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Social Mobility in Europe between 1970 and 2000

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This chapter, and the eleven that follow it, make up the empirical core of this book. In the present chapter we report the results of our comparative analyses of social mobility in all eleven countries. We begin with a discussion of the data that we use, then we deal in turn with social mobility among men and women, and we end by trying to draw together the most significant of our findings. At this stage we make no attempt to explain our results: rather, our aim is to provide an overview of differences and trends in mobility, leaving it to the separate country chapters to provide the details. We address the task of explanation in the concluding chapter, where we are in a position to draw on the results of this chapter and of the eleven country studies.

Data

We use the same data as in each of the eleven country chapters: in total, we use 117 mobility surveys covering the period 1970–2000. The sources of the data are shown in Table 3.1. The number of tables per country ranges from two in Israel and Italy to thirty-five in the Netherlands. In two countries we have, for some years, more than one mobility table. In the German case for each of 1978, 1979, 1982, and 1986 we have two mobility tables, and for 1980 we have three. A test of common social fluidity within each year (the test has 216 degrees of freedom (d.f.)), returns a deviance of 203.7 among men and 205.2 among women, neither of which is statistically significant, suggesting that we can analyse the German data as if it were annual (i.e. without having to include parameters that allow social fluidity to be different in the various German series). So the twenty-two German surveys are used to yield observations for sixteen years. In the case of the Netherlands, several datasets refer to the same years, and here the thirty-five surveys give us mobility tables

TABLE 3.1. *Sources of data*

Country	Number of tables	Sources of data	Years for which data are included
Germany	22	Zumabus	1976–7, 1979(2), 1980, 1982
		Allbus	1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990–2, 1994, 1996, 1998
		Politik in der BRD	1978, 1980
		Wohlfahrtssurvey	1978
		German socio-economic panel	1986, 1999
France	4	Formation–qualification professionnelle Insee surveys	1970, 1977, 1985, 1993
Italy	2	National survey on social mobility	1985
		Italian household longitudinal survey	1997
Ireland	3	Survey of the determinants of occupational status and mobility	1973
		Survey of income distribution and poverty	1987
		Living in Ireland survey	1994
Great Britain	15	General household survey	1973, 1975–6, 1979–84, 1987–92
Sweden	24	Annual surveys of living conditions (ULF)	1976–99
Norway	3	Colbjørnsen et al. 1987	1982
		Moen et al. 1996	1994
		Level of Living Survey	1995
Poland	3	Zagorski 1976	1972
		Slomczyski 1989	1988
		Treiman/Szelenyi	1994
Hungary	4	Social mobility and life history survey	1973, 1983, 1992
		Way of Life and Time Use Survey (Hungarian Central Statistical Office)	2000
Israel	2	Matras and Weintraub 1977	1974
		Kraus and Toren 1992	1991
Netherlands	35	Parliamentiary Election Study	1970, 1971, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1986, 1994, 1998
		Political Action Survey I	1974, 1979
		Justice of Income Survey	1976
		CBS Life Situation Survey	1977, 1986
		National Labour Market Survey	1982
		National Prestige and Mobility Survey	1982
		Strategic Labour Market Survey	1985, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996,1998
		Cultural Changes [ISSP]	1987
		Justice of Income Survey	1987
		Primary and Social Relationships	1987
		Social and Cultural Trends	1990
		Justice of Income Survey [ISJP]	1991
		Family Survey I, 1992–93	1992
		Households in the Netherlands pilot	1994
		Households in the Netherlands	1995
		Social Inequality in the Netherlands	1996
		National Crime Study	1996
		Social and Economic Attitudes	1998
		Netherlands Family Survey II	1998
		Use of Information Technology	1999

for twenty separate years. A test of whether, for all years in which there is more than one survey, social fluidity differed between tables in the same year, returned a deviance of 538.4 (men) and 427.3 (women) with 540 d.f. Again, this is not statistically significant and so we analyse the Dutch data as twenty annual surveys.

In general the age range of the respondents in our mobility tables is 25–64, though in the British case it is 25–49. This is because, in some years, respondents to the British General Household Survey who were older than forty-nine were not asked about their class origins (as explained in Chapter 8 by Goldthorpe and Mills). We have coded social class according to the seven-class 'CASMIN' (Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations) scheme. This identifies classes I + II (the service class); III (routine non-manual class); IVab (petty bourgeoisie with and without employees); IVc (farmers); V + VI (skilled manual workers, technicians, and supervisors of manual workers); VIIa (unskilled manual workers not in agriculture), and VIIb (farm workers). One consequence of choosing this categorisation is that it allows our results to be compared with those of *The Constant Flux*, where the same categories were used. However, some general and specific problems associated with the use of the CASMIN version of the Goldthorpe schema should be kept in mind. For one thing, putting classes I and II together means that we do not distinguish between the upper and lower service classes and, as several of the country chapters note, this distinction is an important one: access to the upper, rather than the lower, service class differentiates the mobility chances of those from

different class origins. Unfortunately, in some countries, such as Britain, I and II cannot be distinguished. For another, in the analysis of women's mobility, it is usual to place class IIIb together with class VIIa. This is because IIIb is made up of occupations, largely in personal services, that are overwhelmingly held by women and whose characteristics place them closer to unskilled manual work than to the kind of white-collar jobs found in class IIIa. But in Poland and Israel it is not possible to distinguish IIIb and IIIa and thus, in all countries, for men (where failing to separate these two parts of class III is of less consequence) and women we treat IIIa and IIIb as a single class.

The specific problems associated with the use of this version of the Goldthorpe schema are three: first, although the British data use a seven-class schema, it is not quite the same as the CASMIN schema. As Goldthorpe and Mills (Chapter 8, this volume) explain, it was not possible, using the General Household Survey, to distinguish between those large employers who would have been placed in class I and the small employers who belong in IVa. Thus, in Britain, the first class comprises I + II + IVa, while the third class is only the self-employed without employees (IVb). Second, in the Swedish data, class VII is not differentiated (because class VIIb has virtually ceased to exist). Finally, as Ringdal notes in Chapter 10, the Norwegian data from 1973 do not distinguish between the employed and the self-employed. Given that the distinction between owners and non-owners of the means of production is fundamental to any class scheme, we decided to omit this dataset from all the analyses reported in this chapter.

Methodological issues

As Table 3.1 showed, our eleven countries contribute rather different numbers of mobility tables to our cross-national analyses. Sweden, for example, has a table for every year from 1976 to 1999, whereas Poland and Ireland have only three tables each, covering the years between the early 1970s and 1994. The amount of information we possess regarding change over time, and the reliability of the conclusions based on this information, will vary between countries. If we have a small number of observations, any one of them may be very influential in determining whether or not the data display a trend (as we shall see) and this will inevitably lead to uncertainty in the conclusions we draw. All else equal we must, as a consequence, attach more credence to results about temporal trends drawn from countries with a larger number of observations (Sweden, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany).

Furthermore, the data that we use are never free of error, and differences in data quality may easily be mistaken for substantive differences. We have used the best quality data available from each of our eleven countries, but we still need to be aware of the potential for differential reliability and validity to induce spurious cross-national variation and temporal change. As far as the differences

between countries are concerned, the fieldwork for the surveys we use was in all cases carried out according to internationally accepted procedures and the subsequent coding of the variables—notably class origins and destinations—followed a common and widely implemented procedure. Nevertheless while adherence to such norms is some reassurance that the data attain high standards of quality, the surveys in the various countries were carried out independently of each other, and so we should be cautious about what we infer from them concerning cross-national differences. As far as change within countries is concerned, we can have more faith in our findings when the various surveys have been administered in a consistent fashion. In three cases the data always come from the same survey series: these are France (the FQP—Formation Qualification Professionnelle—surveys), Britain (the General Household Survey, GHS), and Sweden (the ULF series). In a further five countries the datasets come from highly comparable sources: these are Ireland (where the three surveys were all carried out by the same fieldwork organization), Hungary (where the four surveys were all fielded by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office), Italy (where a number of the same academics were involved in the design and execution of the two surveys), Germany, and Israel. But in the remaining three cases—Norway, Poland, and the Netherlands—the data come from various sources within each country and thus the possibility that variations in data quality might be mistaken for temporal change is greatest here.[1] Figure 3.1 summarises the position of each country along the two dimensions of internal comparability of datasets and number of surveys. Following the arguments we have made, we would consider that the degree of confidence that can be placed in the results increases as one moves away from the south-west corner of the figure, with the greatest confidence attached to results that come from the datasets listed in the north-east corner.[2] Furthermore, we believe that more reliance can be placed on estimates of trends *within* countries than measures of differences *between* them: thus our discussion, later in this chapter, of which countries are more or less open in their mobility regime, should be interpreted with some caution. Finally, while the data that we have are probably adequate for presenting a picture of broad trends and differences, we would have less confidence in the extent to which they allow the specifics of the pattern of social fluidity to be compared across either time or countries. This consideration has then dictated our choice

[1] There are probably two major factors that will lead to change in the quality of mobility data within each country. First, response rates tend to decline over time and so the representativeness of mobility tables derived from survey data may worsen (though this is not an inevitable consequence of falling response rates and it is also quite plausible that when response rates are lower the quality of the data that are collected is higher). Second, it seems reasonable to suppose that there may be variation over time in the quality of treatment of the actual data collected: that is to say, in the collection, coding, and processing of questionnaires.

[2] Though even within the series that we claim to be of the highest quality we find changes in procedures that may introduce difficulties in interpreting trends. For example, as Goldthorpe and Mills point out in their chapter, the British GHS changed during the 1980s from a less to a more accurate sampling frame.



FIG. 3.1. *Number of datasets and their comparability within each country*

Note: NL: the Netherlands; DE: Germany; SE: Sweden; NO: Norway; PL: Poland; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IL: Israel; IT: Italy; GB: Great Britain; FR: France.

of models. Rather than seeking to develop detailed models of the fluidity regime, we prefer instead to fit rather general models and to assess their adequacy using several measures (including the conventional χ^2 goodness-of-fit test and the index of dissimilarity, Δ).

