



# Practical Relative Order Attack in Deep Ranking

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arXiv




Github




# Background

- Deep ranking (deep metric learning) models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks (the ranking result can be dramatically changed).



# Insight

- Previous attacks focus on absolute rank
- Attack on relative order remains under-explored




Absolute rank: the absolute positions of selected candidates

Relative order: the relative positions among selected candidates

# Contributions

- **Order Attack (OA)**, which alters the relative order among selected candidates through adversarial attack.
- White-Box OA: a triplet-style implementation
- Black-Box OA: a Short-range Ranking Correlation (SRC) metric as a surrogate objective approximating the triplet-style formulation.
- Real-world attack demo: including a major online retailing e-commerce platform and a major search-by-image platform.

# Order Attack (OA)



# White-Box OA

## Formulation

- ▷ **Order Attack** finds an adversarial perturbation

$$\mathbf{r} \ (\|\mathbf{r}\|_{\infty} \leq \varepsilon \text{ and } \tilde{\mathbf{q}} = \mathbf{q} + \mathbf{r} \in \mathcal{I}),$$

so that the adversarial query  $\tilde{\mathbf{q}}$  results in  $\mathbf{c}_{p_1} \prec \mathbf{c}_{p_2} \prec \cdots \prec \mathbf{c}_{p_k}$  based on the **attacker-specified permutation**  $\mathbf{p} = [p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k]$

# White-Box OA

## Implementation

- ▷ The inequality chain prescribed by the permutation

$$f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_1}) < f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_2}) < \cdots < f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_k})$$

can be decomposed into a series of inequalities, i.e.,

$$f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_i}) < f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_j}), \quad i, j = 1, 2, \dots, k, \quad i < j.$$

- ▷ Reformulation of the inequalities into triplet loss form leads to the **relative order loss** function

$$L_{\text{ReO}}(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}; \mathbb{C}, \mathbf{p}) = \sum_{i=1}^k \sum_{j=i}^k [f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_i}) - f(\tilde{\mathbf{q}}, \mathbf{c}_{p_j})]_+.$$

which can be combined with a previously proposed semantics-preserving loss term to keep the selected candidates within the topmost part of ranking.

# White-Box Experiments

	$k = 5$					$k = 10$					$k = 25$				
$\varepsilon$	0	$\frac{2}{255}$	$\frac{4}{255}$	$\frac{8}{255}$	$\frac{16}{255}$	0	$\frac{2}{255}$	$\frac{4}{255}$	$\frac{8}{255}$	$\frac{16}{255}$	0	$\frac{2}{255}$	$\frac{4}{255}$	$\frac{8}{255}$	$\frac{16}{255}$
Fashion-MNIST $N = \infty$															
$\tau_S$	0.000	0.286	0.412	0.548	0.599	0.000	0.184	0.282	0.362	0.399	0.000	0.063	0.108	0.136	0.149
mR	2.0	4.5	9.1	12.7	13.4	4.5	7.4	10.9	15.2	17.4	12.0	16.1	17.6	18.9	19.4
Stanford Online Products $N = \infty$															
$\tau_S$	0.000	0.396	0.448	0.476	0.481	0.000	0.263	0.348	0.387	0.398	0.000	0.125	0.169	0.193	0.200
mR	2.0	5.6	4.9	4.2	4.1	4.5	12.4	11.2	9.9	9.6	12.0	31.2	28.2	25.5	25.4

Table 1: White-box order attack on Fashion-MNIST and SOP datasets with various settings.

$k$ : number of selected candidates

$\varepsilon$ : perturbation budget

$\tau_S$ : Kendall's ranking correlation

mR: mean rank of selected candidates

\*  $\tau_S$  is equivalent to Kendall's ranking correlation in white-box scenario.



# Black-Box OA

- Short-range Ranking Correlation (SRC) as a surrogate objective.
- Measures the alignment between the specified permutation and the actual ranking result.
- Inspired by Kendall's tau.

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**Algorithm 1:** Short-range Ranking Correlation  $\tau_S$ .
 

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**Input:** Selected candidates  $\mathbb{C} = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k\}$ ,  
 permutation vector  $\mathbf{p} = [p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k]$ ,  
 top- $N$  retrieval  $\mathbb{X} = \{x_1, x_2, \dots, x_N\}$  for  $\tilde{q}$ .  
 Note that  $\mathbb{C} \subset \mathbb{D}$ ,  $\mathbb{X} \subset \mathbb{D}$ , and  $N \geq k$ .

