



Update from the
MITRE ATT&CK Team
Adam Pennington
 @_whatshisface

 @MITREattack

MITRE

System Owner/User Discovery (T1033)

adamp\$ whoami

- **New Lead of MITRE ATT&CK**
- **12 years with MITRE**
- **Focused on threat intel and deception**
- **Past defender and CTI analyst**
- **Part of ATT&CK since it was a spreadsheet with no &**
- **11 years at Carnegie Mellon as student and researcher**
- **Certified decompression and rebreather diver**
- **Former live sound engineer**



ATTACK Circa 2014

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Credential Access	Host Enumeration	Defense Evasion	Lateral Movement	Command and Control	Exfiltration
New service	Exploitation of vulnerability	OS/Software Weakness	Process enumeration	Software packing	RDP	Common protocol, follows standard	Normal C&C channel
Modify existing service	Service file permissions weakness	User interaction	Service enumeration	Masquerading	Windows admin shares (C\$, ADMIN\$)	Common protocol, non-standard	Alternate data channel
DLL Proxying	Service registry permissions weakness	Network sniffing	Local network config	DLL Injection	Windows shared webroot	Commonly used protocol on non-standard port	Exfiltration over other network medium
Hypervisor Rootkit	DLL path hijacking	Stored file	Local network connections	DLL loading	Remote vulnerability	Communications encrypted	Exfiltration over physical medium
Winlogon Helper DLL	Path interception		Window enumeration	Standard protocols	Logon scripts	Communications are obfuscated	Encrypted separately
Path Interception	Modification of shortcuts		Account enumeration	Obfuscated payload	Application deployment software	Distributed communications	Compressed separately
Registry run keys / Startup folder addition	Editing of default handlers		Group enumeration		Taint shared content	Multiple protocols combined	Data staged
Modification of shortcuts	AT / Schtasks / Cron		Owner/user enumeration		Access to remote services with valid credentials		Automated or scripted data exfiltration
MBR / BIOS rootkit			Operating system enumeration		Pass the hash		Size limits
Editing of default handlers			Security software enumeration				
AT / Schtasks / Cron			File system enumeration				