The last methodological issue concerns sample size. As Table 3.2 shows, sample sizes vary greatly not only between countries but also, in some cases (most strikingly Poland), over time. And since the number of tables also differ between countries so does the number of cases in each table. For men in Germany, 14,895 observations are spread over sixteen tables, giving an average of 19 cases per cell of these tables, whereas for France, which has only four tables, there are around 246 cases per cell. The smaller the number of observations per cell the less power our statistical tests have. This is something that we shall try to take into account when we discuss our results.

Class structures and absolute mobility, men 1970–2000

We start our analyses with social mobility among men. For both sexes we follow a common analytical strategy: we begin with absolute mobility, then

TABLE 3.2. *Original sample size by country and decade*

Country	Decade			
	1970s	1980s	1990s	Total
Men				
Germany	3,339.0	7,373.0	4,183.0	14,895.0
France	26,516.5	14,255.6	7,549.7	48,321.8
Italy		1,823.0	2,947.0	4,770.0
Ireland	1,877.6	2,054.0	2,698.2	6,629.8
Great Britain	18,014.5	32,220.5	11,619.0	61,854.0
Sweden	7,727.0	15,856.7	14,473.2	38,056.9
Norway		962.0	2,108.4	3,070.4
Poland	27,892.0	2,086.0	901.0	30,879.0
Hungary	10,498.0	9,439.8	10,841.7	30,779.5
Israel	2,969.0		3,555.0	6,524.0
Netherlands	4,688.6	6,331.7	9,973.4	20,993.7
Total	103,522.2	92,402.3	70,849.6	266,774.1
Women				
Germany	1,674.0	3,868.0	2,245.0	7,787.0
France	14,784.5	9,442.2	5,310.6	29,537.3
Italy		727.0	1,705.0	2,432.0
Great Britain	11,575.0	22,580.5	9,120.0	43,275.5
Sweden	6,470.6	12,827.3	12,788.0	32,085.9
Norway		567.0	1,676.5	2,243.5
Poland	24,839.0	1,859.0	724.0	27,422.0
Hungary	7,442.0	7,526.7	8,302.4	23,271.1
Israel	959.0		2,976.0	3,935.0
Netherlands	1,058.6	2,335.3	5,628.9	9,022.8
Total	68,802.7	61,733.0	50,476.4	181,012.1

turn to temporal trends in social fluidity within countries, and finish by attempting to make comparisons of social fluidity between countries. Accordingly, the first issue we address is whether there has been any convergence between countries in their class destination distributions: in other words, have the class structures of different countries become more similar? To examine this we have simply divided the period into three decades, the 1970s (1970–9), 1980s (1980–9), and 1990s (1990–2000), and we have aggregated each country's mobility tables within each of these decades into a single table. For Italy and Norway we have no observations from the 1970s and we have no 1980s observations for Israel. In other cases the observations are reasonably well spread out over the period except in Britain where the 1990s observations are drawn from 1990, 1991, and 1992. We have one table for 2000 (from Hungary) which, for the present, we include as part of the 1990s data.

Table 3.3 shows the dissimilarity indices (Δ) between the class destination distributions of each pair of countries in each decade. A glance at this shows a general pattern of convergence evident in the declining average Δ: 24.2 in the 1970s, 20.2 in the 1980s, and 19.7 in the 1990s. This is brought about by differing trends in different countries. As one might have expected, the largest Δs are found in the 1970s in comparisons between countries which, like Ireland and Poland, had retained a large farming sector, and others, like Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands, where this sector accounted for a very small share of the workforce. As the agricultural sector has declined in Ireland and Poland and elsewhere, the Δs involving these countries have also fallen. However, some particular pairs of countries show little or no convergence in their class structures. Most noticeable is the position of the Netherlands. The Dutch class structure has diverged from that of most others: the Δs for the 1990s are larger than those for the 1970s in a comparison of the Netherlands with Germany, France, Italy (the comparison here is between the 1980s and 1990s), Sweden, Norway, Poland, and Hungary.

Table 3.4 shows the overall class structures for the eleven countries in each decade. These figures show approximate constancy in the sizes of classes III and V + VI, decline in class VIIa, substantial declines in classes IVc and VIIb, and growth in I + II and IVab. Despite growing similarities between class structures, there still remain notable variations in the 1990s (see the appendix to Chapter 3). Classes I + II have increased markedly in Great Britain (from 31 to 42 percent) and the Netherlands (37 to 49 percent). In Germany, Britain, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, class I + II accounts for around 35 percent or more of all positions, whereas in France, Italy, Ireland, Poland, and Hungary it accounts for around 25 percent or less.[3] Class IVab, although it shows overall growth, remained constant or even declined slightly in seven of our countries. All its growth is therefore found in Britain, Sweden, Poland (where it increased from 2 to 13 percent), and Hungary. But the self-employed and small proprietors are most numerous in Italy (19 percent) and Israel (17 percent) and least numerous in Hungary (6 percent) and the Netherlands (4 percent).[4]

In the majority of our countries, the farming sector (IVc and VIIb) was small even in the 1970s. In Germany, Britain, Sweden, Hungary, Israel, and the Netherlands, class IVc accounted for less than 6 percent of men in the class structure in the 1970s, and VIIb accounted for less than 3 percent everywhere except Ireland and Hungary. In contrast to all other countries, in Hungary the farm sector was predominantly made up of agricultural workers

[3] But we need to bear in mind that the British service class numbers are inflated by the inclusion of class IVa.

[4] Now the British figure of 10% is understated because of the inclusion of some members of class IVab in I + II.

TABLE 3.3. *Between-country class destination dissimilarity indices by decade (all men)*

	Decade	France	Italy	Ireland	Great Britain	Sweden	Norway	Poland	Hungary	Israel	Netherlands
Germany	1970	22.2	—	41.3	4.9	19.5	—	33.6	30.6	32.7	13.4
	1980	16.7	30.4	26.7	7.4	18.8	15.6	24.2	26.9	—	14.9
	1990	14.5	24.4	26.9	12.0	17.7	14.4	28.8	22.9	19.5	16.3
France	1970	—	—	20.0	18.7	16.6	—	17.8	20.2	16.8	19.5
	1980	—	17.0	13.2	14.4	16.2	14.3	13.2	20.5	—	19.0
	1990	—	17.7	12.4	17.9	16.8	14.0	17.0	16.9	9.3	23.6
Italy	1970		—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1980		—	20.3	26.7	21.0	17.7	28.0	32.9	—	24.0
	1990		—	17.9	22.8	20.6	21.2	24.6	30.4	10.8	26.1
Ireland	1970			—	38.0	24.7	—	20.2	29.1	22.6	31.8
	1980			—	23.3	16.7	21.7	16.9	20.3	—	24.2
	1990			—	22.7	18.3	18.2	10.9	20.5	16.0	28.8
Great Britain	1970				—	16.6	—	29.4	25.8	29.7	14.0
	1980				—	15.5	12.3	21.3	25.3	—	10.7
	1990				—	12.7	11.1	25.8	27.6	16.9	12.1
Sweden	1970					—	—	30.4	25.2	14.8	12.7
	1980					—	7.4	28.0	25.9	—	13.2
	1990					—	9.8	22.3	24.9	13.7	16.8
Norway	1970						—	—	—	—	—
	1980						—	26.5	32.8	—	9.5
	1990						—	27.0	29.4	16.6	11.1
Poland	1970							—	29.6	32.8	31.1
	1980							—	22.5	—	25.5
	1990							—	17.4	18.0	36.2
Hungary	1970								—	25.8	33.4
	1980								—	—	31.3
	1990								—	23.9	35.0
Israel	1970									—	24.3
	1980									—	—
	1990									—	23.8

Note: The mean and variance for 1970, 1980, and 1990 are 24.2 and 64.6, 20.2 and 44.2, and 19.7 and 41.5, respectively.

TABLE 3.4. *Aggregate class structures (all men) in the eleven countries by decade*

	1970s	1980s	1990s
I + II	23.1	28.6	30.8
III	8.7	9.0	10.1
IVa + b	7.9	8.6	10.4
IVc	8.6	5.7	4.0
V + VI	27.7	27.6	27.1
VIIa	20.6	18.3	15.7
VIIb	3.5	2.3	2.0

Note: Each country is weighted equally in computation of aggregate class structure.

(15 percent in the 1970s) rather than farmers (1 percent in the 1970s). In all the countries where IVc and/or VIIb were relatively large in the 1970s, their share has declined over the last quarter of the twentieth century; elsewhere, where they were small to begin with, they have either declined further or remained stable. So, the proportion in class IVc has fallen markedly in France (from 10 to 5 percent), Ireland (22 to 9), and Poland (26 to 12), and the percentage in VIIb has fallen from 6 to 2 in Ireland and from 15 to 7 in Hungary. In the 1990s class IVc accounted for 5 percent or less everywhere except in Ireland and Poland, and VIIb accounts for less than 3 percent everywhere except Hungary.

The class of unskilled non-agricultural workers, VIIa, has declined in relative size everywhere except Poland, where it accounts for a steady 19 percent of male workers. The skilled manual worker class, V + VI, has remained stable in most countries or has displayed very slight (1 or 2 percent) increases or decreases. Major changes have occurred only in Ireland, Israel, and Hungary, where this class has grown in size, and Britain, where it has declined. The working class as a whole (V + VI and VIIa) now constitutes between 40 and 50 percent of the class structure everywhere except Britain (39 percent), Norway (36 percent), Italy (34 percent), the Netherlands (33 percent), and Hungary (almost 60 percent). Finally, class III has been stable except in Britain and the Netherlands, where it has declined; and in Ireland where it has increased from 7 to 14 percent.

