The Generational Effects of Emancipative Values

on Support for Liberal Democracy in the USA

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Abstract

Spurred by a debate regarding the state of the democratic trend, this thesis investigates whether democratic deconsolidation has taken place in Western democracies between the years of 1995 and 2017, as Foa & Mounk (2016, 2017, 2017b) state. Explicitly, this thesis asks: Has support for liberal democracy declined among younger birth cohorts in the United States? Data presented by the World Values Survey was manipulated so as to separate the population of the different surveys from each other by birth cohort and social class, so that these groups' levels of support for democracy, as well as other indicators, could be acquired and compared between groups. This was to test the hypothesis: Support for liberal democracy has increased among younger birth cohorts. Using a methodology adopted from Alexander & Welzel (2017) and Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018), in which support for democracy takes on a different character than one's pure support of the political system, one shall see that this hypothesis is supported by the evidence presented within this work. After a long period of nervousness within political and scientific communities as to the state of democracy, it seems that democratic deconsolidation and backsliding may not be as big a problem as it is made out to be, at least, not within the timeframe covered in this thesis. With nearly every societal group becoming more liberal in the last twenty years, those who worry about the state of democracy may be able to take a sigh of relief.

Keywords: Emancipative Values, Democracy, Deconsolidation, World Values Survey

1. Introduction

Facets of different forms of government have been studied for thousands of years. As phenomena take place in this world, different aspects of different polities are brought into question, and democracy is no different. Democracy, like any other form of polity, has different characteristics depending on the democracy's geographical and temporal dimensions. For example, ancient Greek democracy shows properties far different from that democracy which is practiced in Western democratic countries of today, such as the United States of America. That being said, the democratic trend, which refers to the ebb and flow of support for democracy within a given context, has become the center of a debate regarding generational levels of support for democracy; more explicitly, this debate considers which individuals have what level of support for democracy, and why.

Democracy is placed on somewhat of a pedestal in the Western world, and has been discussed in positive terms since the ending of World War II. This should not come as a surprise, as democracy provides individuals with a (generally) equal say in how their district, state, or country is run. Democracy seemed to be the most fair way to carry out governmental decisions and, because of this, academia has taken a strong liking to democracy. Not only that, after World War II, it was thought that the world would become more democratic, country by country, given the neoliberal world order. During the Cold War, Western democracies fought to export their regime-ideals to non-democratic countries, as well as to secure their interests abroad. It was thought at this point that democracy was an unstoppable force that would change the regimes of the world one at a time to the democratic standard.

All was not to turn out well, however. At least, not yet. See, it was only until recently that the high spirits that normally characterized academic feelings towards democracy turned

sour (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018). To make this point more clear, ". . . widespread pessimism has replaced the initial euphoria about the future of democracy." (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 2). To understand this, one must understand the resilience of non-democratic regimes in the face of this perceived global turn to democracy. Countries such as Brazil, China, Russia, Turkey, Venezuela, India, parts of the European Union, and the United States have all experienced perceived backslides in their liberalisation. This is due to the authoritarian-populist leaders and ideals that have recently, or not so recently, come into power in these countries. Several controversial political campaigns come to mind, such as the English Brexit, or the consolidation of power of the executives in China and Russia (Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively), or the election of right-wing populist parties into national parliaments, such as the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, or the near election of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally in France. As a result of these phenomena, political scientists have begun to question the merits of democracy as well as their projections considering the democratic trend. After World War II, it was thought that regime change to democracy would follow a pattern such as dominoes falling; as more countries became democratic, other non-democratic countries would follow this trend, or vis-versa (Dean & Leeson, 2009). Now, considering these happenings, one can understand why some individuals in academia signal that Western democracies may be backsliding.

It is at this point that democratic deconsolidation be mentioned, as well as Foa & Mounk, who published three articles pointing to evidence of democratic deconsolidation among Western democracies in general. To understand democratic deconsolidation, ". . . 'democratic consolidation' refers to the extent to which democracy is 'the only game in town.'" (Foa & Mounk, 2017, p. 9). Democratic deconsolidation means that in a particular country, a decline in support for democracy is present, while a rise in support for alternatives

to democracy is also present, such as military rule, technocratic rule, etc. (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Foa & Mounk (2016, 2017, 2017b) show evidence of democratic deconsolidation throughout the Western world. In rebuttal to these findings, authors such as Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, Erik Voeten, Christian Welzel, and others published a plethora of scientific articles all poking holes in the work performed by Foa & Mounk. For several reasons, such as methodological shortcomings, these authors reject the findings of Foa & Mounk, and reject the positing of a strong turn towards democracy's alternatives among Western populations.

There is a discrepancy between the findings of these groups of authors. If one set of authors claim that democratic deconsolidation is the reality that Western democracies face, and the opposing set of authors claim that the claims of the other authors are false, then it would seem that there is a problem with reconciling the two different sides of the debate. These two sides are diametrically opposed to one-another; either Western democracies are deconsolidating or they are not. That is where the work of this thesis comes into the fold. This thesis asks whether support for liberal democracy has declined among younger birth cohorts in the United States.

It should here be noted that though this democratic trend was observed in Western democracies by Foa & Mounk, and though the authors opposing the findings Foa & Mounk also focused on Western democracies in general, this thesis focuses exclusively on support for liberal democracy in the United States between 1995 and 2017. The United States has undergone what some would consider democratic backsliding since November 8, 2016, when Donald Trump was elected to the Office of the President of the United States. This thesis would like to find out whether levels of support for liberal democracy have increased or decreased, based on the birth cohort groupings of distinct survey populations.

The following chapter will outline the methodologies and findings behind the works of the aforementioned authors. After that, the methodology that was employed in this thesis shall be described in detail, and the results of the different analyses will also be presented. Subsequent to that, the results of the analyses of this thesis will be compared to the results of the articles upon which this thesis was based. Lastly, a summary of the thesis shall tie together any loose ends, and speculate about the future of the research that was performed within these pages.

2. *Democratic Deconsolidation: Should We Worry?*

The essence of the works of Foa & Mounk, as well as Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018), Alexander & Welzel (2017), and other authors, written in response to the findings of Foa and Mounk, shall now be discussed so that the reader be made aware of essential information that will aid in understanding the work that was performed in this thesis. This section shall first discuss and describe the articles published by Foa & Mounk, as these articles detail the phenomenon of democratic deconsolidation, or what could also be referred to as democratic backsliding. After that, the articles rejecting the findings of Foa & Mounk will be described, as well as the variance in findings of these negatory articles. This section shall end by discussing the ins and outs of emancipative values, and what emancipative values have to do with democracy.

