Skeptical Linguistic Essays

Chapter 8 Junk Syntax 2: 'There Remain a Few As Yet Unexplained Exceptions'

Section 1 Background

During the now nearly five decades during which the ideas of generative transformational grammar have been applied to English syntax, *passive* constructions such as (1) have been a continuing focus.

(1)a. Claudia was interviewed by that company.

b. Few linguists were considered by Marie capable of solving that problem.

If these ideas were sound, one could today reasonably expect a basic analysis embodying a core of insight into English passive structures to have emerged. Such has often been implied, as in the implicit suggestion in (2), which yielded the title of this chapter, that the only problems persisting (as of 1977; presumably even a few of *those* would have *since* been resolved) are at the margins:

(2) Chomsky (1977a: 14 note 14).

"On the analysis of passive constructions, see Reflections on Language, Chapter 3. There remain a few as yet unexplained exceptions"

I am aware of no repudiation since by the author of this remarkably optimistic view of the level of success achieved by his transformational movement view of English passivization. Moreover, as is well known, in the overall Principles and Parameters tradition which represents the later evolution of the ideas of the author of (2), the description of passives continues to share a great deal with that of the period of the remark. It is as much standard doctrine now as in 1977 that English (verbal) passives are properly described transformationally, via (DP) movement of a specific type (now called A-movement); see e.g. Culicover (1997: 89-101), and more recently still Hornstein and Nunes (2002: 28-29). If so, the unrepudiated optimism of (2) should not be less tenable today than in 1977.

But the burden of this chapter is twofold: first, to suggest that beyond (partially) capturing the gross semantic/selectional similarities between active object and passive subject and active subject and passive by phrase already noted in 1957 (see (3)) there is little about the relevant construction that transformational accounts get right; second, and more importantly, to argue that the exposition and justification of

transformational views of passivization has been a prototypical instance of junk syntax. It is argued that claim (2) was then, and would be today, not only wrong but deeply irresponsible.

Section 2 Syntactic Structures: The Beginning

The earliest generally available statement of a transformational view of English passives is represented by the informal account in (3):

(3) Chomsky (1957: 43):

"Passive sentences are formed by selecting the element *be+en* in rule (28iii). But there are heavy restrictions on this element that make it unique among the elements of the auxiliary phrase."

"Finally, note that in elaborating (13) into a full-fledged grammar we will have to place many restrictions on the choice of *V* in terms of subject and object in order to permit such sentences as: "*John admires sincerity*," "*sincerity frightens John*," "*John plays golf .. .. John drinks wine*," while excluding the 'inverse' non-sentences' "*sincerity admires John*," "*John frightens sincerity*," "*golf plays John*," "*wine drinks John*". But this whole network of restrictions fails completely when we choose *be+en* as part of the auxiliary verb. In fact, in this case the same selectional dependencies hold, but in the opposite order. That is, for every sentence NP_1-V-NP_2, we can have a corresponding sentence NP_2-is+Ven - by+NP_1. If we try to include passives directly in the grammar (13), we shall have to restate all of these restrictions in the opposite order for the case in which *be +en* is chosen as part of the auxiliary verb. This inelegant duplication, as well as the special restrictions involving the element be +en, can be avoided only if we deliberately exclude passives from the grammar of phrase structure, and reintroduce them by a rule such as:

(34) If S, is a grammatical sentence of the form

$$NP_1 - Aux - Y - NP_2,$$

then the corresponding string of the form

$$NP_2 - Aux + be + en - V - by + NP_1$$

is also a grammatical sentence.

For example, if *John - C - admire - sincerity* is a sentence then *sincerity - C+be+en - admire - by+John* (which by (29) and (19) becomes "*sincerity is admired by John*") is also a sentence."

This passage introduced one clearly correct insight of the transformational description; namely, the existence of corresponding selections. Beyond that, from the beginning there was vast exaggeration, a remarkable detachment from the facts of English, as well as outright distortion, that is, aspects of junk syntax. Most significant in particular is the claim that for *every* sentence of the form [NP_1 V NP_2], there is a corresponding passive of the form [NP_2 is + Ven by NP_1]. One might assume today in defense that this long ago falsehood (see below) was due to mere naivete, carelessness or the inevitable limits of a beginning field. But it is worse. For consider passage (4) from the author's thesis of 1955, a study finished *two years before* the publication of the volume from which (3) is drawn: [1]

(4) Chomsky (1975b: 565)

"There are many exceptions to the transformations that we have set up."

"We might mention several incidental exceptions (whether real or apparent, only future investigation can determine) to the transformations we have constructed. As instances of actives with no corresponding passive we have:

471(a) this costs a lot of money
(b) this weighs three pounds
(c) John traveled three days
(d) Mary married John
(e) misery loves company
(f) he got his punishment
(g) he had an accident
(h) no one foresaw any improvement
(i) he didn't like either of them
(j) he only likes certain people
(k) the artist redecorated it completely"

That is, the author was aware several years before the publication of claim (3) in 1957 that it was false, had even said that there were many exceptions to his transformations in general and knew in particular that his passive mapping failed for e.g.:

(5)a. [$_{NP}$ John] [traveled] [$_{NP}$ three days] ⇨ * three days were traveled by John
b. [$_{NP}$ this] [costs] [$_{NP}$ a lot of money] ⇨ * a lot of money is cost by this
c. [$_{NP}$ he] [had] [$_{NP}$ an accident] ⇨ *an accident was had by him

Further, the author noticed (1975b: 534) that (6b, d) were ungrammatical, meaning that the claim in (3) was also false for (6a, c), the latter example explicitly mentioned:

(6)a. John saw himself in the mirror.
b. *Himself was seen by John in the mirror
c. John ate dinner by himself.
d. *Dinner was eaten by himself.

More generally, as amply (but still only in part) illustrated below, the degree to which the 'every' claim fails is extraordinary. One can only speculate as to why such a deliberate falsification was advanced in (3). But one can hardly avoid consideration of the fact that it appears in the author's first *published* attempt to tout the virtues of transformational grammar. Nor can one ignore the truism that a view always looks better if it can claim exceptionless principles, rather than rough approximations. Putting these together does not seem to leave much mystery as to the ground for the falsification. In any event, the junk linguistic feature of outright fact distortion to render a proposal more attractive than it is had evidently surfaced in the first work advocating a transformational view of English passives.

Moreover, claim (3) also contains the unsupportable assertion that the duplication of selectional and other restrictions which the author had argued were associated with a phrase structural account of passive cases could *only* be avoided via a rule like the author's (34). This linked to similar exaggeration on pages 78, where it was claimed that "any grammar that can distinguish singular from plural is sufficiently powerful to enable us to prove that the passive requires inversions of nouns phrases", and page 79, where it was stated that "Such verbs prove quite conclusively that the passive must be based on an inversion of subject and object." Critical is the occurrence of the strong <u>prove</u> and still stronger <u>prove quite conclusively</u> in these claims. The unfounded, exaggerated character of such remarks is shown entirely internal to the development of the author's own views. For he has, of course, long since abandoned the idea that there is inversion of DPs in passives and only recognizes movement of objects; see Section 5. So what was 'proved (quite conclusively)' by X in 1957 was not even considered true by X a couple of decades later. Evidently there was no proof but only empty claims of such, raising minimally another issue of conduct. For the later abandonment of the conclusion was not to my knowledge associated with any public retractions of the false claims. A distinct strand of junk linguistic practice is illustrated. Claim something quite strong, using words like <u>prove</u>, later abandon the claim if it proves a burden, but never discuss or admit the lack of basis for the earlier admittedly false and exaggerated assertion.

And there was more.

(7) Chomsky (1957: 82-83)

"As another example of a similar type, consider the sentence

(108) John came home.

Although "John" and "home" are NP's, and "came" is a Verb, investigation of the effect of transformations on (108) shows that it cannot be analyzed as a case of NP - Verb - NP. We cannot have "home was come by

John" under the passive transformation, or "what did John come" under the question transformation T, We must therefore analyze (108) in some other way (if we are not to complicate unduly the description of these transformations), perhaps as NP - Verb - Adverb. Apart from such considerations as these, there do not appear to be very strong reasons for denying to (108) the completely counterintuitive analysis NP - Verb - NP, with "home" the object of "came"."

In the discussion, the author encounters a failure of passivization, represented by (8b):

(8)a. John came home.

b. *Home was come by John.

Passage (7) does not indicate that the problem is general across the class of intransitive verbs accepting a postverbal <u>home</u>:

(9)a. John crawled/dashed/flew/hopped/ran/swam home.

b. *Home was crawled/dashed/flown/hopped/ran/swam by John.

The author's reaction to (8b) was remarkable. Although the passage already says that <u>John</u> is an NP, <u>came</u> is a verb and <u>home</u> is an NP, it then claims bizarrely that (8a) *cannot* be analyzed as a case of [NP - Verb –NP], because if it is, it is wrongly predicted that e.g. (8b) is good. It is suggested that it should be given some other analysis, perhaps [NP -Verb – Adverb], to block the bad case. This proposal is incoherent. Stating that <u>home</u> was a NP had already granted that (8a) has the analysis [NP Verb NP]. [2] Thus one need not depend on passages from Chomsky (1975b). Under its own constituency assumptions, the 1957 volume itself contains a counterexample to its claim in (3) that *every* [NP_1 V NP_2] structure yields a passive.

It is, moreover, irrelevant to any current point whether it is claimed that *in addition* the structure of cases like (8a) includes a subtree of the form (10)

(10) Adverb

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NP.

For the author's conceptions of transformational grammar have always been such that such a subtree would not block application of a rule defined in terms of NP-Verb NP. [3]

The only conclusion then is that the author had, as in the case of the counterexamples in (4), already noticed another anomaly for his transformational view of passive in cases like (8b), had no coherent solution for it, but was unwilling to admit it.

As an account of the relation between English active and passive structures, (3) was clearly radically false; see Sections 4-6 for an extensive listing of counterexamples to it.. Moreover, other classes of data, while not counterexamples, also show its extreme inadequacy. These involve uncontroversial passives which do not correspond to actives of the form cited in (3). The most visible group of such seemingly exceptional cases are the prepositional passives or *pseudopassives*. Section 6 treats these exceptions to principles like those embodied in (3).

Evidently then, fundamental junk linguistic features were already highly visible in the work which introduced a transformational description of English passives to the general linguistic public. Despite this, the view that there is a viable, moreover insightful transformational account of English passives had great fairly immediate *popular* success, which has persisted to the present day. The implication is that just because a proposal is awful linguistics and/or offends decent standards of inquiry doesn't begin to determine that a piece of junk linguistics will not be widely accepted. Parallels are clear. with the remarks in Chapter 7 about the social success of the Principle C account of strong crossover phenomena despite its incompatibility with data published a decade before that account surfaced.

Section 3 'Applies Blindly'

The falsehood in (3) that *every* English [NP + V + NP] structure yields a corresponding passive received, in effect, a more elaborate and abstract formulation by its author during the 1970s. Associated with that development was an unheralded, repeated appeal to protective devices, elements which in effect can defend the formulation against any data. This is illustrated in (11):

(11) Chomsky (1973); reprinted in Chomsky (1977a: 82-3) (emphasis mine: PMP)

"the Passive transformation (reducing it to essentials) applies to any phrase marker that can be "factored" into five successive substrings in such a way that the second and fourth are noun phrases, the third a verb of a particular category (perhaps determined by some semantic property), and the first and fifth anything at all (including nothing). Thus the structural condition defining the transformation can be given in the form (Z, NP, V_x, NP, Y). The transformation rearranges the noun phrases in a fixed way. It will, therefore, apply to the phrase markers underlying the sentences of (1), converting them to the corresponding passive forms:

(1) a. Perhaps-John-read-the book-intelligently

b. John-received-the book

c. John-regards-Bill-as a friend

d. John-painted-the wall-gray

e. John-expects-the food-to be good to eat

Evidently, the semantic and grammatical relation of the main verb to the following noun phrase varies in these examples (there is no relation at all in (e)), but these relations are of no concern to the transformation, which *applies blindly* in all cases."

Although position (11) offers a refined formulation of the ideas of the Syntactic Structures account, it is similar in most key ways. Passivization continues to be characterized via NP/DP) movement of both underlying post-verbal DP and subject DP. But there are new emphases; specifically, transformations are stipulated to be *blind* to semantic and grammatical relations. So passivization in particular is thereby taken to be independent of these features. [4] The highlighted claim of blind application only appears strong since the associated hedge that a verb instantiating term three of the structural description has to be 'of a particular category', not characterized, (moreover, one possibly determined by some unspecified semantic relation) render claims of blind application vacuous. Any potential counterexamples, e.g. those of (5) or (8b), could be handled merely by stipulating that their verbs are not of the right category. Such assignments could never be wrong since no independent criteria for membership in that category were presented. So, as a conception of the conditions permitting an English active structure to have a corresponding passive, proposal (11) embodies only the tautology that for a fixed active A, A has a corresponding passive or not., depending on whether A's verb belongs to category V_x or not. [5]

As (12) documents, the author of (11) made similar and/or related pseudostrong claims on other occasions during the 1970s, indicating that the position cannot be dismissed as a temporary aberration.

(12) (all emphases mine: PMP)

a. Chomsky (1971: 30-31)

"In all cases, the passive is formed by the rule informally described a moment ago. The rule pays no attention to the grammatical and semantic relations of the main verb to the noun phrase that follows it. Thus in " I believed your testimony," the noun phrase is the grammatical object of "believe." In "I believed your testimony to be false," it bears no relation to "believe," and is the subject of "be false." In "I believed your testimony to have been given under duress," it bears no relation to "believe" and is the grammatical object of the embedded verb "give." Yet in all cases, the rule *applies blindly*, caring nothing for these

differences." Thus in an important sense, the rules are structure dependent and only structure-dependent. Technically, they are rules that apply to abstract labeled bracketing of sentences (abstract, in that it is not physically indicated), not to systems of grammatical or semantic relations.''

b. Chomsky (1972: 118)

''The basic property of transformations is that they map phrase-markers into phrase-markers. Each transformation applies to a phrase-marker on the basis of the formal configurations expressed in it, and quite independently of the meanings or grammatical relations expressed by these formal configurations. Thus such sentences as *John received the book, John read the book, John expected the book to be good, John gave Bill the book,* and so on, undergo the passive transformation in exactly the same way. The transformation *applies blindly* to any phrase-marker of the proper form, caring nothing about meanings or grammatical relations. This situation is typical; I know of no exceptions, and no counterarguments that amount to more than terminological revision.''

While no insight into passives is visible in (11) or (12), they do reveal something about general principles of junk linguistics. These involve the tactic of making proposals *seem* significant by stating them in a vividly strong form ('applies blindly'/independent of grammatical relations) while at the same time covering oneself against potentially embarrassing counterexamples via background tempering with protective hedges rendering them safe from any data. The particular hedges in (11) are among a variety of mechanisms invoked by its author to eliminate testability of an otherwise strong claim about a transformational description of English passives. Other such devices with similar functions will be touched on presently.

Hedging the sort of transformational views promoted in the 1970s so that they could not be falsified was well motivated. Despite boasts like (2), *considerable* data incompatible with an unhedged formulation had accumulated by the time claims like (11) and (12) were made. For example, Fillmore (1965), a well-known and prominently reviewed work of the time (see Wilson, 1966; Kuroda, 1968), had discovered several generalizations about one type of English, his own (and, incidentally, that of the present author). The generalizations concerned *double object* or *ditransitive* cases like (13):

(13)a. Armand sold her the six Uzis.

b. Armand bought her the six Uzis.

Fillmore observed that in the type of English at issue, structure (13a), call it a *type A ditransitive*, corresponds to two distinct passives, while structure (13b), call it a *type B ditransitive,* corresponds to none.

(14)a. She was sold the six Uzis by Armand.

b. The six Uzis were sold her by Armand.

(15)a. *She was bought the six Uzis by Armand.

b. *The six Uzis were bought her by Armand.

Fillmore noted, moreover, that it was in significant part predictable whether a double object structure was of type A or B. The type A variety was such that the first object alternated with a structure with a PP in to, while the type B was such that the first object alternated with a structure with a PP in for.

(16)a. Armand sold the six Uzis to her (for Rhonda).

b. *Armand bought the six Uzis to her (for Rhonda).

