

Digging Deep: How to Find and Exploit Bugs in IoT Devices

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Speaker@



- SANS DFIR Summit
- DFRWS EU
- HTICA US
- DefCON 20
- HITCON
- CodeBule
- AVTokyo
- APWG
- ISC² APAC Congress



ISLA (Asia Pacific)
2016 Honoree

Publications

- » 10 years experience in Digital Forensics
- » Facebook Forensics (2011) on Hakin9 Magazine
- » Mac Memory Forensics (2014) on Digital Forensics Magazine
- » Investigation and Intelligence Framework (2015) on Forensics Focus
- » Advanced Mobile Devices Analysis Using JTAG and Chip-Off (2016) on eForensics Magazine



Hacking IoT ?

Attack Vector on IoT

- » Ecosystem
- » Device Memory
- » Device Physical Interfaces
- » Device Web Interface
- » Device Firmware
- » Etc...(OWASP IoT project)

Protocol / Software based

- » Wifi
- » BLE
- » Zigbee
- » RF
- » NFC
- » HCE

Hardware Based ?

Cherry Blossom – Page 124, Para 13

13.2 (S) Firmware Inspection

(S) To be able to inspect a firmware image that is loaded on a device, an adversary would need to disassemble the device, solder a JTAG header onto the board, and extract the firmware from the flash chip through the JTAG using JTAG extraction software. The team has been able to successfully solder a JTAG and extract the firmware from a Linksys WRT54G.

Hardware based method?

- » UART
- » JTAG
- » ISP
- » Chip-off


JTAG

- » Joint Test Action Group
- » Communicate with memory chips through Test Access Ports(TAPs)
- » Physical data acquisition
- » Have different pins

Test Access Port (TAP)

- » TCK – test clock
- » TMS – test mode state
- » TDI – test data in
- » TDO – test data out
- » TRST – test reset
- » NRST – normal reset
- » RTCK – return clock
- » GND – ground


Linksys Router JTAG pins




UART


- » serial communications over a computer or peripheral device serial port
- » Transmitting and receiving serial data
- » See the output from console

UART pins





BusBlaster



Attify



Etc.....

OpenOCD

- » Open Source
- » Open On-chip Debugger tool
- » Provide debugging, in system programming and boundary-scan test
- » Work with a list of debug adapter
- » Support a list of router/chips configuration

```
Chriss-MacBook-Pro-3:openocd Chris$ openocd -f interface/MyBlaster.cfg
Open On-Chip Debugger 0.10.0+dev-00131-g3414dae (2017-05-05-13:07)
Licensed under GNU GPL v2
For bug reports, read
    http://openocd.org/doc/doxygen/bugs.html
```

```
Info : If you need SWD support, flash KT-Link buffer from https://github.com/bha
rrisau/busblaster
and use dp_busblaster_kt-link.cfg instead
adapter speed: 1300 kHz
Info : clock speed 1300 kHz
Info : JTAG tap: bcm5352e.cpu tap/device found: 0x0535217f (mfg: 0x0bf (Broadcom
), part: 0x5352, ver: 0x0)
```


2. openocd

```
Info : If you need SWD support, flash KT-Link buffer from https://github.com/ChrisSau/BusBlaster
rrisau/busblaster
and use dp_busblaster_kt-link.cfg instead
adapter speed: 1300 kHz
Info : clock speed 1300 kHz
Error: JTAG scan chain interrogation failed: all zeroes
Error: Check JTAG interface, timings, target power, etc.
Error: Trying to use configured scan chain anyway...
Error: bcm5352e.cpu: IR capture error; saw 0x0 not 0x1
Warn : Bypassing JTAG setup events due to errors
^C
Chriss-MacBook-Pro-3:openocd Chris$ openocd -f interface/MyBlaster.cfg
Open On-Chip Debugger 0.10.0+dev-00131-g3414dae (2017-05-05-13:07)
Licensed under GNU GPL v2
For bug reports, read
  http://openocd.org/doc/doxygen/bugs.html
Info : If you need SWD support, flash KT-Link buffer from https://github.com/ChrisSau/BusBlaster
rrisau/busblaster
and use dp_busblaster_kt-link.cfg instead
adapter speed: 1300 kHz
Info : clock speed 1300 kHz
Info : JTAG tap: bcm5352e.cpu tap/device found: 0x0535217f (mfg: 0x0bf
), part: 0x5352, ver: 0x0)
Info : accepting 'telnet' connection on tcp/4444
```

