

ECPN Final Evaluation PAP

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Introduction

Clashes between farmer and pastoralist communities in Nigeria's Middle Belt states are increasingly violent and taking on religious and ethnic overtones that divide these communities even further. Due to the effects of climate change, underdevelopment, and massive displacement caused by extremist groups in the North, communities that traditionally interacted over land and natural resources are fast becoming polarized from each other. Farmer and pastoralist communities in the Middle Belt region face limited access to natural resources and land, negatively affecting their livelihood options and causes grievances to fuel more violence and instability in an environment where widespread poverty, poor governance and high corruption levels are already pervasive.

To address this, Mercy Corps is implementing the two-year Engaging Communities for Peace Nigeria 2-year program in the Middle Belt of Nigeria that aims to prevent violence and conflict between farmer and pastoralist communities. More specifically, the program 1) strengthens the capacity of farmer and pastoralist leaders to resolve disputes in an inclusive, sustainable manner; 2) leverages social and economic opportunities to build trust across lines of division; and 3) fosters engagement among farmer-pastoralist communities, local authorities and neighboring communities to prevent conflict.

To understand the impacts of the program, we conducted a two-level evaluation: 1) A RCT at the community level to understand how the overall intervention affects communities and 2) individual analyses to understand how one aspect of the program—joint project committees that foster contact—affects attitudes and behaviors toward outgroups.

Theory and Hypotheses

The ECPN intervention is based on a number of social psychological theories that this study will field test. The main theory is the contact hypothesis. The contact hypothesis is the basis of many social interventions—from integrating classrooms to preventing intercommunal conflict. According to Allport's original theory, the conditions under which intergroup attitudes will improve include:

- Equal Status
- Common goals
- Intergroup cooperation
- Support of law, authorities or customs
- Personal interaction

Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 515 studies and found that intergroup contact reduces prejudice. Moreover, Paluck and Green (2009), who reviewed the contact hypothesis as well as other prejudice reducing interventions in both the lab and the field, found that there have been few field experiments examining the contact hypothesis, and the ones they note involve intense living arrangements during a camp or a dorm. A more recent review by Paluck, Green, and Green (2019) focused on field experiments did find an overall significant effect of contact, but this was largely in smaller studies. Additionally, studies focused on racial and ethnic prejudice had weaker effects.

In Kaduna – part of the Middle Belt of Nigeria – Scacco and Warren (2018) tested the contact hypothesis with Christian and Muslim youth in a computer training program. Youth were divided into either heterogeneous

or homogeneous classrooms, and within the heterogeneous classrooms, youth were either in homogeneous pairs or heterogeneous pairs. The main findings of the study were that while attitudes did not change due to contact, cooperative behavior did as measured by dictator and destruction games. This effect appears driven not so much that contact made people more cooperative towards the outgroup, but that those in homogeneous groups tended to favor their ingroup more.

Contact and creating opportunities for cooperation is the implicit theory behind many community-driven development programs (CDD). Yet, the effects of such programs are minimal, particularly on social outcomes. CDD purports that this process will lead to social cohesion (Chase, Woolcock, et al. 2005). Recent studies on the benefits of these programs have shown little evidence that the process builds social cohesion or social capital between groups in a range of contexts, from DRC, the Philippines, and Afghanistan (King 2013). However, Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009) found in Liberia that a CDD did improve cooperation among community members that were in mixed-gender groups as compared to all women’s groups.

One potential reason that CDD programs may have little impact on social outcomes at the community level is that a small group of people make a decision for the whole community on a project that will benefit the whole community, but may not foster interaction between people. The hope is that if community leaders or a small group of people cooperate, others will see it and/or benefit from cooperation, thus changing their opinions of other member of the community or “outgroup.” However, it is unclear if those spillover effects do occur and, if so, to what extent.

This study builds off this previous work in the following ways: 1) we examine contact within an ongoing conflict; 2) contact is sustained over multiple years rather than at most one year, and usually much less; 3) the CDD intervention is combined with more intentionality to bring communities from different groups in conflict together (i.e., there could be a ceiling effect in other CDD studies on social outcomes); and 4) communities receive a tangible, material benefit from working together. Below we specify our hypotheses at the community and individual level.