Table 3.5 shows the indices of dissimilarity between class origins and destinations in each country in each decade. In most countries these Δs are declining or stable, suggesting that long-term structural change is gradually diminishing. So, for example, in Hungary the index almost halved between the 1970s and the 1990s. Indeed, the most substantial declines in Δ are seen in Poland, Hungary, and Israel. In the first two, this is driven to a considerable

TABLE 3.5. *Origin–destination dissimilarity index by country and decade (all men)*

	1970s	1980s	1990s
Germany	18.1	18.0	16.9
France	24.3	21.9	20.1
Italy		24.5	24.7
Ireland	19.0	22.7	23.1
Great Britain	13.3	16.9	17.1
Sweden	25.3	22.4	20.5
Norway		28.7	20.6
Poland	32.2	21.1	22.2
Hungary	42.2	33.5	22.6
Israel	44.3		30.5
Netherlands	25.1	23.7	23.1
Mean	27.1	23.3	21.9
Variance	112.7	23.5	14.0

extent by the share of men in the farmer class, IVc. In both countries there are very many more men from farming origins than are found in farming destinations. In origins and destinations the share of men in IVc declines but, over the decades, it declines more rapidly as an origin than as a destination, so contributing to the falling Δs. In Hungary, class V + VI is much larger as a destination than an origin and here another factor driving the reduction in Δ is the growth, over the decades, in the proportion of fathers who come from this class. In Israel, the farmer role is taken by the petty bourgeoisie (IVab). A very large share of Israelis originated in this class, but rather fewer of them are found in it, and while the proportion in destination class IVab has declined a little, the proportion originating in IVab has fallen much more markedly.

In a few countries—notably Britain and Ireland—the Δs are increasing, suggesting more significant ongoing changes to the class structure. But what is perhaps most striking is the decline in the between-country variance in this particular measure, from 113 in the 1970s to 14 in the 1990s. In the 1970s the degree of dissimilarity between origins and destinations itself varied substantially between countries, whereas by the 1990s this variation had been reduced to about one eighth of its earlier value.

Table 3.6 reports four measures of mobility within each country. The first of these is the proportion of men who were intergenerationally mobile (i.e. whose destination and origin classes differ). Then we report the proportion who were vertically mobile: that is, whose destination class is at a higher or lower level than their origin.[5] Vertical mobility itself can be partitioned into upward and

[5] All the classes are assigned to one of three levels: classes I and II comprise the highest, VIIa and VIIb the lowest; and III, IVab, IVc, and V + VI are between these.

Table 3.6. *Percentage mobile by country in each decade (all men)*

	Germany	France	Italy	Ireland	Great Britain	Sweden	Norway	Poland	Hungary	Israel	Netherlands	Mean	Variance
Total mobility													
1970s	61.6	66.6	—	56.7	63.0	70.8	—	59.4	77.5	74.4	66.3	66.3	48.0
1980s	62.1	67.5	69.5	61.3	61.8	71.4	71.9	61.0	74.9	—	67.7	66.9	25.8
1990s	60.3	67.0	72.1	66.1	60.8	71.0	68.1	67.4	71.6	74.3	65.7	67.7	19.9
Vertical mobility													
1970s	44.1	43.8	—	39.9	50.7	54.0	—	40.9	53.0	43.7	50.6	46.7	28.5
1980s	45.8	45.9	40.8	42.6	50.8	54.7	55.2	42.9	55.8	—	54.1	48.9	34.6
1990s	46.3	46.3	46.3	45.5	50.7	55.2	52.1	45.9	53.7	50.4	54.0	49.7	13.9
Upward mobility													
1970s	31.7	25.9	—	21.6	32.8	35.1	—	22.1	26.9	20.1	36.1	28.0	37.1
1980s	33.6	29.1	29.0	27.9	33.1	35.3	39.3	24.8	34.7	—	38.9	32.6	22.9
1990s	33.3	29.9	35.9	31.4	31.7	36.6	34.2	26.3	35.9	35.0	37.7	33.4	11.4
Downward mobility													
1970s	12.4	17.9	—	18.4	17.9	19.0	—	18.8	26.2	23.5	14.5	18.7	17.3
1980s	12.2	16.8	11.8	14.7	17.7	19.4	15.9	18.0	21.1	—	15.2	16.3	8.7
1990s	13.0	16.4	10.4	14.1	19.0	18.6	17.9	19.6	17.8	15.4	16.3	16.2	8.0

downward mobility, and we report the rates of these in the final two panels of the table. The percentage of mobile men is fairly constant over time except in Ireland and Poland, where it increased substantially, and Hungary, which is the only country to show a large decline. On average, two-thirds of men occupy a class other than that in which they originated, and over the last part of the twentieth century the variance between countries in this figure has become quite small, in line with what we would have expected given the declining indices of dissimilarity between the origin and destination distributions. Nevertheless some differences remain: mobility rates are lowest in Germany and Britain, highest in Italy, Sweden, Hungary, and Israel.

Two-thirds of men are mobile and just under half of all men have experienced vertical mobility: thus about three-quarters of mobility is vertical (the remainder being movement between classes at the same hierarchical level). Temporal change has been modest, as is the degree of cross-national variation remaining in the 1990s. Two-thirds of vertical mobility is in an upward direction, reflecting the increased share of positions in classes I + II and the reduced share in VIIa and VIIb, as shown in Table 3.4. The percentage of men upwardly and downwardly mobile has remained substantially the same over the three decades, though there are three exceptions to this: Italy, where upward mobility has increased by seven percentage points between the 1980s and 1990s; and Ireland, Hungary, and Israel, where rates of upward mobility have increased markedly and rates of downward mobility have declined. But in all four panels of Table 3.6 probably the most striking finding is the high degree of similarity among countries that prevailed by the 1990s in all the measures of mobility.

Absolute mobility: convergence or divergence?

What can we conclude from this overview of absolute mobility among men in our eleven countries? The evidence seems to point to a gradual convergence, so that the class structures of the countries, and the intergenerational flows of men between classes, are becoming more similar. The former trend has two main components: the continued decline of farming occupations in those countries where agriculture has long persisted as an important sector of the economy, and the increase at the top of the class structure in the service classes, I + II. Most of the change occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, and convergence has been by no means complete: in the 1990s countries still differed, sometimes in quite marked ways, in their class structures.

The strength of convergence of intergenerational mobility flows is quite impressive. Of necessity, convergence requires that different countries display different trends and/or different rates of growth or decline within a common trend. So, the rate of mobility has clearly become more similar, and a closer

inspection of Table 3.6 shows that this is mainly due to change in three countries: rates of mobility increased to bring Ireland and Poland closer to the average, while those in Hungary declined with the same effect. In the other countries there is little change in this particular measure. On the other hand, the trend in the rate of vertical mobility is driven by a more widespread convergence, with several countries' rate of vertical mobility moving closer to the mean by a few percentage points. Much the same is true of the rates of upward and downward mobility.

National and temporal variation in social fluidity among men

We turn now from the analysis of absolute mobility to the study of social fluidity, in which we use data from eight of our eleven countries. We omit Italy and Israel because for these countries we only have two mobility surveys, and we also omit Norway because, once the 1973 data are excluded, this leaves us with, effectively, just two observations for this country as well (the remaining three Norwegian tables come from 1987, 1995, and 1996).

The CASMIN (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992) project analysed cross-national mobility among men using a single table from each country, referring, for the most part, to the early 1970s. Since our analysis of men's mobility starts in the early 1970s we wanted to ensure that our results for this period were consistent with those of the CASMIN project. We therefore tested whether the initial mobility table in each of our countries showed the same pattern of social fluidity as reported in *The Constant Flux*. In several cases, of course, this comparison was made between the same datasets. The results are shown in Table 3.7 and we cannot reject the hypothesis of common social

TABLE 3.7. *Tests of common social fluidity between initial observation in each country and the CASMIN data (test has 36 d.f. except for Sweden where it has 25)*

Country	Deviance	Number of cases (weighted)
West Germany	27.53	6,530.3
France	38.23	33,310.5
Ireland	4.89	4,137.2
Sweden	19.82	4,663.5
Poland	0.95	64,108
Hungary	48.12	24,389

fluidity for any of the six countries listed there. It was not possible to carry out these tests for Britain because of the problem in the allocation of members of class IVa. However, Goldthorpe and Mills (Chapter 8, this volume) report that common social fluidity holds for men among the first table in the GHS series (for 1973) and the 1972 Oxford Mobility Survey (which was used in *The Constant Flux*) when the GHS class classification is applied to the latter. We can therefore be confident that, in the seven countries represented here and in CASMIN, our analyses do indeed begin where CASMIN left off.

Changes over time in social fluidity within countries: men

Perhaps the first questions that someone confronted with the data that we have would want answered are: how has social fluidity evolved within each country over the last part of the twentieth century, and which countries are the most and least open? Here we will try to provide some provisional answers to these two questions, though bearing in mind our reservations about how satisfactorily the latter can be addressed. To do this we turn first to our decade data so that we can make an approximate comparison of social fluidity in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.

Table 3.8 shows the results of fitting three models to the data for each country considered separately.[6] The first model is constant social fluidity (CnSF), which we can write $OT\ DT\ OD$, and the second is the Unidiff model, or, as we term it, log-multiplicative social fluidity (LmSF), which we write $OT\ DT\ OD\beta_T$. Here we use T to mean decades, while O and D stand for origin and destination, respectively. In the LmSF model, $OD\beta_T$ indicates that the origin–destination association varies over T according to the parameter, β, which may take a different value in each decade. Whereas the CnSF model says that the association between origins and destinations is the same in each decade for a given country (i.e. $\beta_T = \beta$ for all T), the LmSF model says that, although the pattern of origin–destination odds ratios is always the same, the strength of the log-odds ratios is greater or less according to the value of β_T.[7] This model is particularly convenient because differences in social fluidity are captured by differences in the value of this parameter. Our third model is simpler yet: it is log-multiplicative social fluidity in which the β_T parameters are constrained to be linear over decades. We call this 'linear LmSF', written $OT\ DT\ OD(1 + \beta t)$ (for $t = 0, \ldots, T$).

[6] As in our earlier analyses, the decade data collapses all the data from a given decade into a single table.

[7] As we noted in Chapter 2, the log-odds ratios are scaled up or down according to β_k: thus the odds ratios themselves are scaled according to $\exp(\beta_k)$.

