I: Intro

* Inefficiency puzzle of war; information & commitment problem
* Another perspective explains lack of trust and information: group biases
* Compatibility.
* Compatibility Example: many cognitive biases prevent groups from developing trust.
* Compatibility Example: Intergroup contact to reduce those biases and help groups develop trust
* Using both of these perspectives necessary for understanding group conflict and crafting policies to reduce conflict.
* Roadmap

IIa: Conflict as bargaining failure

* Information problem: Trust game
* Footnote issue indivisibility
* Commitment problem: Prisoners Dilemma
  + Problem of collective action
* Can be not a bargaining failure: “Preferences Problem” (Coe 2011; Slantchev 2012)
* *Can* be solved by repeated interactions
  + Footnote “contracts”

IIb: Solutions to bargaining failures

* Third party intervention and problems (often no state)
* Repeated interactions/Reputations

III: Non-material factors that cause conflict, including collective action problem

* Make fighting preferable to peace (or at least to the bargains the other side will agree to)
  + Adding costs to peace (preferences problem)
  + Adding value to fighting (preferences problem)
* Constraints on leaders
* Limitations of repeated interactions (info/commit problem)
  + Biasing perceptions (even if groups prefer peace to fighting) (information and commitment problems)
    - Cannot build trust; only in interest to cooperate if
  + Difficulty solving collective action problem
    - Most discussion about how groups better at collective action better at fighting. Can compel group members. Bornstein (2003), Keefer (2012), Kaplan (2010), Rubin (2019- rebel territorial).
    - “Fearon (2008) describes the modal civil war in the last 60 years as persistent, small and relying on guerrilla tactics, rather than as a conflict between large conventional armies, as in the United States Civil War” from Keefer 2012 “Why follow”
    - Keefer 2012: “Less attention has been paid to commitments between group leaders and members, although the credibility of these commitments influences every aspect of conflict, from a group’s ability to mobilize military capacity to its ability to make agreements with other groups. This paper focuses on these commitments. The central argument here is that leader commitments are credible to the extent that group members and armed forces can act collectively to enforce them. However, to insulate themselves from the risk of expulsion by their own supporters or armed forces, leaders impose limits on collective action. These limits make it more difficult for them to win the hearts and minds of citizens and to field an effective military, each of which increases a group‟s vulnerability to attack by opposing groups.”
* Bleak picture; next section proposes a solution.

IVa: Intergroup contact to remove those factors

* Make groups want peace: Goal achievement through cooperation: cooperation in each group’s interest. Like third party punishment/payoffs from the future.
* Give groups incentive to solve collective action problem: Norms for cooperation
* Reduces psych biases to perception: removes stereotypes, anxiety/threat; adds empathy, identification of similarities/joint interests
* Provides opportunity for costly signaling: groups interact and can directly observe outgroup’s preferences and behavior. Confidence-building measure.

IVb: Joint punishment institutions to minimize misperceptions

* Situation is an iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma: best off with [C,C] but really want to avoid [D,D]. Describe iterative PD.
* When groups prefer peace and intend to cooperate, misperceptions/accidents main challenge to peace: Try to throw C, accidentally throw D. OR Throw C, gets interpreted as D.
* Collective action problem: societies heterogeneous, some don’t want peace. A bad apple could throw D; C is then punishing your own. Two levels of misperception: (1) that D was purposeful on part of group, and (2) that the punishment was not severe enough and the punishment C was actually a D.
* Solution described (police your own) subject to misperceiving.
* Need groups to agree to a peace agreement that allows joint-policing.
* Social norms/institutions minimize “accidental” individual D. Institutions to minimize misperception of C to D.
* Joint punishment: both groups decide together. Pros/cons.

V: Farmer-pastoralist conflict

* Describe conflict
* Describe damage
* Describe commitment problem and information problem
  + Commitment problem can be resolved through information about the other side’s preferences and ability to compel group members
* Describe joint punishment institutions: adhoc and agreed upon code of laws.
* Describe typical conflict escalation without joint-punishment institution: case of poisoned crop residue
* Describe similar situation with joint-punishment institution: case of captured vigilantes (accidental D).

VI: Implications for Peacebuilding Programs

* Identify whether conflict is materially irrational? Think about conflict as deviation from rationality and how to demonstrate the rationality of peace to each group.
* Think about incentives of individual group members, not just groups as a whole.
* Do not try to solve groups conflict externally; help groups solve own problems.
* Programs that demonstrate material rationality of peace. Contact, what about others?
* Important for both groups to benefit equally. Otherwise creating a power disparity.
* Reduce psych biases
* Groups need strength to compel group members.
* Opportunities to observe other side, signal C.
* Contact programs \_can\_ do these things, but others may also. More contact mismanaged runs risk of exacerbating conflict.
* Joint punishment institutions: legitimacy of institutions paramount.
* Aid to governments?
* Favoring one group: makes things worse.

VII: Avenues for Future Research

* Test contact programs with groups in conflict and with history of conflict.
* Compare contact programs that do and do not (1) work to achieve goal, (2) actually achieve it.
* Best means to demonstrate material rationality of peace. Trade, differentiated groups?
* Need for enforcement at onset to incentivize Cooperation?
* Role of elites: contact says must support
* Difficulty with very decentralized groups
* Power disparities between groups
* Contact’s differential effects with these power disparities.
* Something about onset & durability.
* Joint punishment institutions to minimize misperceptions
  + Situation is an iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma: best off with [C,C] but really want to avoid [D,D]. Describe iterative PD.
  + When groups prefer peace and intend to cooperate, misperceptions/accidents main challenge to peace: Try to throw C, accidentally throw D. OR Throw C, gets interpreted as D.
  + Collective action problem: societies heterogeneous, some don’t want peace. A bad apple could throw D; C is then punishing your own. Two levels of misperception: (1) that D was purposeful on part of group, and (2) that the punishment was not severe enough and the punishment C was actually a D.
  + Solution described (police your own) maybe subject to misperceiving.
  + Need groups to agree to a peace agreement that allows joint-policing.
  + Social norms/institutions minimize “accidental” individual D. Institutions to minimize misperception of C to D.
  + Joint punishment: both groups decide together. Pros/cons.