Journal of Semantics 22: 401–438
doi:10.1093/jos/ffh019
Advance Access publication March 14, 2005

The Semantic and Syntactic Decomposition of *get*: An Interaction Between Verb Meaning and Particle Placement

ANDREW McINTYRE
Universität Leipzig

Abstract

VPs with *get* and a PP/particle provide an argument for lexical decomposition in syntax. *Get* (and German *kriegen*) has a 'hindrance' reading, which does not denote causative events and resembles *manage* in that the result is portrayed as hard to achieve, and in that possibility operators do not affect the meaning under negation: *I didn't* (=*couldn't*) *get the key in*. These effects surprisingly follow from an analysis where hindrance-*get* VPs are nothing more than inchoatives of *have*-VPs of the type *have the key in*. In *get out one's wallet*, we see another reading which is genuinely causative and is not found with German *kriegen*. Hindrance-*get* VPs (like VPs with *have*, *want* and *need*, which decompose with HAVE, and unlike causative *get* and other causative-agentive verbs) disallow particle-object order (*get/take out your wallet* vs. **get/have/want/need in the key*). The effects of semantics on word order are shown to be unmysterious only if the HAVE predicate in the meaning of hindrance-*get* is a syntactic head.

1 INTRODUCTION

Many linguists believe that verb meanings (partly) decompose into primitives like CAUSE and BECOME (e.g. Dowty 1979; Jackendoff 1990; Wunderlich 1997). Some of these linguists assume what I call *syntactic decomposition*, in that the primitives are treated as morphemes present in the syntax. For instance, Harley (1995) and Richards (2001) express a semantic decomposition of *give* in a syntax like (1). Causative-agentive morphemes like CAUSE (also answering to names like *v*, VOICE) are now common in generative studies (e.g. Baker 1997; Hale & Keyser 1993; Harley 1995; Kratzer 1996; Marantz 1997; Pesetsky 1995; Pylkkänen 2002; Stechow 1996).

(1) *Mary gave John a book*: [$_{VP}$ Mary[$_{V'}$ CAUSE[$_{PP}$ John [$_{P'}$ HAVE a book]]]]

The syntactic decomposition hypothesis differs radically from theories decomposing verbs at a lexical-semantic level or not decomposing them. Methodological arguments avail us nothing in choosing between these approaches. Syntactic decomposition simplifies the syntax-semantics mapping, but the received conception of the verb as syntactically atomic, standard outside minimalism, simplifies the mapping between syntax and its audible output. Syntactic decomposition requires an abstract, complex syntax, which many find methodologically repugnant, while a syntax where 'what you see is what you get' (Jackendoff 1990: 159) entails abstraction and complexity in a lexical/semantic component, which is methodologically unappealing to other linguists. Conceptual arguments are a flimsy basis for deciding the issue, so we need empirical arguments. This study offers a new empirical argument for syntactic decomposition, complementing those in Baker (1997), Hale & Keyser (1993) and Stechow (1996).

However the argument is received, I hope it will become clear that there is intrinsic worth in someone's attempt at understanding the data on which it is based, structures like (2a), where a DP and PP/particle appear in the complement of *get*. The data have languished in obscurity, despite displaying quirks affording insights into agentivity, causation, event structure, and the syntax–semantics interface.

(2) a. I got the screws out; I got him to the station
b. I got {out} my wallet {out} to pay.
c. The lock is rusty, and I can't get {*in} the key {in}.
d. I had/wanted/needed {*in} the key {in}.

A foretaste of the odd behaviour of *get* is the puzzle in (2b–d), which involves restrictions on the position of a complementless preposition ('particle'). Particles can usually appear before or after a direct object, cf. (2b). (2c) shows that *get* sometimes disallows particle-object order. Replacing *get* in (2c) with *push* makes both sequences possible. Blockages on particle-object order are observable with *have* (and other verbs argued to have a silent *have* in their complements, e.g. *want* and *need*, cf. (2d) and section 4.4). I argue that the uses of *get* like that in (2c) which disallow particle-object order are inchoatives of *have*, while those that allow particle-object order like (2b) have a genuinely causal semantics. Independent differences between the use of *get* in (2c) and that in (2b) are that (2c), but not (2b), can be translated with German *kriegen* or *bekommen* and displays a peculiar form of non-agentivity I call 'hindrance specialization': it suggests that the result is achieved despite resistance. The effect of the meaning of *get* on word order in

(2b, c) is shown to follow naturally only if the elements into which *get*-VPs decompose semantically (BECOME, HAVE) are present in syntax.

We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces basic semantic observations about *get* + PP structures. Section 2.1 discusses the hindrance reading. Section 2.2 discusses what I call the 'unintentional' reading (*I got ants in my room*). This is irrelevant to particle verbs but must be mentioned because it helps us to understand the hindrance use. Section 2.3 describes what I call the '(genuinely) causative' use in (2b), which (like *take* and unlike *put*) entails that the object comes to be possessed or manually controlled by the subject. This requirement suggests that these VPs originated as resultative constructions based on agentive DP complement uses (*get*/*take the book*), but some idiosyncrasies speak against the synchronic validity of this analysis for *get*. A causative semantics is formulated for this reading, supplemented by conditions stipulating the contexts where it may appear.

Section 3 gives a more detailed analysis of the hindrance reading, arguing that it is an inchoative of *have*. Surprisingly, this analysis captures (a) the fact that the subject of hindrance-*get* is invariably seen as responsible for having brought about the result, and (b) hindrance specialization.

Section 4 discusses the particle position facts. After an introduction to the basic facts on particles, differences between speakers in their acceptance of a particle before an object in a given combination are shown to follow from differing degrees of liberality in the use of causative *get*. Section 4.3 introduces the light verbs used here. In a framework indebted to distributed morphology, I survey most uses of *get*, concluding that it is a spellout of BECOME in all its uses. Section 4.4 defends an account of the particle shift in which HAVE—seen as an item present in the syntax—disallows the incorporation of particles, thus disqualifying them from movement to a head position to the left of the object. Section 4.5 argues that only syntactic lexical decomposition can give a non-arbitrary account of the data.

Section 5 summarizes the main properties of the readings of *get* discussed here.

Space permits only a focus on transitive *get* + PP VPs, with side glances at other uses of *get*, e.g. possessive uses (*get a book*), unaccusative uses (*get off the boat*), AP uses (*get him drunk*), 'passive' uses (*get killed*), 'inchoative' uses (*get working*) and 'causative' uses like those in *get him to go*, *get him working*. Ditransitive structures like (3a) are irrelevant here, *pace* a reviewer. Ditransitive *get* VPs are augmentations by a beneficiary of the agentive DP complement use of *get* in the sense 'fetch, buy'. I assume with Pylkkänen (2002) that these are licensed by

a benefactive-applicative head below the agent-licensing head. (3a) is interpreted like (3c), not (3b), for (a) and (c), but not (b), are true if I have obtained the book but not yet given it to Ann. Linguists wanting to derive ditransitive *get* VPs by dative shift would have to start with structures like (c), not (b). It is reasonable to exclude (c) from the purview of this study. The *for*-PPs are not directional complements like the PPs in (3b) and (2a), but are adjuncts (cf. *do so* ellipses: *I got a book for Ann, then I did so for John*, v. **I got a book to Ann, then I did so to John*).

(3) a. I {got/fetched/bought} Ann the book
b. I {got/*fetched/*bought} the book to Ann
c. I {got/fetched/bought} the book for Ann

The literature on *get* does not help with the questions discussed here. There are several studies on 'passive' uses (e.g. Haegeman 1985). General treatments of *get* are scarce, although (or because?) *get* dwarfs the oft-discussed verb *have* in the complexity of the issues it raises. Givon & Yang (1994), Kimball (1973) and Tobin (1994) offer worthwhile insights, but do not delve into complexities like those discussed herein.

2 THREE READINGS FOR *get* + PP STRUCTURES

I now introduce the three readings of *get* + PP structures. Since the empirical terrain covered in this section is substantial, a summary of the main points is provided in section 5.

2.1 *The hindrance reading*

My introduction to the uses of *get* + PP structures begins with a use called 'hindrance-*get*'. It suggests that the result is hard to attain. Put otherwise, this use of *get* displays 'hindrance specialization', being specialized to contexts where the subject overcomes some kind of obstacle. Consider (4), where # indicates acceptability contingent on special contextual assumptions. In (4a) *get* is good in a context where the arm-lifting is difficult, for instance if the subject is injured or holding a heavy object. In (4b–d), the use of *get* in describing the physically easy act of carrying a book somewhere is acceptable only if obstacles to the reaching of the goal are either explicit (as in (4c, d)) or contextually inferred (for instance if it is known that the book in (4b) could be confiscated). (4e) is acceptable in any context if the time limit expressions are included, apparently because time is construable as

a factor competed against, as an obstacle. (4f) can be reconciled with the above remarks if we extend the notion of hindrance to cover *imagined* difficulties. Were there no imagined difficulties in (4f), there would be no point in denying them with *without difficulty*.

