

# CEOINDUSTRIES, INC.

## Reversing Challenge

### Winter 2024

**DePaul University**

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Section: 801  
March 29, 2024

.danger file malware  
analysis

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# ANALYSIS REPORT

## Malware Analysis Report

1 NUMBER

2024-29-

DATE

### Notification

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### Summary

#### Description

CEO, Inc. received 1 Windows Portable Executable (PE) file for analysis. DePaul University (Client) received several alerts on or about March 11, 2024. These alerts presumably came from an employee's desktop: JCortes\_PC01. The alerts reported that the desktop was downloading a suspected suspicious file. Client has requested that CEO, Inc. perform Malware Analysis on this file and report its findings, which are provided herein.

#### Submitted File(s) (1)

- I) 9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87.danger  
(9a00f.danger)

#### Analysis Tools Used

CEO, Inc. has performed its analysis using industry-standard professional tools:

- BinaryNinja
- Capa
- CFF Explorer
- DetectItEasy
- Fiddler
- Floss
- HxD
- IDA Pro
- PE Browser
- PE-Studio
- Radare2
- Regshot
- SysInternals: strings; Process Monitor; Process Explorer
- Wireshark
- X32dbg

## Findings

### I) Filename: 9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87.danger

#### Determination

It is the professional opinion of CEO, Inc. that this file is malicious. Please see Appendices A through D for screenshots and additional technical information.

#### VirusTotal Information

Please see the following website for more information:

[VirusTotal - File - 9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87](#)

#### Details

Filename	9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87.danger
Microsoft Known Malware Name	Trojan:Win32/CobaltStrike!rfn
MD5	C9B105EC2412AC0E2ACE20BFA71E1450
SHA1	3CEF1CA36A78CBA308FB29A46B20E5CA22D03289
SHA256	9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87
Imphash	7698a47cb1463adc6420e55f320386c
TimeDateStamp	Friday, June 26, 2015 9:12:52 PM GMT
Number of Sections	5
List of Section Names	.text .rdata .data .rsrc .reloc
EntryPoint	000028D8 .text
Intended CPU	Intel
32bit or 64bit	32-bit
Dll or Exe	Exe
Compiler Information	Operation system: Windows(XP)[I386, 32-bit, GUI] Linker: Microsoft Linker(11.00.60610) Compiler: Microsoft Visual C/C++(17.00.60610)[C++] Language: C/C++

	Tool: Visual Studio(2012)
Interesting Strings	CloseHandle CreateFileA GetProcAddress LocalAlloc WININET.dll CRYPT32.dll urlmon.dll gdiplus.dll CryptAcquireContextA CryptReleaseContext CryptGenKey CryptEncrypt CryptDecrypt InternetOpenA InternetConnectA HttpOpenRequestA GetSystemDirectoryA GetComputerNameA GetVersionExA GetUserNameA GetAdaptersInfo CreateProcessA CreateThread VirtualAlloc VirtualProtect SetFileAttributeA DeleteFileA CopyFileA MoveFileExA CreateMutexA CreateToolhelp32Snapshot Process32First Process32Next ZwAllocateVirtualMemory ZwWriteVirtualMemory ZwResumeThread ZwSetContextThread
Verdict Determination	Malicious. Please see Description Section below.

## Description

The provided file is 100% malicious malware. It is a Trojan virus created to establish persistence on the host system, indicated by the creation of startup items (**funefyza.exe**, **wveqaga.exe**) in the user's startup directory, ensuring it is executed upon every system startup. It employs network communication to contact a remote server (<http://adobe-dns-3-adobe.com/eojysoyx.php>), likely for Command and Control (C2) purposes, as well as DNS resolutions and HTTP requests that

indicate its capability to receive instructions and/or exfiltrate data. It interacts with critical system components, including processes (**svchost.exe**), and engages in file system manipulation such as creating, copying, and deleting files, indicative of an attempt to modify system behavior or cover its tracks. The malware also accesses and modifies registry entries, which could be used to change configuration settings or disable security features. Additionally, the use of cryptographic functions suggests attempts to encrypt data or communications to avoid detection. Windows Defender antivirus software also flagged this file and the additional files created as being malicious.

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## Recommendations

CEO, Inc. recommends that users and administrators consider using the following best practices to strengthen the security posture of their organization's systems. Any configuration changes should be reviewed by system owners and administrators prior to implementation to avoid unwanted impacts.

- Maintain up-to-date antivirus signatures and engines.
- Keep operating system patches up-to-date.
- Disable File and Printer sharing services. If these services are required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication.
- Restrict users' ability (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications. Do not add users to the local administrators group unless required.

Enforce a strong password policy and implement regular password changes.

Exercise caution when opening e-mail attachments even if the attachment is expected and the sender appears to be known. Enable a personal firewall on agency workstations, configured to deny unsolicited connection requests.

Disable unnecessary services on agency workstations and servers.

Scan for and remove suspicious e-mail attachments; ensure the scanned attachment is its "true file type" (i.e., the extension matches the file header).

- Monitor users' web browsing habits; restrict access to sites with unfavorable content.
- Exercise caution when using removable media (e.g., USB thumb drives, external drives, CDs, etc.).
- Scan all software downloaded from the Internet prior to executing.
- Maintain situational awareness of the latest threats and implement appropriate Access Control Lists (ACLs).

Additional information on malware incident prevention and handling can be found in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-83, "**Guide to Malware Incident Prevention & Handling for Desktops and Laptops**".

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## *Appendix A – Basic Static Analysis*

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I) **Filename:** 9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87.danger

## PE-Studio – Screenshot Results

The results from PE-Studio flag those items that are suspicious and provide the category of and hints regarding the techniques being used.

### Strings Output:

encoding ...	size ...	location	flag (36)	label (96)	group (10)	technique (10)	value
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	file	T1485   Data Destruction	DeleteFile
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	T1106   Execution through API	CreateProcess
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	MoveFileEx
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	GetCurrentProcess
ascii	24	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	Process32First
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	Process32Next
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	memory	T1055   Process Injection	VirtualAlloc
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	memory	T1055   Process Injection	VirtualProtect
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	T1055   Process Injection	ZwResumeThread
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptAcquireContext
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptReleaseContext
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptGenKey
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptDestroyKey
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptExportKey
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptImportKey
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptEncrypt
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptDecrypt
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	SystemFunction036
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Info...	CryptStringToBinary
ascii	16	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	windowing	-	GetDesktopWindow
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	GetAdaptersInfo
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	InternetOpen
ascii	19	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	InternetCloseHandle
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	InternetConnect
ascii	16	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	InternetReadFile
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	HttpOpenRequest
ascii	21	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	HttpAddRequestHeaders
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	HttpSendRequest
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	HttpQueryInfo
ascii	21	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	network	-	ObtainUserAgentString
ascii	23	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	memory	-	ZwAllocateVirtualMemory
ascii	20	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	memory	-	ZwWriteVirtualMemory
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	file	-	WriteFile
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	file	-	SetFileAttributes
ascii	18	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	x	import	execution	-	ZwSetContextThread
ascii	5	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	-	execution	T1497   Sandbox Evasion	Sleep
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	dynamic-library	T1106   Execution through API	LoadLibrary
ascii	8	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	CopyFile
ascii	18	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	reconnaissance	T1083   File and Directory Disco...	GetSystemDirectory
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	reconnaissance	T1082   System Information Dis...	GetComputerName
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	reconnaissance	T1082   System Information Dis...	GetComputerNameEx
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	reconnaissance	T1033   System Owner/User Dis...	GetUserName
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	synchronization	-	ReleaseMutex
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	synchronization	-	CreateMutex
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	reconnaissance	-	GetSystemInfo
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	reconnaissance	-	GetVersionEx
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	file	network	-	IPHLPAPI.dll
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	file	network	-	WININET.dll
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	file	network	-	urlmon.dll
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	memory	-	LocalAlloc
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	memory	-	LocalSize
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	memory	-	LocalFree
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	file	-	CreateFile
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	import	file	-	GetTempPath

