

Therborn, Göran (2006): "Meaning, Mechanisms, Pattern, and Forces: An Introduction". In
Therborn, G. (ed): Inequalities of the World. London/New York: Verso, p. 1-60

Meaning, Mechanisms, Patterns, and Forces of Inequalities

An Introduction _

Göran Therborn

Concerns about inequality are usually first of all moral, political, and empirical. We are interested in inequality for moral and political reasons, and then we want to find out, and to show, what it looks like, its tendencies, and its consequences.

However, inequality also raises fundamental theoretical issues. Does inequality differ from difference, and if so, how? Is it fruitful to distinguish different kinds and different shapes of inequality, as well as different amounts? Is it possible to find a sort of generative social grammar of inequality? If so, what social processes or mechanisms would it involve? Can corresponding processes of equality be identified?

Social theorizing of inequality has moved forward enormously in the last decade or so, while more and more data are collected on a global scale, and subjected to ever increasingly sophisticated analyses. Let me just mention a few of the most sterling contributions, from which I have learnt a lot. A new theoretical level was opened up by Amartya Sen's (1992) Inequality Examined, raising the basic question, Inequality of what?, and answering it by focusing on humans capability. Charles Tilly (1998) brought the mechanisms of Durable Inequality into focus, developing a formidable structural explanation of enduring inequality. Between categories of people, such as white and black, or male and female, for example.

Inequality of health (cf. Navarro 2004) has become more central to social science through the development of epidemiology and public health, and broad interest has been stimulated by the hypothesis developed by R.G. Wilkinson (1996, 2000), that socioeconomic inequality has detrimental effects on a wider population than the most disadvantaged. Problems of what I would call existential inequality have entered the circle of bright

theoretical light through the debate on recognition and redistribution between philosophers Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003), and by Richard Sennett's (2002) characteristically perceptive exploration of respect.

The number of eye-opening empirical studies has become too large for a roll-call, and particularly so in a brief introduction like this, although one cannot avoid a special tribute to Pierre Bourdieu's (1979), *La Distinction*, which brought current intra-ethnic cultural stratification into the limelight. Sociology has also mobilized hard-science rebuttals of anti-egalitarian ideological crusaders (e.g. Fisher et al. 1996). The core of mainstream sociological inequality studies is investigations of intergenerational mobility, into and through the educational system, and into the labour market and the class structure. Major findings of these efforts were summed up in two excellent works of early 1990s Eriksson and Goldthorpe (1992), and Shavit and Blossfeld (1993), reporting persistent inequality of opportunity.

Though there are significant sociological contributions to the study of global income inequality, by Glenn Firebaugh (2003) - methodologically versed, professionally pedagogic - and others, it is the best among economists who have devoted more energy to global studies and to the contemporary distributional dynamics of the OECD states under competitive pressure. Readers of distribution economics are immensely grateful for the wisdom of Anthony Atkinson, the doyen of the corps, and an exemplar of sceptical British empiricism at its very best (see e.g. Atkinson 2004), co-editor of a valuable Handbook of Income Distribution (Atkinson and Bourguignon 2000). From the huge recent economic literature, at least the incisive, wide-ranging collection gathered and edited by Giovanni Andrea Cornea (2004) needs to be singled out.

In an introduction by a sociologist to a Verso book, i.e., a book on the opposite side of the conventional mainstream, a special acknowledgement is due to a group of economists little likely to be read on the left, unfortunately, most accessible from the websites of their employers. I am thinking of a minority set of international bank economists, for instance of Miguel Székely, formerly at the Inter-American Development Bank, and of World Bank economists like Francois Bourguignon (recently appointed Chief Economist of the Bank), Elizabeth King, Branko Milanovic, and Martin Ravallion, who are all using their privileged position for perceptive analyses of inequality and poverty.

For all the brilliant lights already there is on the field of inequality, this book was conceived from a sense of something missing, and with an ambition to add something of importance, theoretically as well as empirically. The starting-point was the idea, that inequality should be understood as plural, as inequalities. It guided the invitation of

participants, each one a prominent expert in her/his topic. A multidimensional view of inequality also called forth a theoretical effort, highlighting what I think are the three fundamental dimensions of inequality, vital, existential, and resource inequality. Two of which have been largely neglected in the world literature. – Even distinguished broad-minded, even if mainly national overviews, like the *Daedalus* Winter 2002 special issue, Fitoussi and Savidan (2003) or Barlösius (2004) refrain from putting the whole field into view.

Furthermore, if one thinks that inequality or equality are important social outcomes, social science should try to systematize the mechanisms of their production. Tilly's above-mentioned work was a major contribution, but it confined itself to one particular, even though particularly important, process. A much more general approach, including corresponding mechanisms of equality, will be needed, laying out how inequalities and equalities are socially generated.

Empirically, the aim is the globe, although most of our individual contributors would be a specialist on this or that part of it. The intention is to get a grasp of global multidimensionality and of global cum sub-global causality.

Social Theory: Meaning and Mechanisms

1. Differences and Inequalities

Human beings are all different in some sense. How do we distinguish an inequality from a difference? Each of us is different from one another. In some sense, then, none of us is equal to others. On the other hand, in some other sense, it is widely believed that "all men are created equal". The relationship between difference and inequality has been much discussed in contemporary Feminism, but that does not seem to have spread into other theoretical fields.

So, what differences make inequality? Inequalities are differences which we consider unjust. In-equality is a negation of equality. Behind a perception of inequality there is a notion of injustice, a violation of some equality. Discourses on inequality contrast to ones on superiority/inferiority. There is one more aspect of inequality. While equality may be divine – coming from the Creator -, inequality is man-made. That is, it is something changeable.

The conception of justice underlying empirical studies of, or even political mobilizations against inequality is rarely, if ever, reflected upon and discussed. But they are variants of three notions of injustice: A difference may constitute an unjust inequality because it is

- i. a difference which constitutes a violation of some just equality; of human rights, of citizenship, , in brief, of some human qualification held to be equal, whether by humanity, by social membership or by achievement
- ii. too large a difference, limiting the life possibilities of the disadvantaged, either materially directly by concentrating resources among the privileged, or indirectly via social psychological mechanisms of humiliating signals of superiority and inferiority.
- iii. goes in the wrong direction, giving undeserved, unfair advantages to some , e.g., to people born in certain countries or milieux, to people of power rather than of contribution.

The question why is there inequality in the world, then requires a moral answer before any sociological one. Some of the differentials of conditions of life are unequal and unjust because they constitute violations of the most elementary human rights, of life and of the pursuit of happiness, i.e., of a moral conception of fundamental human equality. Other differentials create inequalities in the capabilities of fully participating in the potentials of contemporary social and cultural life in the world.

For this writer, those are the two basic reasons for being concerned with human world inequality. Why shouldn't a newborn child in Congo have the same chance to survive into healthy adulthood as a child in Sweden? Why shouldn't a young Bihari woman have the same autonomy to choose her life-pursuit as a young White American male, or an Egyptian college graduate the same as a Canadian? Why shouldn't all Pakistani and Brazilian families have the same access as British or French to good toilets, air conditioning and/or heating, washing-machines, and holiday tickets? Why should many children have to work? Why shouldn't a Black HIV-positive in Southern Africa have the same chance to survive as a White European? Why should a handful of individual "oligarchs" be able to expropriate most of the natural resources of Russia, while a large part of population have been pushed into pauperism? Why should big business executives be able to pay themselves hundreds of times more than the workers they are constantly pushing to work harder, more "flexibly", and at lower cost?

In brief, there is inequality in this world because so many are denied possibilities to live their lives at all, to live a life of respect, to try out their interests in life, to make use of the existing potential of human life. The inequalities of the world prevent hundreds of millions of people to develop their differences.

2. Inequality of What?

Amartya Sen (1992) has advanced the frontier of reflections on inequality, in his raising and treating the question, “Inequality of What?” But it may be wondered how far his answer of human “functionings” has reached beyond the high table of High Philosophical and Economic Theory. General public discussion is still fed upon the stale diet of “inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome”. True, perceptions of injustice and unfairness are widespread, against which rightwing punditry of “envy” and “resentment” carry little weight. However, there is a need for elaborating Sen’s question a bit in the direction of a simple social theory, easily understandable for purposes of civic discussion and political change, as well as useful for empirical investigations.

In this vein, inequality may be conceived as having three fundamental dimensions. They refer to human beings as biological organisms, as persons, and as actors.

Life and Health

Most basically, there is inequality of life and death. That is, of differential exposure to fatal risk. We may call this vital inequality, and it can be measured by life expectancy, if possible corrected for disability, by mortality and/or morbidity rates, and by the incidence of malnutrition. That the incidence of disease and the age of death are amenable to social change is one of the most important social and medical discoveries of the last two centuries. Thereby the issue of vital inequality was made, where before there had only been murders, accidents, and divine punishments.

It may well be argued that vital inequality is the most important of all, given its reference to the ultimate question of life, health, and death. But if so, it plays an astonishingly modest role in public debate and in political controversy. This may have something to do with the remarkable combination involved in vital inequality, on the one hand of personal, bodily

intimacy, on the other of statistical abstraction. The rich are more concretely visible at a distance, than the long-lived healthy, not to speak of rates morbidity or mortality.

The HIV-AIDS catastrophe in Africa is only slowly bringing vital inequality to wider attention.

There is one significant vital differential, which is usually not regarded as an inequality, though. That is the generally larger longevity of women in comparison with men, a difference which can be very large, and often as large or even larger, than the differential between classes or continents. In a country like Russia it amounts to a likelihood of thirteen more years of life, counted from birth (WHO 2004) The female sex is genetically stronger than the male, and therefore human populations give birth to somewhat more boys than girls (105-6 to 100) But life expectancy differentials vary considerably among large (say national) populations.

Why has there been no morally driven counting of the “missing men” of the former Soviet Union, comparable to Amartya Sen’s calculation of the missing women of patriarchal (northern) India, from the excess mortality of young girls? Presumably because the abnormally shorter lives of men in some countries is not perceived as unjust, because self-inflicted, either by the victims themselves, by alcoholism, violence, and bodily neglect, or by other men. This difference is not perceived as an inequality. The mounting generational conflicts and their actuarial arguments may well change the terms of the debate. And with respect to Russia it is of course a pertinent question, why has male life-expectancy been shortened so much with the re-introduction of capitalism? (Below we shall come back to that question.)

Freedom and Respect

Secondly, there is the unequal recognition of human individuals as persons. This creates an existential inequality , which allocates freedom and unfreedom in the pursuit of personal life-projects, rights and prohibitions to act, and which distributes affirmations and denials of recognition and respect. The struggle for, and the denial of, recognition is a classical theme of social philosophy, at least since Hegel (cf. Honneth 1992), but it has rarely been incorporated into systematic thought on inequality (see Fraser and Honneth 2000: Sennett 2002, though). . Stigma is the opposite of recognition, and stigmatization is a basic process of producing and reproducing existential inequality (cf. Goffman 1963; Elias and Scotson 1992).

Patriarchy, slavery, caste, estates, and racism have been the main, stark, classical forms of institutionalized existential inequality. Religious domination, when it was not bent

on outright annihilation, as in Western Europe from the mid-Middle Ages to the Enlightenment, also included limitations on what the, e.g., Jewish or Christian, minority must and must not do.

“Equality of opportunity” is, in one sense, existential equality light. It is a light version referring to equality only at one or a few –crucial, true - moments of life, to some moment(s) of entry, to school, to a job. It is silent on the rest of the life-course. However, unequal opportunities, the inheritance of disadvantages, social immobility are denials of existential freedom.

Existential inequality can be pervasive without being institutionalized and formally inscribed in society at large. Giving or withholding recognition and respect is intrinsic to social action and social relations. But differences of recognition and respect do not per se make up an inequality, according to our argumentation above. When do they? There is little of any quantitative benchmark here, but whenever there is humiliation, there is existential inequality.

When existential inequality is no longer backed up by strong norms of difference and by stark resource inequality, the reaction tends to be explosive. A great deal of contemporary youth violence in the rich countries seems to arise out of perceptions of non-respect. The enormous resentment which the crusades by Messrs. Bush and Blair are creating among Muslims everywhere, and among young male Muslims in particular, appear to derive from a deep sense of being humiliated, non-recognized, and non-respected. And in contrast to the damned of the earth of yesterday, these frustrated men have some resources, of knowledge, including lethal, and of communication. Existential humiliation is not to be played with.

