### These Artifacts aren't Fiction






Ohio Information Security Conference

March 1, 2023 | Sinclair Conference Center

# Matt Scheurer Tuan Phan

Dayton, Ohio



# Introducing: Matt Scheurer

Matt works for a big well-known organization...



As an Assistant Vice President (AVP) of Computer Security and Incident Response (IR). However, he has many years of hands-on technical experience, including Digital Forensics & Incident Response (DFIR).

He is also a Podcast Host for



https://threatreel.com

Follow / contact Matt:



https://www.linkedin.com/in/mattscheurer



https://twitter.com/c3rkah

### Where Matt volunteers....

**Matt is an Official** 



**Advocate** 

https://www.hackingisnotacrime.org

He is also a



Women's Security Alliance (WomSA) Technical Mentor

https://www.womsa.org

# Introducing: Tuan Phan

- Independent Security Researcher
- First-time speaker!
- Professional Experience
  - Digital Forensics,
     Investigation, Data
     Security, eDiscovery, and
     Insider Threat Strategy



### **Disclaimer!**

Yes, the presenters both have day jobs. However...

Opinions expressed are based solely on their own independent security research and do not express or reflect the views or opinions of their employers.



# We are not Lawyers!



This presentation is for educational purposes only! Please consult with qualified legal counsel before using these techniques in an actual investigation.

# **Out-of-Scope Topics**

- 3<sup>rd</sup> party "Forensically Sound" tools for
  - Memory Capture (a.k.a. a "Memory Dumps")
  - Disk Imaging
- How-To's
  - Chain of Custody
  - Court Cases and Trials
    - Data handling and acceptable practices
  - Isolation, remote access, and when to disconnect or shutdown
- Data storage, data archival, data write blockers, etc.

### **Data Preservation Methodology**

- Collect a "Forensic Image" first and foremost!
  - Work from a "Forensic Clone"
    - A working copy of your original "Forensic Image"
  - After completing & hashing a "Forensic Image"
    - Creating a "Forensic Clone", while the "Forensic Image" is copying, provides a good opportunity to conduct live host eDiscovery acquisition
- Minimize activities that could modify system data and access times as much as possible

### The Windows SRUM Database

SRUM (SRUDB.dat) The System Resource Utilization Monitor (**SRUM**) is built into Windows 8 and above. System "*App History*" data is recorded and stored in an Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) database named "**SRUDB.dat**".

### The "SRUDB.dat" File

The Windows SRUM database file is located at:

### C:\Windows\System32\sru\SRUDB.dat

Think of the SRUM database as holding the same level of details typically found in most commercial Endpoint/Network Detection & Response (**XDR**) solutions, but without any monitoring, alerting, "Detection", or "Response" capabilities.

### **Useful SRUM Data**

The Windows SRUM was never intended to be used for forensic purposes by Microsoft. Consequently, more details are stored than is typically helpful for our investigations. We'll focus our efforts on the following:

- Application Resources Usage
- Network Usage

### "SRUDB.dat" Tools

Here are some Free and Open-Source Software options:

- SRUM Dump 2
  - https://github.com/MarkBaggett/srum-dump
- Velociraptor
  - https://www.rapid7.com/products/velociraptor
- NirSoft (AppResourcesUsageView & NetworkUsageView)
  - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/app\_resources\_usage\_view.html
  - https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/network\_usage\_view.html

# SRUDB.dat Example Output

AppResource	-				-	ð X
	w Options Help					
📙 🛭 🔓 🧟	ř 🙎 🐬					
Record ID	Timestamp	App Name	App Description	App ID	User SID /	Foregrou
■1001	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■877	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\cmd.exe		722	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1132	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1009	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1256	2/11/2023 2:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1445	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1379	2/11/2023 3:24:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1566	2/11/2023 4:26:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\ApplicationFrameHost.exe		1047	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1129	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>■1123</b>	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\explorer.exe		404	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■880	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1442</b>	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1114	2/11/2023 1:22:00 PM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■998	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1377	2/11/2023 3:24:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1366	2/11/2023 3:24:00 PM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
<b>1253</b>	2/11/2023 2:22:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe		410	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1005	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM	$\verb \Device  HarddiskVolume 4  Users   User App Data  Local   Microsoft   One Drive   23.023.0129.0002   Microsoft. Share Point. exemple   Share Point   Control of the Con$		1044	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1428	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■862	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	Microsoft.AAD.BrokerPlugin_1000.19580.1000.0_neutral_neutral_cw5n1h2txyewy		407	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■1444	2/11/2023 4:23:00 PM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Users\User\AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe		963	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	
■876	2/8/2023 9:49:00 AM	\Device\HarddiskVolume4\Users\User\AppData\Loca\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe		963	S-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-1000	

# **Application Resources Usage**

May include the following application execution details:

Timestamp, Application Name, User SID, cycle times, bytes read and written, number of read and write operations, and more.