encoding ...	size ...	location	flag (36)	label (96)	group (10)	technique (10)	value
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">file</a>	-	<a href="#">GetTempPath</a>
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">file</a>	-	<a href="#">GetTempFileName</a>
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">file</a>	-	<a href="#">SHGetFolderPath</a>
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">file</a>	-	<a href="#">PathAppend</a>
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">execution</a>	-	<a href="#">CreateThread</a>
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">execution</a>	-	<a href="#">ExitProcess</a>
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">execution</a>	-	<a href="#">IsWow64Process</a>
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">dynamic-library</a>	-	<a href="#">GetModuleHandle</a>
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">dynamic-library</a>	-	<a href="#">GetProcAddress</a>
ascii	17	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">dynamic-library</a>	-	<a href="#">GetModuleFileName</a>
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	<a href="#">diagnostic</a>	-	<a href="#">GetLastError</a>
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">file</a>	<a href="#">cryptography</a>	-	<a href="#">CRYPT32.dll</a>
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">CloseHandle</a>
ascii	8	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">wsprintf</a>
ascii	11	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GetWindowDC</a>
ascii	9	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">ReleaseDC</a>
ascii	13	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GetWindowRect</a>
ascii	22	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">CreateCompatibleBitmap</a>
ascii	18	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">CreateCompatibleDC</a>
ascii	8	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">DeleteDC</a>
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">DeleteObject</a>
ascii	12	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">SelectObject</a>
ascii	21	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">CreateStreamOnHGlobal</a>
ascii	10	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">StrToIntEx</a>
ascii	14	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GdiplusStartup</a>
ascii	15	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GdiplusShutdown</a>
ascii	16	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GdipDisposeImage</a>
ascii	21	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GdipSaveImageToStream</a>
ascii	27	<a href="#">section:.rdata</a>	-	<a href="#">import</a>	-	-	<a href="#">GdipCreateBitmapFromHBITMAP</a>

## Sections:

The provided footprints here enable each section to be researched using the SHA256 value.

property	value	value	value	value	value
section	section[0]	section[1]	section[2]	section[3]	section[4]
name	.text	.rdata	.data	.rsrc	.reloc
footprint > sha256	8B700495F6F1CAD69F16BD5...	42805D0F03AA57584026D96...	D4294B046657EF6F80C2A6C...	79E650FC0D108F0B5CB9099...	541CABBBBA3BD01F1E
entropy	6.224	5.106	0.913	4.696	2.389
file-ratio (93.10%)	55.17 %	20.69 %	3.45 %	3.45 %	10.34 %
raw-address (begin)	0x00000400	0x00002400	0x00003000	0x00003200	0x00003400
raw-address (end)	0x00002400	0x00003000	0x00003200	0x00003400	0x00003A00
raw-size (13824 bytes)	0x00000200 (8192 bytes)	0x00000C00 (3072 bytes)	0x00000200 (512 bytes)	0x00000200 (512 bytes)	0x00000600 (1536 bytes)
virtual-address	0x00001000	0x00003000	0x00004000	0x00005000	0x00006000
virtual-size (13138 bytes)	0x00001EBA (7866 bytes)	0x00000B5C (2908 bytes)	0x000002DC (732 bytes)	0x000001E0 (480 bytes)	0x00000480 (1152 bytes)
characteristics	0x60000020	0x40000040	0xC0000040	0x40000040	0x42000040
write	-	-	x	-	-
execute	x	-	-	-	-
share	-	-	-	-	-
self-modifying	-	-	-	-	-
virtual	-	-	-	-	-
items		0x00003234	-	-	-
directory > import	-	-	-	0x00005000	-
directory > resource	-	-	-	-	0x00006000
directory > relocation	-	-	-	-	-
directory > import-address	-	0x00003000	-	-	-
manifest	-	-	-	0x00003260	-
base-of-code	0x00001000	-	-	-	-
base-of-data	-	0x00003000	-	-	-
entry-point	0x000028D8	-	-	-	-

## Imports:

Those imports that are flagged in red below are critical to understanding this virus. It clearly indicates that the file performs copies, and includes: obfuscation, cryptography key manipulation, file executions, discovery of processes and process injections, data destruction, attempts to retrieve system file data and connect to the network for exfiltration, attempts at evasion, and attempts to gain persistent access.

