

Tagalog *pala*: an unsurprising case of mirativity

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Similar to many descriptions of miratives cross-linguistically, Schachter & Otnes (1972)’s classic descriptive grammar of Tagalog describes the second position particle *pala* as “expressing mild surprise at new information, or an unexpected event or situation.” Drawing on recent work on mirativity in other languages, however, we show that this characterization needs to be refined in two ways. First, we show that while *pala* can be used in cases of surprise, *pala* itself merely encodes the speaker’s sudden revelation with the counterexpectational nature of surprise arising pragmatically or from other aspects of the sentence such as other particles and focus. Second, we present data from imperatives and interrogatives, arguing that this revelation need not concern ‘information’ per se, but rather the illocutionary update the sentence encodes. Finally, we explore the interactions between *pala* and other elements which express mirativity in some way and/or interact with the mirativity *pala* expresses.

1. Introduction

Like many languages of the Philippines, Tagalog has a prominent set of discourse particles which express a variety of different evidential, attitudinal, illocutionary, and discourse-related meanings. Morphosyntactically, these particles have long been known to be second-position clitics, with a number of authors having explored fine-grained details of their distribution, relative order, and the interaction of this with different types of sentences (e.g. Schachter & Otnes (1972), Billings & Konopasky (2003) Anderson (2005), Billings (2005) Kaufman (2010)). With a few recent exceptions, however, comparatively little has been said about the semantics/pragmatics of these different elements beyond Schachter & Otnes (1972)’s pioneering work (which is quite detailed given their broad scope of their work).

In this paper, we explore in detail the contribution of one second position particle, *pala*, as illustrated in (1). Schachter & Otnes (1972) – henceforth S&O – describe *pala* as being “used in expressing mild surprise at new information, or an unexpected event or situation, ... or in expressing an afterthought”. While the category of mirativity as such did not exist at the time and *pala* has not been discussed in literature on miratives, even this brief description makes clear that *pala* is a mirative morpheme.

- (1) *Ikaw pala ang kapatid ni Pedro.*
you MIR DIR sibling INDIR Pedro
‘So you’re Pedro’s sister.’ (Schachter & Otnes 1972:p. 462)

Since first entering broad currency as a category in DeLancey (1997), literature on mirativity has considered a number of different conceptions of mirativity. Aikhenvald (2012) summarizes by listing the following conceptions of mirativity: (i) ‘new information’, (ii) ‘sudden discovery, revelation or realisation’, (iii) ‘surprise’, (iv) ‘counterexpectation’ and (v) ‘unprepared mind’. While often regarded as theories or analyses of the concept of mirativity, recent works such as Salanova & Carol (2016) AnderBois (2016a, 2018) instead take the difference between these to be an empirical matter with individual mirative morphemes expressing one or another of these related, but distinct, meanings. Since S&O’s above description makes reference to several of these notions, the question we ask here is what the relationship is between *pala* and these various notions?

Here, we break this question down into two subparts: **Q1:** Which of these various meanings does *pala* conventionally encode? **Q2:** How do the more specific uses of *pala* (e.g. as identified

by S&O) arise from the co-occurrence of *pala* with other discourse particles, focus, and context? Looking ahead, we make the following claims:

A1: Similar to AnderBois (2016a, 2018)’s account of Yucatec Maya *bakáan*, I argue that *pala* semantically encodes a ‘sudden revelation’ about the illocutionary update being performed. New or surprising information is a likely source of such a revelation, but these more specific meanings are not a necessary feature for the felicitous use of *pala*.

A2: In addition to *pala*, Tagalog has a number of other elements which play key roles in the expression of the various kinds of mirativity, often in combination with *pala*. Some of these, such as the sentence-final particle *a* in (2) are also miratives, conventionally encoding a mirative meaning of some sort. Others, such as the use of contrastive focus in (3) do not conventionally encode a mirative meaning per se, but can be used (together with *pala*) to express one under certain conditions. We term the latter MIRATIVITY STRATEGIES by analogy to Aikhenvald (2004)’s well-known distinction between evidentials proper and evidentiality strategies.¹ Finally, we find elements like the particle *nga* in (4) which do not themselves express mirativity in any of these senses, but which express other meanings which are only compatible with certain kinds of mirative uses, thereby indirectly constraining the kind of mirativity expressed.

- (2) *Ma-ganda pala ito, a!*
 ADJ-beauty MIR DEM PART
 ‘Oh, but this is pretty!’ (Schachter & Otones 1972:p. 462)
- (3) **Context:** Dogs are supposed to eat dog food, but you suddenly realized that your dog Ruffie is eating cake.
[Yung keyk]_{Foc} pala yung kinain ni Ruffie.
 DEM.LNK cake MIR DEM.LNK eat.AV.IPFV INDIR Ruffie
 ‘Oh, Ruffie is eating CAKE!’
- (4) **Context:** I knew that it was raining, but it slipped my mind. I suddenly remember and say:
Umuulan nga pala.
 rain.IPFV PART MIR
 ‘Oh yeah it’s raining (of course).’

The road map for the rest of the paper is as follows: §2 provides background on Tagalog; §3 discusses previous empirical and theoretical properties of miratives and mirativity strategies across languages; §4 examines declaratives with *pala* with an eye towards distinguishing distinct mirative notions; §5 extends the investigation to non-declarative types; §6 examines the interactions between *pala* and other aspects of Tagalog grammar; §7 presents preliminary data from a mirative in another language of the Philippines, Iloko *gayam*, showing that it behaves very similarly to *pala* in many respects; §8 concludes.

2. Background on Tagalog

Tagalog is an Austronesian language of the Philippines, spoken as a first language by tens of millions in the Philippines and diasporic communities around the world. It is also spoken by at

¹ Indeed, we believe one of the difficulties faced in much of the prior literature on mirativity is the lack of a clear distinction between miratives proper and mirativity strategies. For example, much of the mirativity literature has focused on mirative uses of indirect evidentials, which *prima facie* appear to be mirativity strategies rather than miratives proper (though see Rett & Murray (2013) *inter alia* for arguments to the contrary). We set aside this particular issue here, as there do not appear to be any indirect evidential or epistemic modals that play prominent roles in the expression of mirativity in Tagalog.

least as many people as a lingua franca in its standardized form known as Filipino.

Tagalog is a predicate-initial language with various types of non-verbal predicates possible with no copula. For verbal predicates, this most typically results in a VOS word order in basic clauses. However, as is common for languages of the Philippines, verbal predicates have a rich system of “voice” morphology which may produce different word orders such as VSO. Beyond word order, the voice system determines the morphological case which occurs with each of the various arguments. The proper analysis of this system has been a central focus in Philippine linguistics (see Chen (2017) for a recent survey of this literature). Since the details of how best to analyze this system are orthogonal to our present considerations, we will label these three cases, exemplified in (5) as follows: *ang* DIR(ECT), *ng* INDIR(ECT), and *sa* OBL(IQUE).

- (5) *Sumusulat ng liham sa titser ang estudyante*
 write.AV.IPFV INDIR letter OBL teacher DIR student

‘The student is writing a letter to the teacher.’

S&O, p. 73

While Tagalog patterns typologically as a predicate-initial language, it also has robust pre-verbal topic and focus positions characterized in detail by Kaufman (2005) (and explored more recently by Latrouite & Riester (2018)). First, there are topics *sa Bulakan* in (6a) which appear preverbally, are followed by *ay*, and do not act as host for pronominal clitics such as *kami*. Second, there are foci such as *sa Bulakan* in (6b) which appear preverbally (but following topics), have no specific morphological marking, and do act as hosts for pronominal clitics like *kami*.

- (6) a. **Context:** Responding to the question “What did you do in Bulacan?”

Sa Bulakan ay nagpiknik kami.

OBL Bulacan TOP picnic.AV.IPFV DIR.1PL.EXCL

‘In Bulacan, we picnicked.’

Kaufman (2005)

- b. **Context:** Responding to the question “Where did you picnic?”

Sa Bulakan kami nagpiknik.

OBL Bulacan DIR.1PL.EXCL picnic.AV.IPFV

‘It was in Bulacan that we picnicked.’

Kaufman (2005)

In addition to the aforementioned pronominal clitics, Tagalog also possesses a set of 18 second-position elements which S&O call “enclitic particles”. As S&O describe in detail, these elements have strict ordering restrictions with respect to one another as well as with respect to pronominal clitics. These restrictions are partially phonological (e.g. monosyllabic and disyllabic clitics pattern differently), but are not entirely determined by such factors. Beyond these phonological factors, there may well be syntactic or semantic principles such as scope which at least partially motivate the ordering of these clitics, but this remains unclear at this time.