Community-level hypotheses:

1. For communities that receive the ECPN program¹ relative to control communities, we will find improved attitudes between farmers and pastoralists.
2. For communities that receive the ECPN program relative to control communities, we will find farmers and pastoralists are more likely to interact with the outgroup.
3. For communities that receive the ECPN program relative to control communities, we will find increased perceptions of physical security by farmers and pastoralists.
4. For communities that receive the ECPN program relative to control communities, we will find farmers and pastoralists are more likely to cooperate in the PGG (will donate more money) and less likely to donate nothing.[We also have a weak hypothesis about changes in the variance of donations, but we do not feel strongly about this hypothesis and believe it could go in either direction. We could observe lower variance because the treatment decreases the size of an individual’s decision space – after treatment, people know about how much everyone in their area will give, and they conform to that amount. But we could observe higher variance because treatment changes the perception of the social norm for *some* people, leading to a distribution of donation amounts drawn from two distributions: the old social norm and the new social norm. If those norms are sufficiently far apart, it would increase variance. Unlike most of our tests, our test of variance would be two-tailed because we do not have expectations about the direction of the effect.]

Individual-level hypotheses:

1. Individuals involved in the planning and implementing of projects that benefit both farmers and pastoralists will have more positive attitudes about the outgroup than individuals who did not participate in these activities.

¹ECPN includes a combination of mediation support, projects that a committee of farmers and pastoralists jointly decide on and implement, and community fora that prevents conflict from escalating. We use “ECPN” to refer to all the various ECPN activities: mediation, joint projects, community fora, etc.

2. Individuals involved in the planning and implementing of projects that benefit both farmers and pastoralists will interact more with the outgroup than individuals who did not participate in these activities.
3. Individuals involved in the planning and implementing of projects that benefit both farmers and pastoralists will have improved perceptions of physical security than individuals who did not participate in these activities.
4. Individuals involved in the planning and implementing of projects that benefit both farmers and pastoralists will cooperate more in the PGG than individuals who did not participate in these activities.
5. Individuals involved in more ECPN activities will have more positive attitudes about the outgroup, interact more with the outgroup, feel more physical security, and cooperate more with the outgroup than those who participated in fewer ECPN activities. More specifically, we will see the most change in participants who participated in the joint projects, followed by the non-participants in the treatment communities, and then the control participants who we expect to have no change.²

Overall Evaluation Design

We evaluate the effects of ECPN with a combination of a RCT at the community level and pre-post test analysis of individuals without random assignment. Initially the plan was to randomize at both the community and individual level as follows: (1) Communities are randomly selected to be “treated” with the ECPN program or remain “control” communities, and then (2) community members within treated communities are randomly selected to participate in the ECPN activities.³ Among participants selected to participate in ECPN programs, some people participate “fully” in every ECPN activity and others participate “partially” in just one ECPN activity. This would yield four experimental groups: (1) full participants in treated communities, (2) partial participants in treated communities, (3) non-participants in treated communities, and (4) non-participants in control communities.

However, due to the low individual-level compliance among those randomly selected to participate (approximately 20% of those selected to participate actually did participate), we modified our study design.⁴ We now have (1) a community-level RCT and (2) a pre-post analysis of individuals we surveyed at baseline and endline. We use the community-level RCT as our main analysis.

Community-level RCT

In the community-level RCT, we will randomly sample ~1,500 people from 10 treated and 5 control sites, where each site contains one farmer and one pastoralist community. These samples will be aggregated at the community level and our analysis is between communities in a difference-in-differences framework. This experiment is also block-randomized within state because ECPN is implemented in states that have different conflict dynamics.

The community-level RCT tells us about community-level change due to ECPN. Since communities were randomly assigned to receive ECPN, control communities function as a counterfactual to treatment communities and we can causally attribute community-level differences to the intervention. Since the control group should have parallel trends with the treatment group if the treatment group was not treated, the community-level analysis uses a difference-in-differences design to compare the baseline-endline change in treatment communities to the baseline-endline change in control communities.

Individual-level pre-post analysis

In the individual-level pre-post analysis, we will resurvey about 100 individuals who participated in the

²This ordered effect is relevant for all of our individual-level hypotheses.

³Because we desired gender equity in group assignment, we blocked each community into males and females and randomly assigned to experimental groups such that each community had about 10 males and 10 females assigned to be full participants, 8 males and 8 females assigned to be partial participants, and the rest assigned to be non-participants.

⁴Lack of compliance was mainly our inability to locate these respondents at the time the joint project committees were being formed, not participants actively refusing to participate. Some of these “passive non-compliers” were located before the endline survey with the assistance of the communities themselves. Some people not assigned to participate in ECPN activities also participated in the committees, so the non-compliance is two-sided.

joint project committees, about 100 individuals from treated communities who did not participate in joint project committees, and about 100 individuals in control sites. Henceforth we will refer to those people who participated as “participants”, those people who did not as “non-participants”, and those people in control communities as “control.” We will compare these groups with a difference-in-differences frameworks.