(4) a. She {raised/moved/#got} her arm up to shoulder level.
b. He {took/carried/#got} the book through the room.
c. He got the book through the room {unimpeded by the crowd/unnoticed}.
d. He got the book through {customs/the narrow opening}.
e. She got me to the station # (in ten minutes/before the train left).
f. I got the thread through the needle without difficulty

Hindrance-specialized *get* + PP structures with goal PPs are achievements, denoting only arrival at the goal, while VPs with other verbs are accomplishments, i.e. also express progress toward the goal. Hindrance-*get* is not usable if the theme's progress toward the goal is interrupted, as in (5a), while other caused motion verbs pattern with standard accomplishments in permitting the progressive with an uncompleted event (cf. the imperfective paradox, e.g. Dowty 1979: 133). With *get* in (5b), the assertion is that we will arrive at the station in ten minutes' time, while with *take/drive* it is that the journey will start in ten minutes' time. In (5c), *on the way* implies that the journey has started. This contradicts the negation of *take/drive*, but not the negation of *get*.

(5) a. I was {taking/driving/*getting} them to France, but we never reached the border.
b. She'll {get/take/drive} us to the station ten minutes from now.
c. Because the car broke down on the way, she didn't {get/ *take/*drive} us to the station.

Another facet of the achievementhood of hindrance-*get* VPs is that they do not denote causing events or agentive acts. In (6a) and (6c) *almost* may take scope over the actions causing the results, while (b) and (d) lack wide scope readings denying that the subject acted. This follows if hindrance-*get* VPs, unlike the causative/ resultative VPs, do not denote agentive acts.

(6) a. I almost {put/stamped/blew} the fire out.
b. I almost got the fire out.
c. I almost {put together/assembled} the machine.
d. I almost got the machine together.

(7) makes the same point. In the deviant variants, the subordinate VPs have causing events in their denotation. The matrix verbs express acts construed pragmatically as identical to the causing events in the unacceptable subordinate VPs. By consequence, the interval occupied by the main clause actions is a subpart of the interval occupied by the subordinate clause events with the causative verbs. This yields a *non sequitur*, since the complementizer *before* indicates that the subordinate clause events occur after (not during) the main clause events. That no such temporal paradox exists with *get* in (7) is explicable if the *get*-VPs do not denote causing events.

(7) a. They had to fight the fire for hours before they {got it out/ *put it out /*extinguished it/*caused it to go out}.
b. I had to twist the key for ages before I {got/*put/*stuck/ *forced} it in the rusty lock.
c. I had to pull on the boot for ages before I {got/*took/ *pulled} it off.

Thus, hindrance-*get* VPs do not include agents' acts in their denotation (although they presuppose them, see below). They are thus non-agentive. It may be objected that the non-agentivity of hindrance-*get* is at best weakly supported by judgments with normal agentivity tests like (8) (Cruse 1973; Dowty 1979: 112f; the contexts in (8a–c) diagnose volitionality, and the sense of the test in (8d) seems to be that non-auxiliary *do* is an underspecified agentive verb).

(8) a. I told him to {drive/?get} the car to the top of the hill.
b. He {helped/??got} the old man across the road to court his favour.
c. Please {bring/??get} him to my office at some stage.
d. What I did was {put/?get} the key in the lock.

However, it has been known (or forgotten) since Cruse (1973) that other non-agentive verbs pass these tests. In (9a) the tests are passed by states (cf. **he's having it ready*, **he's being absent*). It seems to me that these cases and any structures like (8) where *get* is judged acceptable involve a metonymy in which the VP with *get*/*have*/*be* stands for the actions which the subject must perform to bring about the situation named by the VP. With regard to imperative, a further extraneous factor is a possible optative reading. The German imperative seems to lack this reading, and the German equivalents of hindrance-*get*, *kriegen* and *bekommen*, resist imperative strongly, cf. (9b). In sum, I feel justified in upholding the claim that hindrance-*get* VPs do not include the actions of an agent in their denotation.

(9) a. What you must do is be absent that day; Please have your passports ready; Please understand that this will ruin our lives.
b. {Hämmer'/*krieg'/*bekomm'} bitte den Nagel in die Wand rein! Please {hammer/get/get} the nail into the wall.

(10) showcases another oddity of hindrance-*get*. Under negation, possibility operators do not affect the interpretation of hindrance-*get* VPs, while negation of causative-agentive VPs without possibility operators is possible if the subject *can* attain the result but *chooses not to*, a reading which is unavailable if possibility expressions are present. Hindrance-*get* behaves as in (10) because it presupposes an attempt at achieving the result. The fact that presuppositions survive under negation (if not explicitly negated: *I didn't get the key in because I didn't try*) coupled with the non-occurrence of the result trivially suggests that the subject is unable to attain it.[1,2]

(10) a. I didn't get them to the stadium = I was unable to get them to the stadium.
a′. I didn't take them to the stadium ≠ I was unable to take them to the stadium.
b. I didn't get the key in the lock = I couldn't get the key in the lock.
b′. I didn't put/insert/stick the key in the lock ≠ I couldn't put/insert/stick the key in the lock.

There are other hindrance-specialized verbs. German *kriegen* and *bekommen* are good translations of hindrance-*get* in all respects, including hindrance specialization. Unaccusative *get* + PP structures also have a hindrance-specialized use, cf. *I got through* {*a thick book*/#*a half-page abstract*}, where the latter variant is odd unless illness or

[1] Other effects of the presupposition: Answering '*no*' to (i) admits attempted envenomation. In (ii) *get* suggests that I could not have attained the result unaided (though I would have tried to), but with *take* I could have refused to act towards attaining the result unaided, though I perhaps could have attained it.

(i) Did you get poison into anyone's beer? (ii) I wouldn't have {got/taken} Basil home unaided.

[2] The variants with *cannot*/*be unable* in structures like (10a, b) sound more natural than those without. The German translations of *get* show the opposite preference, cf. the literal and idiomatic glosses in (i). I cannot explain this, but an explanation seems unnecessary given that the Anglo-German contrast is not specific to *get*, cf. the glosses in (ii).

(i) Ich kriege den Nagel nicht durchs Brett; Wir kommen nicht da rein
I get the nail not through the board; We come not there in
'I can't get the nail through the board'; 'We can't get in there'

(ii) Ich finde/verstehe/sehe/höre/fühle/rieche/schmecke es nicht
I find/understand/see/hear/feel/taste it not
'I can't find/understand/see/hear/feel/smell/taste it'

disability make the reading of the abstract difficult. Di Meola (1994: 59–72) sees the overcoming of obstacles as one of the non-deictic meanings of German *kommen*, which normally means 'come' but also translates some types of unaccusative *get* + PP structures. *Manage* and *succeed* are also hindrance-specialized: *#manage to cross/succeed in crossing the street* are odd unless hindrances like disability or traffic are presupposed. It is hard to detect a difference between a *get* + PP structure in the complement of *manage* and one which is not (*I managed to get the key in the lock* v. *I got the key in the lock*). The 1995 *Oxford English Reference Dictionary* defines *get* + PP uses using *succeed* ('succeed or cause to succeed in coming or going').

I offer a more explicit analysis of hindrance-*get* in section 3. Before doing so, it is necessary to acquaint readers with other uses of *get* + PP structures.

2.2 *Unintentional get*

(11) instantiates **unintentional *get***. Here there is no hindrance specialization. The subject is not responsible for the result. Unintentional *get* does not combine with particles and is not directly relevant to my main argument, but section 3 requires some knowledge of it.

(11) I_i got ants in my_i room; She_i got her_i hair in a tangle (because the wind blew); The $camera_i$ got dust in it_i; He_i got blood all over him_i and shrapnel in his_i arm in the explosion; The car_i got paint on the top of its_i fender

(11) makes clear that unintentional *get* requires co-indexation between the subject and an item somewhere in the complement of *get*, a requirement also known to hold with certain uses of *have* (see section 3). Unintentional *get* disallows unambiguously directional PPs like *into*: *I got ants into my room* has a hindrance-specialized, not an unintentional reading. It is clear that (11) involves small clause (predicative) complementation. An analysis where the sole complement is a DP (e.g. *get* [$_{DP}$ *ants in my room*] or [$_{VP}$ [$_{VP}$ *get ants*] *in my room*]) is falsified by cases in (11) where the subject does not *get* the object: **the camera got dust*, **she got her hair*, etc.

2.3 *Genuinely causative get + PP structures*

I now introduce and analyse the use of *get* in (12a), where *get* is a normal manner-unmarked causative position change verb. It is not

hindrance-specialized. In *I almost got out my wallet* the scope of *almost* may include a causing actions, which is impossible with hindrance-*get*, cf. (6). The use of *get* in (12a) also fails to display the phenomenon in (10) in that *I didn't get out my wallet* suggests not that I was unable to but that I chose not to. I call *get* in (12a) '(genuinely) causative *get*'. (In this study, 'causative *get*' only refers to the PP complement use relevant to us, not to other causative uses like *I got him to sing*. Section 3 argues that hindrance-*get* is not genuinely causative.)

