

# RSA® Conference 2019

San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



# BETTER.

SESSION ID: SPO2-T08

# Using the Cloud to Secure Versus Securing the Cloud

**Tom Corn**

SVP/GM Security Products  
VMware  
@therealtomcorn



#RSAC

an Ounce of Prevention  
is worth a Pound of Cure



# THE Pennsylvania GAZETTE.

## *Protection of Towns from Fire*

February 4, 1735

Being old and lame of my Hands, and thereby incapable of assisting my Fellow Citizens, when their Houses are on Fire; I must beg them to take in good Part the following Hints on the Subject of Fires.

In the first Place, as an Ounce of Prevention is worth a Pound of Cure, I would advise 'em to take Care how they suffer living Brands-ends, or Room into anot pan shut; for Sc Appearance till you may be forc and hazard you

And now we tal to the Act for p Coopers Shops, Houses in the p testable Practic Fire Place, whic Turpentine, sta Brand shall rou

Once more; if Chimneys were more frequently and more care fully clean'd, some Fires might thereby be prevented. I have known foul Chimneys burn most furiously a few Days after they were swept; People in Confidence that they are clean, making large Fires. Every Body among us is allow'd to sweep Chimneys, that please to undertake that Business; and if a Chimney fires thro' fault of the Sweeper, the Owner pays the Fine, and the Sweeper goes free. This Thing is not right. Those who undertake Sweeping of Chimneys, and employ Servants for that Purpose, ought to be licensed by the Mayor; and if any Chimney fires and flames out 15 Days after Sweeping, the Fine should be paid by the Sweeper; for it is his Fault.

We have at present got Engines enough in the Town, but I question, whether in many Parts of the Town, Water enough can be had to keep them going for half an Hour together. It seems to me some Publick Pumps are wanting; but that I submit to better Judgments.

To our Conduct in the Affair of Extinguishing Fires, tho' we

obedience, to these Officers in any, at such Times, is punished by a Fine of 40s. or ten Days Imprisonment. These Officers, with the Men belonging to the Engine, at their Quarterly Meetings, discourse of Fires, of the Faults committed at some, the good Management in some Cases at others, and thus communicating their Thoughts and Experience they grow wise in the Thing, and know how to command and to execute in the best manner upon

In the first Place, as an Ounce of Prevention is worth a Pound of Cure, I would advise 'em to take care how they suffer living Coals in ...

Manner of the new Buildings in London, and as Mr. Turner's House in Front-Street, or Mr. Nichols's in Chestnut-Street,<sup>3</sup> are built; which I conceive would tend considerably to their Preservation.

Let others communicate their Thoughts as freely as I have done mine, and perhaps something useful may be drawn from the Whole.

For SOUTH-CAROLINA directly, The Ship Loyal-Judith, LOVELL PAYNTER, Commander, WILL Sail when the Weather permits. For Freight or Passage agree with the said Master on board the said Ship, now lying at Mr. Samuel Autin's Wharf; or with Benjamin Shoemaker, Merchant, in High-Street Philadelphia.




Roman period






## Medieval period





Early modern period






Innovation focused on reacting  
to fires




Escalating cost of  
fires




# Philadelphia 18<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY




# Philadelphia 18<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY






Innovation focused on reacting  
to fires

# 18<sup>th</sup> Century fire prevention approaches



Chimney sweeps



Transferring coals  
properly

# Modern fire prevention approaches



Building regulations  
and codes

Flame retardant paints  
and  
materials



Safe liquid  
storage



Fire proof homes

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Warning-  
I make no  
Flames,  
ur Windows,

## an Ounce of Prevention

And now we talk of Prevention, where would be the Damage, if, to the Act for preventing Fires, by regulating Bakehouses and Coopers Shops, a Clause were added to regulate all other Houses in the particulars of too shallow Hearths, and the detestable Practice of putting wooden Mouldings on each side the Fire Place, which being commonly of Heart-of-Pine and full of Turpentine, stand ready to flame as soon as a Coal or a small Brand shall roul [roll] against them.

