3 and especially Figure 13 in the supplement provide the detailed connectivity of the pulvinar with the cortex, and discuss the principles behind this connectivity at a biological and computational level. Thus, we would greatly appreciate more specific guidance about exactly where the gaps are in this existing presentation, so that we may better fill them.

In general, I'm not seeing how the introduction and the three elements above play out in the results. I think I was initially quite excited about the premise of the paper, but could not find enough data within the manuscript to support the ideas laid out in the introduction. Also, as a general comment, I found the figures difficult to follow; they could be made more informative.

Again, more specific comments would really help here -- we tried our best but obviously failed!

Specific comments:

1. There has been a surge of "biologically plausible approximations of backpropagation" recently and several of them show that the learned representations match performance (ML/neuro) of standard backprop. But often these algorithms tend to not scale and break down e.g. at the scale of ImageNet. You could argue that we care about the brain and not ImageNet, but I always found that ML benchmark to be a good judge of how well something can scale up to a challenging task.

Indeed we would like to argue that we care about the brain and not ImageNet :) In particular, almost all of the principles that underlie current DCNN models were invented back in the 1980’s and 90’s, and the main difference now is largely due to advances in “engineering” that has enabled very large, deep models to run fast on massive datasets (GPU’s and the like). Thus, from a purely scientific perspective, the ImageNet results have not necessarily changed our understanding of the essential nature of learning in the brain.

Furthermore, there are significant tradeoffs between including more biologically-based properties vs. pure computational speed. For example, we show that our models learn abstract representations in ways that other DCNN-based models do not, and that this may depend on the presence of full simultaneous bidirectional activation flow, which allows top-down influences to shape the overall attractor dynamics of the network. The dynamic nature of this network, which captures both the bidirectional connectivity and widely-demonstrated top-down influences in the brain, means that it takes well over 100 times longer to train than a corresponding feedforward DCNN. Just the bidirectional connectivity alone imposes a huge factor of 2 in memory and processing for all the connections -- this is actually much larger in practice because we find that shortcut connections in both directions are useful, as also widely found in the brain. Our models take over a day to run across 32 CPUs on our compute cluster, and they are already pushing the maximum memory throughput bottlenecks, so scaling them up significantly is currently not feasible. They also do not work well on GPUs at this point due to critical optimizations for sparse activity -- this is an ongoing area of work in the lab.

2. The RDM category similarity used in figs 4 and 5 are noisy and easy to score well on. The authors really need to use neural predictivity and similarity similar to that used by labs like Jim DiCarlo's (e.g. Brainscore). I suspect that they can't do this now is because their model gets video input, not static image input, and monkey physiologists haven't curated large-scale video response datasets. However, without gaining access to such datasets, it is almost impossible to validate their model.

Yes our model does require video input. We provided extensive analysis showing that our model learned qualitatively different types of representations than those in the comparison BP models, using multiple different measures, some of which are easier to see and understand, and some of which eliminate any subjective factors. Compare Figure 6 with Figure 7c -- these are computed on the raw similarity matrices directly (no subjective factors at all), and clearly show that the IT layers in our model developed abstract representations in a way that the BP models did not. See also Reviewer 3’s comments recognizing the importance of this analysis, and our further responses to their comments below regarding these issues.

3. Violation of expectations. If their model is good, it should be able to reproduce violation of expectations results from psychology. There are lots of open-source datasets and benchmarks for that (from both machine learning people and cognitive scientists).

Indeed, and there are lots of other such data that could be accounted for by our model. We included Figure 9 because it was the most iconic, important predictive learning result that connects directly to the neural areas simulated in the model. As might be expected, we are planning many other applications of the model to explain many other findings, including behavioral experiments that we have designed to specifically test this model -- these experiments include violation of expectations conditions, and our model certainly predicts such effects, as predicted...

