

Hacking .NET Applications: The Black Arts



U S A + 2 0 1 1

EMBEDDING SECURITY


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THIS WILL COVER

- ◆ How-To Attack .NET Applications
- ◆ Tools and Methodology of Attacking
- ◆ Overcome “secure” .NET Applications
- ◆ Building KeyGen/Crack/Hacks/Malware
- ◆ Reverse Engenerring for Protection

Attacking/Cracking IN MEM ||| ON DISK




ATTACK OVERVIEW



Attack on Disk

- ➊ Access Logic ➋ Decompile
- ➊ Infect Logic ➋ Recompile
- ➊ Hook Logic ➋ Debug



Attack in Memory/Runtime

- ➊ Inject Structure
- ➋ Navigate Structure
- ➌ Edit/Control Structure

Attack The Source

In Memory

OR

On Disk




Find the weak spot

Subvert the Logic/State

Control what you need

ATTACKING ON DISK



101 - DECOMPILERS

DEMO

GrayWolf – IL_Spy – Reflector

101 - ATTACK ON DISK

● Connect/Open - Access Code

● Decompile - Get code/tech

● Infect - Change the target's code

● Exploit - Take advantage

● Remold Application - WIN

101 - Recon

EHSHELL



Windows
Media Center

- .NET Framework
Ver 3.5

- Un-0bfu\$ca7ed

- Crash Reporting
Watson

- Coded in C#

101 - Recon



- File Location

C:\Windows\ehome\ehshell.dll

- StrongName KEY

d:\w7rtm.public.x86fre\internal\strongnamekeys\fake\windows.snk



- Registry CurrentUser OR LocalMachine

SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Media Center\

- Web Host Address

www.microsoft.com/WindowsMedia/Services/2003/10/10/movie

CRACK THE APP



Flip The Check



Cut The Logic



Return True



Access Value




Set Value is “True”



SET VALUE TO “TRUE”

~~bool Registered = false;~~

~~If(a != b)~~





CUT THE LOGIC

```
bool IsRegistered()
```

```
{
```

```
    Return "TRUE"
```

```
}
```



ACCESS VALUE

```
bool ValidPassword(int x)
```

```
{
```

```
    ShowKey(Pass);
```

```
    Return (x==Pass);
```

```
}
```

CRACK



CRACK the weak
Media Center

CRACK



PASSWORD

```
public static bool CheckPin(string pin)
{
    ParentalControl.Settings.PIN = null;
    ParentalControl.Settings.Load();
    string text = ParentalControl.Settings.PIN;
    if (text == null)
    {
        return 1;
    }
    if (text.Length > 0)
    {
        if (text.get_Chars(0) == 58)
        {
            goto Block_6;
        }
    }
    ParentalControlPin.StoreNewPin(text);
    return text == pin;
Block_6:
    return text == ParentalControlPin.HashForPin(pin);
}
```

CRACK



DEMO



CRACK THE KEY

Attack the STRONG

“I’m sure they protected
the registration check”

CRACK THE KEY



Complex Math == Complex Math



Public/Private == Change Key



Challenge == Make it EZ



3/B==Name*C == ASK what is /B?



Call Server == Hack the Call



COMPLEX MATH

1. Chop up the Math
2. Attack the Weak
3. ??????????
4. Profit



CHANGE THE KEY

If you can beat them
Why join them

Key = “123456ABCDE”



CHALLENGE

Complex Math

OR

Control the Challenge

REG CODE

Name:



JON DOE

Code:




98qf3uy



REG CODE

Name:



Code:





REG CODE



Name:



JON DOE

Code:

