

Forging the USB armory

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2007: Unusual Car Navigation Tricks




Injecting RDS-TMC Traffic Information Signals



2009: Sniff Keystrokes With Lasers/Voltmeters

Side Channel Attacks Using Optical Sampling Of Mechanical Energy And Power Line Leakage




2011: Chip & PIN is definitely broken

Credit card skimming and PIN harvesting in an EMV world



2013: Fully arbitrary 802.3 packet injection

Maximizing the Ethernet attack surface






Designed for personal security applications

- mass storage device with advanced features such as automatic encryption, virus scanning, host authentication and data self-destruct
- OpenSSH client and agent for untrusted hosts (kiosk)
- router for end-to-end VPN tunneling, Tor
- password manager with integrated web server
- electronic wallet (e.g. pocket Bitcoin wallet)
- authentication token
- portable penetration testing platform
- low level USB security testing




enhanced mass storage






enhanced mass storage







enhanced mass storage





SSH proxy






password manager

**trivial example, better options planned*





authentication token





USB device authenticates host





Design goals

Compact USB powered device

Fast CPU and generous RAM

Secure boot

Standard connectivity over USB

Familiar developing/execution environment


Open design




Selecting the System on Chip (SoC)

Freescale i.MX53


- ARM® Cortex™-A8 800-1200 Mhz
- almost all datasheets/manuals are public (no NDA required)
- Freescale datasheets are “ok” (far better than other vendors)
- ARM® TrustZone®, secure boot + storage + RAM
- detailed power consumption guide available
- excellent native support (Android, Debian, Ubuntu, FreeBSD)
- good stock and production support guarantee








ARM® TrustZone®



<http://genode.org/documentation/articles/trustzone>



ARM® TrustZone®






<http://genode.org/documentation/articles/trustzone>



Development time-line

- 2014/03: schematics development begins (Freescale chosen)
- 2014/04: PCB layout for breakout/prototyping board
- 2014/08: alpha board order
- 2014/09: USB armory alpha board delivery & evaluation
- 2014/10: project announcement
- 2014/10: order for 7 optimized beta revisions
- 2014/11: beta boards delivery & evaluation
- 2014/11: design finalization, Mk I production candidate order
- 2014/12: Mk I delivery
- 2015/01: first batch production (1k)
- 2015/03: shipping begins!




<http://inversepath.com/usbarmy>




USB armory - Open source flash-drive-sized computer

- Freescale i.MX53 ARM® Cortex™-A8 800Mhz, 512MB DDR3 RAM
- USB host powered (<500 mA) device with compact form factor (65 x 19 x 6 mm)
- ARM® TrustZone®, secure boot + storage + RAM
- microSD card slot
- 5-pin breakout header with GPIOs and UART
- customizable LED, including secure mode detection
- excellent native support (Debian, Ubuntu, Arch Linux ARM)
- USB device emulation (CDC Ethernet, mass storage, HID, etc.)
- Open Hardware & Software




device mode





host mode
(stand-alone)









INVERSE PATH


inversepath.com/usbarmory


































α





βs


8L-NOUSBH, 8L, 8L-DDR-LDO, 8L-DDR-NCP
6L, 6L-DDR-LDO, 6L-DDR-NCP

Mk I






lessons learned #1
tiny inductors are fragile




evil



good

lessons learned #2 (the five-second rule)
gold plating traces cause under-voltage on hot swap



Compiling and running Genode OS (>= 15.02):

```
git clone https://github.com/genodelabs/genode
cd genode

./tool/create_build_dir hw_usb_armory
cd build/hw_usb_armory

# in etc/build.conf add "--include image/u-boot" to RUN_OPT

make run/tz_vmm
cp var/run/tz_vmm/uImage $SD_CARD_MNT

uboot> ext2load mmc 0:1 0x70200000 /boot/uImage-genode; bootm 0x70200000
```

Requires minimally patch Normal world kernel compiled as follows:

```
make ARCH=arm zImage LOADADDR=0x80008000 modules
```

Secure Mode Monitor (LED example)

```
@ set GPIO4 to SECURE
    movw    r0, #0x33
    movt    r0, #0xff
    ldr     r1, =CSU_CSL
    add     r1, r1, #4      @ CSL1
    str     r0, [r1]
```

```
@ set IOMUXC to SECURE
    movw    r0, #0x33
    movt    r0, #0xff
    ldr     r1, =CSU_CSL
    add     r1, r1, #20     @ CSL5
    str     r0, [r1]
```

```
@ set OCRAM to SECURE
```

```
...
```

```
_secure_monitor:
    mov     r10, #0xcafe
    cmp     r0, r10
    beq     smc_handler
    beq     to_nonsecure
```

Secure Mode Monitor (LED example)

smc_handler:

```
ldr      r10, =IOMUX_LED
mov      r0, #1
movt    r0, #0
str      r0, [r10]          @ set the pad to GPIO

ldr      r10, =GPIO4_DIR
movw    r0, #0xffff
movt    r0, #0xffff
str      r0, [r10]          @ set direction to output

ldr      r10, =GPIO4_DR
ldr      r0, [r10]
mvn    r0, r0
str      r0, [r10]          @ toggle LED output

movs    pc, lr
```

Secure Mode Monitor (LED example)

```
static int beg_for_led_switch(void)
{
    printk("dear smc, kindly switch the LED\n");

    /* give control to the secure monitor */
    asm volatile ("movw r0, #0xcafe");
    asm volatile ("smc #0");

    return 0;
}
```

The LED is hardware restricted via TrustZone to Secure monitor control.

A trivial interface implementation between Nonsecure Linux and Secure monitor illustrates a simple request for LED switching.

INTERLOCK

<http://github.com/inversepath/interlock>

Open source file encryption front-end developed, but not limited to, usage with the USB armory.

Provides a web accessible file manager to unlock/lock LUKS encrypted partition and perform additional symmetric/asymmetric encryption on stored files.

Take advantage of disposable passwords, “nuking” option.

Design Goals

Clear separation between presentation and server layer to ease auditability and integration.

Minimum amount of external dependencies and footprint.


Encrypted volumes: LUKS encrypted partitions

Asymmetric ciphers: OpenPGP


Symmetric ciphers: AES-256-OFB w/ PBKDF2 + HMAC

Security tokens: Time-based One-Time Password Algorithm
(Google Authenticator)


Authentication credentials are directly tied to LUKS partition.




Files can be further encrypted on the USB armory...



...and later downloaded.



Logging out locks the encrypted partition.



Thank you!

Q & A

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