imports (84)	flag (36)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	hint	group (10)	technique (10)	t	library (0)
CryptAcquireContextA	x	0x000003806	0x000003806	176 (0x00B0)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptDecrypt	x	0x000003888	0x000003888	180 (0x00B4)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptDestroyKey	x	0x000003842	0x000003842	183 (0x00B7)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptEncrypt	x	0x000003878	0x000003878	186 (0x00BA)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptExportKey	x	0x000003854	0x000003854	191 (0x00BF)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptGenKey	x	0x000003834	0x000003834	192 (0x00C0)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptImportKey	x	0x000003866	0x000003866	202 (0x00CA)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptReleaseContext	x	0x00000381E	0x00000381E	203 (0x00CB)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
SystemFunction036	x	0x000003898	0x000003898	753 (0x2F1)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
CryptStringToBinaryA	x	0x000003A8A	0x000003A8A	216 (0x00D8)	cryptography	T1027   Obfuscated Files or Information	i.	CRYPT32.dll
CreateProcessA	x	0x000003586	0x000003586	164 (0x00A4)	execution	T1106   Execution through API	i.	KERNEL32.dll
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot	x	0x0000036D2	0x0000036D2	190 (0x00BE)	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetCurrentProcess	x	0x000003598	0x000003598	448 (0x1C0)	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
Process32First	x	0x0000036EE	0x0000036EE	917 (0x395)	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
Process32Next	x	0x000003700	0x000003700	919 (0x397)	execution	T1057   Process Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
ZwResumeThread	x	0x000003966	0x000003966	1591 (0x0637)	execution	T1055   Process Injection	i.	ntdll.dll
ZwSetContextThread	x	0x000003978	0x000003978	1602 (0x0642)	execution	-	i.	ntdll.dll
DeleteFileA	x	0x00000365E	0x00000365E	211 (0x00D3)	file	T1485   Data Destruction	i.	KERNEL32.dll
MoveFileExA	x	0x000003678	0x000003678	863 (0x35F)	file	T1105   Remote File Copy	i.	KERNEL32.dll
SetFileAttributesA	x	0x000003648	0x000003648	1118 (0x405E)	file	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
WriteFile	x	0x0000035E2	0x0000035E2	1317 (0x5025)	file	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
VirtualAlloc	x	0x000003710	0x000003710	1257 (0x40E9)	memory	T1055   Process Injection	i.	KERNEL32.dll
VirtualProtect	x	0x000003720	0x000003720	1263 (0x04EF)	memory	T1055   Process Injection	i.	KERNEL32.dll
ZwAllocateVirtualMemory	x	0x000003934	0x000003934	1312 (0x0520)	memory	-	i.	ntdll.dll
ZwWriteVirtualMemory	x	0x00000394E	0x00000394E	1682 (0x0692)	memory	-	i.	ntdll.dll
GetAdaptersInfo	x	0x000003998	0x000003998	63 (0x003F)	network	-	i.	IPHLPAPI.dll
HttpAddRequestHeadersA	x	0x000003A1A	0x000003A1A	82 (0x0052)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
HttpOpenRequestA	x	0x000003A06	0x000003A06	87 (0x0057)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
HttpQueryInfoA	x	0x000003A48	0x000003A48	89 (0x0059)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
HttpSendRequestA	x	0x000003A34	0x000003A34	91 (0x005B)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
InternetCloseHandle	x	0x0000039C8	0x0000039C8	107 (0x006B)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
InternetConnectA	x	0x0000039DE	0x0000039DE	113 (0x0071)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
InternetOpenA	x	0x0000039B8	0x0000039B8	151 (0x0097)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
InternetReadFile	x	0x0000039F2	0x0000039F2	159 (0x009F)	network	-	i.	WININET.dll
ObtainUserAgentString	x	0x000003A66	0x000003A66	84 (0x0054)	network	-	i.	urlmon.dll
GetDesktopWindow	x	0x000003776	0x000003776	291 (0x0123)	windowing	-	i.	USER32.dll
BitBlt	-	0x000003796	0x000003796	19 (0x0013)	-	-	i.	GDI32.dll
CreateCompatibleBitmap	-	0x0000037A0	0x0000037A0	47 (0x002F)	-	-	i.	GDI32.dll
CreateCompatibleDC	-	0x0000037BA	0x0000037BA	48 (0x0030)	-	-	i.	GDI32.dll
DeleteDC	-	0x0000037D0	0x0000037D0	227 (0x00E3)	-	-	i.	GDI32.dll
DeleteObject	-	0x0000037DC	0x0000037DC	230 (0x00E6)	-	-	i.	GDI32.dll
SelectObject	-	0x0000037EC	0x0000037EC	631 (0x277)	-	-	i.	GDI32.dll
CloseHandle	-	0x0000034D0	0x0000034D0	82 (0x0052)	-	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
IstrcpyA	-	0x00000355E	0x00000355E	1351 (0x0547)	-	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
IstrlenA	-	0x00000356A	0x00000356A	1357 (0x054D)	-	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
StrToIntExA	-	0x00000391A	0x00000391A	332 (0x014C)	-	-	i.	SHLWAPI.dll
GetWindowDC	-	0x00000374C	0x00000374C	402 (0x0192)	-	-	i.	USER32.dll
GetWindowRect	-	0x000003766	0x000003766	412 (0x019C)	-	-	i.	USER32.dll
ReleaseDC	-	0x00000375A	0x00000375A	613 (0x265)	-	-	i.	USER32.dll
wsprintfA	-	0x000003740	0x000003740	818 (0x0332)	-	-	i.	USER32.dll
GdipCreateBitmapFromHBITM...	-	0x000003AEE	0x000003AEE	77 (0x004D)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
GdipDisposeImage	-	0x000003AD2	0x000003AD2	152 (0x0098)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
GdipGetImageEncoders	-	0x000003B38	0x000003B38	286 (0x011E)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
GdipGetImageEncodersSize	-	0x000003B1C	0x000003B1C	287 (0x011F)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
GdipSaveImageToStream	-	0x000003AE6	0x000003AE6	497 (0x01F1)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
GdiplusShutdown	-	0x000003AC0	0x000003AC0	628 (0x0274)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
GdiplusStartup	-	0x000003AAE	0x000003AAE	629 (0x0275)	-	-	i.	gdiplus.dll
CreateStreamOnHGlobal	-	0x0000038EA	0x0000038EA	134 (0x0086)	-	-	i.	ole32.dll
GetLastError	-	0x0000035BA	0x0000035BA	514 (0x0202)	diagnostic	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetModuleFileNameA	-	0x00000360E	0x00000360E	531 (0x0213)	dynamic-li...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetModuleHandleA	-	0x0000034DE	0x0000034DE	533 (0x0215)	dynamic-li...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetProcAddress	-	0x000003516	0x000003516	581 (0x0245)	dynamic-li...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
LoadLibraryA	-	0x000003576	0x000003576	828 (0x033C)	dynamic-li...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
CreateThread	-	0x00000354E	0x00000354E	181 (0x0085)	dynamic-li...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
ExitProcess	-	0x0000035AC	0x0000035AC	281 (0x0119)	execution	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
IsWow64Process	-	0x0000036C0	0x0000036C0	782 (0x030E)	execution	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
Sleep	-	0x0000035DA	0x0000035DA	1202 (0x04B2)	execution	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
CopyFileA	-	0x00000366C	0x00000366C	112 (0x0070)	file	T1106   Execution through API	i.	KERNEL32.dll
CreateFileA	-	0x000003508	0x000003508	136 (0x0088)	file	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetTempFileNameA	-	0x000003634	0x000003634	642 (0x0282)	file	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetTempPathA	-	0x000003624	0x000003624	644 (0x0284)	file	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
SHGetFolderPathA	-	0x0000038CA	0x0000038CA	191 (0x008F)	file	-	i.	SHELL32.dll
PathAppendA	-	0x00000390C	0x00000390C	51 (0x0033)	file	-	i.	SHLWAPI.dll
LocalAlloc	-	0x000003528	0x000003528	836 (0x0344)	memory	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
LocalFree	-	0x000003542	0x000003542	840 (0x0348)	memory	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
LocalSize	-	0x000003536	0x000003536	845 (0x034D)	memory	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetUserNameA	-	0x0000038AC	0x0000038AC	356 (0x0164)	reconnaissance...	T1033   System Owner/User Discovery	i.	ADVAPI32.dll
GetComputerNameA	-	0x000003686	0x000003686	396 (0x018C)	reconnaissance...	T1082   System Information Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetComputerNameExA	-	0x00000369A	0x00000369A	397 (0x018D)	reconnaissance...	T1082   System Information Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetSystemDirectoryA	-	0x0000034F2	0x0000034F2	623 (0x026F)	reconnaissance...	T1083   File and Directory Discovery	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetSystemInfo	-	0x0000035EE	0x0000035EE	627 (0x0273)	reconnaissance...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
GetVersionExA	-	0x0000036B0	0x0000036B0	675 (0x02A3)	reconnaissance...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
CreateMutexA	-	0x0000035FE	0x0000035FE	155 (0x009B)	synchronization...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll
ReleaseMutex	-	0x0000035CA	0x0000035CA	1018 (0x03FA)	synchronization...	-	i.	KERNEL32.dll

## Import Directory:

library (13)	du...	flag (4)	first-thunk-original (INT)	first-thunk (IAT)	type (1)	imports (84)	group	description
KERNEL32.dll	-	-	0x000033AA4	0x00003058	implicit	37	-	Windows NT BASE API Client
USER32.dll	-	-	0x00003450	0x00003104	implicit	5	-	Multi-User Windows USER API Client Library
GDI32.dll	-	-	0x00003380	0x00003034	implicit	6	-	GDI Client Library
ADVAPI32.dll	-	-	0x0000334C	0x00003000	implicit	10	-	Advanced Windows 32 Base API
SHELL32.dll	-	-	0x0000343C	0x000030F0	implicit	1	-	Windows Shell Library
OLE32.dll	-	-	0x000034C0	0x00003174	implicit	1	-	Microsoft OLE for Windows
SHLWAPI.dll	-	-	0x00003444	0x000030F8	implicit	2	-	Shell Light-weight Utility Library
NTDLL.dll	-	-	0x000034AC	0x00003160	implicit	4	-	NT Layer
IPHLPAPI.DLL	-	x	0x0000339C	0x00003050	implicit	1	network	IP Helper API
WININET.dll	-	x	0x00003468	0x0000311C	implicit	8	network	Internet Extensions for Win32 Library
URLMON.dll	-	x	0x000034C8	0x0000317C	implicit	1	network	OLE32 Extensions for Win32
CRYPT32.dll	-	x	0x00003378	0x0000302C	implicit	1	cryptography	Windows Crypto Library
GDIPUS.dll	-	-	0x0000348C	0x00003140	implicit	2	-	Microsoft GDI+ Library