Resources: material and symbolic

Thirdly, even as healthy organisms and persons with rights to act, human actors can be very unequal in their capability to act. This may be summed up as resource inequality. (In contrast to Ronald Dworkin 2000, I think resources had better be seen as one rather than the dimension of (in)equality.) For many purposes, a study of the distribution of income will give the most pertinent picture of resource inequality, given its easy measurability and its wide-ranging convertibility. But adequate resources to act also include, e.g., knowledge or education, social networks, and rights to claim social security in case of need. From the work of Pierre Bourdieu we may distinguish the inequality of resources into that of economic, cultural, and social “capital”.

Resources also take on a symbolic meaning, with differentials creating existential inequality as well. Your income, your work space, credential of education may be

disrespected or respected, signalling a “winner” or a “loser”. While income is a universally convertible resource e currency, symbolic differentiations constitute inequality only to the extent that they have connotations of unfair (dis)advantages. Differences in cultural capital (Bourdieu 1979) may just refer to cultural differences between different strata, as do different lifestyles (Beck 1983).

Experimental economics has illustrated the operation of humiliating resource allocation in its so-called ultimatum games. The experimenter gives one person a sum of money, which he/she has to allocate between him/herself and another person. If that person accepts the proposed allocation, the two divide the money accordingly, but if the person rejects the offer, neither gets anything. The results show, that a division 7-3 or lower is rejected by most people, who prefer to get nothing than accept a humiliating offer. That is, a reaction of honour, rejecting a purely economic rationality. On the other hand, when the proposals are made non-intentionally, by random procedure (a kind of lottery), even a 9-1 division is accepted by a majority (Falk and Fischbacher 2002:224).

3. Arenas, Interactions, Basic Sources, and Pathways

Inequalities are produced in different social arenas, “fields” in the nomenclature of Bourdieu, “social sub-systems” in the eyes of Niklas Luhmann (1997: ch. 4). Vital inequality is mainly produced at home, in the family and its habitat, existential inequality in adult social interaction, and resource inequality above all in the areas of property and employment. The evolutionary tendency of social differentiation tends to increase these arenas and their autonomy of each other. A plurality of cultural milieux provides a variety of criteria of status, and huge incomes may be generated in very different ways, from media displaying an ample bosom or golf scoring to capitalist entrepreneurship and property ownership.

However, while specific in their meaning and in their dynamics, the three dimensions of inequalities also interrelate and interact.

Vital inequality is determined by natural conditions – genetic and ecological – ,by resource inequality (incl. cognitive), and by cultural differences (of consumption and body care), and it will be reinforced, and occasionally overruled by existential inequality. In Pakistan, northern India, and until very recently in Bangladesh, female life expectancy is lower than male. (cf. table 6 below) The HIV-AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa has become particularly virulent out of a witches’cauldron of African sexual inequality, colonial migration, and post-colonial poverty ((Cf. UNAIDS 2004, 19ff).

Existential inequality is first of all culturally determined – by a cultural system, and inscribed in family socialization – ,often fastened onto natural signs (of sex or skin) or coming

directly out of the power of one culture (e.g. religion) over another. It is reinforced by resource inequality. But it is also possible that the cultural system allocates existential recognition according to a person's command of resources. The amount of income, or the knowledge credential a person has may be interpreted as the person's worth.

Resource inequality can follow from natural endowments – of territories as well as of individuals - , from productivity differentials, and from systemic structuring of opportunities and rewards. Like the ecology of vital inequality, resource inequality is significantly affected by the demography of the population. It is strongly reinforced by categorical existential inequality – between genders, races, ethnic groups (Cf. Tilly 1998), and its reproduction over time is reinforced by vital inequality of childhood. Under-nourishment and maltreatment leave enduring handicaps.

Inequalities feed on sources or bases, and are produced and reproduced – alternatively dismantled – by processes of social interaction. The latter operate along a number of different paths, and not seldom in opposite directions, making the distributive outcome a net sum of conflicting tendencies (This was a major finding of Bourguignon et al. 2004 in their tracing of different distributive paths in East Asia and Latin America.)

Summing up, inequalities derive from four basic factors of social differentiation:
natural endowments (of individuals, groups, territories),
systemic arrangements of opportunities and rewards,
the performance or productivity of actors,
and individual and collective distributive action, including via use of the state.
Class struggle is one form of distributive action.
Inequalities among their members are affected by the growth, or other dynamics, of the populations.

The relative importance of these factors provide a major part of the interminable ethical and explanatory controversies about inequality. Each determinant can also operate along an indeterminate number of social pathways.

However, inequalities are outcomes of action. They do not just derive from sources, whatever the argumentation. Inequalities are produced, reproduced, reduced and dismantled by social interaction. It may therefore be fruitful to try to specify these mechanisms of interactions, whereby inequality or equality are produced and sustained. Again the number of four appears the most appropriate.

4. Four Mechanisms of Inequality: Distanciation, Hierarchization, Exclusion, and Exploitation

As these mechanism have very different moral loading, the reader is now entering a minefield of controversy. Ideologically, the analysis has often been strung up between “[individual] achievement “ and “exploitation” (cf. Wright 1994), or between inequality and equality of opportunity. I would argue, that what was is called “achievement” is in fact very dependent on systemic game construction and reward structuration, while “exploitation” is currently much more rare than Marx would have suspected, and, thirdly, that “equality of opportunity” is no more than a fleeting moment in the overall process of (in)equality.

Inequalities are produced and sustained by distributive action, individual as well as collective, and by social systemic arrangements and processes. It is crucial to pay systematic attention to both. “Distributive action” is here taken as any social action with direct distributive consequences, be they actions of advance, of retardation, or of allocation/redistribution. Together, distributive action and system dynamics produce and maintain inequalities through four different mechanisms, with different implications for evaluation and for change. The mechanisms refer to the kind of social interaction which yields a certain distributive outcome. They operate among kids at school as well as among regions of the world economy.

This interaction is hung between two poles. At one pole we have the distance produced by A running ahead of B, because of A’s more helpful parents or other better preconditions, more training, lucky start/course, or harder effort. No interaction between A and B is necessary to produce the distance between them, but A and/or B, as well as their onlookers, may find it important. And, whatever produced the initial distance, social psychological mechanisms of self-confidence, ambition, and dedication often tend to consolidate and to widen it. We may refer the process at that pole as distanciation. In liberal, individualist discourse, this mechanism is often referred to as “achievement”, and held to produce not inequality but legitimate rewards.

Distanciation is an important mechanism of inequality, which should not be subsumed under other processes. But “achievement” would be a notion with ideological blinds here. It is blind to everything but the achieving actor, telling us nothing about her relations to others, nor about the contexts of opportunities and rewards. Social distance may very well be considered an unjust inequality, albeit not necessarily. Distanciation can be a systemic process, by game goal – defining “winning” -, cultural objectives formulation – like “growth” or “success” -, or

by a value of social distance in general -, and by reward patterning, such as “winner takes all” (cf. Frank and Cook 1995) or cumulation of success by increasing returns to scale.

At the other pole, A derives his inequality over B because of the valuables that B provides him with. At this pole we have inequality by exploitation. Exploitation involves a categorical division between some superior and some inferior people, whereby the former unilaterally or asymmetrically extracts values from the latter. Once some notion of elementary human equality has been accepted, exploitation is always unjust. It can be denied, or disguised as benevolent exchange, but not defended.

Between distancing and exploitation we may discern two other kinds of mechanisms producing inequalities. Exclusion means barring the advance or access of others, a divide of in-groups and out-groups. As an explanatory mechanism, exclusion had better be seen as a variable, rather than as a category, as a set of hurdles being placed in front of some people, a set which includes hindrances, discriminations of various sorts, as well as a closed gate. Exclusion figures in economics as monopolization, land rent and other kinds of “rent-seeking”(cf. Sorensen 1996). French empirical sociology made it in the 1990s into a major, policy pertinent social category in France (Paugam 1996) and in the EU, which since its Laeken Council in 2001 has endorsed a set of indicators to measure it. Stigmatization is a marker of exclusion, bestowing upon those outside never-healing cultural wounds.

We may also have a kind of inequality deriving from some institutionalized ranking of social actors, some high, others low, from some super- and subordination. This is inequality by hierarchization, highlighting the importance of formal organization. An interesting modern example, no doubt inspired by ancestral tradition, was the system of civil service ranking set up in Communist China in 1953. It was a ladder with 26 ranks, which governed not only your salary, the appearance of your uniform, and the size and amenities of your apartment, but also your access to information and your means of travel on duty. Only from grade 14 and above could you buy a plane ticket or a comfortable, “soft” train seat, and only from grade 13 could you book a hotel room with a private toilet (Chang 1991:240-1).

Hierarchization can also be anchored in an articulated value system. Pre-modern social orders were usually perceived and formulated in terms of hierarchical orders, estates or castes, with a core division of intellectuals (priests, Brahmins, Mandarins, ulama), warriors, traders/craftsmen, and/ farmers. A similar hierarchy survived into contemporary high cultures through aesthetic value systems of “taste” and “style”. In contemporary Europe this cultural hierarchization is probably most articulate in France, Pierre Bourdieu (1979) devoted his

perhaps very best work to it. He started from something which is no longer so self-evident, especially not outside France: “To the socially recognized hierarchy of the arts ... corresponds the social hierarchy of [their] consumers”, whereby cultural taste can function as “privileged markers of ‘class’ . “ (pp. I-II).

These four mechanisms are cumulative. The exclusion mechanism becomes relevant and important to the extent that the excluding barriers or hindering obstacles are put up by those in some sense being ahead of and more advantaged than others.

For hierarchization to be institutionalized some barring divide between superiors and inferiors must be in place. Exploitation, finally, presupposes distancing, exclusion, and institutionalized superiority/inferiority, and then adds on top of all that an extraction of resources from the inferiors.

Exclusion, super-/subordination, and exploitation are all transitive mechanisms of inequality, mechanisms which, in contrast to distancing, directly disadvantage the disadvantaged.

Table 1. Inequality Mechanisms and Their Interactive Dynamics

<i>Mechanism</i>	<i>Dynamics</i>	
	<i>Direct Agency</i>	<i>Systemic Dynamics</i>
<u>Distancing</u>	Running ahead/ Falling behind Outcompeting Social psychology of success/failure	Reward Structuration and Normation, e.g. “Winner takes all”, “Matthew effect”, “Star” system Returns to scale Opportunity structuration
<u>Exclusion</u>	Closure, Hindering, Opportunity hoarding Discrimination, Monopolization	Membership boundaries, entry thresholds Cumulation of advantages Stigmatization Citizenship/Property rights
<u>Hierarchization</u>	Super/subordination Patron/client relations Put down/deference	Organizational ladder, Status/Authority distance Hierarchy of family roles Systemic centre and peripheries Ethnic/racial/gendered hierarchies Generalizations of super/inferiority

<u>Exploitation</u>	Extraction	Polarized power relations
	Utilization	Asymmetric dependence
	Abuse	Tributary systems

To each of these mechanisms of inequality there is also a corresponding kind of opposite mechanisms

Table 2. Equality Mechanisms

<u>Catching-up</u>	Field-Evening, compensatory capacitation, “affirmative action”, New opportunity openings
<u>Inclusion</u>	Entitlement, migration, human rights
<u>Organizational/Institutional Flattening</u>	Empowerment, democratisation, unionisation, user rights
<u>Redistribution</u>	Taxation, social policy

Catching-up may be due mainly to extra efforts, as in individual cases of achievement. On a larger scale it is usually dependent on system changes, which, of course, does not render effort without significance. Field-evening occurs in several countries, from the Indian quota of public sector jobs to scheduled castes to gender quotas, or special educational efforts targeted at disadvantaged children in the North Atlantic area. It was the core mechanism of classical as well as of “actually existing” socialism, through the collectivization of property. Catching-up may also start from new systemic opportunities, for instance new technologies or new markets, to which latecomers may be faster to adopt. In economic history, such “advantages of backwardness” was highlighted by the Harvard economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), drawing upon the 19th century industrialization of central and eastern Europe. East Asian economic development after World War II might be seen in a similar perspective.

Inclusion is the most widespread of the equality mechanisms. It is intrinsic to the modern nation-state, which entitles its citizens and normally also its permanent residents to certain rights and public services. For EU membership the new member states had each to provide a National Action Plan on Social Inclusion by 2004. Migration possibilities, within and

across states open channels of inclusion. Human rights, including rights to social and economic development, and the diffusion of medicine and medical knowledge exemplify efforts at global inclusion.

