




FIRST CONTACT: New vulnerabilities in contactless payments

TO GOOD


To be true?





NEO BANKS

The big banking boom



SORT FACTS FROM FICTION

“I could accidentally pay for someone
else’s shopping”



WE TAKE SECURITY

~~At face value~~



HAS FRAUD REDUCED?

“Contactless payments have
resulted in a fraud reduction”



Low fraud rates

While the use of contactless cards has increased rapidly, Visa's contactless fraud rate in Europe has declined by 40% between 2017 and 2018.^[2] Specifically in the UK, a report by UK Finance found that fraud on

[1] Visa's Zero Liability Policy does not apply to Visa corporate or Visa purchasing card or account transactions. For specific restrictions, limitations and other details, please consult your card issuer.


[2] Visa in Europe data

[3] UK Finance, "2018 half year fraud update," Sept. 2018, Page 12, <https://www.ukfinance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-half-year-fraud-update-FINAL.pdf>

Contactless fraud covers fraud on payments made by both contactless cards and mobile devices.

Fraud on contactless cards and devices remains low with £8.4 million of losses during the first half of 2018, compared to spending of £31.9 billion over the same period.

Contactless fraud covers fraud on payments made by both contactless cards and mobile devices. Fraud on contactless cards and devices remains low with £8.4 million of losses during the first half of 2018, compared to spending of £31.9 billion over the same period.



UK
FINANCE




Data quietly released this week shows the instances of thefts relating to contactless cards doubled in just 10 months last year, according to **Action Fraud**, the national reporting centre for fraud and cybercrime.

Up from 1,440 cases worth £711,000 over the same period in 2017 to around 2,740 cases worth almost £1.8m in 2018, the average amount stolen last year was more than £650. One case investigated by police reported a £400,000 loss after a card was used multiple times.

The 2018 cases, recorded between April 2017 and January 2018, represent more than half of all the reports of contactless-related fraud investigated by the City of London Police alone, which runs Action Fraud, since 2013.


Sharks and Tigers




CONTACTLESS, A MODERN FORM OF PAYMENT?





1979



1996



2005




NFC is(n't) different

- NFC includes legacy modes (magstripe) that CHIP didn't.
- NFC uses the same key and same areas of memory on the CHIP as CHIP inserted.



ARE PAYMENTS STANDARDISED?







EMV KERNELS

VISA




VISA



FORMAT OF COMMUNICATION


APDU {
6f 47 84 0e 32 50 41 59 2e 53 59 53 2e 44 44 46
30 31 a5 35 bf 0c 32 61 30 4f 07 a0 00 00 00 0c
10 10 50 10 56 69 73 61 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 87 01 03 9f 0a 08 00 01 05 01 00 00
00 00 bf 63 04 df 20 01 80 90 00 }




Value
2PAY.SYS.DDF
01

TLV = Tag Length Value


1. Reading The PPSE



2. Card responds with AID




3. Terminal selects AID



4. Card provides PDOL




5. Terminal sends requested data




6. Card provides Application Cryptogram

ATC
Track2 Equiv
CTQ


Online Pin?
Signature?
CDCVM?



7. Terminal conducts risk analysis




WHAT SECURITY MEASURES ARE IMPLEMENTED IN A TRANSACTION?




RISK ANALYSIS

- Card authentication
- Transaction authorisation
(cryptogram)
- Cardholder verification (CVM)
Tap & Go limits
 - regulated by country
 - set up on the terminal
 - are not mandatory



HOW “SOFT LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED

VISA



HOW “HARD LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED

UK VISA cards will ask to
insert the chip if CVM is
required



HOW “SOFT LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED

3 different types of limits
on the terminal



HOW “HARD LIMITS” ARE IMPLEMENTED



VISA HAS A VULNERABILITY

C.2 Cryptogram Version Number 17('11')

Table C-1: Data Elements included in Cryptogram Version Number 17



Tag	Data Element
'9F02'	Amount, Authorized
'9F37'	Unpredictable Number
'9F36'	Application Transaction Counter (ATC)
'9F10'	Issuer Application Data (IAD) Byte 5

WHERE IS THE VULNERABILITY?