(12) a. I got out my wallet; I got the milk out of the fridge; I got the washing out of the dryer
b. So full of money was my wallet that I couldn't get it in my pocket; I got the milk in the fridge before it went off

If we replace *out (of)* in (12a) with *in(to)*, we must replace *get* with *put* (unless we want the hindrance reading, as in contexts like (12b)). This is a reflection of a **possession constraint** which affects causative *get* (but not *put* and hindrance and unintentional *get*), in that the subject must come to possess the object, with 'possession' understood as control or access, not just ownership. If I *get out my wallet*, I do not affect my ownership of it, but I do move it into my hands, where I have more immediate access to and control over it. This is not true of *I got the cat outside*, where *get* has the hindrance rather than the causative reading, witness, for example, the *almost* test. Causative *get* is not only found with *out*. *Get in the police* and *get together some money* involve bringing the respective objects into a domain where they are accessible to the subject, so they obey the possession constraint, and the constructions do not exhibit hindrance effects.

The possession constraint on causative *get* suggests a connection to the likewise possessive DP complement use: if I *get the milk out of the fridge*, I in a sense *get the milk*. That this connection is real is confirmed by other verbs with both a possessive DP complement use and a causative position change use with a possession constraint like that found with causative *get*. Examples are *take* (*take the key* {*out of*/**into*} *the lock*) and, in some varieties, *fetch* (witness internet attestations like *he fetched it out of his pocket* and *she fetched it out of her bag*), as well as German *nehmen* 'take' and *holen* 'fetch'. (*Holen*, unlike *fetch*, is in common use, freely allowing constructions like *es aus der Tasche holen* 'get it out of one's pocket').

Verbs like *get*, *take*, *fetch*, *nehmen* and *holen* with both a causative PP complement use and a possessive DP complement use all have in common that the latter is *agentive*, i.e. requires an

act induced by a decision on the part of the subject. *Take the book* expresses a volitional initiation of manual control of the book, while *get the book* can express deliberate initiation of possession, such as buying or fetching it. *Receive* illustrates this phenomenon well. With objects like guests, spiritual influences, *receive* is agentive, requiring an act of the will, and directional PPs may occur exactly in these cases, cf. (13). German *kriegen/bekommen* + PP VPs are never agentive; they have hindrance-specialized and unintentional readings, but not genuinely causative ones. This tallies with the fact that their DP complement uses only express passive receipt.[3]

(13) a. She decided to receive {guests/Christ/*books}.
b. She received {guests/*books} into her home; She received Christ into her life.

The above facts initially favour an analysis where the grammar of causative *get* directly refers to the agentive possessive sense. Earlier versions of this essay therefore treated causative *get* VPs as resultative constructions based on the agentive monotransitive use. On this view, *get/take one's wallet out* is grammatically parallel to *pull one's wallet out*; both express causation of motion with the verb root identifying the causing event as *getting/taking* (in the monotransitive agentive senses of the verbs) or *pulling*. That only agentive readings of possession verbs are suitable as causing events in these structures should fall out from a general theory of resultatives (cf. *I rammed/*fell the door open*). Wunderlich (1997) and McIntyre (2004) offer different theories of resultatives from which the matters just discussed could be made to follow.

An objection to the resultative analysis is that, context free, (14a) does not seem to entail (14b). (14b), but not (14a), implies that the subject moves some distance toward the object (the same holds of German *holen*). This does not refute the resultative analysis, for the motion intuition in (14b) seems to be an implicature. In (14b), where ownership is irrelevant to an event denoted by *get* VPs, the type of possession initiated must be assumed to be temporary access or control. Objects in reach of the subject are liable to be already possessed in this way, so we infer

[3] In *Max und Moritz*, *Erster Streich* (Wilhelm Busch, 1865) we read *. . .Kriegt sie jetzt das Messer her*, literally 'gets she now the knife hither'. The context suggests that *(her)kriegen* should be glossed with 'fetch', suggesting that a (now impossible) causative use of *kriegen* + PP once existed. This exception proves the rule, for *kriegen* + DP was formerly used agentively, true to its original meaning 'obtain by war'.

that they are out of reach of the subject, who must thus move towards the object to gain control over it. Like other implicatures, this inference can be cancelled. (14b) would be possible if it were known that the knife had been within the subject's reach. PPs like *out of my pocket* in (14a) are simply another way of cancelling the motion implicature.

(14) a. I got my knife out of my pocket b. I got my knife

Unfortunately, other data speak against the resultative analysis. In (15), clothing is the theme and the human body is the implicit ground/reference object of *off*. In varieties like mine, *get* in (15a) can only have the hindrance reading: it implies that the subject cannot undress, e.g. due to disability. Other speakers can use (15a) of a situation where the subject decides not to undress, and allow *get* in clearly agentive contexts like (15b). These speakers have a use of causative *get* which must be replaced by *take* in other varieties. The resultative analysis cannot capture varieties which lack a causative use for *get off* in (15) but use *take off* in this context.

(15) a. They didn't get their clothes off
b. The band members get their clothes off on stage to attract publicity

Other problems for the resultative analysis concern cases like (16a). Here the subject *gets* the object, but by the test in (10), (16a) involves the hindrance, not the causative reading, since we do not change the meaning by replacing *didn't* with *couldn't*. (16b) shows the opposite problem. *Get* has the genuinely causative reading, although one cannot *get* the objects, since they cease to exist as soon as they are out/off (*stitches* become *threads* once removed).

(16) a. He didn't get the children home
b. I didn't get {out the stitches/out the stain/off the rust} because that's not my job

The resultative analysis is thus empirically suspect, but the parallels between *get* and *take*, *receive* and *holen* show that it is real in some sense. I respond to this paradox by suggesting that the resultative analysis applied to causative *get* at an earlier stage (as it does to *receive* + PP VPs currently, cf. (13)), but that causative *get* has undergone lexical drift. The possessive constraint, when it holds, is a relic from the period when the resultative analysis was valid. Synchronically, it must be stipulated in some way, since a stipulation-free account of it like the resultative analysis would

both over- and under-generate with regard to examples like (15) and (16).

I approach these facts by assuming that causative *get* and other causative position change verbs like *put* are semantically identical, but that their lexical entries stipulate different *use conditions*, constraints on the contexts where the (relevant senses of) the verbs may appear. The proposal is in (17) and (18).

(17) Semantics for [$_{VP}$ *x get y* [$_{PP}$P (*z*)]] with *get* in the causative use:
λP {λZ} λY λX λS CAUSE (ACT(X), BECOME P(Y {,Z}))(S)

(18) [$_{VP}$ *x get y* [$_{PP}$P (*z*)]] with *get* in the causative use is usable if either (a) or (b) holds.
- a1. (some speakers:) *x* moves *y* into a position where *x* has control over *y*
- a2. (other speakers:) *x*'s primary motivation in moving the object is to bring it into a position where, after the event, *x* can *do something with* it (i.e. use it or perform some action involving it).
- b. *y* ceases to exist as a result of the event

For expository clarity (17) and other semantic representations before section 4.3 ignore my belief that the decomposition predicates are syntactic heads. These representations can be thought of as interpretations or LFs of syntactic phrases. I ignore irrelevant matters like tense, focussing on the VP, assuming VP-internal subjects. The syntax in (17) and (18) also ignores finer points about the structure of VP. BECOME is defined more precisely in section 3.4, where it becomes crucial. For now, it suffices to take BECOME as symbolizing that what is in its scope changes from being untrue to true. P is a placeholder for the semantics of the preposition. In particle verbs like *get out your wallet* the preposition's internal argument *z* is absent in syntax (and perhaps in conceptual structure in some cases, hence the braces around *z*). The causal relationship holds between two events. The causing event is assumed to be some unspecified action(s) of the subject, represented as a one-place function ACT.

(18) gives use conditions for causative *get*. (18a) gives variety-specific versions of the possessive constraint. 'Control' in (18a1) is prototypically manual control, where the subject holds and may manipulate, the object. Speakers accepting (15b) follow (18a1), not (a2), for people removing clothing gain manual control over it, but are not motivated by a desire to use or otherwise interact with it. More

confirmation for (18) is given in section 4.2, where it is discussed with reference to particles, which would have disrupted the exposition here.[4]

(18b) is motivated by the causative interpretation of *get* in (16b). I do not know how this use of *get* constitutes a natural class with uses of *get* obeying the possession constraint (including its variants in (18a)), but there is evidence that the two uses are somehow related. The *get* data in (16b) have parallels in (19) with *take* ((19b, c) are variety-specific). Recall that *take* normally resembles causative *get* in imposing a possession constraint (*take the ball {out of/*into} the box*), so the disappearing theme use is somehow connected to the possession constraint.

(19) a. The doctor didn't take out the stitches
b. she couldn't take out the stain [www.cs.washington.edu/homes/notkin/jstories/node1.html]
c. You can take off the rust [www.automotivehelper.com/topic24462.htm]

3 HINDRANCE-*get* AS AN INCHOATIVE OF *HAVE*

I now analyse hindrance-*get* in detail. I suspect that many linguists would at first glance surmise that (20a) is a causativization of (b) (cf. Hale & Keyser 1993: 86f).

(20) a. John got the lion in the cage. b. The lion got in the cage.