2.1. Evidence Supporting Democratic Deconsolidation

Authors Roberto Stefan Foa and Sascha Mounk published three articles between 2016 and 2017 detailing a downturn in the democratic trend present in Western populations. Foa & Mounk referred to this phenomenon as democratic deconsolidation, and posit that it is taking place in Western democracies all over the world. In their 2016 article, Foa & Mounk claim "It is at least plausible to think that such a process of democratic deconsolidation may already be underway in a number of established democracies in North America and Western Europe." (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 15). This claim is supported by several general observations made within this article, such as the fact that older generations seem to have a strong personal need for democracy, with 72 percent of respondents from the Interwar birth cohort (which includes parts of the Greatest Generation (1915-27) and Silent Generation (1928-45)) clocking their need to live in a democracy at a ten out of ten. This in comparison with the Millennials (1981-1996), of whom only 30 percent claimed their need to live in a democracy to be as high. If one takes this discrepancy at face value, then Foa & Mounk's findings seem to support their conclusions regarding democratic deconsolidation (Foa & Mounk, 2016). Furthermore, Foa & Mounk note that ". . . in both Western Europe and North America, interest in politics has rapidly and markedly declined among the youth." (Foa & Mounk, 2016, p. 10). In addition, Foa & Mounk find levels of support for authoritarianism increase parallel to one's financial means, and decrease in the same fashion (Foa & Mounk, 2016).

In their first 2017 article, Foa & Mounk claim that American citizens are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the activities of specific regimes and governments, as well as with democracy as a polity altogether (Foa & Mounk, 2017, p. 5). The authors back this

statement up with the claim that ". . . in the United States, 46 percent of respondents . . . reported that they either 'never had' or had 'lost' faith in U.S. democracy." (Foa & Mounk, 2017, p. 7). Within this article, Foa & Mounk also posit that alternatives to democracy are becoming more acceptable to the citizens of the United States, such as living under army rule or in a technocracy, where decisions are made by experts, not elected officials (Foa & Mounk, 2017).

The last article that was published by Foa & Mounk to be used in this thesis is titled *The End of the Consolidation Paradigm: a response to our critics* (2017b). In this article, Foa & Mounk double down on the conclusions that they drew in their two subsequent works, and claim that the paradigm of democratic consolidation is over. This would mean that an increase in openness to illiberal, authoritarian alternatives to democracy has become apparent within populations, and for Foa & Mounk, this is exactly the trend that was observed (Foa & Mounk, 2017b). It is in this article that Foa & Mounk state: "Rather than being indicative of a healthy civic culture, the rising skepticism of democratic institutions may instead reflect feelings of relative deprivation, frustration at the lack of democratic responsiveness, anger at the remoteness of political elites, and a long-term disengagement from political institutions." (Foa & Mounk, 2017b, p. 15-6). Thus, Foa & Mounk present evidence supporting their claims that the effects of democratic deconsolidation are stronger in younger generations as compared to older generations. Better said, Foa & Mounk find evidence to support the fact the younger birth cohorts have lower levels of support for democracy than older birth cohorts. This is, however, merely one side of the story, and it is worth hearing from the detractors of Foa & Mounk, so as to see what perspectives they can bring into the synthesis of this research.

2.3. Evidence Negating Democratic Deconsolidation

Having heard from Foa & Mounk, who posit that there has been a rise in support for alternatives to democracy, it is now time to delve into the work of authors that disputed the findings of Foa & Mounk. The articles published by Foa & Mounk were not taken lightly by the political science community, and spawned a number of responses from authors involved in many different aspects of the study of democracy. In this section, works by Erik Voeten and Pippa Norris will be discussed in detail, as well as an article from Alexander & Welzel (2017) and lastly, an article from Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018). The first two articles reject aspects of the Foa & Mounk findings and conclusions, and the latter two articles aim to illuminate the reader to the relationship between emancipative values and support for democracy in different ways, and why it is important to include emancipative values (such as sexual emancipation) in the calculation of the dependent variable of this thesis.

Beginning with the article published by Voeten, Voeten writes ". . . there is simply no evidence in the current set of studies that the public in consolidated democracies is turning against democracy." (Voeten, 2016, p. 12). Voeten goes on to claim that there is no evidence that citizens of consolidated democracies are turning away from democracy and towards its alternatives (Voeten, 2016). That being said, there are some nuances in Voeten (2016) that are worth discussing, as they directly involve support for democracy in the United States.

Voeten claims "There is some evidence that Millennials have grown somewhat more acceptant of non-democratic alternatives, most notably in the United States." (Voeten, 2016, p. 11). This information stems from a 2011 survey in which US Americans under the age of thirty-five had relatively less positive feelings towards democracy, while having more positive feelings towards other forms of government (Voeten, 2016). Voeten further states that

". . . the U.S. finding is worthy of more research and a potential cause for concern." (Voeten, 2016, p. 8). Summarily, though Voeten rejects the findings of Foa & Mounk, consensus is found between these articles when it comes to the United States; there, according to Foa & Mounk, as well as Voeten (2016), the United States' younger birth cohorts may be facing, to some degree, a period of democratic deconsolidation. However, a firm theoretical background in democracy is necessary before expressing stout conclusions regarding democratic deconsolidation in the United States.

The next article that is to be discussed was published by Pippa Norris. Like Voeten (2016), Norris (2017) expresses a general rejection of the findings of Foa & Mounk, although like Voeten (2016), Norris' findings are also nuanced regarding the United States, making this article a perfect candidate to be discussed within this context.

Norris states "The generational gaps presented by the authors are exaggerated both by cherry-picking cases and by the visual presentation and treatment of the survey data." (Norris, 2017, p. 5). A statement of this magnitude regarding the work of other authors should not be taken lightly; in fact, nearly all of the authors that reject the findings of Foa & Mounk cite problems with the methodology of the analyses carried out by Foa & Mounk. Norris also states ". . . contrary to Foa and Mounk's suggestion, in fact the reverse pattern of generational support for populist-authoritarian parties can be observed." (Norris, 2017, p. 3). Norris finds that individuals that support authoritarian-populist regimes, or better said, individuals who do not support a liberal, intergenerational definition of democracy, are drawn from older birth-cohorts as compared to the younger birth cohorts (Norris, 2017).

As has been mentioned, Norris' work contains nuances that are worth discussing. Norris finds ". . . the Anglo-American democracies (including Australia, the US, Canada, the UK, and New Zealand) do indeed display a statistically significant fall in democratic

approval by birth-cohort, as Foa and Mounk note." (Norris, 2017, p. 6). With this information in mind, one is forced to question just what could cause this phenomenon of decline in support for democracy among younger birth cohorts in comparison to older birth-cohorts. The information presented here will be discussed at a later point, in order to illuminate the reader to the actual state of the democratic trend within and between various birth-cohorts.

The next article to be discussed, published by Alexander & Welzel ". . . questions the alarmist claims [of Foa & Mounk] on a number of accounts." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 1). To begin, Alexander & Welzel (2017) posit that Foa & Mounk's findings cannot be correct, because Foa & Mounk ignored the fact that levels of support for democracy are largely incomparable across different generations. To understand this point fully, one must understand that ". . . support for democracy has changed its meaning; while older generations continue to endorse illiberal notions of democracy, younger generations support an unequivocally liberal notion." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 1). This information leads back to the necessity of an intergenerational definition of democracy, an element that the analyses performed by Foa & Mounk lack. If the concept of a dependent variable is understood differently by segments of the population of a single study, then that particular dependent variable possesses little to no explanatory power, and the findings that are connected to that particular dependent variable should also be rendered largely null and void. This is because support for democracy has undergone a drastic change in meaning throughout the decades and centuries in which it has existed (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 3).

