REPLY

Class Analysis and the Heavy Weight of Convention

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The roles of critic, defender, and observer take on quite stylized forms when an especially entrenched research agenda is questioned and debated. The following positions characteristically emerge in such debates: (a) the defenders of the status quo tend to argue that the critics have failed to appreciate the subtlety, flexibility, or key objectives of the reigning approach (i.e. the 'misunderstood paradigm' stance); (b) the critics themselves counter that this aggressive repositioning and defense of the conventional approach only signals that real analytic problems have emerged and that entrenched academic interests and identities are being defended (i.e. the 'vested interests' stance); and (c) the residual class of disinterested observers and bystanders often argue that minor and easily reconciled differences of opinion have become exaggerated or magnified because the discipline is debate-hungry, because of pre-existing acrimony among the principals, or because the substantive topic at hand is so fashionable that even trivial matters have been elevated to debate status (i.e. the 'flogging a dead horse' lament).

In the present case, the defenders of conventional class analysis have advanced position (a) broadly and ably, and our role now is to defend against that interpretation while simultaneously hinting at position (b) and dissuading from any serious consideration of (c). Although it is poor form to argue (b) directly (especially in *ad hominem* form), we can at least make (b) more plausible by showing that traditional class analytic approaches are beset with difficulties and that scholars who embrace the convention do so at potential analytic and explanatory cost. We shall proceed, then, by concentrating on the strongest critiques that cut to the heart of the debate, despite the obvious temptations of 'cherry-picking' more easily refuted critiques. In this regard, we are grateful that our critics have taken on many of our most basic claims, as this allows us to stay focused on core topics and thereby defend more readily against position (c).

We will thus address such fundamental topics as the forms of social organization that emerge and become institutionalized at the site of production, the case for carrying out class analysis with realist (i.e. 'institutionalized') categories rather than nominal ones, the statistical and intellectual argument for tolerating the losses in parsimony that our approach implies, and the rationale for applying the language of class analysis to the realist categories that emerge at the micro-level. These topics are addressed in turn below.

1. Is the site of production organized functionally?

The natural starting-point for our commentary is the provocative suggestion that class analysts should 'junk the assumption that the relevant boundaries of structuration correspond to slots in the division of labor' (Adams 2002:227). As Adams elaborates, the various and sundry jobs within the site of production do not automatically self-divide into functionally defined occupations, but instead are classified into occupations on the basis of 'signs or representations linked in discourses' (p. 226). These discourses 'define and bound rather than simply "reflect" occupational and class categories and the identities that actors are invited to inhabit' (Adams 2002:226). Similarly, Therborn (2002) suggests that classes can usefully be viewed as a 'discursive construction' (p. 223), although he appears more sympathetic than Adams to materialist accounts that attribute cross-national variation in class discourse to such variables as the structure of employment or the 'nature of politics' (pp. 223).

We agree with Adams that class analysts should reject the 'naive view' that occupational

boundaries are mechanically determined by narrowly technical or functional considerations. Indeed, we have explicitly rejected this view in our prior work, arguing at some length that the 'division of labor cannot be understood as a simple one-to-one mapping between structure and function' (Grusky & Sørensen 1998:1195; Grusky & Weeden 2001:207). At the same time, our reasons for rejecting the naive view evidently differ from those of Adams, as indicated below.

Cultural functionalism

First, we would stress that the naive view ignores how cultural presuppositions and 'discourse' support certain types of boundary-constructing activities, making the supported types seem natural or inevitable while delegitimizing competing forms. While we therefore agree with Adams (2002) that 'discourses define and bound' (p. 226) all categorization, this statement is in itself empty without also recognizing that much of the relevant discourse has a functionalist content to it. The support for such 'cultural functionalism' is evident in various institutional domains. For example, employers fall back on standard functionalist recipes in dividing labor at the workplace, while the state is predisposed to allow functionally defined associations to control training and prescribe codes of ethics, and workers and consumers likewise view the labor market through largely functionalist lens. In this sense, culture and discourse intervene in the classificatory process, but in ways that reinforce rather than undermine functionalist solutions (e.g. Meyer 2000). Although the culture of functionalism runs exceedingly deep, other classificatory discourses (e.g. big-class principles) have appeared at particular historical moments and overlaid themselves on seemingly more fundamental functionalist discourses.[1]