Enterprise ATT&CK as of May 2020

Initial Access	Execution	Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Collection	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Impact
Drive-by Compromise		Scheduled Task		Binary Padding	Network Sniffing	AppleScript	Audio Capture	Commonly Used Port	Automated Exfiltration	Data Destruction	
Exploit Public-Facing Application		Launchctl	Access Token Manipulation	Account Manipulation	Account Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Automated Collection	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Encrypted for Impact		
External Remote Services		Local Job Scheduling	Bypass User Account Control	Bash History	Application Window Discovery	Clipboard Data	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Defacement		
Hardware Additions		LSASS Driver	Extra Window Memory Injection	Brute Force	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Distributed Component Object Model	Data from Information Repositories	Connection Proxy	Data Transfer Size Limits	Disk Content Wipe	
Replication Through Removable Media		Trap	Process Injection	Credentials in Files	Discovery	Exploitation of Remote Services	Data from Local System	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Efiltration Over Other Network Medium	Disk Structure Wipe	
Spearphishing Attachment	AppleScript	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Credentials in Registry	Domain Trust Discovery	Data from Network Shared Drive	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	Data from Removable Media	Custom Command and Control Protocol	Efiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Endpoint Denial of Service	Firmware Corruption
Spearphishing Link	CMSTP	Image File Execution Options Injection		Exploitation for Credential Access	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Data Encoding	Communication Through Removable Media	Inhibit System Recovery	Network Denial of Service	
Spearphishing via Service	Compiled HTML File	plist Modification	Valid Accounts	Forced Authentication	Network Service Scanning	Pass the Hash	Data Obfuscation	Data Staged	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Resource Hijacking	
Supply Chain Compromise	Control Panel Items	Accessibility Features	BITS Jobs	Hooking	Network Share Discovery	Pass the Ticket	Email Collection	Domain Fronting	Efiltration Over Physical Medium	Runtime Data Manipulation	
Trusted Relationship	Dynamic Data Exchange	AppCert DLLs	Clear Command History	Input Capture	Password Policy Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Input Capture	Domain Generation Algorithms	Service Stop	Service Stop	
Valid Accounts	Execution through API	Appinit DLLs	CMSTP	Permission Group Discovery	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	Man in the Browser	Screen Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Stored Data Manipulation	
	Execution through Module Load	Application Shimming	CMSTP	Input Prompt	Remote Services	Replication Through Removable Media	Fallback Channels			Transmitted Data Manipulation	
	Dylib Hijacking	Code Signing	Component Firmware	Kerberosasting	Process Discovery	Video Capture	Multiband Communication				
	File System Permissions Weakness	Compiled HTML File	Component Object Model Hijacking	Keychain	Query Registry		Multi-hop Proxy				
Graphical User Interface	Hooking	Component Object Model Hijacking	LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	Remote System Discovery	Security Software Discovery	SSH Hijacking	Multi-layer Encryption				
InstallUtil	Launch Daemon	Control Panel Items	LMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay	System Information Discovery	Taint Shared Content	System Time Discovery	Multi-Stage Channels				
PowerShell	New Service	>Password Filter DLL	Private Keys	System Network Configuration Discovery	Third-party Software	Virtualization/Sandbox	Port Knocking				
Regsvcs/Regasm	Path Interception	DCShadow	Security Memory	Windows Admin Shares	Windows Admin Shares	Evasion	Remote Access Tools				
Regsvr32	Port Monitors	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Two-Factor Authentication	Windows Network Connections Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Remote File Copy				
Rundll32	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	Setuid and Setgid	Interception	System Owner/User Discovery			Standard Application Layer Protocol				
Scripting	StartupScript Items	Disabling Security Tools		System Service Discovery			Standard Cryptographic Protocol				
	DLL Side-loading	DLL Side-loading		System Time Discovery			Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol				
Service Execution	Web Shell	Execution Guardrails		Virtualization/Sandbox			Uncommonly Used Port				
Signed Binary	.bash_profile and .bashrc	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation		Evasion			Web Service				
Proxy Execution	Account Manipulation	Exploitation for Defense Evasion									
Signed Script	Authentication Package	SID-History Injection									
Proxy Execution	BITS Jobs	Sudo	File Permissions Modification								
Source	Bootkit	Sudo Caching									
Space after Filename	Browser Extensions	File System Logical Offsets									
Third-party Software	Change Default File Association	Gatekeeper Bypass									
Trusted Developer Utilities	Component Firmware	Group Policy Modification									
User Execution	Component Object Model Hijacking	Hidden Files and Directories									
Windows Management Instrumentation	Create Account	Hidden Users									
Windows Remote Management	External Remote Services	Hidden Windows									
XSL Script Processing	Hidden Files and Directories	HISTCONTROL									
	Hypervisor	Indicator Blocking									
	Kernel Modules and Extensions	Indicator Removal from Tools									
	Launch Agent	Indicator Removal on Host									
LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition	Install Root Certificate	Indirect Command Execution									
Login Item	InstallUtil	Indirect Command Execution									
Logon Scripts	Launchctl	Install Root Certificate									
Modify Existing Service	LC_MAIN Hijacking	Indirect Command Execution									
Netshell Helper DLL	Masquerading	Install Root Certificate									
Office Application Startup	Modify Registry	Indirect Command Execution									
Port Knocking	Mstah	Indirect Command Execution									
Rc common	Network Share Connection Removal	Indirect Command Execution									
Redundant Access	NFTS File Attributes	Indirect Command Execution									
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder	Obfuscated Files or Information	Indirect Command Execution									
Re-opened Applications	Port Knocking	Indirect Command Execution									
Screen saver	Process Doppelgänging	Indirect Command Execution									
Security Support Provider	Process Hollowing	Indirect Command Execution									
Shortcut Modification	Redundant Access	Indirect Command Execution									
SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking	Registers	Indirect Command Execution									
System Firmware	Rootkit	Indirect Command Execution									
Systemend Service	Rundll32	Indirect Command Execution									
Time Providers	Scripting	Indirect Command Execution									
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription	Signed Binary Proxy Execution	Indirect Command Execution									
Winlogon Helper DLL	Signed Script Proxy Execution	Indirect Command Execution									
	SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking	Indirect Command Execution									
	Software Packing	Indirect Command Execution									
	Space after Filename	Indirect Command Execution									
	Template Injection	Indirect Command Execution									
	Timestamp	Indirect Command Execution									
	Trusted Developer Utilities	Indirect Command Execution									
	Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion	Indirect Command Execution									
	Web Service	Indirect Command Execution									
	XSL Script Processing	Indirect Command Execution									