Due to this requirement of an intergenerational conception of democracy, Alexander & Welzel choose to operationalize the liberal/illiberal dimension of democracy. The authors use questions regarding the toleration of homosexuality, divorce, and abortion in order to acquire a value that represents the liberal/illiberal dimension of democracy, so that the

intergenerationality of the dependent variable can be unquestioned (Alexander & Welzel, 2017). Though there are other domains of liberal values ". . . those in sexuality show especially strong linkages with prevalent notions and actual qualities of democracy." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 3). Explicitly, the liberal values of sexuality are used by Alexander & Welzel to determine an individual's placement on a liberal/illiberal spectrum, which will in turn be used by this thesis for the operationalization of the dependent variable: liberal democracy. Foa & Mounk fall short in their analyses, as they ". . . overlook that support ratings for democracy are largely incomparable across birth cohorts. The reason is that the oral values on which people base their democratic support have turned dramatically more liberal over the generations." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 1). The intergenerationality of the dependent variable is essential to acquiring scientific findings that have value, and it is this aspect that Foa & Mounk failed to take into account.

For Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018), the intergenerationality of the concept of democracy rests in the dimension of emancipative values. In fact, the authors ". . . expect democracy to take root and flourish only under conditions that give rise to emancipative values." (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, the authors write "The importance of emancipative values then leads us to demonstrate that overt mass support for democracy is an altogether deceptive indicator of a public's affinity to democracy." (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 2). Conclusively, the authors claim that debate around democracy is currently futile, as the indicators of democracy need to be refreshed; this the authors accomplish by adding the emancipative values dimension to their conception of democracy.

In order to understand what emancipative values are, "Emancipative values measure people's emphasis on universal freedoms" (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 11). That

being said, ". . . emancipative values . . . vary within nations and do so in predictable ways along cleavage lines like gender, cohort, class, ethnicity, and religion, such that the group with the greater action resources emphasizes emancipative values more strongly on average." (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 11). To fully understand this point, action resources refers to the material means, cognitive skills, and connective opportunities that an individual or a society possesses. Following this logic, support for liberal democracy should rise concurrently with the amount of action resources within a society, or between individuals. As has been illustrated by Welzel & Inglehart, ". . . the temporal co-evolution of action resources, emancipative values, and comprehensive democracy is driven by a dynamic in which spreading action resources give rise to emancipative values, which then motivate mass pressure in favor of comprehensive democracy." (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 12, Inglehart & Welzel, 2017, p. 1-7).

The article published by Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018) points to the fact that emancipative values must be included in a study of support for democracy between birth cohorts. Liberal democracy, the dependent variable of the analysis of this thesis, was adopted from Alexander & Welzel (2017) and Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018). Shortly stated, the liberal democracy that will be tested in this thesis combines scores regarding an individual's support for a democratic polity, as well as an individual's justification levels regarding different aspects of sexual emancipation.

Of course, this is a debate, and not one person or group is exclusively correct at this point, regardless of what side of the democratic trend debate they find themselves standing. After taking all of this information into account, the hypothesis of this work posits that support for liberal democracy within the United States has increased. Explicitly, this thesis hypothesizes that support for liberal democracy has increased among younger birth cohorts in

the United States. This hypothesis runs perpendicular to the findings of Foa & Mounk, as well as partially the findings of Norris (2017) and Voeten (2016), and shall be tested in the section subsequent to this.

3. *Empirical Analysis*

This section shall begin by discussing the methodologies used in the separate models that were performed within this work. This will include discussing datasets, variables, and anything else that was foundational in the execution of this thesis. After that, a discussion of the actual analysis will take place. Here, the mathematics and logic behind the three analytical models performed within this thesis will be explained. Subsequent to that, the results of the three models shall be presented and discussed, based on the literature contained within the previous section. The results will be presented through a mixture of tables (which will be presented in the body text) and figures (which will be presented in the Appendix). That will be followed by a critical discussion regarding aspects of this thesis. This section is followed by a general discussion regarding the entire thesis and will attempt to bring the information that was presented in this thesis around full-circle.

3.1. Methodology

The data used in this thesis was gleaned exclusively from the World Values Survey, specifically survey waves 3 through 7. Briefly stated, a survey wave is simply a survey taken at a different time; i.e., survey wave 3 was taken before survey wave 4 and 5 and so on. These survey waves span a twenty-two-year gap, from 1995 to 2017, offering five different datasets

with a similar structure. The World Values Survey ". . . consists of nationally representative surveys conducted in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90 percent of the world's population, using a common questionnaire." (World Values Survey, 2019). This particular survey proved to be very conducive for drawing comparisons between individuals whose answers were given years apart, due to the structure of the World Values Survey. That being said, this work focuses exclusively on survey waves 3 through 7 as they apply to the United States of America.

To fully understand why the World Values Survey was so important in the synthesizing of this research, one must understand the aspects about which the survey inquires, as well as the corresponding variables to these inquiries. The World Values Survey provides information regarding, among other things, an individual's year of birth, attitude towards a democratically-governed political system, as well as measures of particular emancipative values, such as an individual's justification of homosexuality, divorce, and abortion. Another feature that the survey possesses is the fact that it was also used by Foa & Mounk and other social scientists that reacted to the findings of Foa & Mounk, such as Norris and Welzel (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, Foa & Mounk, 2016, Norris, 2017). It makes sense, then, to use the same datasets as the authors mentioned in the previous section, so as to be able to test respondents using the same survey questions and data, so that Foa & Mounk's findings can either be supported or rejected; using the same datasets makes it easier to replicate studies as well, as Model 1 of this thesis replicates some of the findings of Alexander & Welzel (2017). Lastly, the World Values Survey also provides information regarding to which social class an individual belongs. All of these aforementioned questions correspond to variables that were operationalized across the survey waves so that the empirical section of this thesis could be carried out. Explicitly, variables

concerning an individual's justification of homosexuality, divorce, and abortion, and respondent's attitudes towards having a democratically-run polity, were calculated against grouping factors such as birth cohort and social class, in order to test for a specific birth cohort's and a specific social class' levels of support for liberal democracy between survey waves, as well as between birth cohorts and social classes.