3. Mirativity cross-linguistically

From the inception of ‘mirativity’ as a term in DeLancey (1997), the nature of mirativity and even its very existence have been hotly debated. While certain aspects of mirativity have been largely agreed upon, the essential question of what kind of mental attitude miratives express has received different answers from different authors, often in service of the analysis of different languages. Often unclear in these discussions is the whether these disputes are primarily theoretical – What is the correct conception of mirativity? – or empirical ones – Which possible mirative notion is appropriate for the analysis of a given mirative in a given language? Following Salanova & Carol (2016) and AnderBois (2016a, 2018), we take this debate to *a priori* be an empirical one. Such an empirical investigation may of course find that miratives are indeed uniform, but we regard this at present as at best an unsubstantiated empirical claim. This of

course is not to say that works that engage these issues on more theoretical or conceptual terms are not useful. On the contrary, if formulated with sufficient precision, they give us a sense of what data are likely to prove useful in the empirical task of establishing the properties of different mirative morphemes.

AnderBois (2018) breaks down the semantics of miratives into two questions which in principle are orthogonal to one another. The question which most literature has grappled with is what sort of mental attitude a speaker who uses a mirative is expressing. Equally pressing, however, is a question much less discussed in most literature: what is the object of this attitude? Most literature implicitly assumes that this is the proposition that the rest of the sentence denotes. Considering the parallel with evidentials, however, there are other plausible answers such as an illocutionary or speech act update, an event, etc. We return to these below in §5 when we consider non-declarative sentences. As far as the mirative attitude, Aikhenvald (2012) identifies 5 distinct conceptions of mirativity from previous literature:

(7) **Five conceptions of the mirative attitude**

1. new information
2. sudden discovery, revelation, or realization
3. surprise
4. counterexpectation
5. unprepared mind

As has been discussed by previous authors, these various notions are, of course, closely related to one another. For example, it would seem that one cannot experience counterexpectation or be surprised by information which is not new. Similarly, psychologists (see, e.g. Huron (2006) for a survey) regard surprise as a basic emotion triggered from experiencing particular kinds of counterexpectation (as opposed to more general notions like surprisal) and Peterson (2016) argues specifically that sudden revelation is a necessary component of surprise. I set aside the fifth notion, ‘unprepared mind’, in what follows. This term is used most extensively by DeLancey (1997), but it remains unclear to me what distinguishes it from the other notions.

Despite the close connections between these different conceptions of mirativity, the relationships between them would seem to be asymmetrical ones. One may be surprised by new information, but new information itself need not be surprising. While new information is one potential cause of a sudden revelation or realization, one may also suddenly remember something or suddenly piece together a realization based on old information they already had. Something may go against one's expectations (at least to a slight extent) without one experiencing the emotional sensation of surprise. In an information theoretic sense, any such expectation violation could be said to result in *surprisal*, but we would be hard pressed to say that this constitutes surprise either intuitively or in the sense discussed in psychological literature on the emotion of surprise.

In addition to the notional connections between these different conceptions of mirativity, there are additionally some shared background assumptions about what mirativity is like. Though not always explicitly addressed, mirativity for all authors it seems is anchored in the deictic center of the conversation. Whichever mirative attitude it encodes, it expresses that the speaker (or occasionally the addressee, for some authors) holds it and does so at or at least near the moment of the utterance. An expression of the speaker's having held such an attitude a week ago would not be considered a case of mirativity, nor would an expression of a third party's holding such an attitude at the time of the utterance. To use Faller (2002)'s term, miratives are *m-performative*, directly reflecting the speaker's subjective mental estimation at the moment of utterance.

One caveat to the ideas here, discussed some in AnderBois (2018) is that – like any speaker-

oriented expression – there may be cases of direct quotation, free-indirect discourse, and other related forms of perspective shift – especially in narratives – which facilitate uses which appear to violate the generalizations described here. For example, in (8), we see that the narrator makes the story more vivid for the hearer by using *pala* to refer to the sudden realization they had at that point in the narrative rather than at the time of the story’s telling. Such uses, however, are clearly distinct from non-mirative lexical expressions such as the English verb ‘surprise’ which encode a similar attitude, but allow the speaker to freely attribute this attitude to any arbitrary agent with no such tie to the deictic center of the narrative.

- (8) **Context:** Speaker is telling a story about the other day about trying to get in touch with a mutual friend.

Kahapon, nasira pala ang kanya-ng telepono, kaya di ko
 yesterday break.PFV MIR DIR OBL.3SG-LNK phone thus NEG INDIR.1SG
siya tinawagan.
 DIR.3SG call.PFV
 ‘So, Yesterday, (I was like) oh, his phone’s broke, so I stopped calling him.’

One potential assumption from some previous literature which we do not adopt here is the presumption that mirativity and evidentiality have any necessary or a priori relationship to one another. While they have in common the m-performativity just discussed above, they express notionally distinct kinds of attitudes (much like evidentiality and epistemic modality). This is not to deny that there are connections between mirativity and evidentiality or that there are not reasons why indirect evidentials in many languages can be used as mirative strategies (or perhaps miratives proper). However, they are in principle distinct and we take it as a matter of empirical investigation to determine what further properties, if any, they may have in common. Since Tagalog *pala* only expresses mirativity and never indirect evidentiality, as illustrated in (9), we do not take up this relationship here further.

- (9) **Context:** I have not been outside all day and go outside and see mud on the ground. Some hours later, I report to you that it was raining earlier.

#Umuulan pala.
 rain.IPFV MIR
 Intended: ‘Apparently, it was raining.’

In this section, we have explored various notions of mirativity from prior literature and their interrelationships. We turn in the next section to examine data from context-relative felicity judgments aimed at disentangling these notions empirically.

4. Mirative *pala* in declaratives

As with all miratives, Tagalog *pala* can, of course, be used in scenarios where the speaker is experiencing surprise, as in (10-12):

- (10) **Context:** Someone goes to a party and strikes up a conversation with another person. Person A recognizes Person B and suddenly realizes that they met a few weeks back.

(Ah!) Ikaw pala ’yon.
 Oh you MIR that
 ‘Oh, that was you! (I just realized)’

- (11) **Context:** The speaker is surprised to suddenly learn that their friend’s boyfriend lives far away and is therefore sad.

Kaya pala malungkot ang kaibigan ko.
 thus MIR sad DIR friend INDIR.1SG
 ‘Oh, that’s why my friend is sad!’

- (12) **Context:** The speaker sees a light on in their child’s room and expects that their child is playing video games, but then suddenly realizes that they are reading the bible instead and says:

Nagbabasa pala ng biblia.
 read.AV.IPFV MIR INDIR bible
 ‘Oh, they’re reading the bible!’

Such uses are of course consistent with the idea that, of the various mirative notions introduced above, *pala* encodes surprise. However, they are equally consistent with the other 3 notions – new information, sudden revelation, and counterexpectation – since the speaker’s surprise in these examples is triggered by suddenly realizing a new piece of information which violates their expectations. There are at least three possible ways to bridge the gap between the apparent surprise felt in these examples and one of the other mirative notions. First, it might be that the use of *pala* is possible when the speaker experiences surprise, but such utterances in no way convey the speaker’s surprise. Second, it could be that pragmatic reasoning about the speaker’s decision to use *pala* produces an implicature of surprise in the given contexts. Finally, it could be that surprise emerges from the combination of *pala* together with world knowledge and other mirative strategies and/or other elements which are not themselves mirative, but which nonetheless constraint the range of possible mirative meanings.

To distinguish between these different notions, then, we need felicity judgments of examples in contexts which are consistent with some but not all of the candidate mirative meanings. Following AnderBois (2018), we take there to be two clear-cut cases of this sort: (i) cases where a speaker’s prior expectation is suddenly met, and (ii) cases where a speaker suddenly remembers a piece of information.

4.1 Prior expectation suddenly met

The first situation which clearly distinguishes between different mirative notions are cases where a speaker has a prior belief or expectation and then receives some new piece of information which confirms this prior expectation. Such a scenario is clearly consistent with new information, a, or revelation, b. For miratives which encode surprise, c, or counterexpectation, d, however, this sort of scenario is incompatible. These predictions are summarized in (13):

- (13) *Felicity in scenarios where speaker’s prior expectation is suddenly met*

Type	Felicitous?
a New Information	✓
b Revelation	✓
c Surprise	✗
d Counterexpectation	✗

As seen in (14-16), Tagalog *pala* is felicitous in such scenarios, supporting the claim that it encodes either new information, a, or sudden revelation, b.