## Manifest:

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' standalone='yes'?>
<assembly xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1" manifestVersion='1.0'>
  <trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
    <security>
      <requestedPrivileges>
        <requestedExecutionLevel level='asInvoker' uiAccess='false' />
      </requestedPrivileges>
    </security>
  </trustInfo>
</assembly>
```

## Malware Initial Assessment:

You can see from this screenshot that there are a number of flags in red. These indicate:

- Libraries related to networking, system information, and cryptography are being used for network communication, information gathering, and encryption tasks
- The Libraries “IP Helper API”, “Internet Extensions for Win32 Library”, “OLE32 Extensions for Win32”, and “Windows Crypto Library” imply that the executable has the capability to interact with network configurations, perform internet operations, and utilize cryptographic functions
- The MITRE ATT&CK Techniques listed for such things as reconnaissance, synchronization, dynamic-library, file, execution, and memory indicate that this file may have known malicious behavior
- You’ll notice that most of the information related to the red flags were seen in the list of Unicode Strings output
- The manifest “asInvoker” means the file does not require elevated privileges to run, which is an attempt by the attacker to avoid suspicion during execution

indicator (17)	detail	level
libraries > flag	IP Helper API	1
libraries > flag	Internet Extensions for Win32 Library	1
libraries > flag	OLE32 Extensions for Win32	1
libraries > flag	Windows Crypto Library	1
imports > flag	36	1
file > checksum	0x00000000	2
groups > API	reconnaissance   synchronization   dynamic-library   file   execution   me...	2
mitre > technique	T1485   T1105   T1082   T1057   T1055   T1497   T1106   T1083   T1027   T1033	2
file > entropy	5.726	3
file > sha256	9A00F0EDC87A44D10369FDB9F35EBE1B1DF57E01719A5B48AC3EDDC068...	3
file > size	14848 bytes	3
rich-header > checksum	0x086C7C87	3
rich-header > offset	0x00000080	3
rich-header > footprint	4C7142CDE4CE96EC467470BB9DE8913BC7D04335D5E9047EC3A9BE93EB...	3
file > tooling	Visual Studio 2008	3
file > subsystem	GUI	3
imphash > md5	F7698A47CB1463ADC6420E55F320386C	3

---

## *Appendix B – Advanced Static Analysis*

---

## IDAPro– Screenshot Results

The results from IDAPro are very detailed and show that the C code used in this program contained intentional hiding of malicious functions (called obfuscation). Following sub-functions

Functions List:

# IDAPRO FUNCTIONS LIST						
Function name	Segment	Start	Length	Locals	Arguments	R
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot	.text	00402E6C	6	0	8	R
GdipCreateBitmapFromHBITMAP	.text	00402EA8	6	0	0000000C	R
GdipDisposeImage	.text	00402E9C	6	0	4	R
GdipGetImageEncoders	.text	00402EB4	6	0	0000000C	R
GdipGetImageEncodersSize	.text	00402EAE	6	0	8	R
GdipSaveImageToStream	.text	00402EA2	6	0	10	R
GdiplusShutdown	.text	4.02E+98	6	0	4	R
GdiplusStartup	.text	4.02E+92	6	0	0000000C	R
GetAdaptersInfo	.text	4.02E+86	6	0	8	R
ObtainUserAgentString	.text	00402E8A	6	0	0000000C	R
Process32First	.text	4.02E+74	6	0	8	R
Process32Next	.text	4.02E+80	6	0	8	R
StartAddress	.text	004028AE	0000002A	8	4	R
SystemFunction036	.text	00402E7E	6	0	8	R
start	.text	004028D8	43	4		.
sub_401000	.text	401000	0000021E	250	18	R
sub_40121E	.text	0040121E	17	4	4	R
sub_401235	.text	401235	160	000003EC	4	R
sub_401395	.text	401395	79	4	10	R
sub_40140E	.text	0040140E	16	4	4	R
sub_401424	.text	401424	16	4	4	R
sub_40143A	.text	0040143A	000000B4	10	4	R
sub_4014EE	.text	004014EE	000000CB	64	14	R
sub_4015B9	.text	004015B9	33	4	4	R
sub_4015EC	.text	004015EC	000000DF	68	14	R
sub_4016CB	.text	004016CB	0000006C	10	0000000C	R
sub_401737	.text	401737	0000009F	64	4	R
sub_4017D6	.text	004017D6	30	0		R
sub_401806	.text	401806	24	8	8	R


sub_40182A	.text	0040182A	000000A7	54	8	R
sub_4018D1	.text	004018D1	78	0000005C	10	R
sub_401949	.text	401949	19	4	0000000C	R
sub_401962	.text	401962	26	4	8	R
sub_401988	.text	401988	0E+00	0000000C	0000000C	R
sub_401A70	.text	00401A70	22	4	5	R
sub_401A92	.text	00401A92	29	4	8	R
sub_401ABB	.text	00401ABB	48	8	8	R
sub_401B03	.text	00401B03	0000001C	8	4	R
sub_401B1F	.text	00401B1F	14	4	4	R
sub_401B33	.text	00401B33	10	4	4	R
sub_401B43	.text	00401B43	37	4	0000000C	R
sub_401B7A	.text	00401B7A	0000002C	4	0000000C	R
sub_401BA6	.text	00401BA6	20	4	0000000C	R
sub_401BC6	.text	00401BC6	23	4	8	R
sub_401BE9	.text	00401BE9	18	4	4	R
sub_401C01	.text	00401C01	17	4	4	R
sub_401C18	.text	00401C18	44	0000010C		R
sub_401C5C	.text	00401C5C	0000003C	4		R
sub_401C98	.text	00401C98	000000C2	0000013C		R
sub_401D5A	.text	00401D5A	42	8	8	R
sub_401D9C	.text	00401D9C	0000008C	218	8	R
sub_401E28	.text	4.01E+30	48	10		R
sub_401E70	.text	4.01E+72	99	10	8	R
sub_401F09	.text	00401F09	75	48		R
sub_401F7E	.text	00401F7E	000000BA	40	0000000C	R
sub_402038	.text	402038	0000003C	10	0000000C	R
sub_402074	.text	402074	51	10	8	R
sub_4020C5	.text	004020C5	140	18	14	R
sub_402205	.text	402205	0000004B	0000000C		R
sub_402250	.text	402250	0000012A	10	8	R
sub_40237A	.text	0040237A	29	4		R
sub_4023A3	.text	004023A3	000000D7	64		R
sub_40247A	.text	0040247A	0000010B	150	4	R
sub_402585	.text	402585	61	18		R
sub_4025E6	.text	4.025E+09	0000000E	0		R
sub_4025F4	.text	004025F4	0000005B	0000000C		R
sub_40264F	.text	0040264F	74	34	0000000D	R
sub_4026C3	.text	004026C3	0000004A	10	9	R
sub_40270D	.text	0040270D	000000D6	120		R
sub_4027E3	.text	4.027E+06	000000CB	0	4	R
sub_40291C	.text	0040291C	51	0000000C	8	R

sub_40296D	.text	0040296D	000000F8	10	8	R
sub_402A65	.text	00402A65	000000A0	10	10	R
sub_402B05	.text	00402B05	38	8	0000000C	R
sub_402B3D	.text	00402B3D	14	4	4	R
sub_402B51	.text	00402B51	000000F3	84	0000000C	R
sub_402C44	.text	00402C44	000000B2	30		R
sub_402CF6	.text	00402CF6	000000FC	30	4	R
sub_402DF2	.text	00402DF2	0000003F	10	4	R
sub_402E31	.text	4.02E+33	25	8	8	R
sub_402E56	.text	4.02E+58	15	4	8	R

#### Function Call List:

Address	Called function
.text:004028E6	call ds:GetModuleFileNameA
.text:004028F2	call sub_401BC6
.text:004028F7	call sub_4023A3
.text:004028FC	call sub_40237A
.text:00402901	call sub_402585
.text:0040290B	call sub_401235
.text:00402915	call ds:ExitProcess

#### Function Start:



```

; Attributes: noreturn

public start
start proc near
push    esi
push    104h          ; nSize
mov     esi, offset String2
push    esi            ; lpFilename
push    0              ; hModule
call    ds:GetModuleFileNameA
push    esi            ; lpString2
push    offset ExistingFileName ; lpString1
call    sub_401BC6
call    sub_4023A3
call    sub_40237A
call    sub_402585
push    offset sub_4027E3
call    sub_401235
add    esp, 0Ch
push    0              ; uExitCode
call    ds:ExitProcess
start endp

```

## Radare2– Screenshot Results

This shows a different view of the disassembled code. The presence of a call to "GetModuleFileNameA" indicates that the program is retrieving its own module's file path. This is common for virus files to attempt to alter the file and possibly self-replicate. The instructions involving "esi" and pushing offsets followed by "call" instructions often indicates that the malware is manipulating strings and/or memory.