The individual-level analysis makes two comparisons. The first comparison, comparing the baseline-endline change of the participants to the baseline-endline change of the control, tells us how participation in joint project committees with ingroup and outgroup members changed the individuals who participated. The second comparison, comparing the baseline-endline change of non-participants to the baseline-endline change of the control, tells us about the social diffusion of the effects of ECPN to community members who did not directly participate in joint project committees.⁵

The average change of respondents in control communities may not be a perfect counterfactual for how respondents in the treatment communities would have changed absent ECPN. Though respondents from these communities were randomly selected at baseline, we are only resurveying the ~20% of each community’s baseline respondents. The 20% of participants and nonparticipants we resurvey could be different types than the 20% of control participants we resurvey. To lend credibility to the claim that participants and nonparticipants in the ECPN communities are not “different types” than control group respondents (i.e. that respondents in control communities function as a counterfactual for respondents in treatment communities), we will (1) compare demographic balance of the participants, non-participants, and controls, and (2) provide evidence for parallel trends by conducting a placebo test on outcomes we do not expect ECPN to change.

Research Design and Data Sources

This section summarizes the data sources and analytic strategy for evaluating ECPN with these data sources.

Evaluation Design

We are interested in the change in attitudes, levels of interaction, cooperation, and perceptions of security from baseline to endline. More specifically, we are interested in the *difference* in the amounts of change between treatment communities and control communities, as well as those that participated fully in the joint project committees and those who did not. This is a “difference-in-differences” (DID) design.

A difference-in-differences analysis is vital when comparing across time. From 2015-2017 many things change for the survey respondents. One glaring difference is the state of the Nigerian economy, which fell deeply into recession in 2016. Another is the institution in late 2017 of an anti-grazing law and the resulting violence in Benue state, one of the states for the intervention. Changes over time could lead to changes in how respondents answer survey questions, and we would not want to confuse those “time changes” with changes that are due to ECPN.⁶ The difference-in-differences analysis lets us capture all changes *not* due to ECPN, and observe if ECPN causes additional changes.

Survey Sampling Strategy

We will survey two groups during enumeration. First, we survey respondents identified from the baseline. Second, we survey new randomly selected respondents in these communities. Our survey protocol is: (1) map the community and select households, (2) survey respondents from baseline at their homes, and (3) survey randomly selected respondents at their homes, moving to the next house if a respondent from the baseline

⁵We can also make a third comparison, comparing the baseline-endline change of participants to the baseline-endline change of non-participants, to tell us if the participants changed more than the non-participants. We do not plan for this to be one of our major comparisons. And we do not plan to make a fourth comparison: all treated individuals baseline to endline change to all control individuals baseline to endline change, pooled.

⁶Other changes can also lead to a shift in survey responses and other outcome measures, even if underlying attitudes remain the same. For example, different enumerators generally lead to slightly different survey responses. In the USA this is especially pronounced with respect to questions about racial tolerance. We would not want to confuse enumerator differences for a treatment effect.

was randomly selected. After each survey is conducted, we will announce the result of the public goods game to the community.

Community-level sampling: Our baseline survey randomly sampled individuals from each community. First our enumeration teams mapped each community, beginning in the community center and extending up to 50 households roughly in each cardinal direction. Enumerators worked in male-female pairs, with each pair taking one cardinal direction. Once a pair had mapped 50 households, they randomly selected 10 total households using a random number generator installed on their survey tablets. Each enumerator took 5 households, randomly selecting a respondent within each household by having each select a number from 1 to n , where n is the number of adults in the household. If the selected respondent was available, the enumerator conducted the survey. If the selected respondent was not available, the enumerator set up an enumeration time for the following day.

In some communities the households were too few and far apart to map 50 in each direction.⁷ In this case, the enumerators created a map with the assistance of the community leaders and then walked to as many households as they could reach in ~30 minutes. They then randomly selected households from that list of “reachable” households. The within-household randomization remained the same.

At endline, we will use the same method to randomly select participants. We will sample 50 people per community with this method.

Individual-level sampling:

We will attempt to identify more of these respondents when we visit the communities and will aim to survey about ten baseline respondents in each community, for approximately 300 baseline respondents evenly distributed in each community. This gives us individual-level baseline and endline data to use in the individual-level analyses we describe above in the “Estimation – Individual Level Panel Data” section Individual-level analysis section.

At baseline respondents were randomly sampled from communities and about 20% of those respondents will be surveyed again at endline.⁸ These 300 contain respondents in control communities, respondents who were assigned to participate in ECPN committees and did, and respondents who were assigned to participate in ECPN committees but were not located in time to include them on committees. The data for these respondents is constructed in the same way as the data for people randomly selected at endline (i.e. we will construct the same indices in the same way).

Data and Outcomes

We will collect survey data, behavioral observation data, and behavioral game data. We will collect survey data at two time points (baseline and endline). We will collect behavioral observation data at multiple time points between baseline and endline. We will collect collect behavioral game data at one time point (endline only).