Organizational/institutional flattening has become a significant management doctrine in the latter area in recent decades, largely inspired by post-World War II Japanese management, and by cultural upheaval following upon the student rebellions of the 1960s.. Movements of organizational democratisation were a central part of “1968”, following upon a century of workingclass struggles for trade union rights. In some parts of the world, especially in northwestern Europe, significant empowerment of the propertyless has been achieved by popular movements of land and house tenants. Micro-credits targeted to women, pioneered by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, have empowered women in parts of the Third World.

Redistribution has been the main Social Democratic road to more equality, and, as we shall see below, it has been powerful and comparatively successful.

The relative importance of these mechanisms of inequality and equality is at the centre of scholarly as well as political controversies about world development, although the mechanisms are usually implied in area-specific notions. Did world inequality rise mainly because of distancing at the time of the Industrial Revolution, with the North Atlantic economies running ahead and away? Or was it also due to hindering exclusive practices, like the crowding out of Indian manufactures by the British rulers, the violent “opening” of China, the hierarchization of the whole world into a “civilized” colonizing part and an “uncivilized” colonized part? To what extent was Western European prosperity, and its initial industrial advantage, built upon colonial exploitation, of the Americas in particular? Is the recent widening of income differentials in the US and elsewhere due to technological change and in ensuing demand shifts, or is it significantly an effect of excluding processes of socially and politically disorganizing the popular classes?

Similar questions are being raised with regard to processes with aims of equality. Does affirmative action work to equal fairness? Is migration a solution to inter-area inequality? Is the human rights discourse effective? Does empowerment of, say, women or ethnic minorities have real equalizing effects? How effective are taxation and social policy? As all these mechanism may operate simultaneously, fuel for controversies is abundant.

An introduction is not the place to claim a settlement of such controversial issues. However, a look below at worldwide variation, in time as well as in space, does indicate that no inequality is a fatality. Alternatives are supplied, even in this unequal world.

5.(In)equality Among Whom?

Inequality as a comparison always refers to some, often implicit, population.

Inequality arose mainly as a national concern, confined to a population defined as a nation or to nations within an empire. The divine basic human equality included in the two major world religions, Christianity and Islam, had for a long time little thisworldly significance, although it did produce some minimalist protection, qua human souls. The Iberian Catholic conqueror states did include the Indians of Ibero-America as human subjects, and Islamic polities did provide some shelter to all “peoples of the book”, i.e., to Christians and Jews in the West, and to Hindus in the East. Totalitarian European Christianity did not reciprocate. But Enlightenment Anglo-Saxon Protestantism and Humanism spawned Anti-Slavery Societies.

Only recently have the planetary human population – after World War II and after decolonization – become a relevant “reference group”. World statistics is being regularly produced, by the UN Development Programme, by the UNICEF, by the World Bank, by the ILO, and others, and spread through mass media throughout the world. Environmental perspectives and pension politics have also recently pointed to populations of generations.

Except for the limiting case of the totality of humanity, (in)equality is bounded. For the Founding Fathers of the USA the boundary of equality was that between White adult males and everybody else. For the most generous post-war European welfare states, equality refers to the national territory and its permanent residents (citizens or not).

The sharpness and the surveillance of the boundary may vary negatively with the internal inequality. White North America was more equal than White Ibero-America, but the exclusion and the treatment of non-Whites was more vicious in the Anglo-Saxon North. In South Africa, it was the egalitarian Boers, who were the most ferocious enemies of the Blacks. Indeed it has been argued, by a great US historian that it was precisely exclusivist racism and slavery that bred the republican ideals of equality and liberty in the “Virginia gentlemen” who created the United States of America, Jefferson, Washington, Madison, Monroe et al. (Morgan 1975: 375ff.) As Morgan notes (p. 380), the link was seen already by an English diplomat to Jefferson’s Presidency: “ The Virginians can profess an unbounded love of liberty and of democracy in consequence of the mass of the people , who in other countries might become mobs, being there nearly altogether composed of their own Negro slaves ..”

This co-variation of internal equality and external inequality is no universal law. Contemporary Sweden, for example, while maintaining a relatively egalitarian socio-

economic orientation has recently become the most open immigration country of Europe, with about 12 per cent of its population currently foreign-born, similar to the United States.

Thirdly, population is important as the numerical size of units of comparison, such as nations for global inequality, and in the context of differential fertility rates, among classes or ethnic groups. World inter-national inequality looks completely differently if you think of the world in UN General Assembly terms, of one nation, one vote. Then inequality has widened continuously in the past fifty years, and is still continuing to do so. But if you give each citizen one vote, and calculate in terms of the population of each nation, then world inequality is going down – basically because of the growth of China, a huge, previously very poor country. Recently, the invigorated economic growth of India is adding to the world economic equality (Milanovic2002, and forthcoming).

Higher fertility among the poorer classes adds substantially to the (already) high inequality of Latin America. If sub-Saharan Africa had had the same fertility after Independence as China, per capita income would have been about forty per cent higher (Therborn 2003).

Populations matter, then, by comparisons, boundaries, and numbers.

6. Shapes of Inequality: Ladders and Circles

Spontaneously and off the cuff, most of us would probably think of inequality in terms of higher or lower, or perhaps as larger or smaller. But inequality may appear in very different shapes. It can take on two very different basic forms, which are not reducible to quantitative comparisons of more or less, of polarization or concentration in the middle.

Inequalities may manifest themselves as ladders or as circles. A ladder is an obvious, i.e., explicit, vertical ordering of differences, with more than one barrier, step, and an order in which there is an intrinsic possibility of mounting or descending. An income distribution, an organizational chart, an ethnic rank order exemplify a ladder in this sense. The distribution of the population on the ladder may of course be of different shapes, like a pyramid, an onion, or a slim-waisted Venus.

Circles, on the other hand, order units more horizontally, only implicitly or indirectly vertically into core-periphery, centre-satellites, insiders-outsiders, etc. by processes of exclusion/inclusion, by segregation or segmentation. The centre-periphery problematic, always significant to urban planning and geography, was developed in Latin American economics by Raúl Prebisch, an Argentinian who made the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean a brilliant centre of regional analysis (Montecinos and

Markoff 2001:115ff. Along the Atlantic diagonal of inequality and equality the conceptualisation was brought into the northern mainstream of post-World War II social science by two great Norwegian scholars, the political scientist Stein Rokkan (1967; 1970) – on European state and party formation -, and the sociologist-cum-peace and conflict researcher Johan Galtung (1971). We find it in the “modern world system” (as Immanuel Wallerstein 1974-has taught us). On labour markets distinctions are made between core and marginal workers, or insiders and outsiders (Lindbeck and Snower 1988). The lifestyle segmentation of “expressive inequality”, which has perhaps aroused most academic interest in Germany (e.g. Lüdtke 1989), is another example, in so far as it constitutes inequalities and not just differences.

Basically there is only one barrier around the circle, separating the insiders from the outsiders, although there may be a constellation of circles. While not necessarily impossible de facto, the circle line is not supposed to be climbed, but to be respected. When there are more ladders than one in a society, however defined, they are inscribed in different circles.

Circles have become increasingly important as forms of world inequality, as they circumscribe national populations, with increasingly unequal life-chances. There are circles of citizens and of non-citizens, of legal residents and non-legal residents. Their identification of one of two basic forms of inequality may also contribute to explaining the paradox, that second to Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa is the most unequal continent of the world, for instance in income distribution. This is paradoxical, because in contrast to Latin America, Africa, outside the southernmost parts, has no large-scale landownership, no ex-slave plantations, no preserved colonial racial hierarchy. Nor has it had much early industrial development. Furthermore, in contrast to South Asia, Africa has no caste system, nor, in contrast to most of Asia, any strong patrimonial states. Yet, as we shall look into more below, tropical Africa generates Gini coefficients of income inequality not much below the worst countries in Latin America, and well ahead of India and most of Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by the world's highest degree of ethnic fractionalization within nation—states. These ethnic groups may occasionally have a vertical order, like Tutsi and Hutu in colonial Rwanda-Burundi, but usually they do not at all correspond to the Latin American hierarchies of White, Mestizo, Indian, or the e two dozen rungs of Mulattos and Blacks of contemporary Haiti. African ethnies are a mosaic of bounded ethnic circles, each in a particular ecological niche -, currently favourable or unfavourable, each with a distinctive culture, receptive or not to new knowledge from the outside, differentially located in relation to colonial exploitation and development, and to post-colonial

political power, etc. To the extent that this circular inequality is important, inter-ethnic inequality should be more significant than intra-ethnic, and inter-ethnic inequality should be related to territorial location and/or to distinctive ethnic cultural norms. While available evidence is still scanty, there is clearly some empirical support for this hypothesis (Glewwe 1988; Milanovic 2003).

World Pictures – of Yesterday and Today

While reporting a broad range of specialized research on different kinds of inequalities of the world, this book does not hold back from trying to answer the boldest of questions. What does world inequality actually look like? Is it increasing or declining?

Following from the theory above, we shall not look only at income and other resource inequality, but at inequality before death and disease, and at inequality with regard to freedom and respect as well. This means, of course, a bird's eye view of inequalities in space and time, which at best may yield a global map before descending into intriguing thicket of everyday life.

1. Vital Inequality

At birth the average life of a baby in a High Income country (Japan, Western Europe, North America, Oceania) is twenty years longer than that of an infant unlucky to be born in a Low Income country, 78 and 58 years, respectively. The bulk of the Low Income world is South Asia (2/3) and Sub-Saharan Africa (1/3), and in Africa current life expectancy at birth is only 46 years (World Bank, World Development Report 2005, table 1.)¹ The newborn of the Rich countries, 15% of the world population, have a life expectancy about eleven years longer than the average human, and those of Poor countries (a good third of humanity) have their lives nine years shorter than the human average, and Africans eleven years shorter. Compared to 1965 this is a polarization.

Table 3. Life Expectancy at Birth in 1965 and in 2002

	1965	1995	2002
World	56	67	67
High Income Countries	71	77	78
Low Income Countries	49	63	58
Sub-Saharan Africa	42	52	46

¹ Life expectancy figures are estimates and in the Third World subject to a certain margin of error. The World Bank figures refer mainly to 2003. A recent UN publication, with estimates for 2000-2005 differ somewhat from the World Bank tables, UNFPA, The State of the World's Population 2004 (2004).

South Asia	46	61	63
East Asia(a)	54	68	69

Note: a. Only Low and Middle Income countries, i.e., excl Japan.

Sources World Bank, World Development Report 1997, and 2005, table 1.

Africa is falling behind, from 14 to 15 to 21 years below world average. At the high end, the advantage of infants of the rich countries first declined from 15 to 10 years, but then seems to be slightly widening again, to 11 years. The absolute decline of life expectancy in Africa should also be noticed. Africa is not only being out-distanced, it is falling back.

The re-introduction of capitalism into the former Soviet Union has had similar lethal effects. Even after a certain recent recovery, Russian life expectancy, at 66 in 2003, is still well below that of the USSR in 1985, at 70. (World Bank, World Development Report 1987, and 2005, tables 29 and 1, respectively). The first two years of the destruction of Communism caused half a million extra dead (calculated from Unicef 1994:42).

Over the long haul we have only scattered but significant data of comparison. In the 1930s the difference in life expectancy between India and Great Britain was a good thirty years, but in 2002 it was only 17 years.

Table 4. Comparative Life Expectancy 1900-2002

	Ca 1900	1930s	ca 1950	2002
UK(a)	50(b)	61	67	78
China	24-35	44©	71
India	25(b)	29-30(d)	37(e)	61
Egypt	39	46(f)	67
Brazil	...	37(g)	46	69

Notes: a. 1900-1950: England and Wales. b. 1901-11. c. 1953-64. d.1921-41.e. 1951-61.f. 1960. g.1920

Sources: UK 1900-1950: R. Fitzpatrick and T. Chandola, 'Health', in A.H. Halsey (ed.), Twentieth Century British Social Trends, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000, table 3.1.China 1930-1950s: J. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press 1999, tables 4.1-4.2; , India 1901-61: P.N. Mari Bhat, 'Morality and Fertility in India, 1881-1961: A Reassessment', in T. Dyson (ed.), India's Historical Demography, London, Curzon Press, 1989, table 4; , Egypt and Brazil 1930s: UN, Statistical Yearbook 1949/50, table 7; Brazil 1950: E. Berquó, 'Demographic Evolution of the Brazilian Population during the Twentieth Century', in D.J. Hogan (ed.), Population Change in Brazil:

Contemporary Perspectives, Campinas, Unicamp, 2001, table 4; 2002: WHO, World Health Report 2004, Annex table 1.

