I: Intro

* Inefficiency puzzle of war; commitment problem
* Third party intervention and problems
* Repeated interactions
* Limitations of repeated interactions
* Problem of collective action
* Bleak picture
* Intergroup contact to help repeated interactions work
* Problem of misperceptions remains
* Institutions to minimize misperceptions
* Roadmap

II: Non-material factors that cause conflict, including collective action problem

* Adding costs to peace
* Adding value to fighting
* Constraints on leaders
* Biasing perceptions (even if groups prefer peace to fighting)
* Difficulty solving collective action problem

IIIa: Intergroup contact to remove those factors

* Make groups want peace: Goal achievement through cooperation: cooperation in each group’s interest. Like third party punishment/payoffs from the future.
* Give groups incentive to solve collective action problem: Norms for cooperation
* Reduces psych biases to perception: removes stereotypes, anxiety/threat; adds empathy, identification of similarities/joint interests
* Provides opportunity for costly signaling: groups interact and can directly observe outgroup’s preferences and behavior. Confidence-building measure.

IIIb: Joint punishment institutions to minimize misperceptions

* Situation is an iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma: best off with [C,C] but really want to avoid [D,D]. Describe iterative PD.
* When groups prefer peace and intend to cooperate, misperceptions/accidents main challenge to peace: Try to throw C, accidentally throw D. OR Throw C, gets interpreted as D.
* Collective action problem: societies heterogeneous, some don’t want peace. A bad apple could throw D; C is then punishing your own. Two levels of misperception: (1) that D was purposeful on part of group, and (2) that the punishment was not severe enough and the punishment C was actually a D.
* Solution described (police your own) subject to misperceiving.
* Social norms/institutions minimize “accidental” individual D. Institutions to minimize misperception of C to D.
* Joint punishment: both groups decide together. Pros/cons.

IV: Farmer-pastoralist conflict

* Describe conflict
* Describe damage
* Describe joint punishment institutions: adhoc and agreed upon code of laws.
* Describe typical conflict escalation without joint-punishment institution: case of poisoned crop residue
* Describe similar situation with joint-punishment institution: case of captured vigilantes (accidental D).

V: Implications for Peacebuilding Programs

* Identify whether conflict is materially irrational? Think about conflict as deviation from rationality and how to demonstrate the rationality of peace to each group.
* Think about incentives of individual group members, not just groups as a whole.
* Do not try to solve groups conflict externally; help groups solve own problems.
* Programs that demonstrate material rationality of peace. Contact, what about others?
* Important for both groups to benefit equally. Otherwise creating a power disparity.
* Reduce psych biases
* Groups need strength to compel group members.
* Opportunities to observe other side, signal C.
* Contact programs \_can\_ do these things, but others may also. More contact mismanaged runs risk of exacerbating conflict.
* Joint punishment institutions: legitimacy of institutions paramount.
* Aid to governments?
* Favoring one group: makes things worse.

VI: Avenues for Empirical Research

* Test contact programs with groups in conflict and with history of conflict.
* Compare contact programs that do and do not (1) work to achieve goal, (2) actually achieve it.
* Best means to demonstrate material rationality of peace. Trade, differentiated groups?
* Need for enforcement at onset to incentivize Cooperation?
* Role of elites: contact says must support
* Difficulty with very decentralized groups
* Power disparities between groups
* Contact’s differential effects with these power disparities.
* Something about onset & durability.
* In US, black-white relations. Black people following social rules and getting punished by joint-punishment institution: the police. Low legitimacy of institution.