Though the main analysis of this work was just shortly described, there are two other models that differ from Model 1, which, explicitly said, tests for levels of support for liberal democracy between birth cohorts and survey waves in the United States from 1995 to 2017. Model 2 had the goal to use Foa & Mounk's methodology with the wave 7 dataset, in order to see what would happen when a model was run testing for support for unqualified democracy between different birth cohorts. Model 2 differs from Model 1 in that Model 2 does not take the emancipative values dimension of support for democracy into account; it purely measures one variable, that is, the level of support for a democratically-run polity, which is the same way in which Foa & Mounk garnered their results (Foa & Mounk, 2016). Summarily, Model 2 is a replication of Foa & Mounk's 2016 study, which acts as a foundation for the rest of their work. Model 3 once again tests for support for liberal democracy, which means that it includes emancipative values into the model. However, in departure from Model 1, Model 3 scraps the birth cohort dimension and replaces it with a dimension regarding a respondent's subjectively perceived social class.

Lastly, the values of the operationalized variables had to be rearranged and normalized, so as to bring all of the values onto a single spectrum with a minimum and maximum of 0 and 1, respectively. Some variables were recoded (i.e. the variable operationalized for support for a democratically-run polity) so that, for example, an absence of support for democracy would result in a 0 and full support for democracy would result in a

1. This technique was also used for the variables that measure a respondent's justification of homosexuality, divorce, and abortion; full justification of these attributes/happenings results in a 1, while no level of justification results in a 0, and all other values fall between these two limits. Variables regarding the grouping of individuals, such as birth year or social class, were left largely untouched.

In Models 1 and 2, respondents were separated based on their year of birth, and then once again joined together based on their birth cohort. Five birth cohorts were included in these models, and from oldest to youngest, they are called the Greatest Generation (1915-27), the Silent Generation (1928-45), the Baby Boomers (1946-64), Generation X (1965-80), and the Millennials (1981-1996). There were other generations that were represented in the surveys as well, however, with a respondent number of less than 50, the Interbellum Generation (1901-1914; the birth cohort before the Greatest Generation) was left out of the analyses. Generation Z (1997-2012) was also left out of the analyses, due to the fact that survey wave 7 was the only survey that included these individuals. Generation Z's mean level of support for liberal democracy could not be compared to anything, so it was left out of the entire analysis. The separation of birth cohorts may seem arbitrary, however this scheme follows the guidelines of the Pew Research Center (Dimock, 2019), and was useful when it came to properly separating the survey populations.

For Model 3, birth cohort separation of respondents was replaced by separation into groups based on what social class a respondent felt they belonged. The World Values Survey questionnaire separates between five different social classes; from lowest earning to highest earning, the order goes: lower class, working class, lower middle class, upper middle class, and lastly, upper class. Unlike the birth cohort analyses, survey waves with a class that possessed less than 50 respondents were left in the analysis. The spread of respondents across

social classes makes sense, with the smallest groups of respondents being grouped into the lowest category (lower class) or the highest category (upper class). Just like the population of the United States of America itself, the vast majority of people find themselves between the working class and the upper-middle-class, or relatively in the middle.

To understand the methodology of this thesis, one must understand how particular variables were manipulated, so that each model could be successfully carried out. Beginning chronologically, Model 1 added the values of a respondent's answers to questions regarding homosexuality, abortion, and divorce, and then divided that value by 3, in order to procure a mean that relates to a respondent's levels of emancipative values (more specifically, sexual emancipation). This value was then multiplied by the variable that operationalizes an individual's support for a democratically-run polity. A formula will be provided under these words, so as to be as clear as possible. The variable 'SD' is used to represent an individual's level of support for democracy, while the H, A, and D, stand for homosexuality, abortion, and divorce, respectively.

$$\text{Level of Support for Liberal Democracy} = SD((H + A + D)/3)$$

This formula replicates the analysis performed by Alexander & Welzel 2017. Model 2, as has been mentioned, leaves emancipative values out of the equation, and tests for support for unqualified democracy. This is because Model 2 replicates the methodology used by Foa & Mounk (2016). Another formula will be provided to show how the values in Model 2 were calculated.

$$\text{Level of Support for Unqualified Democracy} = SD$$

Lastly, Model 3 looks very similar to Model 1 as far as the mathematics go, the only departure is that Model 3 takes the social class of a respondent into account, and separates populations by social class, not birth cohort.

Separation of the respondents into their corresponding birth cohorts and social classes was necessary for this work, first of all to replicate the studies of Foa & Mounk (2016), as well Alexander & Welzel (2017) and others, and second of all to be able to answer the research question of this thesis. As a refresher, the question that this thesis answers is: Has support for liberal democracy declined among younger birth cohorts in the United States? This is a good point to present the results of the three models that are present within this thesis, so as to be able to provide an answer to the research question.

3.2. Results

The results of Model 1 (found in Table 1) show the opposite of what Foa & Mounk claim should be happening in their three articles (Foa & Mounk, 2016, 2017, 2017b); that is, all generations show a growth in level of support for liberal democracy throughout the twenty-two year multi-survey span. Though the Silent Generation, the Baby Boomers, and Generation X all had positive and negative fluctuations over the years, all of the birth cohorts included in Model 1 express a net rise in levels of support for liberal democracy. According to the data table and the figures presented, support for liberal democracy is rising among all birth cohorts between waves; not one birth cohort had less support for liberal democracy in survey wave 7 in comparison to survey wave 3.

As one can see in Table 1, while all birth cohorts seem to be in flux at points as regards their levels of support for liberal democracy, on average, younger birth cohort possess higher levels of support for liberal democracy. Though there is some back and forth when it comes to which cohort has the highest levels of support for liberal democracy in which wave, younger birth cohorts show that they are not going through a process of democratic

deconsolidation. Because of this, the findings of Foa and Mounk can be called into question.

In fact, according to the data, it seems that a process of democratic consolidation is taking

Table 1: Support for Liberal Democracy by Birth Cohort Between Waves (1995-2017)

Model 1	Color Code	Birth Cohort	Mean	Standard Error	% Change	(N=)
W3 (N=1138)		Greatest	.2532	.0189		163
		Silent	.3018	.0148		286
		Baby Boomers	.3283	.0119		481
		Generation X	.3228	.0176		208
W4 (N=1026)		Greatest	.3281	.0369	29.5	60
		Silent	.3495	.0169	15.8	186
		Baby Boomers	.3576	.0118	8.9	441
		Generation X	.2775	.0126	-14	339
W5 (N=1073)		Silent	.3353	.0161	2.1	231
		Baby Boomers	.3445	.0165	-1.4	423
		Generation X	.3985	.0231	11.4	316
		Millennials	.3438	.0253		103
W6 (N=2062)		Silent	.3676	.0137	9.6	361
		Baby Boomers	.3903	.0097	13.2	818
		Generation X	.3872	.0128	-2.8	505
		Millennials	.3646	.0138	6	378
W7 (N=2343)		Silent	.4339	.0262	18	123
		Baby Boomers	.4351	.0114	11.4	616
		Generation X	.4598	.0111	18.7	668
		Millennials	.4522	.0093	24	936

Table 1. Support for liberal democracy by birth cohort, for Survey Waves 3-7 (1995-2017). While all birth cohorts express a net gain in support for liberal democracy, younger birth cohorts express stronger levels of support for liberal democracy than older birth cohorts in more recent waves. Color codes that apply to different groups correspond to colors used in the figures in the Appendix, and were used to aid a reader's of viewing of the information.

place, due to the rising levels of emancipative values, and support for liberal democracy, in rejection of the findings of Foa & Mounk (2016, 2017, 2017b). Model 1 captures the emancipative values dimension of support for democracy, and supports the fact that though there are differences in the understandings of democracy between different birth cohorts, rising levels of emancipative values ensure that democracy is not deconsolidating among younger birth cohorts within the United States; as one can see in Table 1, younger generations such as Generation X and the Millennials all have higher levels of support for liberal democracy in survey wave 7 as compared to survey wave 3, as well as generally higher levels of support for liberal democracy than older birth cohorts. Though there was some decline in support for liberal democracy between survey waves, between all generations and all survey waves from 1995 to 2017, the various birth cohorts of the United States observed net rises in levels of support for liberal democracy.