No currency/date

! No CTQ/TTQ


[REDACTED]

C.2 Cryptogram Version Number 17('11')

Table C-1: Data Elements included in Cryptogram Version Number 17


Tag	Data Element
'9F02'	Amount, Authorized
'9F37'	Unpredictable Number
'9F36'	Application Transaction Counter (ATC)
'9F10'	Issuer Application Data (IAD) Byte 5

5. Terminal sends requested data




Declines Transaction


6. Card provides Application Cryptogram






5. Terminal sends requested data



6. Card provides Application Cryptogram



7. Terminal conducts risk analysis




Acquirer

CDCVM – CONSUMER DEVICE CVM


- Introduced with Apple Pay
- Represents the idea of CVM
- Fingerprint or PIN
- Much higher than Tap & Go limits (£5,500)





6. Card provides Application Cryptogram




2. Change CTQ
“CDCVM Performed”
value
from 0 to 1







1. Change TTQ “CVM Required”
value from 1 to 0



Acquirer







UK
FINANCE

VALUE - £95,000,000
VOLUME - 434,991

HOW MANY ARE AFFECTED?



All VISA cards
all cryptograms
are affected

12 VISA cards
UK, EU, US, Asia


Only 2 banks
blocked £31
transactions*

* can be bypassed



Min - £31
Max - £100

Tested in multiple places


Raspberry PI




PN532



MITM PROXY FOR STEALTH



WHY IS ONLY VISA AFFECTED?



9f02 amount

5f2a currency

9f37 UN

82 AIP

9f36 ATC

CVR (part of 9f10)

9f03 amount, other

95 TVR



9f1a terminal country

9a date

9c type


9f27 CID








ALL BRANDS HAVE A **VULNERABILITY**








ATC

Track2 Equiv
CTQ

ATC

increments
with each
transaction



VISA



Book II

162 p


ATC
*The counter results
in uniqueness to the
cryptogram
allowing ...
replayed
transactions and
cloned cards to be
identified*



Currency £

Amount 10

UN **AAAAAAAAA**




ATC
Track2 Equiv
Mastercard

Currency £

Amount 10

UN **AAAAAAAAA**




ATC
Track2 Equiv

Currency £

Amount 10


UN **AAAAAAAAA**



ATC
Track2 Equiv



An Issuer must not decline a Transaction solely on the basis that the ATC is out of sequence.




Block ATC jumping
Block equal ATC



Allow ATC jumping
Allow equal ATC

UN

00AD00AD
00AD00AB
00AB00AB
00AC00AC
00A...




Tag 04:	A000000031010
Tag 5A:	
Tag 5F34:	81
Tag 9F26:	FD4E04DB0FC91EE5
Tag 9F02:	000000001112
Tag 9F03:	000000000000
Tag 9F1A:	0643
Tag 5F2A:	0643
Tag 9A:	190725
Tag 9C:	00
Tag 9F37:	00AA00AA


Verifone

VX 520




STEAL A CARD OR A TRANSACTION?







HOW MANY ARE AFFECTED?



SCA for contactless


Two-factor authentication

Insert card and use PIN

Should be made occasionally

Cumulative limits (£150)

Issuing bank is in charge



How to bypass SCA cumulative limits


Change the type of transaction

Contactless becomes EMV



Pretend to be a phone

With CDCVM flag



Be a phone




WHAT ABOUT CONSUMER DEVICES?



2014



GPAY HAS A VULNERABILITY FOR VISA



CTQ “CDCVM Performed” value is always **1** for consumer devices


ATC
Track2 Equiv
CTQ



CDCVM=1

1. Change TTQ “CVM Required” value from **1** to **0**


Currency
Amount
UN
TTQ

CVM REQUIRED=1 0





CONCLUSIONS



U.S. ALSO AFFECTED



\$50.00 – No CVM


\$10,000.00 - CDCVM

THE GOOD NEWS



Safe inside

BLAME GAME



IN CONCLUSION



Three vulnerabilities

Visa will not issue a fix


Google will not issue a fix

Contactless, less secure than CHIP

Not all card brands are the same

Contactless fraud is real

Someone has to pay...who will it be?



NEXT STEPS

- AmEx
- WeChat
- Secure Elements
- HCE

Illustrations (mostly)

PAYMENT RESOURCES

securingpayments.com

leigh-annegalloway.com

Whitepaper available here

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