**Output:** SRC coefficient  $\tau_S$ .

Permute candidates as  $\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}} = \{c_{p_1}, c_{p_2}, \dots, c_{p_k}\}$ ;

Initialize score matrix  $S = 0$  of size  $k \times k$ ;

```

for  $i \leftarrow 1, 2, \dots, k$  do
    for  $j \leftarrow 1, 2, \dots, i - 1$  do
        if  $c_i \notin \mathbb{X}$  1 or  $c_j \notin \mathbb{X}$  then
             $S_{i,j} = -1$  // out-of-range
        else if  $[R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_i) > R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_j) \text{ and } R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_i) > R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_j)]$ 
            or  $[R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_i) < R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_j) \text{ and } R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_i) < R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_j)]$ 
            then
                 $S_{i,j} = +1$  // concordant
        else if  $[R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_i) > R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_j) \text{ and } R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_i) < R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_j)]$ 
            or  $[R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_i) < R_{\mathbb{C}_{\mathbf{p}}}(c_j) \text{ and } R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_i) > R_{\mathbb{X}}(c_j)]$ 
            then
                 $S_{i,j} = -1$  // discordant
    return  $\tau_S = \sum_{i,j} S_{i,j} / \binom{k}{2}$ 
  
```

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# Black-Box Experiments

## Fashion-MNIST Dataset

Algorithm	$k = 5$				$k = 10$				$k = 25$			
	$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{4}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{8}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{16}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{4}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{8}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{16}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{4}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{8}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{16}{255}$
None	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 12.0	0.0, 12.0	0.0, 12.0	0.0, 12.0
Fashion-MNIST $N = \infty$												
Rand	0.211, 2.1	0.309, 2.3	0.425, 3.0	0.508, 7.7	0.172, 4.6	0.242, 5.0	0.322, 6.4	0.392, 12.7	0.084, 12.3	0.123, 13.1	0.173, 15.8	0.218, 25.8
Beta	0.241, 2.1	0.360, 2.6	0.478, 4.6	0.580, 19.3	0.210, 4.8	0.323, 5.7	0.430, 9.6	0.510, 30.3	0.102, 12.4	0.163, 13.8	0.237, 19.7	0.291, 42.7
PSO	0.265, 2.1	0.381, 2.3	0.477, 4.4	0.580, 21.1	0.239, 4.8	0.337, 5.7	0.424, 9.7	0.484, 34.0	0.131, 12.7	0.190, 14.6	0.248, 21.7	0.286, 54.2
NES	0.297, 2.3	<b>0.416, 3.1</b>	<b>0.520, 8.7</b>	<b>0.630, 46.3</b>	<b>0.261, 5.0</b>	0.377, 6.6	0.473, 14.3	0.518, 55.6	<b>0.142, 13.0</b>	0.217, 15.9	0.286, 28.3	0.312, 74.3
SPSA	<b>0.300, 2.3</b>	0.407, 3.2	0.465, 7.1	0.492, 16.3	0.249, 5.0	<b>0.400, 6.6</b>	<b>0.507, 12.8</b>	<b>0.558, 27.5</b>	0.135, 12.9	<b>0.236, 16.3</b>	<b>0.319, 27.1</b>	<b>0.363, 46.4</b>
Fashion-MNIST $N = 50$												
Rand	0.207	0.316	0.424	0.501	0.167	0.242	0.321	0.378	0.083	0.123	0.165	0.172
Beta	0.240	0.359	0.470	0.564	0.204	0.323	0.429	0.487	0.103	0.160	0.216	0.211
PSO	0.266	0.377	0.484	0.557	0.239	0.332	0.420	0.458	0.134	0.183	0.220	0.203
NES	<b>0.297</b>	<b>0.426</b>	<b>0.515</b>	<b>0.584</b>	<b>0.262</b>	0.378	0.463	0.458	<b>0.141</b>	0.199	0.223	0.185
SPSA	0.292	0.407	0.468	0.490	0.253	<b>0.397</b>	<b>0.499</b>	<b>0.537</b>	0.131	<b>0.214</b>	<b>0.260</b>	<b>0.275</b>
Fashion-MNIST $N = k$												
Rand	0.204	0.289	0.346	0.302	0.146	0.181	0.186	0.124	0.053	0.062	0.049	0.021
Beta	0.237	0.342	0.372	0.275	0.183	0.236	0.218	0.106	0.072	0.079	0.058	0.020
PSO	0.252	0.342	0.388	0.284	<b>0.198</b>	0.240	0.219	0.081	<b>0.080</b>	0.082	0.046	0.013
NES	<b>0.274</b>	<b>0.360</b>	0.381	0.282	<b>0.198</b>	0.234	0.213	0.113	0.071	0.076	0.055	0.016
SPSA	<b>0.274</b>	<b>0.360</b>	<b>0.412</b>	<b>0.427</b>	0.188	<b>0.251</b>	<b>0.287</b>	<b>0.298</b>	0.067	<b>0.086</b>	<b>0.091</b>	<b>0.095</b>

Table 3: Black-box OA on Fashion-MNIST dataset. In the  $N = \infty$  experiments,  $(\tau_S, mR)$  are reported in each cell, while only  $\tau_S$  is reported in the cells when  $N$  equals 50 or  $k$ . A larger  $k$  and a smaller  $N$  make the attack harder.