```
/ 67: entry:  .exp.0x004028d8      56          push    esi
0x004028d9      6804010000      push    0x104
0x004028de      be30404000      mov     esi, 0x404030      ; '0@@'
0x004028e3      56          push    esi
0x004028e4      6a00          push    0
0x004028e6      ff1560304000      call    dword [sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_GetModuleFileNameA] ; 0x403060 ; DWORD GetModuleFileNameA(HMODULE hModule, LPSTR lpfilename, DWORD nSize)
0x004028ec      56          push    esi
0x004028ed      6838414000      push    0x404138      ; LPSTR lpString2
0x004028f2      e8cff2ffff      call    fcn.00401bc6      ; '8A@' ; int32_t arg_8h
0x004028f7      e8a7faffff      call    fcn.004023a3
0x004028fc      e879faffff      call    fcn.0040237a
0x00402901      e87ffcffff      call    fcn.00402585
0x00402906      68e3274000      push    0x4027e3      ; int32_t arg_8h
0x0040290b      e825e9ffff      call    fcn.00401235
0x00402910      83c40c          add    esp, 0xc
0x00402913      6a00          push    0
0x00402915      ff15a4304000      call    dword [sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_ExitProcess] ; 0x4030a4 ; VOID ExitProcess(UINT uExitCode)
[0x004028d8]>
```

## DetectItEasy– Screenshot Results

These screenshots show a more advanced Static snapshot of the file. The Entropy screenshot shows that the

### Basic Information:

The screenshot shows the Detect It Easy interface with the following details:

- File name:** C:\Users\Corinne\Desktop\9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35be1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77fb7.danger
- File type:** PE32
- File size:** 14.50 KB
- Base address:** 00400000
- Entry point:** 004028d8
- Sections:** 0005
- Time date stamp:** 2015-06-26 16:12:52
- Size of image:** 00007000
- Architecture:** I386
- Type:** GUI

Scan results for PE32:


- Operation system: Windows(XP)[I386, 32-bit, GUI]
- Linker: Microsoft Linker(11.00.60610)
- Compiler: Microsoft Visual C/C++(17.00.60610)[C/C++]
- Language: C/C++
- Tool: Visual Studio(2012)

Scan options at the bottom:

- Signatures
- Recursive scan
- Deep scan
- Heuristic scan
- Verbose
- Directory
- Log
- All types
- Scan button
- 586 msec

## Entropy:

This entropy graph indicates that the file was not packed. Typically, the entropy value of a section that is 7 or above would indicate that there is a function within that section that is packed.



---

## *Appendix C – Basic Dynamic Analysis*


---

## Regshot Screenshots


Registry scans are taken before and after running and dynamically analyzing the active processes, file creations/deletions, attempts to connect to the network, etc. Regshot then does a compare of the two scans to provide output on what has changed by running the malicious file. The comparison file is far too large to insert here, but the suspicious changes to the registry were recorded.

## Process Explorer Screenshots

### Snapshot Before Running the Malicious File:



### Snapshot After Running the Malicious File:



## Procman Output Summaries

## File Summary:

Procmon-FileSummary

File Time	Total Events	Opens	Closes	Reads	Writes	Read Bytes	Write Bytes	Get ACL	Set ACL	Other	Path
0.0280332	244	46	44	36	0	496,416	0	14	0	104	<Total>
0.0067880	23	2	2	13	0	180,224	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\wpnapps.dll
0.0027401	17	2	2	7	0	102,400	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthAgent.dll
0.0038039	15	3	3	2	0	12,288	0	1	0	6	C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthUdk.dll
0.0007027	15	2	2	2	0	24,576	0	1	0	8	C:\Windows\System32\wlwp.dll
0.0005561	14	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	C:\Windows\System32\vpcss.dll
0.0022095	11	2	2	1	0	8,192	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\msxml6.dll
0.0002310	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\OneCoreUAPCommonProxyStub.dll
0.0032228	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthProxyStub.dll
0.0003772	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\ShellCommonCommonProxyStub.dll
0.0000862	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\WinTypes.dll
0.0001457	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\kernel.appcore.dll
0.0001042	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\msasn1.dll
0.0000881	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\msvcp110_win.dll
0.0001837	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\ntmarta.dll
0.0002191	10	2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	5	C:\Windows\System32\policymanager.dll
0.0001267	8	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	C:\Windows\System32\msxml6.dll
0.0000883	7	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	C:\Windows\System32\imm32.dll
0.0001004	7	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	C:\Windows\System32\oleaut32.dll
0.0000917	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	C:\Windows\System32\SecurityHealthHost.exe
0.0004520	6	1	1	1	0	20,480	0	0	0	3	C:\Windows\System32\en-US\SecurityHealthAgent.dll.mui
0.0027159	5	1	1	2	0	16,260	0	0	0	1	C:\Windows\Prefetch\SECURITYHEALTHHOST.EXE-06344EE9.pf
0.0012725	5	0	0	5	0	131,072	0	0	0	0	C:\Windows\System32\config\SOFTWARE
0.0001059	5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	C:\Windows\System32\en-US\KernelBase.dll.mui
0.0014779	3	0	0	3	0	924	0	0	0	0	C:\\$MapAttributeValue
0.0000407	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C:\Windows\System32\MsMpLics.dll
0.0000450	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	C:\Windows\System32\SHCore.dll
0.0000412	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll
0.000097	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	C:\Windows\System32\shell32.dll
0.000070	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	C:\Windows\System32\shlwapi.dll

## Registry Summary:

Registry Time	Total Events	Opens	Closes	Reads	Writes	Other	Path
0.0834646	1,174	426	209	326	7	206	<Total>
0.00001157	12	4	4	0	4	0	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\PolicyManager\default\AppHVS1\AllowAppHVS1
0.0000445	8	2	1	0	1	4	HKCU\Software\Classes\Local Settings
0.0003037	46	2	2	0	0	41	HKLM
0.0000222	3	1	1	0	1	0	HKLM\Software\Microsoft\COM3
0.0043773	46	2	2	0	0	42	HKCR
0.00002	7	3	3	0	0	0	HKCR\{AppID\}\{7E55A26D-EF95-4A45-9F55-21E52ADF9878}
0.0000736	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
0.0000141	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
0.0000508	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000462	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000274	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
0.0000453	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000683	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
0.0000491	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000053	3	0	0	3	0	0	0
0.0000057	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000369	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000426	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000056	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000560	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000060	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000058	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000388	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000050	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0000064	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
0.0004427	32	7	7	0	0	18	HKCR\CLSID\{0B728914-3F57-4D52-9E31-49DAEC5A80A}\SRPTrustLevel
0.0000574	4	0	0	4	0	0	0
0.0000488	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
0.0000796	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
0.0000081	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
0.0001049	2	2	0	0	0	0	0

Filter... 341 items Save... Close

HKCR\CLSID\{0B728914-3F57-4D52-9E31-49DAEC5A80A}\ActivateOnHostFlags

HKCR\CLSID\{0B728914-3F57-4D52-9E31-49DAEC5A80A}\AppID

HKCR\CLSID\{0B728914-3F57-4D52-9E31-49DAEC5A80A}\Elevation

HKCR\CLSID\{0B728914-3F57-4D52-9E31-49DAEC5A80A}\InprocHandler


76°F Haze

Search

4:54 PM 3/26/2024

To direct input to this VM, click inside or press Ctrl+G.

### Process Activity Summary:



### Count Values Occurrences Summary:

The screenshot shows the 'Count Values Occurrences' window. At the top, there's a header bar with the title 'Count Values Occurrences'. Below it, a table lists various file operations along with their counts. The columns are 'Value' and 'Count'. The table includes entries like CloseFile (44), CreateFile (46), CreateFileMapping (44), FileSystemControl (14), Load Image (40), Process Exit (1), Process Start (1), QueryBasicInformationFile (20), QueryEAFile (14), QueryNameInformationFile (7), QuerySecurityFile (14), QueryStandardInformationFile (5), ReadFile (36), RegCloseKey (209), RegOpenKey (426), RegQueryKey (206), RegQueryValue (326), RegSetInfoKey (7), Thread Create (8), and Thread Exit (8). A 'Column:' dropdown menu is set to 'Operation'. At the bottom right are buttons for 'Save...' and 'Close'.

Value	Count
CloseFile	44
CreateFile	46
CreateFileMapping	44
FileSystemControl	14
Load Image	40
Process Exit	1
Process Start	1
QueryBasicInformationFile	20
QueryEAFile	14
QueryNameInformationFile	7
QuerySecurityFile	14
QueryStandardInformationFile	5
ReadFile	36
RegCloseKey	209
RegOpenKey	426
RegQueryKey	206
RegQueryValue	326
RegSetInfoKey	7
Thread Create	8
Thread Exit	8

### LogFile Summary:

Included in Zip File. This logfile was essential to identifying what the malicious software was doing upon execution and trying to do after. It also confirmed that most of the strings that were identified as suspicious early on did turn out to be malicious.


## Wireshark Results

The Wireshark output is far too large to include here, but as you can see, the malicious file did make efforts to get out to the network to go to this url (highlighted in black):

... 61.451562	localhost	localhost	TCP	44	0	50721 → ddi-tcp-1(8888) [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=262144 Len=0
... 61.465454	localhost	localhost	HTTP	403	359	GET http://adobe-dns-3-adobe.com/wlemf.php?fyuj=4156b7a30441&dfrofe=ASCmx
... 61.465526	localhost	localhost	TCP	44	0	ddi-tcp-1(8888) → 50721 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=360 Win=2160896 Len=0

## Anitvirus Screenshots

Notifications from Windows Antivirus During Execution of file:



## Windows Defender Alert Screenshot

As you can see, Windows Defender did recognize and quarantine this malicious file.



## 🕒 Protection history

View the latest protection actions and recommendations from Windows Security.

Filtered by: Quarantined Items

Filters ▾



Threat quarantined

3/26/2024 4:18 PM

Severe ^

Detected: Trojan:Win32/CobaltStrike!rfn

Status: Quarantined

Quarantined files are in a restricted area where they can't harm your device. They will be removed automatically.

Date: 3/26/2024 4:18 PM

Details: This program is dangerous and executes commands from an attacker.

Affected items:

file: C:\Users\Corinne\Desktop

\9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87.danger.exe

[Learn more](#)

Actions ▾



Threat blocked

3/20/2024 8:56 PM

High

---

## *Appendix D – Advanced Static Analysis*

---

## Capa File Analysis

The Capa utility shows how each of the functions works, what they are trying to do, and how the program flows. This provided the most essential information in discovering the functionality of the code.