Micro-level occupational struggle

These functionalist principles are obviously not so concrete and particularized that they dictate classification decisions down to the last detail. In the interstices of the division of labor, there are always hybrid jobs that could be functionally classified into any number of occupations, and the supported categorization is often an outcome of competitive struggle between occupational groups rather than the neutral application of abstract functionalist principles. This is precisely why the occupational structure cannot be understood as a simple reflection of technical boundaries. For example, ophthalmologists and optometrists are currently struggling to control the practice of corrective eye surgery, and the outcome of this struggle will likely depend on such factors as the extent to which the principals are engaged in struggles on other fronts, the amount of resources that are accordingly available for lobbying on any particular front, and the persuasiveness of the discourse with which such lobbying is pursued. These considerations introduce non-functionalist noise into classification outcomes. At the same time, even interstitial classifications of this sort work within the context of cultural functionalism, meaning that occupations that prosecute their cases on the basis of a convincing functionalist logic are, all else being equal, more likely to be persuasive and win out. In the case of corrective eye surgery, the ophthalmologists would seem to have the upper hand, not simply because they can draw upon more power and resources but also because they can easily press the functionalist case that corrective eye surgery requires the skills, training, and experience of a professional surgeon.

We thus agree with Adams that classification struggles are affected by the discourse that is deployed, but we fail to see how this process undermines functionalist forms of organization. The disjuncture between structure and function arises not so much from the independent effects of discourse as from the differential power of occupational associations and other relevant actors (e.g. employers, the state) to achieve their classificatory aims; and even here the strong cultural support for functionalist solutions serves to constrain and channel the operation of such power. If Adams (2002) truly wants to 'junk the assumption' (p. 227) that functionalist principles govern classification outcomes, one has to wonder what the alternative understanding might be. To be sure, there is no denying that big-class discourse is well established in Scandinavia and that functionalist discourse is poorly established in Japan (Grusky & Weeden 2001; Goldthorpe 2002; Birkelund 2002), but outside these celebrated counterexamples the dominance of functionalist solutions (within advanced industrialism) seems difficult to dispute. In fact, when Goldthorpe (2002) and Birkelund (2002) argue against our approach, they do so not by questioning whether

functionalist forms of organization dominate the site of production but by claiming that 'big classes' can be analytically important even in the absence of such deep social organization. We turn next to this fallback claim.

2. Should class analysts resign themselves to nominal categories?

The core claim of Goldthorpe (2002:211–217) and Birkelund (2002:217–221) is that conventional class analysts need not be embarrassed that their preferred categories are largely nominal. As Goldthorpe (2002:213) so lucidly argues, nominal classes are perfectly sufficient for the purposes of modern analysis insofar as (a) the posited classes validly measure the underlying variable or variables (e.g. employment status) that they are intended to measure, and (b) the analyst can then derive and verify hypotheses about the effects of such underlying variables on individ-ual action. These hypotheses are ideally based on causal mechanisms of the rational action variety; that is, Goldthorpe suggests that individuals tend to pursue courses of action that, given the 'constraints and opportunities' (p. 212) of their class situation, are subjectively rational and thereby intelligible to others. The class situation should thus be viewed as a social context that actors rationally take into account when choosing from possible behaviors or practices.

The preceding formulation is instructive because it explains class-linked behavior exclusively in terms of rational action mechanisms and accordingly turns away from other explanatory mechanisms that may well be more powerful. This paring-down of mechanisms is a direct consequence of relying on weak-form nominal models. Indeed, when analyses are instead based on realist classes that are institutionalized in the labor market, an entire package of explanatory mechanisms becomes available. The class analyst can, for example, draw on three additional mechanisms at the unit occupational level: (a) self-selective processes recruit workers who are attracted to preexisting occupational 'stereotypes' (e.g. sociology attracts left-leaning recruits); (b) explicit training regimens (e.g. professional school, apprenticeships) introduce further micro-level homogeneity in the attitudes, behaviors, and worldviews of prospective incumbents; and (c) social interaction occurs disproportionately within occupational boundaries and reinforces occupation-specific attitudes, values, and lifestyles (see Hedström & Swedberg 1998). These mechanisms are clearly less important within the context of nominal categories. When occupations are grouped on the basis of abstract analytic principles (e.g. employment status, socioeconomic status, autonomy), the resulting categories will not typically correspond to any institutionalized groups; and the residual homogeneity within these categories proceeds from Goldthorpian constraints on rational action more than the social effects of selection, socialization, and interaction.[2] The explanatory losses involved in forgoing such social effects may be substantial.