TABLE 3.8. *Deviance and Δ for CnSF, LmSF, and linear LmSF models fitted to decade data per country, all men (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Germany	France	Ireland	Great Britain	Sweden	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands
	Countries							
N	14,895.0	48,321.8	6,629.8	61,854.0	38,056.9	30,879.0	30,779.5	20,993.7
(1) CnSF	96.89	**181.00**	102.76	92.23	**80.41**	**162.34**	**262.68**	**158.78**
d.f.	72	72	72	72	50	72	72	72
(2) LmSF	95.31	**150.86**	93.63	87.54	72.53	**136.69**	**192.03**	**100.63**
d.f.	70	70	70	70	48	70	70	70
(3) Linear LmSF	95.39	**153.85**	98.27	92.19	73.07	**139.45**	**210.12**	**100.83**
d.f.	71	71	71	71	49	71	71	71
(2) − (1)	1.58	**30.14**	**9.13**	4.69	**7.88**	**25.65**	**70.65**	**58.15**
d.f.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
(3) − (1)	1.50	**27.15**	**4.49**	0.04	**7.34**	**22.89**	**52.56**	**57.95**
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
(3) − (2)	0.08	2.99	**4.64**	**4.65**	0.54	2.76	**18.09**	0.20
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Δ for CnSF	2.20	2.00	3.88	0.99	1.68	1.25	3.01	2.81
Δ for LmSF	2.15	1.76	3.77	0.93	1.59	0.99	2.56	2.01
Δ for Linear LmSF	2.14	1.78	3.84	1.00	1.57	0.99	2.69	2.01
β parameters LmSF								
1970s	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1980s	0.98	0.91	1.06	1.04	0.93	0.83	0.78	0.86
1990s	0.94	0.89	0.90	1.00	0.90	0.81	0.77	0.75
β parameters linear LmSF	−0.0289	−0.0604	−0.0541	0.0029	−0.0490	−0.1231	−0.1108	−0.1263

In the table we show the deviances and indices of dissimilarity, Δ, associated with each of these models and also the likelihood ratio tests of whether LmSF and linear LmSF are statistically significant improvements over CnSF.[8] We also show the difference in deviance between LmSF and its linear counterpart. According to the normal goodness-of-fit tests, whether or not CnSF fits the data tells us whether there is change over decades, and, if there is, the goodness-of-fit of LmSF and linear LmSF tell us whether it takes the rather simple form specified by these models. So, in the British case, CnSF fits the data (the critical value at $p < .05$ for a χ^2 test with 72 d.f. is approximately 92.7) and we can reject the hypothesis that there is change over time.[9] In Poland, on the other hand, we can reject CnSF (suggesting that Polish social fluidity has changed). LmSF and linear LmSF are both a significant improvement over CnSF in Poland, but neither fits the data (the critical value for 70 d.f. is roughly 90.4), indicating that temporal change is more complex than a simple scaling up or down of the log-odds ratios.

This pattern of temporal change that is not wholly captured by LmSF or linear LmSF but in which either or both fits the data better than CnSF is also found in France, Ireland, Sweden, Hungary, and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, although LmSF and linear LmSF fail to fit using conventional goodness-of-fit tests, the index of dissimilarity shows they correctly classify 97 percent or more of cases (the exception is Ireland where the fit is a little poorer). On this basis we are strongly inclined to accept these simple models of change as presenting a sufficiently accurate picture. In France, Sweden, Poland, and the Netherlands the linear LmSF model is as good a fit to the data as the LmSF model: in other words in these cases there is a linear trend in social fluidity.

This picture can be readily summarised. In Britain there is stability in social fluidity: CnSF fits the data and neither LmSF nor linear LmSF improves on it. In Germany there also seems to be stability in social fluidity, though this is not quite so clear cut. Here, CnSF comes very close to fitting, and, once again, neither LmSF nor linear LmSF improves on it. At the bottom of Table 3.8 the β parameters from the LmSF model show no differences between decades in

[8] When we say that something is or is not statistically significant and when we refer to whether or not a model fits the data, we use the $p < .05$ criterion unless otherwise specified. But, when interpreting the results of statistical tests based on the deviance, a point made in Chapter 2 should be kept in mind: it is difficult to find models that fit tables which are based on very large samples. Some of our samples are very large indeed: in six countries the male samples exceed 20,000 cases. We could compute $G^2(S)$—that is, the deviance standardised to a smaller sample size—and, given the appropriate choice of S, this would yield values showing that many of our models 'fit' the data; but this would not be any more informative about the adequacy of the models than would Δ, and so we rely heavily on Δ in choosing between alternative models.

[9] Strictly speaking, we can reject global change. Using the CnSF model is not a parsimonious way to test for temporal change because it uses many degrees of freedom and changes in some parts of the fluidity regime may thus be overlooked. It is possible to devise more specific tests of partial change but, if we apply such tests without some strong theory to guide us, we run the risk of modelling error rather than true variation. Furthermore, we believe that global tests of the full set of origin–destination odds ratios are more appropriate if, as is the case here, we want to address the question of whether there is any evidence of overall change towards more or less social fluidity.

Britain, and the trend shown by the linear LmSF β is effectively zero. The coefficients suggest some change in Germany but this is not statistically significant and the models of change bring little improvement to the index of dissimilarity. The difficulty in establishing a significant trend is probably due to the relative sparseness of the German data, to which we referred earlier.

There are six countries where social fluidity appears to have increased: France, Ireland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands. The βs from the linear LmSF model suggest a steady weakening of around 5 or 6 percent per decade in the origin–destination association in Ireland, Sweden, and France, and around 12 percent in Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands. Closer inspection of the βs from the LmSF model, however, suggests that in France, Sweden, Poland, and Hungary almost all the change occurred between the 1970s and 1980s, with stability since then, and only in the Netherlands has fluidity declined over the entire three decades. In Ireland, LmSF is preferred to both CnSF and linear LmSF, and this is because the direction of change has itself varied. Between the 1970s and 1980s fluidity weakened, but then strengthened between the 1980s and 1990s.

We can check these conclusions by moving from a focus on decades to look at the original yearly data. The relevant goodness-of-fit statistics are reported in Table 3.9 and the β parameters are plotted in Fig. 3.2. Now the CnSF model fitted to each country posits a common pattern of fluidity in each year for which we have data for that country; LmSF says that fluidity is scaled up or down in each year according to a single parameter; and linear LmSF says that this scaling follows a linear trend over years.[10] Table 3.9 tells us that the CnSF model fits the data in Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden, but, in the last of these, the linear LmSF model is a significant improvement in fit. Figure 3.2 shows a downward trend in Sweden where the linear LmSF β is estimated as -0.0046. Change is also evident in France, the Netherlands, and Hungary (of course, the results for Ireland and Poland are the same as in the decade analysis because we have only one table per decade for these countries, though the linear LmSF parameter changes because its metric is now years rather than decades). In France, Poland, and the Netherlands, linear LmSF is the best fitting model, and the linear trends here can be seen in Fig. 3.2,[11] though the French case suggests a gradual slowing in the rate of change. In Hungary, however, the temporal trend seems to be U-shaped: fluidity strengthened between the 1970s and 1980s but weakened in the 1990s.

The indices of dissimilarity for these models are rather larger than in the decade analyses, but they suggest that, overall, these models reproduce the data quite well. The largest Δs for LmSF (over 5 percent) are found in the

[10] The linear trend is measured with respect to time in years with 1970 taken as year 0.

[11] The Dutch trend is robust to the exclusion of either or both of the first and ninth observations (1970 and 1985), both of which might appear to be outliers.

TABLE 3.9. *Deviance and Δ for CnSF, LmSF, and linear LmSF models fitted to yearly data per country, all men (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Countries							
	Germany	France	Ireland	Great Britain	Sweden	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands
(1) CnSF	526.23	**243.77**	**102.76**	506.72	512.76	**162.34**	**330.66**	**812.33**
d.f.	540	108	72	504	575	72	108	684
(2) LmSF	503.61	212.96	**93.63**	487.41	490.96	136.69	**257.31**	717.20
d.f.	525	105	70	490	552	70	105	665
(3) Linear LmSF	525.79	**214.83**	**99.88**	506.71	506.97	**137.11**	**291.57**	**745.92**
d.f.	539	107	71	503	574	71	107	683
(2) – (1)	22.62	**30.81**	**9.13**	19.31	21.80	**25.65**	**73.35**	**95.13**
d.f.	15	3	2	14	23	2	3	19
(3) – (1)	0.44	**28.94**	2.88	0.01	**5.79**	**25.23**	**39.09**	**66.41**
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
(3) – (2)	22.18	1.87	**6.25**	19.30	16.01	0.42	**34.26**	28.72
d.f.	14	2	1	13	22	1	2	18
Δ for CnSF	5.18	2.33	3.88	2.43	3.86	1.25	3.32	5.93
Δ for LmSF	5.03	2.16	3.77	2.37	3.72	0.99	2.81	5.26
Δ for Linear LmSF	5.19	2.17	3.86	2.43	3.80	0.98	3.04	5.48
β parameters Linear LmSF	-0.0018	-0.0057	-0.0042	-0.0001	-0.0046	-0.0099	-0.0088	-0.0120



FIG. 3.2. *Annual LmSF (or Unidiff) coefficients by country (all men)*

Netherlands and Germany—but in both cases the model fits the data using the conventional likelihood ratio χ^2 goodness-of-fit test. The index for the other countries is less than 3 percent except in Sweden (where LmSF also fits the data using the goodness-of-fit test) and Ireland.[12]

What can we conclude from these results about changes in men's social fluidity? In our view the eight countries can be grouped into three. First are

[12] The likelihood ratio χ^2 test tells us that the various models tend to fit most poorly in France, Poland, and Hungary. These are the countries in which a large sample is spread over a small number of tables. So, the average number of cases per mobility table is around 12,000 in France, 10,000 in Poland, and 7,500 in Hungary.

those in which there is no clear evidence of change over time: Germany and Britain. In Germany the annual βs vary a great deal but they show no consistent trend, while in Britain the parameters are generally close to one. Second are those in which there seems to be good evidence for increasing social fluidity: France, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Finally, in Hungary, Poland, and Ireland the picture is less clear. In Ireland we have only three observations and no linear trend. Nevertheless, the β parameter for 1994 is significantly lower than those for either 1973 or 1987 whereas there is no significant difference between the 1973 and 1987 βs, suggesting that any trend in Ireland is towards greater social fluidity. In Poland the argument for growing fluidity rests entirely on the 1972 observation: with this removed CnSF fits the data and models of change do not improve on it. Likewise in Hungary, the trend towards increasing fluidity owes everything to the 1973 observation: without it the trend is in the opposite direction (because of the 2000 observation). In any case, all our findings must be seen in the context of the very modest change in the goodness-of-fit of our models associated with variation in fluidity. This is evident in the small value of Δ returned by the CnSF model in every country (less than 4 percent in the decade data and less than 6 percent in the annual data) and the very small improvement in Δ that is brought about by models of change (less than one percentage point).