1. telnet

```
Chriss-MacBook-Pro-3:~ Chris$ telnet localhost 4444
Trying ::1...
telnet: connect to address ::1: Connection refused
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
Open On-Chip Debugger
> █
```

Kill the watchdog and halt system

A screenshot of a terminal window titled "1. telnet". The window has three colored window control buttons (red, yellow, green) at the top left. The title bar says "1. telnet". The terminal content is as follows:

```
Chriss-MacBook-Pro-3:~ Chris$ telnet localhost 4444
Trying ::1...
telnet: connect to address ::1: Connection refused
Trying 127.0.0.1...
Connected to localhost.
Escape character is '^]'.
Open On-Chip Debugger
> bcm5352e.cpu mdw 0x9fc00000 1000
target not halted
embedded:startup.tcl:21: Error: error reading target @ 0x7fff5
> halt
target halted in MIPS32 mode due to debug-request, pc: 0x800031b4
> halt
> halt
target halted in MIPS32 mode due to debug-request, pc: 0x800031b4
> █
```

The terminal window has a dark background and light-colored text. A vertical scroll bar is visible on the right side of the window.

Print the kernel address value

Open On-Chip Debugger

```
> bcm5352e.cpu mdw 0x9fc40000 100
0x9fc40000 30524448 0035f000 ba4a80fc 00010000 HDR0..5...J.....
0x9fc40010 00000001c 000b9a74 00000000 08088b1f ...t.....
0x9fc40020 568f4a82 69700302 00796767 6c7f5aec .J.V..piggy..Z.1
0x9fc40030 7f76751c debb333b 76321b24 31dac736 .uv.;3..$.2v6..1
0x9fc40040 f599c778 c2e8602e ade9872d 8271b0ca x....`...-.....q.
0x9fc40050 83e568a9 a8af4aa8 f039dada 4029535d .h...J...9.]S)@
0x9fc40060 da5d2342 e03b5b9b 571e26f6 cdab54b2 B#]..[;..&.W.T..
0x9fc40070 15fe7bb5 1c78dbd3 35e9ae63 00842b14 .{....x.c..5.+..
0x9fc40080 aab3d715 c7288953 2221c9b9 8b51157a ....S.(...!"z.Q.
0x9fc40090 4c72384a 3be66f3f 8938c6f6 153aff69 J8rL?o.;.8.i.::
0x9fc400a0 bceed64b efbefbef 3be3fdfb 4a2452ab K.....;..R$J
0x9fc400b0 f67dfd9f ffdffd9f7 7f8bbfcf 06f1d061 ..}.....a...
0x9fc400c0 81bd7cc3 d6f746be 790d9bd4 9a72fce4 .|...F.....y..r.
0x9fc400d0 2a1c77e8 328c1836 3240df37 99da3519 .w.*6..27.@2.5..
0x9fc400e0 b9a37cb2 fcfc5f39 be6d6dd7 7fba772c .|..9_.mm.,w..
0x9fc400f0 fbe8b694 4ea34e8e 97c0ca82 388d248d .....N.N.....$.8
0x9fc40100 d0ce7893 b23d4398 4ee34ad1 9a59cf05 .x...C=..J.N..Y.
```

Magic Header of Kernel Section

0	1	2	3
0	1	2	3
4	5	6	7
8	9	0	1
-----+-----+-----+-----+	magic number ('HDR0')		
-----+-----+-----+-----+	length (header size + data)		
-----+-----+-----+-----+	32-bit CRC value		
-----+-----+-----+-----+	TRX flags		TRX version
-----+-----+-----+-----+	Partition offset[0]		
-----+-----+-----+-----+	Partition offset[1]		
-----+-----+-----+-----+	Partition offset[2]		

Memory Dump

- » firmware-recovery script from Openocd
- » Image_dump(If address do not match)
- » CFE Memory: 0x9fc00000, size: 0x40000
KERNEL Memory : 0x9fc40000, size:
0x1B0000
NVRAM Memory : 0x9fDF0000, size:
0x10000