4. The authors need to run the model on more than one dataset. They only ran the model on one dataset --- a dataset of rotating 3D objects from their lab (that almost nobody else in the literature uses). Thus I'm worried that their model is overfit to that dataset. They could easily run it on more standard video datasets, and I have no idea why they don't. Running on other datasets is a way to cross-validate the model architecture, which is essential to show that the model is robust, particularly for a complicated model like this one with so many hand-crafted hyperparameters.

We have run the model on numerous other datasets, including a project applying the model to prediction in speech, which is nearly ready for writing up. Standard video datasets do not typically contain a suitably sampled set of object shapes that would enable answering the central question regarding the process of developing abstract invariant shape representations across the hierarchy in the model. The ones we are familiar with focus on driving and rotating faces. If the reviewer knows of an appropriate data set, we would be glad to hear of it, and will plan to apply our model to such a dataset in the future. Please see under Reviewer 3 comments the discussion of overfitting and dataset size, and also the critical role of attention in relation to cluttered visual scenes.

Reviewer #2:

The authors propose a computational theory that pulvinar is central to predictive error-driven learning (learning by comparing predictions with outcomes) of sensory representation. In the authors' model, pulvinar integrates both top-down future predictions from cortical L6 neurons, and actual sensory outcome from L5 bursting neurons. The authors showed that a computational model of the visual cortex trained with predictive learning shows more object-selective representation in higher layers compared to lower layers, unlike structurally-analogous models trained with back-propagation. The authors study the important question of the neural mechanism of representation learning in sensory cortices, and propose a novel theory based on the combination of predictive learning and higher-order thalamus. However, I cannot support publication of the manuscript in its current form due to the following major concerns (especially the first two).

Major:

(1) This study lacks critical details for understanding the inner working of the model.

The authors go through great length of motivate and explain their model conceptually. However, very little quantitative details are provided to aid the readers' understanding and reproducing of results. The following are several indications for this lack of details.

The authors acknowledged that their model is very complex ("the only way to really understand the model is to explore the model itself"). They pointed the readers to a github repo (p. 28) for more insights, however, the linked repo doesn't exist (publicly). This alone would be OK if the authors plan to open-source the code after publication and sufficient details are provided to reproduce the core phenomena without the authors' code.

We already did make the github repo publically available. All the details are there, across two different simulation frameworks, the newer of which is quite a bit more transparent than the original C++ version, and should provide a very clear and explicit basis for understanding precisely how to reproduce the model.

There appears to be no mathematical description of the core predictive learning algorithm. Only 6 equations exist throughout the paper, Eq. 1 data analysis (clustering), Eqs. 3-6 are for the PredNet model from Lotter et al. 2016. And Eq. 2 provides very little information about the predictive learning algorithm. So I couldn't find out how the core predictive learning algorithm proposed by this paper is implemented. This is in contrast with common computational papers that clearly define the model used in the Methods section.

We regret not including more such equations. The referenced website: <https://github.com/emer/leabra> contains every equation used in the model, with reasonably extensive explanation. Furthermore, there is a full online textbook <https://github.com/CompCogNeuro/ed4> explaining all of these equations in detail as well. However, we can revise the paper to include a more explicit description of how the equations are implemented in the context of this model. It is all very generic, however, with the same equations used throughout, but perhaps illustrating how it works in more concrete terms would facilitate understanding.

As noted in our overall comments, we would greatly appreciate pointers to specific gaps that would particularly improve understanding of the model.

(2) The model is overly complicated, obscuring the key point being made by the authors.

The authors propose a specific role for pulvinar, yet the model contains a great amount of details that may not be important for demonstrating the role of pulvinar. For example, the model contains a saccade component, is it really necessary? It certainly makes the model more powerful, but it may make it harder for the readers to understand the model. Similarly, could the authors have shown the same results without the where pathway, when there is no saccade and the object remains centered (two reasons cited for the necessity of the model where pathway, p.21)?

Every detail of the model is there because either it makes a measurable impact on the way the model learns, or it is consistent with well-established biological data (and reassuringly often, both). The appendix provides some extensive figures and documentation explaining how the model connectivity aligns with this biological data. We also provided a tiny sample of the many, many such tests we have run with the model to validate the importance of its properties, in Figure 8. This figure specifically shows the significant effects of lesioning the where pathway.