The (potential) weakness of conventional approaches may be illustrated by considering the familiar case of sociologists and their seemingly distinctive 'habitus' (Bourdieu 1984). In accounting for the humanist, antimaterialist, and otherwise left-leaning culture and lifestyle of sociologists, we would emphasize (a) the left-leaning reputation of sociology and the consequent self-selection of left-leaning recruits, (b) the liberalizing effects of lengthy professional training and socialization into the sociological worldview, and (c) the reinforcing effects of social interaction with like-minded colleagues. The case of economists provides an instructive contrast; after all, economists labor under quite similar working conditions and employment situations, yet are nonetheless comparatively conservative in their politics and lifestyles. It would be difficult to account for such conservatism without recognizing that economists are self-selected for conservatism, that their graduate training in neoclassical economics only reinforces this pre-existing affinity for conservatism, and that their subsequent interaction with fellow economists further protects against any ideological 'straying'. Clearly, our commentary here is speculative and requires substantiation, but the conservatism of economists appears, at least on the face of it, to be socially produced rather than attributable to narrowly rational calculations of the Goldthorpian variety.[3] If there is much intra-class heterogeneity of this socially generated sort, the nominal models favored by Goldthorpe will fall well short of capturing the full effects of the site of production on class outcomes.

This is not to gainsay the simplicity, elegance, and consequent lure of the class analytic project that Goldthorpe has laid out. As we see it, nominal class models marry

exceedingly well with the rational action agenda that Goldthorpe wishes to pursue, since they make it possible to hold aside precisely those explanatory mechanisms that rational action theorists seek to downplay. If the operative agenda is to build a sociology that draws on norms, culture, and socialization only as a last resort (see Goldthorpe 2000), it is surely sensible to rely on nominal groups that are unencumbered by those complicating details. Although we are supportive of this agenda (Grusky & Di Carlo 2001), it is also important for sociology to hedge its bets with an alternative approach that features normative effects by relying on institutionalized groups that may plausibly generate them.

3. Will realist class models mire us in unnecessary detail?

We next consider the practicality of our approach and, in particular, the seemingly reasonable claim that a micro-level operationalization of class is simply too complicated and bothersome to apply. For example, Birkelund (2002) worries about losing the 'overall bird's-eye view of society that is a vital aspect of class analysis' (p. 220), while Therborn (2002) suggests that 'class is a handy way of managing information' (p. 224) that allows for an appropriate 'trade-off between detail and graspable overview' (p. 223). Likewise, Goldthorpe characterizes micro-level analysis as attending to mere 'occupational variation on a class theme' (p. 213), thus making it clear that the aggregate 'class theme' is best regarded as the more fundamental. In the extreme form of this critique, we are seen as advocating a fine-grained exploration of the attitudes and lifestyles of particular detailed occupations, a research agenda that may be appropriate for the occupational sociologist but is hardly the heady stuff befitting a class analyst. As Therborn (2002) points out, 'How much would be gained by highlighting that x per cent of gardeners vote for party A, and y per cent of dieticians vote for party B?" (p. 224). These critiques all assume that disaggregate models will mire the field in unnecessary detail rather than provide new insights into the workings of class.

There is, it is hoped, no need to belabor the point that details of the sort that Therborn cites have never been the focus of our research agenda. Instead, we have worked with conventional questions about the size and patterning of class effects, albeit with the new and additional concern that standard operationalizations of class may not provide adequate answers to these conventional questions. As Therborn (2002:223) correctly points out, micro-level models will expend many degrees of freedom, but such detail is hardly incapacitating given that our interest has always been in the underlying pattern of effects rather than the size of any particular ones. When the process at hand is complicated in known ways, correct statistical practice is to incorporate into the model all of the variables that are at work, appreciating that some of these may constitute nuisance effects that are beyond the scope of discussion. If these effects are nonetheless omitted out of interest in 'simplifying', the resulting estimates for the variables of interest may be biased.[4] Under this formulation, complex models should be viewed as a necessary but ultimately harmless evil, as we remain free within the context of such models to focus on the larger patterning of effects and thereby address questions of fundamental importance.

It may be useful to lay out more explicitly how omitted variable bias threatens our ability to answer fundamental class analytic questions. This potential for bias arises, as indicated below, for each of the three main uses to which class analysis has historically been put.