```
md5                      c9b105ec2412ac0e2ace20bfa71e1450
sha1                     3cef1ca36a78cba308fb29a46b20e5ca22d03289
sha256                   9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48ac3eddc068f77f87
path
C:/Users/Corinne/Desktop/Danger2/FinalRE/9a00f0edc87a44d10369fdb9f35ebe1b1df57e01719a5b48
ac3eddc068f77f87.danger
timestamp                2024-03-29 01:24:55.870681
capa version              7.0.1
os                        windows
format                    pe
arch                      i386
analysis                  static
extractor                 VivisectFeatureExtractor
base address               0x400000
rules                     C:/Users/Corinne/AppData/Local/Temp/_MEI84762/rules
function count             79
library function count     2
total feature count        3086

allocate memory (2 matches, only showing first match of library rule)
author 0x534a@mailbox.org, @mr-tz
scope basic block
mbc   Memory::Allocate Memory [C0007]
basic block @ 0x4012C9 in function 0x401235
or:
api: ZwAllocateVirtualMemory @ 0x4012EC

allocate or change RW memory (library rule)
author 0x534a@mailbox.org, @mr-tz
scope basic block
mbc   Memory::Allocate Memory [C0007]
basic block @ 0x402B05 in function 0x402B05
and:
or:
match: allocate memory @ 0x402B05
or:
api: VirtualAlloc @ 0x402B1C
or:
number: 0x4 = PAGE_READWRITE @ 0x402B0C

change memory protection (library rule)
author @mr-tz
scope basic block
mbc   Memory::Change Memory Protection [C0008]
basic block @ 0x402A24 in function 0x40296D
or:
api: VirtualProtect @ 0x402A32

contain loop (23 matches, only showing first match of library rule)
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope function
function @ 0x401000
or:
characteristic: loop @ 0x401000

create or open file (4 matches, only showing first match of library rule)
author michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com, joakim@intezzer.com
scope basic block
mbc   File System::Create File [C0016]
basic block @ 0x401D9C in function 0x401D9C
or:
api: CreateFile @ 0x401DE4
```

```

delay execution (2 matches, only showing first match of library rule)
author      michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com, @ramen0x3f
scope       basic block
mbc        Anti-Behavioral Analysis::Dynamic Analysis Evasion::Delayed Execution
[B0003.003]
references  https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sync/wait-functions,
https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/blob/master/al-
khaser/TimingAttacks/timing.cpp
basic block @ 0x402228 in function 0x402205
or:
and:
os: windows
or:
api: Sleep @ 0x40222D

get OS version (library rule)
author  @mr-tz
scope   function
function @ 0x40247A
or:
api: GetVersionEx @ 0x4024D1

write process memory (library rule)
author  moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope   function
att&ck  Defense Evasion::Process Injection [T1055]
function @ 0x401235
or:
api: ZwWriteVirtualMemory @ 0x401326

get MAC address on Windows
namespace  collection/network
author      moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com,
eichernofsky@google.com
scope       function
att&ck    Discovery::System Information Discovery [T1082]
references  https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser/blob/master/al-
khaser/Shared/Utils.cpp#L128,
https://evasions.checkpoint.com/techniques/network.html#check-if-mac-address-is-specific
function @ 0x4023A3
and:
os: windows
or:
and:
api: GetAdaptersInfo @ 0x4023B6, 0x4023CB
or:
offset: 0x194 = IP_ADAPTER_INFO.Address @ 0x4023F0

capture screenshot
namespace  collection/screenshot
author      moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, @_re_fox, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope       function
att&ck    Collection::Screen Capture [T1113]
mbc      Collection::Screen Capture::WinAPI [E1113.m01]
function @ 0x402C44
or:
and:
or:
api: GetWindowDC @ 0x402C58
or:
api: BitBlt @ 0x402CC7
api: CreateCompatibleDC @ 0x402C6A
api: CreateCompatibleBitmap @ 0x402C9E
optional:
or:
api: GetDesktopWindow = get entire desktop @ 0x402C4E

```

```

receive data
namespace    communication
author       william.ballenthin@mandiant.com
scope        function
mbc         Command and Control::C2 Communication::Receive Data [B0030.002]
description  all known techniques for receiving data from a potential C2 server
function @ 0x401000
or:
  match: read data from Internet @ 0x401000
  and:
    optional:
      or:
        match: connect to HTTP server @ 0x401000
        and:
          api: InternetConnect @ 0x401059
          optional:
            match: create HTTP request @ 0x401000
            and:
              optional:
                api: InternetCloseHandle @ 0x4011FC, 0x401205, 0x401211
              or:
                api: InternetOpen @ 0x40102C
            or:
              api: InternetReadFile @ 0x401182

send data
namespace    communication
author       william.ballenthin@mandiant.com, joakim@intezer.com
scope        function
mbc         Command and Control::C2 Communication::Send Data [B0030.001]
description  all known techniques for sending data to a potential C2 server
function @ 0x401000
or:
  and:
    os: windows
  or:
    match: send HTTP request @ 0x401000
    or:
      and:
        or:
          api: HttpOpenRequest @ 0x40109D
          api: InternetConnect @ 0x401059
        or:
          api: HttpSendRequest @ 0x40115F

reference HTTP User-Agent string
namespace  communication/http
author     @mr-tz
scope      function
mbc       Communication::HTTP Communication [C0002]
references https://www.useragents.me/, https://www.whatismybrowser.com/guides/the-latest-user-agent/
function @ 0x401000
or:
  api: ObtainUserAgentString @ 0x40101C

connect to HTTP server
namespace  communication/http/client
author    michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope      function
mbc       Communication::HTTP Communication::Connect to Server [C0002.009]
function @ 0x401000
and:
  api: InternetConnect @ 0x401059
  optional:
    match: create HTTP request @ 0x401000

```

```

and:
optional:
    api: InternetCloseHandle @ 0x4011FC, 0x401205, 0x401211
or:
    api: InternetOpen @ 0x40102C

create HTTP request
namespace communication/http/client
author michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com, anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc Communication::HTTP Communication::Create Request [C0002.012]
function @ 0x401000
and:
optional:
    api: InternetCloseHandle @ 0x4011FC, 0x401205, 0x401211
or:
    api: InternetOpen @ 0x40102C

read data from Internet
namespace communication/http/client
author michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com, anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc Communication::HTTP Communication::Get Response [C0002.017]
function @ 0x401000
and:
optional:
    or:
        match: connect to HTTP server @ 0x401000
        and:
            api: InternetConnect @ 0x401059
            optional:
                match: create HTTP request @ 0x401000
                and:
                    optional:
                        api: InternetCloseHandle @ 0x4011FC, 0x401205, 0x401211
                    or:
                        api: InternetOpen @ 0x40102C
    or:
        api: InternetReadFile @ 0x401182

send HTTP request
namespace communication/http/client
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc Communication::HTTP Communication::Send Request [C0002.003]
function @ 0x401000
or:
and:
or:
    api: HttpOpenRequest @ 0x40109D
    api: InternetConnect @ 0x401059
or:
    api: HttpSendRequest @ 0x40115F

decode data using Base64 via winAPI (2 matches)
namespace data-manipulation/encoding/base64
author michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope basic block
att&ck Defense Evasion::Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [T1140]
basic block @ 0x4016EA in function 0x4016CB
and:
    api: CryptStringToBinary @ 0x4016F7
    or:
        number: 0x1 = dwFlags=CRYPT_STRING_BASE64 @ 0x4016F1
basic block @ 0x401705 in function 0x4016CB
and:
    api: CryptStringToBinary @ 0x401721

```