If no saccades are included, then we cannot address the predictive remapping effects (Figure 9), and we also think this role of predicting the effects of motor actions is an essential part of the predictive learning story in the brain. So, yes, we could probably make a simpler model that didn’t have that component, but it does significantly contribute to the difficulty of the prediction task, in ways that we think capture how it works in the brain. So, in our judgment, this was important enough to merit the extra complexity in the model.

If there are no saccades and the object doesn’t move, then almost certainly the prediction task will become too easy (“degenerate”) and it just won’t learn much at all because it will very quickly achieve high levels of accuracy. The more difficult the prediction task, the more prediction errors, and the more the model can learn.

If there are a small number of additional tests that would significantly improve understanding of the model, we would be happy to include them. Obviously, there is a limit, and the ones we chose for Figure 8 seemed like the most important cases to us.

I believe the manuscript could be much more approachable to a broad readership if the authors to explain their key model mechanism in a simpler model setup, preferably not relying on models that are only understandable when reading through the code.

We attempted to provide such an understanding through Figures 1 & 2. We could provide an implementation of something like those figures for people to play around with, but it isn’t clear that having such a model would change the paper itself, as the model would essentially be identical to what is shown in those figures. We definitely have a number of simpler models, applied to a range of predictive learning tasks, including for example the classic probabilistic sequence learning tasks used in psychology experiments (finite state automata grammars) <https://github.com/emer/leabra/tree/master/examples/deep_fsa> We have also applied the model to language prediction in the Sentence Gestalt model our textbook: <https://github.com/CompCogNeuro/sims/tree/master/ch9/sg> In effect, computationally, as we explain in the appendix, the model is similar to the classic SRN models from Elman et al -- anything that has been published with such models should be replicable in this framework.

(3) The manuscript is too long, with extensive discussion and literature review that are more appropriate for a review/opinion piece instead of a research article.

The paper is very long (~12,000 words, compared to ~5,000 words expected in regular eLife research articles), perhaps substantially longer than average eLife papers. This is not a major issue because the authors can trim it.

The main issue is that the authors spend too much space proposing the pulvinar as suitable for predictive coding (page 5-16), substantially delaying the introduction of the actual model (actual results start from page 16). This structural issue makes it difficult to evaluate this manuscript as a research article because a substantial proportion is literature review and synthesis in nature (there is nothing wrong with thorough literature review, simply less appropriate for a research article).

Per our initial comments, we believe that this reflects a misunderstanding about the major goals of the paper. It is not literature review: it is explaining how the novel theory accounts for critical existing data. If there are specific aspects of this data that are deemed superfluous, we could perhaps shorten or eliminate that, although we would strongly prefer doing so under the guidance of someone who actually is involved directly in the kind of data we’re discussing.

Reviewer #3:

(Please also see attached PDF)

Summary: This work proposes to use the temporal difference between the neuronal predictions for the next stimuli and the subsequent inputs from earlier layers in the pulvinar as error signals to drive the learning of the other visual cortical areas. The authors implement this learning mechanism in a large-scale model of the visual system and show that the simulated inferotemporal (IT) pathway develops abstract representations of inputs. It is further claimed that the learned IT pathway categorizes and groups 3D objects according to their shapes and the resulting grouping matches human judgements. Moreover, the authors also show that this biologically plausible framework surpasses alternatives in how abstract the learned IT pathway is.

Overall Reaction: The problem addressed in this work is undoubtedly important for the community: how the visual system develops its strong representations without supervision. I also appreciate the authors' efforts in building a large-scale model and in formulating a predictive-error-driven learning mechanism together to simulate the learning of the visual cortex. Furthermore, both the model and the learning mechanism are biologically plausible and integrate many neuroscience experimental findings, making it easier to imagine how the proposed model can be instantiated by real organisms. The authors also claim that the learned representations in the simulated IT pathway are similarly abstract and category-selective as human judgements. According to the comparisons shown in the paper, the proposed model also surpasses alternatives including PredNet and a backpropagation model with the same architecture and error signal.