Survey Data

We conduct a baseline survey and an endline survey. The data for the community-level analysis comes from aggregating together the survey responses from ~50 randomly selected respondents in each community (~1500 total survey respondents in 30 communities). Each community’s value will be the arithmetic mean of all the randomly-selected respondents in that community.

We measured several outcomes related to our hypotheses. Our main survey outcomes are attitudes towards the farmer/pastoralist outgroup (Hypothesis 1), self-reported interaction with the outgroup (Hypothesis 2), and perceptions of security (Hypothesis 3). Each of these outcomes is measured through multiple survey questions asked at baseline and endline. We will combine these survey questions into indices for measurement

⁷This was frequently the case for pastoralist settlements.

⁸Due to resource constraints, we and the field team have only attempted to locate and identify respondents assigned to the full or partial participant group in our original study design, and respondents in control communities.

precision. To construct the index for each measured concept we will use inverse covariance weighting.⁹ Specific questions for these topics can be found in the Question Appendix.

We also use two survey experiments to measure outgroup attitudes and circumvent social desirability bias. First, an endorsement experiment to measure outgroup affect (Hypothesis 1). Second, a percent experiment to measure tolerance for interacting with the outgroup (Hypothesis 2).¹⁰

We also measure placebo outcomes: attitudes towards violence and radio listening. The primary purpose of these placebo outcomes is to help us rule out other explanations for treatment-control differences, like greater social desirability bias in the treatment group. Attitudes about violence are a good candidate for a “placebo outcome” because intergroup contact should not affect general attitudes about violence, but respondents may feel social pressure to answer violence questions in a desirable way. Radio listening should also not be affected by ECPN but is less relevant for how self-reported attitudes change from baseline to endline.

Behavioral Observation Data

We monitor market and social behavior in the communities under study. We want to know if ECPN is increasing social interaction between farmers and pastoralists (Hypothesis 2), particularly in their shared marketplace and with social events. We therefore attempt to measure: (1) cross-group interaction at the market, including purchasing of market goods, (2) cross-group social event attendance and food sharing. The observers intended to monitor the market at the same time each month and monitor social events roughly once per month at the first event that occurred each month. In practice, the market and social event monitoring was less regular.

These data quantify qualitative information; they are difficult to collect and will likely to be noisy measures. But they are extremely valuable for documenting changes in how ECPN participants *interact*, which we may miss in survey responses.¹¹ We expect ECPN participants to interact more with their farmer/pastoralist outgroup than non-ECPN participants.

The behavioral monitoring will produce panel data: each site has some data points from the beginning of the project and some from the end of the project.¹²

Behavioral Game Data

We use the natural-field public goods “game” to measure intergroup cooperation (Hypothesis 4).¹³ Our game is similar in form to the game implemented in Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009). In the “game”, we observe participants’ contributions to a community fund that will be used to fund a development project that benefits them *and* their paired conflict community. Participants are told that any contribution they make to the community fund will be matched, so that their giving 100 Naira to the community fund becomes 300 Naira for the community fund. The socially desirable behavior – contributing to a community fund – is costly, but it generates more overall money than the selfish behavior. Thus, participants must make a difficult trade-off between their own interests and the interests of the broader community. In this case, that broader community contains both members of their ingroup and members of the outgroup they are or were in conflict with.

⁹Inverse covariance weighting upweights questions that are less correlated with other questions of the index and downweights questions that are highly correlated. Compared with other ways of constructing indices, it should maximize precision if all index questions measure the same concept but reduce precision if a question used to create the index is unrelated to the underlying concept.]

¹⁰We also conducted a list experiment, but the list experiment failed – the control list had higher scores than the treatment list in most communities, indicating that the difference between the treatment list and control list was not the percentage of people who agreed with the treatment item. We therefore removed the list experiment from this revised PAP.

¹¹Several studies, including Scacco and Warren (2018) and Paluck (2009) demonstrate that intergroup contact programs can affect behavior without necessarily affecting attitudes.

¹²Due to funding issues, there was no monitoring in the middle of the project.

¹³We also believe this game could measure intergroup trust, since participants with more trust that their outgroup will donate to the community fund should donate more than participants who do not trust their outgroup to donate to the community fund. It is weaker as a measure of trust than as a measure of cooperation, and a trust game would more explicitly measure intergroup trust.

This game was conducted at endline only. This will make it difficult to interpret that measure, as we won't know if differences in the level of cooperation are due to (1) the people who participated were more cooperative types, or (2) the engagement in project committees and learning how to work with the outgroup made the more cooperative.

For outcomes, we expect (1) people in treated communities are more likely to contribute to the community fund and (2) people in treated communities contribute more money to the community fund than people in control communities. More details of the behavioral game are in the appendix `{#behGame}`.