Model 2 aimed to replicate Foa & Mounk's 2016 study. This was done by leaving a respondent's scores for sexual emancipation out of the analysis, and simply observing the respondent's feelings towards "Having a democratic political system" (World Values Survey, 1995); in other words, Model 2 tested for support for unqualified democracy. As the reader should be aware, different conceptions of democracy between different birth cohorts could lead to divergent ideas about democracy, which would in turn cause different generations of a population to support or negate a democratically-run polity for different reasons. Model 2, as well as the analyses performed by Foa & Mounk did not operationalize democracy in a way that allows the concept of democracy to be intergenerational, thus, one should notice a difference in the mean values for support for liberal democracy and for support for unqualified democracy in Models 1 and 2.

Table 2: Support for Unqualified Democracy by Birth Cohort (1995-2017)

Model 2	Color Code	Birth Cohort	Mean	Standard Error	% Change	(N=)
W3 (N=1138)		Greatest	.8261	.0189		163
		Silent	.8344	.0164		286
		Baby Boomers	.7997	.0109		481
		Generation X	.7467	.0187		208
W4 (N=1026)		Greatest	.8555	.0267	3.5	60
		Silent	.8351	.0169	.08	186
		Baby Boomers	.7951	.0123	-0.5	441
		Generation X	.7487	.0147	0.2	339
W5 (N=1073)		Silent	.8181	.0519	-4.3	231
		Baby Boomers	.7706	.0124	-7.7	423
		Generation X	.7362	.0152	-7.4	316
		Millennials	.7184	.0259		103
W6 (N=2062)		Silent	.7848	.0128	-4	361
		Baby Boomers	.7542	.0096	-2.1	818
		Generation X	.7221	.0125	-1.9	505
		Millennials	.6693	.0145	-6.8	378
W7 (N=2343)		Silent	.8997	.0211	14.6	123
		Baby Boomers	.8192	.0105	8.6	616
		Generation X	.7819	.0101	8.2	668
		Millennials	.7165	.0084	7	936

Table 2. Support for unqualified democracy separated by birth cohort, for Survey Waves 3-7 (1995-2017). This table uses the same methodology as Foa & Mounk (2016), and supports the findings of Foa & Mounk, until W7, in which all birth cohorts observe an increase in support for unqualified democracy.

When one observes and compares the differences in mean values in Models 1 and 2, it is clear that the non-use of the emancipative dimension of democracy affected the results, and the analyses performed by Foa & Mounk, in a negative way. Model 2 (the results of which

can be seen in Table 2) shows a decline in support for democracy (unqualified), between all birth cohorts, not including the Greatest Generation (1915-27). Of note, survey wave 7 observed an increase in support for unqualified democracy in comparison to survey wave 6 as it regards all birth cohorts. At this point, however, one should be aware of why this measurement of democracy is faulty at best.

Because different birth cohorts have different conceptions of what democracy is and what democracy should do, the results of Model 2, as well as the results originating in the research of Foa & Mounk (2016, 2017 & 2017b), should be carefully taken into account, as well as with a grain of salt. Foa & Mounk were not able to use the resource of survey wave 7, as it was not available at the time that they wrote their journal articles. As one can see, support for democracy, albeit unqualified, takes a uniform upturn between wave 6 and wave 7, further casting doubt upon Foa & Mounk's ideas about democratic deconsolidation among younger birth cohorts, or any birth cohorts, for that matter.

That being said, when one looks at the results of Model 2 as structured by survey wave and birth cohort, it becomes clear that the results of Model 2 and the results of the articles by Foa & Mounk are problematic. In the figures for Model 2 contained within the Appendix, one can easily see the democratic trend decreasing as birth cohorts become younger. Between survey waves, in every single survey wave, older birth cohorts have higher levels of support for democracy.

Due to the differences in mean values between birth cohorts present in the two different models, one can safely posit that the emancipative dimension of democracy has a large influence on individual respondents' understandings of the concept of democracy, and its absence can have large consequences regarding scientific discourse and discovery that concerns democracy. The differences between support for liberal democracy and unqualified

democracy (Foa & Mounk's conception, as well as Model 2) point to the need for the scientific community to reevaluate how democracy should be measured in the future, and also make clear that individuals and social scientists must take the emancipative dimension of democracy into account when performing scientific studies that involve democracy and different birth cohorts. At this point, it should be said that the democratic trend in Model 2 champions the findings of Foa & Mounk, however, with the information presented above, one can be assured that these results are flawed, foundationally and methodologically, and should not be considered final or binding.

After Model 2, the results of Model 3 will be presented, which can be found on the next page. Model 3 measures support for liberal democracy, just like Model 1, however, instead of dividing the population of respondents by birth cohort, Model 3 separates respondents based upon which social class the respondent felt that they belong. This leaves five social classes for the population of the World Values Survey, through the same five survey waves.

The results of Model 3 (which can be seen in Table 3) point to a few different population trends that are worth discussing. Considering the difference between survey waves regarding a single social class, all of the social classes, except for the upper class, showed a net gain in support for democracy between 1995 and 2017. The working class and the lower class had especially strong rises in support for liberal democracy between survey waves 6 and 7. Positive and negative fluctuations between survey waves can be seen in all of the social classes, except for the upper middle class, which experienced varying degrees of constant growth in support for liberal democracy between survey waves 3 and 7. Again, the figures that show the differences between different social classes within a single survey wave paints a more detailed picture, and more information can be garnered from them. These can be