We appreciate this summary statement, which we think captures the contributions of the paper well.

Nevertheless, I'm concerned that the paper doesn't really support its claims in a strong way. My concerns are a set of issues that are pretty serious in my view, half-way between mere technical cavils and high-level conceptual gaps, so I think are quite important to address before publication.

Specific comments:

1. In this article, the authors claim that the proposed model develops abstract representations and surpasses alternatives. However, these claims are seriously undermined by the fact that both the model and the alternatives are trained and tested on the same small dataset. This fact hurts the support for the claims in at least two ways. First, as the proposed model (WWI) is trained on the same set of objects that are used to measure the Representational Dissimilarity Matrixes (RDMs) that are later compared to human subject judgements and other models, it is highly likely that observed category-selective representations are a result of overfitting on this dataset and cannot generalize to other categories. Secondly, both the PredNet and the backpropagation models are only trained on the small dataset and in fact evaluated on the same training dataset. Although it is shown in the paper that both models reasonably fit to the training videos, they may very well overfit to the training set and yield trivial solutions that do not generalize to held-out categories. The authors may argue that the fact that these alternatives easily overfit while the WWI model can yield non-trivial solutions also supports the superiority of the proposed algorithm. However, it is unclear whether this overfitting can be avoided through properly tuning the hyperparameters or the training curriculum, as even the hyperparameter search conducted for the alternatives is done on the same dataset. Therefore, it will be good to see the evaluations of these models and the comparisons on them to human judgements done on a dataset with different categories or at least with different configurations (object orientations, size, rotation speed, etc).

Although the general concern for overfitting is understandable, we are not sure that it applies in this case, at least not in the standard kinds of ways. Unlike most models, this one is not trained explicitly on a small fixed set of object category labels. The only inputs are bitmap images. Furthermore, each of these images is unique, across the 512,000 images that the model receives. There is extensive, completely randomly sampled variability (using uniformly distributed floating point numbers) in trajectory, 3D rotation, saccades, across all of the images, which are also sampling randomly across 156 different 3D objects. Thus, it is actually quite a large dataset from this perspective (e.g., it is massive in terms of underlying systematic dimensions of variation, and dimensionality of inputs, compared to the MNIST digit recognition dataset, which is still widely used in current biologically-based learning papers). And again, unlike MNIST and ImageNet, etc, there is no low-dimensional supervised training signal that the model could seize upon to overfit to.

We did also reserve 40 objects for an untrained test set, and did establish that the prediction accuracy and categorization results were similar in those items -- this data can be included. It was omitted due to main focus on RSA results, and because of the above considerations, but we can include it in the supplement and mention it in the main paper for those who might have similar concerns.

Furthermore, it should be noted that this model was initially developed using an entirely different dataset, with objects rendered as arbitrary combinations from a feature vocabulary, which enabled us to look specifically at held-out such combinations during testing. The details of this dataset and results can be found in an earlier preprint: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.04654> The reviewer’s reaction to this paper was that our dataset was too artificial: we needed to run on “real” bitmap images with realistic objects, which we have now done. In our tests, the same model features that were important on one dataset were also important on the other. We can include mention of these results to hopefully address this concern.

2. Another concern I have is that although the WWI model has a hierarchical architecture that mimics the visual cortex, including V1, V2, V3, V4, and IT cortical areas, the learned representations seem to only have two levels of representations: V1-like layers and IT layers. This is especially contradicting the authors' claim that the WWI model develops progressive representations that are similar to the progression from V4 to IT in macaque monkey visual cortex, which is shown in Figure 5. In fact, the very figure that follows Figure 5 shows that all the layers that are lower than IT layers are almost identical to V1. It is difficult to imagine how a model with only two effective levels of representations can yield representations in its higher layers that are claimed to be similar to the IT area, whose functions are supported by the cascades of a series of cortical areas. The fact that the WWI model only has two levels of representations further strengthens the worry that the similarity between the model's representations and human judgements may only be a result on this particular set of objects that the model is trained on and cannot generalize to other stimuli. I believe it is critical for the authors to clearly explain this inconsistency between the WWI model and the visual cortex.