Doubts about an analysis where (20a) differs from (b) in the presence of a causal relation emerge from the discussion of (6)–(10). There it was shown that hindrance-*get* VPs do not denote causing events and are not agentive, properties which do not hold of genuinely causative *get* and of other causative verbs. A causal analysis for hindrance-*get* must give way to

[4] (18a2) is attested elsewhere as a direction of semantic specialization. It is found with some uses of *before*. *I sat before the piano* entails intent to do something with the piano (e.g. play it, clean it, inspect it), while *I sat in front of the piano* does not force this entailment (cf. *The sofa was taken, so I sat {in front of/*before} the piano while watching the film*. (18a2) also distinguishes *take up* from *pick up*. One can *take up* a pen or stone if one intends to do something with it (e.g. use it, look at it), but not in the context of streetcleaning work, where only *pick up* is usable. That (18a2) constrains both *take up* and causative *get* in some varieties may suggest principled connections between (18a2) and possession, but (18a2) is an idiomatic property of *take up* not found with other uses of *take*, for (ia) entails no intended use of or interaction with the sword. A final note on the bigger context of (18a2) is that it should not be confused with functional specializations like that in (ic), which entails intended *canonical use* of the sword, while (ib) need not entail this, but (in varieties constrained by (18a2)) does entail intent to do something with it.

(i) a. He {took out/pulled out} the sword in order to clean the sheath
b. He got out the sword {to look at it/*to clean the sheath}
c. He {brandished/ pulled/ drew} the sword {*to look at it/*to clean the sheath}

a representation which asserts that the subject is the initiator of the result state without referring to causing events. Perhaps unexpectedly, it turns out that the approach in (21) gives us this, since the use of *have* in question holds the subject responsible for having brought about the state (an example of this use is *He had the lion in the cage*). I argue that hindrance specialization should not be stipulated but follows from reasoning based on the use of the BECOME operator, correctly defined, in certain contexts.

(21) The BECOME HAVE theory: Hindrance-*get* VPs are nothing more than inchoatives (embeddings under BECOME) of states expressed overtly by a certain type of *have* + PP structure.

3.1 *Initial plausibility arguments for the BECOME HAVE theory*

I firstly indicate why it would even be desirable to argue for (21). German *kriegen* and *bekommen* are cognate with neither *get* nor each other, but display many of the same uses as transitive *get*, cf. (22). (*Bekommen* matches *kriegen* in all uses.) The result states of all these sentences can be expressed by replacing *kriegen/get* with *haben/have*. The possessive use in (22a) and the unintentional PP use in (22b) are straightforwardly analysable as inchoatives of the *have* variants. Beside these uses, we find uses which (i) are hindrance-specialized and (ii) hold the subject responsible for having brought about the result. We find that uses with these properties occur under the same conditions in both languages. AP complement uses like (22d) seem always to be hindrance-specialized in both languages (cf. *She didn't get her hair straight = she couldn't . . .* , and analogously in German). The participial use in (22c) is hindrance-specialized in both languages under the same conditions. If the subject is unconscious while being bandaged (and hence not responsible for the result), there is no hindrance specialization. The expressions are hindrance-specialized, e.g. if they denote bandaging one's own arm (*I didn't (= couldn't) get my left arm bandaged because my right hand was injured*).[5]

[5] Two complications with participial structures like (22c): Firstly, some scholars see the non-responsibility reading of the German structure in (22c) as a passive based on dative structures like *ich verband ihm den Arm* (lit. 'I bandaged him^{dat} the arm'). English lacks a comparable ditransitive structure (**I bandaged him his arm*), but *get* is still possible in (22c), showing that the passive analysis of the German in (22c) is redundant. I show elsewhere that German *kriegen*-subjects can paraphrase datives because they are both arguments of the same HAVE relation. Secondly, beside the hindrance reading, the English in (22c) has a genuinely causative reading 'get someone to bandage one's arm' which is impossible with *kriegen*. This difference between *get* and *kriegen* may be systematic since there are other causative-agentive uses of *get* which are impossible with *kriegen*, namely agentive *get* + DP structures (*I tried to get the book*) and causative *get* + PP structures.

(22) a. Briefe kriegen = get letters (in sense 'receive', not 'fetch')
b. einen Kugel in den Arm kriegen = get a bullet in one's arm
c. den Arm verbunden kriegen = get one's arm bandaged
d. die Haare glatt kriegen = get one's hair straight
e. den Löwen in den Käfig kriegen = get the lion in the cage

The coexistence in three historically unrelated verbs of (i) uses which are plausibly inchoatives of *have*, and (ii) hindrance-specialized uses, is surely not arbitrary. The question is not *whether* the uses are connected, but *how*. My proposal is that both types of uses of *get* are inchoatives of *have* and that differences them are due to different uses of *have*. To uphold this proposal, I must show how it captures hindrance specialization and the concomitant requirement that the subject be interpreted as responsible for having brought about the result. I begin my attempt at this now.

3.2 *The responsibility requirement*

I firstly discuss the **responsibility requirement**, the fact that subjects of hindrance VPs are responsible for having initiated the situation: *I got the lion into the cage* is untrue if I am an inactive beneficiary of a voluntary return of the lion into its cage or of actions performed by people not acting at my behest. The responsibility requirement also occurs with some *have* + PP structures. (23a) is untrue if Cuthbert did nothing to induce the attacker to flee (e.g. if he was tied up and the attacker fled because the police arrived). (23b) entails that Clive had (asked someone to) put the goods in the warehouse. However, not all *have* + PP structures exhibit the responsibility requirement, cf. (23c).

(23) a. Cuthbert has the attacker on the run [responsibility]
b. Clive has the stolen goods in a warehouse [responsibility]
c. The box has sand in it [unintentional]

My approach to these matters is encapsulated in (24).

(24) a. Semantics for $[_{VP}\ x\ get\ y\ [_{PP}P\ (z)]]$ with *get* in the hindrance reading: $\lambda P\ \{\lambda Z\}\ \lambda Y\ \lambda X\ \lambda S$ BECOME HAVE^{resp}(X, P(Y{,Z}))(S) HAVE^{resp} is provisionally defined as meaning what responsibility *have* in (23a, b) means, and defined more exactly in (32).
b. Semantics for $[_{VP}\ x\ get\ y\ [_{PP}P\ (z)]]$ with *get* in the unintentional reading: $\lambda P\ \{\lambda Z\}\ \lambda Y\ \lambda X\ \lambda S$ BECOME HAVE^{unint}(X, P(Y{,Z}))(S)

> HAVE^{unint} is provisionally defined as meaning what unintentional *have* in (23c) means.

(24), a more precise statement of the BECOME HAVE theory in (21), claims that the hindrance and unintentional uses of *get* are inchoatives respectively of the responsibility and unintentional uses of *have*. Although it is not crucial to my purposes, I assume that HAVE^{resp} and HAVE^{unint} are two context-specific manifestations of one highly underspecified HAVE relation. If this were not so, the fact noted in section 3.1 that *get*, *kriegen*, *have* and *haben* all have these readings would be arbitrary. The ensuing sections elaborate on (24a) by defining HAVE^{resp} explicitly and by showing how (24a) captures hindrance specialization. ((24b) is discussed only insofar as it helps us to understand the hindrance reading. It is not directly relevant to the main argument in this study since unintentional *get* does not combine with particles.)

Extra support for the idea in (24) that the responsibility requirement in hindrance-*get* is inherited from a predicate overtly expressible by *have* comes from striking parallels between *have* and *get* with respect to the conditions under which the responsibility and unintentional readings are found.

Firstly, many studies (e.g. Belvin 1993, 1996; Belvin & den Dikken 1997; Déchaine *et al*. 1994; den Dikken 1997; Harley 1995, 1998; Ritter & Rosen 1997) note that unintentional *have* (= 'experiencer *have*' in these works) requires coindexation between the subject of *have* and an item in its complement, unlike responsibility-*have* (= 'causative *have*' in these works). (25) shows that this applies to *get* as well as *have*. (25a) holds John responsible for the puncture, while (b), where there is coindexation, need not. Belvin & den Dikken (1997: 167) note that covert coindexation suffices for the unintentional reading. Replacing *his* with *the* in (25b) allows the unintentional reading provided *the tyre* is understood as John's tyre.

(25) a. John got/had a nail in my tyre. [responsibility/*unintentional]
b. John$_i$ got/had a nail in his$_i$ tyre. [responsibility/unintentional]

Secondly, *get* behaves analogously to *have* with regard to Harley's (1998) observation that a reflexive in the complement of *have* forces a responsibility reading. (26a) attributes the location of the paint to the subject's carelessness or deliberate self-decoration. In (26b), the subject could be the passive victim of someone else's act. In (26c) the sergeant may be an inconvenienced by enemy spies (if the camp is *his* camp), while (26d) forces the responsibility reading where the sergeant had

stationed himself in the camp, as opposed to an unintentional reading (e.g. he is emprisoned in the camp).

(26) a. he_i had/got paint on $himself_i$ [responsibility]
b. he_i had/got paint on him_i [unintentional]
c. The sergeant had/got spies in the camp [unintentional/responsibility]
d. The sergeant had/got himself in the camp [responsibility/*unintentional]

Thirdly, responsibility readings with both *have* and *get* are forced in the presence of exclusively directional prepositions like *into* and *onto*. With both *get* and *have*, (27a) portrays Smith as a selector or captain responsible for Jones' inclusion in the team, while in (27b) Smith could be a player in the team who is not responsible for Jones' inclusion. I cannot explain (27),[6] but it is a further case where the responsibility readings with *get* as with *have* are sensitive to the same principles, as expected under the BECOME HAVE theory.