```

or:
    number: 0x1 = dwFlags=CRYPT_STRING_BASE64 @ 0x40171B

encode data using XOR (2 matches)
namespace  data-manipulation/encoding/xor
author      moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope       basic block
att&ck     Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]
mbc        Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information::Encoding-Standard Algorithm
[E1027.m02], Data::Encode Data::XOR [C0026.002]
basic block @ 0x402430 in function 0x4023A3
and:
    characteristic: tight loop @ 0x402430
    characteristic: nxor @ 0x402434
    not: = filter for potential false positives
    or:
        or: = unsigned bitwise negation operation (~i)
            number: 0xFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for unsigned 32 bits
            number: 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for unsigned 64 bits
        or: = signed bitwise negation operation (~i)
            number: 0xFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for signed 32 bits
            number: 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for signed 64 bits
        or: = Magic constants used in the implementation of strings functions.
            number: 0x7EFEFEFF = optimized string constant for 32 bits
            number: 0x81010101 = -0x81010101 = 0x7EFEFEFF
            number: 0x81010100 = 0x81010100 = ~0x7EFEFEFF
            number: 0x7EFEFEFEFEFEFEFF = optimized string constant for 64 bits
            number: 0x8101010101010101 = -0x8101010101010101 = 0x7EFEFEFEFEFEFEFF
            number: 0x8101010101010100 = 0x8101010101010100 = ~0x7EFEFEFEFEFEFEFF
basic block @ 0x402E18 in function 0x402DF2
and:
    characteristic: tight loop @ 0x402E18
    characteristic: nxor @ 0x402E1C
    not: = filter for potential false positives
    or:
        or: = unsigned bitwise negation operation (~i)
            number: 0xFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for unsigned 32 bits
            number: 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for unsigned 64 bits
        or: = signed bitwise negation operation (~i)
            number: 0xFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for signed 32 bits
            number: 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFF = bitwise negation for signed 64 bits
        or: = Magic constants used in the implementation of strings functions.
            number: 0x7EFEFEFF = optimized string constant for 32 bits
            number: 0x81010101 = -0x81010101 = 0x7EFEFEFF
            number: 0x81010100 = 0x81010100 = ~0x7EFEFEFF
            number: 0x7EFEFEFEFEFEFEFF = optimized string constant for 64 bits
            number: 0x8101010101010101 = -0x8101010101010101 = 0x7EFEFEFEFEFEFEFF
            number: 0x8101010101010100 = 0x8101010101010100 = ~0x7EFEFEFEFEFEFEFF

create new key via CryptAcquireContext (3 matches)
namespace  data-manipulation/encryption
author      chuong.dong@mandiant.com
scope       function
att&ck     Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]
mbc        Cryptography::Encryption Key [C0028]
references https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincrypt/nf-wincrypt-cryptacquirecontexta
function @ 0x4014EE
and:
    api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x40150D
    or:
        number: 0x18 = CRYPT_NEWKEYSET | CRYPT_DELETEKEYSET @ 0x401504
function @ 0x4015EC
and:
    api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x40160B
    or:
        number: 0x18 = CRYPT_NEWKEYSET | CRYPT_DELETEKEYSET @ 0x401602

```

```

function @ 0x401737
and:
api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x401756
or:
number: 0x8 = CRYPT_NEWKEYSET @ 0x40177E, 0x401799
number: 0x18 = CRYPT_NEWKEYSET | CRYPT_DELETEKEYSET @ 0x40174D

encrypt or decrypt via winCrypt (2 matches)
namespace data-manipulation/encryption
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]
mbc Cryptography::Decrypt Data [C0031], Cryptography::Encrypt Data [C0027]
function @ 0x4014EE
and:
or:
api: CryptDecrypt @ 0x401583
optional:
or:
api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x40150D
api: CryptImportKey @ 0x40154D
function @ 0x4015EC
and:
or:
api: CryptEncrypt @ 0x40166A, 0x4016A2
optional:
or:
api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x40160B
api: CryptImportKey @ 0x40164B

encrypt data using AES via WinAPI (3 matches)
namespace data-manipulation/encryption/aes
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027]
mbc Defense Evasion::Obfuscated Files or Information::Encryption-Standard
Algorithm [E1027.m05], Cryptography::Encrypt Data::AES [C0027.001]
function @ 0x4014EE
and:
or:
api: CryptImportKey @ 0x40154D
or:
number: 0x6610 = CALG_AES_256 @ 0x401529
optional:
or:
number: 0x1 = PROV_RSA_FULL @ 0x40157D
api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x40150D
api: CryptDecrypt @ 0x401583
function @ 0x4015EC
and:
or:
api: CryptImportKey @ 0x40164B
or:
number: 0x6610 = CALG_AES_256 @ 0x401627
optional:
or:
number: 0x1 = PROV_RSA_FULL @ 0x401661, 0x40169C
api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x40160B
api: CryptEncrypt @ 0x40166A, 0x4016A2
function @ 0x401737
and:
or:
api: CryptGenKey @ 0x40176E
or:
number: 0x6610 = CALG_AES_256 @ 0x401766
optional:
or:

```

```

number: 0x1 = PROV_RSA_FULL @ 0x401764
api: CryptAcquireContext @ 0x401756

generate random numbers via RtlGenRandom (2 matches)
namespace  data-manipulation/prng
author      william.ballenthin@mandiant.com, richard.weiss@mandiant.com
scope       function
mbc        Cryptography::Generate Pseudo-random Sequence::Use API [C0021.003]
references  https://doxygen.reactos.org/df/d13/sysfunc_8c_source.html,
https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/tag/systemfunction036
function @ 0x401806
or:
api: SystemFunction036 @ 0x401810
function @ 0x40182A
or:
api: SystemFunction036 @ 0x401855

get common file path (3 matches)
namespace host-interaction/file-system
author   moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com,
anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope    function
att&ck   Discovery::File and Directory Discovery [T1083]
mbc      Discovery::File and Directory Discovery [E1083]
function @ 0x401235
or:
api: GetSystemDirectory @ 0x40124A
function @ 0x401D9C
or:
api: GetTempPath @ 0x401DB3
api: GetTempFileName @ 0x401DCB
function @ 0x40270D
or:
api: SHGetFolderPath @ 0x402727

copy file
namespace host-interaction/file-system/copy
author   moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope    function
mbc      File System::Copy File [C0045]
function @ 0x40270D
or:
api: CopyFile @ 0x4027B0

delete file
namespace host-interaction/file-system/delete
author   moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope    function
mbc      File System::Delete File [C0047]
function @ 0x401C5C
or:
api: DeleteFile @ 0x401C7B

set file attributes (4 matches)
namespace host-interaction/file-system/meta
author   moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com,
anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope    basic block
att&ck   Defense Evasion::File and Directory Permissions Modification [T1222]
mbc      File System::Set File Attributes [C0050]
basic block @ 0x401C5C in function 0x401C5C
or:
api: SetFileAttributes @ 0x401C74
basic block @ 0x401E70 in function 0x401E70
or:
api: SetFileAttributes @ 0x401E8D
basic block @ 0x401EF8 in function 0x401E70

```