- (14) **Context:** I am supposed to meet my friend Juan, who is very punctual, at the library. I'm checking my phone for the time and suddenly look up and see that he is there, on time as always and say:
Ah, nandito na pala si Juan.
 ok here now MIR DIR Juan
 'Oh, Juan's here.'
- (15) **Context:** My friend and I are looking for a private place to talk in a student center which is always crowded. I say:
May mga estudyante naman pala dito
 EXIS PL student PART MIR here
 'Oh, but there's a lot of students in here.'
- (16) **Context:** I am talking to my friend about my stomachache and trying to figure out what to do about it. Eating always helps with this kind of stomachache, so I say:
 (Ah,) *kailangan ko pala-ng kumain*
 ok need INDIR.1SG MIR-LNK eat.AV
 'Oh, I need to eat!'

Another interesting case to consider is the pair in (17). In (17a), we see a context where the speaker's prior expectation that the speaker is smart is met. And yet, the sentence sounds odd in this context because it sounds like it might be implying that the teacher had thought the student was not smart previously. This example appears to go against the generalization here and suggest instead that some amount of counterexpectation is indeed required. However, we find that a structurally identical context in (17b) produces a markedly different result, being totally felicitous and not giving the appearance of rudeness due to counterexpectation.

- (17) a. **Context:** The teacher had no prior belief that their student was anything but smart when they make a really insightful comment. The teacher says:
#Ang talino mo pala
 DIR smart INDIR.2SG MIR
 #'Oh, you're really smart!' (intelligible but inappropriate)
- b. **Context:** A friend in our group of friends has always been known as the smart one and we all consider them to be very smart. She goes on Jeopardy and we don't know how she did until her episode airs. After seeing the episode in which she crushes her competition, we say to her:
Ang talino mo pala
 DIR smart INDIR.2SG MIR
 'Oh, you're really smart!'

So, what could be different between the two cases? First, the structure in question – *ang* plus a root adjective in the *ma*- class – is one which S&O (pp. 280-282) describe as being exclamatory in nature. So, it may simply be that the degree of intelligence or the emotional attitude about it that the sentence expresses somehow seems sarcastic in (17a), but authentic in (17b). Second, while speakers do not reject the minimal pair without *pala* in either case, since Jeopardy is a broad-based test of a certain kind of intelligence, it may more naturally support a sudden revelation about overall intelligence than a single comment in class would. Finally, while the group of friends' prior beliefs about the smart friend's abilities are publicly known in the context, the teacher's may be more likely private and or subject to doubt on the part of the student.

Ultimately, we leave it to future work to determine what factors are crucial here, especially since doing so would require a better understanding of the complex range of degree constructions Tagalog possesses. However, we conclude that the felicity and lack of rudeness of (17b) provides further confirmation that counterexpectation is not a necessary component of *pala* and tentatively conclude that the rudeness of (17a) is due to other unrelated factors.

4.2 *Speaker suddenly remembers*

The second sort of scenario AnderBois (2018) discusses for Yucatec Maya *bakáan* are two different sorts of cases where a speaker has a sudden revelation or realization with no new outside information. Within this category, there are two different subcases, one more airtight than the other. First, we have situations where the speaker knows a particular fact, but it slips their mind temporarily and then pops back in to their head, what we will call PURE REMEMBERING. Second, we have cases where a speaker knows a set of premises and has them more or less in mind, but suddenly realizes that they can draw a given inference from them that they had not previously drawn, what we can call SUDDEN INFERENCE. Of course, these two situations are not mutually exclusive either since one may suddenly remember a fact *p* that they had forgotten and then draw a new inference based on *p* together with other information.

As seen in (18-21), Tagalog *pala* is felicitous in both sorts of scenarios:

- (18) **Context:** You are asking me what I did yesterday and I am listing things I did before momentarily blank before remembering suddenly and saying:
Tapos, nagbeach (nga) pala ako.
 after go.to.beach.PFV PART MIR DIR.1SG
 ‘Oh yeah, then I went to the beach.’
- (19) **Context:** The singer recounts being nauseated and confused, looking for their own place to live, and wondering what has happened. Suddenly remembering, the singer sings:
Oo nga pala, hindi nga pala tayo
 yes PART MIR NEG PART MIR DIR.1PL.INCL
 ‘Oh yeah, there’s no ‘us’.’ AnderBois (2018: 28)
- (20) **Context:** We are trying to figure out where our mom is when I suddenly remember that she went to the store and say:
Pumunta pala siya para bumili ng pagkain.
 go.PFV MIR DIR.3SG for buy.AV INDIR food
 ‘Oh yeah, she went to go buy food.’
- (21) **Context:** We are talking about someone I haven’t been in touch with for a while. I suddenly realize why she’s out of town on vacation and has been busy of late and say:
Ay, kasal (nga) pala si Maribel.
 INTERJ marry.PFV PART MIR DIR Maribel
 ‘Oh, Maribel got married!’

For PURE REMEMBERING cases like (18), it seems quite clear that such a context is compatible only with sudden revelation, b, and therefore that Tagalog *pala* must encode that notion. For cases of SUDDEN INFERENCE, whether such an inference counts as ‘new information’ or not depends on how we conceive of information. Under a fairly standard semantics which captures information in terms of propositions modeled as sets of possible worlds, we make the simplifying idealization that belief is closed under entailment. Under such a theory of belief, then, SUDDEN INFERENCE cases seemingly must be regarded as old information since the speaker’s belief worlds already include only worlds where the proposition denoted by the mira-

tive’s scope holds. This is in some sense an intuitive result, since a speaker in such a scenario does not receive any new information from the outside world.

On the other hand, we of course know that ultimately beliefs of human agents are not always closed under entailment, even if this is an ideal state which we do indeed tend towards. Depending on how our theory addresses this issue, we may find that SUDDEN INFERENCE cases could indeed be regarded as new information, despite arising entirely from propositions which are old information. We see this state of affairs summarized in (22):

(22) *Felicity in PURE REMEMBERING and SUDDEN INFERENCE scenarios*

	Type	Pure remembering	Sudden inference
a	New Information	✗	??
b	Revelation	✓	✓
c	Surprise	✗	✗
d	Counterexpectation	✗	✗

We set aside the issue of how to interpret SUDDEN INFERENCE scenarios here since the felicity of *pala* in PURE REMEMBERING cases renders it moot. Moreover, as we will see in §5 – and as AnderBois (2018) argues for Yucatec Maya *bakáan* – the use of *pala* across sentence types suggests that information is not the relevant notion in the first place, but rather illocutionary updates.

In sum, I have argued that the Tagalog particle *pala* encodes sudden revelation or realization, rather than surprise, counterexpectation, or new information (though it is consistent with the speaker experiencing any of these). This paper, then, joins a growing body of work that arguing that many mirative markers do not in fact encode surprise, but rather one of these other notions: AnderBois (2016a, 2018) on Yucatec Maya *bakáan*, Salanova & Carol (2016) on Guaraní *ra’e*, Simeonova (2015) on Turkish and Bulgarian, and possibly Tawilapakul (2013) on Thai *læw45*.

We turn now to address two further questions about the meaning and use of *pala* and, in particular, its semantic interactions with other elements. First, in §5, we examine the behavior of *pala* in non-declarative sentences. While undiscussed in much of the mirative literature, AnderBois (2018) has shown that Yucatec *bakáan* MIR can be readily used in imperative and interrogative sentences and has argued that the range of such uses provides important evidence about how it should be analyzed. Second, in §6, we examine other miratives, mirativity strategies, and non-mirative elements which constrain or otherwise influence the type of mirativity conveyed by *pala* on a given use.

5. Mirative *pala* across sentence types

Thus far, we have examined the use of the second position clitic *pala* in declarative sentences. Given the obvious connections and similarities between miratives and evidentials, however, there is obvious reason to consider other sentence types, as these have often been key sources of evidence for or against different analyses in different languages.

For evidentials, there are four main sorts of interactions which are well-established in previous literature. First, there are evidentials which are simply incompatible with some or all types of non-declarative sentences. In some cases, this appears to be for independent syntactic reasons, while in others no such independent reason is found (cf. Aikhenvald (2004: §8.1)). Second, evidentials in interrogatives in some languages undergo what has been dubbed ‘interrogative flip’, where instead of encoding some evidential attitude on the part of the speaker, they express that the speaker expects that the addressee will hold such an attitude for the answer they give (cf. Murray (2017), Faller (2002)), as illustrated in (23a). A third possibility attested for evidentials is to form biased questions that simultaneously express the speaker’s evidential attitude towards a proposition, and ask the addressee to confirm (cf. Bhadra (2017)), (23b).

This option has been less discussed cross-linguistically, but to my knowledge is only attested with indirect evidentials.² Finally, we find evidentials, as in (23c), that express that the speaker holds a given evidential attitude about the illocutionary update the sentence itself encodes (cf. Faller (2002), AnderBois (2017)). This ‘outside the speech act’ case is attested in both interrogatives and imperatives, but only for reportative evidentials, presumably since other information sources do not apply readily to illocutionary content.