Estimation – Community Level RCT

Survey Data Analysis

We will use the DiD framework to estimate the effect of ECPN with our baseline and endline survey data. We are analyzing a block-randomized experiment and therefore our default linear model predicts endline outcomes using baseline outcomes as a control variable. However, if baseline outcomes are not balanced across experimental groups we will use the unbiased but less precise differencing method.¹⁴

We will use following linear model and ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the average treatment effect:

$$Y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_{i,j} + X_{i,j} + D_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

`{#eq:ate1}`

where i is the community in state j , Z is the treatment indicator, and Y is the outcome at endline. X is the baseline outcome for community i and D is a state fixed effect. If baseline outcomes are not balanced, we will use the change score, $Y_i = Y_{i,endline} - Y_{i,baseline}$ and we will not use X . For standard errors we will bootstrap sites within states; for p -values we will use randomization inference to shuffle treatment to sites within states.

Behavioral Observation Data Analysis

We will use following linear model and ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the average treatment effect:

$$Y_{i,j,k} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_{i,j,k} * \beta_2 T_{i,j,k} + X_j + D_k + \epsilon_{i,j,k}$$

`{#eq:ate2}`

where i is the observation in site j and state k , Z is the treatment indicator, T is timepoint, and Y is the outcome. X is the site fixed effect and D is a state fixed effect. We are interested in the interaction between treatment and time (did outcomes improve more in treatment sites than control sites). For standard errors we will bootstrap observations within sites; for p -values we will use randomization inference to shuffle treatment to observations within sites.

The behavioral observations are panel data: each site has some data points from the beginning of the project and some from the end of the project.¹⁵ We treat data points from the beginning of the project as 0 (baseline) and data from the end of the project as 1 (endline).¹⁶

Behavioral Game Data Analysis

We will use following linear model and ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the average treatment effect:

¹⁴Our preferred method of analyzing data with two time points is to add baseline outcomes as a covariate because, generally, this strategy yields more efficient estimates. However, if treatment and control groups are not balanced on baseline outcomes (i.e. treatment is correlated with baseline outcomes), baseline outcomes will be correlated with the error term and will bias our estimate. The change score removes the correlation between the baseline outcome and treatment, and provides unbiased estimates. We define unbalanced by either (1) a p -value below 0.10 or (2) a greater than a 0.20 SD difference between the groups' baseline outcomes. See this `DeclareDesign` post for more about differencing vs controlling for baseline outcomes.

¹⁵Due to funding issues, there was no monitoring in the middle of the project.

¹⁶We do not average all baseline and endline together to create one observation per site because that dismisses the information gained from multiple baseline and endline data points.

$$Y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Z_{i,j} + D_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

{#eq:ate3}

where i is the community in state j , Z is the treatment indicator, Y is the outcome at endline, and D is a state fixed effect. For standard errors we will bootstrap sites within states; for p -values we will use randomization inference to shuffle treatment to sites within states.

Estimation – Individual Level Panel Data

Survey Data Analysis

The data for our individual-level analyses comes from surveying the same ~300 respondents at baseline and endline. With these data, we will make two main comparisons: (1) participants compared to controls and (2) non-participants compared to controls. We can also make a third comparison – participants compared to non-participants – but we do not plan for that to be part of our main analysis.

We will use following linear model and ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the average treatment effect:

$$Y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_{i,j} + \beta_2 N_{i,j} + X_{i,j} + D_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

{#eq:ate1}

where i is the community in state j , P is the Participant indicator, N is the Nonparticipant indicator, and Y is the outcome at endline. X is the baseline outcome for community i and D is a state fixed effect. If baseline outcomes are not balanced, we will use the change score, $Y_i = Y_{i,endline} - Y_{i,baseline}$ and we will not use X . For standard errors we will bootstrap sites within states; for p -values we will use randomization inference to shuffle treatment to sites within states.

Behavioral Game Data Analysis

We will use following linear model and ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the average treatment effect:

$$Y_{i,j} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 P_{i,j} + \beta_2 N_{i,j} + D_j + \epsilon_{i,j}$$

{#eq:ate3}

where i is the community in state j , P is the Participant indicator, N is the Nonparticipant indicator, Y is the outcome at endline, and D is a state fixed effect. For standard errors we will bootstrap sites within states; for p -values we will use randomization inference to shuffle treatment to sites within states.

The behavioral game was conducted only at endline, so this equation is endline only.

Behavioral Observation Data Analysis

There is no behavioral observation data at the individual-level, only at the site-level.

Inference Criteria

We hypothesises that the program will *improve* outcomes (rather than *change* outcomes). This type of strong hypothesis is represented by a one-tailed “greater than” test.

We have no reason a priori to change the α level of our testing procedures compared to other studies, so we maintain the common standard of $\alpha = .05$.