(27) a. Smith had/got Jones into his team (*due to circumstances beyond Smith's control)
b. Smith had/got Jones in his team (due to circumstances beyond Smith's control)

3.3 *The semantics of HAVE^{resp}*

(24a) decomposes hindrance-*get* VPs using HAVE^{resp}, which was said to mean whatever the responsibility-*have* with PP complements (henceforth: *have*^{resp}) means. I now analyse *have*^{resp} and equivalently HAVE^{resp}. The studies on responsibility-*have* cited above (25) treat infinitival complements and ignore *have* + PP structures, so I now conduct my own analysis of these.

Have^{resp} + PP VPs are states, witness the use of the simple present in contexts like (28), where habitual, generic or historic narrative readings compatible with non-states are unavailable.

(28) Egbert has the stolen car on the street now

[6] The tie-in between directional prepositions and responsibility recalls Déchaine *et al.* (1994), who derive responsibility *have* by incorporating a specifically directional preposition into a copula, but the account suffers from the lack of a plausible connection between the directionality of the preposition and responsibility semantics. The incompatibility of unintentional *have*/*get* with small clauses headed by inherently directional PPs also recalls the claim (e.g. Belvin 1993, Harley 1998, Ritter & Rosen 1998) that unintentional *have* requires stative complements, while responsibility *have* may have eventive complements. I know of no satisfying account for this generalization.

Rough equivalence between (29a) and (29b) should not tempt us to view *have*^{resp} + PP VPs as some type of elliptical structure involving the perfect auxiliary *have*. *Have* in (a) has the syntax of a lexical verb, not that of the auxiliary in (b), witness, e.g. the relative position of *have* and *now*, and the fact that the tag question for (a) would be *doesn't she* while that for (b) would be *hasn't she*.

(29) a. She now has my car in John's garage
b. She has now put my car in John's garage

The state expressed by *have*^{resp} + PP VPs and the state expressed by the complement small clause hold during exactly the same interval. Actions performed by the subject before the start of the interval in which the embedded state holds are not included in the interval occupied by either state. Hence, (30a) is true only if the car was on the street when the siren sounded. It is false if Egbert was still moving the car towards the street at that point. The subject may do something to sustain the small clause state during the time that it holds, cf. (30b), but need not, cf. (30a).

(30) a. When Egbert heard the police siren, he had the stolen car on the street
b. Grandma has her wrestling opponent on the floor
c. Egbert didn't have the car on the street

Although subjects of *have*^{resp} must have performed actions aimed at bringing about the small clause state before the interval occupied by the *have*^{resp} state, these actions are not presuppositional, i.e. need not have occurred if the VP is negated, as in (30c).

The fact that *have*^{resp} + PP structures hold an entity responsible for bringing about a situation, yet are states and do not express causing events, may seem strange, but has a precedent in (31).

(31) She is responsible for this situation; This situation is due to him

Putting the above observations together, we arrive at the definition in (32) of *have*^{resp} (and thus of the HAVE^{resp} relation with which I decompose hindrance-*get* VPs).

(32) Interpretation of $[_{VP}$ *x have* $[_{SC}$ *y* $[_{PP}P$ (*z*)$]]]$ with *have* in the responsibility reading: $\lambda P\ \{\lambda Z\}\ \lambda Y\ \lambda X$ HAVE^{resp}(X, [P(Y{,Z})])
This is true during interval *I* if (i) the state denoted by the small clause is true at *I* and (ii) *x* had performed actions before *I* which caused this state to come about.

(32) is provisional. I will not describe uses of HAVE/*have* other than those manifesting themselves in responsibility *have* + PP structures, which I see as part of the meaning of hindrance-*get* VPs crucial to my main argument. Belvin (1993, 1996), Harley (1998) and Ritter & Rosen (1997) and others may be right in assuming an underspecified semantics covering most uses of *have*. If this were wrong, the observation in section 3.1 that several unrelated verbs have similar ranges of meanings would be mysterious. However, the literature known to me has not brought forth an underspecified meaning for *have* which predicts exactly the generalisations captured by (32). Theories claiming that *have* has next to no semantic content (e.g. Ritter & Rosen 1997) cannot prevent *I had the lion in the cage* from meaning 'I saw that the lion was in the cage'. The same overgeneration problem attends the claim that *have*-sentences decompose semantically and, in some theories, syntactically, into a metaphorically construed location of the entity or situation expressed by *have*'s complement with respect to *have*'s subject (Benveniste 1966; Belvin 1993;1996; Belvin & den Dikken 1997; Déchaine *et al*. 1994; den Dikken 1997; Freeze 1992; Harley 1998). This may be right, but I know no suitably predictive variant of this proposal. I therefore leave (32) as a purely descriptive generalization, trusting that successful attempts at more general meanings covering more uses of *have* and further decompositions of it will be able to be brought together with the central aims of this study without spoiling its main message.

3.4 *BECOME and the Aktionsart of hindrance-get*

(33) (cf. (24) and (32)) is the semantics for hindrance-*get* VPs which I am proposing. (34) introduces the definition for BECOME, based on Bierwisch's (2004) revision of that in Dowty (1979: 141). Bierwisch and Dowty may be right to treat (34c) as an implicature. I state it explicitly since its consequences are important here.

(33) a. Semantics for $[_{VP}$ *x get y* $[_{PP}P\ (z)]]$ with *get* in the hindrance reading: $\lambda P\ \{\lambda Z\}\ \lambda Y\ \lambda X\ \lambda S$ BECOME $\text{HAVE}^{\text{resp}}(X, P(Y\ \{,Z\}))(S)$

b. $\lambda P\ \{\lambda Z\}\ \lambda Y\ \lambda X\ \text{HAVE}^{\text{resp}}(X, [P(Y,Z)])$ is true during interval *K* if (i) the state $[P(Y\ \{,Z\})]$ is true at *K* and (ii) *x* had performed actions before *K* which caused this state to come about.

(34) [BECOME ϕ] is true at interval *I* iff

a. there is an interval *K* containing the final bound of *I* with ϕ implied to be true at *K*.

b. there is an interval J containing the initial bound of I with $\neg\phi$ presupposed to hold at J.
c. there is no interval I' such that I' is included in I and conditions (a) and (b) hold for I'.

The definitions capture the Aktionsart properties of hindrance-*get* VPs. (33b) reflects the finding of section 3.3 that the $\text{HAVE}^{\text{resp}}$ relation is temporally co-extensive with the small clause state, i.e. the state of a theme at a location. Thus, the only parts of the meaning of hindrance-*get* VPs relevant to Aktionsart are BECOME and a target state. (34c) ensures that a BECOME transition does not hold until the negation of the small clause proposition ceases to hold. This matches the results of tests like (5) and (6), which showed that hindrance-*get* VPs are achievements, i.e. are not yet assertable if the theme is known to be moving towards the goal or the subject is acting towards realizing the result state.

The term 'achievement' is sometimes associated with punctuality, but (35) shows that hindrance-*get* VPs need not be punctual. (34) allows BECOME transitions to be non-punctual if the initial and result states are separated by an interval where the speaker cannot decide whether the result state holds. Such truth value gaps give a plausible account for cases like (35), where the goal region (here: at the top of the mountain) has fuzzy boundaries, so that the theme must pass through a state where the theme is neither at the goal but nor not at it.[7]

(35) My mobile rang twice while I was getting the cart to the top of the mountain

[7] An open (apparently undiscussed) question is how BECOME interacts with PPs. My earlier dealings with motion sentences eschewed BECOME in favour of Jackendoff's (1990) GO function relating entities to paths. I found the claim of the BECOME analysis that motion sentences like (ia) assert the inchoation of states like (ib, c) problematic in view of hostility of the states to directional prepositions found in motion sentences.

(i) a. Cuthbert got (the books) {into/to/onto} the truck
b. Cuthbert had the books {in/at/on/*into/*to/*onto} the truck
c. The books were {in/at/on/*into/*to/*onto} the truck

The BECOME analysis can be upheld if we assume that directional PPs differ from locational PPs only in that the former must be in the same clause (or subevent) as BECOME. I cannot elaborate on this here. This is a gap in my analysis, but the alternative, the GO analysis, now seems untenable to me. Its non-recognition of result states precludes it from handling restitutive scope (e.g. Stechow 1996) with *re-* and *back* in cases like *when I left the country for the first time, I {reentered/got back in} after a week*. Using GO for PPs and BECOME for APs cannot explain the existence of verbs like *get* taking both types of complements (*I got to the shops/I got sick*).

3.5 *Deriving hindrance specialization and the trying presupposition*

I now show how the semantics for hindrance-*get* in (33) captures hindrance specialization and the *trying presupposition*, the presupposition that the subject of hindrance VPs must have tried to bring about the result. Recall from section 2.1 that this presupposition manifests itself in the intuitive equivalence of (36a) to *I couldn't get the screw in the wall*. The trying presupposition coupled with the non-occurrence of the result trivially suggests that the subject cannot attain it.

