



San Francisco | March 4–8 | Moscone Center



A large, abstract graphic in the top right corner consists of a dense web of thin, colored lines (blue, green, yellow) radiating from a central point, resembling a network or a sunburst diagram.

BETTER.

SESSION ID: GRC-T08

# Finding the Right Answers—Facilitating Insider Threat Analysis Using OCTAVE FORTE

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#RSAC

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# Can This Happen to Your Organization?

**Law Enforcement Employee  
Performed Unauthorized Queries  
in Database; Provided Sensitive  
Information to Domestic and  
International Acquaintances**

**Disgruntled Former Employee  
Compromised Supervisor  
Credentials to Read Email, View  
Employee Reviews, Steal IP, and  
Post Data to Social Media Site(s)**

**VP of Technology Company Transferred  
>\$19M from Organization to Personal  
Accounts; Created False Reimbursement  
Documents for Health Insurance Plan**

# Assessing Insider Threat with OCTAVE FORTE

All attendees will walk away with a greater appreciation for risk:

## Educate + Learn = Apply

We will apply OCTAVE  
FORTE process to an  
Insider Threat Risk

You will actively participate  
with your own  
organizational challenges

You will gain practical ideas  
to manage risk and be  
educated on insider threat

**Bottom Line: Insider Threat is a critical risk that can be included in most enterprise risk portfolios**

# In a World of Great Uncertainty

## What is Certain?


- Risk environment will not contract – number of risks and **complexity will increase**
- Organizations must get better at “**surviving**” uncertainty
- **Knowledge and awareness of risk issues** must be pervasive throughout the organization
- Traditional tools, techniques, and methods may not work and will need to **evolve**
- Organizations must be **agile** enough to adapt



# OCTAVE's Evolution => FORTE

*Accounts for Several Standards to Incorporate*

- Leverages many standard principles and best practices
- Facilitated – Getting Organizational Input
- Operational – Real Time Applicability
- Risk – Establishing a Process to Assess
- Tailored – Flexible for All Organizations
- Enterprise – Application at All Levels




# Use Case for an Organization...

*No Two Organizations are the Same*

- Suppose you belong to a private, mid-sized company that consults for various industry sectors with sensitive information.



# Where to begin...



Think Marathon, NOT Sprint



# Most Critical Item to Get Started from Step 1...

*Risk Appetite that is Quantitative and Functional*

	Revenue (Operating Profit)	Safety	Operations	Reputation	Compliance	Human Capital	Projects
<b>Escalate to Executive Attention</b>	Any more than a 10% deviation from planned operating profit for a quarter	Loss of life or permanent disability	No more than three days of lost operations	Loss of market segment with multiple customers	Debarment from a particular market segment linked to regulatory violation(s)	Any more than 5% high performer attrition from any business unit in a quarter	Liquidated damages that exceed contract value
<b>Escalate to Management Attention</b>	Any more than a 5% deviation from planned operating profit for a quarter	Time away or other reportable incident	No more than one day of lost operation	Loss of customer	Any fines or other penalties linked to regulatory violation(s)	Any more than 3% high performer attrition from any business unity in a quarter	Liquidated damages that erode the margin as sold
<b>Provide Front Line Attention</b>	Any deviations from planned operating profit for a quarter	Bumps, strains, bruises	No more than one shift of lost operation	Customer complaints or negative social media buzz	Any warnings linked to regulatory violation(s)	Any developing trend in high performer attrition	Minor disputes with limited contractual impact

***Appetite May Also be Characterized by Likelihood, Adaptability, and Others***

# Compressing Effort for Time...



# Summary of Results from Steps 2-4


## *Asset Management and Requirements*

- People, information, technology, facilities, and external providers are documented
- Their contributions to business objectives are understood
- Ownership determination is critical




# Linking Asset Disruptions to Strategic Objectives

## Crossroads of Strategy, Risk, and Operations



Thinking about that day  
that may never come...



# Information Security Risk Management

Risk = Probability (Threat **exploits** Vulnerability **causing** Unwanted Outcome)

Threat = External, Internal, Human, Non-Human, Malicious, Non-Malicious



# Insider Threat Mitigation

## Insider Incident



if detected

## Insider Threat



if detected

## Insiders



## Insider Threat Program

Carnegie Mellon University

Software Engineering Institute

RSA® Conference 2019

# CERT's Definition of Insider Threat



The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization.