Issues with ATT&CK in 2020

- **Technique abstraction imbalance across knowledge base**
 - Some techniques broad: Masquerading
 - Some techniques narrow: Rundll32
 - Most common complaint over the past couple of years
- **Techniques have a lot of depth to them**
 - Some don't read beyond the name
 - An analytic per technique may not make coverage “green”
- **Technique overload**
 - Too many techniques!
 - The matrix is too big!



Our Solution: Sub-Techniques

- Released March 31st in beta
 - Website
 - STIX 2.0 (Not yet via TAXII)
 - ATT&CK Navigator
 - Crosswalks from pre sub-techniques to sub-techniques
 - Design & Philosophy paper



ATT&CK with Sub-Techniques Beta



What is a Sub-Technique?

- **It's a more specific technique**
 - Still describes behavior, but at a lower level
 - Still intelligence driven, observed in the wild use
- **Sub-techniques are not procedures!**
 - Procedures continue to be specific adversary implementation
- **Sub-technique Initial coverage**
 - Enterprise
 - Cloud




What Do Sub-Techniques Mean for ATT&CK?

- **Large reorganization of information**
 - Initial release is same data, just new structure
- **Fixes a lot of the abstraction issues**
- **More sustainable growth**
 - Reduction by 99 techniques
 - Provides better framework for others to add to local copies
- **Easier to convey complexity of techniques for coverage**
- **Opportunity to trim/refine**
 - Several techniques deprecated: hypervisor, etc.
 - Higher level ideas broken out: masquerading



Sub-Technique Example



New Technique Page – Pre-OS Boot

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Pre-OS Boot

Pre-OS Boot

Sub-techniques (3)

ID	Name
T1542.001	System Firmware
T1542.002	Component Firmware
T1542.003	Bootkit

Adversaries may abuse Pre-OS Boot mechanisms as a way to establish persistence on a system. During the booting process of a computer, firmware and various startup services are loaded before the operating system. These programs control flow of execution before the operating system takes control.^[1]

Adversaries may overwrite data in boot drivers or firmware such as BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system. This can be particularly difficult to detect as malware at this level will not be detected by host software-based defenses.

Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Boot Integrity	Use Trusted Platform Module technology and a secure or trusted boot process to prevent system integrity from being compromised. Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. ^[2] ^[3]
Privileged Account Management	Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform these actions
Update Software	Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary.

Detection

Perform integrity checking on pre-OS boot mechanisms that can be manipulated for malicious purposes. Take snapshots of boot records and firmware and compare against known good images. Log changes to boot records, BIOS, and EFI, which can be performed by API calls, and compare against known good behavior and patching.

Disk check, forensic utilities, and data from device drivers (i.e. processes and API calls) may reveal anomalies that warrant deeper investigation. ^[4]

ID: T1542

Sub-techniques: T1542.001, T1542.002, T1542.003

Tactic: Defense Evasion, Persistence

Platform: Linux, Windows

Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM

Data Sources: VBR, MBR, Component firmware, Process monitoring, Disk forensics, EFI, BIOS, API monitoring

Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, File monitoring

Version: 1.0



New Sub-Technique – System Firmware

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Pre-OS Boot > System Firmware (sub)

Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware

Other sub-techniques of Pre-OS Boot (3)

ID	Name
T1542.001	System Firmware
T1542.002	Component Firmware
T1542.003	Bootkit

The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. [1] [2] [3]

System firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.

Procedure Examples

Name	Description
Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit	Hacking Team UEFI Rootkit is a UEFI BIOS rootkit developed by the company Hacking Team to persist remote access software on some targeted systems. [5]
LoJax	LoJax is a UEFI BIOS rootkit deployed to persist remote access software on some targeted systems. [6]
Trojan.Mebromi	Trojan.Mebromi performs BIOS modification and can download and execute a file as well as protect itself from removal. [7]


Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Boot Integrity	Check the integrity of the existing BIOS or EFI to determine if it is vulnerable to modification. Use Trusted Platform Module technology. [4]
Privileged Account Management	Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique.
Update Software	Patch the BIOS and EFI as necessary.