This is a consequence of aggregating across the different views of each object exemplar, which obscures important differences in lower levels of the network. These layers have much more dynamically varying representations across the course of the trajectories, as a function of spatial differences, but because we’re not factorizing the data in that way, this variation is all lost, and the layers appear similar to V1 in this aggregate measure. If we focused specifically on this spatial variability / invariance component of the representations, then we know that there would be significant differences progressively up the hierarchy. We have this data and can plot it to show that, along these other dimensions of interest, the representations are not identical, and that significant work is progressively being done in producing more and more invariant representations going up the hierarchy.

This overall pattern is consistent with what is known about the primate visual system, where higher-order categorical structure emerges only at higher layers (including up into PFC), while lower layers have much more variable representations, and are building up spatial invariance more with respect to features, rather than developing object category structure. We focused exclusively on the category structure given the focus on what was learned in IT, and the key issue of abstraction.

3. I am also concerned by the way the authors compare different models or compare the WWI model to the human judgements. In my view, the authors compare the representation in two ways: one way is through plotting the models' RDMs and eyeballing them to tell which one is closer to the target (Figure 4 and Figure 5) or which one is more "reasonable" (Figure 7); the other way is to first get clusters of categories through iteratively adjusting the cluster assignments according to the category similarities measured by the models and then compare different cluster assignments generated by models to see which one is better aligned with that from humans. Both ways are qualitative or even subjective. Having qualitative comparisons can help readers develop intuitively understanding. However, it also leaves space for readers to interpret the results themselves and can weaken the supports for the claims. For example, Figure 7 attempts to compare the backpropagation models (BP), PredNet, and WWI. According to the plotted RDMs, I am somewhat convinced that BP is weaker than WWI, as the RDM in Fig 7.a only roughly gives two big categories and is therefore less category-selective. This impression is strengthened by the correlation result shown in Fig 7.c, which shows that even the IT layers in BP are similar to V1. The comparison between PredNet and WWI is, nevertheless, less convincing to me. The authors claim that the RDM in Fig 7.b is "less cleanly similar within categories" and "overall follows a broad category structure similar to V1". But I find that the two RDMs in Fig 7.b and Fig 7.f (the RDM of WWI model in category orders of V1 clustering) share some similarities, such as messy diagonals and boundaries (see Fig. 1 of this review in PDF, boxes of corresponding colors). It is possible that PredNet also generates abstract representations, which can be better shown with a different category order. If the authors can show correlation analysis between V1 and all the layers in PredNet, it will then provide a quantitative measure about the quality of the representations. In fact, if the authors can conduct similar correlation analysis between similarity structure of human subjects and that of models for all models, it will also make the comparisons between different models more convincing.

The Prednet equivalent for figure 7c, which is computed on raw exemplar-level similarity matrices and has no subjective element at all, looks very similar to that of Bp, except it doesn’t have the same set of biologically-based layer names -- just level numbers. There is no level in PredNet that differentiates significantly from its V1 structure -- we can include that figure. We agree that this raw similarity comparison is important for avoiding any subjective judgments, and all the critical results are substantiated by these analyses, so we feel confident that they are not due to any subjective judgments. We also appreciate the acknowledgement that the categorized figures are much more intuitively understandable, and when we present these results in talks, it is much more difficult to convey the meaning of plots like 7c compared to the others.

Also, in comparing 7b and 7f, it is critical to note the locations of the white category boundary lines (admittedly these are too faint, and the labels are too small -- we will fix this), which are in very different places in the two (and the items are different, etc). The similarity structure in 7f is really not aligned at all with those category boundaries, in contrast to 7b.