Evidently, nothing in proposals (11)/(12) offer any insight into these facts. Moreover, (15a, b), etc., are further prima facie counterexamples to the claim in (3) about 'every' transitive active, and to any factual content to a claim that there is some rule that 'applies blindly'. And (14b), an instance of the *tertiary passives* of Postal (1986a), challenges the assumption that only directly postverbal DPs passivize in English. If those assertions had been serious, they would have had to take into account Fillmore's observations and advance some proposal to keep the double object data consistent with the formulation. But typically for junk linguistics, formulations like (11)/(12) were advanced, multiply published, and defended as if Fillmore's observations, uncited, had never been made.

And it is entirely impossible that the author of (3)/(11)/(12) was unaware of the dual passive possibilities of cases like (14). Least of all, it was traditionally documented; see e.g. Jespersen (1927: Chapter XV). Moreover, amazingly, he *had himself noted this fact before Fillmore*. The point is made explicitly in his thesis, noted earlier to have preceded Fillmore's work by a decade, despite its publication delay by the same amount. Chomsky (1975b: 493) cites the type A ditransitive cases:

(17)a. he was given several books by the teacher.

b. several books were given him by the teacher.

Worse:

(18) Chomsky (1975a: 242, note 43)

"In ordinary passives such as (55), the rule of NP-preposing disregards the grammatical relation between the verb and the NP following it, at least if we use the term "grammatical relation" in something like its' traditional sense. Thus in (55), the rule moves the direct object, but in such cases as "John was told to leave" or "John was promised that he would get the job," it is the indirect object that is preposed (cf. "John was told a story," "a story was told to John"; "our promise to John . . . " ...)."

That is, a decade *after* the appearance of Fillmore (1965), the author of (11)/(12) cited double object passives *selectively* as *supporting* his view that passive movement ignores grammatical relations, with no mention of his own or Fillmore's earlier observations, work which minimally is problematic for that view. This was feasible only by carefully picking examples of type A ditransitives and none of type B manifesting, as Fillmore documented, unpassivizable direct and indirect objects, arguing that passivization does not disregard the type A/type B distinction, which nothing in the structures the author was offering distinguished. Moreover, it was necessary as well to avoid mention of type A tertiary passive examples like (14b)/(17b), since their citation would have inevitably raised issues for which no solutions were available. So where genuine linguistics would have manifested a real attempt to handle the facts Fillmore had discussed, some of which the author of (18) had noted even earlier, one finds instead spurious boasts like (2). The fact that claims like (11), (12) and (18) ignore the relevant ditransitive observations is in itself an excellent indication of the junk linguistic character of the passive proposals at issue.

More generally, the history of generative discussion of passives like (14b) is arguably an exceptional illustration of the grip of junk linguistics. Although such examples are commonly cited in traditional descriptions of British English (see Sweet, 1891:113; Jespersen, 1927: 301-312; Curme, 1931: 117), and were analyzed for American English in Fillmore (1965), Oehrle (1976) and Postal (1986a), many linguistic works of the last twenty years, especially more recent ones, deny the existence of American English passives like (14b); see e.g. Bresnan (1982a: 25-29; 2001: 316), Riemsdijk and Williams (1986: 117), Ouhalla (1994: 175), Pesetsky (1995: 124), Boeckx (1998, 451-2), Runner (1998: 155), Lasnik (1999b: 198) and Ura (2000: 244-248). Evidently, many Americans, especially younger one, do not accept them.

But for many American speakers, including the present writer, many examples are perfect. Example (17b) shows that the inventor of transformational ideas about passives being criticized here was in 1955 among them. And Christopher Potts kindly provides the following published written examples:

(19)a. He was a man of many holdings - many of them handed him, as each ancestor finished his life's run and passed the stick forward, handed him in a lineal descent of bonds and a bank, of glass birds and dishes, land, houses, and attitudes.

M. Malone. <u>Dingley Falls</u> (p 88)

b. The young men crunched ice cubes and wolfed cheese sandwiches brought them by Chris Henry.

M. Malone. <u>Dingley Falls</u> (p 127)

c. Lagniappe: a small gift given a customer by a merchant at the time of purchase.

<u>Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary</u>

d. Included meanwhile in the epic consolations given the conservationists - ... - were more than two million acres along the Yukon between Eagle and Circle.

John McPhee. Coming into the Country (246, hardcover)

e, The friendship extended him by his classmates. Richard Russo. Mohawk (Chap 16, p1)

f. Cooper (1983) is the most explicit and fully developed attempt to pursue the first strategy, but the semantic techniques involved are significantly more complex than those afforded us by PC.

Gennaro Chierchia & Sally McConnell-Ginet. Meaning & Grammar (p 119)

So, given that many speakers reject them, a serious treatment of tertiary passives should have, even ignoring British English, throughout dealt with what are clearly partially contrasting grammatical systems. A proper account of American English passives evidently needs to specify how these differ, a point explicitly made in Bach (1980: 325) and Iwakura (1987: 94). Instead, it has, probably under the pressure of various theoretical assumptions, come to be widely accepted in generative circles, despite clear evidence to the contrary, that tertiary passives do not exist in American English.

To see the truly bizarre character of this, one finds that e.g. Stroik (1997: 43), a work explicitly developing the recent ('minimalist') transformational ideas of Chomsky (1993, 1995a, 1995b), does not flinch from deriving *support* for specific assumptions from their ability to predict the *impossibility* of such passives. That is, in 1997 one finds someone putatively developing the theoretical ideas of author A and claiming support for a version of those ideas from the claimed fact that they predict the impossibility of sentences richly exemplified in the literature and that A himself had documented for his own NL in 1955. Perhaps even more tellingly, in a work submitted to a website of papers to honor the author of (18), Romero (1998), someone associated with that author's own institution, states as part of a theoretical discussion of passives crosslinguistically that only 'goal' passives are possible in English ditransitives, citing:

(20)a. Almodovar was given the awards

b. *The awards were given Almodovar

So here someone is 'honored' by theoretical discussions assuming the contrary of what the honoree had documented (in (17b)) forty three years earlier. This might be said to go beyond junk linguistics to a form of unintended comedy.

One further point about the interaction of ditransitive structures and passivization is worth highlighting. A fact rarely discussed in transformational terms is the existence of passive constituents embedded under got. Notably, while e.g. (18) correctly cites various ditransitive first (indirect) objects as being passivizable, and

(17b) correctly indicates certain ditransitive second objects are, even those having that property in standard settings with be lack it in got cases:

(21)a. The wrong books were/got ordered.

b. The house was/got destroyed.

c. The books were/got sold to Mike.

d. Mike was/*got sold the books.

e. Mike was/*got told several stories.

f. Several books were/*got given him by the teacher.

g. Nobody wants to be/*get sent threatening letters.

A parallel point holds for passive constituents embedded under causative verbs like have:

(22)a. Stella had the wrong books ordered.

b. Stella had the house destroyed.

c. Stella had the books sold to Mike.

d. *Stella had Mike sold the books.

e. *Stella had Mike told several stories.

f. *Stella had several books given him.

Needless to say, nothing in the proposals about transformational descriptions of English passives accounts for these gaps. No aspect of (3)/(11)/(12) seems to have any application. Indicated, I believe, is that the standard idea that all English passivization is to be reduced to a single undifferentiated operation is misguided. But in any event, the contrast between unsupported dreams like (2) and the factual reality of English is again quite palpable.

Statements (11) and (12) assert that transformations, specifically that involved in passivization, apply blindly and are indifferent to grammatical relations. But consider:

(23) Chomsky (1971: 29-30)

"Consider next the sentence "I believe the dog's owner to be hungry." Applying the postulated operation, we locate the main verb "believe" and the noun phrase "the dog" following it, as before, and form "The dog is believed 's owner to be hungry." Obviously, this is incorrect. What we must do is choose not the noun phrase "the dog," but rather the noun phrase of which it is a part, "the dog's owner," giving then: "The dog's owner is believed to be hungry." The instruction for forming passives was ambiguous: the ambiguity is

resolved by the overriding principle that we must apply the operation to the largest noun phrase that immediately follows the verb. This, again, is a rather general property of the formal operations of syntax.''

Here a really blindly applying rule would wrongly allow the impossible passivization of the genitive phrase. But instead of admitting that talk of blind application was vacuous, the author invokes an auxiliary hypothesis, in effect, the A-over-A principle. But if one is allowed to invoke some new curative hypothesis every time blind application fails, the claim obviously has no testable consequences. Moreover, it was untenable even in 1971 to invoke a *general* A-over-A principle. Ross (1967) had a whole chapter devoted to the general untenability of such, work which the author is silent about. But the really key point is that the failed passive of the genitive discussed in (23) is *exactly* the sort of case which is properly *excluded* if passivization is, contra the claims, sensitive to grammatical relations, in particular, if one views passivization in anything like traditional relational terms such as those in (52) below. For in no one's sense is the genitive phrase any kind of object of the verb in whose clause it is unpassivizable. So like the 'applies blindly' claim, the supposed independence of passivization from grammatical relations was also interpreted in such a way as to admit of no falsification, at the same time it was proclaimed with great emphasis.

At a certain point, it was assumed that the transformational DP preposing putatively crucial for characterizing verbal passives was the same operation as one putatively yielding certain prenominal genitive DPs; see Fiengo (1977, 1980), Hoekstra (1984: 133-136). So e.g. (24a, b) were both taken to involve preposing of a DP, a theory-internal way of saying both are passive structures. [6]

(24)a. The city was destroyed by the giant gorilla.

b. the city's destruction by the giant gorilla

But Chomsky (1975a: 242), citing Joseph Emonds, noted a contrast between seeming nominal and verbal passives, as follows:

(25)a. the lecture yesterday $\Rightarrow$ yesterday's lecture

b. he lectured yesterday $\Rightarrow$ *Yesterday was lectured by him.

It was then added:

(26) Chomsky (1975a: 242):

"I think that in many cases, perhaps all, the discrepancies can be attributed to other factors."

Crucially, the author does not say that his formulations of the NP preposing rule are *wrong*. Again, for a rule said to 'apply blindly', the fact that it fails to apply in a case where its formulation says it should apply is not taken to show that the 'apply blindly' claim is wrong. Rather than abandon the claim, in the particular

case of (25), the author appeals instead to something he calls the *subject-predicate relation*, hypothesizing it to be defined on the surface structures of sentences but not on nominals:

(27) Chomsky (1975a: 242):

"..it might be plausibly argued that 'was lectured (by NP)' is not a possible predicate of 'yesterday' accounting for the ungrammaticalness."

In effect, (27) claims that some semantic principle involving predication blocks (25b), but is inapplicable to the good (25a) because the subject predicate relation is undefined for NPs/DPs.

Nothing about this proposal is serious. First, the author has not defined the putative subject-predicate relation, nor given any evidence that there is such a thing, not shown independently a single fact it accounts for. So there is no visible justification for assuming any such subject-predicate relation defined on surface structures. Rather the contrary is true, given e.g. (28a, b), where grammatical passive subjects are expletives, meaningless phrases of which it would make no sense to predicate anything.

(28)a. It was proved that Disneyland is toxic.

b. There are assumed to be space aliens in Congress.

Still worse for the author's proposal, there are perfectly fine English sentences having exactly the sort of subject NPs that are bad in passives like (25b):

(29)a. Yesterday found Mike in Detroit.

b. Yesterday saw the Yankees lose to the Red Sox.

c. Yesterday was found to be a poor day to launch the Space Shuttle.

What reason could there be why it is correct to predicate <u>found mike in Detroit</u>, <u>saw the Yankees lose to the Red Sox</u> or <u>was found to be a poor day to launch the Space Shuttle</u> of <u>yesterday</u> but not <u>was lectured by him</u>. None is of course given.

In short, the casual, unsupported attempt to defend the NP preposing rule in Chomsky (1975a: 142) was entirely spurious and no genuine basis whatever was offered for the ungrammaticality of (25b). Nonetheless, the same account is in effect repeated in (1977a: 177-178). The very appeal to it shows clearly the emptiness of claims about movement rules 'applying blindly'. If the term 'junk linguistics' did not exist, it would arguably need to be invented for this invocation of an unmotivated and indefensible semantic principle of predication just to block the application of a rule which, if the 'applies blindly' terminology had any content, would have to apply even if the predication principle were real. [7]

Moreover, the procedure of proposing a desperate, ad hoc patch for an otherwise factually leaking proposal about passivization seen in (27) is not unique. That junk linguistic characteristic recurs; when the author notes factual problems for his transformational approach to passivization, he appears *never* to contemplate the possibility that these show it is false. A second highly revealing instance is found in Chomsky (1981: 147 note 108), which considers (30):

(30) They forced John to wait.

This is taken to be a *control* structure, in the author's terms, one with an invisible PRO complement subject coindexed with one in the including phrase, here John. One assumes this would be taken to be the right analysis for the whole range of force +infinitive cases like e.g. (31):

(31)a. Mike forced Selma to do the dishes.

b. Germany forced Holland to surrender.

Suspiciously though, the author gives no argument for a control analysis, and considers no alternatives. Moreover, the various novel tests appealed to in Chapter 3 to differentiate control from raising structures unambiguously indicate that infinitival complements with force are raising not control cases:

(32)a. Middles

The occupying power forced Uruguayan police to bribe cheaply.

b. Metonymous Stock Structures

Not even Zeus could force Lucent Technologies to go up.

c. Partial Control

*The director forced his subordinate to meet at noon.

That is, it was seen that control complements could not be middles or the metonymous structures and that raising complements could not manifest partial control. In all three respects then, the force complements behave like raising cases.

The arguably wrong control assumption putatively leads to an expectation, not explained, that cases like (33) are *bad*:

(33)a. they forced it to rain (by seeding the clouds.)

b. the forced better care to be taken of the orphans (by passing new laws).

But according to the author (I agree) these seem 'moderately acceptable'. A straightforward reaction would have been to simply reject the control analysis, the source of the false expectation about (33). But this idea was not even considered.

Instead, it was proposed that these examples "are only derivatively generated (in the sense of Chomsky (1965, p. 227; 1972 pp27f.)". The former reference yields a discussion claiming that an adequate grammar directly generates all the perfect sentences but 'derivatively generates' imperfect ones with, in some unspecified way, an account of how they are imperfect. The latter offers parallel claims with indication that what is being talked about is to be interpreted in part in terms of *analogy*, in terms of speakers "failing to take note of a certain distinction of grammaticalness" And the author goes so far as to insist that:

(34) Chomsky (1972b: 28)

"There is no doubt that such processes of derivative generation exist as a part of grammar in the most general sense."

One observes that (33) represent further cases where the sort of 'blind application' views of passivization advocated by the author, if interpreted substantively, fail, since the following are bad:

(35)a. *it was forced to rain.

b. *better care was forced to be taken of the orphans.

But, as in his discussion of the contrast between DP preposing in clauses and nominals, instead of seeing some problem with his formulation, the author again seeks an ad hoc solution, this time, in effect choosing to criticize the examples and to exclude them from the NL, or to claim that they involve violations which speakers are failing to notice. Despite the undefended and indefensible (34), there is evidently no reason to see this as anything but junk linguistics. Support for that conclusion is that the author gives no substance to the claim that (33) are 'derivatively generated'. How is this done? What principle or aspect of the grammar do they putatively violate? No answers are offered.

But the author does go on to offer what is called "evidence supporting this conclusion", namely, the fact that they resist "further grammatical operations", this a reference to the ungrammaticality of *passives* like (35). This putative evidence would have to have a logic of the following form:

(36)a. There are structures, e.g. (33), putatively 'derivatively derived', which satisfy the input conditions for the author's passivization (DP preposing) rule.

b. The output of that rule on the cited structures is ungrammatical.

c. Fact b. supports the 'derivatively derived' claim for the structures of (33).

But no logical connection between premisses and conclusion is visible here; one could hardly better instantiate the notion 'non-sequitur'. Further, what is stated in (36) is that an operation, once said to apply blindly, gives as output from a grammatical input structure satisfying its requirements something

ungrammatical. Instead of concluding from that that the rule is wrong, the author leaps to a view of the input in entirely obscure and unanalyzed terms as 'derivatively derived'. But evidently state of affairs (36b) is exactly that which could show that a factual claim involved in the transformational passivization rule is false. Again then the author makes ominously clear that in his methodology, nothing will be allowed to lead to that conclusion for a proposal he favors. Instead, he decided to attempt to marginalize the facts under the obscure rubric 'derivatively derived', making it at least rhetorically unnecessary to deal with them seriously.