(23) a. **Interrogative flip**

Context: I know your friend went to a concert and you didn’t, but that you probably talked to your friend about it. I’m asking you about the concert expecting your answer will be based on the roommate’s report.

Ma-galing ba daw yung kumanta?

ADJ-good POLQ REP DEM.LNK singer

‘Was the singer good (according to what you heard)?’

Tagalog

b. **Biased question**

Context: Ram and Sita live together, and as they are going out for a movie, Ram asks Sita to leave their house keys with the neighbor, and NOT the caretaker. When they return, Ram sees Sita dialing the caretaker’s number, and asks:

cabi-ta kyaartekar-er kache rekh-e esh-e-chish naki?

key-CL caretaker-LOC close keep-IPFV come-IPFV-PERF.2P INFER

‘(I infer) you left the keys with the caretaker, (is that true)?’

Bangla (Bhadra

2017: p. 95)

c. **Outside the speech act**

Context: Our mother has told me to make sure that my younger sibling eats their bread. I tell my sibling:

Kainin mo daw ang tinapay mo

eat.PV INDIR.2SG REP DIR bread your

‘Eat you bread (she orders)’

Tagalog (AnderBois 2017: p. 467)

For miratives, the paucity of discussion of miratives in non-declarative sentences in prior literature presumably reflects the fact that in at least some of these cases, the first situation obtains and the combination is not possible. While not logically impossible, an interrogative flip interpretation for miratives seems to be of limited utility. The flipped mirative would have the speaker expressing their expectation that the addressee will answer their question with an answer the addressee finds surprising/suddenly realized/etc., and yet they are still asking the addressee the question and so presumably do not themselves have access to this new information. For the biased question case, it is hard to see how a sensible mirative analogue would be possible since unlike indirect evidentials, for which the addressee may be expected to have better evidence, a speaker who holds any of the mirative attitudes has no such epistemic weakness (except insofar as the mirative also encoded indirectness or uncertainty of some sort).

In the remainder of this section, we show that *pala* in interrogatives and imperatives is possible and has an ‘outside the speech act’ interpretation. Moreover, we argue in §5.3 that even in declaratives, there is evidence that the speaker’s sudden revelation concerns the sentence’s illocutionary update rather than the proposition itself. That is to say that all uses of *pala* are ‘outside

² Beyond the fairly limited empirical support for such a restriction, there is a theoretical reason to expect this to be the case as well. A rational speaker who had the best kind of evidence possible for a given claim would typically have no reason to ask their interlocutor the question. In contrast, with indirect evidentials, the speaker may reasonably expect that the addressee may have ‘better’ evidence.

the speech act’ uses as opposed to non-declaratives having some sort of special interaction.

5.1 Imperatives with *pala*

For evidentials, imperatives more or less only ever co-occur with reportatives and have an ‘outside the speech act’ use, as illustrated with Tagalog *daw* in (23c). Imperatives with Tagalog *pala* are readily possible, and as illustrated in (24), have clearly illocutionary uses. In particular, such sentences convey that the speaker has a sudden revelation that motivates the imperative speech act they perform with the rest of the sentence. This is most typically in cases where the speaker had previously intended to issue the command/advice/offer/wish/etc. and forgot or had otherwise been unable to do so and then suddenly remembers.

- (24) a. **Context:** A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says:
Bumili ka nga pala ng monggo
 buy.AV.IMPER DIR.2SG PART MIR INDIR
 ‘Oh yeah, go buy beans.’
- b. **Context:** While working in the library, we are trying to remember the Tagalog word for ‘blue’. I suddenly realize that being in the library, there are dictionaries nearby and say:
Gamitin mo pala yung diksyonario.
 use.PV.IMPER INDIR.2SG MIR DEM.LNK dictionary
 ‘Oh yeah, use the dictionary!’
- c. **Context:** I am going to buy us concert tickets. You already bought them though and suddenly remember you never told me not to as you had intended and say:
Huwag na pala
 don’t now MIR
 ‘Oh, don’t (buy them).’

While *pala* occurs readily in imperatives, there are restrictions on the contexts in which this is possible. For very similar data in Yucatec Maya, AnderBois (2018) argues that these restrictions are related to the illocutionary update which imperative mood conventionally encodes. Here, we will not delve into the details of the analysis, but will summarize a bit the main empirical restriction and refer the reader to that work for further discussion.

Intuitively, imperatives in their most prototypical uses are about the speaker’s desire for the addressee to perform some action. While this is clearly true in command uses, for example, it’s not clear that the speaker’s desire is always necessary for an imperative to be used, which has led to vigorous debate over whether or not imperative mood cross-linguistically encodes the speaker’s desire as (part of) its meaning (see AnderBois (2018) for recent discussion and references).

However, as AnderBois (2018) claims for Yucatec Maya *bakáan* MIR, we find instead that *pala* is infelicitous in situations where the speaker’s sudden realization concerns their own individual desires, as in (25b) and (26b). In contrast, the same imperatives with *pala* are completely acceptable in minimally different situations where the speaker’s sudden revelation concerns some other aspect of the speech act besides a shift in their own wishes.

- (25) a. **Context:** A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says:
Bumili ka (nga) pala ng monggo
 buy.AV.IMPER DIR.2SG PART MIR INDIR
 ‘Oh yeah, go buy beans.’

- b. **Context:** A mother is in the kitchen cooking and realizes that she wants her son to go buy beans and says:
#Bumili ka (nga) pala ng monggo
 buy.AV.IMPER DIR.2SG PART MIR INDIR
 Intended: ‘Oh yeah, go buy beans.’
- (26) a. **Context:** My friend is about to tell a secret of mine which I told him. I had meant to tell him not to say anything to anyone, but forgot and now that the conversation is on a related topic, I say to him:
Huwag mo pala sabihin.
 don’t INDIR.2SG MIR say.PV
 ‘Don’t say anything.’
- b. **Context:** I told my friend some sensitive information. Now that the conversation is on a related topic, he sounds like he’s starting to tell my secret. I normally am happy to hear my friend talking, but since I don’t want him to tell my secret suddenly want him to be quiet:
Huwag mo (#pala) sabihin.
 don’t INDIR.2SG MIR say.PV
 ‘Don’t say anything.’

In the felicitous examples of imperatives with *pala* thus far, the speaker’s sudden revelation has been a sudden remembering of their intent to issue the imperative in question. While perhaps the most common cases where such sentences arise, it is not the only one. Such imperatives are also possible in situations where the addressee’s goals and/or knowledge state about possible means of achieving them suddenly become clear. For example, in (27), the speaker suddenly realizes that the addressee does not know where to go and therefore that the advice their imperative conveys is relevant to impart to the addressee.

- (27) **Context:** Someone who is expected to know how to get to the university already asks for directions and get the response:
Dumiretso ka nga pala dito.
 go.straight.IMPER DIR.2SG PART MIR here
 ‘Oh yeah, go straight here.’

In (27), the speaker is aware of the addressee’s goal the entire time (to get to the university), but suddenly realizes that they don’t have sufficient information to select an appropriate action to meet this goal. In contrast, (28a) represents a case where all parties are certainly aware of what actions the addressee could take to achieve the goal in question (namely, grabbing a cookie from right in front of them and eating it), but where the addressee’s goals themselves are the object of the speaker’s sudden revelation. In this case, the close paraphrase with a conditional imperative, as in (28b), can serve to make this explicit.

- (28) a. **Context:** The addressee, Jorge, typically does not like cookies and so even though the speaker has a tray of cookies, they don’t think to offer them to Jorge. However, Jorge is eyeing the cookies and so the speaker suddenly realizes that he in fact might want one this time and says:
Kumain ka pala ng cookie.
 eat.IMPER INDIR.2SG MIR INDIR cookie
 ‘Have a cookie!’

- b. **Context:** [same as (28a)]

Kung gusto-ng mo pala kumain ka ng cookie
 if want-LNK INDIR.2SG MIR eat.IMPER INDIR.2SG INDIR cookie
 ‘Oh, if you want, have a cookie’

In sum, mirative *pala* is felicitous in imperatives in cases where the sudden revelation concerns the relevance or utility of the imperative update, but not those where it concerns the speaker’s preferences themselves. AnderBois (2018) has established essentially the same pattern for a mirative particle in an unrelated language, Yucatec Maya *bakáan* MIR. Following AnderBois (2018), we take this as evidence that mirative markers in these languages encode an sudden revelation about an illocutionary update rather than a proposition per se. On the strength of these data, then, we can therefore conclude that illocutionary updates for imperatives include things like the presumption of relevance to the conversational participants current decision problems, but do not include the speaker’s desire for the addressee to perform the imperative action (though this desire may of course arise pragmatically in many cases).