Properties	×
Record ID:	1012
Timestamp:	2/11/2023 11:23:00 AM
App Name:	ım Files\Windows NT\Accessories\wordpad.exe
App Description:	
App ID:	1049
User Name:	
User SID:	\$-1-5-21-1658346478-91125410-2641079694-10
Foreground Cycle Time:	
Background Cycle Time:	
Face Time:	00:12:53
Foreground Context Switches:	74,092
Background Context Switches:	0
Foreground Bytes Read:	24,786,432
Foreground Bytes Written:	102,400
Foreground Read Operations:	749
Foreground Write Operations:	25

## Network Resource Usage

May include: the timestamp, name and description of the service or application, the name and SID of the user, the network adapter, and the total number of bytes sent and received by the specified service or application.

Properties	×				
Record ID:	23				
Timestamp:	1/12/2023 10:00:00 PM				
App Name:	s (x86)\microsoft\edge\application\msedge.exe				
App Description:					
App ID:	351				
User Name:					
User SID:	S-1-5-21-124793260-1819790467-2837426190-5				
Network Adapter:					
Bytes Sent:	2,681				
Bytes Received:	12,811				
Network Adapter Guid:					
Network Adapter Luid:	0×6008001000000				
Connection Name:					
	OK //				

### **SRUM Database Conclusions**

The Windows SRUM database helps us with identifying file execution, user attribution, activity correlation, and time lining of system events.

SRUM (SRUDB.dat)

### Web Browser Artifacts

Analyzing artifacts related to web browser usage from a suspect's system is essential for digital forensic examiners and computer forensic investigators.



# Data Extraction & Analysis Tools

- Free and Open-Source Software
  - Browser History Examiner
  - Browser History Viewer
  - BrowsingHistoryView
  - DB Browser for SQLite
  - ESEDatabaseView
  - Hindsight
  - Nirsoft Web Browsers Tools
- Various 3<sup>rd</sup> party commercial forensic tools

### **Artifact Sources**

- Hard Drives
- Forensic Clones
  - Hard Drive Images
- Memory Dumps
- Databases and Other Files

### **High-Value Artifacts**

- History
- Typed URLs
- Cache
- Cookies
- Session Restore
- Searches

- Form values
  - Auto-fill
  - Contents
  - Searches, etc.
- Downloads
- Favorites
  - a.k.a. Bookmarks

# **Private Browsing**



Private (a.k.a. incognito) browsing modes allow users to surf the web without retaining browser history and associated cache and cookie files.

# **Memory Dumps**

One step in collecting high-value web browser artifacts is through live-capturing an image of the system's physical memory.

Memory dumps also include private browsingmode session artifacts otherwise unavailable on those systems.

# History

A web browser's "History" records websites visited by date and time. Details are stored for each local user's account, records number of times visited (frequency), and tracks access of local system files.

# **Example History Database Paths**

#### **Microsoft Edge on Windows:**

\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\\WebCache\O1.dat

#### **Mozilla Firefox on Windows:**

\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Hex].default\places.sqlite

#### **Google Chrome on Windows:**

\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History


#### **Safari on MacOS:**

\Users\%username%\Library\Safari\History.db

# History Extraction Example 1/5

Advanced Options			×
Filter by visit date/time: Load histor	ry items from the following	time rar ▼ 10 12/12 ▼ 10:14:32 ➡	
Load only URLs contain one of the s	pecified strings (comma-d	elimited list):	,
Don't load URLs that contain one of	the specified strings (com	nma-delimited list):	
Web Browsers			
☐ Internet Explorer	✓ Chrome	Firefox	
☐ Internet Explorer 10/11 + Edge	Chrome Canary	SeaMonkey	
☐ Safari	Opera	☐ Yandex	
Edge (Chromium-based)	Pale Moon	Vivaldi	
☐ Waterfox			