4. I also think the claim in the abstract that "These categories ... are consistent with neural representations in IT cortex in primates.", one of the central claims in this paper, is not supported at all by the presented evidence. The major evidence for this claim is Figure 5 in the paper, which qualitatively compares the RDMs of the WWI model at V4 and IT layers to the RDMs of primate V4 and IT areas. However, the stimuli used to compute the RDMs of the WWI model are totally different from those used for the RDMs of primate V4 and IT areas, which makes this comparison not scientifically meaningful. It is not only that the categories of the stimuli are drastically different, but also that the complexity of the stimuli presented to primates is much bigger than that of the stimuli shown to the WWI model. More specifically, the categories of the primate stimuli are seven finegrained categories like animals, cars, and chairs. But the categories of the WWI model stimuli are five meta-categories, each of which includes several different objects that can be very different from each other. Although the authors put their categories into a specific order so that the RDMs of the WWI model are visually similar to the primate RDMs, this comparison is not meaningful at the beginning. In fact, even just the fact that primate V4 and IT neurons successfully distinguish these fine-grained categories while the WWI model similarly responds to the categories in the meta-categories is already clearly saying that the two representations are totally different. Moreover, the stimuli presented to primates are generated by combining irrelevant and naturalistic backgrounds and 3D objects with greatly varied orientations, scales, and positions, while the model stimuli are simply the 3D objects without any backgrounds and it is unclear how big the variations of the orientations, scales, and positions of the authors are. With such high-variation stimuli, the neuronal responses of primates are still category-selective. In contrast to this, the WWI model groups many categories into meta-categories even with such low-variation stimuli. The authors may argue that it is the progression from V4 to IT that they want to show in this figure. However, as I have mentioned in previous points, the WWI model only has two levels of representations: V1-like layers and IT layers. This figure is just showing that the WWI-IT representation is slightly more category selective than the WWI-V1 representation, but the category-selective property of the WWI-IT representation is significantly worse than that of primate IT or even V4 representations, due to the reasons described above in this point. In summary, I believe the authors need to either totally remove their point about the similarity between the model and the primate responses as well as the misleading Figure 5, or present much stronger evidence supporting this point than Figure 5.

We acknowledged in the paper that the data could only be compared at a very qualitative level, and there are many, many differences in the learning life of a primate compared to our model, that would shape these kinds of representations. Nevertheless, we do think that the qualitative similarity of the differences from V4 to IT is relevant, and as noted above it is not the case that there are only 2 different kinds of reps in the model. Furthermore, as mentioned above, there really is a very high level of variation in the inputs -- we can include more sample images to demonstrate this. In any case, it is essentially impossible for a fully self-organizing vision-only model to replicate in any meaningful way the rich multi-modal lives of monkeys, and if the reviewer insists that this invalidates the ability to make qualitative comparisons, then we can remove the figure.

We nevertheless think that the qualitative nature of the differences between V4 and IT in the two cases are readily apparent visually in the figure, and provide additional insight into the model relative to the extant data on these brain areas. Furthermore, as noted below (and in the paper), the existing models applied to this data can be questioned on the basis of their reliance on human labeled data -- how much of their fit depends on the implicit knowledge conveyed in these labels, which we are not relying upon at all in our model? Is there any other model that shows the emergence of category structure like this without depending on explicit category inputs? Including this data provides an important occasion to discuss these issues.

5. As the authors are attempting to model how real organisms develop their visual system from real world stimuli, I believe it is critical to show the algorithm's ability in learning from much more general inputs in addition to the currently used toy-like datasets. The dataset used in this paper is different from real world stimuli in many ways like they do not have backgrounds, each of the video only has one object, and the transformations of the objects are very simple and consistent across different frames. The authors should test their algorithm on more realistic datasets such as SAYCam [1], a dataset collected by head-cameras mounted on infants during their development. If the model can be trained on that dataset, it will be important to analyze the learned representations. Otherwise, the authors need to provided explanations about why it cannot leverage real world stimuli, which are actually used by infants to develop their visual system.