Once more; if Chimneys were more frequently and more carefully cleand, some Fires might thereby be prevented. I have known foul Chimneys burn most furiously a few Days after they were swept; People in Confidence that they are clean, making large Fires. Every Body among us is allow'd to sweep Chimneys, that please to undertake that Business; and if a Chimney fires thro' fault of the Sweeper, the Owner pays the Fine, and the Sweeper goes free. This Thing is not right. Those who undertake Sweeping of Chimneys, and employ Servants for that Purpose, ought to be licensed by the Mayor; and if any Chimney fires and flames out 15 Days after Sweeping, the Fine should be paid by the Sweeper; for it is his Fault.

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Let me say one thing more, and I will be silent. I could wish, that either Tiles would come in use for a Covering to Buildings; or else that those who build, would make their Roofs more safe to walk upon, by carrying the Wall above the Eves, in the Manner of the new Buildings in London, and as Mr. Turner's House in Front-Street, or Mr. Nichols's in Chestnut-Street,<sup>3</sup> are built; which I conceive would tend considerably to their Preservation.

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# An Ounce of Prevention

# Reactive Versus Preventive Cyber Controls

Firefighting versus fire prevention

## Reactive


(E.g., AV, Deception, HIPS, EDR)

## Preventive

(E.g., Patching, Segmentation, App Control, Encryption)


# Where do we Invest and Innovate?

Reactive versus preventive cyber controls



# What has the Bigger Impact on Risk?


Reactive versus preventive cyber controls



# Cloud Workload Protect Controls Hierarchy

## Gartner Market Guide for Cloud Workload Protection Framework


Figure 1. Cloud Workload Protection Controls Hierarchy, © 2018 Gartner, Inc.



Source: Gartner, Market Guide for Cloud Workload Protection Platforms, Neil MacDonald, March 26th 2018. Gartner does not endorse any vendor, product or service depicted in its research publications, and does not advise technology users to select only those vendors with the highest ratings or other designation. Gartner research publications consist of the opinions of Gartner's research organization and should not be construed as statements of fact. Gartner disclaims all warranties, expressed or implied, with respect to this research, including any warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. This graphic was published by Gartner, Inc. as part of a larger research document and should be evaluated in the context of the entire document. Charts/graphics created by VMware based on Gartner research.

# What Would it Take to Rethink Prevention?

Shift the focus from infrastructure to applications




# An Infrastructure-Centric Approach




Perimeter



# An Infrastructure-Centric Approach




# An Infrastructure-Centric Approach




# An Application-Centric Approach

Understand the composition, topology and behavior of your application




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# An Application-Centric Approach


Use that understanding to drive how you lock and monitor



# Principle of Least Privilege

“Every program and every privileged user of the system should operate using the least amount of privilege necessary to complete the job.”

Professor Jerome Saltzer,  
MIT Communications of the ACM






Attacker advantage

Defender advantage

## Focus on Infrastructure

Attacker advantage

Defender advantage



Compute



Storage



Network

## Focus on Threats

Attacker advantage

Defender advantage



Compute



Storage




Network


Focus on the Application

Attacker advantage

Defender advantage









# The Unique Properties of Clouds




# Leveraging the Unique Properties of Virtualization




# What does that look like?









# Learn




# Learn





# Adapt





















## Shared Services



North / South

East / West

Service  
Driven  
Firewall

How effective is this  
in real world situations?



Christopher Key


CEO & Co-Founder Verodin

>> VERODIN



## VERODIN PLATFORM

# VERODIN'S SECURITY INSTRUMENTATION PLATFORM (SIP)



Enables customers to prove the effectiveness of the cybersecurity controls within their production environment


Moves cybersecurity from a “magic black box” to a quantifiable business function

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CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS /  
CONFIGURATION ASSURANCE

OPTIMIZATION

RATIONALIZATION

KNOWN GOOD  
BASELINE


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### CONTINUOUS VALIDATION



CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS /  
CONFIGURATION ASSURANCE