(36) a. I didn't get the screw in the wall
b. I didn't {reach/get to/arrive at/make it to} the shop
c. I didn't finish (reading) the book

The trying presupposition seems to be related to presuppositions triggered in (36b, c). (b) presupposes that I had been moving towards the shop, and (c) that I started reading the book. The examples in (36) are all achievements and all express situations which, judged by world knowledge, are '(inherently) subeventive', i.e. are intrinsic final parts of larger events also comprising characteristic leadup actions (cf. Piñón's 1997 view that achievements are boundaries of larger situations). (36b, c) are subeventive in this sense because one cannot simply reach a location without prior motion, or finish a book without prior reading. Hindrance-*get* VPs like (36a) are subeventive in the following sense. Hindrance VPs always show the responsibility requirement (captured in my theory by $\text{HAVE}^{\text{resp}}$), but do not actually *denote* actions of the subject which lead to the goal state. Yet the subject cannot be responsible for this state without having performed such actions, i.e. without having *tried* to attain it.

Given this notion of sub-eventiveness, it is easy to see why, if we reformulate (36) without negation, the subject is inferred to have acted with a view to inserting the screw in (a), to have been moving prior to reaching the goal in (b) and to have been reading in the book in (c). What requires explaining is why these inferences are retained in the negative variants in (36), i.e. why they are presuppositions. I put this down to the following reasoning. Speakers can easily avoid these inferences by replacing the VPs in (36) with accomplishment VPs (e.g. with *put/insert* in (a), with *go/drive* in (b) and by omitting the aspectual verb in (c)), so that the leadup actions would have fallen under the scope of negation. The choice to bypass these expressions in favour of the relatively marked subeventive ones is therefore plausibly a sign that the leadup actions are to be excluded from negation.

We turn now to hindrance specialization, the intuition that the result of hindrance-*get* is hard to attain. My account for this begins with the observation in section 2.1 that hindrance-*get* VPs are non-agentive. While the BECOME HAVE^{resp} representation presupposes actions on the part of the subject aimed at bringing about the result, as just noted, it has no causing event or agentive component explicitly attributing the attainment of the result to actions performed by the subject. In choosing such a representation, and in bypassing normal causative-agentive verbs, the speaker downplays the importance of these actions as the cause of the result. A natural conclusion which can be drawn from the failure to credit the attainment of the result to the subject's actions is that results with hindrance-*get* are perceived as *non-automatic*, i.e. are not guaranteed to eventuate just because the subject tries to attain them. By its very nature, a non-automatic result occurs partly due to propitious circumstances such as luck, external help or lack of resistance. One can *try* to bring about a non-automatic result, but one cannot *decide* to. Non-automatic results are by definition hard to achieve, which is the intuition we set out to explain.

I do not claim that all hindrance-specialized verbs are to be dealt with in the manner just sketched (though I will show elsewhere the approach extends to unaccusative *get* and German non-deictic *kommen*). It is likely that something else must be said about hindrance-specialized verbs with infinitival complements like *manage*. However, it seems reasonable to conclude that hindrance-specialization can be inferred from the BECOME HAVE representation. This is fortunate given the observation in section 3.1 that any other approach would be arbitrary.

4 *Get* WITH VERB PARTICLES

4.1 *Basic facts about particles*

We can now begin explaining the effects of *get* on particle position. I firstly review some facts about particles. Most English particle verbs (alias 'phrasal verbs', 'verb-particle combinations') allow either object-particle order or particle-object order:

(37) I carried/took/pushed {out/in/away/down} the box {out/in/away/down}.

Particle verbs should not be confounded with so-called 'prepositional verbs' like (38), where the post-verbal DP is complement of the preposition (and semantically its ground/reference object). Prepositional verbs trivially disallow V-DP-P order, since English has

PREpositions rather than POSTpositions. Compare this with particle verbs like (37), where the post-verbal DP is a theme or figure, whose final/initial location is indicated by the particle, often with respect to an *implicit* reference object. Thus, the particle verb *take in the box* entails motion of the box into something, while the prepositional verb *fall in the box* expresses motion into a stationary box.

(38) go {in} the house {*in}; fall {off} a cliff {*off}; look {through} the glass {*through}

'Particle' is shorthand for 'complementless preposition which may occur before or after a direct object'.[8] The latter clause is needed because some intransitive prepositions shun the pre-object position. This applies to *through* and some morphologically complex intransitive prepositions (exceptions: *away*, *aside*), cf. (39a). When studying particle verbs with *get*, we will ignore prepositional elements like those in (39a), since these independently resist particle-object order.

(39) a. *we carried {through/inside/upwards/around} the materials
b. She got/hurt/hit {*back} her enemy {back}
c. She got {back} her book {back}.

We should also exclude *back* from the discussion. (39b) involves monotransitive verbs (e.g. *get* in the sense 'inflict harm on') and reciprocal *back*. This cannot precede an object because it is an adverbial, not a particle, cf. post-PP uses like *punch him in the face back*. Radford (1997: 444–8) and Koizumi (1993: 125) noted that restitutive *back* in (39c) shows greater flexibility than normal particles in double object constructions. It can precede objects in *have/want/need back the book*, though these verbs otherwise disallow particle-object order (cf. (51)). One can *receive back a book*, although no normal particle combines with *receive* (**receive in guests*).[9]

When discussing particle position, we must use examples where objects are not weak pronouns, which insist on object-particle order: *I took {*out} it {out}*. This is due to general information-structural principles, and/or clitic-like properties of weak pronouns (Dehé 2002).

[8] One could redefine 'particle' to include the few non-prepositions that can separate verbs and objects (*let slip$_V$ a chance, let go$_V$ the rope, set free$_A$ the captives, cut short$_A$ the meeting*), but these are irrelevant to *get*. The only superficially non-prepositional item relevant to us is *home* in *take home the books*, but *home* distributes like a PP in other contexts like coordination (*they went [home or to work]*), use in the complement of *way* (*the way home/down/into the house*) and locative inversion (*home/into the house/down ran the children*).

[9] **Receive in* DP obeys a ban on particle verbs with Latinate stems (Fraser 1976) which, though not exceptionless (*partition off* DP), seems real, witness 'Germanicizing' truncations like *sum(*marise) up* and *(*con)fess up* 'own up'.

One should also be wary of objects consisting of more than a determiner and an article; 'heavy' DPs may appear clause finally due to an extraneous phenomenon known as heavy-NP-shift. (40) shows why heaviness should be controlled for.

(40) a. I threw [the article] in the fire v. *I threw in the fire [the article].
b. I threw in the fire [the article about dative-ablative syncretism in phonetically null case infixation in English adjectives].

4.2 *Particle-object order with get*

While certain particle verbs with *get* allow particle-object order (*get out your wallet*), (41) gives cases where *get* (unlike the verbs given in brackets with each example) disallows particle-object order in varieties like mine. Some speakers allow particle-object order in some cases in (41), but all reject particle-object order in at least some of these cases. I offer an account of speaker variation shortly. Prior to that, all judgments are based on varieties like mine.

(41) a. I wish I could get {*off} this straitjacket {off}. [take]
b. I can't get {*on} the lid {on}, maybe it doesn't go with this jar. [screw]
c. The lock was rusty, but I eventually got {*in} the key {in}. [push]
d. How can we get {*down} the cat {down}? It wants to stay on the roof. [lure]
e. You'd better get {*off} that letter {off} soon. [send]
f. I'm so sick I can't get {*down} my food {down}. [hold]
g. We eventually got {*out} the fire {out} [put]
h. We got {*home} the children {home} by six. [take]
i. I can't get {*up} the blind {up}; it's stuck [pull]
j. I can't get {*on} the heater {on}; I think it's blown a fuse. [turn, switch]

We can dismiss an account of (41) which says that, e.g. *get on the lid* in (41b) is avoided because it is homophonous with the prepositional verb meaning 'climb onto the lid'. Apart from doubts about whether weird readings involving climbing onto a lid or, for example, climbing down food in (41f) would really block the desired readings, such an explanation fails in cases like (41g, h) where the particle has no DP complement use (*out* would require *of* insertion: *get out of the fire*).

The vast literature on particle verbs only discusses data like (41) twice. It does not generalize about *get*. Pesetsky (1992: 250, 304) stars **Her remarks really got down Bill* and admits to being unable to explain why this is worse than other psych particle verb structures (?*It pissed off Bill*). (The contrast is ignored in the published version, 1995: 284.) Harley & Noyer (1998) note the contrast *he got out a gun* vs. **he got out the drunk sailor* without trying to explain it.

I now establish the generalizations in (42).

(42) a. Causative *get* allows both particle-object and object-particle order.
b. Hindrance-*get* disallows particle-object order.[10]

In (43) particle-object order is good if the structure fulfils the possessive constraint on causative *get* noted in section 2.3. The acceptable variants in (43) are not hindrance-specialized, for negation of the sentences does not suggest that the subject was unable to attain the result (recall (10)), and the hindrance-specialized German verbs *kriegen* and *bekommen* cannot accurately translate the acceptable sentences.[11] If we put the particles after the objects, the unacceptable variants become acceptable, but have the hindrance reading.

(43) a. I got together {some money/some friends/*an estranged couple/ *a machine}
b. She got out {her wallet/the milk/a shotgun}
c. I got down the details[12]

Since speakers differ in when they accept *get*-particle-object order, I solicited judgments and comments on the *get* sentences in (44) and the corresponding object-particle variants. Eleven informants (five Australian, four American and two British) judged all sentences, and other informants were consulted on a less complete set of data.