# History Extraction Example 2/5




# History Extraction Example 3/5

Browsing His	tory Items									
А		В	С	D	E	F	G	Н	j.	J
Browsing	Histor	y Items	3							
Created by u	sing Brow	singHisto	ryView							
URL	G T	itle	Visit Time	Visit Count	Visited From	Visit Type	Web Browser	User Profile	Browser Profile	URL Length
http://windows	.microsoft.	com/en-U	3/22/2015 8:09:2	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	74
https://dl.goog	le.com/upo	late2/1.3.;	3/22/2015 8:11:0	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	284
http://go.micro	soft.com/fv	vlink/?Linl	3/22/2015 8:09:0	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	44
http://go.micro	soft.com/fv	vlink/?Linl	3/22/2015 8:09:2	0		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	45
https://www.go	ogle.com/	webhp?sc	3/22/2015 8:55:4	1	https://www.goog	Link	Chrome	admin11	Default	84
http://iweb.dl.s	ourceforge	net/proje	3/25/2015 7:47:3	1			Internet Explorer	informant		84
https://www.go	oc security	checkpo	3/24/2015 2:06:5	1		Link	Chrome	informant	Default	50
http://www.bin	g.c Bing		3/24/2015 2:05:4	1		Reload	Chrome	informant	Default	20
https://news.g	oo Google	News	3/24/2015 12:01:	1		Reload	Chrome	informant	Default	46
http://www.bin	a c Bina		3/24/2015 12:01	1		Reload	Chrome	informant	Default	20

# **History Extraction Example 4/5**



# History Extraction Example 5/5



# Typed URLs

This artifact has the full URLs typed or inserted in the browser address bar. Example paths include:

#### Mozilla Firefox on Windows

- \Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\
 Profiles\[Hex].default\places.sqlite (Firefox, Windows)

### Google Chrome on Windows

- \Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\
 User Data\Default\History

### Searches

This artifact shows what the user has searched.

Here is an example artifact path:

- Google Chrome on Windows
  - \Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Google\
     Chrome\User Data\Default\History

### Downloads

Downloaded files are typically (though user-configurable) stored in each user's "Downloads" folder by default. Investigators would inspect the contents from an investigation subject's downloaded files.

### **Alternate Download Paths**

These artifacts show the location where the user stored downloaded files...

#### **Microsoft Edge on Windows:**

\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\WebCacheV01.dat

#### **Mozilla Firefox on Windows:**

\Users\%username%\AppData\Roaming\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\[Hex].default\places.sqlite

#### **Google Chrome on Windows:**

\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\History

#### **Safari on MacOS:**

Safari Downloads are stored in the 'Downloads.plist' binary plist file within the 'Safari' folder.

### **Future Trends**

Many forensic tools target a vendor specific web browser. Vendor-agnostic browser tools today lack accurate artifact extraction. Ideally, forensic tools should support cross-vendor platform and browser analysis, and automate correlation of data based on timestamps for integrated artifact analysis.

I anticipate a growing need in performing forensic analysis within web browsers on mobile devices.

### Conclusions

While web browsers play a pivotal role in Internet access, they continue being targeted by threat actors.

Tracing evidence from Web browser utilization is an important process in digital forensic investigations. Analyzing a trace from a Web browser's use helps us understand the objective, methods, and criminal activities of a suspect. When an investigator is examining a suspect's system, the Web browser's log details remain a key artifact of our investigations.

### **PowerShell Artifacts Collection**



PowerShell cmdlets and commands useful for digital forensics, artifact collection, and eDiscovery.

## The Inspiration

Use of "Living Off The Land Binaries and Scripts" (LOLBAS) is a notable trend among Offensive Security practitioners and threat actors alike...



## **Objectives**

- Leverage PowerShell to collect digital forensic artifacts from the endpoint being investigated
- Presentation order based on RFC 3227
  - Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving
    - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3227.html
    - Section: 2.1 Order of Volatility

#### **Reminder: Data Preservation**

- Avoid commands that will alter the system, system data, and access times
  - Some Examples (**NOTE**: Not an all-inclusive list)
    - "Clear-", "Debug-", "Disable-", "Enable-", "Expand-", "Import", "Install-", "New-", "Register-", "Remove-", "Save-", "Set-", "Unregister-", "Update-", "Write-", etc.
- Avoid importing or installing external or 3<sup>rd</sup> party modules

# Warning!



Be prepared to defend running PowerShell as "Administrator" if you decide to do so.