Comparisons between countries: men

Turning to a comparison between countries, Table 3.10 shows the fit statistics for the CnSF and LmSF models applied to the data for all the countries in each decade. We now write CnSF as *OC DC OD*, where *C* stands for country; and LmSF as *OC DC OD*β_C where the subscripted *C* indicates that the origin–destination log-odds vary according to a country-specific multiplier. The former model says that social fluidity is the same in all countries within a given decade, while LmSF says that the pattern is common to all countries but its strength may vary. Neither model fits the data for any of the three decades, implying that the hypothesis of a common pattern of fluidity has to be

TABLE 3.10. *Deviance and Δ for CnSF and LmSF models fitted to country decade data per decade, all men (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	d.f.	1970s	1980s	1990s
CnSF	241	**1674.75**	**1177.75**	**1039.39**
LmSF	234	**1260.79**	**888.19**	**862.06**
CnSF–LmSF	7	**413.95**	**289.56**	**177.33**
Δ for CnSF		3.93	3.21	3.72
Δ for LmSF		3.15	2.85	3.36

TABLE 3.11. *Deviance and Δ for models fitted to country by decade data, all men (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Deviance	d.f.	*p*	Δ
0	**65,575.49**	831	.00	18.55
1 *OD*	**4,410.09**	795	.00	3.95
2 *COD*	**1,137.10**	554	.00	1.86
3 *TOD*	**3,891.89**	723	.00	3.62
4 *COD TOD*	**817.17**	482	.00	1.47
5 $OD\beta_C$	**3,612.39**	788	.00	3.48
6 $OD\beta_T$	**4,269.30**	793	.00	3.87
7 $OD\beta_C\beta_T$	**3,464.48**	786	.00	3.42
8 $OD\beta_{CT}$	**3,354.28**	772	.00	3.39

rejected. But if we look at the dissimilarity indexes for both models, we see that they lie between 3 and 4 percent, which might suggest that the consequences of deviations from commonality are rather slight.

Table 3.11 presents the results of a more systematic comparative analysis using the decade data. All the models reported there include the terms *OCT* and *DCT*: the entries in the table then tell us how, in each case, the origin–destination association is allowed to vary. In Model 0 the *OD* term is absent because this is a model of conditional independence of origins and destinations: in other words, within each country and decade, perfect mobility holds. This model is very far from fitting the data according to the χ^2 test, though it correctly classifies just over four-fifths of all cases. In model 1 the association between origins and destinations is held constant across all eight countries and in all three decades. Although this model—in common with all the models in Table 3.11—falls well short of fitting the data, it nevertheless misclassifies only 4 percent of all cases and its deviance constitutes a huge reduction over that for the model of conditional independence. Model 2 allows social fluidity to vary, in a completely unrestricted way, over countries but not between decades. Model 3 allows fluidity to vary over decades (recall that *T* stands for decades) but not countries and model 4 allows it to vary over both. Variation between countries reduces Δ to about half of its value for Model 1, but variation over decades makes less impact: Δ for Model 3 is only marginally less than for 1, and, comparing Model 4 with 2, the addition of temporal change to a model that already allows for differences between countries reduces Δ only slightly: from 1.9 to 1.5. But it should also be borne in mind that modelling temporal change uses very many fewer d.f. than does cross-national variation and so it would be unwise to attach too much importance to this comparison. The finding that Model 4 does not fit the data indicates that there are statistically significant differences between countries in their temporal variation in fluidity. But this should not come as a surprise, given the results of our earlier analyses.

The last four models in Table 3.11 permit only log-multiplicative uniform change in social fluidity: in Model 5 over countries and in Model 6 over decades. Model 7 allows fluidity to change according to the product of two coefficients, one for decades, the other for country. Finally, Model 8 allows every table (i.e. each decade/country combination) to have its own β parameter. These models are a significant improvement on model 1. Model 7 is preferred to either of 5 and 6 but Model 8 is a better fitting model than 7 (the difference in deviance is 110.2 on 14 d.f.). Models 5 through 7 are direct counterparts to 2 through 4 in that they restrict change whereas the latter do not. But Model 8 has no counterpart in the earlier part of the table because it allows social fluidity to vary in different ways over decades depending on country. Its counterpart allowing for unrestricted, rather than uniform, change would be the saturated model.

The β parameters from Model 8 are shown in Fig. 3.3 and provide us with a rather tentative answer to the question of which countries are most and least open. We have seen that in Britain fluidity has not changed over this period and so Britain in the 1980s is taken as the reference point (and its β is set to one). Using this yardstick, Germany, France, and Ireland are always the least fluid countries, having βs greater than one. At the other extreme, Sweden, and Poland are always the most fluid.

In Fig. 3.3 the line joining the points for the 1970s is always (with the exception of Ireland) above that for the 1980s and the line for the 1990s is always (except in Poland) below that for the other decades. The simple



FIG. 3.3. *LmSF (or Unidiff) coefficients per decade per country (all men)*

unweighted average of the βs falls from 1.07 in the 1970s to 0.98 in the 1980s and to 0.91 in the 1990s, though, in those countries where the βs have fallen most (Hungary, the Netherlands, France, Poland, and Sweden) the change was greater between the 1970s and 1980s than between the 1980s and 1990s, and only in the Netherlands was there large change in the latter interval. This echoes what was seen in Table 3.8: the main change towards greater fluidity occurred in the 1970s to 1980s period and, for the most part, little has altered since then. However, we need to be cautious in drawing inferences about change in the light of our earlier findings where we saw that we could only be unequivocal about increasing fluidity in France, Sweden, and the Netherlands.[13]

We can extend our comparison between countries to include Italy, Norway, and Israel. For Italy and Norway we have one observation in the 1980s and another in the 1990s, for Israel we have data from 1974 and 1991. As Yaish observes in Chapter 13 (and as Ganzeboom and Luijkx note in theirs), Israel has long been considered a highly fluid society, and, indeed, our results bear this out. When we add Norway, Israel, and Italy to the analysis shown in Fig. 3.3 we find that the β value for Israel is 0.64 in the 1970s and in the 1990s.[14] Not only does this support the belief in high Israeli fluidity, it also bears out Yaish's conclusion of no change in fluidity over the period. For Italy the values are 1.15 in the 1980s and 1.07 in the 1990s which places Italian fluidity at the lower end of the range, alongside France. The small decline foreshadows Pisati and Schizzerotto's findings in Chapter 6 of this volume. For Norway the figures are 0.77 and 0.80. Ringdal (Chapter 10, this volume) also finds a small decline in fluidity between the 1980s and 1990s.

In the 1970s, levels of social fluidity were lowest in Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, and the Netherlands and highest in Britain, Sweden, Norway, Poland, and Israel. Figure 3.2 (and the analyses reported in Tables 3.8 and 3.9) showed that fluidity increased in France, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and possibly in Ireland, Hungary, and Poland too. The increases in the Netherlands and Hungary were particularly marked. These different trends have left several countries—Sweden, Norway, Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands—with, as far as we can tell, rather similar rates of fluidity, followed by Britain (where the absence of change has led to a shift in its relative position), Ireland, France, Italy, and Germany, which remains the country with the strongest association between class origins and class destinations. At the other extreme,

[13] The fact that Models 5–7 (and also 8) fit much more poorly than their counterparts, 2–4 (at least using the criterion of deviance), shows that cross-national and temporal variation is not wholly captured by the log-multiplicative specification of a common pattern of origin–destination association that varies in strength according to a single parameter. Variation in fluidity over time and between countries is more complex than this: the pattern (and not just the level) of social fluidity differs over time in a different way for each country. There are, therefore, some countries for which small discrepancies are apparent between the trend over time shown in Fig. 3.3 and the decade β values reported in Table 3.8.

[14] When we add these three countries the βs for the others remain almost identical with the values reported in Fig. 3.3.

TABLE 3.12. *Deviance and Δ for models fitted to yearly data by country, all men (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Deviance	d.f.	*p*	Δ
0	**67,385.25**	2940	.00	18.80
1 *OD*	**6,442.21**	2904	.00	4.77
2 *COD*	**3,197.58**	2663	.00	3.08
3 *TOD*	**3,206.88**	1835	.00	2.69
4 *COD TOD*	**1,709.59**	1558	.00	1.85
5 $OD\beta_C$	**5,653.26**	2897	.00	4.41
6 $OD\beta_T$	**5,773.38**	2874	.00	4.46
7 $OD\beta_C\beta_T$	**5,436.28**	2867	.00	4.33
8 $OD\beta_{CT}$	**5,302.43**	2816	.00	4.26

Israel is consistently more open than any other country. Overall, however, we can find no convincing evidence of convergence in fluidity regimes: for example, the within decade variance of the βs shown in Fig. 3.3 is largest for the 1980s and the Δ for CnSF across countries in each decade (Table 3.10) is larger for the 1990s than for the 1980s.

Finally, in Table 3.12 we repeat the analysis using yearly data (and, once again, without Norway, Israel, and Italy).[15] Reassuringly, a similar picture emerges, and the only important contrast with Table 3.11 is that now temporal variation (see especially Model 3) appears more important. But this is due to our having thirty-one annual time points, rather than three. Once again, among the log-multiplicative models (5 through 8), model 8, allowing a β value for each year/country combination, proves to fit best, though in terms of Δ there is rather little to choose between these four models.

Class structures and absolute mobility, women 1970–2000

When we turn to differences between countries and temporal change in women's mobility we incur a set of difficulties that are, by and large, absent from the analyses of men's mobility. One particular problem has already been discussed in Chapter 1: namely that many women do not have, and have not had for many years, an occupation and thus cannot reasonably be assigned to a social class position in the usual way. We circumvent this by focusing here only on women who are currently in the labour force—that is, either working

[15] All the models in Table 3.12 include the terms *OCT* and *DCT*, where *T* now stands for years.