New Matrix Visualizations

Side Layout



Flat Layout



Things You Should Know About Subs

- **ID Structure: T#####.### - T[technique].[sub-technique]**
 - e.g. Pre-OS Boot: **T1542**; System Firmware: **T1542.001**
- **Single parent from sub-techniques to technique**
- **Sub-techniques *may* have different tactics within a technique**
- **Not all techniques have a sub-technique**
- **Procedures mapped to sub-techniques where possible**
 - Ambiguous info goes to technique



Timeline for Sub-Techniques

- **Beta of sub-techniques released March 31, 2020**
 - Currently in feedback/review period
 - Feedback has been largely positive
- **Accepting contributions for techniques/groups/software**
 - Will **only** be updating sub-technique version of ATT&CK
- **On track for an early July 2020 release**



Other Sub-Technique Information Resources

- **Sub-technique update log**
 - <https://attack.mitre.org/beta/resources/updates/updates-march-2020/index.html>
- **Old ATT&CK to sub-technique crosswalk files:**
 - CSV: <https://attack.mitre.org/docs/subtechniques/subtechniques-csv.zip>
 - JSON: <https://attack.mitre.org/docs/subtechniques/subtechniques-crosswalk.json>
- **Updated ATT&CK Design and Philosophy paper:**
 - https://attack.mitre.org/docs/ATTACK_Design_and_Philosophy_March_2020.pdf
- **ATT&CK mitre/cti GitHub repo for JSON STIX content:**
 - <https://github.com/mitre/cti/tree/subtechniques>
- **ATT&CK Navigator sub-technique beta**
 - <https://mitre-attack.github.io/attack-navigator/beta/>



On Deck After Sub-Techniques

Mobile ATT&CK

Enterprise ATT&CK


PRE-ATT&CK

It's just

ATT&CK




Launch/Compromise -> Initial Access




2018



PRE's Place in the Adversary Lifecycle



PRE's Place in the Adversary Lifecycle



How do we scope techniques?