Conclusion

This document summarizes our research designs and analytic strategies for assessing the impact of Mercy Corps' program *Engaging Communities for Peace in Nigeria* (ECPN). Our research designs compare (1) the effects of ECPN between communities that received ECPN and control communities that did not, and (2) the effect over time for people who did and did not directly participate in ECPN activities. We measure impact in three ways: (1) survey data, (2) observational monitoring, and (3) a natural-field public goods behavioral game. Each type of data tells us something unique about farmer-pastoralist relations. The survey data tells us about individual-level attitudes and perceptions, the observational monitoring tells us about cross-group interaction, and the public goods game tells us about cooperation with the outgroup community.

Behavioral Game Appendix (#behGame)

We use a natural-field behavioral game to measure attitudes towards the farmer/pastoralist outgroup. Behavioral games create a strategic choice-making situation for participants, and researchers observe participants' behavioral choices. In a typical behavioral game, participants make this strategic choice in a lab with full knowledge that they are participating in an experiment. Due to these artificial conditions, which are not present in real-world choices, results from lab behavioral games may not conform to similar real-world behaviors (Winking and Mizer 2013; Galizzi and Navarro-Marti 2017). Natural-field experiments solve this problem by creating a choice-making situation in the participants' natural environment where participants are not aware that an experiment is taking place (Harrison and List 2004; Winking and Mizer 2013).

Natural-field behavioral games are especially useful for measuring the tangible, behavioral effects of an intervention. A behavioral game displays an individual's real behavior in an artificial situation; a natural-field behavioral game displays an individual's real behavior in a real situation. As Grossman and Baldassarri (2012) found in Uganda, the cooperation displayed through a public goods game was correlated with observational data on similar cooperative behaviors. Our natural-field public goods game as a measure of behavior change complements our survey responses as a measure of attitudinal change.

Game Details

In our "game", the fifty randomly selected members from each community and the respondents identified from the baseline survey receive 1,000 Naira as part of a development project. They are told that Mercy Corps has money that is to be given directly to people in communities where Mercy Corps works. The money is for these people to do with as they please – they can keep the money or contribute it to a joint farmer-pastoralist project committee that will use the money for a collective good that will help both communities. Participants are also told that Mercy Corps also found someone who will match all donations to these project committees, so if participants donate 1 Naira it becomes 3 Naira for the project committee, and if they donate all 1000 Naira the project committees will receive 3,000 Naira.

Following Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009), we will go to the communities before implementing the game. Both treatment and control communities are told that receipt of funds depends on completing a form that tells us: (1) the community members who will form a committee to manage the money, and (2) plans for how the funds will be spent.

More contributions towards the community fund by people in treatment villages would show behavioral change in a real situation regarding the use of funds. It shows that people in the treatment villages are willing to cooperate across community lines and sacrifice their own money so that both communities can benefit. 1,000 Naira is not an inconsequential amount of money in this area. According to our baseline survey, the average annual income in these communities is around 100,000 Naira. 1,000 Naira amounts to about half a week of personal income. Willingness to contribute that money to a community fund that helps the outgroup demonstrates powerfully that the program has affected a significant change in intergroup relations.

Similar to Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009), we will run the game as a one-time trial as opposed to

a repeated game. We are interested in how the participants play, not in how participants learn to play and change their behavior after repeated exposures to the same game.

One concern is that a member of the research team is a foreigner, and could prime communities to give differently than if he was not present (Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi 2012). This difference is exacerbated with status differentials. As the communities we are working in are quite poor, this is a concern. To minimize the possibility that his presence will affect people's responses, the researcher will stay at a central point and not go out with the enumerators to the households. The researcher will also balance his presence in treatment and control communities.

Implementation of the Public Goods Game

The natural-field public goods game will be conducted in all communities, both treatment and control. An advance team will visit each community to secure their consent to receive funds for development one week before we conduct the public goods game.¹⁷ We should explain the conditions of these development funds to the community leaders and other people important to community consent. They should know: (1) that we can provide 1,000 Naira to fifty farmers and fifty pastoralists of their community; (2) that the community members to whom we give the funds can keep the money or donate it to a project committee containing an equal number of farmers and pastoralists; (3) that we found another donor who will match every contribution to the project committee at a 2:1 rate, such that an individual giving 100 Naira to the project committee results in the project committee receiving 300 Naira; and (4) that receipt of funds depends on completing a form that tells us who in the community will form a committee to manage the money and the plans for how the funds will be spent. The communities should have the form completed when we return for the endline survey, and a project committee and plan for use of funds should be ready when we present the keep/donate option to the participants.