```

or:
  api: SetFileAttributes @ 0x401EFF
basic block @ 0x4027BA in function 0x40270D
or:
  api: SetFileAttributes @ 0x4027C3

move file (2 matches)
namespace host-interaction/file-system/move
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc File System::Move File [C0063]
function @ 0x401C5C
or:
  api: MoveFileEx @ 0x401C89
function @ 0x402205
or:
  api: MoveFileEx @ 0x402246

write file on windows (2 matches)
namespace host-interaction/file-system/write
author william.ballenthin@mandiant.com, anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc File System::Writes File [C0052]
function @ 0x401D9C
or:
  and:
    os: windows
    optional:
      basic block:
        or:
          number: 0x40000000 = GENERIC_WRITE @ 0x401DD8
          number: 0x2 = FILE_WRITE_DATA @ 0x401DD4
          match: create or open file @ 0x401D9C
          or:
            api: CreateFile @ 0x401DE4
        or:
          api: WriteFile @ 0x401DFE
function @ 0x401E70
or:
  and:
    os: windows
    optional:
      basic block:
        or:
          number: 0x40000000 = GENERIC_WRITE @ 0x401E9C
          number: 0x2 = FILE_WRITE_DATA @ 0x401E98
          match: create or open file @ 0x401E70
          or:
            api: CreateFile @ 0x401EA2
        or:
          api: WriteFile @ 0x401EBB

check mutex and exit
namespace host-interaction/mutex
author @_re_fox, moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc Process::Check Mutex [C0043], Process::Terminate Process [C0018]
function @ 0x401F09
and:
  match: create mutex @ 0x401F09
  or:
    api: CreateMutex @ 0x401F41
  or:
    or:
      and:
        api: GetLastError @ 0x401F50
      or:

```

```

number: 0xB7 = ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS @ 0x401F56

create mutex
namespace host-interaction/mutex
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc Process::Create Mutex [C0042]
function @ 0x401F09
or:
api: CreateMutex @ 0x401F41

get hostname (2 matches)
namespace host-interaction/os/hostname
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, joakim@intezer.com, anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Discovery::System Information Discovery [T1082]
mbc Discovery::System Information Discovery [E1082]
function @ 0x4023A3
or:
api: GetComputerName @ 0x402428
function @ 0x40247A
or:
api: GetComputerNameEx @ 0x40251C

get system information on windows
namespace host-interaction/os/info
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, joakim@intezer.com
scope function
att&ck Discovery::System Information Discovery [T1082]
function @ 0x40247A
and:
os: windows
or:
api: GetSystemInfo @ 0x40248F

create process on windows
namespace host-interaction/process/create
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope basic block
mbc Process::Create Process [C0017]
basic block @ 0x4018D1 in function 0x4018D1
or:
api: CreateProcess @ 0x401909

allocate or change RWX memory
namespace host-interaction/process/inject
author @mr-tz
scope basic block
mbc Memory::Allocate Memory [C0007]
basic block @ 0x4012C9 in function 0x401235
and:
or:
match: allocate memory @ 0x4012C9
or:
api: ZwAllocateVirtualMemory @ 0x4012EC
or:
number: 0x40 = PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE @ 0x4012D7

enumerate processes
namespace host-interaction/process/list
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Discovery::Process Discovery [T1057], Discovery::Software Discovery [T1518]
function @ 0x401C98
or:
and:
api: Process32First @ 0x401CC2

```

```

api: Process32Next @ 0x401D1A
optional:
  basic block:
    and:
      api: CreateToolhelp32Snapshot @ 0x401CA9
      or:
        number: 0x2 = TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS @ 0x401CA7

terminate process (2 matches)
namespace host-interaction/process/terminate
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com,
anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope function
mbc Process::Terminate Process [C0018]
function @ 0x4027E3
  or:
    and:
      or:
        api: ExitProcess @ 0x40289E
function @ 0x4028D8
  or:
    and:
      or:
        api: ExitProcess @ 0x402915

get session user name
namespace host-interaction/session
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Discovery::System Owner/User Discovery [T1033], Discovery::Account Discovery
[T1087]
function @ 0x40247A
  or:
    api: GetUserName @ 0x402558

create thread
namespace host-interaction/thread/create
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com, joakim@intezer.com,
anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope basic block
mbc Process::Create Thread [C0038]
basic block @ 0x401949 in function 0x401949
  or:
    and:
      os: windows
      or:
        api: CreateThread @ 0x40195A

resume thread
namespace host-interaction/thread/resume
author 0x534a@mailbox.org, anushka.virgaonkar@mandiant.com
scope basic block
mbc Process::Resume Thread [C0054]
basic block @ 0x401345 in function 0x401235
  or:
    api: ZwResumeThread @ 0x401376

link function at runtime on windows
namespace linking/runtime-linking
author moritz.raabe@mandiant.com, michael.hunhoff@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Execution::Shared Modules [T1129]
function @ 0x40143A
  and:
    os: windows
    or:
      api: GetProcAddress @ 0x4014B9

```

```

optional:
  api: LoadLibrary @ 0x401478

inspect section memory permissions
namespace  load-code/pe
author     @Ana06
scope      function
mbc       Discovery::Code Discovery::Inspect Section Memory Permissions [B0046.002]
description translate section memory permissions (specified in the 'Characteristics' field of the image section header) into page protection constants
function @ 0x40296D
and:
  os: windows
  3 or more:
    and:
      number: 0x40000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ @ 0x4029B6
      number: 0x2 = PAGE_READONLY @ 0x4029FD
    and:
      number: 0x20000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE @ 0x4029AE
      number: 0x10 = PAGE_EXECUTE @ 0x402A01
    and:
      or:
        number: 0x60000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ | IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE @ 0x4029BE
        and:
          number: 0x40000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ @ 0x4029B6
          number: 0x20000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE @ 0x4029AE
        number: 0x20 = PAGE_EXECUTE_READ @ 0x4029F9
    and:
      or:
        number: 0xC0000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ | IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE @ 0x4029D6
        and:
          number: 0x40000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ @ 0x4029B6
          number: 0x80000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE @ 0x4029C6
        number: 0x4 = PAGE_READWRITE @ 0x4029EA
    and:
      or:
        number: 0xE0000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ | IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE |
IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE @ 0x4029A7, 0x4029DE
    and:
      number: 0x40000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ @ 0x4029B6
      number: 0x80000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_WRITE @ 0x4029C6
      number: 0x20000000 = IMAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE @ 0x4029AE
    number: 0x40 = PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE @ 0x4029E6, 0x402A15

parse PE header
namespace  load-code/pe
author     moritz.raabe@mandiant.com
scope      function
att&ck   Execution::Shared Modules [T1129]
function @ 0x4017D6
and:
  os: windows
  and:
    mnemonic: cmp @ 0x4017E5, 0x4017ED, 0x4017F5
    or:
      number: 0x4550 = IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE (PE) @ 0x4017F5
    or:
      number: 0x5A4D = IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE (MZ) @ 0x4017E0

execute shellcode via indirect call
namespace  load-code/shellcode
author     ronnie.salomonsen@mandiant.com
scope      function
mbc       Memory::Allocate Memory [C0007]
function @ 0x401235
and:
  match: allocate or change RWX memory @ 0x4012C9

```

```

and:
  or:
    match: allocate memory @ 0x4012C9
    or:
      api: ZwAllocateVirtualMemory @ 0x4012EC
  or:
    number: 0x40 = PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE @ 0x4012D7
or:
  characteristic: indirect call @ 0x401387, 0x40138C

get startup folder
namespace persistence/startup-folder
author matthew.williams@mandiant.com
scope basic block
att&ck Persistence::Boot or Logon Autostart Execution::Registry Run Keys / Startup
Folder [T1547.001]
basic block @ 0x40270D in function 0x40270D
  and:
    or:
      number: 0x7 = CSIDL_STARTUP @ 0x402724
    or:
      api: SHGetFolderPath @ 0x402727

write file to startup folder
namespace persistence/startup-folder
author matthew.williams@mandiant.com
scope function
att&ck Persistence::Boot or Logon Autostart Execution::Registry Run Keys / Startup
Folder [T1547.001]
function @ 0x40270D
  and:
    match: get startup folder @ 0x40270D
    and:
      or:
        number: 0x7 = CSIDL_STARTUP @ 0x402724
      or:
        api: SHGetFolderPath @ 0x402727
  or:
    match: copy file @ 0x40270D
    or:
      api: CopyFile @ 0x4027B0

```

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## *Appendix E – Conclusion*

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All IDAPro database saves, logs, raw data files, screenshots, etc. are in the zipped file entitled “Associated Materials.” I have also included the Outline that I created after researching each part of what was asked for in the Challenge.