### Credit and investment distortions: Evidence from Mexican manufacturing

Carlos Lezama, Jesus Lopez Dynamic Macroeconomics II ITAM

Fall 2022

- 1 Introduction
- 2 The environment
- 3 Overrejection in DD Estimation
- 4 "If hundreds of researchers analyzed the effects of various laws in the CPS, what fraction would find a significant effect even when the laws have no effect?"
- 5 Solutions
- 6 Conclusion



#### Introduction

The paper analyzes the influence of financial factors on firms' investment decisions and aggregate capital accumulation via their effect on dynamic capital distortions.

The authors build a multi-industry model to measure labor and investment wedges using data for the Mexican manufacturing sector (for 2003-12) and assess their importance in accounting for aggregate capital and TFP over time.

#### Introduction

The research is based on the merged dataset in Meza et al. (2019), linking output, employment and investment with credit flows and interest rates at the 4-digit industry level.

The two main results arise:

- Changes in dynamic capital distortions are important in accounting for the path of capital over time.
- Industry specific investment wedges and credit conditions are correlated. Industries where the availability of credit falls and/or real interest rates increase experience an increase in their capital distortions.

# The environment

#### The environment

- *n* industries, each one a representative firm, facing two distortions: static labor wedge and dynamic investment wedge.
- Technology:  $Y_t^i = A_t^i (K_t^i)^{\alpha^i} (L_t^i)^{1-\alpha^i}$ , where  $A^i$  is an industry specific shock
- Firms own K and maximize profits net of expenditures  $\Pi$ :
- The output of all industries is combined  $Y_t = \prod_{i=1}^n (Y_t^i)^{\omega^i}$ , with  $\omega^i$  constant expenditure share in each industry.

#### A Survey of DD Papers

Table 1: Distribution of time span for papers with more than 2 periods

Percentile	Value
1%	3
5%	3
10%	4
25%	5.75
50%	11
75%	21.5
90%	36
95%	51
99%	83
Average	16.5

#### A Survey of DD Papers

**Table 2:** Most commonly used dependent variables

Employment	18
Wages	13
Health/medical expenditure	8
Unemployment	6
Fertility/teen motherhood	4
Insurance	4
Poverty	3
Consumption/savings	3

#### A Survey of DD Papers

Table 3: Informal techniques used to assess endogeneity

15
2
11
7
3
3

## Overrejection in DD Estimation

#### Data

The survey above suggests that most DD papers may report standard errors that understate the standard deviation of the DD estimator. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem they turn to a sample of women's wages from the Current Population Survey (CPS).

#### More specifically, data on:

- Women in their fourth interview month in the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group of the CPS.
- Years: 1979 1999.
- Age: 25 50 y/o.
- Information on weekly earnings, employment status, education, age, and state of residence.

#### Data

#### Summary

The sample contains:

- Nearly 900,000 observations.
- Approximately 540,000 women report strictly positive weekly earnings.
- wage = log(weekly earnings).

This generates ( $50 \times 21 = 1050$ ) state-year cells, with each cell containing on average a little more than 500 women with strictly positive earnings.

The correlogram of the wage residuals was informative enough to estimate first, second, and third autocorrelation coefficients for the mean state-year residuals from a regression of wages on state and year dummies such that they equal 0.51, 0.44, and 0.31, respectively (obtained by a simple OLS regression of the residuals on the corresponding lagged residuals) — which are high and statistically significant.

#### Subsequently, in the DD context:

- 1 Randomly, draw a year  $\sim \mathcal{U}(1985, 1995)$ .
- 2 Select exactly half states (25) at random and designate them as "affected" by the law such that

$$I_{st} = egin{cases} 1 & ext{for all women that live in an affected state} \\ & ext{after the intervention date,} \\ 0 & ext{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

3 Estimate equation (1) using OLS on these placebo laws.

"If hundreds of researchers analyzed the effects of various laws in the CPS, what

fraction would find a significant effect even when the laws have no effect?"

If OLS were to provide consistent standard errors, we would expect to reject the null hypothesis of no effect ( $\beta=0$ ) roughly 5 percent of the time when using a threshold of 1.96 for the absolute t-statistic.

#### A. CPS DATA

			Rejecti	on rate
Data	$\hat{ ho}_1,\hat{ ho}_2,\hat{ ho}_3$	Modifications	No effect	2% effect
1) CPS micro, log			.675	.855
wage			(.027)	(.020)
2) CPS micro, log		Cluster at state-	.44	.74
wage		year level	(.029)	(.025)
3) CPS agg, log	.509, .440, .332		.435	.72
wage			(.029)	(.026)
4) CPS agg, log	.509, .440, .332	Sampling	.49	.663
wage		w/replacement	(.025)	(.024)
5) CPS agg, log	.509, .440, .332	Serially	.05	.988
wage		uncorrelated laws	(.011)	(.006)
6) CPS agg,	.470, .418, .367		.46	.88
employment			(.025)	(.016)
7) CPS agg, hours	.151, .114, .063		.265	.280
worked			(.022)	(.022)
8) CPS agg, changes	046, .032, .002		0	.978
in log wage				(.007)