The thoroughly junk linguistic character of that move is shown differently by the fact that its logic, (36), would require taking *every* passive failure to indicate 'derivative generation' of the input. For some idea of the scope of the absurdity of this, see in particular Section 7 below. Two additional cases would be:

(37)a. The chimp has a peach. ⇨ b. *A peach is had by the chimp. c. Therefore a. is 'derivatively derived'.

d. Wanda got a puppy. ⇨ e. *A puppy was got(ten) by Wanda. f. Therefore, d. is 'derivatively derived'.

Moreover, as remarked in Postal and Pullum (1988: 657), the author has himself not in general followed that logic and has on multiple occasions there referenced concluded merely that a passive failure indicates the existence of some linguistic constraint blocking the output. Obviously, that is what he did with respect to the nominal/clausal contrast of (25). The junk linguistic character of methodology (36) then includes the fact that its advocate refuses to even follow it consistently.

The author then moves on from (33) and (35) to examples like:

(38) they prevented it from raining.

Here he says bizarrely (1981: 147 note 108) that it "should also be ungrammatical if <u>prevent</u> assigns a θ-role to its object." This is bizarre because even if one adopts a framework sanctioning concepts like 'assign a θ-role', no independent reason is cited to make the assumption for the particular case and there is none:

(39)a. He prevented *tabs* from being kept on her movements.

b. God prevented *it* from being nice in the Congo.

c. Only the president can prevent *there* from being a strike.

d. The director prevented *it* from being revealed that the treasury was empty.

That is, the post-<u>prevent</u> position allows all sorts of DPs (highlighted) which the author has otherwise assumed cannot receive θ-roles. Moreover, the novel tests distinguishing raising from control complements again indicate that the <u>prevent</u> cases are raising structures:

(40)a. Middles

The occupying power prevented Uruguayan police from bribing cheaply.

b. Metonymous Stock Structures

Not even Zeus could prevent Lucent Technologies from going down.

c. Partial Control

*The director prevented his subordinate from meeting at noon.

So the author's unsupported factual assumptions were clearly wrong. It was then claimed there is a parallel between his (35) and the force cases because supposedly the corresponding passive is again impossible:

(41) *it was prevented from raining

Here though, as discussed in Postal and Pullum (1988: 657), the facts are wrong, since in general speakers find passives like (41) and (42) essentially perfect:

(42)a. Only through the use of nuclear weapons can it be prevented from raining.

b. It could not for long be prevented from being noticed that he was dead.

The author says about (38) that "it has been proposed as an argument for raising-to-object" referring without citation to one of the arguments in Postal (1974). But he states that no argument can be based on it "since the rules for generating it would appear to be idiosyncratic." This illustrates a further junk linguistic lack of logic for several reasons. First, since no actual rules are given or cited, there is no way to evaluate any claim about them. If there is no such set or if its putative members were not correct, nothing could follow. But, second, even if the author had in mind a relevant set of correct and idiosyncratic rules, nothing would follow. For no known logic determines that arguments can't be based on idiosyncratic rules. They can be based on any facts and, even, in the case of reductio arguments, on false assertions. The 'no argument' claim is entirely junk linguistic bluff.

Thus the passages just discussed show again the emptiness of claims of blind application But they also illustrate the more harmful characteristic that when faced with data incompatible with some putatively significant claim, the author systematically refuses to contemplate its falsehood, and instead will seek to invoke the most ill-defined and farfetched protective moves, instantiating a solid strand of junk linguistics. A variety of other proposals either inoculating his passive proposals from falsification or showing that claims of 'blind application' are empty have been made by the author of (11)/(12). Besides those already touched on, others are found in the list in Postal and Pullum (1988: 656-657). [8]

Overall then, the transformational passive proposals of the 1970s I have been discussing had the following junk linguistic characteristic: strong, prestigious sounding claims systematically bound to one or another hedging device which guaranteed their factual emptiness. Not surprisingly, such spurious proposals coexisted with a flagrant disregard of well-documented and publicly known facts, such as those from Fillmore (1965), some even earlier noted in Chomsky (1975b).

Section 4 Evolution of Ideas

The accounts of transformational description discussed so far, (3), (11), (12), etc., all fall within an earlier set of transformational assumptions. From the mid 1970s through the mid 1980s, the theoretical framework underlying these descriptions underwent significant evolution. At least *six* innovations are potentially relevant to subsequent discussion of passives in transformational terms:

(43)a. Each transformational movement was ultimately taken to leave an invisible *trace* in the position of origin;

b. It was ultimately claimed that individual transformational rules, including movements, were properly subsumed under general, construction-independent schema like *Move alpha*;

c. It was ultimately claimed that transformations could move elements to positions higher in trees, but never to lower positions.

d. It was ultimately claimed that there was a system of abstract *case* assignment so that NPs/DPs in particular were associated with invisible cases, subject to various principles called Case Theory.

e. It was ultimately claimed that there was a system of assignment (in some not clear way) of elements called *theta roles* to DPs, subject to various principles called Theta Theory.

f. It was ultimately claimed that moved phrases and their traces formed objects called *chains*, subject to various conditions.

It is not my intention to describe any of these changes in detail. They are all well-known and much discussed. Accounts better than any I could provide are found in such works as Riemsdijk and Williams (1986), Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988), Ouhalla (1994, Culicover (1997), Webelhut (1995) and Roberts (1997). Roberts (1986) probably gives the description most closely tied to passive issues.

These innovations and in certain cases the various theoretical losses they entail have diverse consequences for the description of passives. The recognition of traces in the two varieties, null, and copy, already discussed in a different context in Chapter 7, need play little role in the present discussion. However, not

so for the shift from a view of individually formulated transformations characterizing specific constructions to one like (43b). That does have significant relations to this discussion, as seen in the early specification of it in (44):

(44) Chomsky (1986a: 72-73)

"Correspondingly, the study of NP movement led to the conclusion that the various cases reduce to Move-NP. In the earliest work, there was, for example, a "passive transformation" converting (29i) to (29ii) by a rule with the structural description and structural change indicated informally in (30), moving the hird term to the position of the first, adding *be-en* to the second term *see* (which becomes *be see-en = be seen* by a later rule; we overlook here the placement of tense), to the third position where it is assigned *by*:

(i) John saw Bill (29)

(ii) Bill was seen by John

(NP, V, NP) - (3, be-en 2, by 1) (30)

Similarly, the rule of raising that converts (31i) to (31ii) was expressed as a transformation (32), moving the third term of the structural description to the position of the first, which is empty in the underlying D-structure generated by phrase structure rules:

(i) e seems [John to be happy] (31)

(ii) John seems [e to be happy]

(NP, V, [NP, X]) - (3, 2, 4) (32)

With appropriate formulation of general principles on rules and representations, both (30) and (32) reduce simply to Move-NP, so that there is no passive or raising rule but simply an interaction of principles of UG yielding various constructions, differing from language to language as a consequence of options that the languages allow. Furthermore, the differences between Move-wh, Move-NP, Move-PP, and so forth can be in large part (perhaps completely) explained in other terms, so that we are left with the rule Move-a, a being an arbitrary category. It would be too strong to claim that this conclusion has been demonstrated, but it is a reasonable hypothesis, and many particular cases appear well substantiated."

Recourse to such schemas yields a major modification of earlier descriptions of passives like that of (3), (11) and (12). The specific formulation of passive as in e.g. (11), which simply vanishes in the 'Move alpha' framework, in itself imposed putatively correct, although, as has been seen and will be further, massively wrong, limitations on which DPs in actives were in principle subject to passivization; it was, modulo the dodge about verb category already touched on, simply those directly post-verbal DPs. But on its own, the Move alpha approach *imposes no conditions whatever on those DPs subject to passivization*, and, as the jargon

goes, vastly 'overgenerates'. In effect then, the original transformational theory of constraints on passives, versions of which are seen in (3), (11) and (12) and (66) below, is abandoned. Something additional is obviously needed. An early recognition of this is seen in (45):

(45) Chomsky (1976), reprinted in Chomsky (1977a: 174)

"Evidently, a grammar limited to such rules as (7) or (8) will overgenerate massively, since intricate constraints cannot be built into specific transformations. Consider the case of NP preposing; i.e., the leftward movement case of (7). By general conditions on recoverability of deletion (the correct formulation of which is a nontrivial matter; cf. Peters and Ritchie (1973)), the second NP can move only to an NP position that is empty of any lexical material. Assuming that the left NP position, which is to receive the moved NP, is empty, either by virtue of prior NP-postposing or for some other reason, we will have such instances of NP-preposing as the following:

(10) a. John is believed [t is incompetent]

b. John is believed [t to be incompetent]

c. John('s) was read [t book]

d. John seems [t to like Bill]

e. John seems [Bill to like t]

f. yesterday was lectured t

g. yesterday's lecture t

In each case, t is the trace left by movement of the NP *(John, yesterday).* Of these examples, only (b), (d), and (g) are grammatical, although NP-preposing has applied in a comparable way in all cases. Thus the rule overgenerates, specifically, in cases (a), (c), (e), and (f).

There are two general approaches to the problem of overgeneration in such cases as these: we may try to impose (i) conditions on the application of rules or (ii) conditions on the output of rules, i.e., on surface structures. The latter may be related to rules of semantic interpretation that determine LF, under the assumptions of EST."

Two points about (45) are obvious. [9] *First*, the passage does not go beyond generalities to real conditions which would properly reduce the vast excess of an unconstrained Move alpha description of passivization. *Second*, although such descriptions no longer specify that a passivizable phrase must be immediately post-verbal, the cases cited arbitrarily met this condition, raising the question of whether the author had faced the magnitude of unwanted possibilities allowed by rule schemata. Notably, a decade later, one finds, as in (44), the reduction of passivization to a variant of the Move alpha schema being described in effect as an

accomplishment, with no specification of problems or unsolved issues. What is unquestionable is that the overall issue of precisely describing the facts of passivization has largely vanished into some much vaster and unfocused problem of controlling the outputs of Move alpha. Given the evolutions in question, it is much less obvious that transformational claims about passives are false because it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, the relevant claims are.

One additional point is that the adoption of the Move alpha view abandons the proposal in (66) below that compatibility with manner adverbials is a defining property of English passives, one which excludes the objects of what were called middle verbs from passivizing. One would have expected that fact to have been discussed and justified. But as far as I know, it never was.

Finally, the claim of 'blind application', seen to combine prestigious apparent force with vacuity determining hedges, of course *necessarily* vanishes in a Move alpha framework, implicitly granting that its only significance was the junk linguistic function of associating some unearned glamour with a factually and conceptually inadequate view.

Section 5 The Cavalier Treatment of the <u>by</u> Phrase

The earliest *transformational* accounts of English such as (3) and (11) involved the posit of two distinct (though linked) nominal movements for passive clauses like (46a).

(46)a. Gloria was bitten by the snake.

b. The snake bit Gloria.

One involved the 'promotion' of a VP-internal DP (here <u>Gloria</u>) to subject position of the auxiliary; the other a 'demotion' of the underlying subject (here <u>the snake</u>) of an active-like structure to a position which, in some way, ended up being inside a PP. The latter mapping was problematic, as it was unclear how to guarantee the derived PP structure, if, as in the earliest accounts, the structure on which passivization operated was essentially like that of the corresponding active like (46b). One subsequent approach to this problem, that of Chomsky (1965: 104), posited an underlying P with a following empty (dummy element) NP position into which the active subject could move. A later version of this is:

(47) Chomsky (1976; reprinted in Chomsky (1977a : 169)

"For example, we might formulate the passive transformation in English with the following SD:

(3) (*vbl*, NP, Aux, V, NP, *by*, #, *vbl*)

In this formulation, the two terms *vbl* are (end-) variables, so that the first and last factors of a string X to

which the transformation applies are arbitrary. The second and fifth factors must be NP's (each is an NP), the third an Aux(iliary), the fourth a V, the sixth by and the seventh # (by and # are terminal symbols; we may think of # as an "abstract" representative of NP).''

In this view, the 'demotion' of subject part of passivization is taken to involve substitution of the subject DP for an the empty post-P DP. This view was still evidently quite inadquate, as like the Syntactic Structures version, it fails to indicate that the passive by + DP form a PP.

Moreover, a few years later, in Chomsky, 1981, the 'demotion' aspect of the original transformational description of passivization had been completely abandoned. Rather, the underlying form of (46a) was claimed to be more like (48) than like (46b):

(48) [e] was bitten Gloria by the snake.

This approach establishes no obvious connection between the object of a passive by phrase and the subject of an active. One motivation for the rejection of subject postposing as a feature of passive description may have been a realization that such was incompatible with a principle like (46), already referenced in (43c):

(49) Chomsky (1975a: 107):

"the permissible rules are rules of "upgrading" which move a noun phrase closer to the "root of the sentence," that is, to a less embedded position; the impermissible rules are rules of "downgrading," which increase the embeddedness of the noun phrase. We might stipulate, then, that upgrading rules are permitted, but not downgrading rules."

For subject postposing in passives would, of course, be an instance of putatively banned downgrading.

But other, more theory fundamental, reasons for abandoning the earlier postulation of subject 'demotion' are inherent in the ideas of Chomsky (1981) and subsequent work. The earlier analysis would end up violating the Theta Criterion of Chomsky (1981), as the DP moved to subject position would be assigned theta roles in both that and its original position. And problems also arise from the fact that the preposed DP would apparently have to appear in a position of the trace of the postposed DP. Details are not relevant here.

What is relevant though is that while the proposals of Chomsky (1981) abandon the demotion analysis of passive by phrases, nowhere in that work is there any explicit justification for the move nor any proposed treatment of the immediate consequences of it.[10] The same lack of discussion is seen in a still later work, where one is only given an indication that that the full by phrase is present at all stages of the passive:

(50) Chomsky (1986a: 73)

"The same will be true of the passive rule if we assume that structure immediately underlying the S-structure form is not (29i) but rather (33):

e was *see-en* Bill (by John) (33)"

Inter alia, the consequences involve partially undermining the original motivations for transformational descriptions of the passive, which included, as specified in (3), the need to capture the identical selectional/semantic relations linking active subject and passive by phrase object. There was, one recalls, even reference in (3) to the existence of NP interchange having been *proved*. But in 1981 the author of (3) abandoned that idea without comment and with no exploration of alternative means of dealing with what had been 'proved' to require subject demotion. Moreover, in discussing passive, it was claimed:

(51) Chomsky (1981: 124)

"The traditional characterization of passive as involving a change of object to subject is correct in one important sense: this is the core case of passive."

Not only does this fail to reference the author's own earlier ideas, e.g. (3), with their explicit recognition of a syntactic relation between active subject/by phrase, it also distorts the 'traditional characterization', which of course included such a relation:

(52) Jespersen (1924: 164)

''In most cases this shifting is effected by means of the passive turn. (B is preceded by A). Here what was the object (or one of the objects) in the active sentence is made into the subject, and what was the subject in the active sentence is expressed either by means of a propositional group, in English with *by* (formerly *of*), in French with *par* or *de*, in Latin with *ab*, etc., or in some languages simply by means of some case form (instrumental, ablative).''

This disdain for the development of ideas evident in the failure of (51) to mention the subject/by phrase relation, traditionally explicit as in (52), or the author's own earlier recognition of this seen in (3), should be regarded as another junk linguistic feature.

If there is no transformational relation between active subject/passive by phrase object, then the unchallenged selectional/semantic relations linking them (see e.g. Jaeggli, 1986: 599; Roberts, 1986: 27; Baker, Johnson and Roberts, 1989) must be described by some mechanisms M *distinct from* transformational derivation. Chomsky (1981, 1986a) provided no account of M nor even any indication that it was necessary. This issue does not seem to have been faced in transformational terms until Jaeggli (1986) and

Baker (1988a: Chapter 6). These works proposed idiosyncratic accounts of mechanism M. Both accounts appealed to manipulations of so-called theta roles, arguably the most obscure and undeveloped aspect of the framework at issue. [11] For Jaeggli (1986: 600) the basic idea was "that the passive suffix *en* is crucially involved in transferring the external θ-role onto the NP in the by-phrase in a passive sentence." This was elaborated in a complex way. Baker (1988a: 335-336) refined and expanded Jaeggli's proposal by claiming that the external theta role of the verb is assigned to the passive morpheme and that the by phrase 'doubles' the theta role of the passive morpheme. The latter is taken to parallel the features of pronominal clitics. To partly formalize these ideas, Baker proposed a special type of coindexing, linking the passive morpheme and the by phrase. It seems fair to see in these complexities a forced, far fetched attempt to recapture part of what the simple identity of active subject and passive by phrase recognized in other approaches, including that of (3), elegantly yielded.