Table 3: Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class Between Waves

Model 3	Color Code	Social Class	Mean	Standard Error	% Change	(N=)
W3 (N=1169)		LC	0.2532	.0455		33
		WC	0.2785	.0118		399
		LMC	0.3105	.0141		329
		UMC	0.3384	.0135		386
		UC	0.3097	.0521		22
W4 (N=1060)		LC	0.3137	.0511	23.8	24
		WC	0.3261	.0142	17	291
		LMC	0.3652	.0159	17.6	289
		UMC	0.3757	.0124	11	438
		UC	0.3086	.0601	-.3	18
W5 (N=1114)		LC	0.2834	.0262	-9.6	72
		WC	0.2882	.0123	-11.6	339
		LMC	0.3401	.0127	-6.8	383
		UMC	0.4227	.0152	12.5	309
		UC	0.4175	.0925	35.2	11
W6 (N=2080)		LC	0.2937	.0247	3.6	117
		WC	0.3328	.0113	15.4	560
		LMC	0.3771	.0101	10.8	702
		UMC	0.4401	.0108	4.1	674
		UC	0.4014	.0542	-3.8	27
W7 (N=2428)		LC	0.5256	.2944	78.9	33
		WC	0.4958	.2881	48.9	721
		LMC	0.4039	.2737	7.1	575
		UMC	0.4464	.2895	1.4	922
		UC	0.3731	.2669	-7	177

Table 3. Support for liberal democracy by social class, for Survey Waves 3-7 (1995-2017). Nearly all social classes observed a rise in levels of support for liberal democracy. The upper class, however, shows a marked decline in support for liberal democracy since W5 (2006). The lower class and the working class show large gains in support for liberal democracy between W6 (2011) and W7 (2017). LC = Lower Class, WC = Working Class, LMC = Lower Middle Class, UMC = Upper Middle Class, UC = Upper Class.

found in the Appendix.

As one can see, exempting information from survey wave 7, the lower middle class and the upper middle class had higher levels of support for liberal democracy in comparison to the other social classes. In addition, the lower class and the working class had the lowest levels of support for liberal democracy, until survey wave 7, where the lower class and the working class possess the highest levels of support for liberal democracy. These two classes made a very strong jump between survey waves 6 and 7. Other than that, the upper class observed a decline in support for liberal democracy between survey waves 5 and 7. These findings shall be further discussed at a later point in this work.

Whether the results of Models 1, 2 & 3 are were statistically significant also had to be tested, so that the robustness of the models could be presented, to quell any objections regarding the analyses that were performed within this thesis. Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed on the models, one ANOVA for each model. The mathematical results of the ANOVAs shall be presented in the Appendix under Tables 4, 5, and 6 (Field, Field & Miles, 2012).

It is worth mentioning here that Model 1 proved to have significant differences between the mean values of liberal democracy between the different birth cohorts and waves. That being said, the combined effect of birth cohort and wave on an individual's levels of support for liberal democracy seems to be insignificant, in comparison to the other two, separate effects.

The ANOVA performed for Model 2 only finds a significant effect on support for unqualified democracy from the birth cohort variable. Other than that, statistical significance is lowest in this model, as compared to the others.

Lastly, the ANOVA performed for Model 3 makes it clear that an individual's social class, the wave to which a respondent's answer belongs, as well as the combined effect of the two proved to have the highest significance level of any of the models. It seems that support for liberal democracy is highly effected by an individual's social class, as well as in what year a survey was taken.

After one examines the ANOVAs contained in the Appendix, it would seem that this information bodes well for the analyses that were carried out in this thesis, as the differences in mean values between birth cohorts, survey waves, and social classes are all significant. At this point, it is important to point out where this thesis may have fallen short, or where mistakes may have been made that would have an influence on the outcome of the results of Models 1, 2, or 3.

3.3. Critical Reflection

Like most, if not all research projects, this thesis did suffer in a few different ways, due to incomplete information, missing information, as well as the fact that certain variables could be volatile designators of certain attributes, in this case, the variables that inquired about a respondent's social class.

This thesis was able to test support levels for liberal democracy and unqualified democracy between five different birth cohorts and social classes in the United States. This notion in mind, in order to be able to further falsify the findings of Foa & Mounk, it would have been advantageous if birth years belonging to Generation Z had been represented in other survey waves, not just wave 7. It is intuitive that these individuals would be excluded in other survey waves, due to the fact that much of Generation Z were not adults in the other

survey waves. Also, the fact that the other survey waves were performed before the birth of many of the respondents belonging to Generation Z, it makes more sense that Generation Z could only be included in survey wave 7. That being said, since Foa & Mounk claim that democratic deconsolidation is taking place particularly among younger birth cohorts, such as Generation Z, it would be useful for future research to cover this birth cohort within its analysis. This information could be the key to further rejection of the findings of Foa & Mounk, and unfortunately must take place at some point in the future. One could wait until the survey wave 8 comes out, and add that to the analysis; nevertheless, future research must include Generation Z, so that the democratic trend can be further observed as it relates to a more diverse spectrum of birth cohorts.

Other than the absence of Generation Z in the analysis, a number of missing responses from the respondents of the World Values Survey in all survey waves led to a purge of respondents that possessed missing values. These respondents were not included in any of the models. There could be many reasons for a non-response when it comes to a survey question; the fact that these individuals were not included in the analyses points to a discrepancy between the data presented in this thesis and the reality of levels of support for liberal democracy in the United States. Though this purging of respondents was done equally across survey waves (i.e. a non-response for one of the variables used resulted in exclusion from the analyses), as well as necessary for the carrying out of this analysis, it likely affected a certain birth cohort or social class more than others. It is impossible to know where these respondents would have fallen within the analyses, and this is why this is being mentioned in this section; the reality of support for liberal democracy within the United States and the results of this thesis must reconcile with this fact.

Next, concerning the variable that determines a respondent's social class, this variable is subjective, and could be volatile in terms of actually being representative of social class distribution within the United States. The statement that individuals are subject to in order to acquire this information reads: "People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class." (World Values Survey, 1995). The interviewer then asks the respondent to place themselves within this spectrum. This variable seems volatile to the real distribution of social classes within the United States due to the fact that it asks an individual to provide a subjective answer as to which social class they belong without basing itself off of any information other than the opinion/feelings of the respondent. This designation could corrupt the distribution of social classes as it reflects reality, due to the simple fact that the respondents are not being asked about income levels, or some other indicator that could better indicate an individual's social class. Furthermore, there seems to be large jumps in respective numbers of individuals that identify as belonging to certain social classes. For example, between survey waves 6 and 7, the upper middle class enjoys quite a large increase. Though it makes sense in the case of social classes to leave the lower class and the upper class in the analysis, the low response numbers belonging to these groups could also corrupt the information presented in this thesis. In the future, while testing levels of support for liberal democracy between social classes, it could be useful to get more responses from individuals within these two social groups, in order to provide a more precise indication of the democratic trend belonging to a particular social class within a particular temporal context. Lastly, regarding Model 3, the drastic drop in number of respondents from the lower class between survey waves 6 and 7 may have affected Model 3 in a way that it would produce the whopping 78.9 percent increase in support for liberal democracy amongst the lower class, and a similar increase amongst the working class. Further inquiry into the

relationships between the dependent and independent variable of Model 3 is necessary in order to accurately posit whether such a strong increase in support for liberal democracy is possible over the span of just six years.