(44) a. [The cat is on the roof:] How can we get down the cat?
b. [The lock was rusty, but] I eventually got in the key.

[10] The account in section 4.4 would also block particle-object order with unintentional *get*, but unintentional *get* does not seem to combine with particles, perhaps because of its aversion to specifically directional prepositions.

[11] Had there been an English verb *krig* with the same set of senses as *kriegen*, I surmise that this verb would always have disallowed particle-object order, since *kriegen* + PP has hindrance-specialized and unintentional readings, but no genuinely causative use. If *krig* had existed, this essay would have been much shorter, as there would have been no need to distinguish causative from hindrance readings.

[12] (43c) is not an idiom. Combinations like *take down*, *write down*, *scribble down*, *note down* show that the particle has a semi-productive sense 'onto paper'.

c. [Said by someone trying to put a lid on a jar:] I can't get on the lid
d. [The prisoner was handcuffed:] Eventually, he saw a way to get off the handcuffs.
e. [The boss said] You'd better get off that letter soon
f. [Maria has trouble swallowing:] She can't get down her food.
g. We eventually got out the fire
h. We got home the children
i. [A blind often gets stuck, requiring one to pull on it, untangle the cord etc.:] After fiddling around with it for five minutes, I finally managed to get down the blind.
j. [Person talking to neighbours making loud noises:] We'll get in the police
k. [The natives were protesting about the conquerors flying the flag of their home country, and tried to prevent them from doing this:] The soldiers didn't get up the flag.
l. I got out the washing.
m. [People were being held captive in a building:] The police got out the hostages.

In my variety, only (44j) and (l) are acceptable. Some informants remarked that (44a), (44b) and (44k) are legitimate only if they express climbing down a cat, into a key or up a flag. This is irrelevant here because these readings reflect a parsing the V-P-DP strings as prepositional verbs with unaccusative *get* rather than as particle verbs.

Speaker variation may also stem from different versions of the possession constraint on causative *get*, described in the different use conditions in (18a). (44a), (44d) and (44m) enjoyed acceptance by five informants. These speakers follow the use condition in (18a1), for the subject gains (e.g. manual) control over the object. Two of these speakers also accept (44i), but not if *down* is replaced with *up*. This is understandable: one momentarily holds a blind after pulling it down, but not after putting it up, and blinds are fixed to window frames, so speakers may differ on whether the subject's holding the blind constitutes control over it.

The varieties of several informants and myself are less permissive particle-object order with *get* because they have the strict use condition on causative *get* given in (45) (from (18a2)).

(45) The subject's primary motivation in moving the object is to bring it into a position where, after the event, the subject can *do something with* it (i.e. use it or perform some action involving it).

This constraint (call it the **purpose constraint)** is fulfilled in the acceptable sentences in (43) and (44j, l), which are good in all varieties, but not in (44a, d, i, m), which are good only in varieties with the control constraint just discussed. As the parenthetic disjunction in (45) suggests, purpose constraint varieties allow causative *get* (and hence particle-object order) in contexts where either the object fulfils some function or the subject performs actions involving it. Neither part of this disjunction subsumes the other. *Get in the police* involves using the police for some purpose, but the subject need not perform further actions, while *get out a knife* is suitable if the subject intends to look at or clean the knife without using it.

The purpose constraint is relevant to *get out the cork* or *get off the lid*, which are unacceptable to me, but are internet-attested. If I remove a lid or cork from a bottle, I end up with manual control over it, but intend to interact with the bottle, not the lid/cork. Compare this with **get on the lid/cork*, which is bad to all informants, since the subject neither intends to do something with the lid/cork, nor gains manual control of the lid/cork.

A final example: In varieties with the purpose constraint, (46) does not suggest removal of the objects from their respective canonical interiors (i.e. mouths, wood), although we might have expected the objects to prime this interpretation strongly (as indeed they do if the particle is placed after the object, allowing the hindrance reading, which has no possessive constraint or purpose constraint). What (46) does suggest in varieties with the purpose constraint is that the objects are removed from storage containers (drawers, boxes, pockets etc.). The extraction of teeth or screws from their canonical interiors does not fulfil the purpose constraint (since in this case the objects cease to fulfil any kind of function), while removing them from storage containers is likely to be motivated by the intention to do something with the objects.

(46) The dentist got out my tooth; I got out the screws

We also find particle-object order in (47), where *get* fulfils the use condition in (18b) that causative *get* is possible with disappearing themes (cf. the remarks on (16b), (19)).

(47) a. He spilt wine on the carpet but didn't get out the stain
b. I didn't get off the rust before painting the metal
c. The doctor didn't get out the stitches [cf. Harley 2004: 266]

I thus conclude that particle-object order with a given sentence is possible when *get* has the causative reading. Differences between speakers on whether particle-object order is possible in a given case

result from differences in the conditions on the use of causative *get* noted in section 2.3. I now move towards an account for why particle placement should be sensitive to the semantics of *get* in this fashion.

4.3 *Syntactic decomposition and the lexical entry for get*

My account of particle placement with *get* appeals to the idea that semantic decomposition predicates are syntactic heads. For expository convenience, the semantic representations given above ignored this idea. I now integrate it into the picture. The approach below draws partly on distributed morphology (DM, e.g. Marantz 1997; Harley & Noyer 1998). A crucial tenet is that VPs are projections not of open class lexical verbs (*get*, *sing* etc) but of closed class items roughly corresponding to semantic primitives in lexicalist theories like Wunderlich 1997 or Jackendoff 1990. I now describe the closed-class items (light verbs) used here.

- $\mathbf{V^{become}}$ is a light verb taking a small clause complement. It is interpreted as in (34), the only additional point to note being that ϕ is the proposition expressed by the small clause.
- $\mathbf{V^{cause}}$ takes a VP as complement and a DP as specifier, and asserts (i) the existence of an event which is the cause of the event named by the inner VP and (ii) that the entity denoted by the specifier of V^{cause} is the agent of the causing event. Taking (i) and (ii) together, we can say that V^{cause} introduces the semantic material symbolized by CAUSE and ACT in (17). Pylkkänen (2002) argues that separate heads may perform the tasks named in (i) and (ii), but not in English.
- $\mathbf{V^{have}}$ is a polysemous morpheme with the same set of functions as English non-auxiliary *have*. It takes a DP as specifier and a small clause or DP complement. Since only the responsibility reading found with PP complements defined in (32) is relevant to my main argument, my account could equally well be formulated in terms of a morpheme $V^{have.resp}$ with the semantics in (32). Although I cannot yet offer a precise semantics for the broader V^{have}, I will use this symbol in the belief that some variant of an underspecified semantics for *have* (and hence V^{have}) must be correct, as noted in section 3.3. I take V^{have} to be of the category V for simplicity. It would not harm my proposal if it is a preposition, as in Harley (1995).

V^{become}, V^{cause} and V^{have} are the only light verbs used here. These (and others irrelevant here) can by hypothesis combine in any

permutation observing selection restrictions. To ensure the interpretability of the combination of light verbs, a VP must contain an audible item functioning as a *spellout* of the light verbs. The spellout is by hypothesis inserted post-syntactically. I now describe how *get* fits into this scheme of things. (48) gives part of *get*'s lexical entry (in DM terms, its encyclopaedia entry). I take *get* to be a spellout of V^{become}. The multiplicity of uses of *get* and the fact that *get* cannot be used in all cases where BECOME is present is handled by conditions stipulating its syntactic context.

(48) Excerpt from the lexical entry for *get*:

a. /get/ spells out V^{become}. It is usable in the following contexts:

b. $[_{VP} V^{become}\ [_{SC}$ DP XP]] (e.g. *I got inside/drunk/working/shot*)

c. $[_{VP} V^{become}\ [_{VP}$ DP $V^{have}\ [_{sc}$ DP PP/AP/$Part^{prog}$P/ $Part^{perf}$P]]](e.g. *I got him inside/drunk/working/shot*)

d. $[_{VP}\ V^{become}\ [_{VP}$ DP V^{have} DP]] (e.g. *I got a letter*, on non-agentive reading))

e. $[_{VP}DP_i\ V^{cause}[_{VP}V^{become}\ [_{VP}\ PRO_i\ V^{have}$ DP]](e.g. *I got a book*, on agentive reading)

f. $[_{VP}DP^a\ V^{cause}[_{VP}V^{become}\ [_{SC}\ DP^b$ PP]] under the following conditions, cf. (18):

i. (some varieties:) DP^a comes to have control of DP^b as a result of the event (other varieties:) DP^a moves DP^b in order to bring it into a position where, after the event, DP^a can use or do something with DP^b.

ii. DP^b ceases to exist as a result of the event

I see *get* as a spellout of V^{become} since it has unaccusative uses where it only spells out V^{become} (*I got sick*) and since V^{become} is present in all its uses. Approaches not seeing *get*'s uses as elaborations of BECOME would require several homonymous *get*s.

(48) does not mention the ditransitive use noted in connection with (3), since this can reasonably be predicted from general principles. (48) stipulates the existence of other readings of *get* because this seems necessary in an empirically responsible theory. For instance, opting to capture causative uses of *get* in (e, f) by productive causativization processes rather than by lexical stipulation would prevent us from capturing its use conditions and would wrongly predict that all spellouts of V^{become} could be productively causativized (**Beer became me a bad linguist*; **fear went him pale*; **it flew him into a rage*; **the plague fell him sick*).