In this long-term perspective, there was a clear increase of vital inequality in the first third of the 20th century, and a clear decline in the second half. In the world, vital inequality seem to have culminated in the inter-war decades of 1920-1940. But, as we noticed above, there is a new polarizing tendency around the millennium.

Hunger and under-nutrition are still plaguing the world, in the beginning of the 21st century one person of eight. Since 1995 the number of under-nourished people has actually increased by 18 million (FAO 2004: table 1.) The hungry are one third of all Africans, and one fourth of all South Asians. Hunger, or under-nourishment, is also the fate of one person in eleven of the new capitalist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. India has more than a fourth of the hungry in the world, 220 million. In Africa, the situation is worst in the East and the South, with 40% undernourished, in Nigeria on the other hand, nine per cent. The introduction of capitalism into the peripheries of the former Soviet Union has been a social disaster. In 2000-2002 under-nourishment was the fate of a fourth the population of Georgia and Uzbekistan, a third of Armenia, and a staggering 61% of Tajikistan . (FAO 2004: table 1.) At the other end, a good proportion of rich country people are indulging in obesity.

HIV-AIDS has added heavily to vital inequality in the world, by hitting the poorest continent hardest. Sub-Saharan Africa has about eleven per cent of the world's population, but two thirds of those infested by HIV-AIDS and suffering three fourths of all deaths from AIDS in 2004 (UNAIDS 2004: 77ff).

There is also much internal vital inequality in African countries. For instance in Namibia an Ovambo child has 23% larger chance of surviving its first five years than other Namibian children, and a Kikuyu child 73% better chance of survival than other Kenyan children (data from the early 1990s, Brockenhoff and Hewett 2000: table 2)

2. Existential Inequality

Existential inequality means above all an unequal distribution of freedom to act and of personal respect. In the past century this has above all been issues of race/ethnicity and gender, although there are also the Indian phenomenon of caste, and outlying areas of slavery or servitude in Africa and America. The class structuration of human existence is a persistent and pervasive theme of social life, which will require a treatment of its own.

Even if sexism and racism have far from disappeared, the last hundred years, and especially the last fifty years have brought down many institutionalized forms of male and white existential superiority over women and other races, respectively. Ethnic existential

inequality is still practiced in many places and ways, but it has become thoroughly discredited as a public explicit discourse. Even that is a great stride in comparison with the days when, for instance, Keep Australia White was the official slogan of the Australian Labour Party.

We may summarize the main world road of existential inequality in the 20th century by listing the most important landmarks on the way.

Table 5. Landmarks of 20th Century Existential (In)Equality

Baseline 1900

Universal, if differentiated, patriarchy, worldwide Euro-American colonialism, universally reigning institutionalized racism of white supremacy, predominant worldwide conception of hierarchy of human existence

1910s

Dismantling of legal patriarchy in Scandinavia and in Russia

After WWI North Atlantic establishment of civic equality, male only in the Latin regions

1920s

Rise and defeats of anti-racist movements in Asia and Africa; rise of pro-indigenous cultural movement in Latin America

Tightened racist immigration legislation in USA

1930s-1945

Nazi German official racism and genocide

Widespread diffusion and policy application of eugenics

1945-50

Discredit of explicit racism, but victory in South Africa

Asian de-colonization

UN Declaration of Human Rights

Dismantling of legal patriarchy in East Asia and Eastern Europe

Civic rights of women in Latin Europe, and, gradually, in Latin America

1954

Racist school segregation declared unconstitutional in USA

1960s

African de-colonization

Global anti-patriarchal student movement

US civil rights movement, US universal right to vote

UN Convention against Racial Discrimination

Erosion of racist immigration legislation in North America and Oceania

1975-85

Tide of Global Feminism, UN Decade for Women, inter-continental

dismantling or delimiting of patriarchy

Legal gender equality in all Western Europe

1995

UN Conference of Women in Beijing

1990s-2000s

Widespread struggles for existential difference and equality, of ethnicity, gender, and sexuality

Beginning recognition of sexual equality, with breakthroughs in Western Europe and South Africa

De-limited patriarchal backlash, Muslim, Jewish, Christian

Mounting anti-immigration racism in Europe

Source: G. Therborn, Between Sex and Power. Family in the World, 1900-2000, London, Routledge, 2004.

The second half of the 20th century dealt some hard blows against patriarchal superiority over women. But in the beginning of the 21st century, patriarchy in the sense of domination by fathers or husbands is still a prevailing institution in large parts of the world. On the whole, it reigns in South Asia, most parts of West Asia and North Africa except urban Turkey and some other urban areas, good parts of Central Asia, and most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, with qualifications for the West Coast and the central areas of Southern Africa, where recent legislative gender equality is beginning to take effect. Patriarchy may also be found in parts of China, in the Balkans – in Kosovo for instance, and in Andean regions of South America. It is also practiced in milieux of Afro-Asian immigrants into Europe, among US Mormons. The human population under patriarchy amounts to something between a third and forty per cent of all (Therborn 2004).

The patriarchal population is larger than the post-patriarchal one, unlikely to be more thirty per cent of humanity, generously counted as including most of Europe, the Americas, Japan, and Oceania, excepting some religious, ethnic or local enclaves. – Post-patriarchal

societies are, of course, not gender-equal. But there male-female inequality has become mainly one of resources.

China and Southeast Asia make up an intermediary zone, often closer to the post-patriarchal world. (See further Therborn 2004: ch. 3)

In South Asia and in Sub-Saharan Africa, less so in West Asia/North Africa, the effects of patriarchy include a significant lowering of the natural advantage of women with respect to life expectancy. On a world scale, women have currently four more years of life than men, 5.6 years advantage in North America, eight years in Europe west of ex-USSR, and twelve years in Russia. China is on the world average, the Arab countries somewhat below, at 3.2 years of female advantage. (UNFPA 2004).

Table 6. Countries with Abnormally Low Male-Female Differences in Life Expectancy, 2000-2005. Female Advantage in Years of Life Expectancy at Brth.

South Asia

Bangladesh	1.8
India	1.4
Pakistan	-0.3

Africa

East Africa	1.4
Ethiopia	1.0
West Africa	1.3
Nigeria	0.7
Zambia	-0.4
Zimbabwe	1.1

Memoranda

North Africa	3.7
Arab States	3.2
World	4.3

Source UNFPA; The State of the World's Population 2004. Indicators table.

3. Economic Resources Inequality

Economic are not the only important resources. Knowledge is another one, for instance, dealt with below by Peter Weingart. Bourdieu taught us the importance the importance of cultural capital accumulation. In this brief overview, however, we shall stay with the topic of income distribution (For a broader cultural analysis see Therborn 2005).

Economic resources are very polarized. The people of the Rich countries, who make up a bare 16 per cent of world population, capture more than three times the average world income – expressed in purchasing power parities. The gap between Low Income countries – a good third of world population – and High Income ones – less than half of the former in population -, is 13:1, in local purchasing power. In international exchange dollars the gap is 63:1 (World Bank 2004a: table 1.)

Between 1960 and 1990, the African countries lost economic standing, regressing from 14 to 8 per cent of rich country GDP per capita. The Third World as a whole bent slightly downwards, from 18 to 17 per cent of rich country GDP per capita (UNDP, 1994, table 7.). Since then the gap has rather widened. In 2003, the purchasing power GNP per capita of “Lower and Middle Income Countries” was 15% of that of the High Incomer Countries. The per capita GDP of a rich country resident was 17 times that of the average sub-Saharan African – 25 times if we exclude South Africa - and 11 times that of the average South Asian (World Bank 2004: table 1). Since 1993, the African average of purchasing power has gone further down from 23% of world average in 1993 to 19% in 2003. On the other hand, the Indian proportion of the world average has increased from 23 to 31 per cent. (UNDP 1996, table 1, 2004:, table 1.)

In three parts of the world, absolute poverty has increased in the past twenty-five years. In Africa the number of people having to subsist on less than \$1 a day increased by a staggering 150 million between 1981 and 2001. In Latin America the poor by this minimalist World Bank standard increased by fourteen million over the same period. By Latin American standards of poverty, the poor grew by 85 million in 1980-2002 (CEPAL 2004: table 1.3). In comparison with the period before the 1980s, the impoverishment of the third region is most spectacular. In post-Communist Eastern Europe and Central Asia World Bank poverty rose from one million to eighteen million in 2001 (Wolfensohn and Bourguignon 2004:table 1).

For the whole period of 1975-2002, per capita GDP in sub-Saharan Africa decreased on the average by 0.8% every year. From the fall of Communism up till and including 2002, Eastern Europe and Central Asia had their national product sliding backwards on the average

1.5% annually. In the meantime world per capita income grew by 1.3% since 1975, and in the richest countries (“High income OECD”²) by 2.1% a year (UNDP 2004: table 13)

The Most Equal and the Most Unequal Parts of the World

The least unequal part of the world is Europe, east of the British Isles, west of Poland, and north of the Alps. That is, the Nordic countries, the Low Countries, and Slavic-cum--Germanic Central Europe, Austria (uneasily), Czech Republic, Germany, and Slovenia, and most probably Belarus, although available data do not have the same reliability as the other ones (WIDER 2004). France is sitting on the fence, more out than in. Their overall distribution of disposable income (after taxes and transfers) is remarkably similar, with a Gini coefficient of 25 in 1995-2000, (Austria up to 28 and France to 29) (LIS 2004: Key figures).³ Contrary to widespread belief. Scandinavia is not unique in this respect. But it is true, that if we also take into account relative poverty, for instance the proportion of people who half an income less than half of the median income, Scandinavia does somewhat better than the rest of Europe.

Slovakia was as late as 1992 the most equal country of the world, with a Gini coefficient of 19. But thereafter capitalization has meant drastic change, to 24 in 1996 (LIS 2004) and to 31 in 2002, with the largest amount of poverty among all the new EU members (European Commission 2005: Annex table 8a)

Among the countries in the most reliable and comparable dataset, the Luxembourg Income Study, Russia, Estonia and the UK are the most unequal European countries, with Gini values circa 2000 of 43, 36, and 35, respectively. According to the more uneven World Bank series, also used by the UN, Portugal, with 38.5, would come after Russia.

² The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has in the recent decade been extended to include some not so rich countries, like Mexico and a few Eastern European countries.

³ Named after an Italian statistician, the Gini coefficient is the most commonly used summary of income distributions. It ranges from 0 (all being equal) to 100 (or 1, if a decimal version is used), when one person gets everything.

After the two non-European countries closest to Northwest-Central Europe in income distribution are Taiwan and Canada (both with a Gini of 30), and the only major region of the world similar to it is Northeast Asia. We may sum up the examples of relative economic egalitarianism in the following table.

Table 7. The Least Unequal Countries of the World, and their Routes. Disposable income after taxes and transfers

<i>Route</i>	<i>Average Gini Coefficient circa 2000</i>
Scandinavian Social Democracy	25
Particular Communist Legacy	25
Western European Christian and Social Democracy	26
Northeast Asian National Capitalism	32

Note: Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden

Particular Communist Legacy: Belarus, Czech Republic, Slovenia

Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands.

Northeast Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan.

Sources: Belarus: WIDER, www.wider.unu.edu; the two 1999 net income coefficients for Belarus average 25.5 Japan; Japan is not part of the Luxemburg Income Study, and recent World Bank and UNDP publications have no recent Japanese income statistics; the source here is the 1999 National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure of the Statistics Bureau of Japan, www.stat.go.jp/english. But it does not publish a Gini coefficient, so the figure of 32 is an estimate from the decile incomes provided. Korea: World Bank 2004: table 2; the rest from LIS 2004: Key figures (www.lisproject.org/keyfigures)

To non-specialists, the Gini language may be abstract and difficult to relate to. We may then add that in the least unequal countries, the most prosperous ten per cent have on the average about six times the disposable income of the poorest tenth. In the UK the same ratio is fourteen times, and in USA sixteen times. (UNDP 2004:table 14). Furthermore, income and wealth tend to be concentrated at the very top. For instance, about half of the income share of the most prosperous tenth of Americans was captured by the richest one percent (Banerjee and Piketty 2003: figure 5).