OPTIMIZATION


RATIONALIZATION


KNOWN GOOD  
BASELINE


ENVIRONMENTAL  
DRIFT DETECTION


**DIRECTOR**













# APPLICATION SETUP



# MITRE ATT&CK VISIBILITY



# MITRE ATT&CK VISIBILITY

AREA OF FOCUS WITH MITRE

RECON

WEAPONIZE

DELIVER

EXPLOIT

CONTROL

EXECUTE

MAINTAIN

Initial access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege escalation

Defense evasion

Credential access

Discovery

Lateral movement

Collection

Exfiltration

Command & control

8 OUT OF 11

OF THE MITRE TACTICS  
WERE TESTED AGAINST

# MITRE ATT&CK VISIBILITY

AREA OF FOCUS WITH MITRE

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## EXECUTION TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution: RegAsm Bypass
- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe
- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service
- Host CLI – Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec
- Host CLI – Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using Powershell
- Host CLI – Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using cU

# MITRE ATT&CK VISIBILITY

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## PERSISTENCE TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Persistence: Scheduled Task
- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service

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## PRIVILEGE ESCALATION TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service

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Command & control

## DEFENSE EVASION TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution: RegAsm Bypass
- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe
- Host CLI – Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service
- Host CLI – Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection
- Host CLI – Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ UPX Packing (2.1.1)
- Host CLI – Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimitaz W/ String Change

# MITRE ATT&CK VISIBILITY

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## CREDENTIAL ACCESS TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Credential Access: Mimikatz (2.1.1)
- Host CLI – Credential Access: Mimikatz W/ 10MB padding (2.1.1)
- Host CLI – Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ UPX Packing (2.1.1)
- Host CLI – Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimitaz W/ String Change
- Host CLI – Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec

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## DISCOVERY TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Discovery: Enumerate Local Administrators

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## LATERAL MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive

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EXPLOIT

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EXECUTE

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## EXFILTRATION TECHNIQUES

- Host CLI – Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using Powershell
- Host CLI – Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using cU

# MITRE ATT&CK VISIBILITY

## AREA OF FOCUS WITH MITRE

RECON

WEAPONIZE

DELIVER

EXPLOIT

CONTROL

EXECUTE

MAINTAIN

## MITRE ATT&CK

Initial access

Execution

Persistence

Privilege escalation

Defense evasion

Credential access

Discovery

Lateral movement

Collection

Exfiltration

Command & control

### APP TIER

VID	Action Name
A104-167	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz (2.1.1)
A104-166	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz W/ 10MB padding (2.1.1)
A104-165	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ UPX Packing (2.1.1)
A104-059	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ String Change
A104-351	Host CLI - Discovery: Enumerate Local Administrators
A104-218	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: RegAsm Bypass
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task
A104-164	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service


### APP TIER > APP TIER

VID	Action Name
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection

### APP TIER > EXTERNAL

VID	Action Name
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec

# EVALUATION METHODOLOGY



Three-phase testing approach to establish  
and prove against known baseline

# EVALUATION RESULTS

## PHASE-1:

### NSX DISABLED AD DISABLED

APP TIER		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE		NSX PREVENT/ DETECT, AD DETECT	AD/NSX PREVENT/ DETECT MODE
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED		
A104-167	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz (2.1.1)	●	●		
A104-166	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz W/ 10MB padding (2.1.1)	●	●		
A104-165	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ UPX Packing (2.1.1)	●	●		
A104-059	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ String Change	●	●		
A104-351	Host CLI - Discovery: Enumerate Local Administrators	●	●		
A104-218	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: RegAsm Bypass	●	●		
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe	●	●		
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task	●	●		
A104-164	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service	●	●		
APP TIER > APP TIER		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE			
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED		
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●		
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●		
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●		
APP TIER > EXTERNAL		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE			
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED		
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●		
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●		
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●		
APP TIER > DB		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE			
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED		
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●		
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●		
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●		
DB > EXTERNAL		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE			
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED		
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task	●	●		
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe	●	●		
A104-345	Host CLI - Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using Powershell	●	●		
A104-344	Host CLI - Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using cU	●	●		

# EVALUATION RESULTS

## PHASE-2: NSX PREVENT AD DETECT

APP TIER		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE		NSX PREVENT/ DETECT, AD DETECT	
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-167	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz (2.1.1)	●	●	●	●
A104-166	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz W/ 10MB padding (2.1.1)	●	●	●	●
A104-165	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ UPX Packing (2.1.1)	●	●	●	●
A104-059	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ String Change	●	●	●	●
A104-351	Host CLI - Discovery: Enumerate Local Administrators	●	●	●	●
A104-218	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: RegAsm Bypass	●	●	●	●
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe	●	●	●	●
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task	●	●	●	●
A104-164	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service	●	●	●	●
APP TIER > APP TIER					
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●	●	●
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●	●	●
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●	●	●
APP TIER > EXTERNAL					
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●	●	●
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●	●	●
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●	●	●
APP TIER > DB					
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●	●	●
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●	●	●
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●	●	●
DB > EXTERNAL					
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task	●	●	●	●
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe	●	●	●	●
A104-345	Host CLI - Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using Powershell	●	●	●	●
A104-344	Host CLI - Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using cU	●	●	●	●

AD/NSX PREVENT/  
DETECT MODE

# EVALUATION RESULTS

## PHASE-3:

### NSX PREVENT

### AD PREVENT

APP TIER		VERODIN TESTS FOR BASELINE		NSX PREVENT/ DETECT, AD DETECT		AD/NSX PREVENT/ DETECT MODE	
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-167	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz (2.1.1)	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-166	Host CLI - Credential Access: Mimikatz W/ 10MB padding (2.1.1)	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-165	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ UPX Packing (2.1.1)	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-059	Host CLI - Credential Access, Defense Evasion: Mimikatz W/ String Change	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-351	Host CLI - Discovery: Enumerate Local Administrators	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-218	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: RegAsm Bypass	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-164	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution, Persistence, Privilege Escalation: New Service	●	●	●	●	●	●
APP TIER > APP TIER							
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●	●	●	●	●
APP TIER > EXTERNAL							
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●	●	●	●	●
APP TIER > DB							
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-341	Host CLI - Lateral Movement: Copy Mimikatz using Mapped Network Drive	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-342	Host CLI - Execution, Credential Access: Remote Execution of Mimikatz using PaExec	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-343	Host CLI - Defense Evasion: Removal of Network Share Connection	●	●	●	●	●	●
DB > EXTERNAL							
VID	Action Name	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED	DETECTED	BLOCKED
A104-010	Host CLI - Persistence: Scheduled Task	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-096	Host CLI - Defense Evasion, Execution: rundll32.exe	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-345	Host CLI - Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using Powershell	●	●	●	●	●	●
A104-344	Host CLI - Execution, Exfiltration: HTTP Exfil/Upload of PCI Data using cU	●	●	●	●	●	●




Christopher Key





CEO & Co-Founder Verodin

>> VERODIN

an Ounce of Prevention  
is worth a Pound of Cure

Benjamin Franklin





Unconventional Thinking Often Comes From  
Unconventional Sources

The VMware logo is displayed in its signature white, lowercase, sans-serif font. The letter 'v' is slightly taller than the other letters. A small registered trademark symbol (®) is positioned at the top right of the 'e'.

Unconventional Thinking Often Comes From  
Unconventional Sources

# Where Can You Learn More?

## Watch

"Three Things the Security Industry Isn't Talking About (but Should Be)"

Thursday, Mar 07  
04:00 P.M. - 04:25 P.M.  
Pat Gelsinger, Chief Executive Officer,  
Vmware  
Shannon Lietz, Director, Intuit

## Experience

See these strategies in action at:

VMware Booth:  
North Hall #5655

VERODIN at Booth #4214

## Learn

Learn more at  
[www.vmware.com/enterprise-security-solutions](http://www.vmware.com/enterprise-security-solutions)

[vmware.com/go/service-defined-firewall](http://vmware.com/go/service-defined-firewall)

<https://www.verodin.com>

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SESSION ID: SPO2-T08

# Using the Cloud to Secure Versus Securing the Cloud

**Tom Corn**

SVP/GM Security Products  
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