Moreover, the question arises why mechanisms of the type M, however elaborated, could not supply an alternative to that part of the DP movement description of English passives, DP preposing, which post 1981 transformational accounts *maintained*. Surely, one reply to this question would reference idiom pieces. For one of the standard arguments for a transformational description of English passives has for decades appealed to idiomatic pieces of VPs, as in (53); see e.g. Culicover (1976: 167-168), Radford (1988: 422-424).

(53)a. The doctors took/*brought/*found/*grabbed/*grasped little heed of her problems.

b. Little heed was taken/*brought/*found/*grabbed/*grasped of her problems by the doctors.

The claim has been that the transformational aspect of the passive is revealed not merely by the selectional/semantic relations but precisely by the passivizability of pieces of structure which either are not directly semantic or which do not bear a direct semantic relation to the verb in whose clause they passivize. Exactly this view was expressed by Chomsky (1975a: 114), where it was claimed that if there were no passives such as inter alia those involving idioms, there would be no motivation for a transformational derivation of passives. The idea is that the relations can be stated only once with respect to the active structure, with the transformational movement as it were projecting them to passives without cost. This argument about idioms is of course maintained even under the altered, 'demotion' rejecting conception of transformational passives; see e.g. Chomsky (1981: 85).

From this point of view then, rejection of the earlier transformational derivation of the passive by phrase object claims that there should not be corresponding subject demotion cases. That is, the post 1981

transformational view of the passive implicitly denies that there are instances in which an *idiomatic subject piece* of a structure T appears as the by phrase object of a passive corresponding to T. Such an absence would apparently justify a difference between capturing the object/subject selectional similarities via one mechanism (e.g. movement) but the subject/by phrase ones by another, some instantiation of M.

Testing this claim, evidently, requires first finding active clauses having both idiomatic subjects and otherwise passivizable objects. However, if the claims of Marantz (1984: 26-27) were fully correct, there could be none. Marantz discussed a putative asymmetry in which there are many verb + object idioms combining with nonidiomatic subjects but apparently no subject + verb idioms combining with nonidiomatic, nonfixed objects. While Marantz noted the existence of idioms like (54a), he stressed that in these the object is as fixed as the subject; in any event, no passive is possible, as in (54b, c):

(54)a. The shit hit the fan. ('things went bad')

b. *The fan was hit. (ok a physical fan was struck; *'things went bad')

c. The fan was hit by the shit (*'things went bad')

However, while English cases of the sort Marantz denied are not common, they are, contrary to his claims, *not* non-existent, as illustrated first in (55):

(55)a. The lovebug bit Ted/your uncle/the guy next door/several policemen last year = "Ted/etc. fell in love last year"

b. The lovebug has bitten Ted/your uncle/the guy next door/several policemen again.

There should be no doubt about idiomaticity here; the term lovebug occurs only with the verb bite, and this verb in such contexts does not denote dental activities.

(56) The lovebug *chewed/*clawed/*grabbed/*licked/*mangled/*overwhelmed/*seized Ted.

Expressions like (55) have two properties which Marantz claimed could not exist: (i) an idiomatic subject coexisting with a freely choosable (human) object; (ii) an idiomatic subject occurring in expressions whose overall form is not that of a fixed phrase. So the post-1981 'no demotion' transformational view of English passivization determines that cases like (55) have no corresponding grammatical passives where the idiomatic subject phrase of the active occurs as object of a passive by phrase But this is false; they do: [12]

(57)a. Ted was bitten *by the lovebug*.

b. Most romantics are bitten *by the lovebug* at least once during their lives.

Moreover, the same morphological elements bite, bug, also form a distinct but more productive idiomatic sequence. This is illustrated by (58) from Bresnan (2001: 15), credited to Avery Andrews:

(58) The photography bug has bitten/*chewed up/*disturbed/*killed Fred.

That is, there seems to be an idiom of the form [$_{DP}$ Noun$_x$ + bug] Aux bite DP$_2$, the whole is interpreted to mean something like 'DP$_2$ has become strongly interested in Noun'. While the verb seems to be fixed as bite, and bug must be present, Noun$_x$ is seemingly not fixed as long as it can be taken to designate an activity of people; that is, roughly Noun$_x$ must be able to appear also in the context [DP is into [$_{DP}$ (D) Noun$_x$ + (plural)].

(59)a. The chess/golf/heroin/internet/poker/polo/skiing/television/tennis/videogame/categorial grammar bug has bitten Fred.

b. Fred is into chess/heroin/the internet/poker/polo/skiing/swimming/television/videogames/categorial grammar.

As in the idiomatic usage in (55), passivization is possible:

(60) Fred has been bitten by the chess/golf/heroin/internet/poker/polo/skiing/television/tennis/videogame/categorial grammar bug.

Another case of the same sort as (55) is, I think, seen in (61):

(61)a. A little bird told/*promised/*sang/*wrote/*informed me (of) that.

b. I was told/*promised/*sung/*informed (of) that *by a little bird*.

The stars in (61b) mark only the case where a little bird is interpreted idiomatically as designating not a small object of possible ornithological interest but a person/source which the speaker is explicitly indicating (s)he is refraining from identifying.

Further, as mentioned in note 6 of Chapter 2, Nunberg, Sag and Wasow (1994) observed that certain figurative idiom pieces like birds of a feather can occur in restricted cases as subjects of certain control complements. Now, a few control structures like that of (62) permit a passive whose subject is extraposition it.

(62)a. Those kids decided to hang out together.

b. It was decided by those kids to hang out together.

Notably then, (63b) seems to me no worse than (62b), while (63d) has the impossible character of (63c):

(63)a. Birds of a feather may decide to flock together.

b. It may be decided by birds of a feather to flock together.

c. *Birds of a feather may decide to surf the net.

d. *It may be decided by birds of a feather to surf the net.

This amounts then to a fourth case where an idiomatic active subject piece can appear in a passive by phrase.

And a fifth is provided by (64), where only the noncanine reading of old dogs is relevant:

(64)a. Old dogs may even decide to learn new tricks.

b. It may even be decided by old dogs to learn new tricks.

c. *Old dogs may even decide to stop drinking.

d. *It may even be decided by old dogs to stop drinking.

Contrary to expectations under a view where the passive by phrase is not syntactically related to active subjects, clear cases have been found of subject idiom chunks in passive by phrases. Since for transformational views, the passivizability of idiomatic VP phrase pieces is taken to support a DP 'promotion' of passive subject/active object relations, parity of reasoning indicates that the facts in (57), (60), (61b), (63b) and (64) support a 'demotional' view of passive by phrase/active subject relations. [13] This does not yield support for a transformational treatment of passivization; it just means that within that framework, an *asymmetric* 'promotion only' view is factually untenable. It also falls out that the claims of Jaeggli (1986) and Baker (1988a) that the relations between active clause subject DPs and passive by phrase DPs can be taken as completely mediated by the manipulation of theta roles is untenable. Even if there are such things, they cannot suffice for this function.

To conclude, the history of the treatment of passive by phrases in transformational terms is an instructive illustration of junk linguistics. Beginning with the exaggerated claims in (3) of a *proof* that the object DPs of passive by had to be moved subjects, one finds an evolution where the 'proved' view is later not even taken as true. And when it was abandoned, no reference to the earlier claims was made and a distorted view of pregenerative views of passive was offered. Moreover, the abandonment was linked to no explicit discussion of how to deal with the facts which motivated what had been claimed to have been proved. Subsequent work like that of Jaeggli (1986) and Baker (1988a) grappled openly with the problems created, but offered only rather convoluted appeals to obscure theta role notions. And the evolved view yields proposals which inherently make the false claim that passive by phrase objects cannot be the sort of restricted DPs whose behavior as passive subjects has standardly been taken to justify transformational movement. Moreover, no facts appear to conflict with the view that by phrase objects are realizations of syntactic subjects. The

historical rejection of this idea seems to have been entirely concept driven. So, nearly a half century after the claimed provably needed DP interchange in (3), there evolved a set of ideas arguably descriptively worse with respect to passive by phrases than the original 1957 view. [14]

Section 6 Reanalysis

Previous to the conceptual evolutions listed in (43), the transformational view in (3)/(11)/(12) faced, as alluded to in Section 2, a vast problem of *under*generation with respect to *pseudopassives* like (65b).

(65)a. Myron referred to the problem.

b. The problem was referred to by Myron.

Such cases seem to fall outside the schema of description in (3)/(11)/(12) since the passivized phrase is *apparently* not immediately post-verbal in what would be the passive rule input. There seem to have been two different transformational approaches to this issue, a transient one in Chomsky (1965), and a standard one.

The former was described as follows:

(66) Chomsky (1965: 103-104)

"These observations suggest that the Manner Adverbial should have as one of its realizations a "dummy element" signifing that the passive transformation must obligatorily apply. That is, we may have the rule (55) as a rewriting rule of the base and may formulate the passive transformation so as to apply to strings of the form (56), with an elementary transformation that substitutes the first NP for the dummy element *passive* and places the second NP in the position of the first NP:

(55) Manner -> *by-passive*

(56) NP ~ Aux ~ V~ ... ~ NP ~ ...- by- *passive* -

(where the leftmost ... in (56) requires further specification -e.g., it cannot contain an NP).

This formulation has several advantages over that presented in earlier work on transformational grammar (such as Chomsky, 1957). First of all, it accounts automatically for the restriction of passivization to Verbs that take Manner Adverbials freely. That is, a Verb will appear in the frame (56) and thus undergo the passive transformation only if it is positively specified, in the lexicon, for the strict sub categorization feature [~ NP-Manner], in which case it will also take Manner Adverbials freely. Second, with this formulation it is possible to account for the derived Phrase-marker of the passive by the rules for substitution transformations. This makes it possible to dispense entirely with an *ad hoc* rule of derived constituent structure that, in fact, was motivated solely by the passive construction (cf. Chomsky, 1957, PP. 73-74). Third, it is

now possible to account for "pseudopassives," such as "the proposal was vehemently argued against," "the new course of action was agreed on," "John is looked up to by everyone," by a slight generalization of the ordinary passive transformation. In fact, the schema (56) already permits these passives. Thus "everyone looks up to John by *passive*" meets the condition (56), with *John* as the second NP, and it will be converted into "John is looked up to by everyone" by the same elementary transformation that forms "John was seen by everyone" from "everyone saw John."

The key currently relevant idea in this proposal is the variable represented by the first set of three dots, constrained not to contain an NP. This broadens the class of NPs/DPs allowed to prepose in passives from the immediately postverbal ones picked out by (3). It basically allows anything to occur between the verb and a passivizable DP except a DP. Even though (66) would properly allow passivization of postverbal PP objects, it hardly represented a correct analysis of these. First, it was still too restricted; even the vast freedom of choice would not have permitted description of e.g. (14b). Moreover, the only principle (66) offered distinguishing V + PP structures which yielded pseudopassives from those that did not was compatibility with manner adverbs. It is seen in the discussion of reanalysis below, that this is nowhere near correct. Moreover, it would arguably have wrongly allowed passivization of DPs out of infinitives, as in:

(67)a. Jerome decided <to become famous in Europe> in an obsessed way.

b. *Europe was decided to become famous in in an obsessed way by Jerome.

In any event, (66) seemingly vanished from the transformational framework without a trace (no pun intended), and without any arguments being offered for abandoning it. Instead, the standard resolution for pseudopassives came to appeal to something called 'reanalysis', a device more often invoked than defined. So Pesetsky (1995: 275) rightly states: "The preposition in these constructions must be affixed to V by a morphological process whose exact nature is unclear." The core assumption is that an operation like (68a) can remove a preposition from a PP and incorporate it into a preceding verb, converting a Verb + PP structure into one of the form Verb + DP, hence subject to the transformational passive defined on postverbal DPs. [15] This idea originates, as (68b) shows, in pregenerative work although Curme never seems to be credited.

(68)a. Reanalysis (schematic)

$<_{\varphi} <_{V} X> + <_{PP} P_a + DP_b> \rightarrow <_{\varphi} <_{V} X + P_a > + DP_b>$

b. Curme (1931: 99)

"In modern times the list of transitive verbs has been greatly increased by the addition of a large number of verbs originally intransitive which took a prepositional object, as 'to depend upon a man,' 'to laugh at a person,' 'to talk over a matter.' In course of time the preposition here has become attached to the verb as an integral part of it, so that the object is no longer a prepositional object but a direct object of the compound verb. This becomes apparent in the passive, where the object becomes subject and, the preposition remains with. the verb: 'They were laughed at by everybody'."

One might easily assume that invocation of a Move alpha view of passivization would have rendered appeal to reanalysis unnecessary. For under the schematic view, every DP in a clause except its subject, PP object or not, is potentially passivizable without special indication. But, in fact, Move alpha does not yield this benefit when combined with later ideas including Case Theory, theta role assignment and chains, for reasons which need not concern us. Thus, reanalysis continues to be appealed to even *after* passivization is claimed to be described properly by a combination of Move alpha, and other later assumptions:

(69) Chomsky (1981: 123)

"There seems to be no difference in θ-role assignment in the examples of (20), though (i) (like (19iv)) can be passivized as (iii), while (ii) cannot be passivized as (iv):

(20) (i) they spoke to John

(ii) they spoke angrily to John

(iii) John was spoken to

(iv) *John was spoken angrily to

It may be, as has frequently been proposed, that in such cases as (19iv), (20iii), the verb-preposition construction has been reanalyzed as a verb, and as is well-known, this device is more readily available when the combination is somehow "verb-like" in its semantic properties."

The appeal to reanalysis to describe pseudopassives, which persists in later views, is though arguably a major flaw. For, as previously argued in Postal (1986a) and Baltin and Postal (1996), the hypothesis that pseudopassive formation depends on the reanalysis of Ps out of PPs into verbs in cases like (65b) is untenable and, unless supplemented by ad hoc restrictions, induces numerous false entailments. Eight are briefly described and illustrated in (70).

(70) Although reanalysis putatively creates new transitive verbs and direct object structures (to feed passive formation via Move alpha, etc.),

a. (i) while *middles* are formed (only) on verbs with direct objects, the putative reanalysis never feeds middle formation (see Keyser and Roeper, 1984: 408; Roberts, 1986: 222):

(ii) Such principles are easily cited/discovered/referred to.

(iii) Such principles cite/discover /*refer to easily.

b. (i) while *nominalizations in* <u>*of*</u> are formed (only) on direct objects, reanalysis never feeds such nominalizations [16]

(ii) your citation/discovery/*reference to of that principle

(iii) the citation/discovery/*reference to of that principle by Myra

c. (i) while direct object DPs can feed *Heavy DP Shift* and PP objects cannot (Ross, 1967), the putatively reanalyzed objects needed to feed pseudopassivization behave like PP objects, not like verbal objects:

(ii) Steve cited often/discovered easily/*referred to frequently the principle you just explicated.

d. (i) the putatively reanalyzed Ps of (some) pseudopassives appear in contexts which make it essentially *impossible to regard them as verb-internal*;

(ii) The bridge was climbed off of/onto by the chimp.

(iii) The bridge was climbed onto by the gorilla and then, a few minutes later, off of by the chimp.

(iv) The bridge was flown over (but) never, (I am quite sure), under by the daredevil pilot.

(v) The bridge was flown over on Sunday by Sheila and under on Saturday by Louise.

e. (i) *gapping*, while clearly zeroing verbs, cannot (at least in the NL of many) yield the zeroing of a P without the zeroing of its complement DP; although supposedly incorporated in verbs, the putatively reanalyzed Ps of pseudopassive also obey this gapping constraint:

(ii) Sandra cited/discovered/praised Plato and Steve Aristotle.

(iii) Sandra argued about/referred to Plato and Steve about/to Aristotle.

(iv) *Sandra argued about/referred to Plato and Steve Aristotle.

f. (i) *pseudogapping* has the same property as gapping:

(ii) Although Steve didn't cite/discover Plato, he did Aristotle.

(iii) Although Steve didn't argue about/refer to Plato, he did about/to Aristotle.

(iii) *Although Steve didn't argue about/refer to Plato, he did Aristotle.

g. there are no *nominal* pseudopassives:

(i) That issue was discussed/argued about by Greg.