TABLE 3.13. *Women's labour force participation rates by decade and country*

	Germany	France	Italy	Great Britain	Sweden	Norway	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands
1970s	0.41	0.54	—	0.62	0.70	—	1.00	0.65	0.27
1980s	0.48	0.64	0.38	0.67	0.80	0.58	0.69	0.72	0.38
1990s	0.53	0.69	0.52	0.74	0.83	0.80	0.66	0.69	0.57

outside the home or unemployed. But this then introduces a further problem when our object is comparison: female rates of labour force participation change over time and differ between countries, and so any differences in social mobility that we find may be reflecting, to some degree, these variations. Table 3.13 shows the female labour force participation rates, computed from our mobility data, for each decade.[16] As we might have expected, rates of women's labour force participation have generally increased. The exceptions are Poland and Hungary, where they declined after the 1980s.[17]

The distinction between full-time and part-time work is more significant among women than men, but it is one that we cannot always make in our data. In those cases where we can, the distinction is nationally specific: that is to say, part-time and full-time work are defined according to what counts as part-time and full-time in the country concerned. It seemed to us more reasonable to follow the national convention in this way rather than seek to impose some necessarily arbitrary criterion. But of the seven countries[18] where we analyse changes in women's social fluidity, we can consistently distinguish part-time from full-time only in Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands. As a result we ignore this distinction and assign the same weight in our analyses to all women currently in the labour force.

Table 3.14 shows the dissimilarity indices between the destination distributions of women in all pairs of countries in each decade. For this part of the analysis we use data from all our countries except Ireland. As with men, there is a clear trend towards convergence, with a decline in the mean intercountry Δ from 28 to 22 to 17 and in its variance from 136 to 73 to 51 over the three decades. The greatest change occurred in Poland and Hungary. In the former this was caused by the decline in the relative size of class IVc from 45 to 13 percent of the female workforce (compared with less than 4 percent everywhere else in the 1970s except in France and less than 4 percent everywhere

[16] We were unable to compute this measure for Israeli women and so Israel is omitted from the table.

[17] The Polish figure of 1 for the 1970s arises because the 1972 survey included only men and women who had a job (see Mach, Chapter 11, this volume).

[18] As was the case for men, we drop Norway, Italy, and Israel from our analyses of social fluidity, and we also lose the Irish case from all our analyses of women's mobility because of the absence, from some of the Irish datasets, of information on women.

TABLE 3.14. *Between-country class destination dissimilarity indices by decade (women in the labour force)*

	Decade	France	Italy	Great Britain	Sweden	Norway	Poland	Hungary	Israel	Netherlands
Germany	1970	19.1	—	14.8	22.9	—	43.9	30.0	13.1	7.9
	1980	14.7	18.5	7.1	21.8	5.4	24.8	26.5	—	9.8
	1990	12.9	13.1	5.2	23.6	6.7	19.0	19.5	7.8	9.4
France	1970	—	—	20.8	29.0	—	34.3	36.0	15.5	15.6
	1980	—	23.0	12.9	29.8	17.9	34.2	34.9	—	13.6
	1990	—	14.7	15.2	31.1	11.5	18.7	24.2	8.4	17.5
Italy	1980	—	—	23.1	28.6	18.5	28.3	31.5	—	21.5
	1990	—	—	16.3	29.4	16.7	18.9	20.7	12.7	19.5
G.Britain	1970	—	—	—	25.6	—	46.2	29.2	23.1	18.2
	1980	—	—	—	24.5	7.7	27.5	27.3	—	9.4
	1990	—	—	—	22.8	7.6	21.4	17.7	11.5	8.8
Sweden	1970	—	—	—	—	—	42.6	24.3	25.2	30.3
	1980	—	—	—	—	22.1	27.5	15.5	—	31.3
	1990	—	—	—	—	29.5	23.8	10.3	23.3	31.3
Norway	1970	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1980	—	—	—	—	—	27.8	24.5	—	12.2
	1990	—	—	—	—	—	24.7	24.6	9.1	7.2
Poland	1970	—	—	—	—	—	—	50.8	41.6	46.2
	1980	—	—	—	—	—	—	28.4	—	34.2
	1990	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.6	16.4	27.7
Hungary	1970	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	34.0	37.5
	1980	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	35.1
	1990	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16.5	26.1
Israel	1970	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14.7
	1980	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	1990	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	14.1

Note: The means and the variances for 1970, 1980, and 1990 are 28.3, 22.3, and 17.4, and 135.7, 73.0, and 51.0, respectively.

else in the 1990s: see Table 3.A1). In the case of Hungary, 18 percent of women were in class VIIb in the 1970s compared with less than 1 percent everywhere else except in Poland, where the figure was 1.3 percent. By the 1990s only just over 3 percent of Hungarian women were found in VIIb. But it would not be correct to say that all the change that we observe is due to these two countries: with the exception of Sweden, whose Δs with other countries (except Poland and Hungary) have not changed much, all the others share in a general tendency towards increasing similarity in their class structures.

Table 3.15 shows the overall class structures for the ten countries (each given equal weight) in each decade. They show a decline in the proportions in VIIa and IVc and a growth in I + II. A comparison with Table 3.4 shows the much greater concentration of women in a few classes: in the 1990s almost 70 percent

TABLE 3.15. *Aggregate class structures (women in the labour force) in the ten countries by decade*

	1970s	1980s	1990s
I + II	22.1	30.5	34.6
III	32.8	32.3	35.1
IVa + b	6.5	6.0	6.1
IVc	8.6	4.4	2.3
V + VI	6.1	6.3	7.1
VIIa	21.1	18.6	13.7
VIIb	2.8	1.7	1.2

Note: Each country is weighted equally in computation of aggregate class structure.

were in I + II and III. The percentages of men and women in classes I + II are quite similar, but the relative size of class III is three times as big for women as for men. This balances the under-representation of women, relative to men, in class V + VI. The trend towards a concentration of women in the white-collar classes has been generally evident, but its results are particularly pronounced in the 1990s in Norway and the Netherlands, where 80 percent or more of women are found in these classes. By contrast, the concentration is least in Sweden and Hungary (where classes V + VI and VIIa are particularly large) and in Poland (where classes IVc and V + VI are large: see Table 3.A1).

The dissimilarity indexes between origins and destinations are reported in Table 3.16. These are much larger than the figures for men (shown in Table 3.5), reflecting the gender difference in class distributions as well as temporal changes in the class structures. The exceptions to this occur in the 1970s in Poland, Hungary, and Israel where the women's Δ differs little from men's. In these three cases, the Δ for men is unusually high in the 1970s and declines steeply (for reasons discussed earlier). But among women in Hungary, Δ does not change very much and in Israel and Poland it increases. In Poland this is because, in the 1970s, while 60 percent of women were from farm origins, 45 percent of women were themselves in this class. Since then, the share of farmers has fallen faster in destinations than in origins, so contributing to the growing Δ. The large Δ in the 1970s was substantially caused by the high proportions of women in classes I + II and III, compared with their fathers, and this gap has also widened over the decades. In Hungary, the 1970s' Δ was driven by the large size of the farmer class as an origin and its smallness as a destination (though this difference declined over decades), and the much greater size of I + II and III in the destination distribution compared with the origin (and this gap has increased). Finally, the Israeli Δ can be attributed to classes I + II and III (large in destinations but small in origins) and IVab (small in destinations but large in origins).

TABLE 3.16. *Origin–destination dissimilarity indices by country and decade (women in the labour force)*

	1970s	1980s	1990s
Germany	40.8	41.5	43.2
France	38.9	50.2	50.6
Italy	—	36.3	37.8
Great Britain	42.0	40.5	39.0
Sweden	37.4	36.2	27.3
Norway	—	42.7	49.5
Poland	25.6	33.2	40.3
Hungary	43.3	35.5	39.0
Israel	42.8	—	50.1
Netherlands	36.5	42.6	42.1
Mean	38.4	39.9	41.9
Variance	33.0	26.9	50.2

The average Δ has remained much the same over the three decades: indeed, in seven of the ten countries it has increased, which is probably due to increased female labour force participation and increasing concentration of women in a few classes. In contrast to men, there is no sign of any convergence, the variance having declined in the 1980s (from 33 to 27) but then increased to 50.

Rates of absolute, vertical, upward, and downward mobility are shown in Table 3.17. The percentage of women who are mobile is higher than for men, as would have been anticipated, though there is little difference between men and women in Sweden and in Poland in the 1970s. There has been little change over the decades in the average rate of mobility, though this masks divergent trends: almost no change in Germany, Italy, Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands, increases in France, Poland, (where it has been pronounced) and Israel, and small declines in Britain and Hungary. But because the declines have occurred in countries that displayed a high rate in the 1970s and the increases have occurred where the rate was low, the outcome is a very clear reduction in the variation between countries. The variance of the mobility rate has fallen from 86 in the 1970s, to 14 in the 1980s and 9 in the 1990s.

A decline, still substantial but of a smaller size, is evident in the variance of rates of vertical mobility. This is due once again to Poland and Israel, where rates of vertical mobility were very low in the 1970s and have grown substantially. Elsewhere there has been almost no change, and a comparison with Table 3.6 shows that male and female vertical mobility rates are identical, implying that the greater rate of overall mobility among women is not associated with movement that is either more or less advantageous than that found among

Table 3.17. *Percentage mobile by country in each decade (women in the labour force)*

	Germany	France	Italy	Great Britain	Sweden	Norway	Poland	Hungary	Israel	Netherlands	Mean	Variance
Total mobility												
1970s	74.0	71.4		78.8	73.1		50.8	81.0	76.5	74.0	72.5	86.4
1980s	75.6	77.6	74.3	76.3	73.6	76.2	66.3	79.5		73.9	74.8	13.7
1990s	72.6	77.2	75.0	73.9	73.2	77.4	76.2	76.5	82.2	72.3	75.7	8.8
Vertical mobility												
1970s	48.6	41.7		52.1	55.4		34.0	54.1	44.9	51.4	47.8	52.2
1980s	48.8	45.7	51.0	52.6	56.4	54.1	48.5	58.2		51.4	51.9	15.7
1990s	47.3	46.0	47.9	53.2	57.9	53.0	50.3	55.7	53.5	53.6	51.8	14.8
Upward mobility												
1970s	25.8	27.8		27.5	23.9		19.5	23.3	26.0	30.9	25.6	11.7
1980s	29.6	32.9	38.5	29.0	27.5	34.4	31.7	38.8		33.6	32.9	15.7
1990s	32.2	33.2	36.7	30.6	33.5	37.1	34.1	42.0	39.0	34.8	35.3	11.6
Downward mobility												
1970s	22.8	13.9		24.6	31.5		14.4	30.8	19.0	20.5	22.2	44.2
1980s	19.2	12.8	12.5	23.7	28.9	19.8	16.8	19.4		17.8	19.0	26.0
1990s	15.2	12.8	11.3	22.5	24.4	15.9	16.2	13.7	14.5	18.8	16.5	17.6

men because their additional mobility takes place between classes that, on balance, would be ranked quite similarly.