The operation of these different roads to economic inclusion, and their rather equivalent effects are still only patchily known, mainly because this comparison has hardly

been made before. Welfare state redistribution, by taxation as well as by social spending, has been the immediate reason in Northwestern Europe. Market income in Sweden in the second half of the 1990s was even more inegalitarian than the British (with then higher unemployment), in Gini terms at a level of 56-58, as compared with the British of 52-54, the Canadian around 50, and the German at 44-45 (Atkinson 2004: figures 9.2-9.6) Communist regimes practiced a system of socio- economic inclusion, through public property, full employment, and compression of financial rewards. They were never uniform, anti-Communist diatribes to the contrary, and Czechoslovakia (and within Yugoslavia and the USSR, respectively, probably also Slovenia and Belarus) (WIDER 2004) was the most egalitarian part of European Communism. Post-Communist paths have diverged, but so far the evidence seems to indicate a threshold effect, the most firmly rooted egalitarianism has shown a remarkable resilience. In the Czech Republic it survived both the neoliberal stridency of Vaclav Klaus and the haute-bourgeois nonchalance of Vaclav Havel.

In Northeast Asian capitalism after World War II we may perhaps discern an external shock national inclusion. Nationalism was always intense in modern Japan and Korea, but American pressure after Hiroshima, and the threat and challenge of Communism in South Korea and Taiwan brought, first, extensive land reform, and then a national project of economic development, which however capitalistic and hierarchical always had a strong communitarian aspect, rooted in the private enterprises, where managers and workers flocked together, from the daily canteen to company leisure.

At the other end of the world, we have the most inegalitarian countries. They are almost all located in two regions, also socially, culturally, and politically very different, in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America.

But before presenting a tidied up table, the reader should be aware of some caveats. Good data on income distributions are difficult to get, particularly at the bottom and, even more, at top of the scale. Taxation records are of little use for most of the world. You have to rely on household surveys, always subject to problems of non-response, representative accessibility, and truthful reporting. And all sample surveys have a margin of statistical error. The questions asked also differ. In the rich OECD world and in Latin America, they tend to focus on income, in large, but far from all, parts of Africa and Asia surveyors ask about consumption and expenditure. We know that the latter are less unevenly distributed than income, but how much differs from country to country, or even from one survey to another. And income data are reported gross and net of taxes, and consumption may be based on a recall of the previous week or the previous month. For the world as a whole, the World Bank

is the best single statistics producer in this area, but its publications can never be fully trusted. This means, that any sophisticated mathematical modelling of world inequality is based on floating sand or a house of cards.

However, having said this, we can indeed identify the most inegalitarian countries of the world, although the meter of their descent into inequality should be treated with great caution.

Table 8. The Most Unequal Countries of the World.

<i>Region</i>	<i>Gini Coefficient circa 2000</i>
<i>Latin America (income)</i>	
Argentina (Metro Buenos Aires, 2002)	59
Bolivia 2002	61
Brazil 2001	64
Chile	59
Colombia (urban, 2002)	58
Dominican Republic	54
Ecuador 2002	51
El Salvador	55
Guatemala 2002	54
Honduras 2002	59
Mexico 2002	51
Nicaragua	58
Panama (urban, 2002)	52
Paraguay	57
Peru	53
Venezuela 2002	50
<u>Regional exceptions</u>	
Cuba (urban, 1996-98)	38
Costa Rica 2002	49
Uruguay (urban, 2002)	46
<i>Asia</i>	
Papua New Guinea (1996)	51 (expenditure)
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa (consumption or expenditure)</i>	

Burkina Faso (1998)	58
Central African Republic (1993)	61
Gambia (1994)	69
Lesotho (1995)	67
Malawi (1993)	50
Mali (1994)	51
Namibia (1993)	71
Niger (1995)	51
Nigeria (1997)	51
Sierra Leone (1989)	63
South Africa (1997)	57 (gross income)
Swaziland (1994)	61 (income)
Zambia	55
Zimbabwe (1995)	70
Regional exceptions	
Burundi	33
Ethiopia	30
Ghana	30
Rwanda (1983/85)	29
<i>Memorandum: World Households</i>	
World Households 1988(a)	62
World Households 1993(a)	65
World Households 1998(a)	64
World Households 1999(b)	68

Note: In Asia there are no data from any of the Gulf states, likely to be among the most unequal countries of the world. Their distribution of manufacturing pay is among the most unequal, together with many African countries, Jamaica, Trinidad, Mongolia, and Paraguay (Galbraith 2002:19). a. Revised and preliminary estimates by B. Milanovic. b. Estimate by Y. Dikhanov. The two different estimates do not form a common time series

Sources: Latin America except Cuba: CEPAL (ECLAC) 2004: table 1.7; Cuba: A. Ferriol, Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Económicas, Havana, written communication; the rest: WIDER 2004; when later data than in the WIDER database reported, UNDP 2004: table 14; World: Milanovic as cited by Wade 2003: 410n.; Dikhanov and Ward 2001..

The first point to be stressed here, is that the citizens of several African and Latin American countries are as unequal as the inhabitants of the planet. The heroic compilation of income or expenditure surveys throughout the world by Branko Milanovic, and the no less heroic combination of national accounts and household surveys by Yuri Dikhanov and Michael Ward are, of course, to be read with a substantial margin of error. -The estimates of the latter are generally somewhat higher than those of Milanovic, so any conclusion of a rise in world inequality from 1998 to 1999 is unwarranted from table 8. Below we shall return to

developments over time. - Compared to national data it might be 5 to 10 Gini points. However, the margins above are large enough for it to be possible to assert, that the citizens of early crisis Zimbabwe were at least as unequal as all humankind, perhaps even more. Brazil and South Africa, with very reliable databases, are at least rather similar to the world as a whole.

Ethnic existential exclusion is clearly at work here, but in very different ways. Namibia and Zimbabwe combine colonial settlements with pronounced indigenous underdevelopment, without much of the late apartheid cross-race industrialization of South Africa. But southern Africa apart, African inequality is more a pattern of exclusive ethnic circles, than the Latin American hierarchies of White- Mestizo-Indian and White-Mulatto-Black.

However, ethnicity is only part of the story, still to be told. The onslaught of neoliberalism has almost wiped out the difference between, say, overwhelmingly White Argentina or (slightly less so) Chile, and ethnically much more complex Mexico and Central America. In fact, ethnically very divided Andean countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, report slightly lower inequality than Argentina. This may be within the margins of error, but the point is that small, White-dominated, historically relatively democratic countries like Uruguay (Gini 46) and Costa Rica (Gini 49) no longer stand out very clearly from the rest of this, the world's most inegalitarian region. Only Cuba is different, but still, in its post-Soviet crisis, substantially unequal with respect to monetary income by European standards

A point to be emphasized about Sub-Saharan Africa is the enormous width of variation, much larger than in Latin America. The exceptional countries are by no means ethnically homogenous, and not more so than the inegalitarian countries. With all the wide margins of measurement error, we are still standing in front of a puzzle. Clearly, the colonial mining migration of Southern Africa has been a major producer of gross inequality. The exclusive appropriation of natural endowments, diamonds in particular, may account for a great deal of inequality in Central Africa and Sierra Leone. But neither constellation has any leverage on the unequal poverty of Sahel states like Mali, Niger or Burkina Faso (Gini 48). At the other end, what do Ghana, Ethiopia, and Burundi/Rwanda have in common, with their different modern history, colonial background, and ethnic-religious set-up - apart from their relative income equality?

After the extremes, we should take a look at the mainstream.

Table 9. Mainstream Inequality: the Big Countries

	Gini Coefficient
China (2001)	45
India (1999/2000)	(33)a
Indonesia (2002)	(34)a
Russia (2000)	43
USA (2000)	37

Note: a. Distribution of consumption expenditure, which is more equal than income, in the order of about six points, but more comparable to the disposable income distribution of Russia and USA..

Sources: China, India, and Indonesia: UNDP 2004: table 14; Russia and USA LIS 2004: Key figures.

The largest countries of the world are not the most unequal. After the Russian and the Chinese return to capitalism, the US is no longer the archetype of capitalist inequality.

The figures above are not quite comparable. The Indian consumption surveys yield consistently lower figures – due to saving and borrowings – than income ones, used in China. The Luxemburg Income Study data on disposable income give a more favourable picture of countries with some mechanisms of public redistribution. In the World Bank/UNDP series, USA appears with a coefficient of 41, Russia with 46, and Mexico with 55, instead of 37, 43, and 49, respectively. As for China, Chinese specialists estimate that the 2004 Gini is about 50 (Professor Li Qiang at the Sociology Department of Tsinghua University, Beijing, personal communication July 2004)

World income inequality is not just one of inter-national inequality. Before the world, there are issues of class, ethnicity, and gender. Let us look at the universal issue of gender income.

Table 10. Women's Income As A Percentage of Men's, circa 2000.

<i>Western Europe</i>	<i>Eastern Europe</i>	<i>North America</i>	<i>Latin America</i>	<i>East Asia</i>
France 62	Czech Rep. 58	Canada 62	Argentina 36	China 66
Germany 50	Hungary 58	USA 62	Brazil 42	Japan 44
Italy 44	Poland 61		Mexico 38	
Sweden 68	Russia 64			
UK 61				

Note: The income is an estimate from the ratio of the average male/female non-agricultural wage, and of the male/female ratio of economically active population.

Source: Calculated from UNDP (2002: table 22). See further Therborn (2004: 128)

This is an estimate with a substantial margin of error. Nevertheless, the table demonstrates clearly that there is a huge and universal economic gap between men and women. It also shows an enduring legacy of Communist gender equalization.

National income distributions can be more polarized than inter-national ones. Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region of the world, with a tenth of world population. This does not mean it comprises the poorest tenth of world population. But if we distract its most prosperous nations, South Africa and some small mineral-rich countries and add Nepal, Tajikistan, and Haiti, we get a good proxy for the poorest tenth of the world populations in terms of nations. At the other end we can put together the countries which make up the richest ten per cent among national populations.

Table 11. National and Inter-National Income Shares around 2000.

	<i>Richest 10%</i>	<i>Poorest 10%</i>	<i>Richest 10 to Poorest 10%</i>
Brazil	47	0.5	85
China(a)	33	1.8	18
Mexico	33	1	33
Namibia(b)	65	0.5	129
Russia(a)	36	1.8	20
South Africa(a,c)	47	0.7	65
USA	30	1.9	16
Sweden	22	4	6
World: national populations(d)43(e)		1.4(f)	30
World: households 1993	51	0.8	63.5
World: households(a) 1999	54	0.5	104

Notes: Different roundings make for some discrepancies between column 4 and columns 2-3.

- a. Expenditure instead of income. b. 1993. c. 1995. d. GDP at purchasing power parities.
- e. Population of the nations making up the richest ten per cent of world population in 2002: North America, Australia, Japan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland. f. Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, and Swaziland, but incl. Haiti, Nepal, and Tajikistan.

Source: Richest 10% in Brazil and Mexico: CEPAL (ECLAC) 2004: table 1.6; other countries: UNDP, Human Development Report 2004: tables 5, 13, 14; World households 1993: Milanovic 2002: table 17; 1999: Dikhanov 2001: table 10.

What this means, is that, contrary to predominant perceptions, world income inequality is not unique. The inequality among national populations is actually surpassed by the inequality within several nations, like Brazil and South Africa. Even the income distance between world households is within reach of some nations. The Namibian data from 1993 are extreme, but Brazilian polarization is not far away. Another great estimate of the world income distribution among households (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002:table 1) yields (for 1992) a ratio of the income of the richest ten per cent in the world to that of the poorest twenty of 24. Calculating the same ratio for Brazil gives 23. As historical backdrop we may remember that in ancient regime France just before the Revolution, the richest tenth of the population appropriated 55-60 per cent of the income (Morrisson 2000:table 7b)

While it is true, after the Depression and at least since 1950 (Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002: table 2), that the major part of total income inequality in the world is between countries, the similarity of some important nation-states to the whole world highlights the crucial significance of (intra-national) ethnic and class relations. Enduring effects of colonial exploitation and exclusion have been incorporated and reproduced in post-colonial nations, even ones having had a profound social revolution, like Mexico, or decades of universal democratic suffrage, like Brazil.