# Black-Box Experiments

## Stanford Online Products Dataset

Algorithm	$k = 5$				$k = 10$				$k = 25$			
	$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{4}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{8}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{16}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{4}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{8}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{16}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{2}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{4}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{8}{255}$	$\varepsilon = \frac{16}{255}$
None	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 2.0	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 4.5	0.0, 12.0	0.0, 12.0	0.0, 12.0	0.0, 12.0
Stanford Online Product $N = \infty$												
Rand	0.187, 2.6	0.229, 8.5	0.253, 85.8	0.291, 649.7	0.167, 5.6	0.197, 13.2	0.208, 92.6	0.222, 716.4	0.093, 14.1	0.110, 27.6	0.125, 146.7	0.134, 903.7
Beta	0.192, 3.3	0.239, 15.3	0.265, 176.7	0.300, 1257.7	0.158, 6.2	0.186, 19.9	0.207, 139.0	0.219, 992.5	0.099, 15.5	0.119, 37.1	0.119, 206.5	0.132, 1208.5
PSO	0.122, 2.1	0.170, 3.0	0.208, 13.3	0.259, 121.4	0.135, 4.8	0.177, 6.5	0.206, 22.8	0.222, 166.5	0.104, 12.7	0.122, 16.7	0.137, 49.5	0.140, 264.2
NES	<b>0.254, 3.4</b>	0.283, 15.6	<b>0.325, 163.0</b>	<b>0.368, 1278.7</b>	<b>0.312, 7.2</b>	<b>0.351, 26.3</b>	0.339, 227.1	0.332, 1486.7	<b>0.242, 18.0</b>	<b>0.259, 51.5</b>	0.250, 324.1	0.225, 1790.8
SPSA	0.237, 3.5	<b>0.284, 11.9</b>	0.293, 75.2	0.318, 245.1	0.241, 7.8	0.325, 22.2	<b>0.362, 112.7</b>	<b>0.383, 389.0</b>	0.155, 18.1	0.229, 41.9	<b>0.286, 185.6</b>	<b>0.306, 557.8</b>
Stanford Online Product $N = 50$												
Rand	0.180	0.216	0.190	0.126	0.163	0.166	0.119	0.055	0.092	0.055	0.016	0.003
Beta	0.181	0.233	0.204	0.119	0.153	0.168	0.116	0.054	0.084	0.057	0.021	0.003
PSO	0.122	0.173	0.183	0.153	0.135	0.164	0.137	0.081	0.093	0.083	0.042	0.011
NES	<b>0.247</b>	0.283	0.246	0.152	<b>0.314</b>	0.295	0.195	0.077	<b>0.211</b>	<b>0.136</b>	0.054	0.013
SPSA	0.241	<b>0.287</b>	<b>0.297</b>	<b>0.303</b>	0.233	<b>0.298</b>	<b>0.298</b>	<b>0.292</b>	0.125	0.130	<b>0.114</b>	<b>0.103</b>
Stanford Online Product $N = k$												
Rand	0.148	0.100	0.087	0.026	0.094	0.044	0.018	0.001	0.023	0.009	0.002	0.001
Beta	0.136	0.106	0.053	0.025	0.076	0.040	0.010	0.004	0.021	0.004	0.001	0.001
PSO	0.102	0.098	0.059	0.031	0.088	0.049	0.022	0.007	0.040	0.015	0.006	0.001
NES	<b>0.185</b>	0.139	0.076	0.030	<b>0.173</b>	0.097	0.036	0.008	<b>0.071</b>	<b>0.027</b>	0.007	0.005
SPSA	0.172	<b>0.154</b>	<b>0.141</b>	<b>0.144</b>	0.107	<b>0.104</b>	<b>0.085</b>	<b>0.069</b>	0.026	0.025	<b>0.017</b>	<b>0.016</b>

Table 5: Black-box OA on Stanford Online Product dataset. In the  $N = \infty$  experiments,  $(\tau_S, \text{mR})$  are reported in each cell, while only  $\tau_S$  is reported in the cells when  $N$  equals 50 or  $k$ . A larger  $k$  and a smaller  $N$  make the attack harder.

# Practical OA Demo


- A major e-commerce platform: JD Snapshot





# Practical OA Demo

2021 **ICCV** OCTOBER 11-17  
VIRTUAL



# Practical OA Demo

- Quantitative Results on JD Snapshot

Algorithm	$\varepsilon$	$k$	$Q$	$T$	Mean $\tau_S$	Stdev $\tau_S$	Max $\tau_S$	Min $\tau_S$	Median $\tau_S$
SPSA	1/255	5	100	204	0.390	0.373	1.000	-0.600	0.400
SPSA	1/255	10	100	200	0.187	0.245	0.822	-0.511	0.200
SPSA	1/255	25	100	153	0.039	0.137	0.346	-0.346	0.033

Table 6: Quantitative  $(k, 50)$ -OA Results on JD Snapshot.

# Practical OA Demo

- Quantitative Results on Bing Visual Search API

Algorithm	$\varepsilon$	$k$	$Q$	$T$	Mean $\tau_S$	Stdev $\tau_S$	Max $\tau_S$	Min $\tau_S$	Median $\tau_S$
SPSA	8/255	5	100	105	0.452	0.379	1.000	-0.400	0.600
SPSA	8/255	10	100	95	0.152	0.217	0.733	-0.378	0.156
SPSA	8/255	25	100	93	0.001	0.141	0.360	-0.406	0.010

Table 7:  $(k, 50)$ -OA Results on Bing Visual Search API.

- Thanks!

arXiv



Github