5.2 Interrogatives with *pala*

Having discussed imperatives with *pala* in some detail, we turn now to another non-declarative sentence type: interrogatives. As discussed at the beginning of this section, the parallel with evidentials might lead us to expect a greater range of interpretive possibilities here than for imperatives (e.g. an interrogative flip reading of some kind). For Yucatec Maya *bakáan*, the fact that AnderBois (2018) does not find any such uses is perhaps unsurprising since even the reportative evidential in Yucatec Maya, *bin* REP, does not allow for such uses. For Tagalog, however, we have already seen in (23), the reportative allows for both illocutionary and flip readings and so to the extent that there is some general (i.e. not morpheme-specific) grammatical mechanism necessary to the flip interpretation, we might expect to find a different situation in Tagalog.

However, what we in fact find is that – again parallel to Yucatec Maya *bakáan* – *pala* only seems to have illocutionary uses expressing the speaker’s sudden remembering or other realization about performing the interrogative update in question. In interrogative cases, this may mean either suddenly remembering a prior intent to ask a question or suddenly realizing the relevance or need (i.e. non-redundancy) of a given question, as seen in (29):

- (29) a. **Context:** We have already started talking before I got a chance to ask your name. I deferentially ask you after a while:
Ano po nga pala ang pangalan ninyo?
 who HON PART MIR DIR name INDIR.2SG.FORMAL
 ‘Oh, sorry I meant to ask, what’s your name?’
- b. **Context:** A child who has forgotten what nata de coco is since it’s mostly served at special occasions only asks:
Ano nga pala ang nata de coco?
 what PART MIR DIR nata de coco
 ‘Oh yeah, what is nata de coco again?’
- c. **Context:** You told me something earlier about work, but I got distracted and forgot and remember and ask:
Ano pala ang sinabi mo tungkol sa proyekto?
 what MIR DIR SAY.PV.PFV INDIR.2SG about OBL project
 ‘Oh, yeah, what is it that you said about the project?’

As in the case of imperatives, interrogatives are subject to certain restrictions in the kinds of sudden revelations which license it. In particular, as with imperatives, the speaker suddenly

deciding or realizing their desire to know something is not sufficient to license the use of *pala*. This gives rise to the patterns of judgments in (30), where interrogatives with *pala* which are felicitous in other contexts are judged inappropriate in such cases:

- (30) a. **Context:** I had been wanting to ask you who speaks Cebuano and say:
 b. **#Context:** I hear Cebuano being spoken and suddenly am curious who is speaking it
Sino pala ang nagsasalita ng Cebuano?
 who MIR DIR speak.AV.IPFV INDIR Cebuano
 ‘Oh (I wanted to ask you), who speaks Cebuano?’
- (31) a. **Context A:** Earlier I had lost my keys and wanted to ask you where they were, but couldn’t. I now remember and ask you
 b. **#Context B:** I just realised I lost my keys and so I want to know where they are
Asan pala yung mga susi ko?
 where MIR DEM.LNK PL key INDIR.1SG
 ‘Oh, where are my keys?’

As in the case of imperatives, we have seen that interrogatives readily allow for *pala* in ‘outside the speech act’ or illocutionary uses in which the illocutionary update the utterance puts forth is itself the object of the speaker’s sudden revelation. We turn now to declarative sentences, to show that there too, we find uses with illocutionary revelations rather than propositional ones.

5.3 Illocutionary uses of *pala* in declaratives

The illocutionary nature of *pala* is plain to see in imperative and interrogative examples since it is not clear what proposition would even be the object of the sudden revelation *pala* encodes. In this section, we argue that even in declaratives, *pala* is illocutionary in nature and as such is usable in contexts where the speaker’s revelation concerns not the propositional content of the declarative, but rather the act of asserting it at a given point in conversation. We this illustrated in (32). In (32a), we see another example of *pala* being used in a case where the speaker suddenly remembers a piece of information. However, the same sentence can also be felicitously used in a context like (32b) where the speaker has so sudden revelation about the fact that Marvin left, but instead suddenly remembers to tell this fact to the addressee:

- (32) a. **Propositional Context:** I forgot that my friend Maria had gone to the cafeteria and suddenly remember.
 b. **Illocutionary Context:** I forgot that I had wanted to tell you that Maria had gone to the cafeteria, but had not forgotten that she had.
Pumunta pala siya sa kainan.
 go.AV.PFV MIR DIR.3SG OBL cafeteria
 ‘Oh, she went to the cafeteria.’

One further illustration of the illocutionary nature of (32b) is that, unlike (32a), it is more or less interchangeable with a more explicit example like (33).

- (33) **Illocutionary Context:** I forgot that I had wanted to tell you that Maria had gone to the cafeteria, but had not forgotten that she had.
Gusto ko pala-ng sabihin sayo pumunta siya sa kainan
 want INDIR.1SG MIR-LNK tell.PV OBL.2SG go.AV.PFV DIR.3SG OBL cafeteria
 ‘Oh yeah, I wanted to tell you that she went to the cafeteria.’

We see further examples of clearly illocutionary uses of *bakáan* in (34). In addition to cases where the speaker suddenly remembers their previous intention to inform the addressee of

something, we also find cases like (34a) in which the sudden revelation concerns the relevance of the information, in this case that Marvin left. The speaker here knows all along that Marvin left (the sentence's propositional content), but the addressee's confusion causes the speaker to suddenly realize that the addressee wants to know what happened to Marvin, and therefore that the assertion would be relevant in context.

- (34) a. **Context:** Marvin left to go get food. I am looking around the room puzzled as to where he went and you say:
Umalis pala si Marvin.
 leave.AV.PFV MIR DIR Marvin
 'Oh, Marvin left'
- b. **Context:** We are talking about birds and so the question I had from earlier about them is suddenly relevant:
Oo nga pala, may tanong ako (tungkol sa ibon).
 yes PART MIR EXIS question DIR.1SG about OBL bird
 'Oh yeah, I have a question (about birds)'
- c. **Context:** I suddenly realize that you might have an interest in knowing that a vase broke and say:
Nabasag pala yung vase.
 break.PFV MIR DEM.LNK vase
 'Oh, by the way, the vase broke.'

In this section, we've seen that even in declaratives, there are plainly illocutionary uses in which the sudden revelation the speaker conveys does not concern the fact of the matter itself, but rather some other aspect of the speaker's assertion of that fact. At first blush, this might seem to suggest that *pala* in declaratives is ambiguous between an illocutionary *pala* and a propositional *pala*, with only the former possible outside of declaratives. While not an impossible state of affairs, a simpler explanation with no covert ambiguity is possible. Just as we have taken the infelicity of *pala* with imperatives in certain cases as evidence that the conventionally encoded illocutionary updates of imperatives do not include, here we may take the felicity of *pala* in propositional cases as evidence that declarative updates do include the speaker's commitment to the truth of their propositional content (or at least their having adequate evidence of this) alongside the more interactional aspects found in illocutionary cases. We refer the reader to AnderBois (2018) for a fleshed out version of such a theory along with discussion of independent support for it.

6. Interractions with other elements

We have argued that Tagalog *pala* does not encode surprise, counterexpectation, or new information, but rather a weaker notion: sudden revelation. This finding is part of a growing body of work (see AnderBois (2018: §6) for recent discussion and references) concluding that many mirative morphemes do not in fact encode surprise or counterexpectation, even though this is often regarded as the prototypical use of mirativity. While the felicity of *pala* in contexts incompatible with these stronger notions provides clear support for this position, it nonetheless is the case that a great many utterances with *pala* seem to convey one of these stronger notions, specifically mild surprise or counterexpectation. Indeed, informal descriptions like S&O's consistently discuss it in these terms.

The claim that we make here is not that this sense of surprise is misguided, but rather that it arises from other sources together with the mirative morpheme itself. One such source, implicit in much of the discussion in §4 and explicitly discussed in detail for (17) is world knowledge. If a speaker conveys that they suddenly realized a proposition *p* and world knowledge suggests

that the speaker might have previously believed or expected something other than *p*, then the net effect will be to convey surprise, or at least something quite close to it. This is added to so if the speaker expects that the addressee will have this knowledge, in which case the speaker may well *intend* to communicate their surprise to their interlocutor. While world knowledge plays a central role in producing surprise readings, the most interesting cases where it does so are ones where it combines with other elements as described below. We therefore do not consider its effect in isolation, but only as it is engaged by different grammatical elements described below.