(ii) the discussion of/argument about that issue by Greg

(iii) that issue's discussion/*argument about by Greg

(v) That scholar was cited/referred to by Greg

(vi) the citation of/reference to that scholar by Greg

(vii) that scholar's citation/*reference to by Greg

h. (i) while subject to semantic constraints, transitive verbs take the derivational prefix re-, no structure putatively reanalyzed as a transitive verb permits re-, even when the semantics seems acceptable:

(ii) Such principles are easily cited/considered/discovered/discussed/referred to/talked about/reflected on

(iii) Such principles should be recited/reconsidered/rediscovered/*rereferred to/*rereflected on/*retalked about

Thus quite systematically, the verbal phrase structures of the sort persistently taken to undergo reanalysis to yield pseudopassives in transformational terms systematically fail to manifest the behavioral features of common structures of the form $[_{VP}\ [_{V}\ X]]\ [_{DP}\ Y\ ]$. Rather, they manifest the behavior of ordinary verb + PP structures. It is striking that all of the evidence just cited against reanalysis as a basis for pseudopassivization in no way impunes a passive-particular statement like (66).

A slightly different piece of evidence against reanalysis is derivable from the discussion of NEX ('locative inversion') clauses in Chapter 1. There was cited an observation of Bresnan (1994) that pseudopassive clauses and NEX clauses do not intersect. It was claimed that this followed under the analysis of Chapter 1 from the fact that visible expletive there cannot be the subject of a pseudopassive.

(71)a. In that article several strange principles were advanced/cited/developed.

b. In that article there were advanced/cited/developed several strange principles.

c. In that article were advanced/cited/developed several strange principles.

(72)a. In that article several strange principles were argued against/depended on/referred to.

b. *In that article there were argued against/depended on/referred to several strange principles.

c. *In that article were argued against/depended on/referred to several strange principles.

The contrasts between (71b, c) and (72b, c) are entirely unexpected under a reanalysis approach, which claims that e.g. argue against/depend on/refer to have the structure of complex transitive verbs like those of (71). Again, the implications of reanalaysis proposals are not verified. Note too that an analysis like (66) offers no insight into the locative inversion and expletive there facts.

A last point about the failure of reanalysis to provide a serious treatment of English pseudopassives is linked to the fact that, of course, many V + P+ DP combinations do *not* sanction related pseudopassives, and these include many which cannot in any way be subsumed under independent constraints which bar, for whatever reason, the passivization of unaccusative structures. [17] So one observes for instance:

(73)a. The audience cheered for the home team.

b. *The home team was cheered for by the audience.

c. Irving fled from/to Peoria.

d. *Peoria was fled from/to by Irving.

e. Herb graduated on that date.

f. *That date was graduated on by Herb.

g. Emily lives with some chimp.

h *Some chimp was lived with by Emily.

i. Nancy never mentioned to them to bring wine.

j. *They were never mentioned to to bring wine.

k. Helen rowed toward the island.

l. *The island was rowed toward by Helen.

m. Wendell was waiting for Nora.

n. *Nora was being waited for by Wendell.

It is worth remarking that the compatibility with manner adverbial criterion of (66) would not help here since all the actives are compatible with such adverbs. In reanalysis terms, whatever principle putatively incorporates Ps into verbs, etc., must be blocked in cases like (73). It might seem that this is not another argument against reanalysis on the ground that *any* view of passives needs to build in analogous restrictions.

However, a further quite strong argument against a reanalysis view nonetheless derives from facts like (73). This is based on an observation discussed and elaborated in Postal (1990b), whose original element was due to David Perlmutter. The following holds:

(74) In wide range of cases, the ban against forming pseudopassives (like those of (73)) is matched by parallel bans against a range of other constructions, which I will for convenience call *Q constructions*; they include those referred to here as *object raising*, *object deletion*, *parasitic gaps*, *nominal object raising*. So alongside a pseudopassive contrast like (75a, b), there are corresponding nonpassive contrasts like (76):

(75)a. The fort was fired at by the soldiers.

b. The fort was crawled under(*neath) by the soldiers.

(76)a. The fort was difficult to fire at.

b. The fort was difficult to crawl under(*neath).

c. The fort was too distant to fire at.

d. The fort was too distant to crawl under(*neath).

e. Which fort did they discuss before firing at?

f. Which fort did they discuss before crawling under(*neath)?

g. a strange fort to fire at

h. a strange fort to crawl under(*neath)

And alongside a pseudopassive contrast like (77c, d), there are corresponding contrasts like those of (78):

(77)a. The thief pleaded with the judge to free the woman.

b. The thief pleaded with the judge to be allowed to free the woman.

c. The judge was pleaded with (by the thief) to free the woman.

d. *The judge was pleaded with (by the thief) to be allowed to free the woman.

(78)a. The judge was hard to plead with to free the woman.

b. *The judge was hard to plead with to be allowed to free the woman.

c. The judge was too cruel to plead with to free the woman.

d. *The judge was too cruel to plead with to be allowed to free the woman.

e. Which judge did he call after pleading with to free the woman?

f. *Which judge did he call after pleading with to be allowed to free the woman?

g. a strange judge to plead with to free the woman

h. *a strange judge to plead with to be allowed to free the woman.

The reason these correlations between bad pseudopassives and bad instances of the Q constructions are lethal for a reanalysis view of the former is this. The Q constructions are in general much freer than pseudopassives and accept as 'target' gaps such a broad range of positions as to make any invocation of reanalysis *for them* out of the question. So there is no hope of analyzing the Q constructions as limited to direct objects, which reanalysis is supposed to render feasible in simple clauses for passivization. Specifically, the gaps involved in Q constructions can be complements of a wide range of PPs not contiguous to verbs.

(79)a. Jerome is difficult to talk about that problem to.

b. Jerome is too young to tell Betty to contact Ruth for.

c. Who did they discuss after telling Betty not to talk to Ruth about that in front of?

d. a strange judge to get people to tell their children not to talk about personal issues with

Therefore the correlations sampled in (75)-(78) cannot be treated by any analog of reanalysis for the nonpassive constructions. So whatever blocks the pseudopassives in e.g. (73) cannot be attributed to reanalysis, but must rather hold of a wide class of PP objects of which those that pseudopassivize are one

subset. Previous arguments show that the putative direct objects produced by posits of renanalysis do not behave like direct objects. This one shows in a different way that the PPs in the active correspondents of pseudopassives behave like genuine PPs in that one subset of them is subject to a set of constraints common to the PPs of object raising, etc. structures.

Overall then, under an interpretation of reanalysis as a factual hypothesis about English pseudopassives, it is incorrect. But (66) aside, transformational grammar, regardless of variety, has never really offered any other approach to pseudopassives. [18] So, it seems fair to say that pseudopassives were clear exceptions to early versions of the transformational approach to passives like those in (3)/(11)/(12), and remain exceptions to a Move alpha/Case Theory approach. The latter view is not compatible with (66), so its only mechanism for treating them is some variant of Curme's (1931) mistaken invocation of reanalysis. Reanalysis might be viewed in part as a device to keep the 'applies blindly' transformational view of passivization (ignoring the hedges rendering this vacuous) consistent with pseudopassives. But it does not. Overall, the failure of reananlysis proposals to describe pseudopassivization reveals in its own way the junk linguistic nature of a claim like (2). [19]

Section 7 Arrays

Preceding sections have presented a bit of data incompatible with the claim of (3) that 'every' English active transitive structure corresponds to a grammatical passive and to the unfounded idea of (2) that exceptional cases to some extant view of English passive structures are few and marginal. But while scattered examples supporting the falsehood of such claims are found throughout the literature, some, as seen, even in the writings of their own author, no single work systematically lists enough such examples to give a true measure of not only of their falsehood but of their genuine absurdity. [20] But only such a measure permits an accurate evaluation of the extent to which such assertions are, beyond false, instances of junk linguistics. More significantly, it turns out, I claim, that counterexamples are to a significant extent not random but correlate with other grammatical features which transformational accounts have completely missed. And this cannot be seen in a few random examples.

So consider e.g. (80a)-(106a), where each a. example seemingly satisfies the input conditions for putative transformational passivization but for none of which is there a grammatical passive.

(80)a. The express train could not approach the station.

b. *The station could not be approached by the express train.

(81)a. A fish course began the dinner.

b. *The dinner was begun by a fish course.

(82)a. Karen's remarks betrayed contempt for linguists.

b. *Contempt for linguists was betrayed by Karen's remarks.

(83)a. The audience didn't buy my argument.

b. *My argument wasn't bought by the audience.

(84)a. Armand caught the flu.

b. *The flu was caught by Armand.

(85)a. Bertrand croaked something unintelligible.

b. *Something unintelligible was croaked by Bertrand.

(86)a. The express departed Grand Central at 11 AM.

b. *Grand Central was departed by the express at 11 AM.

(87)a. Deborah lacked a pleasing personality.

b. *A pleasing personality was lacked by Deborah.

(88)a. The key couldn't enter the lock.

b. *The lock couldn't be entered by the key.

(89)a. This theory fits the facts.

b. *The facts are fit by this theory.

(90)a. Snakes don't give milk.

b. *Milk is not given by snakes.

(91)a. Horace heard that from Mildred.

b. *That was heard from Mildred by Horace.

(92)a. The cabinet includes the secretary of defense.

b. *The secretary of defense is included by the cabinet.

(93)a. Sadam inspired loathing.

b. *Loathing was inspired by Sadam.

(94)a. The affair involved foreign banks.

b. *Foreign banks were involved by the affair.

(95)a. US95 will lead you to New Haven.

b. *You will be led to New Haven by US95.

(96)a. Ellen left Chicago in June.

b. *Chicago was left by Ellen in June.

(97)a. Evelyn doesn't mind profanity.

b. *Profanity isn't minded by Evelyn.

(98)a. The Titanic neared the iceberg.

b. *The iceberg was neared by the Titanic.

(99)a. The dean's decision permitted Nancy to remain in class.

b. *Nancy was permitted to remain in class by the dean's decision.

(100)a. Hugh quit the police.

b. *The police were quit by Hugh.

(101)a. The package never reached Gwen.

b. *Gwen was never reached by the package.

(102)a. The Eifel Tower resembles the Washington Monument.

b. *The Washington Monument is resembled by the Eifel Tower.

(103)a. Carmen can't stand sushi.

b. *Sushi can't be stood by Carmen.

(104)a. The chimps couldn't tell (i.e. 'determine') the distance to the chasm.

b. *The distance to the chasm couldn't be told by the chimps.

(105)a. Tom wanted pizza.

b. *Pizza was wanted by Tom.

(106)a. That experiment yielded a strange result.

b. *A strange result was yielded by that experiment.

These twenty seven cases represent an arbitrarily chosen subset of a group I refer to as *Array 1*. To avoid taking such data as clearly falsifying claims like (11), one would have to specify that none of the verbs of Array 1 is a member of the V_x category of (11). One might, for instance, propose that only members of that category have passive participles, that English passive participles are requisite for English passive clauses, and thus that the data of Array 1 follows.

Aside from such an ad hoc division of verbs motivated only by the failure of some to permit grammatical passives, the only other proposal in decades of transformational remarks about passives which offers anything is apparently the remarks in (107), related to (66) above:

(107) Chomsky (1965: 103)

"Thus Verbs generally take Manner Adverbials freely, but there are some that do not -for example: *resemble, have, marry* (in the sense of "John married Mary," not "the preacher married John and Mary," which does take Manner Adverbials freely); *fit* (in the sense of "the suit fits me," not "the tailor fitted me," which does

take Manner Adverbials freely); *cost, weigh* (in the sense of "the car weighed two tons," not "John weighed the letter," which does take Manner Adverbials freely); and so on. The Verbs that do not take Manner Adverbials freely Lees has called "middle Verbs" (Lees, 1980*a,* p. 8), and he has also observed that these are, characteristically, the Verbs with following NP's that do not undergo the passive transformation. Thus we do not have "John is resembled by Bill," "a good book is had by John," "John was married by Mary," "I am fitted by the suit ... .. ten dollars is cost by this book," "two tons is weighed by this car," and so on (although of course "John was married by Mary" is acceptable in the sense of "John was married by the preacher," and we can have "I was fitted by the tailor," "the letter was weighed by John," etc.)."

Combining these observations with proposal (66), it might, ignoring the fact that the latter is long abandoned, be claimed that Array 1 cases are simply middle verbs in the sense of Lees (1980). Putatively, these would preclude passivization, which requires compatibility with a manner adverb, while middle verbs do not combine with such adverbs. While I would agree that Lees' middle verbs are essentially instances of what I am calling Array 1, it is not true that this class is picked out by incompatibility with manner phrases. Of the twenty seven cases cited, I find at least eleven compatible with these *on the uses illustrated*, namely, approach, betray, catch, croak, depart, enter, leave, permit, quit, reach, and tell.

Further, no appeal to an ad hoc V_x category like that of (11) or to compatibility with manner adverbials could defend the transformational account against Array 1 data. The reason is that the object DPs in the active examples share properties not really fully characterizable by appeal to such notions. The passive failures are simply one of a whole set of properties of Array 1 structures with respect to which they contrast with standardly passivizable clauses. Other properties shared by Array 1 members include those of (108):

(108) Array 1 structures also:

a. have no corresponding *middles*

b. have no corresponding *nominalizations* in of (lack is the only exception I know of)

c. have no corresponding nominalized *incorporation* forms

d. have no corresponding –able forms

e, have no corresponding *object raising* (with difficult, easy, etc.) forms

f. have no corresponding *object deletion* (with too/enough) forms

g. have no corresponding parasitic gap forms

h. have no corresponding *nominal object raising* form

i. have no corresponding there/have forms

It can be seen that included in (108) are the failure of Array 1 cases to occur grammatically in what were called Q constructions in Section 6. Space precludes documenting these claims fully, but (83')-(105') illustrate the sort of facts at issue for six corresponding Array 1 cases:

(83')a. *Such arguments don't buy easily.

b. *the/Clara's buying of such arguments

c. *argument buying

d. *That argument is unbuyable.

e. *That argument is difficult to buy.

f. *That argument is too weak for anyone to buy.

g. *Which argument did he analyze carefully before buying?

h. *That is a strange argument to buy.

i. *There are/He has several arguments for you to buy.

(85')a. *Such things don't croak frequently.

b. *the croaking of threats

c. *threat croaking

d. *Such threats are uncroakable.

e. *Such threats are difficult to croak.

f. *That threat was too horrible to croak.

g. *a threat which he considered without ever croaking

h. *That is a strange threat to croak.

i. *There is/She has something to croak.

(90')a. *Milk gives frequently.

b. *that cow's giving of poisoned milk

c. *milk giving

d. *Chocolate milk is ungivable.

e. *Half and half is impossible for most cows to give.

f. *That kind of milk is impossible for cats to give.

g. *That is the kind of milk the cow promised to give without ever giving.

h. *That is a strange kind of milk to give.

i. *There is no milk for that cow to give.

(91')a. *Such islands don't near easily.

b. *the destroyer's nearing of the island

c. *iceberg nearing

d. *That island is unnearable.

e. *That sort of island is hard to near.

f. *That sort of island is too radioactive for us to near.

g. *Which island did he survey after nearing?

h. *That is a bizarre island to near.

i. *There are few islands in this sector for us to near.

(100')a. *Such units don't quit easily.

b. *Bob's quitting of the police

c. *police quitting

d. *The police are unquittable.

e. *That sort of organization is impossible to quit.

f. *That sort of organization is too unforgiving for me to quit.

g. *Which unit did he criticize without quitting?

h. *That is a bad unit to quit.

i. *There are other organizations for Mike to quit.

(105')a. *Pizza wants too often.

b. *Marsha's wanting of pizza

c. *pizza wanting

d. *Such food is unwantable.

e. *Marshmallow pizza is hard to want.

f. *Marshmallow pizza is too yucky for anyone to want.

g. *What sort of pizza did he discuss before wanting?

h. *That is an easy type of pizza to want.

i. *There is nothing else for me to want.

A few comments about particular cases. First, one should compare paradigm (83'), based on a use of <u>buy</u> meaning 'accept as correct', with the corresponding forms for the standard meaning of this verb. These have fine passives, as in (109): see (83''):

(109)a. The customer didn't buy my radio.

b. My radio wasn't bought by the customer.

(83'')a. ?Such radios don't buy easily.

b. ?the/Clara's buying of the radio

c. radio buying

d. ?That radio is unbuyable.

e. That radio is difficult to buy.

f. That radio is too beat up for anyone to buy.

g. Which radio did Irving praise after buying?

h. That is a strange radio to buy.

i. There are/He has several radios for you to buy.

The broad contrast between the two paradigms is a good indication of the systematic linking of the negative properties defining Array 1 but totally missing in a standard object paradigm like (83'').

Second, paradigm (85') is parallel to those for other so-called *manner of speaking* verbs, many of which are listed in (110).