5G9P3



WIN



FAKE SERVER CALL

1. Seed the Request
2. Fake the Reply
3. Kill the Call

DEMO

CRACK A KEY

IL – Intermediate Language

Code of the Matrix |||| NEW ASM

ldarg.0		78	stloc.2		171	ldobj	System.Int32	285	ldloc.3
newobj	System.Void System.Random..ctor(System.Int32)	79	ldloc.2		175	ldloc.0		286	ldloc.3
stloc.0		80	ldc.i4.0		177	ldc.i4	10000	287	btrue
ldc.i4.4		81	lddelem	System.Int32	182	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	242	ldarg.0
newarr	System.Int32	86	dup		187	add		243	ldloc.1
ldloc.1		87	ldobj	System.Int32	188	stobj	System.Int32	244	ldc.i4.2
ldloc.1		92	ldloc.0		193	ldarg.0		245	ldelem.4
ldc.i4.0		93	ldc.i4.0	10	194	ldloc.1		246	rem
ldloc.0		95	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	195	ldc.i4.0		247	ldloc.2
ldc.i4.5	10	100	add		196	ldelem.4		248	ldc.i4.1
callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	101	stobj	System.Int32	197	rem		249	ldelem.4
stelem.i4		106	ldloc.2		198	ldloc.2		250	add
ldloc.1		107	ldc.i4.1		199	ldc.i4.3		251	ldc.i4
ldc.i4.1		108	lddelem	System.Int32	200	ldelem.4		255	ceq
ldloc.0		113	dup		201	add		258	ldc.i4.0
ldc.i4.5	100	114	ldobj	System.Int32	202	ldc.i4	5396	259	ceq
callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	119	ldloc.0		207	ceq		261	stloc.3
stelem.i4		120	ldc.i4.0	100	208	ldc.i4.0		262	ldloc.3
ldloc.1		122	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	210	ceq		263	btrue
ldc.i4.2		127	add		212	stloc.3		268	ldarg.0
ldloc.0		128	stobj	System.Int32	218	ldloc.3		269	ldloc.1
ldc.i4	1000	133	ldloc.2		214	btrue	L_0Te8 ret	270	ldc.i4.3
callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	184	ldc.i4.2		219	ldarg.0		271	ldelem.4
stelem.i4		185	lddelem	System.Int32	220	ldloc.1		272	rem
ldloc.1		140	dup		221	ldc.i4.1		273	ldloc.2
ldc.i4.3		141	ldobj	System.Int32	222	ldelem.4		274	ldc.i4.0
ldloc.0		146	ldloc.0		223	rem		275	ldelem.4
ldc.i4	10000	147	ldc.i4	1000	224	ldloc.2		276	add
callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	152	callvirt	System.Int32 System.Random.Next(System.Int32)	225	ldc.i4.2		277	ldc.i4
stelem.i4		157	add		226	ldelem.4		282	ceq
ldarg.1		158	stobj	System.Int32	227	add		284	ldc.i4.0
newobj	System.Void System.Random..ctor(System.Int32)	163	ldloc.2		228	ldc.i4.3	59	285	ceq
stloc.0		164	ldc.i4.3		230	ceq		287	stloc.3
ldc.i4.4		165	lddelem	System.Int32	232	ldc.i4.0		288	ldloc.3

IT CAN'T BE THAT EZ

NO

PROTECTION ON DISK

- Protection - Security by 0b\$cur17y
 - Code Obfuscation
 - Logic Obfuscation
 - Shells / Packers / Encrypted(code)
 - Unmanaged calls.....

SHUTDOWN

Decompilation

PROTECTION ON DISK

0bfu\$ca7ed

```
public static bool XXXXXX()
```

```
{
```

```
    try
```

```
    {
```

```
        bool flag = ( &4 ) == 4;
```

```
    }
```

```
    catch (Exception exception)
```

```
    {
```

```
        XXXXXX.XXXXXX(arg_0F_0, box(Application));
```

```
        throw;
```

```
    }
```

```
    return flag;
```

```
}
```



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PROTECTION ON DISK

- Protection – Security by security
 - Signed code (1028 bit CRYPTO)
 - Verify the creator
 - ACLs..... M\$ stuff

This can SHUTDOWN
Tampering

UNPROTECTED/PROTECTED



IT CAN'T BE THAT EZ



YES

NEW ATTACK VECTOR SIGNED CODE HACKING



Signed code is based on

- Private Key - 1028 bit
- Signed Hash of Code
-

SIGNED CODE CHECKING IS OFF BY DEFAULT

FAKE SIGNED DLL



FAKE SIGN DLL/EXE

Y U NO Check



Y ASK 4 PASSWORD



NEW ATTACK VECTOR ASM THE OLD IS NEW



- Shell Code - ASM
- UNmanaged
- NO .NET Security
-


Attack from ASM(unmanned)
The Gate is Down

FAKE SIGNED DLL




Attacking / Cracking

In MEM |||| On Disk



ATTACKING .NET APPLICATIONS: AT RUNTIME



ATTACKING APPS

- ① Gain Full Access
- ② Reverse Engineer
- ③ Attack (on Disk or in MEM)
- ④ Take out the “Security”
- ⑤ Control the Program

DEMO: GOD MODE

Inject and Control

PAST TALKS

Hacking .NET Application: A Runtime Attack

Control the Runtime
Control the Application

IF YOU'RE NOT A HACKER WHY SHOULD YOU CARE?