Rates of upward mobility show a general increase, while downward mobility rates have fallen. In the 1970s the mean rates of both were equal but by the 1990s there was, on average, twice as much upward as downward movement. The increase in the rate of upward mobility has been pronounced in Sweden, Hungary, Poland, and Israel. In the first two cases, vertical mobility rates have remained unchanged, so the increase in upward mobility has been met by a corresponding decline in downward mobility (the same occurs in several other countries, such as Germany and Britain, but is less marked). In Poland and Israel rates of vertical mobility increased, and, in the former, the growth of upward mobility has not been matched by any change in downward movement. But in Israel, the large increase in upward mobility has been accommodated by growth in vertical mobility and a reduction in downward mobility.

The convergent trend in class structures and mobility flows is clearer among women than men. To some extent this is because they displayed greater differences between countries in the 1970s. There has been a trend towards a common class distribution in which women are heavily concentrated in classes I + II and III, and movement towards this has been more rapid in those countries (such as Hungary and Poland) where the class distribution in the 1970s differed most from this pattern. The very substantial convergence that we see in mobility flows is largely due to changes in Poland, Hungary, Israel, and, to a lesser extent, France. In France, Poland, and Hungary, the decline in the farming sector (classes IVc and VIIb) is the driving force behind change, while in Israel the decline in the percentage of women in the petty bourgeoisie (IVab) plays a similar role.

National and temporal variation in social fluidity among women

Tables 3.18 and 3.19 report the goodness-of-fit of models for the analysis of women's social fluidity, using both decade and year data.[19] In Table 3.18 (which refers to the decade data) none of the models fits the British or German data (using the likelihood-ratio χ^2 test): this suggests that there is change over time in the pattern of social fluidity which makes it impossible to speak of a clear trend towards more or less fluidity. The β coefficients from the LmSF model increase over time in Britain and follow a U-shape in Germany. In the remaining five countries, LmSF is always an improvement on the common social fluidity model and the linear LmSF model fits as well as the

[19] At this point we drop the Norwegian, Italian, and Israeli cases.

TABLE 3.18. *Deviance and Δ for CnSF, LmSF, and linear LmSF models fitted to decade data per country, women in the labour force (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Countries						
	Germany	France	Great Britain	Sweden	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands
N	7,787.0	29,537.3	43,275.5	32,085.9	27,422.0	23,271.1	9,022.8
(1) CnSF	99.15	**145.87**	**105.88**	**84.33**	**104.94**	**143.12**	77.03
d.f.	72	72	72	50	72	72	72
(2) LmSF	**93.39**	**124.99**	**104.18**	**67.36**	74.40	**117.99**	66.38
d.f.	70	70	70	48	70	70	70
(3) Linear LmSF	**97.48**	**124.99**	**105.34**	**69.36**	**75.52**	**120.53**	66.67
d.f.	71	71	71	49	71	71	71
(2) − (1)	5.76	**20.88**	1.70	**16.97**	**30.54**	**25.13**	**10.65**
d.f.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
(3) − (1)	1.67	**20.88**	0.54	**14.97**	**29.42**	**22.59**	**10.36**
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
(3) − (2)	**4.09**	**0.00**	1.16	2.00	1.12	2.54	0.29
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Δ for CnSF	3.07	1.79	1.12	1.72	1.18	2.42	2.20
Δ for LmSF	2.92	1.56	1.08	1.55	0.75	2.36	1.97
Δ for Linear LmSF	3.03	1.55	1.16	1.54	0.78	2.35	1.95
β parameters LmSF							
1970s	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1980s	0.84	0.93	1.05	0.97	0.80	0.86	0.92
1990s	0.89	0.85	1.04	0.84	0.72	0.82	0.76
β parameters Linear LmSF							
	−0.0562	−0.0807	0.0179	−0.0913	−0.1966	−0.1003	−0.1244

unconstrained version (though these models fit the data only in the Netherlands and Poland). In these five countries, fluidity has increased: the rate of change is between 8 percent per decade in France and 20 percent in Poland.

The yearly data confirm these results. Constant fluidity is the best fitting model for Britain, LmSF is best for Germany, and linear LmSF is the preferred model for Poland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. In France and Hungary none of the three models fits the data but LmSF always improves on CnSF and linear LmSF is as good a fit and more parsimonious than LmSF. Figure 3.4 gives a clear picture of the conclusions that we can draw. There has been no change in Britain, and, while there has been change in Germany, it has not been of any systematic kind: as Fig. 3.4 shows, the LmSF βs fluctuate in what looks like a random fashion. In the remaining countries—France, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands—there is a clear downward linear trend in the coefficients of around 1 percent per annum.[20]

[20] The Dutch trend is robust to the removal of two apparent outliers—the large value for 1976 and the very small one for 1991.

TABLE 3.19. *Deviance and Δ for CnSF, LmSF, and linear LmSF models fitted to yearly data per country, women in the labour force (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Countries						
	Germany	France	Great Britain	Sweden	Poland	Hungary	Netherlands
1. CnSF	514.56	**204.45**	497.98	578.14	**104.94**	**184.59**	575.90
d.f.	540	108	504	828	72	108	684
2. LmSF	483.84	175.42	492.13	532.78	74.40	157.14	547.54
d.f.	525	105	490	805	70	105	665
3. Linear LmSF	513.84	177.23	497.92	557.88	74.40	162.73	563.67
d.f.	539	107	503	827	71	107	683
(2) − (1)	**30.72**	**29.03**	5.85	**45.36**	**30.54**	**27.45**	28.36
d.f.	15	3	14	23	2	3	19
(3) − (1)	0.72	**27.22**	0.06	**20.26**	**30.54**	**21.86**	**12.24**
d.f.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
(3) − (2)	**30.00**	1.81	5.79	**25.10**	0.00	5.59	**16.12**
d.f.	14	2	13	22	1	2	18
Δ for CnSF	6.74	2.38	2.56	4.54	1.18	2.81	6.47
Δ for LmSF	6.55	2.16	2.54	4.26	0.75	2.72	6.54
Δ for Linear LmSF	6.73	2.20	2.56	4.44	0.75	2.71	6.25
β parameters Linear LmSF							
	−0.0040	−0.0077	0.0007	−0.0101	−0.0125	−0.0084	−0.0117

The Δs for the decade data are all around 3 percent or less, and the differences between the CnSF model and those that allow for changing fluidity are very small. As was the case among men, the Δs for the annual data are larger, especially for the Netherlands, but, once again, models of change only improve this statistic by a small amount. There is a good deal of consistency in the results for the two sexes: most notably, in all of those countries where we found increasing fluidity among one sex we also found it among the other, and, within every country, the women's results accord closely with those we reported for men, with the possible exception of Hungary where among women, we see a levelling off of the trend towards increasing fluidity between the 1992 and 2000 surveys, whereas among men the trend was reversed.[21] The caveats that we expressed regarding men apply to women too. In Hungary and Poland, the evidence for a downward trend in the βs depends wholly on the first observation (1972 for Poland, 1973 for Hungary).

[21] But this is consistent with the results of Luijkx et al. (2002) who, comparing data from 1973, 1983, 1992, and 1993, also find declining fluidity in the post-Communist period among Hungarian men (but not women) in the association between father's occupation and first occupation.



FIG. 3.4. *Annual LmSF (or Unidiff) coefficients by country for women in the labour force*

Comparisons between countries: women

Table 3.20 reports the goodness-of-fit of the common social fluidity and log-multiplicative social fluidity models applied to the data for each decade. As with men, neither fits the data, but LmSF, which allows fluidity to differ between countries, always improves on CnSF. The Δs for both models are around 3 percent, and they show some evidence of growing smaller over time.

TABLE 3.20. *Deviance and Δ for CnSF and LmSF models fitted to country decade data per decade, women in the labour force (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	d.f.	1970s	1980s	1990s
CnSF	205	**1,107.30**	**832.72**	**530.61**
LmSF	199	**788.84**	**699.59**	**427.57**
CnSF–LmSF	6	**318.46**	**133.13**	**103.04**
Δ for CnSF		3.73	3.48	3.09
Δ for LmSF		3.04	3.13	2.53

TABLE 3.21. *Deviance and Δ for models fitted to country by decade data, women in the labour force (significant at 5% level in boldface)*

Model	Deviance	d.f.	*p*	Δ
0	**34,515.30**	723	.00	16.35
1 *OD*	**2,789.02**	687	.00	3.81
2 *COD*	**760.32**	482	.00	1.68
3 *TOD*	**2,470.63**	615	.00	3.48
4 *COD TOD*	**587.01**	410	.00	1.36
5 $OD\beta_C$	**2,256.25**	681	.00	3.35
6 $OD\beta_T$	**2,704.29**	685	.00	3.75
7 $OD\beta_C\beta_T$	**2,174.27**	679	.00	3.25
8 $OD\beta_{CT}$	**2,134.10**	667	.00	3.21

Tables 3.21 and 3.22 then show a series of models fitted to the decade (3.21) and annual (3.22) data, which allow the origin–destination association to vary in different ways.[22] Model 0 is conditional independence: perfect mobility holds in each country- and time-specific table. This is always far from fitting the data but it correctly classifies around 84 percent of cases. This can then be set against the 95 or 96 percent of cases correctly classified by the model of common fluidity (Model 1) and the 98 percent of cases correctly classified by model 4 which allows for variation in social fluidity according to country and time. In Table 3.22, two models fit the data using the χ^2 criterion: these are Model 2, which allows fluidity to vary in a completely free way over countries, and Model 4 which extends this variation over years. Model 4 is a better fitting model than 2, but the fact that it fits the data suggests that a model of common change over time may be a reasonable approximation to

[22] As with these models fitted to the men's data, we always include the terms *OCT* and *DCT*, where *T* is decades in Table 3.21 and years in 3.22.