Another factor which we will leave to future work to explore is the role that intonation plays in conveying surprise, both separately and together with *pala*. Intonation and prosody generally have been quite understudied compared to other aspects of Tagalog grammar (though see S&O pp. 30-54, Kaufman (2005), and Richards (2010: §3.3.3) for some discussion) and so far more background work is needed here. The most comprehensive work on Tagalog intonation by far is Schachter & Otnes (1972: 30-54), who describe a wide range of different meaning-bearing intonation patterns in some detail. While none of them is described as relating to surprise per se – unlike in English, where intonational expression of surprise has been widely discussed since at least Sag & Liberman (1975) – they nonetheless are likely to play at least an indirect role.

Setting aside these quite general mechanisms, though, we focus here on a number of specific grammatical mechanisms which play more narrowly proscribed roles in producing more specific mirative meanings. These include other discourse particles, the syntactic expression of information structural notions like focus and topic, and exclamatory constructions, which have been claimed in other languages to be inherently mirative in some sense (e.g. Rett (2011) for English).

While this large group of different elements all may impact the kind of mirativity an utterance expresses, they may do so in quite different ways. First, in §6.1, we explore elements which are themselves also plausibly miratives, but which co-occur with *pala*. These elements include the sentence-final particle *a*, and sentence-initial interjections *ah*, *aba*, and *ay*. Second, there are what we call ‘mirativity strategies’, elements which do not encode any of the mirative notions but which nonetheless may convey counterexpectation or another mirative notion in a suitable context. Finally, in §6.3, we discuss the particle *nga*, which does not itself ever appear to express mirativity, but which nonetheless serves frequently to constrain the range of mirative meanings with which *pala* is otherwise compatible.

6.1 A preliminary look at other miratives in Tagalog

Schachter & Otnes (1972: 461-2) describe a sentence-final particle *a* which they describe as follows: “*a* is used in sentences that express an even or situation that is contrary to expectation”, illustrated in (35).

- (35) a. *Ayun (pala) sila a!*
 there MIR DIR.3PL PART
 ‘(Oh,) but there they are!’ (Schachter & Otnes 1972: 462)
- b. *Ma-ganda pala ito, a!*
 ADJ-beauty MIR DEM PART
 ‘Oh, but this is pretty!’ (Schachter & Otnes 1972:p. 462)

The consultants for this study, however, do not recognize this use of *a*, instead correcting such sentences (including S&O’s original examples) to have an initial interjection *a* (also spelled *ah*), as in (36c). S&O describe (p. 555) a range of interjections as conveying surprise including *a*, and also *ay* and *aba*, illustrated in (36). While these particles may co-occur with *pala*, it is clear from their discussion that they may also express a mirative meaning of some sort

independent form *pala*.

- (36) a. *Aba! Si Mang Rudy pala!*
INTERJ DIR sir Rudy MIR
'Aha, it's Mr. Rudy!'³
- b. *Ay, kasal (nga) pala si Maribel.*
INTERJ marry.PFV PART MIR DIR Maribel
'Oh, Maribel got married!'
- c. *A, hindi pa pala ako!*
INTERJ NEG yet MIR DIR.1SG
'Oh, not yet (I thought it was my turn already)'

While we leave a detailed exploration of what kinds of mirative meaning and other they each convey, we can note that we have already seen examples in §4.1 such as (37), repeated from (14), which suggest that sentence-initial *a(h)*, like *pala*, does not encode counterexpectation or surprise.

- (37) **Context:** I am supposed to meet my friend Juan, who is very punctual, at the library. I'm checking my phone for the time and suddenly look up and see that he is there, no time as always and say:
Ah, nandito na pala si Juan.
INTERJ here now MIR DIR Juan
'Oh, Juan's here.'

Similar to this, we found above that the most common exclamatory construction in Tagalog, formed with the direct case marker, *ang* DIR and the bare root form of the adjective is compatible with scenarios where no counterexpectation is found, (17b). We again leave more detailed work on this to future work, but note that here too we find that elements which may often convey surprise are possible in contexts where no surprise or counterexpectation is present, suggesting that sudden revelation (albeit perhaps of a different kind) may be a more common mirative attitude to be semantically encoded.

6.2 Contrast-based mirativity strategies

One common way to express surprise with mirative *pala* is by combining it with other elements which contrast (some aspect of) the stated situation with some other possible way things could be or could have been. The clearest example of this is the contrastive use of focus. Whereas English encodes focus intonationally, Tagalog largely encodes it morphosyntactically, as discussed briefly in §2 (and in far more detail by Kaufman (2005) and Latrouite & Riester (2018)). Thinking about focus in particular, it is hopefully clear that focus does not itself encode mirativity. Rather, it simply conveys that the stated choice was selected from a set of contextually salient alternatives. However, if world knowledge and other factors convey that those alternatives were more expected, then together with the m-performative sudden revelation of *pala*, we arrive at a very close approximation of surprise in the mirative sense.⁴ We see the effect of this combination play out across three distinct scenarios in (38).

³ Textual example from *Intermediate readings in Tagalog*, Philippine Center for Language Study, UC Press, 1968.

⁴ Note that without *pala*, focus plus the prior expectedness of the alternatives do not necessarily produce surprise in the mirative sense any more than a lexical verb like English *surprise* does.

- (38) a. **Context:** Dogs are supposed to eat dog food, but you suddenly realized that your dog Ruffie was eating cake.
 [Yung keyk]_{Foc} pala yung kinain ni Ruffie.
 DEM.LNK cake MIR DEM.LNK eat.PV.PFV INDIR Ruffie
 ‘Oh, Ruffie ate the CAKE!’
- b. **Context:** You suddenly realized that your dog Ruffie is eating cake rather than doing something else altogether.
 Kinain pala ni Ruffie yung keyk.
 eat.PV.PFV MIR INDIR Ruffie DEM.LNK cake
 ‘Oh, Ruffie ate the cake!’
- c. **Context:** You know that someone ate the cake and just realized it was your dog Ruffie.
 [Si Ruffie]_{Foc} pala yung kumain ng keyk
 DIR Ruffie MIR DEM.LNK eat.AV.PFV INDIR cake
 ‘Oh, RUFFIE ate the cake!’

A whole host of other elements establishing contrast in different ways have similar uses in combination with *pala*. These include other second position clitics such as the temporal clitic *pa* ‘still, yet’, (39), as well as the clitic *naman* PART, (40), which may be used to express contrast in many contexts (see AnderBois (2016b) for detailed discussion and analysis of *naman* itself).⁵

- (39) *Meron pa pala.*
 EXIS yet MIR
 ‘So there’s still more (I thought there’s none left).’
- (40) **Context:** A singer sings about the moment she was getting to know the addressee and suddenly realized that her preconception of the addressee as a snob was mistaken
Hindi ka naman pala totoo-ng suplado
 NEG DIR.2SG PART MIR true-LNK snob
 ‘Oh, but you’re not a real snob after all.’ Song lyrics⁶

Indeed, once we go looking for it, we find that expressions which contrast a given state of affairs with alternatives and in some way imply in context that the alternative was expected are quite rampant. For example, as discussed by Givón (1978), Horn (1989:Ch.3) and many others, sentential negation has this sort of pragmatic profile – a sentence like “My wife is not pregnant” is typically used in contexts where its opposite, “My wife is pregnant.”, was expected. While none of these elements necessarily ensures counterexpectation, their tendency towards this means that when they co-occur with the *pala*, they readily evoke a sense of surprise or counterexpectation.

In sum, we have seen that Tagalog has a wide range of different elements which, with varying degrees of explicitness, convey counterexpectation or surprise in suitable contexts. This counterexpectation is not necessarily rooted in the speaker’s mental evaluation at the utterance time and therefore is not by itself mirative per se. However, when combined with the sudden revelation encoded by *pala*, it produces the effect of conveying surprise or counterexpectation

⁵ As discussed previously in §3, this example represents a case of Free Indirect Discourse or other similar perspective shift. While the singer is singing some time after having established a relationship with the addressee, they are able to evoke the emotion of that moment through the use of perspective shift, in a sense ‘transporting’ the listener back to the moment when the shift in her view of the addressee occurred.

⁶ <https://lyricstranslate.com/en/aegis-minahal-kita-lyrics.html>

that is of the m-performative sort that characterizes miratives. The fact that elements that at least have this tendency are so pervasive goes a long way towards explaining why so much confusion has reigned over this domain and why mirativity has often been associated with counterexpectation, even though close investigation often reveals – as it has for *pala* – that counterexpectation is not a necessary feature for *pala*’s felicitous use.