Defend your Applications

Defend your Systems

Verify your Tools\Programs

VERIFY YOUR APPLICATIONS

What is the Crypto & KEY

What info is it sending home

Does it have Backdoors?

Is your data Secure?

REVERSE ENGINEERING

What is going on?

What technology is used?

Any MaLWare?

AM I safe?

REVERSE ENGINEERING

Hack your applications

Don't be helpless

DON'T

LOOK





SECURITY

The Login security check is

- Does $A == B$
- Does $MD5\%5 == X$
- Is the Pass the Crypto Key



DATA LEAK

The Data sent home is

- Application Info
- User / Serial Number
- Security / System Data

KEY

The Crypto Key is

- A Hard Coded Key
- The Licence Number
- A MD5 Hash of the Pass
- 6Salt 6MD5 Hash of the Pass

CRYPTO

The Crypto is

- DES 64
- Tripple DES 192
- Rijndael AES 256
- Home MIX (secure/unsecure)

BAD SOFTWARE

Y U NO CRYPT



Y ASK 4 PASSWORD

THE OLD IS NEW AGAIN

ASM-SHELLS



Pointers in .NET

- What are they good for?
- Are they safe?
- What about the Runtime?
- So ASM-Shells....

MALWARE T1M3
W A R E M A L W A R E


Protection (Shell Crypto)

Attack (Unmanaged Calls)

Protection (Obfuscated Code)

Fake (Signed DLL Protection)

MALWARE T1M3



MALWARE

WHY BE A HOE



- Intelligent names
- Code style
- Don't use loops
- Don't use one area for your Vars
- Access the normal program
- Link to Events
- Use Timers
- Call back into your target
- Spread out your Vars and code

MALWARE FIGHT

MALWARE FIGHT



TD3Ms

fDP3St

VfSdaI

Protect Me! 2010

Rijndael

Salt

Good VI

Ob\$cur17y
Androsa FileProtector

Androsa FileProtector

Version 1.4.4

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MALWARE FIGHT



Androsa FileProtector

Version 1.4.4

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MAJ WARE FIGHT

Protect Me! 2010

```
{
```



```
this.filesToAdd = new List<string>();  
base..ctor();  
this.InitializeComponent();  
this.Text = this.AssemblyTitle + " " + this.AssemblyName;  
if ((int)par.Length == 1)  
{  
    if (par[0].Contains("en"))  
    {  
        this.langParEn = 1;  
    }  
}
```



Androsa FileProtector

```
private void x03a69b6bf16c508c()
{
    var arg_AA_0 = this.xef9c50c23fdde0e7;
    object[] array = new object[][]{6};
    array[0] = this.x991baafb3e2f1814.getTranslation
("mejfjaagfahgfaog", 127490266));
    array[1] = string.Intern(x1110bdd110cdcea4._d57);
    array[2] = box(System.Int32, this.xe25232a1a3e3);
    array[3] = string.Intern(x1110bdd110cdcea4._d57);
    array[4] = box(System.Int32, this.xe25232a1a3e3);
    array[5] = string.Intern(x1110bdd110cdcea4._d57);
    arg_AA_0.Text = string.C
}
```

MALWARE FIGHT



Androsa FileProtector


Version 1.4.4

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PROTECTION FOR WHO?



Obfu\$ca73

WHAT M\$ DID **RIGHT**

Un-obfuscated Code

- Σ Good for user security
 - Σ User can see what they are running

.NET Framework Security

- Σ Targeted Security Access
 - Σ Protect the Computer from the app

Giving Reduced Rights Inside Code

- Σ Put venerable code in a box
 - Σ Mitigate Risk, Segment Risk

WHAT M\$ DID **WRONG**

MixModeCode – Bad for security

- Σ This allows unmanaged code
 - Σ This breaks out of .NET security

GAC & Native Image Override

- Σ Removes ability to secure code

Not Hash Checking Code

- Σ Good for hackers

ATTACKING APPS

- Read my papers: Reflections Hidden Power & Attacking .NET at Runtime
- Watch 2010 Presentations on Attacking .NET DefCon 18, AppSec-DC, DojoCon
- Look up Presentations and Research from Andrew Willson, Erez Ezule, Arndet Mandent
- Use tools: Visual Studio/MonoDev Reflector/GrayWolf/ILspy/.../ILASM/ILDASM

FIN



MORE INFORMATION @:

www.DigitalBodyGuard.com

FIN = 1



HACKER VS ATTACKER