It will also be decidedly beneficial in the future to test for other dimensions of emancipative values, not exclusively those that have to do with sexual emancipation. Like sexual emancipation, these other dimensions are made up of an aggregation of three items. There are three other dimensions regarding emancipative values (so far), and they include levels of child autonomy, gender equality, and popular voice, which prioritizes freedoms of speech (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018, p. 11). These dimensions could be added to this research in the future, so as to be able to capture emancipative values from more sides than one. As has been mentioned, however, the dimension of sexual emancipation has a strong relationship with the particular aspects of democracy for which this thesis wished to test.

Lastly, the survey waves in and of themselves could be seen as problematic, due to the fact that every survey has certain biases and formal shortcomings. This research could also be performed with other data sets from other organizations, to more fully capture levels of support for emancipative values, however; the World Values Survey proved sufficient for the scope of this research.

All empirical work has shortcomings that need to be addressed, and this thesis is no different. With more complete, detailed information, and variables that objectively better represent the reality of the distribution of certain attributes across a population, this work could be taken a step further in order to disprove Foa & Mounk's findings regarding democratic deconsolidation on more bases.

4. Summary

After the completion of the empirical portion of this thesis, the entirety of this work is to be summarized, as well as reconciled with the information that was presented in the section regarding democratic deconsolidation. The results that were acquired by carrying out the three models included in this work leave some clarification to be completed regarding the democratic trend in the United States. This section will briefly work chronologically to showcase where the findings of authors align with the results presented in this thesis and where they do not, as it regards the democratic trend in the United States of America.

First and foremost, this thesis aimed to answer the question of whether support for liberal democracy has declined among younger birth cohorts in the United States. According to Model 1, support for liberal democracy has not only not decreased among younger birth cohorts in comparison to older birth cohorts, but the levels seem to be steadily rising. The findings provided by Foa & Mounk (2016, 2017, 2017b) have been repudiated on multiple grounds. The most foundational mistake that Foa & Mounk made in their analyses is the fact that they failed to use an intergenerational definition and conception of democracy. As was communicated by other authors, using this particular indicator for democracy is not in any way sufficient, because democracy means different things to different people, especially when particular people are grouped in certain ways, such as by birth cohort or social class (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018). Failing to use an intergenerational definition flawed the methodology and the results of Foa & Mounk's articles detailing democratic deconsolidation, and thus, a general rejection of the findings of these articles is logical; the findings are based on a flawed methodology and conception of the item for which Foa & Mounk were measuring, therefore, these results cannot be accepted

as valid. Any conclusions that claim to have measured support for democracy within any given population should include the emancipative values dimension of democracy, as it is a more precise and comprehensive indicator for peoples' notions of democracy.

Other authors found similar developments to Foa & Mounk, such as Norris (2017) and Voeten (2016). These authors used different methodologies to acquire results measuring support for democracy in the West, however, they too seem to leave the emancipative values dimension out of their analyses. This could explain why both of these authors provide a nuanced reaction to the state of the democratic trend in the United States of America. Both of these authors note some kind of decline in support for democracy within the United States based on birth cohort. When one analyses the results of Model 1 based off of survey wave, such as survey wave 3, then one will see that older generations do indeed have lower levels of support for liberal democracy in comparison to younger generations, on average. That being said, when one looks at the figures detailing a single birth cohort's support for liberal democracy, one will see that all of the birth cohort groups showed a net gain in support for liberal democracy.

Of course, Model 2 uses the same methodology as Foa & Mounk (2016), and supports the findings of Foa & Mounk (2016). That being said, since Foa & Mounk's flawed methodology was used in Model 2, the results of Model 2 should be ignored as far as their explanatory ability of the democratic trend. The only result that matters from Model 2 is the fact that it details just what Foa & Mounk said would happen, which confirms that their model was conceptually incorrect. As far as what happened between waves 6 and 7 in Model 2 in the context of a sharp rise in support for unqualified democracy, more research may be needed to understand how this uptick in support for unqualified democracy between all birth cohorts was able to take place.

The last model to be discussed here is Model 3, which measured for levels of support for liberal democracy based on social class. Foa & Mounk (2016) posit that levels of support for authoritarianism increase with one's financial means, meaning that those with more monetary wealth will have lower levels of support for liberal democracy. Though positive and negative fluctuations were present between waves in nearly all social classes, the upper class is the only class that shows real decline in levels of support for liberal democracy. Whether this trend shall continue in the future is something that cannot be known at this time. Considering the information present in the data tables as well as the figures in the Appendix, the results of this thesis support Foa & Mounk's findings regarding levels of support for democracy based on social class. That being said, when one inserts emancipative values into the equation, and tests for levels of support for liberal democracy, one finds that ". . . the predominant shift across all social classes is from illiberal to liberal values, reflecting the general emancipatory trend typical of all post industrial societies." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 11). However, with the sinking levels of support for liberal democracy amongst the upper class since 2006, one may be concerned that the upper class is becoming more illiberal, contra to what Alexander & Welzel claimed is happening amongst this particular social class. Further research is needed to be able to posit anything more concrete about levels of support for liberal democracy amongst the upper class.

Lastly, Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018) as well as Alexander & Welzel (2017) were able to foresee the fact that a conception of democracy is weak without including the dimension of emancipative values. Model 1 aimed to further the research of the two aforementioned groups with new survey waves and looked into how the liberal democratic trend is moving. Both of these articles agreed that overt support for democracy was a poor indicator of a population's affinity to democracy, and it is in this way that the conception of

liberal democracy came into play, in the aforementioned articles and in the empirical analysis of this thesis.

Alexander & Welzel (2017) is also able to quell any confusion that may arise from the data and results gathered by other authors, such as Norris and Voeten. On this point, the authors write "The apparent age pattern in political disaffection has little generational to it but is mostly a lifecycle effect: younger people have been more disaffected already in earlier times but turn more allegiant as they age." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 9). This would explain why younger birth cohorts such as the Millennials or Generation X have perceived lower levels of support for liberal democracy, despite generally rising over time. This lifecycle effect could also be used to explain why Foa & Mounk observed a decline in support for democracy between birth cohorts. The lower levels of support for liberal democracy among younger persons due to this lifecycle effect can be seen in nearly all of the analyses, including those performed by other authors and in this work. That being said, this effect should provide democracies with birth cohorts that not only support democracy, but an unequivocally liberal version of democracy. It should be clear that it is expected that as birth cohorts age, such as the Millennials or Generation X, they too will become more allegiant to democracy (Alexander & Welzel, 2017). That being said, in the years to come, the intergenerational context of support for democracy may change its meaning, and once again, the social science community will have to discuss just what makes democracy an intergenerational concept for all.