6.3 Interaction with *nga*

Thus far, we have seen cases in which other elements that co-occur with *pala* either themselves express mirative meanings or express some part of a mirative meaning and therefore may convey mirativity in a particular context. In this section, we turn to examine an element which does neither of these, but nonetheless influences the nature of the mirativity *pala* conveys: the second-position enclitic particle *nga*. Whereas the elements in §6.2 had the effect of conveying counterexpectation, *nga* has somewhat the opposite effect, constraining *pala*’s mirative meaning to cases of sudden remembering and ruling out new information uses and especially counterexpectational ones. We see this illustrated in (41a) for declaratives and imperatives, repeated from (4) and (24a) above respectively.

- (41) a. **Context:** I knew that it was raining, but it slipped my mind. I suddenly remember and say:
Umuulan nga pala.
 rain.IPFV PART MIR
 ‘Oh yeah it’s raining (of course).’
 b. **Context:** A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says:
Bumili ka nga pala ng monggo
 buy.AV.IMPER DIR.2SG PART MIR INDIR
 ‘Oh yeah, go buy beans.’

Stepping back to consider *nga* on its own, S&O give separate characterizations of *nga* for imperatives and declaratives.⁷ For imperatives, S&O describe *nga* as changing imperatives to polite requests. For declaratives, has a superficially opposite effect: *nga* expresses “affirmation or confirmation”. The effect of *nga* in declaratives is typically an emphatic verum-focus-like one, sometimes even resulting in impoliteness or annoyance, as in (42). The inclusion of *pala* here is infelicitous since the speaker is not experiencing any sort of revelation, having answered the question recently already.

- (42) **Context:** A younger sibling asks repeatedly where mom went and despite already having been told the answer, keeps asking. I answer annoyed:
Pumunta nga (#pala) siya para bumili ng pagkain.
 go.PFV PART MIR DIR.3SG for buy.AV INDIR food
 ‘As you already know, she went to go buy food.’

While these two effects seem quite opposite, as discussed by Lee (2018) and references therein, there are in fact a number of discourse particles cross-linguistically that show a similar asymmetry including Colloquial Singapore English *lah*₂₁ and Japanese *yo*. The basic intuition Lee (2018) develops is that this asymmetry arises because imperatives in general (following

⁷ S&O also briefly discuss *nga* in hortatives and optatives, which we set aside here. While they do not discuss interrogatives with *nga*, we have already seen in (29a-29b) that such a combination is possible and appears to behave more or less similarly to *nga* in imperatives, serving to make the speaker’s request for information more polite or deferential.

Hamblin (1987) and others) can be backed by two different sorts of authority: social authority and rational authority. The former is the authority to impose different goals on the addressee (e.g. in directive uses), while the latter is a more epistemically-based authority to propose actions in order to achieve goals the addressee already has (e.g. advice, offers). Particles like *nga*, then, can be thought of as talking about the epistemic state of the hearer and/or speaker. For declaratives, this produces a ‘stronger’ assertion in some sense, while for imperatives, the same meaning has the effect of producing a ‘stronger’ rational authority, thereby avoiding the risk that the speaker will be perceived as flexing their social authority.

Returning to cases where *nga* co-occurs with *pala* in (41), we find that these are exclusively cases like (41a) where the speaker is suddenly remembering their intent to make a given speech act, including suddenly remembering the propositional content of the declarative. Since *nga* signals some aspect of the illocutionary update as being previously certain/obvious/etc., its meaning is therefore incompatible with the mirative notions of new information, surprise, and counterexpectation (and arguably sudden inference cases). The particle *nga* therefore constrains the sort of mirativity that *pala* might otherwise be taken to express in other contexts, despite itself expressing an epistemic meaning of some kind rather than a mirative-related one of any sort.

Finally, while we leave it future work to flesh out exactly what kind of certainty or epistemic authority *nga* encodes, whose it is, etc., there is one minimal pair of contexts with *nga* co-occurring with *pala*, (43), that appears to suggest that it must involve the addressee’s epistemic state in some way, rather than just the speaker’s. In these examples, consultants report that the inclusion of *nga* makes it sound as if I am sort of reminding both of us of a fact we already knew. Its inclusion is therefore felicitous in the context in (43b) and infelicitous in (43a). Conversely, omitting *nga* is strongly preferred in (43a) even though the speaker is suddenly remembering something since they are not remembering a thing that the addressee has any apparent knowledge of.

- (43) a. **Context:** We are trying to figure out where our mom is when I suddenly remember that I had seen her leave to go to the store earlier when you weren’t there and say:
Pumunta (#nga) pala siya para bumili ng pagkain.
 go.PFV MIR DIR.3SG for buy.AV INDIR food
 ‘Oh yeah, she went to go buy food.’
- b. **Context:** We are trying to figure out where our mom is when I suddenly remember that she had told us she went to the store and say:
Pumunta (nga) pala siya para bumili ng pagkain.
 go.PFV PART MIR DIR.3SG for buy.AV INDIR food
 ‘Oh yeah, she went to go buy food.’

In this section we have seen that while *pala* itself expresses a quite weak mirative meaning –sudden revelation or realization – a variety of different elements serve to produce the effect in context of a more specific meaning. Some of these elements are themselves plausibly miratives (e.g. *ah*, *ay*, *aba*), while others plainly are not (e.g. contrastive focus, *naman*, *nga*). Together with world knowledge and context-driven assumptions, these elements often serve to give the impression of a stronger, more specific mirative meaning such as surprise or counterexpectation. Beyond giving a sense of how these stronger senses are conveyed in Tagalog in the cases where they are, we hope that this serves as a general caution for researchers that any claim that a given mirative encodes a stronger mirative notion such as surprise necessarily relies on having controlled for a host of contextual, intonational, and other formal factors.

7. Comparison with Iloko *gayam*

Looking beyond Tagalog, it is often the case that discourse particles in other languages of the Philippines have functional equivalents in those languages, sometimes cognate (or borrowed via contact) and sometimes unrelated in phonological form. For example, Daguman (2018) describes in detail the presence of reportative clitics across languages of the Philippines, some related in their phonological form to Tagalog *daw*, and some unrelated in form, but quite similar in use. Mirative particles appear to pattern similarly, being found in a number of other languages, again sometimes with similar or identical phonological form, and sometimes with an unrelated form:

- (44) a. *Ah, diyan palan*
 ah, there MIR
 ‘Oh, so it’s there’ Bikol (Mintz 1971: 124)
- b. *Wa pala.*
 yes MIR
 ‘Oh yes, that’s right, isn’t it? (i.e. I forgot, just remembered, was reminded)’
Kapampangan (Forman 1971: 130)
- c. *Uy, gabii na diay.*
 hey late now MIR
 ‘Oh, it got late.’ Cebuano (Bunye & Yap 1971: 55)
- d. *Ay, sigi pala sirin anako*
 ah go.ahead MIR then child.INDIR.1SG
 ‘Oh, then go ahead by all means.’ Pangasinan (Benton 1971: 72)
- e. *Sia gali’ ang maestra ko sa sunod nga tuig*
 3SG MIR DIR teacher INDIR.1SG OBL follow LNK year
 ‘She is really the one who will be my teacher next year.’
Hiligaynon (Wolfenden 1971: 72)

Among these non-cognate forms with similar function is Iloko⁸ *gayam* MIR, as illustrated in (45). Rubino (1997: 330) describes *gayam* as “a second position particle used to express sudden realization of an unexpected situation. It often also connotes mild surprise. . . . may also be used to express and afterthought, or a statement or intention that suddenly comes to mind.”

- (45) a. *Adda met gayam asawa=m=on.*
 EXIS also MIR spouse=INDIR.2SG=EMPH
 ‘So you have a spouse (emphasis on the fact that the addressee is already married)’
 Rubino (1997: 323)
- b. **Context:** We are inside the library. I suddenly look out the window and notice it is raining, which it hadn’t been before, and say:
Agtudtudo gayam(=en).
 raining MIR=EMPH
 ‘Oh, it’s raining.’ (I didn’t expect it)

While we leave a detailed investigation to future work, we present elicited data here showing that Iloko *gayam* MIR systematically patterns together with Tagalog *pala* in the various properties outlined above. In particular, for declaratives, it is felicitous not only in contexts supporting counterexpectation or surprise, (46), but also in contexts where the speaker’s expectation is sud-

⁸ Iloko is a Northern Luzon language also known as Ilocano and Ilokano

denly met, (47), where the speaker suddenly remembers a piece of old information, (48), and cases which are more clearly illocutionary in nature, (49).