Currently, the model does not have a functioning attentional system. In real brains, visual attention mechanisms, dependent in part on the parietal lobe spatial representations, are essential for processing cluttered visual scenes. For example, people with parietal damage suffer from significant impairments in processing cluttered visual displays (balint’s syndrome, simultagnosia, etc). Thus, until we incorporate such mechanisms, we do not think it would be reasonable to test our model on cluttered scenes.

Indeed, the fact that existing DCNN models succeed in processing cluttered visual images without such attentional mechanisms could be considered grounds for invalidating these models as accurate models of the primate visual system. Furthermore, the way in which they achieve this feat involves an extreme sensitivity to texture-level information, not shape information, and this texture-based solution is a critical reason why they are so susceptible to “adversarial images” that our visual systems have absolutely no difficulties with. Thus, this example demonstrates the limitations of a purely engineering-focused, ML-style approach for understanding at a scientific level the way in which vision works in the primate brain. Although one might argue that these models have been validated through tests like Brainscore, that does not address these points. The highest correlations of these models with brain data is only around .5, and it is likely that a significant amount of this is driven by the fact that they are explicitly trained on human-generated category labels.

The discussion section includes mention of the synergistic role of predictive learning and attention, and we have several promising results along these lines. However, a sufficient treatment of these issues requires at least one (and likely several) full papers on its own, which we are excited to embark upon. Thus, there is no way that we could include such results in this paper, where one of the primary complaints has been that the model is already too complex.

6. This work also needs more ablation studies and controls to support its claims. One control I think is important is to have an untrained model with the same architecture to show the effects of learning. For now, it is unclear how much the developed representations are a result of the proposed learning mechanism alone or a joint result of both the learning mechanism and the architecture. The architecture includes a complicated connection map across different layers. Although these connections may have some neuroscience experimental results as supports, systematic ablation studies showing the influence of different connections can still help readers better understand the architecture and the proposed learning algorithm.

That is a great idea to run an untrained model -- we will do so. As noted above, we have run extensive ablation studies, and included one of the where pathway in figure 8. Also, it is important to note that the BP model has exactly the same architecture, so clearly the architecture alone is not sufficient. If there are other specific ablation studies of particular interest, we can add them to Figure 8 or the appendix as space allows.

7. Finally, I think the authors need to provide more explanations about how the learning works, even just explanations that give the readers some intuitions about how the algorithm works. For example, after reading the whole paper and some external links provided by the authors about the codes and the Leabra framework, I still find it hard to imagine how the temporal difference signal is used in the model. This temporal difference signal is the prediction signal between the actual outcomes and predicted outcomes and is hypothesized to be the only supervision signal used to learn the weights. It is therefore critical to understand how it is actually used in the model. In my understanding, the general weight updates in the model are done by the STDP-like learning rule described in <https://github.com/emer/leabra>, however, neither the paper nor the link explains how the temporal difference is integrated in this learning rule. Although the authors provide the source codes for the model (<https://github.com/ccnlab/deep-obj-cat/tree/master/sims/cemer>), I find it impossible to look into the codes, as they are mega-bytes files in specific formats without any explanations about how they can be read.

As described above, we can provide a figure that more concretely demonstrates how the learning works, with equations etc. The learning is literally a difference between the prediction and outcome, and in its simplest form is just:

dWt = x+y+ - x-y-

Where the + is the outcome state of activity and - is the prediction, and x is sender and y is receiver -- this is the contrastive hebbian learning rule (CHL), used in many computational models, and derived from backprop in O’Reilly (1996). The more recent STDP-based version is a bit more complex and explicitly shown in the first web link, but if the reviewer is really interested in how it works, chapter 4 of the online textbook <https://github.com/CompCogNeuro/ed4> provides an extensive description of everything, which, because these ideas have been developed over many years, and incorporate a lot of biological detail themselves, are not easy to describe in short form.

Also, the github repository will contain a new version of this model, implemented in our new simulation framework, which provides a much more transparent picture of exactly what goes into constructing and running the model. It is just one source code file. As noted above, other such models also exist in our online textbook -- we will include links to those as well.