#### B. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS WITH SAMPLING FROM AR(1) DISTRIBUTION

Data			Rejecti	on rate
	ρ	ρ Modifications	No effect	2% effect
9) AR(1)	.8		.373	.725
			(.028)	(.026)
10) AR(1)	0		.053	.783
			(.013)	(.024)
11) AR(1)	.2		.123	.738
			(.019)	(.025)
12) AR(1)	.4		.19	.713
			(.023)	(.026)
13) AR(1)	.6		.333	.700
			(.027)	(.026)
14) AR(1)	4		.008	.7
			(.005)	(.026)

These results demonstrate that, in the presence of positive serial correlation, conventional DD estimation leads to gross overestimation of t-statistics and significance levels.



#### **Solutions**

VARYING N AND T

			Rejecti	on rate
Data	N	T	No effect	2% effect
		A. CPS DATA		
1) CPS aggregate	50	21	.49	.663
			(.025)	(.024)
2) CPS aggregate	20	21	.39	.54
			(.024)	(.025)
3) CPS aggregate	10	21	.443	.510
			(.025)	(.025)
4) CPS aggregate	6	21	.383	.433
			(.025)	(.025)
5) CPS aggregate	50	11	.20	.638
			(.020)	(.024)
6) CPS aggregate	50	7	.15	.635
			(.017)	(.024)
7) CPS aggregate	50	5	.078	.5
			(.013)	(.025)
8) CPS aggregate	50	3	.048	.363
<del>-</del>			(.011)	(.024)
9) CPS aggregate	50	2	.055	.28
0			(.011)	(.022)

#### **Parametric Methods**

A first possible solution to the serial correlation problem would be to specify an autocorrelation structure for the error term, estimate its parameters, and use these parameters to compute standard errors.

#### **Parametric Methods**

PARAMETRIC SOLUTIONS

			Rejecti	ion rate
Data	Technique	Estimated $\hat{\rho}_1$	No effect	2% Effect
	A. CPS I	DATA		
1) CPS aggregate	OLS		.49	.663
			(.025)	(.024)
<ol><li>CPS aggregate</li></ol>	Standard AR(1)	.381	.24	.66
	correction		(.021)	(.024)
<ol><li>CPS aggregate</li></ol>	AR(1) correction		.18	.363
	imposing $\rho = .8$		(.019)	(.024)
В. О	THER DATA GENE	RATING PROCE	ESSES	
4) AR(1), $\rho = .8$	OLS		.373	.765
			(.028)	(.024)
5) AR(1), $\rho = .8$	Standard AR(1)	.622	.205	.715
	correction		(.023)	(.026)
6) AR(1), $\rho = .8$	AR(1) correction		.06	.323
	imposing $\rho = .8$		(.023)	(.027)
7) AR(2), $\rho_1 = .55$	Standard AR(1)	.444	.305	.625
$\rho_2 = .35$	correction		(.027)	(.028)
8) $AR(1)$ + white	Standard AR(1)	.301	.385	.4
noise, $\rho = .95$ , noise/signal = .13	correction		(.028)	(.028)

#### **Block Bootstrap**

This variant of bootstrap maintains the autocorrelation structure by keeping all the observations that belong to the same group (e.g., state) together. In practice, we bootstrap the t-statistic as follows. For each placebo intervention we compute the absolute t-statistic  $t = |\hat{\beta}/\mathrm{SE}(\hat{\beta})|$ , using the OLS estimate of  $\beta$  and its standard error. We then construct a bootstrap sample by drawing with replacement 50 matrices  $(\bar{Y}_s, V_s)$ , where  $\bar{Y}_s$  is the entire time series of observations for state s, and s is the matrix of state dummies, time dummies, and treatment dummy for state s.

#### **Block Bootstrap**

We then run OLS on this sample. obtain an estimate  $\hat{\beta}_r$  and construct the absolute t-statistic  $t_r = |(\hat{\beta}_r - \hat{\beta})/SE(\hat{\beta}_r)|$ .

#### Remark

The difference between the distribution of  $t_r$  and the sampling distribution of t becomes small as N goes to infinity, even in presence of arbitrary autocorrelation within states and heteroskedasticity.

#### **Block Bootstrap**

BLOCK BOOTSTRAP

			Rejecti	ion rate
Data	Technique	N	No effect	2% effect
	A. CPS DA	ΛTA		
1) CPS aggregate	OLS	50	.43	.735
			(.025)	(.022)
2) CPS aggregate	Block bootstrap	50	.065	.26
	-		(.013)	(.022)
3) CPS aggregate	OLS	20	.385	.595
			(.022)	(.025)
4) CPS aggregate	Block bootstrap	20	.13	.19
			(.017)	(.020)
5) CPS aggregate	OLS	10	.385	.48
			(.024)	(.024)
6) CPS aggregate	Block bootstrap	10	.225	.25
			(.021)	(.022)
7) CPS aggregate	OLS	6	.48	.435
			(.025)	(.025)
8) CPS aggregate	Block bootstrap	6	.435	.375
			(.022)	(.025)

#### **Ignoring Time Series Information**

#### **Simple Aggregation**

One could simply average the data before and after the law and run equation (1) on this averaged outcome variable in a panel of length 2 — this solution will work only for laws that are passed at the same time for all the treated states.

#### **Residual Aggregation**

First, one can regress  $Y_{st}$  on state fixed effects, year dummies, and any relevant covariates. One can then divide the residuals of the treatment states only into two groups: residuals from years before the laws, and residuals from years after the laws. The estimate of the laws' effect and its standard error can then be obtained from an OLS regression in this two-period panel. It also does well when the laws are staggered over time.

#### **Ignoring Time Series Information**

#### IGNORING TIME SERIES DATA

			Rejecti	on rate
Data	Technique		No effect	2% effect
	A. CPS DATA			
1) CPS agg	OLS	50	.49	.663
			(.025)	(.024)
2) CPS agg	Simple aggregation	50	.053	.163
			(.011)	(.018)
3) CPS agg	Residual aggregation	50	.058	.173
			(.011)	(.019)
4) CPS agg, staggered laws	Residual aggregation	50	.048	.363
			(.011)	(.024)
5) CPS agg	OLS	20	.39	.54
			(.025)	(.025)
6) CPS agg	Simple aggregation	20	.050	.088
			(.011)	(.014)
7) CPS agg	Residual aggregation	20	.06	.183
			(.011)	(.019)
8) CPS agg, staggered laws	Residual aggregation	20	.048	.130
			(.011)	(.017)

#### **Empirical Variance-Covariance Matrix**

Suppose that the autocorrelation process is the same across all states and that there is **no** cross-section **heteroskedasticity**. In this case, if the data are sorted by states, and years, the variance-covariance matrix of the error term is block diagonal. Each of these blocks is symmetric, and the element (i, i + j) is the correlation between  $\varepsilon_i$  and  $\varepsilon_{i-j}$ . We can therefore use the variation across the 50 states to estimate each element of this matrix, and use this estimated matrix to compute standard errors.

#### Remark

Under our initial assumption, this method will produce consistent estimates of the standard error as  $N \longrightarrow \infty$ .

#### **Empirical Variance-Covariance Matrix**

EMPIRICAL VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX

			Rejecti	ion rate
Data	Technique	N	No effect	2% effect
	A. CPS DAT	ΓA		
1) CPS aggregate	OLS	50	.49	.663
			(.025)	(.024)
2) CPS aggregate	Empirical variance	50	.055	.243
	-		(.011)	(.021)
3) CPS aggregate	old	20	.39	.54
			(.024)	(.025)
4) CPS aggregate	Empirical variance	20	.08	.138
			(.013)	(.017)
5) CPS aggregate	old	10	.443	.510
			(.025)	(.025)
6) CPS aggregate	Empirical variance	10	.105	.145
			(.015)	(.018)
7) CPS aggregate	old	6	.383	.433
			(.025)	(.025)
8) CPS aggregate	Empirical variance	6	.153	.185
			(.018)	(.019)

#### **Arbitrary Variance-Covariance Matrix**

Since the assumption in the previous method is likely to be violated in practice, this method can be generalized to an estimator of the variance-covariance matrix which is consistent in the presence of any correlation pattern within states over time.

#### **Arbitrary Variance-Covariance Matrix**

This estimator for the variance-covariance matrix is given by

$$W = (V'V)^{-1} \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N} u'_{j} u_{j}\right) (V'V)^{-1},$$

where V is matrix of independent variables (year dummies, state dummies and treatment dummy). Furthermore,  $u_j$  is defined as follows

$$u_j = \sum_{t=1}^T e_{jt} v_{jt},$$

where  $e_{jt}$  is the estimated residual for state i at time t, and  $v_{jt}$  is the row vector of dependent variables.

#### **Arbitrary Variance-Covariance Matrix**

ARBITRARY VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX

			Rejecti	ion rate
Data	Technique	N	No effect	2% effect
	A. CPS	DATA		
1) CPS aggregate	OLS	50	.49	.663
			(.025)	(.024)
2) CPS aggregate	Cluster	50	.063	.268
			(.012)	(.022)
3) CPS aggregate	OLS	20	.385	.535
			(.024)	(.025)
4) CPS aggregate	Cluster	20	.058	.13
			(.011)	(.017)
5) CPS aggregate	OLS	10	.443	.51
			(.025)	(.025)
6) CPS aggregate	Cluster	10	.08	.12
			(.014)	(.016)
7) CPS aggregate	OLS	6	.383	.433
			(.024)	(.025)
8) CPS aggregate	Cluster	6	.115	.118
			(.016)	(.016)



#### Conclusion

This study suggests that, because of serial correlation, conventional DD standard errors may grossly understate the standard deviation of the estimated treatment effects, leading to serious overestimation of t-statistics and significance levels. In other words, it is possible that too many false rejections of the null hypothesis of no effect have taken place.