1 – Violence is bad, destroys. Why violence? Results from commitment/trust problem. Explain comm/trust problem.

2 – Comm problems between groups often solved by 3rd parties or reputations/repeated interactions. Problems with 3rd parties.

3 – many ways other than 3rd party to create trust. Reputation in repeated interaction. **Benefit: doesn’t require outside actor.**

4 – But probs with rep/repeated interactions: need to want peace, be able to signal, be able to receive signals.

5 – Challenge not yet identified for building trust between groups: there is a within-group Collective action problem in addition to a between-group commitment problem. Groups made of individuals. What does it mean to trust a group? It means trusting that sufficient number of group members will cooperate and that they can and will compel other group members who do not want to cooperate.

6 – Bleak picture.

7 – Insights from psych on how to overcome limitations of reputation/repeated interactions. Change attitudes and relieve biased perceptions. Intergroup contact to achieve goal can remove psych/social barriers to trust (prejudice): contact must show the groups that it is in the other side’s interest to cooperate. H.L. Mencken: “It is hard to believe that a man is telling the truth when you would lie in his place.” Show that cooperation is in both groups interest: contact helps each group achieve something they desire/achieve a goal. Groups need a reason to get along. Contact is Confidence-building measure.

* Third party intervention and repeated interaction function by making peace in the interest of each group

8 – Not costly, so can be used everywhere. Sustainable because groups cooperate out of own self-interest. Works in low state capacity.

9 – build to joint-punishment apparatus/joint criminal justice institutions: outgroup policing defectors bad because chance that ingroup perceives outgroup punishment as too harsh, causes spiral. Ingroup policing defectors bad because chance that outgroup perceives ingroup punishment too lenient, causes outgroup punishment. Both groups involved minimizes chance of misperceptions causing a spiral of violence.

* Ingroup only punishment: reactive devaluation.

Contact: get to see that other group has norms/laws/institutions to solve collective action problems.

Contact creates trust [@rohner2013war]

6 – groups must desire peace enough to punish ingroup and signal that desire to other side.

* To have groups desire peace, must see how peace is in their interest.
* To signal to other side the desire for peace, need to (1) remove psych/social barriers to trusting other side, (2) signal that each group has solved its collective action problem and can compel radical group members to not take aggressive action against outgroup.

7 –

8 –

9 – Perspective/Application:

* Nigeria farmer-pastoralist: pastoralists graze cattle on farmland, farmers attack cattle and sow seeds in grazing lands. Farmers do not know whose cattle, pastoralists do not know who attacked their cattle. Attack outgroup generally. Through a contact intervention, groups established joint criminal punishment institutions when a farmer/pastoralist have grievances. Representative from each side’s “government” (chiefs) meet and agree on punishment, make sure ingroup abides by ruling.
* Race Protests/Riots 2020: black people (ingroup) following social rules, punished extremely by cops (outgroup) anyway, no punishment for outgroup defectors, eventually ingroup starts punishing members of outgroup == spiral equilibrium (F&L). Ingroup cannot identify outgroup members who defected so punish any others perceived as outgroup. Low trust in criminal justice system, low legitimacy, low compliance.
  + Use trials; need members of ingroup and outgroup at trial.
  + Describe: black people following laws/social contract, being punished by society’s enforcers (cops) anyway, and nobody is punishing the faulty enforcers. Eventually black people start punishing enforcers: Black Panther Party. Long-term, social institutions lose legitimacy: why follow the legal/social contract if they will be punished as if they are not?
  + Rethought: the joint judicial institution is breaking the rules we agreed upon.

10 – Outstanding issues: (1) Onset of these structures: How to get the ball rolling? A place for 3rd parties? (2) What to do if no bargaining range: how to increase bargaining range so that there are agreements each side accepts?

10 – Implications for peacebuilding programs

* Enforcement to prevent violence initially?
* Contact that achieves a goal so both groups (1) want to cooperate and (2) believe other wants to cooperate. EXTERNAL TO THIRD PARTY, incentive remains even after 3rd party leaves.
* Joint criminal justice institutions that both sides see as credible and legitimate.

Structured intergroup contact – cross-group interactions in which groups cooperate to achieve shared goals – can show groups that peace is in both their interests and remove the psychological barriers to each group identifying that the other wants peace. Intergroup contact Intergroup contact that achieves a joint goal demonstrates to each group that their interests can be served through cooperation, and the prospect of cross-group cooperation that benefits the group motivates individuals to improve attitudes [@grady2020lab] and adopt group norms to ensure cooperation [@fearon1996explaining]. Believing that the other side wants peace also creates the expectation that the other side will solve its collective action problem: the other group will police their own because it is in their interest, not in your interest. Contact also provides opportunities for each group to observe the other policing their ingroup [@fearon1996explaining].

**ALTERNATIVE FIRST FEW PARAGRAPHS THAT CUTS A PARAGRAPH**

1 – conflict bad and enigma, is commitment problem.

2 – commitment problems can be overcome by these two methods: 3rd parties and repeated interactions.

* Third party intervention or the prospect of repeated interactions can help solve commitment problems. These two solutions work by making cooperation in both groups interest. With third party intervention, the groups have an interest in cooperating because the third party will punish them if they do not. Though each group may have an incentive to defect on an agreement after it is made, the groups have less incentive to defect if a strong third party is capable of and willing to punish defection from bargained agreements [@fearon1994ethnic]. With repeated interactions, the groups have an interest in cooperating in the short-term to achieve better outcomes in the long-term. Though each group may have an incentive to defect on an agreement today if the groups will not interact tomorrow, the groups have an incentive to cooperate now if their behavior today will be reciprocated by the other side in future interactions [@ostrom2003trust; @kydd2000trust; @axelrod1981evolution].[^reputation] Both groups stand to gain more from enduring cooperation than enduring defection.

3 – Problems with both

4 – Unidentified problem of collective action

5 – Bleak picture

6 – psych means to overcome issues that