The public goods game will be conducted immediately after the respondent completes the endline survey at their home. Enumerators will survey the community members identified from the baseline and 50 randomly selected respondents from each community. The enumerators will survey the respondent, describe the public goods game, provide each respondent with an envelope with their unique ID number that contains five 200 Naira notes, allow the respondent to privately select the amount they wish to keep and the amount they wish to donate, and collect the donation envelopes in a large sealed manila folder.

The participants will be told the same thing we told the community leaders: (1) that we can provide 1,000 Naira to about 50 members of their community, including the respondent themselves, and about fifty people in the other community, for about 100,000 Naira in total funds given to individuals; (2) that they can keep the money or donate it to the joint-community project committee that contains an equal number of farmers and pastoralists; and (3) that we found another donor who will match every contribution to the project committee such that 1 Naira donated = 3 Naira received by the committee and 1,000 Naira donated = 3,000 Naira received by the committee.

We should then give the participants an envelope with their unique participant ID on it. This will allow us to know their contribution, but will keep it anonymous to anyone who does not have the participant ID-Name key. We must be sure to give each participant the correct envelope. We then tell the group that each envelope contains five 200 Naira in bank notes¹⁸, and that the enumerator has a donation envelope to collect donations. The respondent may go into their home, take whatever money they want to keep, leave whatever amount they want to donate in the envelope, and come back out to place their envelope in the donation envelope. We tell them that we will tally the money and announce how much money their community has raised for the project committee within three days, on our last day doing the survey in their community.

Also to ensure that people do not learn what other people donate to the public good we will 1) have people determine their donations in the privacy of their own home, 2) inform participants that they should not tell others what they donated as it is critical for the research, 3) only announce the whole pool of funds, not

¹⁷It is possible that knowledge that we are coming to bring "funds for development" could affect survey responses about farmers/pastoralists. Ideally, we would conduct the public goods game months after the survey to avoid this issue.

¹⁸It is important that every respondent receives the same mix of bank notes

what communities or individuals gave. If we find that people do tell others, that data will be excluded from the analysis. Additionally, we will match all contributions as if everyone gave the full amount.

Scripts

Game

Great, thank you very much for participating in our survey. Before I go, there is one last thing. As you may have heard, we have development funds to use in this community. We have randomly selected you as one of the 50 people to receive these funds. These funds are not for a Mercy Corps project, but rather for you to keep personally or to donate to a community fund. We have 1,000 Naira to give to you. It is yours, and you can use it either way—for yourself or for a community good.

Your community and [joint farmer/pastoralist community] have created a project committee to whom you can donate this money so that it may be used to help both communities. The project committee has 4 people from each community. We have found a donor that will match the funds that you all contribute to the project committee, so that if you donate 100 Naira the project committee receives 300 Naira, and if you donate all 1,000 Naira the project committee receives 3,000 Naira. You are welcome to donate none, some, or all of the money to the project committee.

Give participant their ID labeled envelopes with five 200 Naira notes in them.

These are your individual donation envelopes. All the donations will be private – only you will know how much money you donated. It essential that you keep how much you give private – please do not tell anyone. I have with me a donation envelope to collect donations. Please go into your home, put however much of the 1,000 Naira you wish to donate to the project committee in the envelope, take whatever amount you want to keep for yourself, and come back to place your envelope in the donation envelope. You are welcome to donate none, some, or all of the money to the project committee. After that we are finished and you may continue your day. We will come back and publicly announce how much money your community’s project committee will receive.

Thank you very much for participating and have a great day.

Result Announcement

Your community did very well and is one of the most generous communities we surveyed! You will receive \$X amount towards the project committee.

Behavioral Game Options

We chose the public goods game, and this specific variation, after considering other variations and even other natural-field behavioral games. The public goods game most closely mimics the type of cooperation that ECPN is intending to foster. Fearon, Humphreys and Weinstein (2009) used public goods games as well to test how a similar intervention affected levels of cooperation.

While there is some concern that what we find will be more of a practice effect in the treatment communities than actual cooperation, since they already have similar project committees working this way, after looking at other games, which were largely dyadic (i.e., dictator game, with or without punishment; trust games) we elected to use the public goods since having trust in joint institutions (i.e., the project committee) is important in of itself. We will use other attitudinal measures to triangulate on why we see or do not see cooperative behavior.

Power Appendix

Community-level power analysis (presented below) suggests we can detect an effect between 0.3 - 0.4 SD with 80% power. The power is based on testing 8 hypotheses simultaneously via Caughey’s Non-parametric combinations procedure (Caughey, Dafoe, and Seawright 2017). It does not use individuals’ or communities’

covariates to absorb error, though our final analysis will. Since the number of communities cannot change, the lines are from simulations with varying amounts of statistical noise added to potential outcomes. Small amounts of noise do not have a substantial effect on power.