As for what all of this means for the United States, it seems that democratic backsliding is not as big of a problem as Foa & Mounk claimed it to be (2016, 2017, 2017b). The liberal democratic trend does not seem to be in as much danger as was posited in 2016 and 2017. In fact, in confirmation of the hypothesis of this work, it seems that one is able to

claim that younger birth cohorts in the United States have rising levels of support for liberal democracy. Of course, this research needs to be carried on once new survey information is available, so that the state of the liberal democratic trend can be further monitored, with new information regarding younger birth cohorts, such as Generation Z. After all, ". . . the prescription of a healthy cure requires a correct diagnosis in the first place." (Alexander & Welzel, 2017, p. 12). As has been mentioned, in the future, it will be important that individuals use a conception of democracy that does not mean different things to different people, such as liberal democracy (Alexander & Welzel, 2017), or comprehensive democracy (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018).

Though this work focused on the United States between the years 1995 and 2017, the same structure of this work could be carried out with data from other countries, in order to be able to make diagnoses regarding the liberal democratic trend in different democratic states. In fact, much of the literature that supports this thesis observes growing emancipative trends in many countries, not just the United States. Having taken this into account, it should be noted that democracy flourishes in areas in which emancipative values are high (Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel, 2018). Conversely, where levels of support for emancipative values are low, there authoritarianism festers, and it is also there that democracy cannot exist, at least, not as it would be recognizable today.

To bring this work full-circle, it should be made clear that emancipative values and democracy go hand-in-hand. Take, for example, the United States. A country with a long history of racism and disenfranchisement of certain groups of the population, one could not rate the level of democracy of the United States high when women and minority groups, as well as people without land, could not vote. With their enfranchisement, these individuals, who were and still are discriminated against, were able to exert some level of influence on the

democracy in which they were functioning, and with the addition of many Civil Rights bills, democracy in the United States became more liberal, due to the fact that levels of emancipative values were rising within portions of the population, as well as generally, on average.

In conclusion, Foa & Mounk's claims of democratic deconsolidation among younger birth cohorts cannot be supported by the findings of this thesis. The findings of Alexander & Welzel (2017) as well as Brunkert, Kruse & Welzel (2018) are supported by the findings of this thesis. Protecting democracy against illiberal, undemocratic forces is arguably one of the most important duties that political science needs to continue, for the sake of civil and individual rights within societies. Lastly, more clarity regarding exactly what democracy means is important for discourse regarding the democratic trend, and the intergenerationality of the concept of democracy is crucial when it comes to discourse regarding democracy. With this newfound clarity involving democracy and emancipative values, the social sciences should have the ability to discuss the ins and outs of democracy while avoiding confusion based on generational meanings of democracy, leading to more realistic projections of the democratic trend, and more fruitful discussion.

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Appendix

Figures for Model 1: Liberal Democracy Between Survey Waves, by Birth Cohort

Greatest Generation: Support for Liberal Democracy Between Waves

Silent Generation: Support for Liberal Democracy Between Waves

Baby Boomers: Support for Liberal Democracy Between Waves

Generation X: Support for Liberal Democracy Between Waves

The Millennials: Support for Liberal Democracy Between Waves

Figures for Model 1: Liberal Democracy Between Birth Cohorts, by Survey Wave

Wave 3: Support for Liberal Democracy by Birth Cohort (1995)

Wave 4: Support for Liberal Democracy by Birth Cohort (1999)


Wave 5: Support for Liberal Democracy by Birth Cohort (2006)

Wave 6: Support for Liberal Democracy by Birth Cohort (2011)

Wave 7: Support for Liberal Democracy by Birth Cohort (2017)

Figures for Model 2: Unqualified Democracy Between Survey Waves, by Birth Cohort

Greatest Generation: Support for Unqualified Democracy Between Waves

Silent Generation: Support for Unqualified Democracy Between Waves

Baby Boomers: Support for Unqualified Democracy Between Waves

Generation X: Support for Unqualified Democracy Between Waves

The Millennials: Support for Unqualified Democracy Between Waves

Figures for Model 2: Unqualified Democracy Between Birth Cohorts, by Survey Wave

Wave 3: Support for Unqualified Democracy by Birth Cohort (1995)

Wave 4: Support for Unqaulified Democracy by Birth Cohort (1999)

Wave 5: Support for Unqualified Democracy by Birth Cohort (2006)

Wave 6: Support for Unqualified Democracy by Birth Cohort (2011)


Wave 7: Support for Unqualified Democracy by Birth Cohort (2017)

Figures for Model 3: Liberal Democracy Between Survey Waves, by Social Class

Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class Between Waves (1995-2017): Lower Class

Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class Between Waves (1995-2017): Working Class

Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class Between Waves (1995-2017): Lower Middle Class

Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class Between Waves (1995-2017): Upper Middle Class


Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class Between Waves (1995-2017): Upper Class

## Figures for Model 3: Liberal Democracy Between Social Classes, by Survey Wave

Wave 3: Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class (1995)

Wave 4: Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class (1999)

Wave 5: Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class (2006)

Wave 6: Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class (2011)

Wave 7: Support for Liberal Democracy by Social Class (2017)

Analyses of Variance Tables:

Table 4: Analysis of Variance: Model 1

Model 1 ANOVA	DF	SUM SQ	Mean Sq	F-Value	Signif. Value	Significance
Birth Cohort	1	2.6	2.573	34.991	$3.45 * 10^{-9}$	***
Survey Wave	1	12.6	12.579	171.039	$2 * 10^{-16}$	***
Birth Cohort/Wave	1	0.0	.009	.119	.73	
Residuals	8029	590.5	.074			

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1, DF = Degrees of Freedom

Table 5: Analysis of Variance: Model 2

Model 2 ANOVA	DF	SUM SQ	Mean Sq	F-Value	Signif. Values	Significance
Birth Cohort	1	14.6	14.6	213.209	$2 * 10^{-16}$	***
Survey Wave	1	0.2	.152	2.226	.136	
Birth Cohort/Wave	1	0.0	.014	.206	.650	
Residuals	8029	549.8	.068			

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1, DF = Degrees of Freedom

Table 6: Analysis of Variance: Model 3

Model 3 ANOVA	DF	SUM SQ	Mean Sq	F-Value	Signif. Value	Significance
Birth Cohort	1	3.8	3.819	52.27	$5.30 * 10^{-13}$	***
Survey Wave	1	17.1	17.068	233.62	$2 * 10^{-16}$	***
Birth Cohort/Wave	1	2.6	2.63	36	$2.06 * 10^{-9}$	***
Residuals	7907	577.7	.073			

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1, DF = Degrees of Freedom

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I would like to thank my instructors, Dr. Stefan Kruse and Lennart Brunkert, for their continued support during the composition of this thesis. I would also like to thank the creators and maintainers of R and RStudio, without which the carrying out of this work would have been impossible. Lastly, I would like to thank Maria Ravlik, whose foundational help with different aspects of RStudio also aided this work in realizing completion.

Eidesstaatliche Erklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die Arbeit selbstständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Alle Stellen der Arbeit, die wortwörtlich oder sinngemäß aus anderen Quellen übernommen worden, have ich als solle kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit have ich in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt.

Lüneburg, 05.09.2019

Collin Daniel Hooper