Technical

Visible to some defenders

Evidence of adversary use






Priority Definition Planning 13 items	Priority Definition Direction 4 items	Target Selection 5 items	Technical Information Gathering 20 items	People Information Gathering 11 items	Organizational Information Gathering 11 items	Technical Weakness Identification 9 items	People Weakness Identification 3 items	Organizational Weakness Identification 6 items	Adversary Opsec 22 items	Establish & Maintain Infrastructure 16 items	Persona Development 6 items	Build Capabilities 11 items	Test Capabilities 7 items	Stage Capabilities 6 items	
Assess current holdings, needs, and wants	Assign KITs, KIQs, and/or intelligence requirements	Determine approach/attack vector	Acquire OSINT data sets and information	Acquire OSINT data sets and information	Acquire OSINT data sets and information	Analyze application security posture	Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies	Analyze business processes	Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services	Acquire and/or use 3rd party infrastructure services	Build social network persona	Build and configure delivery systems	Review logs and residual traces	Disseminate removable media	
Assess KITs/KIQs benefits	Receive KITs/KIQs and determine requirements	Determine highest level tactical element	Conduct active scanning	Aggregate individual's digital footprint	Conduct social engineering	Analyze architecture and configuration posture	Analyze social and business relationships, interests, and affiliations	Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies	Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services	Acquire and/or use 3rd party software services	Choose pre-compromised mobile app developer account credentials or signing keys	Build or acquire	Test ability to evade automated mobile application security analysis performed by app stores	Distribute malicious software development tools	
Assess leadership areas of interest	Submit KITs, KIQs, and intelligence requirements	Determine operational element	Conduct passive scanning	Conduct social engineering	Determine 3rd party infrastructure services	Analyze data collected	Assess targeting options	Analyze presence of outsourced capabilities	Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates	Acquire or compromise 3rd party signing certificates	Choose pre-compromised persona and affiliated accounts	C2 protocol development	Test callback functionality	Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest	
Assign KITs/KIQs into categories	Task requirements	Determine secondary level tactical element	Conduct social engineering	Identify business relationships	Determine centralization of IT management	Analyze hardware/software security defensive capabilities					Develop social network persona digital footprint	Compromise 3rd party or closed-source vulnerability/exploit information	Test malware in various execution environments	Hardware or software supply chain implant	
Conduct cost/benefit analysis	Determine strategic target	Determine 3rd party infrastructure services	Identify groups/roles	Determine physical locations	Analyze organizational skillsets and deficiencies						Common, high volume protocols and software	Friend/Follow/Connect to targets of interest	Create custom payloads	Test malware to evade detection	Port redirector
Create implementation plan		Determine domain and IP address space	Identify job postings and needs/gaps	Dumpster dive	Identify vulnerabilities in third-party software libraries						Assess vulnerability of 3rd party vendors	Compromise 3rd party infrastructure to support delivery	Create backup infrastructure	Obtain Apple iOS enterprise distribution key pair and certificate	Upload, install, and configure software/tools
Create strategic plan		Determine external network trust dependencies	Identify people of interest	Identify business processes/tempo	Research relevant vulnerabilities/CVEs						Data Hiding	Domain registration hijacking		Discover new exploits and monitor exploit-provider forums	Test signature detection for file upload/email filters
Derive intelligence requirements		Determine firmware version	Identify personnel with an authority/privilege	Identify business relationships	Research visibility gap of security vendors						DNSCalc	Dynamic DNS		Identify resources required to build capabilities	
Develop KITs/KIQs		Discover target logon/email address format	Identify sensitive personnel information	Identify job postings and needs/gaps	Test signature detection						Dynamic DNS	Install and configure hardware, network, and systems		Obtain/re-use payloads	
Generate analyst intelligence requirements		Enumerate client configurations	Identify supply chains	Identify supply chains							Fast Flux DNS	Obfuscate infrastructure		Post compromise tool development	
Identify analyst level gaps		Enumerate externally facing software applications technologies, languages, and dependencies	Mine social media	Obtain templates/branding materials							Host-based hiding	Obtain boomer/stressor techniques		Remote access tool development	
Identify gap areas		Identify job postings and needs/gaps									Misattributable	Procure required equipment and software			
Receive operator KITs/KIQs tasking		Identify security defensive capabilities									Network-based hiding	Shadow DNS			
		Identify supply chains									Non-traditional or less attributable payment options	SSL certificate acquisition for domain			
		Identify technology usage patterns									Obfuscate	SSL certificate acquisition for trust breaking			
		Identify web defensive services									Obfuscate operational	Use multiple DNS infrastructure			



Intelligence Planning (Out of scope)

Post-Merger Enterprise ATT&CK



PRE-ATT&CK Merger Roadmap

- **Reconnaissance and Resource Development tactics**
 - Technique development ongoing
 - Next release after sub-techniques
 - Currently slated for August 2020
- **Looking at how to preserve the content of PRE-ATT&CK**
 - We've heard from people using "intel planning" for teaching
 - Open to input



Other Upcoming ATT&CK Plans

- **Revamp of ATT&CK data sources**
 - Planned initial release of source definitions to GitHub
- **Technique coverage of network devices such as routers**
- **New ATT&CK training on defense and analytics**
 - Continue training series that started with CTI in January



ATT&CK To

ATT&CK
Sightings

ATT&CK
Evaluations

PRE-ATT&CK

ATT&CK for ICS

Mobile ATT&CK

ATT&CK-Based
SOC Assessments

Cyber Analytics
Repository

ATT&CK Updates this Past Year

1

NEW
TACTIC

43

NEW
TECHNIQUES

13

NEW MOBILE
TECHNIQUES

16

NEW
GROUPS

87

NEW
SOFTWARE

41

NEW
MITIGATIONS

87

UPDATED
TECHNIQUES

16

UPDATED MOB
TECHNIQUES

67


UPDATED
GROUPS

92

UPDATED
SOFTWARE




ATT&CK for ICS – Released in Jan



Unique Adversary Goals



Technology Differences



Different Defenses





MITRE

ATT&CK™
for Cloud

Credit to Dave Herrald and Ryan Kovar

ATT&CK for Cloud


- **36 techniques**
- **Part of Enterprise ATT&CK**
- **Almost 100% community-contributed techniques!**
 - Input from:
 - A cloud service provider
 - Red teams
 - Threat analysts
 - Detection analysts