The structure of class effects

The long-standing focus, some might say obsession, of class analysts has been to locate the most fundamental class boundaries and thereby characterize the 'geography' of the site of production (Sørensen 2000). In the context of this mapping tradition, one might reasonably ask, as we do, whether barriers are more developed at the aggregate or disaggregate level. For mobility analysts, a question of this type is addressed by simultaneously fitting disaggregate and aggregate inheritance effects, where the former blank out the 'thin' micro-diagonal and the latter blank out the 'fat' macro-diagonal (corresponding to class inheritance in an aggregate array). By failing to fit the micro-diagonal, conventional analysts have long confounded disaggregate and aggregate inheritance, thus upwardly biasing the effect of the latter and creating the impression of more aggregate closure than in fact there is. When a full model is estimated, we may well find that occupational reproduction is more pronounced

than class reproduction, implying that decades of class analysts have been pursuing what amounts to minor class variation on an occupational theme.

The total effects of class

The objective of much class analytic research is to estimate the total effects of class on outcomes of all kinds (e.g. political behavior, life-chances) and to explore how these effects may vary over time, by country, or across subgroups. For analysts working within this tradition, it is important to apply a class scheme that can adequately capture the structure at the site of production, as otherwise estimates of variability in class effects will be biased. There is good reason to believe that such biases may be substantial. Indeed, insofar as the social mechanisms that generate class-linked behavior (i.e. selection, socialization, and interactional closure) operate principally in institutionalized groupings, class analysts who nonetheless insist on applying nominal class schemes will be cut off from much of the explanatory power of the site of production.

Class as a control variable

In other sociological fields, the effects of class may not be of direct interest, yet class is nonetheless statistically controlled to protect against the critique that the effects of interest are in fact those of class in disguise. By this same logic, we should also be troubled by models that rely on poor operationalizations of class, as these will purge only some portion of the confounding effects of class. It follows that omitting class effects may bias some of our more celebrated coefficients in sociology (e.g. the 'returns' to schooling). Because controls for class are so central to sociology, it seems prudent at least to explore this possibility, even though doing so may in the end only confirm the original estimates.

We are, then, more concerned with the costs of simplification than of elaboration. Although we are as attracted as anyone to a simple model, a commitment to simplicity should not supersede the larger interest in getting it right. In the social sciences, most subfields have moved forward by elaborating their models rather than simplifying them, much to the chagrin of those who hold to some (romanticized) physical science model. It is unclear to us why scholars should expect (or even want) class analysis to be immune to this general elaborating trend.[5]

4. Should class analysis involve classes?

As a final line of defense, it has been argued that our proposed research agenda is not all that relevant to the rarefied concerns of class analysis, even though it may well contribute to and 'revitalize' the field of occupational sociology. This line of criticism appears widely in many of the essays in this symposium and elsewhere (e.g. Kingston 2000; Portes 2000). For example, Therborn (2002) claims that our research agenda does not engage adequately with true class analytic concerns, so much so that it becomes an 'unnecessary violation of language' (Therborn 2002:222) to even label it as class analytic. Similarly, Goldthorpe (2002) remains unconvinced that our agenda can 'serve as an adequate substitute for class analysis' (p. 211), and Birkelund (2002) wonders, yet more bluntly, why we have equated occupations with classes rather than 'using the [existing] concept of occupations' (p. 219). It would be unfair to dismiss such commentary as the predictable response of a subfield that is famous for jealously guarding the boundary between true class analysis and its ersatz versions. As we see it, critiques of this sort are entirely understandable, given that our proposed approach moves some distance from conventional class analytic models.

At the same time, we think that class analysis would do well to embrace our expansionary impulse rather than close ranks, especially because there is ample analytic basis for doing so. We have sought in this regard to demonstrate that the social organizational processes that are often ascribed to big classes emerge more clearly at the lower level of unit occupations (Grusky & Weeden 2001:204–206). If class analysts wish to show that advanced economies are 'lumpy' amalgams of competing groups (rather than seamless neoclassical markets), they would accordingly do well to turn to the local level and analyze the institutionalized associations that emerge around functional niches in the division of labor. We have described, for example, the tendency of occupational groupings to act collectively on behalf of their interests, to defend their boundaries and thereby secure (partial)

closure, to define lifestyles and consumption practices that are binding on members, and to become subjectively meaningful categories through which workers perceive themselves as well as others. These are precisely the social processes that class analysts have long sought. To be sure, class analysts are free to claim that such processes are of interest only when revealed at aggregate levels, but such definitional rigidity closes off an important route for revitalizing class analysis and protecting it from postmodernists who have exploited the weakness of big classes to advance broader claims about the irrelevance of the site of production. If class analysts could somehow move beyond their collective obsession with big classes and own up to the possibility of smaller ones, they could develop more powerful accounts of social behavior and tend more persuasively to the explanatory business of class analysis.