- (46) **Surprise Context:** I thought you were Japanese before, but find out you are Filipino
Pilipino ka gayam.
 Filipino DIR.2SG MIR
 ‘Oh, you’re Filipino.’
- (47) **Expectations-met Context:** I am supposed to meet my friend Juan, who is very punctual, at the library at 3pm. It is almost exactly 3pm and I suddenly see him walking up to the meeting spot and I say:
Adadtoy gayam ni Juan=’en.
 EXIS.here MIR ART Juan=now
 ‘Oh, Juan’s here now.’
- (48) **Sudden Remembering Context:** I hunted yesterday, but forgot for a second. I suddenly remember and say:
Naganup nak gayam ti ugsa idi kalman.
 hunted I MIR ART deer then yesterday
 ‘Oh yeah, I hunted a deer yesterday.’
- (49) **Illocutionary Context:** We start talking about birds and I suddenly remember that I have a question about birds which I wanted to ask you:
Adda gayam saludsod ko.
 EXIS MIR question INDIR.1SG
 ‘Oh yeah, I have a question.’

Also similar to Tagalog *pala*, Iloko *gayam* is possible in imperative and interrogative sentences, where it again serves to indicate that the relevance or some other aspect of the speech act being performed is driven by a sudden revelation or realization on the part of the speaker, most typically a sudden remembering of their intent to perform the speech act. In these non-declarative uses, Iloko *gayam* shows similar contextual restrictions to Tagalog *pala*, being infelicitous in cases where the speaker’s desire to issue an imperative or request information is the apparent source of their revelation.

- (50) a. **Context:** My friend is about to tell a secret of mine which I told him. I had meant to tell him not to say anything to anyone, but forgot and now that the conversation is on a related topic, I say to him:
Haan mo gayam ibagbaga.
 NEG INDIR.2SG MIR tell-CONT.PV.IMPER
 ‘Oh yeah, don’t tell anyone!’
- b. **Context:** I told my friend some sensitive information. Now that the conversation is on a related topic, he sounds like he’s starting to tell my secret. I normally am happy to hear my friend talking, but since I don’t want him to tell my secret suddenly want him to be quiet
#Agtalna ka man gayam.
 be.silent.IMPER DIR.2SG PART MIR
 Intended: ‘Oh, (I just realized I want you to) be quiet!’

- (51) a. **Context:** I just realised I lost my keys and so I want to know where they are
 b. **#Context:** Earlier I had lost my keys and wanted to ask you where they were, but couldn't. I now remember and ask you
Ayan=na gayam dagidiay tulbek ko?
 where=INDIR.3SG MIR DEM.PL key DIR.1SG
 'Oh, where are my keys?'

As with Tagalog *pala*, we conclude that Iloko *gayam* encodes a weaker mirative meaning of sudden illocutionary revelation or realization. While we will not review systematically the various other elements which may conspire to convey more specific mirative meanings like surprise in a given utterance, there is one such interaction which warrants special mention: the emphatic clitic *=(e)n*. Rubino (1997:321-326) describes *=(e)n* as having a variety of temporal uses (similar to Tagalog *na*), but also non-temporal uses including contrastive and emphatic uses. One such emphatic use of *=(e)n* occurs when *gayam* serves as the host for *=(e)n*, as in (52a).

Compared with the minimally different (52b), which lacks the emphatic *=(e)n* EMPH, we see two differences. First, in terms of form, whereas *gayam* is strictly a second position clitic, *gayamen* is sometimes acceptable in final position as illustrated in (52a). Second, in terms of meaning, we see from this minimal pair that *gayamen* appears to convey surprise or counterexpectation more clearly, whereas *gayam* alone is preferred in other cases. However, we regard as an open question whether *gayamen* in fact semantically encodes a counterexpectational mirative meaning or simply is effective in producing this effect in the specific contexts here.

- (52) a. **Context:** A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because her son didn't do his chore as asked of going to buy beans and says:
Gumatang ka iti balatong gayam=en.
 buy.AV.IMPER DIR.2SG ART beans MIR=EMPH
 'Oh (I meant to remind you), go buy some beans.'
 b. **Context:** A mother is in the kitchen cooking and remembers that there are no beans in the house because she forgot to tell her son to go buy some and says:
Gumatang ka (man) gayam iti balatong.
 buy.AV.IMPER ever DIR.2SG MIR ART beans
 'Oh (I meant to tell you), go buy some beans.'

To summarize, we have shown based on preliminary data that Iloko *gayam* patterns together with Tagalog *pala* in key respects, therefore confirming that not only do many languages of the Philippines also have mirative particles, but there is reason to believe they may similarly encode sudden illocutionary revelation/realization. The brief descriptions and published examples in other Philippines languages suggest the same conclusion quite generally, though the available data is quite limited at this time.

8. Conclusions

In this paper, I have considered Tagalog *pala* against the backdrop of different conceptions of mirativity proposed in previous research on other languages. Following AnderBois (2018) and other recent work, we have taken these the differences between these distinct mirative notions to be an empirical matter to be investigated using standard tools of semantic/pragmatic research such as context-relative felicity judgment tasks. Based on this, I have proposed that *pala* does not encode counterexpectation, surprise, or even new information, but rather the less specific notion of sudden revelation or realization.

Additionally, we show that – as AnderBois (2018) has argued for Yucatec Maya *bakáan* MIR – Tagalog *pala* has ‘outside the speech act’ uses not only in declaratives, but also in other sentence types such as imperatives and interrogatives. The study therefore highlights a mostly unexplored dimension in the cross-linguistic study of miratives. Moreover, the striking parallels between Tagalog *pala*, Yucatec Maya *bakáan*, and Iloko *gayam* across sentence types provides support for a particular theory of illocutionary updates as a basis for explaining the uniformity of this pattern.

While mirativity is often defined informally as the linguistic encoding of surprise, we find further support for the recent body of literature arguing that many mirative morphemes do not actually semantically encode counterexpectation at all. While *pala* itself does not encode counterexpectation, we have surveyed a variety of different elements which, together with a suitable discourse context, may produce utterances which convey the speaker’s counterexpectation or surprise. These include other elements such as interjections which may themselves be miratives, but also a range of other elements such as focus and other discourse particles that convey a sense of contrast and thus play a crucial role in communicating counterexpectation of the mirative sort. These elements are each independently complex and so one clear direction for future work is to better understand these elements and their interactions in greater detail.

Finally, we highlight one additional future challenge for the present account: the ability of *pala* to occur in certain kinds of clausal complements. While this possibility may seem unexpected given the illocutionary account we have given, such examples are indeed possible, as illustrated in (53).

- (53) a. **Context:** I suddenly realize that you might not know that Maribel got married and so I should double check to make sure you do and say:
Alam mo ba pala [kinasal si Maribel]
 know INDIR.2SG INTERR MIR marry.PV.PFV DIR Maribel
 ‘Oh, did you know Maribel got married?’
- b. *Alam mo ba [kinasal pala si Maribel]*
 know INDIR.2SG INTERR marry.PV.PFV MIR DIR Maribel
 ‘Oh, did you know Maribel got married?’

Although I do not have clear differences in felicity judgments to support this at present, consultants report a subtle but consistent difference between such pairs of examples. For (53a), consultants report that the revelation intuitively is more about the question about the addressee knowing, while in (53b), it seems to be more about the fact of the matter. Based on this example, then, we might speculate that the difference in the position of the particle relates to a difference in whether the matrix or embedded clause serves as the main point of the utterance (i.e. its at-issue content). It is well-known that English sentences analogous to (53) which have a veridical attitude and its complement can be used both in discourses where the topic of conversation is about the addressee’s mental state and in ones which are about the fact of the matter itself. In this latter case, the attitudinal information serves as not-at-issue content of some kind (see Simons (2007), Hunter (2016), and AnderBois (2016c) for recent accounts).

A hypothesis consistent with the account in its present form, then, is that the syntactically embedded use *pala* is possible only if that embedded clause has main-point/at-issue in the discourse. Whether this speculation holds across a broad range of data remains to be tested. While embedded uses are *prima facie* unexpected for an illocutionary account, there remains hope that the broader pattern of embedded data will be compatible with the account here given the illocutionary variability of such constructions.

Acknowledgments

First off, my heartfelt thanks to the Tagalog and/or Iloko consultants for sharing their language and culture with me: Alenette Ballesteros, Mariel Pacada, Amber Teng, and Gianna Uson. Thanks also to Rick Nouwen and anonymous reviewers at *Journal of Semantics* where AnderBois (2018) was published for their helpful comments and feedback on the data and ideas there, which included some preliminary data with Tagalog *pala*.

Abbreviations

1	first person	INDIR	Indirect case
2	second person	INTERJ	interjection
3	third person	IPFV	imperfective
ART	article	LNK	linker
AV	agent voice	MIR	mirative
CLF	classifier	NEG	negation
CONT	continuative	OBL	oblique
DEM	demonstrative	PREP	preposition
DIR	direct case	PART	particle
EMPH	emphatic	PL	plural
EXIS	existential	PFV	perfective
EXCL	exclusive	PV	patient/theme voice
IMPER	imperative	SG	singular
INCL	inclusive	TOP	topic

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