(110) Other Manner of Speaking of Verbs (Zwicky 1971)

bellow, chirp, cry, drawl, groan, growl, grunt, hiss, howl, moan, mumble, mutter, roar, scream, shout, shriek, snap, snarl, squeak, stammer, wail, whimper, whine, yell

Third, paradigm (90') contrasts with standard uses of <u>give</u>, which allow passives freely as (111) shows, and which do not really bar any of the constructions in (108), with <u>able</u> forms a possible exception; see (90''):

(111) Milk products should not be given to children for Christmas.

(90'')a. ?Milk products don't give frequently for Christmas.

b. that monster's giving of poisoned milk to the children

c. gift giving for Christmas

d. ?Chocolate milk is ungivable to laxtose intolerant individuals.

e. That much milk is impossible for Australia to give to that country.

f. That kind of milk is impossible for us to give to those children.

g. What kind of milk did he purify before giving to those children?

h. That is a bizarre kind of milk to give to those children.

i. There is no milk for us to give to those children.

Even this overly brief survey of Array 1 shows the following: first, the idea that [DP Verb DP] structures systematically have corresponding passives is not just falsified by a few random counterexamples but by whole classes of structures. Second, for some of these classes, appeal to e.g. lexical absence of past

participles or to compatibility with manner adverbials are not possible accounts, as the passive failures are not isolated properties. Each is just one among many failures of the same DPs to enter into constructions normally possible for direct objects and in some cases for a range of PP objects. These constructions are in general independent of issues of past participles or manner adverbials.

Next, I turn to what I will call *Array 2*, illustrated in (113)-(124).

(112)a. Mary never answered Greg.

b. *Greg was never answered by Mary.

(113)a. The general never cabled Louisa.

b. *Louisa was never cabled by the general. (ignore irrelevant reading involving pieces of cable)

(114)a. Her name eludes me.

b. *I am eluded by her name.

(115)a. The Navy had failed her in several ways.

b. *She had been failed by the Navy in several ways.

(116)a. 1998 found Becky in Paris.

b. *Becky was found in Paris by 1998.

(117)a. The truth just hit me.

b. *I was just hit by the truth.

(118)a. A six pack doesn't last Marshall very long.

b. *Marshall isn't lasted very long by a six pack.

(119)a. The brute could not let Sally go (= 'let go of', 'release')

b. *Sally could not be let go by the brute.

(120)a. Quentin was putting people down. (= 'demeaning')

b. *People were being put down by Quentin.

(121)a. That movie starred Madonna.

b. *Madonna was starred by that movie.

(122)a. Laura struck everyone as intelligent.

b. *Everyone was struck as intelligent by Laura/by Laura as intelligent.

(123)a. That did not suit the dean.

b. *The dean was not suited by that.

(124)a. Claude never wrote Irene.

b. *Irene was never written by Claude.

These thirteen additional cases might just seem to be further instances of Array 1. This conclusion would be especially easy to reach given that for all of them, not only are passives impossible but so are the other properties of (108). Paradigm (121') illustrates only for case, (121):

(121')a. *Old people don't star too often.

b. *that film's starring of Madonna

c. *foreigner starring

d. *Such actors are unstarable.

e. *Marshall is hard for a good movie to star.

f. *Marshall is too sick for any movie to star.

g. *That is the ex-wrestler that every movie that starred tended to displease.

h. *Marshall is a strange person for any movie to star.

i. *There is no other person for my film to star.

However, while sharing all the restrictions of Array 1, Array 2 forms are grammatically distinct because they also systematically manifest various constraints *not* associated with Array 1. These properly include those of (125):

(125) Properties of Array 2 *not* Shared with Array 1

a. The object DP cannot be a target of left extraction

b. The object DP cannot be a target of Heavy Phrase Shift

c. The object DP cannot be a target of Right Node Raising

d. The object DP does not permit subconstituent left extraction

e. The object DP does not strand under Gapping

f. The object DP is not subject to partitive phrase (of + pronoun) suppression

I illustrate in (126) and (127) for only two Array 2 verb cases, those of (121) and (124), contrasting them with *ordinary* verbal object structures, meaning by that term those subsumed by *neither* Arrays 1 nor 2:

(126)a. [What actress]$_1$ did that movie enrich/*star t_1?

b. That movie enriched t_1 enormously/*starred t_1 in the lead role - [a strange foreign actress]$_1$.

c. The former film might have enriched t_1/*starred t_1 and the latter film did enrich/star [the foreign actress in question]$_1$.

d. [Which actress]$_1$ did that film enrich/*star several friends of t_1?

e. *The first film may have enriched/*starred Jim and the second film Tim.

f. As for those foreigners, his films enriched/*starred many.

(127)a. [Which actress]$_1$ did Melvin contact t_1/*write t_1?

b. Melvin called t_1/*wrote t_1 several times [the actress in question]$_1$.

c. Melvin may have contacted t_1/*written t_1 and Tom certainly did contact t_1/*write t_1 [that strange foreign actress]$_1$.

d. [Which actress]$_1$ did Mike call/*write several friends of t_1?

e. Mike may have contacted/*written Lois and Ed Selma.

f. As for those foreigners, Mike may have contacted/*written several.

I must leave it to readers to verify that, on the contrary, none of the properties of (125) hold of Array 1 structures.

While all the Array 2 objects cited so far are *animate*, there exist inanimate object instances of the pattern, as in (128):

(128)a. The soldier/oil filled the bottle.

b. The bottle was filled by the soldier/*oil.

c. [Which bottle]$_1$ did the soldier/*oil fill t_1?

d. The soldier/*Oil filled t_1 at that time [most of the large bottles]$_1$.

e. The soldier/*Oil may have filled t_1 and the sailor/gasoline certainly did fill t_1 [the large bottles on the shelf]$_1$.

f. [Which bottle]$_1$ did the soldier/*oil fill half of t_1?

g. The soldier/*Oil filled the large bottle and the sailor/gasoline the small bottle.

h. As for those bottles, the soldier/*oil filled several.

Other inanimate object cases whose membership in Array 2 must be left to the reader to verify include those of (129):

(129)a. Water covered the town.

b. The pipe was oozing a dark liquid.

c. The tank was dripping green muck

d. The bottle leaked sodium tribenzoate.

e. Hedges surrounded the mansion. [21]

One might note that as with Array 1, there is no systematic correlation between Array 2 verbs and those which preclude manner adverbials. While some do, <u>answer</u>, <u>cable</u>, <u>fail</u>, <u>let go</u>, <u>put down</u>, and <u>write</u> accept them without problem.

There are several other arrays of forms whose incompatibility with passivization correlates with that for other constructions, including the Q constructions. Space precludes documenting this in detail. But (130) lists some relevant cases and (131) gives one illustration of a correlation for each of types (130a-c):

(130)a. W-verb + DP +infinitive (e.g. *Helen wishes Greg to call Sonia*.)

b. Causative verb + DP + <u>to</u>-less infinitive (e.g. *Helen let Greg call Sonia*)

c. Verb + predicate nominal DP (e.g. *They made a center fielder out of that guy*)

d. Expletive + verb + DP (e.g. *It disgusts her, the things they write*)

e. Verb + lexically determined <u>it</u> (see Bach, 1980: 305; Postal and Pullum, 1988) (e.g. Serena made it to Memphis).

f. Verb + ambient <u>it</u> (see Napoli, 1988, 1993: 348-351) (e.g. George loves it in Seattle)

g. Cognate object cases (e.g. She lived an exemplary life.)

h. Intellectual product subject cases (e.g. *That book proved something important*).

(131)a. *Greg was wished by Helen to call Sonia.

b. *Greg was impossible for Helen to wish to call Sonia.

c. *Greg was let call Sonia by Helen.

d. *Greg was too boorish for Helen to let call Sonia.

e. *A centerfielder was made out of that guy by the local team.

f. *What kind of centerfielder did they need before making out of that guy?

g. *She is disgusted by it, the things they write.

h. *She is easy for it to disgust, the things they write.

i. *It was made to Memphis by Serena.

j. *It was too late for Serena to make to Memphis.

k. *It is loved in Seattle by George.

l. *It is a strange thing to love in Seattle.

m. *An exemplary life was lived by Martha.

n. *An exemplary life is hard to live.

Let us consider type (130g) in a bit greater detail though.

(132)a. That author/Joe/Your uncle argues/asserts/claims/demonstrates/insists/proves/shows/states/that every set is a member of itself.

b. That article/book/chapter/monograph/report/story argues/asserts/claims/demonstrates/insists/proves/shows/states/that every set is a member of itself.

While the verbs of the class illustrated in (132) normally take human or mind-possessing type subjects, one sees that they also permit subjects which denote e.g. documents. Notably, while the former cases have corresponding passives, not so for the document subject cases. This gap yields counterexamples to a strong interpretation of the claim of Roberts (1986: 26) that: "Exactly those complement-taking Verbs which have thematic subjects can passivize." Moreover, again there are correlations since the human cases allow all of the Q constructions, while the document ones allow none:

(133)a. That every set is a member of itself was claimed/demonstrated by Joe.

b. That every set is a member of itself was difficult for Joe to claim/demonstrate.

c. That every set is a member of itself is too absurd for Joe to claim/demonstrate.

d. That every set is a member of itself, no one should claim without demonstrating.

e. That every set is a member of itself is a strange for Joe to claim.

(134)a. *That every set is a member of itself was claimed/demonstrated by that book.

b. *That every set is a member of itself was difficult for that book to claim/demonstrate.

c. *That every set is a member of itself is too absurd for that book to claim/demonstrate.

d. *That every set is a member of itself, no book should claim without demonstrating.

e. *That every set is a member of itself was a strange thing for that book to claim.

Moreover, there are further regularities:

(135)a. That there are three ranks was proved by Jespersen/*<u>Analytic Syntax</u>.

b. That there are three ranks was unprovable by ?Jespersen/*<u>Analytic Syntax</u>.

c. the proof by Jespersen/ *<u>Analytic Syntax</u> that there are three ranks

d. Jespersen's/ *<u>Analytic Syntax</u>'s proof that there are three ranks

Clearly then, some systematic characteristic of document subject clauses with the verbs of (132) must block not only passives, but all the Q constructions, <u>able</u> forms, nominalizations, etc. What have five decades of transformational grammar offered in this connection? The answer, as far as I can see, is that none of the ideas of this framework which have been applied to English passives have anything to say at all. This paradigm alone suggests how deeply claim (2) was junk linguistics.

The intellectual product subject cases differ from Array 1, Array 2, etc. in the following way. They seem to be systematically related to sentences with the same verbs with animate subjects. That is, (132b) does not represent a distinct class of verbs from (132a). Each verb seems to have the same semantics in each corresponding a/b pair. There is nothing visible in transformational grammar which permits saying this, however. [22]

Moreover, systematic relations between paradigms with the same verbs only one of which blocks passivization do not seem isolated. Consider the pair:

(136) Frank punched Mike (back).

It was noted in Fraser (1965/1974: 52) that the particular particle back of (136), call it *retaliatory* back, blocks passivization:

(137) Mike was punched (*back) by Frank.

Fraser did not though observe that the passivization failure is not isolated. In a range of ways parallel to those of earlier arrays, retaliatory back yields gaps in various constructions, including the Q constructions:

(138)a. Great boxers don't punch (*back) easily.

b. Great boxers are difficult to punch (*back).

c. That boxer is too skilled to punch (*back).

d. Which boxer did he tangle with without punching (*back)?

e. He is a bad person to punch (*back).

Again though, it would make no sense to say that a verb without back is of a different category than the same verb occurring with it. Moreover, it is thoroughly obscure what sort of constraint a transformational approach could propose to block all the relevant constructions in the back case. Notably, the considerations relevant to the 1AEX mentioned in note 17 are irrelevant to this case, as the semantics of the subject is identical in both the paradigm with and without back.

Overall then, the various arrays show in a distinctive way that there is nothing like a current account of conditions which allow or fail to allow passive correspondents to active clauses. Moreover, whatever principles deal with the passive facts for the arrays must evidently be special cases of more general ones also controlling a range of distinct constructions, including the Q constructions. Viewed against these facts, it is clear again that self-congratulatory claims like (2) have the character of junk linguistics.

Section 8 Complement Passivization and Nonpassivization

Despite the fact that passives are, in the transformational terms being criticized in this chapter, systematically described as manifesting movement of a postverbal DP which ends up as passive subject, it has been known for decades (see Rosenbaum, 1967:10), that e.g. that clauses can be the subjects of passives in ways seemingly parallel to DPs: [23]

(139)a. Gina proved that/that the turtle was clever.

b. That/That the turtle was clever was proved by Gina.

In fact, in Chomsky (1975b: 496) not only were examples like the long form of (139b) noted, they were taken to be a prima facie argument that that clauses were NPs. Moreover, as already touched on in note 19, there are also that clause pseudopassives:

(140)a. That the perpetrators might be space aliens was agreed on by the authorities..

b. That he will come on time cannot be counted on by anyone.

c. That not every cube has right angles was referred to by the professor.

Since such clauses were originally categorized as NPs/DPs, that clause passivizability did not originally raise a theoretical problem in transformational grammar. But following the work of Emonds (1969, 1976) almost all transformationalists subsequently *abandoned* this idea and now generally claim that that clauses are not DPs (but CPs). That makes it obscure how to subsume clausal passives under transformational accounts of passivization like (11) and their descendants in terms of Move alpha, traces, Case Theory, etc..

Schemas like Move alpha would of course allow non-DPs/CPs to move without special stipulation. But CP movement nevertheless does *not*, under standard assumptions, directly solve the problem raised by the long form of (139b). For in general trace-theoretic terms, movement of a phrase of category K must link two positions *of category K*. Recall the discussion of traces and specifically quote (141) cited in Chapter 7:

(141) Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988: 41)

"In accord with Trace Theory, let us assume that who leaves a trace when it moves. This trace is obviously an NP, a fact ensured by Trace Theory, which essentially says that, upon movement, an item leaves behind a syntactic silent copy of itself."

Moreover, the requirement that moved elements and their traces be of the same category is now a fundamental element of the much touted copy theory of traces, also discussed in Chapter 7. Consistent with this view would then be an analysis of the type in (142) given by Webelhut (1992: 96):

(142) [$_{CP}$ That John would be unqualified] had been expected [$_{CP}$ e]

However, given that assumption, if the moved phrases in e.g. the long form of (139b) and (140) are CPs, both the subject position and position of origin must be CPs. And, given the failure of reanalysis proposals already argued, clausal pseudopassives like (140) would, in transformational terms then have to involve CP

movement out of positions *where CPs are barred*, yielding what Bresnan (2001: 17) refers to as a *movement paradox*.

Webelhut's (1992) nonstandard (I believe) solution to this situation is in effect to reject the principle in (141) (hence implicitly the copy theory of traces) and allow CP movement to link to DP traces. Minimally, this yields a conceptually undesirable less general statement of category relations in movement chains. Martin (1999: 21 n13) also confronts the problem under discussion. He offers though barely three line in a footnote which contemplates two entirely different proposals; in one, CPs (= that clauses) optionally have Case features. In another, rather similar to Webelhut's suggestion, these CPs optionally link to null DPs in argument positions.

One finds then a much discussed and frequently praised general theoretical framework of movement, seemingly involving a general condition of categorial identity between moved element and trace. But decades after Chomsky's 1955 documentation of that clause passives, no adequate description of them is integrated with that view. A serious attempt like that of Webelhut (1992) to achieve descriptive adequacy proposes something inconsistent with the generally praised theory. But that description is not presented as a criticism of the theoretical framework. More general works seem to ignore the problem. One has been told (see the Introduction) that researchers should *hope* their proposals are false. And, according to Webelhut, the proposal of moved element/trace identity has to be false because of e.g. that clause pseudopassives. And yet I have encounted nothing touting this result as progress. One suspects a junk linguistics disconnect between strong theoretical claims maintained in a partial factual vacuum and descriptive proposals incompatible with the theory. The former is not allowed to control the descriptive work and the latter is not taken to falsify the theory. This yields both strong sounding general theoretical claims and descriptive proposals sensitive to the facts, but no confrontation between them; ideal circumstances for junk linguistics.