Arrows of Time

The trajectories of world inequality have run different courses over the past two hundred years. Vital inequality has been mainly driven by distancing, and, later, by the countertendency of inclusion into a common pool of sanitation, vaccination, and other public health policies. Within Europe, the Nordic countries had by 1900 run ahead of England, France, and Germany with respect to infant mortality (Flora et al. 1987: ch.1). On a larger scale the divergence got momentum in the second or third decade of the 20th century, and then turned around (see table 2 above). In 1900, Jamaica had a lower infant mortality rate than Canada, 174 to 187, but by the 1925 while Jamaica was still at 173 Canada had got down to 93, but thereafter there was a catching up. In 1950 their difference was 36 per thousand, and in 1975 8 (Mitchell 1998a: table A7.)

The second half of the 20th century issued a major global wave of vital equalization, mainly through the inclusion of the colonial or ex-colonial world into the world of anti-malaria spraying, vaccination, and sanitation services. At work here was an inclusion of the world into the summit of medical and hygienic knowledge: The more advanced colonial powers, Britain and France, played an important and positive role here, carried on, more

vigorously, by WHO, UNICEF, and other UN organizations. Melchior et al. ... Lately, as we noticed above, Eastern European capitalism and African aids have re-started the engines of vital divergence.

England and Wales show a remarkably persistent pattern of vital inequality throughout the 20th century, which is probably exceptional but also significant because of the industrial tradition of the country and its remaining cultural and economic importance.

Table 12 Vital inequality in England and Wales 1910-12-1991-93.

Risk of dying: Ratio of standardized mortality rates for men aged 20-44.

	1910-12	1949-53	1970-72	1991-93
Unskilled manual to professional	1.61	1.37	1.78	2.86
Semiskilled manual to professional	1.06	1.21	1.48	1.76

Source: Calculated from Fitzpatrick and Chandola (2004: table 3.8)

This is a trajectory of inequality, of increasing distanciation, very different from most, declining in the first half of the 200th century and increasing in the second. In the 1990s an unskilled manual worker in England ran a risk of dying before the age of 45 almost three times as high as that of a professional.

Stark existential inequality ruled large parts of the world till the last third or quarter of the century, although it was on some retreat throughout. While Scandinavian Liberalism-cum-Social Democracy and Russian Communism did away with institutionalized patriarchy around 1920, important de facto restrictions on women's action persisted even there. Only since about 1975 has gender equality been an actual European norm and at least an official norm globally, but with heavy patriarchal limitations still in South and West Asia, and in Africa. Possibly, there is today more inter-national existential inequality between, say, Western Europe and, on the other hand, South Asia, than a hundred years ago (Cf. Therborn 2004: ch.3).

Official racism survived the defeat of Nazism: Blacks got the right to vote in the US (South) only from about 1970, and the South African apartheid regime was generally delegitimized only in the 1980s, and fell in the early 1990s. The superior rights of Israeli Jews over Arabs in general and over Palestinians in particular are still part of world hegemony. Trans-national inclusive action has been crucial in eroding existential inequality in the forms of racism and sexism.

Existential inequalities operate through mechanisms of exclusion. They become endangered when the capabilities of action of the excluded arise, and/or when the capability of the gatekeepers declines. On a global scale, de-colonization undermined racism, as did the post-World War II higher education of women to patriarchy.


With regard to inter-generational social mobility (and equality of opportunity) a secular, oscillating stability seems to be the predominant pattern, from European and North American data, with temporary revolutionary disruptions, and a few exceptions of evolving equality (Eriksson and Goldthorpe 1992). Here the family is the main mechanism of exclusion, and for all its vicissitudes it has maintained itself as a crucial agency of socialization.

Income Inequality: Global and National Curves

Global economic resource inequality clearly increased continuously throughout the 19th and the first half or two thirds of the 20th century. That seems to be fairly non-controversial. Controversies tend to concentrate on what happened then, and, of course on the reasons for the mounting inequality. The latter concern the relative importance of distancing, exclusion, and exploitation. An introducing editor had better claim abstain from committing himself to one of rival historical explanations.

But there does seem to be empirical evidence enough for concluding the global curve up to the beginning of the 21st century. Over the long haul, then, it appears that the longterm historical tendency of increasing world income inequality has flattened out in the last third of the past century. The main reason is the rise of China, huge and (previously very) poor.

Figure 1.1 World Income Inequality 1820-2000



Sources: Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002:figure 7)

A similar picture, comparing the group of most developed countries with the whole of the Third World, a widening gap till 1950, thereafter basic stability, with a slight decreasing tendency, was drawn by the great economic historian Paul Bairoch (1997:1037).

How the latest decades by themselves should be assessed is still subject to debate (cf. Wade 2004; Arrighi et al. 2003), but the overall global change seems to be small – in contrast to dramatic changes of some regions and of many nations. Dikhanov and Ward (2001), for instance, estimate a change of the world distribution of personal consumption expenditure between 1970 and 1999 in Gini terms from 0.67 to 0.68. A similar picture of relative stability, when taking the size of national populations and purchasing power into account emerges also from other studies (Melchior et al. 2000; Milanovic' preliminary 1998 figures.) Current tendencies have run in opposite directions. The rapid of growth of China and the accelerating catch up of India reduce inequality, but the rise of internal inequality in China and the ex-USSR augment global inequality, like Africa's falling behind.

On the other hand, stability may also be translated as enduring inequality, with Chinese economic growth the main counterweight to a number of current inegalitarian tendencies, national and international.

National Trajectories

Only fragile data and sophisticated but not seldom competing estimates are available for longterm national trajectories, and then only for a few countries, of Western Europe and North America. They tend to show, that industrialization usually first meant increasing inequality, with soaring capital income, then often followed by a high plateau of high inequality, occasionally with some slight decline. In France, the inegalitarian thrust from the

1830s did not succeed in undoing the equalizing effects of the Revolution and its aftermath (Morrison 2000:235ff). In non-revolutionary Britain inequality rose from mid-18th century up to mid- 19th century, then staying at a high plateau till World War I (Lindert 2000:174ff). The German *Gründerjahre* (years of nation-state and industrial capitalism foundation), 1870s-1890s, meant more economic inequality, which then began to taper off in the decade before the war (Morrison 2000:233-4). USA has a long record of rising inequality, from 1774 to 1929, with uncertain spurts of acceleration and periods of slowing down. 19th century USA also saw a lowering of life expectance and widening vital inequality till about 1870 ((Lindert 2000:186ff).

The twentieth century has been a century of national equalization, from the end of World War I till around 1980 (Atkinson 2002; Lindert 2000; Morrison 2000; Piketty 2000; Banerjee an Piketty 2003; Cornia et al. 2004). The two World Wars, the Russian and the Chinese revolutions, with their international repercussions, the post-World War II establishment of redistributive welfare states, of East Asian national community capitalism, of Indian (capitalist) “socialism”, and (more unevenly) decolonization have been crucial events. The most dramatic changes occurred at the top, where the super-rich were pulled down somewhat closer to the earth, with reduced capital income. The diminishing gap between agriculture and industry seems to have played only a minor role in Western Europe, whereas organizational flattening and de-hierarchization of remuneration has been significant. Those were the years of the labour movement.


Then what happened? Industrial employment in the developed countries peaked historically around 1970, and the 1970s was the tide of labour influence. De-industrialization and the economic crises of the mid-1970s and of the early 1980s fatally weakened the forces of labour. Bourgeois *revanchisme* captured the UK and the US, and from that North Atlantic core set new parameters to the world. In Latin America a similar social historical thrust albeit under different conditions pushed popular forces ahead, in the Southern Cone in particular. Where they were met and defeated by military Thatcherism *avant la lettre*. In Africa, post-colonial national projects stalled in the 1970s, and in China the paroxysm of the Cultural Revolution was petering out. The financial shock of 1980-81 with ensuing soaring of interest rates threw reckless borrowers into trouble. The Third World debt crisis began, and with it sooner or later the IMF “structural adjustment” programs, with strong inegalitarian implications. Then came the post-Communist turn to capitalism, in China and Vietnam under political control, in Russia and Eastern Europe as a free-for-all. Whatever route, with only a

few small country exceptions, as we noticed above, the result was an enormous increase of inequality.

In brief, a whole, contingent constellation of factors seems to have brought about the historical turn of the 20th century, from less inequality to more. But the divide was very clearly socio-political. Trade unions, popular movements, left-wing and nationalist politicians lost, and right-wing politicians and military, capitalists generally and financial capitalists and consultants in particular won, sometimes with bullets, more often by ballots. There was no economic fatality to it, although the liberalization of financial markets and the electronic revolution opened a field to new fortunes. While the inequality of disposable income increased in USA from 32 to 37 Gini points between 1975 and 2000, in neighbouring Canada it was oscillating around 29, being at 29 in 1974 and 30 in 2000 (Luxemburg Income Study 2004) The staying power of the redistributive state has been crucial. As in the previous period of equalization, inegalitarian change was driven by changes at the top, this time by the highest income-earners increasing their distance to the rest.

However, twenty-five years of neoliberalism have not undone fifty- sixty years of 20th century equalization. The US would be the most plausible candidate, but the evidence is clear enough for a negative verdict.

Figure 2. US Income Inequality 1929-2000



Sources : Pre-tax income, 1929-94 : Lindert 2000 :table 4 ; 2000 : Atkinson 2004 : figure 1 ; disposable income after taxes and transfers : Luxemburg Income Study 2004.

In contrast to Western European countries inequality in the US peaked in 1929 on the eve of the Depression. While the distribution of pre-tax income has become rather similar to those days of roaring capitalism, there was then very little of any public redistribution. Disposable income was then not very different from pre-tax income. In the most recent years there has been a tendency in USA, Mexico, and Western Europe for the inequality surge to flatten out.

Explaining

Explanations of inequalities may focus on mechanisms or on basic sources. Ideally, they had better include both.

There are currently two quasi-paradigmatic controversies of how to explain present patterns of income inequality. One pits the politics of power relations and policies against the economics of factorial supply and demand. The other contrasts national (or more generally, sub-global) constellations of power and forces to global ones. Most recent debates on economic inequality in the OECD area seem to have concentrated on the relative importance of economics, of productivity differentials above all, and of politics, i.e., of power and policy. On the global arena, the main issue is the national versus the global, which is debated in two different ways. In the “North” mainly with regard to the impact of current economic globalization on national relations and practices, in the “South” also, and often more, in terms of the weight of the global (imperialist) past upon nations today.

Recent research has strengthened the cases for politics and collective action (Atkinson 2004; Piketty 2000) over technology and economy in the field of income inequality where they have made their strongest claims, and for the importance of national policies and institutions. State redistribution can change the income picture considerably. In the late 1990s, the difference between market income and disposable income after taxes and transfers was 12-13 Gini points in Canada, 16-17 points in Germany, 16-18 points in the UK., and 27-28 points in Sweden (Atkinson 2004: figures 3-8).

Put in other words, Swedish inequality was twice as high before taxes and transfers than after. In Latin America, on the other hand, disposable household income is very close to labour market income, with any progressive effect of taxation and social transfers largely counterbalanced by the greater inequality of capital income. In Brazil of the mid-late nineties, the distributive effect of social spending was in fact negative, i.e., adding to an already enormously unequal income distribution (Inter-American Development Bank 1998: Appendix table 1.2, figure 8.21). Chinese taxes and transfers also add further to inequality (Khan and Riskin 2001:table 7.2))

With regard to existential inequality the evidence of a decisive role played by politics and collective action appears overwhelming. But politics takes place on fields laid out by property, labour, and income. (On human rights cf. Banton 1996; Steiner and Alston 1996; Glendon 2001; on patriarchy Therborn 2004).

The picture is more complex with regard to vital inequality, but the current situation clearly includes some crucial socio-political forces, as appear from the dramatic health impact of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, and from the African geography of AIDS. A major reason for the health catastrophe in capitalist Russia and the deteriorations in other countries of post-Communist Europe seems to be the exclusion from control over one's life situation which has been the experience among the unemployed, the impoverished, and the marginalized in the new political economy (Marmot and Bobak 2005). Liberal political democracy is apparently no compensation for the loss of everyday social security, sense of control, and meaning for a large part of the population.

One important aim of this book is to contribute to global knowledge and to global research on inequalities. In view of the character of the intense globalization debates of the past ten-fifteen years, a framework for assessing the relative importance of global and non-global factors and mechanisms seems to be called for. We shall end this introduction with a sketch of such an analytical framework.

Explaining Global Outcomes: A Framework

In order to get a handle on so-called globalization, two operations are essential. First, our explanatory framework has to allow explicitly for national (or any other sub-global) determinants as well as global ones, for us to be able to assess their relative weight. Secondly, we had better specify "globalization" into a set of global, or at least trans-national processes.

