1 – Violence is bad, destroys. Why violence? Results from commitment/trust problem. Explain comm/trust problem.

2 – Comm problems between groups usually solved by 3rd parties or reputations/repeated interactions. Problems with 3rd parties

3 – problems with reputation/repeated interactions.

4 – bleak picture (short para). Neither 3rd parties nor repeated interaction/reputation often sufficient to build trust between groups.

5 – How, then, to build trust between groups and solve commitment problems? What does for a group to trust another group. Collective action problem. 3rd party/rep needs not only signal group desire for peace, but willingness to punish group members who do not. Sambanis: “peace can be derailed by a few radicals.” Beyond most members of a group signaling a commitment to peace, they must also signal a willingness and capacity to punish ingroup members who do not contribute to peace.

6 – groups must desire peace enough to punish ingroup and signal that desire to other side.

* To have groups desire peace, must see how peace is in their interest.
* To signal to other side the desire for peace, need to (1) remove psych/social barriers to trusting other side, (2) signal that each group has solved its collective action problem and can compel radical group members to not take aggressive action against outgroup.

7 – structured intergroup contact to remove psych/social barriers to trust (prejudice): contact must show the groups that it is in the other side’s interest to cooperate. H.L. Mencken: “It is hard to believe that a man is telling the truth when you would lie in his place.” Show that cooperation is in both groups interest: contact helps each group achieve something they desire/achieve a goal. Groups need a reason to get along. Contact is Confidence-building measure.

* Third party intervention and repeated interaction function by making peace in the interest of each group

8 – Joint criminal justice institutions: outgroup policing defectors bad because chance that ingroup perceives outgroup punishment as too harsh, causes spiral. Ingroup policing defectors bad because chance that outgroup perceives ingroup punishment too lenient, causes outgroup punishment.

* Ingroup only punishment: reactive devaluation.

9 – Perspective/Application:

* Nigeria farmer-pastoralist: pastoralists graze cattle on farmland, farmers attack cattle and sow seeds in grazing lands. Farmers do not know whose cattle, pastoralists do not know who attacked their cattle. Attack outgroup generally. Through a contact intervention, groups established joint criminal punishment institutions when a farmer/pastoralist have grievances. Representative from each side’s “government” (chiefs) meet and agree on punishment, make sure ingroup abides by ruling.
* Race Protests/Riots 2020: black people (ingroup) following social rules, punished extremely by cops (outgroup) anyway, no punishment for outgroup defectors, eventually ingroup starts punishing members of outgroup == spiral equilibrium (F&L). Ingroup cannot identify outgroup members who defected so punish any others perceived as outgroup. Low trust in criminal justice system, low legitimacy, low compliance.
  + Use trials; need members of ingroup and outgroup at trial.
  + Describe: black people following laws/social contract, being punished by society’s enforcers (cops) anyway, and nobody is punishing the faulty enforcers. Eventually black people start punishing enforcers: Black Panther Party. Long-term, social institutions lose legitimacy: why follow the legal/social contract if they will be punished as if they are not?
  + Rethought: the joint judicial institution is breaking the rules we agreed upon.

10 – Outstanding issues: (1) Onset of these structures: How to get the ball rolling? A place for 3rd parties? (2) What to do if no bargaining range: how to increase bargaining range so that there are agreements each side accepts?

10 – Implications for peacebuilding programs

* Enforcement to prevent violence initially
* Contact that achieves a goal so both groups (1) want to cooperate and (2) believe other wants to cooperate. EXTERNAL TO THIRD PARTY, incentive remains even after 3rd party leaves.
* Joint criminal justice institutions that both sides see as credible and legitimate.