For class analysts who remain unconvinced by our arguments, it is worth noting that the fallback nominalist agenda is not necessarily any more authentic to original class analytic principles, at least not without further conceptual and empirical work specifying precisely how nominal class boundaries may be defined. The main problem in this regard is that Goldthorpian nominalism may be read as implying that classes are superfluous and that class analysis can be carried out by simply regressing the outcome of interest (e.g. voting behavior) on various measures of working conditions. For a committed nominalist, classes are presumably nothing more than a bundle of 'constraints and opportunities', with these in turn defining the logic of the class situation and shaping the course of action that workers select in light of this logic. The question that then arises is whether anything is gained by pushing a nominalist analysis through a class fulcrum. Why not simply measure constraints and opportunities directly at the job level and abandon the pretense of class altogether? The class nominalism outlined by Goldthorpe is arguably consistent with a variable-centered approach in which the analyst codes all the job-level conditions that may affect constraints and opportunities, formulates a set of hypotheses about precisely how such conditions (and interactions among them) affect the likelihood of a particular course of behavior, and then evaluates these hypotheses by regressing the behavior of interest (e.g. voting) on the requisite job-level conditions (e.g. Breen forthcoming).

We are thus suggesting that Goldthorpian nominalism, taken to its logical conclusion, can work quite well without invoking classes at all. Insofar as one wishes to salvage the 'class concept', it is necessary to build a model with somewhat richer properties, a point that Goldthorpe seems to have glossed over. We describe below two additional properties that, if adopted, would restore classes to class analysis.

Cultural coherence

The class concept becomes most obviously useful when culturally prescribed recipes of action develop and are adapted to the particular constellation of conditions that the class categories embody. These cultural recipes, which are the 'rules of thumb' to which Goldthorpe (2002:213) occasionally refers, are of interest because they involve a layering of adaptive class culture on top of the bundle of class conditions that pure nominalists emphasize. If cultural coherence of this sort is referenced, classes can no longer be reduced to a constellation of variables or characterized as merely the 'sum of their constraints'. This supplementary assumption nonetheless comes with a price; namely, the resulting classes are no longer purely nominal (i.e. class-based cultures have emerged), and the behavior that is generated through class membership is no longer purely rational (i.e. norms are coloring action). The 'cultural coherence' principle cannot, then, be used to restore the class concept unless one is also willing to relax strict nominalist and rational action presuppositions.

Structural coherence

For this reason, pure nominalists might prefer to restore the class concept by assuming that classes are 'structurally coherent', where this refers to the tendency for particular constellations of relevant conditions (e.g. income, authority) to cluster together in particular classes. When classes are coherent in this fashion, the jobs that comprise them tend to imply a consistent package of conditions, with these packages in turn generating predictable behavior through the usual individual-level calculative responses (rather than normative 'rules of thumb').[6] The relevant statistical imagery here is that of latent class analysis (e.g. Birkelund et al. 1996; Evans & Mills 1998; 2000); that is, if standard latent class models

could be applied to job-level data (coded in terms of relevant working conditions), the big-class theorist would anticipate that (a) a small number of big classes would adequately characterize such data, and (b) the boundaries between these emergent classes would be consistent with those of conventional big-class schemes. The question that then arises is whether the emergent classes will indeed take on big-class form or might instead correspond to unit occupations (or some modest aggregation of them). Obviously, the answer to this question depends on the types of working conditions that are assumed to be relevant for behavior, with big-class models likely to receive support to the extent that abstract conditions (e.g. employment status) are emphasized over more specialized and occupation-specific ones (e.g. the frequency of high-brow intellectual discourse). The further complication, of course, is that certain types of working conditions may be especially salient for particular types of behavior, thus raising the specter of a separate and distinct class mapping for each dependent variable of interest (e.g. voting behavior, lifestyles). Although such complications may be readily handled with a variable-based approach, they do serve to highlight the difficulty of developing a nominalist class analysis that is truly class based.