	linksys_NVRAM.bin																							
	Edit As:		Hex		Run Script		Run Template																	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	0123456789012345							
9040h:	68	5F	6D	6F	64	65	3D	6E	6F	6E	65	00	70	70	74	70	h_mode=none.pptp							
9050h:	5F	67	65	74	5F	69	70	3D	00	70	70	74	70	5F	70	61	_get_ip=.pptp_pa							
9060h:	73	73	3D	31	00	70	70	70	5F	6B	65	65	70	61	6C	69	ss=1.ppp_keepali							
9070h:	76	65	3D	30	00	6D	74	75	5F	65	6E	61	62	6C	65	3D	ve=0.mtu_enable=							
9080h:	30	00	64	31	31	67	5F	72	74	73	3D	32	33	34	37	00	0.d11g_rts=2347.							
9090h:	62	6C	6F	63	6B	5F	61	63	74	69	76	65	78	3D	30	00	block_activex=0.							
90A0h:	77	6C	30	5F	72	78	63	68	61	69	6E	5F	70	77	72	73	wl0_rxchain_pwrs							
90B0h:	61	76	65	5F	65	6E	61	62	6C	65	3D	31	00	61	67	30	ave_enable=1.ag0							
90C0h:	3D	30	78	30	32	00	68	74	74	70	5F	70	61	73	73	77	=0x02.http_passw							
90D0h:	64	3D	61	64	6D	69	6E	00	77	6C	5F	77	70	61	5F	70	d=admin.wl_wpa_p							
90E0h:	73	6B	3D	00	72	65	6D	6F	74	65	5F	6D	67	74	5F	68	sk=.remote_mgt_h							
90F0h:	74	74	70	73	3D	30	00	62	6C	6F	63	6B	5F	77	61	6E	ttps=0.block_wan							
9100h:	3D	31	00	6C	61	6E	5F	73	74	70	3D	30	00	77	6C	30	=1.lan_stp=0.wl0							
9110h:	5F	77	6D	65	5F	61	70	5F	76	69	3D	37	20	31	35	20	_wme_ap_vi=7 15							
9120h:	31	20	36	30	31	36	20	33	30	30	38	20	6F	66	66	00	1 6016 3008 off.							
9130h:	77	6C	30	5F	62	73	73	5F	6D	61	78	61	73	73	6F	63	wl0_bss_maxassoc							
9140h:	3D	31	32	38	00	77	6C	5F	6D	6F	64	65	3D	61	70	00	=128.wl_mode=ap.							
9150h:	73	6B	69	70	5F	61	6D	64	5F	63	68	65	63	6B	3D	30	skip_amd_check=0							
9160h:	00	77	6C	30	5F	63	6C	6F	73	65	64	3D	30	00	77	6C	.wl0_closed=0.wl							
9170h:	30	5F	72	61	74	65	3D	30	00	77	6C	30	5F	70	6C	63	0_rate=0.wl0_plc							
9180h:	70	68	64	72	3D	6C	6F	6E	67	00	77	61	6E	5F	70	70	phdr=long.wan_pp							
9190h:	74	70	5F	67	61	74	65	77	61	79	3D	00	77	6C	30	5F	tp_gateway=.wl0_							
91A0h:	6D	61	63	6D	6F	64	65	3D	64	69	73	61	62	6C	65	64	macmode=disabled							
91B0h:	00	64	31	31	67	5F	72	61	74	65	73	65	74	3D	64	65	.d11g_rateset=de							
91C0h:	66	61	75	6C	74	00	77	6C	5F	77	70	61	5F	67	74	6B	fault.wl_wpa_gtk							
91D0h:	5F	72	65	6B	65	79	3D	33	36	30	30	00	73	65	6C	5F	rekey=3600.sel							

Whole FLASH structure


- » Common Firmware Environment (CFE) - bootloader
- » Kernel - firmware
- » NVRAM - store variable information

Secret


- » Plaintext username and password
- » No authentication is required for console login
- » RAM address: 0x80000000 size: 0x01000000

```
pppoe_passwd
ddns_passwd
ddns_passwd_buf
/etc/passwd
/etc/passwd
/etc/passwd
auth_passwd
http_passwd
ppp_passwd
ddns_passwd
ddns_passwd_2
ddns_passwd_buf
ddns_passwd_bak
ppp_passwd
pppoe_passwd
ppp_passwd_1
pppoe_passwd_1
ppp_passwd=
http_passwd=Password!
auth_passwd=Password!
ddns_passwd_bak=
ddns_passwd_2=
pppoe_passwd=
ddns_passwd=
ddns_passwd_buf=
```


ISP – In System Circuit Programming




Amazon Alexa



Chip-Off



Google Home Mini



Chip-off Village by VXRL



VXCON on 21-22 April in Hong Kong



Discount code for HITB AMS

'hitb@ams_@vxcon2018'

<https://www.eventbrite.hk/e/vxcon-2018-tickets-43644511910>

Or www.vxcon.hk for agenda

Thank You!