Figure 1. ECPN Community-Level Power Analysis




Figure 1: Community-Level Power Analysis

Individual-level power analysis suggests we can detect an effect size between $0.10 = 0.15$ SD with a small amount of noise, defined here as draws from a normal distribution with mean=0 and sd=0.25 SDs. We can detect an effect size of about 0.20 SD with a moderate amount of noise, defined here as draws from a normal distribution with mean=0 and sd=0.50 SDs. The power is based on testing 4 hypotheses simultaneously via Caughey’s Non-parametric combinations procedure (Caughey, Dafoe, and Seawright 2017).

The “noise” parameter simulated how much an individual would change without the ECPN project. Noise at 0.25 SDs translates to an average change of ~ 1.3 points on a 5 question index where questions are 4-point Likert scales where options are to (strongly) agree or (strongly) disagree. Noise at 0.50 SDs translates to

an average change of ~2.1 points on the same 5 question index. An example of a two point change is one respondent moving from “agree” to disagree” on two of five questions, a respondent moving from “agree” to “strongly agree” for two of five questions, or a respondent moving from “disagree” to “strongly agree” on one question.




Figure 2: Individual-Level Power Analysis

Survey Question Appendix

Outgroup Affect

- With regards to someone from [X GROUP], would you feel comfortable:
 - if they worked in your field?

- paying them to watch your animals?
- trading goods with them?
- sharing a meal with them?
- with a close relative marrying a person from [X GROUP]?
- From 1-5, how much do you trust people from [X GROUP] in your area?
- Now I'm going to ask you questions about your community here in Benue/Nassarawa, including [X GROUP]. Please tell me how strongly you agree/disagree with each of the following statements: People in this area can be trusted.

Contact

- Now I'm going to ask you questions about your contact with [X GROUP] in your area.
 - Think of the market you go to most frequently. During the past month, have members of X GROUP gone to that market too? In the past month, how many times did you interact with X group in the market?
- In the past month, have you:
 - Joined a member of X group for a social event outside the home? How often?
 - Hosted a member of X group for a ceremony in your home? How often?
 - Gone to the home of a member of X group for a ceremony? How often?
 - Have you interacted with members of X group in any other way in the past month?

Insecurity

- In the last year were there any areas that you avoided going to or through because of insecurity during the night?
- In the last year were there any areas that you avoided going to or through because of insecurity, during the day?
- In the last year, did insecurity ever prevent you from:
 - Working when you wanted to work? About how many days were you unable to work?
 - Going to the market?
 - Getting water for the household?
 - Going to your field/farm?
 - Moving your animals to grazing areas?
 - Moving your animals to water?
 - Earning money or going to work?
 - Going to school?

Endorsement Experiment

- Imagine that there is a proposal by [the Farmer's Cooperative Society/MACBAN] for action to enhance access to clean water in rural areas. Though expensive, the proposal aims to bring fresh, clean water to hundreds of areas without access to it, including this one. If this were proposed, how would you feel about it?

Percent Experiment

- Think about groups that you might join in your leisure time. Would you join a group that had **5/25/50/75%** X Group members?
- Think about the community you live in. Would you live in a community that had **5/25/50/75%** X Group members?

Violence Placebo

- Now I am going to ask you some questions about the use of violence. Is it always, sometimes, rarely, or never justified to use violence to do each of the following:
 - Retaliate against violence
 - Defend one's group
 - Maintain culture and traditions
 - Defend one's religion

- Bring criminals to justice
- Force the government to change their policies

Public Goods Game

“Thank you very much for participating in our survey. Before I go, there is one last thing. As you may have heard, we have development funds to use in this community. We have randomly selected you as one of the 50 people to receive these funds. These funds are not for a Mercy Corps project, but rather for you to keep personally or to donate to a community fund.

We have 1,000 Naira to give to you. It is yours, and you can use it either way—for yourself or for a community good.

Your community and [joint farmer/pastoralist community] have created a project committee to whom you can donate this money so that it may be used to help both communities. The project committee has 4 people from each community. We have found a donor that will match the funds that you all contribute to the project committee, so that if you donate 100 Naira the project committee receives 300 Naira, and if you donate all 1,000 Naira the project committee receives 3,000 Naira. You are welcome to donate none, some, or all of the money to the project committee.

These are your individual donation envelopes. All the donations will be private – only you will know how much money you donated. It is essential that you keep how much you give private – please do not tell anyone. I have with me a donation envelope to collect donations. Please go into your home, put however much of the 1,000 Naira you wish to donate to the project committee in the envelope, take whatever amount you want to keep for yourself, and come back to place your envelope in the donation envelope. Remember, you are welcome to donate none, some, or all of the money to the project committee. After that we are finished and you may continue your day. We will come back and publicly announce how much money your community’s project committee will receive.”

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