 Microsoft Azure



Google Cloud



Azure
Active Directory





imgflip.com

Impact Tactic

- Attacks targeting availability and integrity
 - Ex: Ransomware, DoS, destruction
- 16 techniques

Data Destruction	Endpoint DoS	Resource Hijacking	Runtime Data Manipulation
Data Encrypted for Impact	Network DoS	Service Stop	Stored Data Manipulation
Disk Content Wipe	Firmware Corruption	Defacement	Transmitted Data Manipulation
Disk Structure Wipe	Inhibit System Recovery	System Shutdown/Reboot	Account Access Removal

Mitigations as an Object

Home > Techniques > Enterprise > Spearphishing Attachment

Mitigations

Mitigation	Description
Antivirus/Antimalware	Anti-virus can also automatically quarantine suspicious files.
Network Intrusion Prevention	Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity.
Restrict Web-Based Content	Block unknown or unused attachments by default that should not be transmitted over email as a best practice to prevent some vectors, such as .scr, .exe, .pif, .cpl, etc. Some email scanning devices can open and analyze compressed and encrypted formats, such as zip and rar that may be used to conceal malicious attachments in Obfuscated Files or Information .
User Training	Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing emails.

Other ATT&CK Team Talks

- **Today at 1830 CET/12:30 PM EDT**
 - ATT&CK Navigator Layer Scripts – Caleb Little
- **Today at 1845 CET/12:45 PM EDT**
 - Technique Report ATT&CK Mapper: TRAM – Connor Magee
- **Tomorrow at 1415 CET/8:15 AM EDT**
 - Bro/Zeek ATT&CK-based Analytics and Reporting: BZAR – Mark Fernandez



Thank you to the ATT&CK Community

Individuals + orgs contributing to ATT&CK!

- Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security
- Alan Neville, @abnev
- Alex Hinchliffe, Palo Alto Networks
- Alfredo Abarca
- Allen DeRyke, ICE
- Anastasios Pingios
- Andrew Smith, @jakx_
- Avneet Singh
- Barry Shteiman, Exabeam
- Bart Parys
- Bartosz Jerzman
- Brian Prange
- Bryan Lee
- Carlos Borges, @huntingneo, CIP
- Casey Smith
- Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek
- Christoffer Strömlad
- Cody Thomas, SpecterOps
- Craig Aitchison
- CrowdStrike Falcon OverWatch
- Cybereason Nocturnus, @nocturnus
- Daniel Oakley
- Darren Spruell
- Dave Westgard
- David Ferguson, CyberSponse
- David Lu, Tripwire
- David Routin
- Drew Church, Splunk
- Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
- Edward Millington
- Elger Vinicius S. Rodrigues, CYBINT Centre
- Elia Florio, Microsoft
- Elly Searle, CrowdStrike
- Emily Ratliff, IBM
- ENDGAME
- Eric Kuehn, Secure Ideas
- Erika Noerenberg, @gutterchurl, Carbon Black
- Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks
- ESET
- Felipe Espósito, @Pr0teus

- Filip Kafka, ESET
- FS-ISAC
- Hans Christoffer Gaardløs
- Heather Linn
- Itamar Mizrahi
- Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach
- Ivan Sinyakov
- Jacob Wilkin, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
- Jan Miller, CrowdStrike
- Jannie Li, Microsoft (MSTIC)
- Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson
- Jean-lan Boutin, ESET
- Jeff Sakowicz, Microsoft (IDPM Services)
- Jeremy Galloway
- Jimmy Astle, @AstleJimmy, Carbon Black
- Johann Rehberger
- John Lambert, Microsoft (MSTIC)
- John Strand
- Josh Abraham
- Justin Warner, ICEBRG
- Jörg Abraham, EclecticIQ
- Kaspersky
- Lab52 by S2 Grupo
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- Loic Jaquemet
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- Lukáš Stefanko, ESET
- Marc-Etienne M. Léveillé, ESET
- Mark Wee
- Martin Jirkal, ESET
- Martin Smolar, ESET
- Matias Nicolas Porolli, ESET
- Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps
- Matt Kelly, @breakersall
- Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward
- Matthew Molyett, @s1air
- McAfee
- Michael Cox
- Michał Dida, ESET
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC)
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- Milos Stojadinovic
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- Nik Seetharaman, Palantir
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- Rahmat Nurfauzi, PT Xynexis International
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