Moreover, it would be a mistake to become overly sanguine about the factual adequacy of a proposal like that of Webelhut (1992). It does not address a variety of problems related to complement clause/passive interactions, including those of note 19. Further, while the proposal requires recognition of CP movement, inter alia to subject and topic positions, a variety of CPs lack a distribution compatible with this property:

(143)a. You should learn that he is a thief/if he is a thief.

b. That he is a thief/*If he is a thief should be learned by everyone.

c. That he is a thief/*If he is a thief, Ted will end up learning.[24]

(144)a. I loved that he did that/when he did that.

b. That he did that/*When he did that was loved by most students.

c. That he did that/*When he did that, most students loved.

(145)a. The children saw that the Romans invaded Samoa/how (*else) the Romans invaded Samoa.

b. That the Romans invaded Samoa/*How (else) the Romans invaded Samoa was seen by the children.

c. That the Romans invaded Samoa/*How (else) the Romans invaded Samoa, the children never saw.

(146)a. Amanda arranged (for you) to be picked up at the airport.

b. *(For you) to be picked up at the airport was arranged (for) by Amanda.

c. *(For you) to be picked up at the airport, Amanda did not arrange (for).

Nothing in Webelhut's proposal accounts for the contrast between such facts and those for that clauses. Nor is there any standard solution in the transformational framework.

Evidently, for an active structure involving a complement clause and a fixed verb, there can be, as in (147b, c), two distinct types of corresponding passive, call them *it passives* and *clausal passives*.

(147)a. Greg proved that <two and two were seven>. <...> = X

b. It was proved by Greg that X

c. That X was proved by Greg.

As illustrated in (148)-(151), there is a four-way division of English that clause complement-taking *verbs* with respect to passivization. Every logical possibility is instantiated: some take both it passives and clausal passives, some neither, some only it passives and some only clausal ones.

(148) Type I Both it passives and clausal passives

a. Myron asserted that X.

b. It was asserted by Myron that X.

c. That X was asserted by Myron.

(149) Type II Neither it passives nor clausal passives

a. Myron meant that X.

b. *It was meant by Myron that X.

c. *That X was meant by Myron.

(150) Type III it passives but no clausal passives

a. Myron thought that X.

b. It was thought (?by Myron) that X.

c.* That X was thought (by Myron).

(151) Type IV No <u>it</u> passives but clausal passives

a. *That theory expresses that X.

b. *It is expressed by that theory that X.

c. That X is expressed by that theory.

Types I and II do not require much comment. Type III has been the subject of some discussion, including Williams (1981), Chomsky (1981: 122), Marantz (1984: 133) and Postal (1986a: 96-99). Marantz concluded that Type III cases like (150c) argue against a 'promotion' analysis of English passives. But the discussion in Postal (1986a) indicates why this is not the case. Type IV has been discussed in Grimshaw (1982), Dowty and Jacobson (1988: 103), Hukari and Levine (1991: 116-117), Jacobson (1992) and Postal (1998: 108-114).

I am aware of no overall account of the four-way division. But several writers including Marantz (1984 : 132-134), Webelhut (1992: 96-97) and Davies and Dubinsky (2001: 254-255) have noted *part* of it, namely, the simple partition into those which permit clausal passives and those which do not, illustrated further by:

(152)a.Myron accepted that <the senator was guilty> = X.

b. That X was accepted by Myron.

c. Myron added that X.

d.*That X was added by Myron.

e. Myron answered that X.

f. *That X was answered by Myron.

g Myron believed that X.

h. That X was believed by Myron.

i .Myron charged that X.

j *X was charged by Myron.

k. Myron couldn't conceive that X.

l. *That X couldn't be conceived by Myron.

m. Myron determined that X.

n. That X was determined by Myron.

o. Myron feared that X.

p. *That X was feared by Myron.

q. Myron heard that X.

r. *That X was heard by Myron.

s. Myron meant that X.

t. *That X was meant by Myron.

u. Myron mentioned that X.

v. That X was mentioned by Myron.

w. Myron mumbled that X.

x *That X was mumbled by Myron.

y. Myron thought that X.

z. *That X was thought by Myron.

The contrast divides even such everyday verbs as <u>believe</u> (good clausal passive) and <u>think</u> (bad clausal assive). What in the historical realm of transformational ideas about passives explains such a division? The only proposals I am aware of involve the recurring idea of Marantz (1984: 133), Webelhut (1992) and Davies and Dubinsky (2001). They have all suggested in effect that the difference lies in generalization (153):

(153) Only those verbs which select DPs permit clausal passives.

So in such terms e.g. (152f) would be bad because <u>answer</u> does not select a DP object understood in the way that the CP it selects is understood, and Marantz's (1984: 133) (154c) would be bad because of (154b):

(154)a. Myron answered *that/*something.

b. *I said the announcement in a loud voice.

c. *That Elmer had the the best porcupines in the business was said around the financial district.

The attempt to integrate division (152) into standard terms via (153) is reasonable. But even though I believe the lattter claim true, it does not fully determine partition (152). For many verbs which allow both DP objects and <u>that</u> clause complements nonetheless *still do not allow clausal passives*. So while (153) can predict that verbs *not* allowing DP objects do not allow clausal passives, it cannot predict what is arguably the case that even many verbs permitting DP objects alternating with clausal complements still do not.

To see this, observe first that many of the verbs barring clausal passives, nonetheless allow their complement to be the focus of a pseudocleft:

(155)a. What Jerome answered was X.

b. *X was thought by Tom.

c. What Tom thought was X.

To claim that (155b) follows from a lack of a DP object would force a surely undesirable denial that the pseudocleft <u>what</u> is a DP.

Second, and worse, a number of that-clause complement-taking verbs which bar clausal passives take unchallengeable object DPs understood to be in the same semantic relation to the verb as the that clause they alternate with:

(156)a. Stan felt/found/heard that the chimp was intelligent.

b. *That the chimp was intelligent was felt/found/heard by Stan.

c. Stan felt/found/heard that.

d. the (only) thing that Stan felt/found/heard was that the chimp was intelligent

e. Stan found/heard something, namely that the chimp was intelligent.

f. Stan had never heard such a(n) (absurd) thing.

g. What did Stan hear, that the chimp had escaped ?

(157)a. Stella couldn't conceive that/such a thing/anything of the sort/that the chimp was intelligent.

b. *That the chimp was intelligent couldn't be conceived by Stella.

(158)a. Theodore held that the chimp was immortal.

b. *That X was held by Theodore.

c. Theodore never held that/such a view.

(159)a. Irma intended that you see the results.

b. *That X was intended by Irma.

c. Irma didn't intended that/any such thing.

(160)a. This means that we will be indicted.

b. *That we will be indicted is meant by this.

c. This has got to mean that/something.

d. Whatever this means is irrelevant to me.

(161)a. Aristotle pledged that he would resign.

b. *That he would resign was pledged by Aristotle

c. Aristotle did not pledge that/anything.

d. the only thing that Aristotle pledged was....

Given these facts, there seems to be no way to reduce the clausal passivizability contrast to a simple distinction between that clause taking verbs which also allow parallel DP objects and those which do not. So even accepting the truth of (153), the behavior of that clauses with respect to passivization still shows the serious current limitations on the insight that transformational grammar has yielded with respect to English passivization.

Moreover, whatever the answer to the contrasts seen in (152), it cannot involve some ad hoc division of complement taking verbs into those permitting passives and those not. First, it passives are possible with many (though not all) of the verbs of (152), including many of those which *bar* clausal passives, as the following partially illustrates:

(162)a.It was

accepted/added/*answered/believed/charged/determined/feared/*heard/*meant/mentioned/?mumbled/ thought by Myron X.

Second, and far more significantly, the division of complement-taking verbs in (152) as to passivization is very closely matched by parallel divisions involving the possibility of the that clause occurring as topic, as the subject of object raising structures (e.g. with hard/easy), as the subject of object deletion structures (e.g. with too/enough), etc., that is with what I have been calling Q constructions. I illustrate only fragmentarily with believe and think:

(163)a. That X, Myron does not believe/*think.

b. That X was hard for Myron to believe/*think.

c. That X was too complicated for Myron to believe/*think.

d. That X, Myron asserted without believing/*thinking. [25]

e. That X was a strange thing for Myron to believe/*think

Assuming the generalizations just suggested are valid, e.g. that the facts in (163) are not accidental, there is evidently a systematic distinction required in the analysis of that clause complements, one which decades of transformational discussion of English have not provided. Moreover, that distinction must group together the possibility of that clause passives, that clause topics, and that clauses in the Q constructions,. There is no hint in the transformational literature of the basis of these divisions.

It is not my goal here to account for the partition of that clause behavior just documented. But the verb set in (152) which divides into those which permit clausal passives and the other cited constructions and those which do not manifests a remarkable independent correlation:

(164) Those that clause taking verbs which permit clausal passives, etc., permit their object to be a weak definite pronoun of the sort which can be anteceded by a that clause; the others do not.

So compare the corresponding cases of (152) and the following:

(165)a. Myron accepted that <the senator was guilty> = <X> but I did not accept it.

c. *Myron added that X but I did not add it..

e. *Myron answered that X but I did not answer it.

g Myron believed that X but I did not believe it.

i .*Myron charged that X but I did not charge it.

k. *Myron couldn't conceive that X but I could conceive it.

m. Myron couldn't determine that X but I could determine it.

o. Myron feared that X but I didn't fear it.

q. *Myron heard that X but I didn't hear it. [26]

s. *Myron meant that X but I didn't mean it.

u. Myron mentioned that X but I didn't mention it.

w. *Myron mumbled that X but I didn't mumble it.

y. *Myron thought that X but I didn't think it.

Earlier work, Postal (1990b, 1993a, 1994a, 1994b, 1998, 2001a, 2001b), provided a partial basis for correlations between topicalization and the distribution of weak definite pronouns and for parallel correlations with most Q constructions. The basis is a claim that these constructions all involve invisible pronouns in the gap positions. No other way to capture the correlations with <u>that</u> clause passivization is evident; that is, it seems motivated to claim that English clausal passives involve invisible object pronouns. Of course, this would be an ad hoc condition if limited only to those passives.

But there is evidence that it is not and that it is a general feature of the construction. For there are such correlations as the following, where <u>that</u> clauses are not involved:

(166)a. They couldn't determine/tell the weight of the beast with that instrument.

b. The weight of the beast couldn't be determined/*told with that instrument.

c. As for the weight of the beast, they couldn't determine/*tell it.

(167)a. They made that guy/him into a centerfielder.

b. That guy was made into a centerfielder.

c. They made an excellent centerfielder/*it/*him out of that guy.

d. *An excellent centerfielder was made out of that guy.

Such correlations are entirely outside the scope of transformational claims about the conditions governing passivization and, of course, cases like (166b) and (167b) are further instances falsifying the 'every' claim of (3) and showing that (2) was not serious.

At the same time, there are problems with the claimed passivization/weak pronoun correlation, such as why many of the verbs of (152) permit <u>it</u> passives. If passive clauses *in general* require object pronouns, and these

verbs bar visible object pronouns, why do they allow even it passives? Clearly, vastly more research is needed on the topics just gone over, which will hardly be stimulated by junk linguistic claims that 'There remain a few exceptions' or that descriptive success if achieved 'is not a real result'.

Section 9 A Remark about Coordination

A remarkable feature of transformational accounts of (inter alia) passives is that to an extraordinary extent they have been developed and promoted in isolation from one of the most fundamental aspects of NL, coordination. Even simple passive/coordinate paradigms like (168) are rarely discussed in such terms in detail:

(168) Janet was praised by Rodney, criticized by Sidney and ignored by Gregory.

In terms of an A-movement trace view of movement, each of the passive VPs should have had its own object move to subject position leaving its own trace. And yet the subject position contains only a single DP, which must somehow apparently link to three distinct traces. Clearly some mechanisms specific to coordination must be invoked. But which? And where are they described? I cannot answer.

But before deciding to invest time in searching, one should recognize that the transformational ideas which have been applied to passives independently of coordination run into enormously greater problems than (168), as seen in (169):

(169)a. Jill praised Otto.

b. Otto was praised by Jill.

c. Otto and Erhard were praised by Jill.

d. Otto and Erhard were respectively praised by Jill and criticized by Linda.

e. The two students were respectively praised by Jill and criticized by Linda.

Suppose it made sense, as evolved forms of transformational analysis claim, to provide an analysis of (169b, c) as involving movement of an object DP into a higher subject position leaving a trace of the subject, conjoined or not, after praised. If a parallel analysis is adopted for structures like (169d), referred to as containing *interwoven dependencies* in Postal (1998), with e.g. a single trace linked to the conjoined subject after some conjoined verbal constituent, or with coindexed traces similarly linked after the two verbs, the grammar would fail to indicate that one of the subject conjuncts links semantically and selectionally to only one verb, the other with only the other verb. That is, at best, something like (170) would be required:

(170) $[\text{Otto}_1 \text{ and Erhard}_2]_3$ were respectively praised t_1 by Jill and criticized t_2 by Linda.

But the usual mechanisms of movement provide no way to obtain such a structure.

For (169e), the situation is if anything worse, as there are no surface DPs to link to distinct traces with the two passive verbs. It is difficult to see how such cases can be integrated into an overall grammar without in some way providing a coordinate analysis with distinct conjuncts for at least *some* plural phrases, including the two students in (169e). That idea has never been part of the conceptual schemes of the chief developer of transformational views of passive and he rejected its general form during the generative semantics dispute and has not, as far as I know, otherwise discussed it; see (171):

(171) Chomsky (1972a: 123 note 26)

"The argument is based on the assumption that such *respectively* constructions are derived by transformation from conjunctions... This assumption, however, is untenable. Consider, for example, the problem of deriving in this way: *The successive descendants of my fruit fly will be heavier, respectively, than the successive descendants of yours*, or any case involving an infinite set or finite set of unknown size."

I will say nothing further about problematic facts like (169d, e), which can be replicated for a wide range of constructions distinct from passives and for which no solution in any known framework may exist. But the fact that after most of half a century, transformational grammar has provided no way even to keep its view of passives consistent with relatively simple coordination-containing clauses like those in (169d, e) clashes mightily with the common doctrinal promotion of this framework as offering some deep insights into the structure of sentences, not to say with boasts like (2). And, as with other aspects of grammar, a most disturbing aspect, indicative of the role of junk linguistics, is the failure to face the problem.

Section 10 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been essentially negative. First, I have wished to debunk an idea which surfaced in 1957, namely, that the ideas of transformational grammar provide a viable and insightful account of English verbal passive clauses. I have considered a range of phenomena, certainly not intended to be complete, which neither the original transformational accounts nor their evolutions in terms of Move alpha, traces, etc. handle properly, or, in some cases, at all. These included:

(172)a. 'overgeneration' problems, failures to block in fact ill-formed passive correspondents of a range of active verbal phrases containing DPs or complement clauses; see e.g. (15a, b), (21d, e), (25b), (35a, b), (37a, b), all of the cases of Array 1 and Array 2 plus those corresponding to the other Arrays of (130), (137), (138), failures to block many in fact barred clausal passives as the bad cases of (156)-(158), failure to bar bad clausal and it passives in e.g. (149) and bad it passives like (151b).

b. 'undergeneration' problems, failures to allow tertiary passives like (14b) and, overwhelmingly, failure to give a viable account of pseudopassives and perhaps most striking of all, failure to provide, and mostly to even try to provide, a serious account of the interaction of passivization with coordination.

c. failure to provide an adequate account of the nature of the by phrase

Any *one* of (170a, b, c) suffices to belie the claim in the title of this chapter. Taken together, they cannot fail to indicate that the historical claims for the adequacy of transformational views of English passives have to be regarded as deeply unfounded.

Moreover, secondly, it has been documented that repeatedly, the discussion of passives has been indelibly stained with aspects of junk linguistics. These included distortion of known facts to make proposals seem more adequate than they in fact were, suppression by an author X of relevant known data found even in X's earlier work, repeated strong-sounding claims ('applies blindly'/'care nothing for grammatical relations') hedged in multiple ways well beyond the point of emptiness, lack of coherent methodology, invocation of vague undefined principles, unfounded cavalier treatment of serious facts, replacement of theoretical view A with a distinct view B without justification or argument, failure to take seriously even one's own conceptual requirements when faced with descriptive problems and a serious neglect of whole classes of facts, most notably coordination, to name only some.