TABLE 3.22. *Deviance and Δ for models fitted to yearly data by country, women in the labour force (significant at 5% in boldface)*

Model	Deviance	d.f.	p	Δ
0	**36,197.52**	2832	.00	16.74
1 *OD*	**4,707.47**	2796	.00	4.86
2 *COD*	2,660.56	2591	.17	3.10
3 *TOD*	**2,417.23**	1727	.00	2.55
4 *COD TOD*	1,381.70	1450	>.50	1.71
5 $OD\beta_C$	**4,167.08**	2790	.00	4.42
6 $OD\beta_T$	**4,234.14**	2786	.00	4.42
7 $OD\beta_C\beta_T$	**4,037.43**	2760	.00	4.28
8 $OD\beta_{CI}$	**3,967.10**	2711	.00	4.25



FIG. 3.5. *LmSF (or Unidiff) coefficients per decade per country for women in the labour force*

trends in women's fluidity. However, this result is not evident in Table 3.21 and of the log-multiplicative models (5–8) in Tables 3.21 and 3.22, model 8, which allows the β values to be country and time specific, is the best fitting (as was the case among men). Figure 3.5 shows the β values from this model applied to the decade data, with the value for Britain in the 1980s set to unity.

In interpreting this figure its limitations should be kept in mind. The model used to derive Fig. 3.5 assumes a common overall pattern of fluidity, which is then raised or lowered across all countries and decades by the βs. This differs from the model reported in Tables 3.18 in which each country is allowed to have its own pattern of fluidity which is then raised or lowered by the LmSF βs. Overall, however, the discrepancies between the two models are minor and Fig. 3.5 gives a reasonable picture of the relative openness of the different countries. This picture is similar to that for men. Once again, the points for the 1970s are above those for the 1980s which are above those for the 1990s, indicating a general tendency for fluidity to increase, with Britain being an exception. The average β falls from 1.28 in the 1970s to 1.14 in the 1980s and 1.05 in the 1990s. France and Germany are the least fluid societies, Britain, Sweden, Poland, and, by the 1990s, the Netherlands are the most fluid. Hungary presents a different picture for women than men, the former showing much lower fluidity, compared with other countries, than the latter. If, as we did with men, we add Italy, Norway, and Israel to the analysis, we find that Italy is one of the least fluid countries: its β values are 1.40 in the 1980s and 1.45 in the 1990s. In Norway the parameter falls sharply from 1.03 in the 1980s to 0.87 in the 1990s. In Israel the values are 0.84 in the 1970s and 0.71 in the 1990s. Taken together with the results for men this is evidence of the exceptionally fluid nature of Israeli society.

Conclusions

Here we provide a rather stark summary of the chapter's findings. As we pointed out earlier, we shall assess their implications in the final chapter of the volume when we will also be in a position to draw on the results of the eleven country chapters which now follow.

First, we have found that there is a convergent trend among countries in their absolute mobility rates and in their class structures. Second, countries differ in their level of social fluidity and they do so in much the same way for both sexes. Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland seem to be the least fluid countries; Israel, Sweden, Norway, Hungary, Poland, and, by the 1990s, the Netherlands, the most fluid. And third, trends in social fluidity are very similar among men and women, showing a widespread tendency towards greater fluidity. Britain is the sole clear exception to this. In other cases—notably Germany—there is no statistically significant change, though the trend, at least for men, is towards a weaker association between origins and destinations. Elsewhere—in France, Ireland, Sweden, Poland, Hungary, and the Netherlands—there is a statistically significant increase in fluidity, though, as we noted, the small number of observations for Ireland, Poland, and Hungary and the lack of a consistent pattern of change in these countries must leave some room for uncertainty. But in contrast to absolute mobility we see no evidence of convergence among countries in their social fluidity.

Appendix

TABLE 3.A1. *Destination distributions for men and women in three decades*

	DE	FR	IT	IE	GB	SE	NO	PL	HU	IL	NL	Mean	Variance
Men													
1970s													
I + II	33.2	17.4	—	12.9	30.6	28.5	—	18.6	14.5	15.4	36.8	23.1	82.9
III	9.5	9.6	—	7.4	9.5	9.0	—	2.7	9.3	11.2	9.7	8.7	5.9
IVab	6.0	9.9	—	9.1	5.2	9.5	—	1.9	1.8	20.0	7.8	7.9	29.9
IVc	2.1	9.6	—	22.4	1.5	4.1	—	26.0	0.6	5.4	5.4	8.6	86.4
V + VI	36.9	30.5	—	17.9	36.0	23.2	—	28.7	30.8	21.9	23.5	27.7	42.5
VIIa	11.7	20.2	—	23.9	16.1	25.7	—	19.1	28.3	25.3	14.7	20.6	32.1
VIIb	0.7	2.8	—	6.4	1.1	0.0	—	3.0	14.6	0.7	2.2	3.5	21.1
1980s													
I + II	35.4	22.6	19.9	18.3	37.1	31.7	35.2	23.1	20.8	—	41.6	28.6	72.1
III	8.6	10.7	14.6	9.0	7.4	10.4	12.0	3.2	4.7	—	9.9	9.0	11.3
IVab	7.0	9.4	20.9	7.9	8.2	9.8	9.7	5.1	2.3	—	5.4	8.6	24.4
IVc	2.1	6.6	5.4	11.4	1.4	2.8	4.7	18.5	1.0	—	3.3	5.7	29.3
V + VI	36.0	32.1	21.1	26.4	30.6	21.4	20.7	31.5	33.5	—	22.8	27.6	33.6
VIIa	10.3	17.2	15.0	24.1	14.4	23.9	17.4	16.4	28.3	—	15.7	18.3	29.7
VIIb	0.6	1.5	3.1	3.0	1.0	0.0	0.4	2.3	9.5	—	1.5	2.3	7.5
1990s													
I + II	38.1	25.3	24.6	20.2	42.3	34.6	38.4	19.4	20.8	26.3	49.0	30.8	101.8
III	8.4	11.2	17.8	14.2	7.0	10.0	12.0	4.0	4.5	11.0	10.6	10.1	16.2
IVab	6.6	9.0	18.8	9.3	9.9	11.5	7.9	13.2	6.2	17.4	4.1	10.4	21.0
IVc	2.2	4.5	2.3	9.3	0.9	1.8	4.3	12.0	1.6	2.4	2.4	4.0	12.4
V + VI	34.9	33.2	23.9	25.9	25.6	21.7	20.5	29.2	34.2	27.7	21.0	27.1	27.6
VIIa	9.1	15.4	9.8	18.8	13.2	20.4	15.3	19.3	25.3	15.1	11.6	15.7	23.8
VIIb	0.7	1.5	2.8	2.4	1.0	0.0	1.6	2.9	7.4	0.2	1.3	2.0	4.1
Women													
1970s													
I + II	30.2	17.4	—	—	21.3	19.1	—	17.7	12.6	25.3	32.8	22.1	47.4
III	36.2	38.5	—	—	48.6	25.9	—	13.1	29.8	32.0	38.7	32.8	110.3
IVab	5.7	11.2	—	—	2.6	4.8	—	2.4	0.9	16.3	7.9	6.5	26.5
IVc	1.6	12.6	—	—	0.4	3.3	—	44.6	0.4	4.1	1.8	8.6	227.2
V + VI	6.5	5.0	—	—	4.9	6.2	—	6.3	8.6	6.7	4.9	6.1	1.6
VIIa	19.4	14.6	—	—	21.5	40.6	—	14.6	29.6	15.4	13.2	21.1	90.9
VIIb	0.4	0.7	—	—	0.8	0.0	—	1.3	18.1	0.2	0.8	2.8	38.5
1980s													
I + II	32.2	24.1	33.7	—	31.0	25.9	32.1	31.6	26.3	—	37.7	30.5	18.6
III	36.9	45.3	25.6	—	42.6	23.9	36.2	17.0	22.6	—	41.2	32.3	104.3
IVab	6.2	7.6	17.6	—	3.8	4.1	6.0	1.9	1.5	—	5.8	6.0	23.0
IVc	1.7	6.1	5.1	—	0.4	2.0	0.7	22.8	0.1	—	1.0	4.4	51.9
V + VI	6.4	4.7	2.5	—	4.3	8.3	3.0	8.7	14.6	—	4.4	6.3	14.3
VIIa	16.3	11.4	13.1	—	17.4	35.9	20.5	17.4	26.1	—	9.6	18.6	65.9
VIIb	0.3	0.7	2.5	—	0.6	0.0	1.6	0.6	8.9	—	0.4	1.7	7.7

TABLE 3.A1. (*continued*)

	DE	FR	IT	IE	GB	SE	NO	PL	HU	IL	NL	Mean	Variance
1990s													
I + II	38.8	28.5	30.2	—	38.7	33.7	39.5	28.3	31.3	31.7	45.8	34.6	33.4
III	36.5	46.6	34.5	—	37.2	19.9	41.5	28.0	26.9	41.1	38.3	35.1	63.8
IVab	5.7	5.4	16.5	—	4.1	4.6	4.8	6.4	4.1	5.8	3.2	6.1	14.3
IVc	1.3	3.6	1.2	—	0.3	0.7	1.5	12.7	0.5	0.8	0.6	2.3	14.3
V + VI	6.9	5.4	5.5	—	4.3	12.5	2.1	9.7	11.8	9.4	3.0	7.1	13.0
VIIa	10.7	9.9	9.8	—	14.9	28.7	9.5	13.0	22.1	10.5	8.3	13.7	43.6
VIIb	0.2	0.6	2.5	—	0.5	0.0	1.0	1.9	3.4	0.9	0.8	1.2	1.2