• We'll touch on <u>potentially</u> justifiable use-cases momentarily...

## **PowerShell Logging**

The following syntax timestamps the start and end of our data collection process. All input activity and output results are logged to a file.

```
Start-Transcript -Path "[PATH\FILENAME.EXT]" -NoClobber
```

Stop-Transcript (NOTE: When the investigation is complete)

#### **PowerShell Version**

There are a number of automatic variables in PowerShell that store state information. Run the following to display the relevant PowerShell version information:

```
$PSVersionTable
```

(NOTE: Includes "PSEdition" in PowerShell 5.1 and above)

## PowerShell Pro Tip!

PowerShell truncates lengthy text output results by default...

Think of these "Format-List" variations as verbose output options:

Verbose:

Format-List

Very Verbose:

Format-List \*

Very Verbose:

Format-List -Property \*

# **System Time**

Frequently time-stamping command activity during an investigation before and after each step is recommended. Here are some examples...

```
Get-Date
Get-TimeZone
Get-Uptime -Since (NOTE: Requires PowerShell v6.0+)
Get-ComputerInfo -Property "OsLastBootUpTime"
Get-ComputerInfo -Property "OsUptime"
```

#### UTC / GMT Time

Investigations are often easier when correlating timestamps using a neutral timezone of reference. The following variable outputs the time in UTC:

```
$Time = Get-Date
$Time.ToUniversalTime()
```

## **Hashing Files**

Get-FileHash [FILENAME.EXT] -Algorithm [VALUE]

- Value options
  - SHA1
  - SHA256
  - SHA384
  - SHA512
  - MD5

#### **Volatile Network Artifacts**

The following PowerShell cmdlets are useful for collecting the routing table, ARP, network traffic details, and DNS cache respectively:

**Get-NetRoute** 

Get-NetNeighbor

**Get-NetTCPConnection** 

**Get-NetUDPEndpoint** 

Get-DnsClientCache

#### **Processes and Services**

The following cmdlets are useful for obtaining a list of running processes and services on the endpoint being investigated:

Get-Process

Get-Service

#### **Less Volatile Network Artifacts**

The following PowerShell cmdlets are useful for collecting the system network configuration settings and network adapter properties:

**Get-DnsClient** 

Get-DnsClientServerAddress

**Get-NetIPAddress** 

**Get-NetIPConfiguration** 

**Get-NetAdapter** 

## **Users and Groups**

Unfortunately, PowerShell does <u>not</u> offer a "Get-LoggedOnUsers" cmdlet or similar. The following will obtain host user and group details:

```
Get-WmiObject Win32_LoggedOnUser | Select Antecedent -Unique
Query User (NOTE: Not an actual cmdlet, but better!)

Get-LocalGroup | Select *
Get-LocalUser | Select *

Get-ChildItem C:\Users
```

## **Execution Policy Settings**

Use the following commands to obtain the current PowerShell execution policy and the execution policy for each scope in order of precedence:

**Get-ExecutionPolicy** 

Get-ExecutionPolicy -List

## **Clipboard and Auto-runs**

Use the following commands to retrieve text stored in the Windows clipboard and a list of Windows startup items:

```
Get-Clipboard (NOTE: Currently logged in user account)
```

Get-CimInstance Win32\_StartupCommand

#### **Host Details**

Use the following to collect additional details such as installed drivers, programs, hotfixes, disk drives, system details, and other OS information:

```
Get-Windows-Driver -Online -All (NOTE: Requires running as 'Administrator')
Get-Package
Get-HotFix
Get-PSDrive
Get-ComputerInfo
```

## The Open Files Conundrum

There are significant challenges in obtaining open file details using native PowerShell...

```
Get-SmbOpenFile
NOTES: Requires running as 'Administrator'. Only works for files
that are remotely accessed
OpenFiles /Query
The system global flag 'maintain objects list' needs to be
enabled to see local opened files.
OpenFiles /Local On (NOTE: Requires running as 'Administrator')
This will take effect after the system is restarted.
```

## More PowerShell Tips & Tricks


These commands and cmdlets barely scratch the surface of PowerShell capabilities in alignment with our objectives of collecting and preservation of data with minimal impacts and changes to the host operating system that we are investigating.

Further reading:

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/

# Questions



# Thank you for attending!





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