Nation-states and state-bound societies affect the world pattern of inequalities by their performance – their health policies, their treatment of race/ethnicity, gender, and other existence-sensitive differences, their economic growth -, their internal distribution, of life and health, of freedom and respect, and of resources -, and, thirdly, their population and its development, which decide their weight among humankind.

We may distinguish three major sets of global variables, global history, global entanglement, and global flows.


All current nation-states and national economies and societies have been populated, cultured, bounded, and located in the world by extra-national forces and processes. Global history is a major global process. Past trans-national interactions have placed today's nation-

states in a world system, and have provided them with a layered cultural and institutional legacy.

In their current functioning in the world, nations are affected by two ongoing sets of global processes. Most straightforward are global, or at least trans-national, flows, of goods and services, of capital, of people, and also, not to be forgotten, flows of information and ideas.

Another current global process we may call global entanglement, referring to the imbrication of institutions, the intertwining of different sets of actors, national and global, local and global. The most tangible form of this entanglement is the emergence of resourceful global organizations affecting and interacting with national and local governments, politicians, and movements. We may lay out the production of global inequality – and of the equality that there is in the world - in a simple model figure.

Figure 1.3. Global and Sub-Global Determinants of Global Inequalities



Trans-National Entanglements:

of the National and the Global
of the National and the Regional

The variety of national development paths, population trajectories, and distributive patterns, shows that a global social science which neglects nation-states would be lost. But we have yet to make even a first assessment of the impact of global, or at least trans-national processes upon current nations, and upon world inequality. This introduction has no space for a full deployment of the framework outlined above. Here only a few illustrative hints can be given. (Some others may be found in Therborn 2003a,b)

1. Global History

Past trans-national interactions and their legacy, I think, are by far the most important global processes in determining current inequalities. There are, on one hand, the distant past, still weighing upon us, and, on the other a fairly recent event, the effects of which are increasingly unfolding.

Current world rankings go far back. For instance, the correlation between the national income of twelve major countries⁴ and of the African continent in 1820 and in 1998 is 0.77. In other words, with an 1820 overview almost sixty per cent of income distribution around 2000 between the major countries of the world could be predicted. If one is prepared to trust Angus Maddison's (2001:table 1-5a) intrepid estimates of life expectancy in 1900 for the same countries, the correlation between 1900 and 1999 would be 0.84. The patriarchy of the world's family systems has seen a couple of important relative changes, with equality making larger strides in Eastern Europe and in East Asia, but a significant part of the relative differences among family systems going back to the first wave of globalization, the establishment of world religions 14 to 17 centuries ago (Therborn 2004: chs. 1-2).

The crucial, recent contingent event is the outcome of World War II. The Communist revolutions in Eastern Europe and East Asia dealt decisive blows to patriarchy, and so did the US occupation of Japan. However, the decisive outcome of WWII was a start of de-colonization. I would venture the hypothesis, that de-colonization, and the retrenchment of European imperialism is the major reason for the postwar flattening out of the curve of global inequality. Evidence is gathering, that nationally specific institutions (Rodrik 2001), and regional contexts (Milanovic 2002), are crucial for economic growth. They could only appear after independence, after national empowerment, but only as a possibility.

⁴ The countries are France, Germany, UK, Spain, Russia, USA, Mexico, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, plus the continent of Africa. The correlation was calculated from the data and estimates of Maddison (2001).

Three basic problems of post-colonialism had to be mastered, though, before any catch-up with the North Atlantic economies. The potential population explosion following colonial medicine's reduction of mortality had to be met by de-patriarchalization and birth control. The colonial elitist abyss between state and society had to be overcome. The anti-elitist revolt had to be prevented from falling into plebeian predation. Large parts of Africa have so far failed to resolve any of them. South Asia have for a long time been burdened with state elitism, even in the case of democratic India, but opportunities are opening. East and Southeast Asia were economically lucky with both their Communist and their anti-Communist post-colonial rulers, although both authoritarianisms took their heavy human toll.

2. Global Entanglements

The entanglement of nation-states and trans-national movements and organizations has borne significantly upon inequality, with effects going in opposite directions. The international movement for family planning gradually gathered momentum after World War II. The UN Population Conference in 1984 signalled global political victory (Therborn 2004:ch. 8). Birth control in poor countries has a strong equalizing effect on income inequality.

The erosion of patriarchy and its gender and generation hierarchy owes very much to trans-national political entanglements. The social modernism of the international Communist movement made the abolition of patriarchal family institutions a central feature of all Communist revolutions. A liberal variant of the same modernism made the American occupants push for radical family reform in Japan. The UN soon came to play a key role in rallying Feminists and women's movements all over the world in their challenging of male supremacy. The UN Women's Conferences from Mexico in 1975 to Beijing in 1995, the Women's Development Decade 1975-85, and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women, in effect since 1981, have forced through crucial constitutional and legal changes, as well as providing foci for a worldwide social movement (Therborn 2004: ch.2).

By contrast, the states which have had to, or have chosen to, link up with the IMF have taken an anti-egalitarian direction. Domestically, the IMF programs have meant a massive redistribution from labour to capital, and inter-state-wise it appears that these programs have also had a negative effect on growth. The difficult selection problems in evaluating crisis interventions such as those of the IMF – which are usually resorted to only

after the economy has gone badly wrong - seem to have been mastered in recent research (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2002). Trans-national entanglements, regional as well as global, have become increasingly important. But their distributive effect depends on the kind of the trans-national institution or movement.

3. Global Flows

Global flows, of trade, capital, people, and information, are what most of the globalization debate are about. However, their effects are all ambiguous or contradictory. The complex, largely inconclusive empirical evidence does not support any clear-cut ideological position. Nor, for that matter, do the consequences vindicate the classical theorems of economics, of convergence through free flows.

People

A hundred years ago, migration was a major equalizer among the Atlantic societies, with masses of poor people of Europe moving to the land-abundant, labour-scarce New Worlds (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). Today's inter-continental migration is smaller, and its distributive effects still have to be sorted out. Where we have to start is, the fact that the swell of Mexican, Caribbean, and Central American emigration into the United States in the last decades of the 20th century has not (yet) been followed by any decrease of inequality or poverty in this region, on the contrary, the latter have increased (Székely 2001; Boltvinik 2001) For Mexico and most of the other countries, the inter-state national income gap to USA has actually widened in the 1990s (UNDP 2001: table 11.) These correlations are, of course, no evidence against equalising effects from migration, only that so far the latter are overwhelmed by other forces at work.

In rich countries with weak unions, like the US, low-skilled immigration tends to depress low wages further, thus increasing national inequality, but the size of the effect is minor even in this case (Cooper 2001:121-22). To poor countries, out-migration may involve a serious brain-drain, but it may also means important monetary inflows of remittances. In 2001 workers' trans-national remittances amounted to about 70 billion dollars (World Bank 2004b:305), which amounted to almost seven per cent of the total national income of the world's Low Income countries (which of course are not the only receivers of remittances, though.)

Capital

Capital flows from capital-rich to capital-poor countries reduce inter-state inequality, and were important as such a century ago (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). Today this effect is smaller, because capital flows have become less global and more concentrated among the rich countries themselves, more a process of "diversification finance" than "development finance" (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002; O'Rourke 2001). Clearly, the spectacular Chinese catch-up has been significantly fuelled by a massive influx of external capital, but there is no robust growth effect of capital account liberalization in evidence (Eichengreen 2000, reviewing a number of studies). There are also perverse capital movements. Using international trade and finance statistics, it has been estimated that the capital moved out of 25 poor, heavily indebted African countries in 1970-1996 exceeds their stock of foreign debt (Boyce and Ndikumana 2001).

Opening up to trans-national capital movements entails risks of exposure to severe shocks from the volatility of short-term capital. East Asian countries from Thailand to Korea were hit heavily by such a shock in 1997, with increasing poverty as a result (Stiglitz 2002: ch. 4). People's economic insecurity in Latin America is largely driven by the magnifying effects of volatile capital flows (Rodrik 2001). Opening a nation's capital account is usually associated with power shifts in favour of capital (taxes, labour rights), and often followed by mounting white to blue-collar differentials. Trans-national capital flows therefore tend to increase intra-state inequality by increasing socio-economic hierarchization, although not intrinsically (Behrman et al. 2000; Morley 2001).

Trade

In spite of their strong free trade instincts, mainstream economists are increasingly recognizing the ambiguous effects of trade. Theoretically, there is now "no systematic link" between foreign trade and economic growth (Cooper 2001:114), and recent trade theory (Jones 2000), is indeterminate with regard to internal distribution effects of foreign trade. Nor is there any clear empirical relationship between foreign trade and economic growth. The successful East Asian export-oriented growth after World War II was for a long time undertaken from very protected home-bases, whether in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan or, most recently, China. (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001).

. Empirical investigations furthermore show no strong or robust net distributive effects in either direction (Behrman et al. 2000; Morley 2001; O'Rourke 2001; Cooper 2001). What is coming out of this fairly intense economic debates might be termed a sociological insight, that trade liberalization as well as protectionism have both losers and winners, and that who is who does not follow from stylized assumptions of factor endowments, but depends on the

country-specific institutions of the trade regime, on class and power relations (Milanovic 2004; Ravaillon 2004).

Looked at more critically, the current global trade system is also a manifest example of hierarchization and exclusion. It is a hierarchy in the sense that the rich and powerful countries, at the top of the inter-national hierarchy, are imposing a trade rule which more or less closes their domestic markets for products in which poor countries traditionally have had a chance to compete, in food and in textiles (Oxfam 2002: ch. 4), while corcing upon the poor financial liberalization and external property rights.

Information

Flows of information may have strong distributive effects, inclusive or exclusive. In what direction depends on the kind of information. Vital inequality in the world has undoubtedly decreased through the diffusion of medical and hygienic information. Most visible was, perhaps, the arrival of pencilin, and of spraying against malaria mosquitoes right after World War II, which, for instance, in Ceylon halved the death rate in less than ten years (Mitchell 1998b: table A6).

Increased inequality, on the other hand, followed from the flow of neoliberalism in the 1980s, institutionally fortified in the Washington Consensus among the US Treasury, the World Bank, and the IMF, and carried by graduates of American economics departments into most corners of the world. While the effects of pure information/ideology flows and of institutional strong-arm methods by the IMF and the World Bank are difficult to sort out, Giovanni Andrea Cornia's (2004) argument of a global ideological force behind the turn to more inequality in most countries is plausible.

Summing up a first appraisal.

An analytical framework and its illustration do not warrant a proper conclusion. But we may end this introduction by summing up a provisional appraisal. National institutions and processes are crucial for global distribution. National rulers have no global alibi for national privileges and inequalities.

Crucial is also global history, weighing heavily upon current institutions, social relations, and human expectations, nationally as well as inter-nationally. What mechanisms of inequality were at work in making the enduring legacies of the past ? The shape of the constellation is still very controversial. Historically, there was clearly massive exploitation, from the Spanish robbing of the gold and silver mines of America, via the American invention of plantation slavery, and the British forcing the opium trade upon China, to the

plunder of Congo, and the British usage of Indian resources in its two “world wars”. According to Wallerstein (1974-) the “modern world system” has an inherent tendency of what we would here call hierarchization, between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery, through a world system of labour. Colonial rule created a modern barrier of exclusion between rulers and ruled, as well as an ethnic/racial hierarchy among the ruled, which post-colonial governance has tended to reproduce, from early 19th century Latin America to late 20th century Africa.

But there is also a case for distancing, and cumulative effects of it, through the innovations of late 18th-early 19th century North Atlantic industrialism, and through the post-World War II dynamics of developed economies. After all, decolonization did not decelerate the European boom.

Global institutional and organizational entanglements have had different effects depending upon the global organization or movement involved and entangled. UN and other global Feminism have opened doors of inclusion to more oppressed women, and its trans-national entanglements have empowered women all over to attack the exclusions and the hierarchies of patriarchy. IMF involvements with nation-states, on the other hand, have tended to erect or to strengthen the exclusion of workers and of subsistence farmers.

The effects of global flows are contradictory and exceedingly complex. The inclusion of some is simultaneous to the exclusion of others. There may be a catch-up effect, but it tends to decrease the distance to the least privileged among the privileged instead of the most. The flow of people tends to have an equalizing effect, through the inclusion of out-migrants in a richer socio-economic environment, but it can also exclude, or push down on a socio-economic ladder, non-migrants, in societies of emigration as well as of immigration. The flow of capital has the capacity to stimulate a catch-up between two economic environments – be they countries or cities or some other areas -, but it may also spiral into increasing distancing. In practice, concern with capital flows tends to stimulate exclusions of labour, and thereby to increase inequality.