With respect to the inadequacies that have been gone over, a remark parallel to that made in Chapter 7 with respect to accounts of the strong crossover phenomenon and its putative explanation via Principle C is surely apropos. As in that case, there appears here also in transformational terms to be nothing like a full length publication, monograph or even substantial refereed article which seeks to analyze English passives in all of their variety and richness and to justify a transformational treatment. [27] Instead, what one finds since 1957 are scattered remarks and paragraphs, treating in isolation one or another problematic aspect but without an integrated treatment. A reader is thereby denied the perspective needed to see the overall extraordinary weakness of what is being said vis a vis the whole construction and to see the full range of distinct, ad hoc, undesirable conceptual proposals (e.g. spurious interpretive rules, ludicrous appeals to analogy) which are needed, or the actual domain of facts which are not handled. As before, this approach is a recipe for junk linguistics and no one should be surprised at the shoddiness of the resulting product.

Notes

*** Thanks to Haj Ross for many useful comment on this chapter.

1 This work's publication was delayed until 1975; see Chomsky (1975b: 2-4) for its history and relation to Chomsky (1957).

2 It is irrelevant here that the categorial analysis was inadequate; data like (i) argue that the naked <u>home</u> of (8b) should be seen as a PP with an invisible P:

(i)a. Joe came right/straight home/to his office.

b. Joe visited (*right/*straight) his office.

c. Joe ran right/straight (to his) home.

d. Joe discussed (*right/*straight) his home.

e. (Straight) home/*office came Joe.

3 This is, for instance, visible in remarks like those of (i).

(i) Chomsky (1973; reprinted in Chomsky (1977a : 88-9)

"(18) $[_S [_{NP}$ I$] [_{VP}$ [V believe$] [_S [_{NP}$ the dog$] [_{VP}$ to be hungry$]]]]$

Under any formulation of the theory of transformations so far proposed, it would require an extra condition on the transformation to exclude (18) from the domain of the Passive with the structural condition (X, NP, V, NP, Y)."

That is, (i) makes clear that the extra structure represented by the S-labelled bracket in the author's (18) does not block application to the NP.

4 Rather than being *blind* to grammatical relations, my view is that passivization is essentially relational, an idea assumed in traditional grammar (see (52)), developed in the relational grammar of the 1970s and 1980s (see Perlmutter, 1984, Perlmutter and Postal, 1983, 1984a, 1984b), borrowed into the LFG framework (see Bresnan 1982a), developed in a modified fashion in Postal (1992, 1996) and expounded in detail in Postal (in preparation).

5 To make the empty hedge fully effective, it will, of course, be necessary in some cases to recognize homonymous verbs, e.g.:

(i)a. Mischa wrote a letter.

b. A letter was written by Mischa.

(ii)a. Mischa wrote a Senator.

b. *A senator was written by Mischa.

To save the 'apply blindly' view in this case, one must minimally say that the <u>write</u> of (i) belongs to V_x while the <u>write</u> of (ii) does not.

6 This was seemingly denied in Bresnan (1982b: 358). However, evidence that nominals with by phrases involve passives is not lacking. Note the parallelisms for the 'document' and Array 1 paradigms discussed in Section 7.

(i)a. Karen/That article demonstrated something important.

b. Something important was demonstrated by Karen/*that article.

c. Karen's/that article's demonstration of something important

d. the demonstration of something important by Karen/*that article

(ii)a. Jerome lacks wisdom.

b. *Wisdom is lacked by Jerome.

c. Jerome's lack of wisdom

d. *the lack of wisdom by Jerome

7 None of the discussion of parallels between passive-like structures in nominals and those in clauses notes, still less accounts for, as far as I know, such contrasts as:

(i) the editorializing of/by that columnist yesterday

(ii) yesterday's editorializing *of/by that columnist

To the extent that these structures are related to passives, they represent further facts unaccounted for by transformational treatments of that domain.

8 The casual appeals to analogy by an author who for decades has stressed the importance of *restrictiveness*, that is, of a narrowly constrained universal system of NL grammar, is a striking failure to take seriously the deepest ideas of his own conceptual system. That characteristic can be regarded as itself a strand of junk linguistics. One should, that is, contrast the invocation of undefined notions of analogy and derivative generation with pronouncements like:

(i) Chomsky (1981: 10)

"Since virtually the origins of contemporary work on generative grammar, a major concern has been to restrict the class of grammars made accessible in principle by UG"

9 Moreover, the appeal to something called 'recoverability of deletion' is significant. As observed in Chapter 9 and Chapter 12, note 10, this *principle name* is something of a running joke in the sense that year after year it is putatively invoked to explain this or that, although a serious formulation of the principle supposedly named is never undertaken.

10 Notably, of the roughly seventy English passive clauses cited in Chapter 2 of that work, almost all are short passives with only two or three containing by phrases, facilitating ignoring the problems raised by the latter. About them, all that is said is (1981: 103): "if an agent phrase (e.g. *by everyone*) is added, then a θ-role

is assigned to its NP by the preposition by, and this θ-role is similar to (perhaps identical with) the θ-role assigned to the agent by the VP in the corresponding sentence…" See the following footnote for comments on this talk of assignment, etc.

11 There are several senses in which so-called θ-roles are obscure linguistic concepts. First, although they are usually described as having something to do with semantics, most appeal to them has no more semantic relevance than expressing that the meaning of some DP is an argument of some functor. Second, even this weak connection is abandoned, as noted in Postal and Pullum (1988: 663-664), when Chomsky (1981: 37) invents a θ-role # for the form advantage of the idiom take advantage, which even its inventor noted was an artifice. This move indicates that in the understanding of their introducer into transformational theory, they are no more than arbitrary syntactic elements hiding behind traditional quasisemantic names like 'agent'.

But more serious than any of this is the fact that the formal structures represented by θ-roles were essentially unspecified in Chomsky (1981) and mostly remain so. So one observes that the standard terminology of 'A assigns a θ-role to B' is *relational*, but how this relation is to be formally marked, what an input structure to such assignment looks like and how the output differs are questions with no received answers. The whole question of how θ-roles formally integrate with phrase structure, etc. has been mostly left open.

It would be reasonable, in my opinion, to view the posit of θ-roles in Chomsky (1981) as the recognition of the need for *primitive grammatical relations*, which relational grammar work had then been arguing for a half dozen years. The failure to make this character explicit could thereby be explicated by the notable fact, then a clear instance of junk linguistic deception, that Chomsky (1981: 10) specifically *rejects* the notion of primitive grammatical relations; see some further discussion of the connection between this and the θ-role # in Chapter 9.

It is notable that a work like Baker (1988b), which attempts to exploit notions of θ-role, provides six nonstandard diagrams. Each is an otherwise standard tree structure annotated with arrows between labelled nodes, these arrows sometimes labelled with θ and pointing at nodes labelled with common names for putative θ-roles like ben, instr, etc. Such diagrams seem to make explicit a view which needs to appeal to a formal notion of arc, as in relational frameworks like that of Chapter 1, Section 9, but which formally has no place for them.

It would also, I believe, be justified to take talk of 'case assignment' in the same framework also to be a hidden introduction of a distinct set of primitive grammatical relations. And again the questions of formal integration are mostly unanswered or not even asked.

12 Cases like (57) seem to me to counterexemplify Roberts' (1986: 28) claim that "the *by*-phrase *must* receive a θ-role". Even if, unlike the present author, one believes there are things like θ-roles, it would be a heavy burden indeed to justify claiming that the lovebug has one. This assumes, of course, that talk of phrases having θ-roles involves testable semantic claims and is hence more than a mere arbitrary syntactic marking, as with the # of note 11. If as for the latter, there is no independent test for the existence of putative θ-roles, claims about phrases 'having to' receive them are rendered essentially contentless.

13 The lovebug, etc., cases are entirely consistent with arc based approaches to passive as described in Chapter 1 and references cited there. For in these, passive by phrase DPs can be treated as demoted subjects. Moreover, what I believe is the core of truth in the 'no downgrading' argument for abandoning subject postposing in transformational terms can be captured in arc terms without abandoning the view of passive by phrase objects as demoted subjects.

14 To avoid this conclusion, a defender of the position of Chomsky (1981) might stress the *restricted number* of cases like (57), (60), (61b), (63b) and (64), to talk of exceptions, marginality, special cases, etc.. There are two rebuttals. First, given Marantz's observation that idiomatic subjects occurring with unfixed objects are very rare, there is only a tiny space of possibilities within which the claim of non-passivizability in such cases can be tested. From that point of view, the five cases cited here where they *do* passivize is not really so few. Second and far more importantly, as a matter of logic, principles which entail P are falsified by even a *single* bona fide instance of not-P. In the present case, a view which fails to link the syntax of active subjects and passive by phrases claims that there should be *no* semantically unspecifiable links between such pairs not merely few. But (57), (60), (61b), (63b) and (64) show that there are, arguing for a syntactic connection between active subject/passive by phrase object.

15 Extensive discussions of reanalysis are found in Riemsdijk (1978), Stowell (1981); see also Hornstein and Weinberg (1981), Radford (1981: 347-348), Hoekstra (1984: 134-135), Riemsdijk and Williams (1986: 148-149), Baker (1988a: 259-263).

16 A lovely instance of this was discussed in Jackendoff (1977: 86). He noted that there are two uses of the verb approve, one which takes a direct object, the other a PP in of:

(i) Mildred approved the plan.

(ii) Mildred approved of the plan.

The uses differ in meaning; that in (i) refers to an action by someone with authority; that in (ii) refers to a subjective evaluation. Jackendoff's key observation was that while both uses have nominalizations of the form (iii), only the direct object use has one of the form (iv):

(iii) the approval of the plan by Mildred

(iv) the plan's approval by Mildred

Jackendoff's generalization was that only a DP which was a direct object in the clausal correspondent could have a form like (iv). Again then reanalysis gets it wrong, since in that view, (v) requires a reanalysis treatment, rendering the DP a direct object in both cases; thus the basis of the distinction Jackendoff noted is lost:

(v) The plan was approved of by Mildred.

Hoekstra (1984: 134-135) argues that the failure of reanalysis in nominals is not an argument against a generalized rule of passivization operative in both clauses and nominals, because, in some way associated with the markedness of reanalysis, it is limited to clausal categories. To give this argument any chance of viability though, it must be denied that there is a systematic relation between nominalizations and the verbal structures they relate to, that is, the latter must not 'feed' the former.

While I will not argue against this view here, it seems to face serious difficulties given that e.g. derivational elements like re- seem to manifest in nominalizations only if they manifest in the corresponding verbal forms:

(v)a. Alice (re)occupied/visited the family ranch.

b. Alice's (re)occupation/visiting of the family ranch

(vi)a. Alice (*re)abandoned/(*re)left the family ranch.

b. Alice's (*re)abandonment/(*re)leaving of the family ranch

Note that even if the nominalization case is erased from (70), the case against reanalysis is formidable.

17 By independent constraints, I am alluding in particular to principles like the 1 Advancement Exclusiveness Law of Perlmutter and Postal (1984b); see also Marantz (1984), Baker (1988a: Chapter 6), Baker, Johnson and Roberts (1989), Farrell (1993, 1994).

18 Postal (1986a, 1996) present arc-based accounts of English pseudopassives entirely independent of reanalysis. Notable about the latter work is its claim that English pseudopassives are structurally parallel in significant ways to French examples like (ib), claimed to stand in roughly a passive relation to actives like (ia) (with the main verb se faire having a functional analogous to the auxiliary be of English verbal passives):

(i)a. Lucille s'est moquée d'André.

Lucille self is mocked of Andre = "Lucille made fun of Andre"

b. André s'est fait moquer de *lui* par Lucille.

"Andre got made fun of by Luiclle"

The crucial point is that the highlighted form in (ib) *is a resumptive pronoun*. This supports the view of Postal (1986a, 1996) that English pseudopassives are also resumptive pronoun structures, with their stranded Ps arising from a requirement absent in the French cases that those pronouns be null.

19 Significant additional problems with reanalysis treatments of passivization touched on in Baltin and Postal (1996: 139-141 note 12) involve complement clauses. There are contrasts like:

(i) That every student will turn in a superb paper cannot be counted on (with much confidence).

(ii) *One cannot count on (with much confidence) that every student will turn in a superb paper.

(iii) It cannot be counted on (with much confidence) that every student will turn in a superb paper.

Reanalysis approaches claim that the pseudopassive (i) can exist only because some mapping has turned <u>counted on</u> into a single verb, so that passivization does not involve a PP. But (ii) seems like a standard case of a barred <u>that</u> clause object of a preposition. So an unexplained fact is why reanalysis fails to save it via a putative structure including:

(iv) [$_V$ count on] (with much confidence) [$_{CP}$ that every student will turn in a superb paper]

Moreover, it is generally claimed in transformational terms that the difference between (i) and (iii), like that between (v) and (vi), involves the fact that CPs, not requiring case, need not move to subject position in passives, so that in (iii), (vi) putatively nothing would have preposed.

(v) That every student will turn in a superb paper cannot be proved.

(vi) It cannot be proved that every student will turn in a superb paper.

See e.g. Chomsky (1981: 125), Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988: 19). But this view leaves it equally mysterious why (ii) and (iii) contrast, since it must be allowed that <u>count</u> (<u>on</u>) subcategorizes for a CP, which then cannot occur in the reanalysis environment.

20 Bach (1980) provides a large number of problems for accounts of English passivization, arguing *against* a transformational approach. Seuren (1996 : 132) lists fourteen nonpassivizable cases. To the question he poses as to why the relevant cases have no passives, he states : "There is no known answer to these questions, and no attempt is made here to find one. This area of syntax and semantics is still relatively obscure."

21 Marantz (1984: 129) and Baker, Johnson and Roberts (1989 : 221) cite (i) as a grammatical passive, which would counterexemplify the claim about (129e):

(i) The house is surrounded by trees.

However, while (i) is grammatical, there are strong reasons to doubt it is a passive. The predicate expression can be taken as an adjectival one, supported by the fact that it occurs with the adjectival prefix un:

(ii) The house still remains unsurrounded by trees.

That is, (i) should, I suggest, be distinguished from the genuine passive :

(iii) The house was deliberately (*un)surrounded by the police.

A clear difference is the possibility of the verbal prefix re-:

(iv)a. The house was (*re)surrounded by trees. (The long version is grammatical only on a personification reading)

b. The house was (re)surrounded by the police.

(iva) is like an uncontroversial adjectival case :

(v) The relocated house was (*re)adjacent to/(*re)far from the nearest highway.

My suspicion is that the relation in (vi) is an irregular variant of the one in (vii):

(vi)a. Trees surrounded the house.

b. The house was surrounded by trees.

(vii)a. Water covered the floor.

b. The floor was covered/remains uncovered with/*by water

22 Farrell (1993, 1994) discusses a number of similar cases, providing a relational treatment of the related paradigms. However, nothing in his approach explicates, I believe, the correlations between passive and Q construction constraints.

23 Although occasionally one finds cited a grammatical instance of a passivized non-WH infinitive, as in (i), in general, passivization of such infinitives is impossible, as in (ii) and (iii):

(i) Rosenbaum (1967: 14)

To remain silent ws preferred by everyone.

(ii)a. Rosenbaum (1967: 14)

*To play with his little brother often was tended by John

b. The doctor hoped/prepared/tried to reduce the patient's discomfort.

c. *To reduce the patient's discomfort was hoped/prepared/tried by the doctor.

(ii)a. The doctor arranged for the nurse to stay with the patient.

b. *For the nurse to stay with the patient was arranged (for) by the nurse.

But WH-infinitives passivize productively:

(iii)a. How to read minds was discovered by Dr. Zaslofsky.

b. When to eat with a fork was not totally grasped by Willie.

c. Where to buy peanut butter sushi was being looked into by Hilda.

In usual terms, this would seem to motivate treating WH infinitives but not simple ones as DPs. How this might be done while recognizing a CP structure with a locus for the WH form is a topic that seems to be little discussed.

24 Although noting their general ungrammaticality, Adger and Quer (2001: 114) cite some cases of <u>if</u> clause subjects as grammatical, e.g.:

(i) If he is guilty can be shown by our evidence.

(ii) If a vaccine is synthesizable is usually discovered a few years after the outbreak of the disease.

But I find these entirely and unequivocally ill-formed.

25 Example (163d) has, of course, an irrelevant reading on which the <u>without</u> constituent contains no parasitic gap.

26 Example (165q) doesn't sound so bad; but that may be due to the fact that in a case where the antecedent of <u>it</u> is e.g. a regular DP, the example is fine:

(i) Myron heard that but I didn't hear it.

27 Even given the limits of our understanding of passive structures, there is no reason to believe this lack is inherent in the situation. For instance, Fiengo and May (1994) manage a careful, detailed and rigorous approach to verb phrase ellipsis with rich factual coverage and citation of previous work and results. There is no reason why serious linguistics could not have produced the same for passives.