



# The stability, structure, and predictability of great ape cognition



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## Background



Theories in psychology, anthropology and evolutionary biology use great ape cognition as a reference point to specify the evolutionary dynamics that give rise to complex cognitive abilities as well as to define the nature of human cognition. This approach requires a comprehensive way of describing great ape cognition in order to determine how it differs from that of other primates – including humans. A robust understanding of great ape cognitive abilities requires that a) group-level results are stable, b) individual differences are measured reliably, and c) cognitive performance is predictable. Even though implicitly assumed, these prerequisites are rarely tested empirically. Here we address this shortcoming.





**Participants**  
Apes were tested every 2 weeks across 1.5 years. Data collection was split in two phases - Phase 2 served to replicate the results of Phase 1.

**Setup and Design**  
Apes were repeatedly tested in 5 tasks spanning across cognitive domains (social cognition, causal reasoning, numerical cognition, executive functions).

## Stability



## Structure



## Predictability