Trade flows appear to be the most unpredictable of all. Trade openings usually mean that new economic opportunities are created, and that some previous economic activities become unsustainable and are destroyed, “out-competed”. If everybody could immediately switch to new opportunities, there would be no problem. But if a way of life is connected with destroyed or threatened economic activities, trade opening creates social exclusion. The net balance of trade inclusion and trade exclusion seems to be highly variable. And to what extent

can the increased misery of some be justly seen as compensated by the increased welfare of others?

The flow of information, finally, has a power which should not be underestimated. The direction of its effects derive from the character of the information. The 19th century spread of white racism contributed significantly to existential and resource inequality throughout the world. The 20th century flow of hygienic and medical information has clearly been conducive to reducing vital inequality.

More rigorous applications of the framework for analyzing global and sub-global processes, and more elaborate investigations into the mechanisms of inequality and of equality may come to different conclusions. But the complexity of the issues may at least in part explain why the protracted struggles for human dignity and equality have so far yielded so modest results. Tools of analysis are also instruments for action.

Inequalities are plural. They have to be understood as operating in multiple ways. The egalitarian struggles against them will have to take various means and various paths. The actual existence of low-inequality societies indicates that a commitment to global equalization, while controversial, is not utopian.

References

- Arrighi, G. et al. 2003. 'Industrial convergence, globalization, and the persistence of the North-South divide', Studies in Comparative International Development 38:3-31.
- Atkinson, A. 2002. 'Top incomes in the United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century', Working Paper.
- Atkinson, A. 2004. 'Increased Inequality in OECD Countries and the Redistributive Impact of the Government Budget', in G..A. Cornia (ed.), Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Atkinson, A. and Bourguignon, F. 2000 (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution vol. I. Amsterdam: North-Holland
- Bairoch, P. (1997) *Victoires et déboires* vol. III. Paris: Gallimard folio
- Banerjee, A., and Piketty, T. 2003. 'Top Indian Incomes, 1956-2000', BREAD Working Paper 046
- Banton, M. 1996. International Action Against Racial Discrimination, Oxford : Clarendon Press
- Barlösius, E. 2004 Kämpfe um soziale Ungleichheit, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag
- Beck, U. 1983. 'Jenseits von Stand und Klasse? Soziale Ungleichheiten, gesellschaftliche Individualisierungsprozesse und die Entstehung neuer Formationen und Identitäten', in R.Kreckel (Hrsg.), Soziale Ungleichheiten, Göttingen: Schwartz
- Boltvinnik, J.(2001) 'Welfare, Inequality and Poverty in Mexico, 1970-2000', paper Presented to the 35th Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Kraków, Poland
- Bourdieu, P. 1979. La distinction, Paris: Ed. de Minuit
- Bourguignon, F., and Morrisson, C. 2002. 'Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992', American Economic Review 92:727-44
- Bourguignon et al. eds. The Microeconomics of Income Distribution Dynamics Washington DC: World Bank

- Boyce, J., and Ndikumana, L. (2001) 'Is Africa a Net Creditor? Estimates of Capital Flight From Severely Indebted Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1970-96', *Journal of Development Studies* 38:27-56
- Brockenhoff, M., and Hewett, P. 2000. 'Inequality of child mortality among ethnicity groups in sub-Saharan Africa', *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 78:30-41
- CEPAL (ECLAC, UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) 2004. Panorama social 2002-2003. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL
- Chang, Jung 1991. Wild Swans, London: Flamingo
- Cooper, R. (2001) 'Growth and Inequality: The Role of Foreign Trade and Investment', in B. Pleskovic and N. Stern (eds.), *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2001/2002*, Washington, World Bank, 107-37
- Cornia, G. A. 2004 (ed.) Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Cornia, G.A. et al. 2004. 'Income Distribution Changes and Their Impact in the Post Second World War Period', in Cornia, G. A. 2004 (ed.) Inequality, Growth, and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Dikhanov, Y., and Ward, M. 2001. 'Evolution of the Global Distribution of Income in 1970-99', www.eclac.cl/povertystatistics/documentos/dikhanov.pdf
- Dworkin, R. 2000. Sovereign Virtue. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
- Elias, N., and Scotson, J. 1992. Etablierte und Aussenseiter, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp
- Eichengreen, B. (2000) 'Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Studies Tell Us?' *The World Bank Economic Review* 15:341-65
- European Commission 2005. Report on social inclusion 2005. Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
- Falk, A. and Fischbacher, U. (2002), 'The Economics of Reciprocity: Evidence and Theory', in R. Freeman (ed.), Inequality Around the World, Basingstoke: Palgrave
- FAO 2004. The State of Food Insecurity in the World www.fao.org
- Firebaugh, G. 2003. The New Geography of Global Income Inequality Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press
- Fisher, C. et al. 1996 Inequality by Design. Princeton: Princeton University Press

- Fitoussi, J-P., and Savidan, P. 2003. 'Les inégalités', Comprendre no. 4
- Fitzpatrick., R., and Charandola, T. 2000. 'Health', in A.H. Halsey and J. Webb (eds.), Twentieth Century British Social Trends, Basingstoke: Macmillan
- Frank, R., and Cook, P. 1995. The Winner-Take-All-Society. New York: The Free Press
- Flora, P. et al. 1987. State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975 2vols. vol II. Frankfurt: Campus
- Fraser, N., and Honneth, A. 2003. Redistribution or recognition? London: Verso
- Galbraith, J. 2002. 'A perfect crime: inequality in the age of globalization', Daedalus Winter: 11-25
- Galtung, J. 1971. 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', Journal of Peace Research 2: 307-27
- Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge Mass.: Belknap/Harvard University Press
- Glendon, M. A. (2001) A World Made New. New York: Random House
- Glewwe, P. 1988. 'The Distribution of Welfare in Côte d'Ivoire in 1985', World Bank: Living Standards Measurement Study Working Paper No. 39
- Goffman, E. 1963. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice-Hall
- Harris-White, B. 2003. India Working Cambridge: Cambridge University Prtess
- Hoff, K., and Pandey, P. 2003. 'Why Are Social Inequalities so Durable?', World Bank: Working Paper
- Honneth, A. 1992. Kampf um Anerkennung Frankfurt: Suhrkamp
- ILO 2001. World Employment Report 2001 Geneva: ILO
- Inter-American Development Bank 1998. Facing Up to Inequality in Latin America. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press
- Khan, A.R, and Riskin, C. 2001. Inequality and Poverty in China in the Age of Globalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lindbeck, A., and Snower, D. 1988. The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment and Unemployment, Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press

Lindert, P. 2000. 'Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America', in Atkinson, A. and Bourguignon, F. 2000 (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution vol. I. Amsterdam: North-Holland

Luhmann, N. 1997 Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 2 vols. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp

Luxemburg Income Study 2004. [www. Lisproject.org/keyfigures](http://www.Lisproject.org/keyfigures)

Maddison, A. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: OECD

Marmot, M., and Bobak, M. 2005. 'Social and economic changes and health in Europe East and West', European Review 13:1, 15-31

Melchoir, A. et al. 2000. Globalisering og ulikhet. Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet

Milanovic, B. 2002. 'The World Income Distribution, 1988 and 1993: First Calculation Based on Household Surveys Alone', Economic Journal 112:51-92

Milanovic, B. 2003. 'Is Inequality in Africa really different?', World Bank: Working Paper

Milanovic, B. 2004. 'Can we Discern the Effect of Globalization on Income Distribution?', Washington DC.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Mitchell, B.R. 1998a. International Historical Statistics. The Americas 1750-1993 4th ed., Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Mitchell, B.R. 1998b. International Historical Statistics. Africa, Asia, & Oceania 1750-1993 3rd ed., Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Montecinos, V., and Markoff, J. 2001. 'From the Power of Economic Ideas to the Power of Economists', in M.A. Centeno and F. López-Alves (eds.), The Other Mirror, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 105-50

Morgan, W. 1975. American Slavery American Freedom, New York: W.W. Norton

Morrisson, C. 2000. 'Historical Perspectives on Income Distribution: The Case of Europe', in Atkinson, A. and Bourguignon, F. 2000 (eds.) Handbook of Income Distribution vol. I. Amsterdam: North-Holland

Navarro, V. 2004 (ed. The Political and Social Contexts of Health , Amityville NY: Baywood

Obstfeld, M., and Taylor, A. (2002) 'Globalization and Capital Markets', Washington DC: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper

O'Rourke, K. and Williamson, J. (1999) Globalization and History, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press

O'Rourke, K. (2001) 'Globalization and Inequality: Historical Trends', in B. Pleskovic and N.

Stern (eds.), *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2001/2002*, Washington, World Bank

Paugam, S. 1996 (ed.) L'Exclusion, l'état de savoirs. Paris : La Découverte

Piketty, T. 2000. Les hauts revenus en France au XXe siècle. Paris :Grasset.

Przeworski, A., and Vreeland, J. (2000) 'The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic Growth', *Journal of Development Economics* 62:385-421

Ravaillon, M. 2004. 'Looking Beyond Averages in the Trade and Poverty Debate', Working Paper, the World Bank

Rodrik, D. (2001) 'Why is there so much economic insecurity in Latin America?', *CEPAL Review* 73: 7-30

Rokkan, S. 1967. 'Geography, Religion and Social Class: Cross-cutting Cleavages in Norwegian Politics', in S.M. Lipset and S.. Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives. New York: Free Press

Rokkan, S. 1970. 'Nation-Building, Cleavage Formation, and the Structuring of Mass Politics', in S. Rokkan et al. Citizens, Elections, Parties, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget

Sen, A. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press

Sennett, R. 2002. Respect in a World of Unequality, New York: W.W. Norton

Shavit, Y., and Blossfeld, H.-P. 1993. Persistent Inequality. Boulder CO: Westview

Sorensen, A.B. 1996. 'The Structural Basis of Social Inequality', The American Journal of Sociology 101:1333-1365.

Steiner, H., and Alston, Ph. (1996) (eds.), International Human Rights in Context. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Stiglitz, J. (2002) *Globalization and Its Discontents* London: Allen Lane/Penguin

Székely, M., and Hilgert, M. (2000) 'What Drives Differences in Inequality across Countries?' Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper

Therborn, G. 2003 'Dimensions and Processes of Global Inequalities', in G. Skapska and A. Orla-Bukowska (eds.), The Moral Fabric in Contemporary Societies, Leiden, Boston: Brill

Therborn, G., 2004. Between Sex and Power. Family in the World, 1900-2000, London: Routledge

Therborn, G. 2006. 'Europe and Asias :in the Global Political Economy, and in yhe World as a Cultural System', in G. Therborn and H. Khondker (eds.), Asia and Europe in Globalization, Leiden, Brill, 2006

Tilly, C. 1998. Durable Inequality, Berkeley: University of California Press

UNAIDS 2004. AIDS epidemic update December 2004 www.unaids.org

- UNDP 1994. Human Development Report 1994, Geneva: UNDP
- UNDP 1996. Human Development Report 1996, Geneva: UNDP
- UNDP 2001. Human Development Report 2001, Geneva: UNDP
- UNDP 2002. Human Development Report 2002, Geneva: UNDP
- UNDP 2004. Human Development Report 2004. www.hdr.undp.org
- UNFPA, 2004. The State of the World's Population, New York: UNFPA
- USAID 2003 'The health sector human resource crisis in Africa: An issues paper', Washington, D.C.: USAID
- Vreeland, J.R. (2002) 'The Effect of IMF Programs on Labor', *World Development* 30: 121-39
- Wade, R.H. 2004. 'Is Globalization Reducing Inequality?', International Journal of Health Services 34.381-414
- WHO 2004. World Health Report 2004, Geneva: WHO
- WIDER 2004. World Income Inequality Database www.wider.unu.edu
- Wilkinson, R.G. 1996. Unhealthy Societies. The Afflictions of Inequality. London: Routledge
- Wilkinson, R.G. 2000. Mind the Gap. Hierarchies, Health, and Human Evolution, London. Weidenfeld and Nicolson)
- Wolfensohn, J., and Bourguignon, F. 2004. Development and Poverty Reduction. Looking, Looking Ahead. World Bank Report, www.worldbank.org
- World Bank 2005a. World Development Report 2005 New York: OUP
- World Bank 2005b. World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank

