

İTÜ

Computer Security

Software and Operating System Security

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Before Starting

The secret to staying safe online

....more than 40 million people in the US had their personal information stolen in 2014, as well as 54 million in Turkey, 20 million in Korea, 16 million in Germany and more than 20 million in China....



<http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20141010-the-secret-to-staying-safe-online>

Outline

- Buffer Overflow
- Basics of Software Security
- Handling Program Input
- Handling Program Output
- Interacting with Operating System
- Writing Safe Program Code

Roots of Security Threats

- **Threat**: A potential for **violation** of security. A threat is a possible danger that might exploit a **vulnerability**.
- **Vulnerability**: A flaw or weakness in a system's **design**, **implementation**, or **operation** and **management** that could be exploited to **violate** the system's **security policy**.

```
if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(  
    &hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)    SSL Vulnerability  
    goto fail;  
goto fail;
```

- **Attack**: An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent **threat**. It is a **deliberate** attempt to **evade security services** and **violate** the **security policy** of a system.

Buffer Overflow

- **Buffer Overrun (Overflow)**: A condition at an interface under which **more input can be placed into a buffer** or data holding area than the capability allocated, overwriting other information.
- Attackers **exploit** such a condition to **crash** a system or to **insert** specifically **crafted code** that allows them to **gain control of the system**.
- **Overflow attacks** is **one of the most common attacks** seen and results from **careless programming** in applications.

```
...  
char buf[BUFSIZE];  
gets(buf);  
...
```

- The **buffer** can be **located** on the **stack**, in the **heap**, or in the **data section of the process**.

Buffer Overflow

- **Testing** of programs may **not identify** the **buffer overflow** vulnerability, as the test inputs provided would usually reflect the range of inputs the programmers expect users to provide.
- **Consequences of buffer overflow:**
 - **Corruption** of data used by the program,
 - Unexpected **transfer of control**,
 - Memory access **violations**,
 - Program **termination**,
 - If it is a part of an attack, **run attacker's code**.



Buffer Overflow

```
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    int valid = FALSE;
    char str1[8];
    char str2[8];

    next_tag(str1);
    gets(str2);
    if (strncmp(str1, str2, 8) == 0)
        valid = TRUE;
    printf("buffer1: str1(%s), str2(%s), valid(%d)\n", str1, str2, valid);
}
```

(a) Basic buffer overflow C code

```
$ cc -g -o buffer1 buffer1.c
$ ./buffer1
START
buffer1: str1(START), str2(START), valid(1)
$ ./buffer1
EVILINPUTVALUE
buffer1: str1(TVALUE), str2(EVILINPUTVALUE), valid(0)
$ ./buffer1
BADINPUTBADINPUT
buffer1: str1(BADINPUT), str2(BADINPUTBADINPUT), valid(1)
```

(b) Basic buffer overflow example runs

Buffer Overflow

Memory Address	Before gets(str2)	After gets(str2)	Contains value of
.....	
bffffbf4	34fcffbf 4 . . .	34fcffbf 3 . . .	argv
bffffbf0	01000000	01000000	argc
bffffbec	c6bd0340 . . . @	c6bd0340 . . . @	return addr
bffffbe8	08fcffbf	08fcffbf	old base ptr
bffffbe4	00000000	01000000	valid
bffffbe0	80640140 . d . @	00640140 . d . @	
bffffbdc	54001540 T . . @	4e505554 N P U T	str1[4-7]
bffffbd8	53544152 S T A R	42414449 B A D I	str1[0-3]
bffffbd4	00850408	4e505554 N P U T	str2[4-7]
bffffbd0	30561540 O V . @	42414449 B A D I	str2[0-3]
.....	

Figure 10.2 Basic Buffer Overflow Stack Values

Buffer Overflow

- To **exploit** any type of buffer overflow the **attacker needs**
 - **identify** a buffer overflow **vulnerability**
 - **understand how** that buffer will be **stored** in the processes memory
- **Programming languages and buffer overflow**
 - **Assembly and machine code (instructions)**: greatest access to computer resources and programming effort. (**vulnerable**)
 - **High level programming languages (Java, ADA, Python)**: require high computer resources and no direct access to hardware resources (**not vulnerable**)
 - **Languages like C**: have many modern control-structures and data type abstractions, provide access to hardware (**vulnerable**)

Buffer Overflow

Stack Buffer Overflows


- A **stack buffer overflow (stack smashing)** **occurs** when the targeted **buffer** is **located** on the **stack**, usually as a local variable in a function's stack frame.
- **Morris Internet worm:**
 - First being seen in the wild in 1988
 - Uses an unchecked buffer of the C **gets()** function in the fingerd daemon.

Buffer Overflow

Stack Buffer Overflows

A stack overflow example

- Because **local variables** are placed **below** the saved **frame pointer and return address**, the possibility exists of exploiting a local buffer variable overflow vulnerability to **overwrite** the values of one or both of these key function linkage values.
- A **stack overflow** can **result** in some form of **denial-of-service attack**.



Buffer Overflow

Stack Buffer Overflows

```
void hello(char *tag)
{
    char inp[16];

    printf("Enter value for %s: ", tag);
    gets(inp);
    printf("Hello your %s is %s\n", tag, inp);
}
```

(a) Basic stack overflow C code

```
$ cc -g -o buffer2 buffer2.c

$ ./buffer2
Enter value for name: Bill and Lawrie
Hello your name is Bill and Lawrie
buffer2 done

$ ./buffer2
Enter value for name: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Segmentation fault (core dumped)

$ perl -e 'print pack("H*", "414243444546474851525354555657586162636465666768
08fcffbf948304080a4e4e4e4e0a");' | ./buffer2
Enter value for name:
Hello your Re?pyyluEA is ABCDEFGHQRSTUVWXabcdefghguyu
Enter value for Kyyu:
Hello your Kyyu is NNNN
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

(b) Basic stack overflow example runs

Buffer Overflow

Shellcode is machine code or series of binary values corresponding to the machine instructions and data values that implement the attacker's desired functionality.

- It is an essential component of many buffer overflow attacks to transfer the execution to the code supplied by the attacker and often saved in the buffer being overflowed.
- Specific to particular processor architecture and operating system.

Buffer Overflow

- Buffer overflow defenses
 - Compile time defenses: aim to harden programs to resist attacks in new programs.
 - Run time defenses: aim to detect and abort attacks in existing programs.
- To prevent buffer overflow
 - Use a dynamically sized buffer to ensure that sufficient space is available
 - Space requested does not exceed available memory for dynamic sizes
 - Process the input in buffer sized blocks
 - Discard excess input
 - Terminate the program

Basics of Software Security

Many security vulnerabilities results from poor programming practices.

Table 11.1 CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors

Software Error Category: Insecure Interaction Between Components Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ("Cross-site Scripting") Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure (aka "SQL Injection") Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type Failure to Preserve OS Command Structure (aka "OS Command Injection") Information Exposure Through an Error Message URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ("Open Redirect") Race Condition
Software Error Category: Risky Resource Management Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ("Classic Buffer Overflow") Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ("Path Traversal") Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ("PHP File Inclusion") Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions Improper Validation of Array Index Integer Overflow or Wraparound Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size Download of Code Without Integrity Check Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Software Error Category: Porous Defenses Improper Access Control (Authorization) Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data Use of Hard-coded Credentials Missing Authentication for Critical Function Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

Basics of Software Security

- Software **quality and reliability** is concerned with the **accidental failure** of a program as a result of
 - unanticipated input,
 - system interaction,
 - use of incorrect code.
- To **improve software quality**
Use some form of **structured design** and **testing** to identify and eliminate **bugs**.



Basics of Software Security

In software security,

- The **attacker** chooses the probability distribution, **targeting specific bugs** that result in a failure.
- The bugs are **triggered** by **often very unlikely inputs** and common tests do not identify them.



Three pillars of software security

1. Risk management framework
2. Touchpoints
3. Knowledge



Basics of Software Security

- Software security assurance is a process that helps design and implement software that protects the data and resources contained in and controlled by that software.
- Software security assurance includes
 - A security evaluation
 - Security requirements for software
 - Security requirements for software development, operations, maintenance processes
 - Evaluation for each software audit and review
 - A configuration management and corrective action process
 - Adequate physical security for software

Handling Program Input

- **Incorrect handling** of program **input** is one of the **most common** failings in software security.
- **Input** is **any source** of data from outside, such as
 - data read from keyboard, mouse, file, network
 - execution environment
- **Input data** and their **source** must be
 - **identified** and explicitly **verified**

İTÜ/MAIL

Hızlı ve güvenli e-posta...

Yenilenen Webmail ile e-postalarınıza her yerden hızlı ve güvenli bir biçimde ulaşabilirsiniz.

Webmail arayüzünde yapılan güncelleme ile birlikte yeni sürümü kullanabilirsiniz.

Webmail kullanımı ile ilgili ayrıntılı bilgi almak için Webmail Dokümanları'ndan yararlanabilirsiniz.

Kullanıcı Adı


Şifre

Oturum Aç

Handling Program Input

- **Meaning** and **interpretation** of **input** is a **key** concern for programs.
- **Input data** may be broadly classified as **textual** or **binary**.
- **Interpretation** of the **raw binary** values may represent **integers**, **floating-point numbers**, **character strings**, or some more **complex** structures.

String



Handling Program Input

- Beyond identifying which characters are input, their meaning must be identified.
 - Filename
 - URL
 - E-mail address
 -
- Failure to identify the meaning could result in a vulnerability that permits an attacker to influence the operation of the program, with possibly serious consequences.



Handling Program Input

- **Injection attack** refers to a **wide variety of program flaws** related to invalid handling of input data.

- OWASP describes 25 different injection attacks (<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:Injection>)



- These attacks **occurs** when program **input** data can **accidentally** or **deliberately influence the flow of execution of the program**.
- **Flaws** related to **invalid** handling of **input data**
 - **influences** program execution
 - passed as a **parameter** to a helper program or other utility or subsystem
 - most **often** occurs in **scripting** languages, such as Web CGI scripts to process data supplied from HTML formats

Handling Program Input

Code Injection

- The **input** includes code that is **executed** by **the attacked system**.
- This type of attack is **widely exploited**.

Command Injection

- The **input** is used in the **construction of a command** that is subsequently **executed** by the system with the **privileges of the Web server**.
- The **problem** caused by **insufficient checking** of program input.

Handling Program Input

```
int main(char* argc, char** argv) {  
    char cmd[CMD_MAX] = "/usr/bin/cat ";  
    strcat(cmd, argv[1]);  
    system(cmd);  
}
```

- The program *accepts* a *filename* as a *command* line argument, and displays the contents of the file.
- if an *attacker* passes a *string* of the form *";rm -rf /"*, then the call to *system()* fails to execute cat due to a lack of arguments and then plows on to *recursively delete* the contents of the *root partition*.

Handling Program Input

SQL Injection

- The **user-supplied input** is used to **construct** a SQL request to **retrieve information** from a database.
- Must **check** and **validate** input

```
SELECT UserList.Username
FROM UserList
WHERE UserList.Username = 'Username'
AND UserList.Password = 'Password'
```

```
SELECT UserList.Username
FROM UserList
WHERE UserList.Username = 'Username'
AND UserList.Password = 'password' OR '1'='1'
```

Handling Program Input

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Attacks

- Input from one user is later output to another user.
- Commonly seen scripted Web applications
- With script code that can be JavaScript, ActiveX, VBScript, Flash, ...
- Assumed that all content from one site is equally trusted and permitted to interact with other sites

To Prevent XSS Attacks

- Identify other programs that could not be trusted.
- If it is necessary to trust other programs, filter their output.
- Ensure that untrusted sources were not permitted to direct output.

Handling Program Input

Validating Input Syntax

- Ensure data **conform** to **assumptions**, eg. HTML, email, printable
- **Compare** against **what** is **wanted**, **accept** only **valid** data
- **Alternative**: **compare** input data with **known dangerous** values
- To **validate** inputs **regular expressions** are used
 - Patterns of characters describe **allowable** input
 - Details vary **between languages**
- The **input data** have the possibility of **multiple encodings**
The **input** data must **first** be **transformed** into a **single, standard, minimal** representation known as **canonicalization**, such as unicode.

Handling Program Input

Input Fuzzing


- A **software testing technique** that uses **randomly** generated data as inputs to a program.
- **Advantage** is **simplicity** and **freedom** from **assumptions** about expected input.
- Inputs may be generated according to **templates** but **disadvantage** is that the templates incorporate assumptions about the input so some **bugs** triggered by other forms would be **missed**.

Limitations

- Only identifies **simple** types of faults
- If a bug is triggered only with a small number of inputs, fuzzing is **unlikely** to **locate** it.

Handling Program Output

Program Output: It is the **generation** of output as a result of the **processing** of input and other **interactions**.




The target of compromise is not program generating the output but rather the program or device used

Handling Program Output

- Purpose of program outputs

- Stored for future use
- Transmitted over networks
- Displayed to user



- A simple categorization

- **Binary** : Complex structures such as network protocol structures
- **Textual** : Some structured output such as HTML


Handling Program Output

Principles of handling program outputs

- **P1** (conform expected form): **Output** does **conform** to the **expected form** and **interpretation**.
- **P2** (validate third-party data): Any **programs** that gather and rely on **third-party data** have to be **responsible** for ensuring that any subsequent use of such **data** is **safe** and does **not violate** the user's **assumptions**.
- **P3** (be careful with encoding): Different **character sets** allow different **encodings** of meta characters, which may **change** the **interpretation** of what is valid output.

Interacting with Operating System


- Programs run under the control of Operating System
- Operating System
 - Mediates access to resources
 - Share the resources
 - Construct an executing environment
- Systems have multiple users with different access permissions
- Programs need to access shared resources that are significant for software security.



Interacting with Operating System

Environment Variables

- Collection of string values inherited by each process from its parent.
- The request to execute a new program can specify a new collection of values.
- The variables provide untrusted input to programs.
- Privileged shell scripts are targeted -> difficult to write safe and correct scripts



Interacting with Operating System

- Well known environment variables: `PATH` and `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`.
- Can be **used to attack** the system.

- **Example**

```
#!/bin/bash
user=`echo $1 | sed 's/@.*$//'`
grep $user /var/local/accounts/ipaddrs
```

Takes identity of a user, strips any domain specification if included, and then retrieves mapping for that user to an IP address.

*Calls two separate programs: **sed** and **grep**.*

*Attacker has to **redefine PATH variable** to include a directory they control. Then when this script is run, **attacker's program is called** instead of standard system version.*

Interacting with Operating System

- Example (Continue)

```
#!/bin/bash
PATH="/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin"
export PATH
user=`echo $1 | sed 's/@.*$//'\`
grep $user /var/local/accounts/ipaddrs
```

Previous attack is *prevented* but *another attack is possible!*

Assignment of new value to `PATH` variable is interpreted as a command to execute program `PATH` with list of directories as its argument. If attacker has *changed `PATH` variable to include* directory with an *attack program `PATH`*, then this will be executed when script is run.

To prevent, *use* a compiled *wrapper* program. *If program executes another program, it is still vulnerable against attacks regarding `PATH` environment!*


Interacting with Operating System

Using Least Privileges

- **Consequence** of some **flaws** is that **attacker** can **execute code** with **privileges** and access rights of **compromised** program or service.
- If **privileges** are greater than those available already to attacker, then this results in **privilege escalation**. Significant step in an **attack**.
- **Normally** when a **user runs** a program, it executes with **the same privileges and access rights** as that user.
- **Programs** should **execute** with the **least amount of privileges** needed to complete their functions, which is known as **the principle of least privileges**.

Interacting with Operating System

- A **common deficiency** found with many privileged programs is to have **ownership** of **all** associated files and directories.
 - This **violates** the **principle of least privilege**.
 - Any **privileged** program have to **modify only** those files and directories **necessary**.





- **Good defensive** program requires to be **partitioned** into smaller modules, each **granted privilege** they **require**, only when they need.

Interacting with Operating System


Systems Calls and Standard Library Functions

- Except some very small systems, **no computer program contains all of code** it needs to execute.
- Programs use **system calls and standard library** functions for common operations.



Interacting with Operating System

- When using these calls and functions, **programmers** commonly **make assumptions** about how they actually **operate**.
- **OS and library functions** attempt to manage their resources in a manner that provides the **best performance** to all the programs running on the system. Thus, **requests for services**
 - Buffered,
 - Resequenced,
 - Modified



- **BUT**, these **optimizations** may **conflict** with goals of the program.

Interacting with Operating System

Example

```
patterns = [10101010, 01010101, 11001100, 00110011, 00000000, 11111111,
...]
open file for writing
for each pattern
    seek to start of file
    overwrite file contents with pattern
close file
remove file
```

(a) Initial secure file shredding program algorithm


```
patterns = [10101010, 01010101, 11001100, 00110011, 00000000, 11111111,
...]
open file for update
for each pattern
    seek to start of file
    overwrite file contents with pattern
    flush application write buffers
    sync file system write buffers with device
close file
remove file
```

(b) Better secure file shredding program algorithm

Interacting with Operating System

Temporary File Use

- Many programs use **temporary files** often **in common area**.
- Most **operating systems provide** well-known **locations** for placing temporary files and **standard functions** for **naming** and creating them.
- The **critical issue** is that they are **unique and not accessed** by other processes.



Interacting with Operating System

- An **attacker** attempt to **guess** the file that a privileged program will use -> **denial of service attack**.
- **Secure temporary file** creation and use **requires** the use of a **random temporary file name**.
 - The **creation** of **temporary file** should be done using an **atomic** system primitive.
 - This **prevents** the **race condition** and hence the potential exploit of this file.
- The standard **C** function **mkstemp()** is **suitable**; however, the older functions **tmpfile()**, **tmpnam()**, and **tempnam()** are all **insecure** unless used with care.

Writing Safe Program Code

Writing secure, safe code requires



- Attention to all aspects of how a program executes,
- The environment it executes in,
- The type of data it process,
- Nothing can be assumed,
- All potential errors must be checked.
- Known as defensive programming or secure programming



Writing Safe Program Code

High-level languages:

- Compiled->linked into machine code -> executed (C)
- Compiled -> intermediate language -> interpreted by suitable program (JAVA)



Writing Safe Program Code

The key issues (software security perspective):

- Whether the implemented **algorithm correctly solves** the specified **problem**,
- Whether the machine **instructions** executed **correctly represent** the high-level algorithm specification,
- Whether the **manipulation** of data values in variables is **valid** and **meaningful**.



Writing Safe Program Code

Correct Algorithm Implementation

- **Good** program development **technique** is **significant** for software security.
- The **consequence** of a **deficiency** in the **design** or **implementation** of the algorithm is a **bug** in the program that could be exploited, such as TCP session spoof or hijack attack.



Writing Safe Program Code

- The implementation **flaws permits** some **attacks**, such as the initial sequence numbers used by many TCP/IP implementations are predictable.
- If an interpreter **does not correctly implement** the specified code, such as incorrect Java Virtual Machine interpretation, it could result in **bugs** that an attacker might exploit.



Writing Safe Program Code

Correct Machine Language

- Ensures machine instructions are correctly implemented for high-level language code
 - Problem1: Often ignored by developers
 - Problem2: Assume compiler or interpreter work correctly
- Requires comparing machine code with original source code that is slow and difficult

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html id="home-layout">
  <head>
    <meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
    <title>Source Code Pro</title>
    <!-- made with <3 and AFDKO -->
    <meta name="keywords" content="sans, monospace, open source, coding, for">
    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="css/source-code-pro.css">
  </head>
  <body>
    <div id="main">
```



Writing Safe Program Code

- The development of trusted computer systems with very **high assurance level** is the one area.
- **Common Criteria assurance level of EAL 7** requires validation of correspondence among design, source code, and object code.



Writing Safe Program Code

Correct Interpretation of Data Values

- All data on a computer are **stored** as groups of **binary bits**.
- **Interpretation** depends on
 - **Program operations** used
 - Specific **machine instructions** used
- **Languages** provides different **capabilities** for restricting or validating data use
 - **Strongly typed** languages are more **limited** but **safer**
 - Others are **flexible** but **less secure**, such as C

Writing Safe Program Code

Correct Use of Memory

- In many applications, memory must be allocated when needed and released (**dynamic memory allocation**).
- **Memory leak**: If a program **fails** to correctly **manage** the **memory**, available memory on the heap is **exhausted**.
- An **attacker** can implement a **denial of service attack** by using **memory leaks** of targeted program.
- Many older languages, like C, have **no explicit support** for dynamic memory allocation.
- **Modern languages** like Java and C++ **handle** dynamic allocation **automatically**.

Writing Safe Program Code

An Example for Memory Leak

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#define LOOPS    10
#define MAXSIZE 256

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int count = 0;
    char *pointer = NULL;

    for(count=0; count<LOOPS; count++) {
        pointer = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char) * MAXSIZE);
    }

    free(pointer);

    return count;
}
```

Writing Safe Program Code

An Example for Memory Leak

```
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#define LOOPS 10
#define MAXSIZE 256

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    int count = 0;
    char *pointer = NULL;

    for(count=0; count<LOOPS; count++) {
        pointer = (char *)malloc(sizeof(char) * MAXSIZE);
    }

    free(pointer);

    return count;
}
```

We have 10 allocations of size MAXSIZE.

Every allocation, with the exception of the last, is lost.


If no pointer is pointed to the allocated block, it is unrecoverable during program execution.

*A simple **fix** to this trivial example is to place the **free()** call inside of the 'for' loop.*

Writing Safe Program Code

Race Conditions and Shared Memory

- **Shared memory** is the memory where **multiple** process or threads can **access**.
- **Race condition** occurs when **multiple processes** and threads **compete** to gain **uncontrolled access** to some resources.
 - **Needs synchronization** primitives to solve race conditions.
- **Incorrect** synchronization leads to **deadlock**, where each process waits another for a resource.
- **Denial of service attack** is **possible** if deadlock conditions are known by attackers.



Summary

- Buffer overflow
- Some buffer overflow attacks
- Defenses
- Basics of software security
- Handling program input and output
- Interacting with OS
- Writing safe program code