The upshot of this section is that nominalism cannot by itself motivate the class concept. Indeed, nominalist approaches press us to reduce classes to their constituent working conditions, suggesting a variable-based rather than class-based formulation. If we prefer a class analysis that truly invokes classes, the nominalist model must be supplemented with the additional assumptions of cultural or structural coherence; and these supplementary assumptions may prove to be more defensible at the disaggregate than aggregate level. We hasten to add that, by contrast, the class concept falls out quite directly and readily in the context of realist formulations.

5. Conclusions

If nothing else, the debate about the future of class analysis is impressive for its longevity (e.g. Pahl 1989; Clark & Lipset 1991; Kingston 1994; Pakulski & Waters 1996; Grusky & Sørensen 1998; Portes 2000). In accounting for this staying power, we might point to the centrality of the concept of class in sociology, the consequent explosion of competing models that differ in mere shadings of interpretation, and the potential for ambiguity, confusion, and misunderstanding that this conceptual and terminological richness implies (see Grusky et al. 2000). While less appreciated, it is equally important to recognize that class analysis has been put to many uses, thus making it difficult to define a single best class analysis that services all ends. In this regard, it is especially important to distinguish between (a) macro-level accounts of transformative events and large-scale social change (e.g. revolutions), and (b) micro-level accounts of the effects of social class on individual attitudes, behaviors, and life-chances. The micro-level tradition has become increasingly dominant as grand narratives, especially of the Marxian variety, fall into disfavor. Indeed, even scholars working within a neo-Marxian framework have come to focus on the implications of class for earnings, attitudes, and life-chances (e.g. Wright 1997), while the older macro-level agenda has regrettably languished (cf. Sørensen 2000; Portes 2000). Although Therborn (2002) chastises us for ignoring macro-level issues and thereby 'shrinking' the class analytic agenda, the field in fact turned to micro-level issues long ago and without any prompting from us.

We have, then, taken this new agenda for granted and asked whether the class categories devised by Marx and others for macro-level purposes are also optimal for the purposes of individual-level explanation. For the most part, scholars of contemporary class relations have concluded that they are not, leading to all manner of attempts to increase the explanatory power of class models by introducing further distinctions within the category of labor. The contemporary fascination with tinkering, adapting, and revising big-class formulations may be understood as the failing efforts of a subfield coming to terms with this new micro-level agenda. We suspect that in the end no amount of tinkering will suffice. If the contemporary micro-level agenda is taken seriously, it requires new micro-class models that go beyond big-class nominalism and exploit such local social organization as can be found.

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Notes

[1] We will not attempt to enter into any discussion of the sources of cultural functionalism. For our purposes, it suffices to emphasize that functionalist principles have taken on an independent life of their own, whatever their sources may be.

[2] We are not suggesting that social effects of this type disappear altogether at the level of aggregate classes. For example, post-secondary schools provide training for members of a broadly defined 'service class', and some norm-based homogeneity may therefore be generated at this class-wide level (by virtue of shared socialization and interactional closure). Similarly, residential segregation may be seen as a weak force for class-wide interactional closure, as neighborhoods typically are segregated by income or major class category rather than detailed occupation. We are merely arguing that such forces tend to operate more directly and powerfully at the level of unit occupations.

[3] Although Goldthorpe (2000) typically does not treat norm adherence as a form of rational action, he does acknowledge that normative 'rules of thumb' may emerge within classes and serve as guides to rational action.

[4] As might be obvious, this line of criticism can easily be circumvented by equating the concept of class with some preferred operationalization of it, thereby cutting off any interest in omitted effects at the site of production. The main point of our essay is that a definitional maneuver of this sort is difficult to defend analytically and, moreover, entails a potentially large explanatory cost.

[5] We are skeptical of the long-standing agenda to reduce occupations to a set of variables (e.g. autonomy, substantive complexity) that may then stand in for them in explanatory analyses. As we have argued elsewhere (Weeden & Grusky 2002), the emergent cultures of occupations are likely to be greater than the 'sum of their parts', thus making it difficult to develop satisfactory reductive accounts.

[6] We are assuming that social behavior is affected by a multiplicity of working conditions (e.g. income, authority, employment status). If behavior is instead dependent on only one condition, the complications described here disappear because the class analyst need merely define classes in terms of that (sole) condition.

[7] Class formation in this sense is necessary in that if mobility were such that classes had no significant degree of demographic continuity, nor then of identity, over time (which is not in fact the case), the very idea of class interests would become problematic.

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