# Insider Threat to Critical Assets

## Individuals

who have or had  
authorized access to

Current or Former

Full-Time Employees

Part-Time Employees

Temporary Employees

Contractors

Trusted Business Partners

## Organization's Assets

use that access

People

Information

Technology

Facilities

## Intentionally or Unintentionally

to act in a way that  
could

Fraud

Theft of Intellectual Property

Cyber Sabotage

Espionage

Workplace Violence

Social Engineering

Accidental Disclosure

Accidental Loss or Disposal of  
Equipment or Documents

## Negatively Affect the Organization

Harm to Organization's  
Employees

Degradation to CIA of  
Information or Information  
Systems

Disruption of Organization's  
Ability to Meet its Mission

Damage to Organization's  
Reputation

Harm to Organization's  
Customers

# The Insider Threat

There are no insider threats that can be characterized as “one type”

Remember that the organization’s critical assets include:

- People
- Information
- Technology
- Facilities

Insider threat can be based on the motive(s) of the insider

Impacts to **Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability** are possible



Cyber Attack = **Cyber Impact**


Physical Attack = **Physical Impact**

Cyber Attack = **Physical Impact**


Physical Attack = **Cyber Impact**

# Examples of Insider Incidents


## National Security Espionage




## IT System Sabotage




## Theft of IP – Entitled Independent




## Espionage / Sabotage



## Fraud



## Theft of IP – Ambitious Leader



# Insider Threat Observables

The CERT National Insider Threat Center has amassed a repository of over 2500 Insider incidents (over 18 years).


Potential Insider Threat Risk Indicators (not a complete list)

# Qualifying the Insider Threat

## *Operations: Insider Driven Disruption*

**Scope Statement:** If the organization suffers a major interruption in operations or impairment from an internal actor, then mission and lives could be jeopardized. Opportunistically, if all malign insider action is avoided, then resources could be saved, reputation could elevate, and mission success could improve.

### Risk Triggers and Key Risk Indicators (KRIs)




### Conditions for Risk Realization

- Could happen during any operational environment
- Most likely to occur with poor corporate performance

### Consequences



# Developing an Appropriate Response



# Insider Threat Tools Vary in Features and Functions




Auditing Host-based Activity	Auditing Network-based Activity	Preventing Data from Leaving Authorized Locations
Preserving Forensic Artifacts	Data Visualization	Rule-Based Alerting
Identity Management / Access Management	Data Correlation / Entity Resolution	Anomaly Detection
Machine Learning	Text Analysis	Risk Scoring
Case / Incident Management	Data Masking / Anonymization	... And More ...

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# Mitigation Plans to Consider



PROCESS + TOOLS = RESILIENCE

# Apply What You Have Learned Today

- **Next week you should:**
  - Determine the what risk processes are used in your organization
  - Identify ownership and state of insider threat management
- **In the first three months following this presentation you should:**
  - Understand how risks are managed and who is managing the program
  - Apply existing risk management process to insider threat as a use case
- **Within six months you should:**
  - Devise response plans to mitigate insider threat and build a business case for necessary resources
  - Begin implementation of plan to seek quick wins

# Resources and References

- CERT National Insider Threat Center: <http://www.cert.org/insider-threat/>
- Introduction to OCTAVE Allegro: <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=8419>
- Podcast for OCTAVE Allegro: <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=34702>
- OCTAVE Version 1.0: <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=13473>
- OCTAVE for Smaller Organizations: <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=6795>
- US Federal Government, GAO Report on ERM, December 2016: <https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=6795>
- COSO Direction on Implementing a Cyber Risk Management Framework:  
[https://www.coso.org/documents/COSO%20in%20the%20Cyber%20Age\\_FULL\\_r11.pdf](https://www.coso.org/documents/COSO%20in%20the%20Cyber%20Age_FULL_r11.pdf)
- NIST Risk Management Framework: [https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management/risk-management-framework-\(RMF\)-Overview](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/risk-management/risk-management-framework-(RMF)-Overview)
- ISACA – COBIT 5 Risk Framework: <http://www.isaca.org/COBIT/Pages/default.aspx>

# Any Questions?

**Brett Tucker**


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