Further work on *get* would doubtless occasion emendations to (48). It ignores non-semantic information and reflects some marginal decisions. (48b) may need to list the possible categories of small clause heads given that *get a nun* cannot mean 'become a nun', unless a theory of blocking can predict this given the existence of *become* or the readings in (48d) and (48e). (48c) and (48d) could be a single use specifying only that the lower VP is headed by V^{have}. (I separated (48c) and (48d) and listed the SC head categories because VP-headed SCs as in *I had him sing* are impossible with *get*.)

Uncertainties notwithstanding, the framework is flexible enough to express subtle constraints on uses of spellouts. The framework is no less flexible than lexicalist theories, for it has a lexicon (encyclopaedia) constraining the contexts where a 'verb' (or, in this theory, a phonological item spelling out a light verb) may be used. We now apply the system to particle verbs with *get*.

4.4 *An explanation for particle position with get*

(49) is the syntax I assume for particle verbs with *get*. (49a) involves hindrance-*get* and (b) causative *get*. V^{become} is spelt out as *get*. In (a) *get* incorporates into the silent V^{cause} head.

(49) a. Ann got {*on} the lid {on}.
[$_{TP}$ Ann_i [$_T$ PAST] [$_{vP}$ $\mathbf{V^{become}}$ [$_{vP}$ $\mathbf{t_i}$ $\mathbf{V^{have}}$ [$_{SC}$ [$_{DP}$ the lid] [$_{P(P)}$on]]]]]

b. (I gave her the bill and) Ann got {out} her wallet {out}.
[$_{TP}$ Ann_i [$_T$ PAST] [$_{vP}$ $\mathbf{t_i}$ V^{cause}[$_{vP}$ V^{become} [$_{SC}$ [$_{DP}$ her wallet] [$_{P(P)}$out]]]]]

Various linguists (e.g. Haider 1997; Haegeman & Guéron 1999: 258; Harley & Noyer 1998; Radford 1997: 374) assume that English particle-object order reduces to the ability of particles to incorporate into a verb (e.g. V^{become} in (49b)). The now complex verb moves to a verbal head position to the left of the direct object (e.g. V^{cause} in (49b)) by the short verb movement used in all shell theories. Another approach (Dehé 2002; Johnson 1991; Koizumi 1993; Olsen 2000) initially generates English particle verbs as morphological objects, forming a complex verb which may optionally be treated as a V° for the purposes of short verb movement. The incorporation approach and the morphological one share the idea that the particle-object sequence involves a V° node dominating the particle and a verbal element. The idea that syntactic incorporation produces a configuration which is subject to peculiarly morphological principles (and idiosyncrasies) was

endorsed by Baker (1988: 68ff). The approaches differ in whether this relationship arises before or during the syntactic derivation (see Koopman 1995: 147, fn. 15 for the suggestion that base generation of particle verbs as morphological objects is not incompatible with assuming that a PP is projected, as in the incorporation approach).

My account for the blockage on particle-object order in (49a) starts with (50). A standard constraint on head movement, the head movement constraint (e.g. Baker 1988), says that heads may move only to the next highest head position. Thus, if the particle cannot head-move to V^{have}, as (50) claims, then it will be unable to move any higher than V^{have}, and thus stays after the object. Upholding this account requires us to confirm the empirical and theoretical status of (50).

(50) V^{have} cannot incorporate anything, including particles. (Alternative formulation: V^{have} cannot head a morphologically complex X°.)

(50) predicts that VPs decomposing with V^{have} with audible verbs other than *get* should disallow particle-object order. We find this with *have*, *want* and *need*, cf. (51a, b). Various writers (Dowty 1979: 244–50, 269–71; Fodor & Lepore 1998; Harley 2003; Larson *et al.* 1997) note that transitive *want* and *need* are equivalent to *want/need to have*. Positing a silent V^{have} makes sense of the scope of the italicized adverbials in (51c). (51d) applies the scope test to show that a silent *have* is present in particle verbs formed with these verbs. Generative semanticists worked with '*have* deletion' based on *want/need to have*. An update of this is to assume a silent V^{have} in the complement of *want/need* (as in Harley 2003 and Larson *et al.* 1997).

(51) a. *He had off his jacket; *I soon had out the splinter; *He was having on the people
b. *I need off the light; *I need out the fire; *The doctor wants out the stitches.
c. I need your apartment *until next week*; Last week Bill wanted your car *yesterday*
d. I need that light on *until tomorrow*; At noon you wanted the heater on *tonight*

(50) may not follow from general principles of grammar, but the formation of complex heads, and thus incorporation/head movement, is known to be fraught with idiosyncrasy. We see this in [$_v$PV] compounds (*downsize*, *downplay*, *download* v. **downbring*, **downpull*, **downtear*; *overturn* v. **overfall*, **overtopple*; *offload* v. **offcast*, **offtake*) and in morphologically complex prepositions (*into, onto* but **underto*, **byto*).

(50) may fall under a larger generalization, though this is hard to prove. If what I notate as V^{have} is (or decomposes with) a preposition (Belvin & den Dikken 1997; Déchaine *et al*. 1994; den Dikken 1995, 1997; Freeze 1992; Harley 1998, 2003; Richards 2001), then (50) would fall under a larger generalization about the incomplete productivity of complex preposition formation just noted.[13]

Many analyses of English particle verbs (see Dehé *et al*. 2002 for an overview) eschew incorporation in the form assumed here. Den Dikken (1995) denies overt particle incorporation, Svenonius (1996) moves particles to a position below the verb and Olsen (2000) rejects incorporation altogether. It is left to proponents of particle verb analyses inimical to mine to check whether these analyses can handle *get*. For reasons given in section 4.5, I maintain that all principled accounts of these facts will converge on syntactic decomposition.

Here I merely address the fact that the structure $[_{V^\circ}V\ P]$ used in incorporation analyses of particle-object order in English violates the right-hand head rule (RHR). Den Dikken (1995: 88f) assumes that the RHR rules out an incorporation analysis like mine. His citing of Williams (1981) in this connection is unfortunate, because Williams did not intend the RHR to be exceptionless (see p. 249f). I do not find Williams' exceptions compelling, but the use of double inflection patterns like *sisters in laws*, *hangers-ons*, *passers-bys* (attestable under www.google.com) confirms the existence of left-headed X° items. If *sister* were not the head of *sister in law*, we would not expect it to host inflection. If *sister in law* were not a morphological object, one wonders why inflection appears on its outer edge. Thus, the RHR can be violated in English, so it does not argue against the incorporation analysis for particle verbs.

(49) can be altered in various ways without detriment to my proposal. Firstly, SC is often used as an abbreviation for an endocentric structure with a head mediating agreement or predication (e.g. den Dikken 1995: 25f, Svenonius 1996). If this is right, 'incorporation of particles' should be understood as shorthand for 'incorporation of functional elements heading an SC which have themselves incorporated a particle'. Secondly, if English objects move to some specifier or

[13] If (50) is a morphological idiosyncrasy, (50) need not hold of all languages with V^{have}. My account merely predicts that items decomposing with HAVE in a language should all behave alike in either allowing or disallowing incorporation. While German shows no word order facts speaking for head movement of particles, Zeller (2001: chap. 6) suggests that affixation of German particle verbs requires incorporation of the particle into the verb. A preliminary check suggests that particle verbs with *kriegen*, *bekommen* and *haben* resist affixation (**heraushabbar* 'have-out-able', **herausbekommbar* 'get-out-able', **heraushaber* 'haver-outer', **herauskrieger* 'getter-outer', cf. *herausnehmbar* 'take-out-able', *herausnehmer* 'taker-outer'), but it is hard to control for extraneous factors here.

adjunction position to receive case, the proposal will not be affected, since all object movement theories move the object to the left to a position just to the right of the spellout position of the verb (with or without an incorporated particle). My own assumption is that V^{cause} and V^{have}, but not V^{become}, can assign case to the specifier of their complement. The assignment of case to specifiers of small clauses is seen transparently in *With [$_{SC}$the psycho in gaol], we could relax*. In (49b), I assume that the object adjoins to the lower VP to receive Case from V^{cause}, roughly as in Johnson (1991) and Kratzer (1996, section 2).

4.5 *Alternative accounts*

My account of particle verbs with *get* counts as an argument for syntactic decomposition only if theories doing without it are problematic. I try to show this now.

Construction grammar (e.g. Goldberg 1995) would see verb-particle constructions as idioms equipped with semantic representations and open slots for verbs, objects and particles. As far as I can see, this theory could only capture the *get*-facts by positing a verb + particle + object template which has a causative semantics, with which non-causative verbs like *have* and hindrance-*get* would be semantically incompatible, and a semantically broader verb + object + particle template (or several homophonous verb + object + particle templates) with which they are compatible. Nothing predicts that object-particle order should be possible in more cases than the reverse, while theories using head movement predict this automatically, since head movement can be blocked under certain circumstances. While construction grammar is able to capture semantic constraints on constructions not yet captured in other theories, the very flexibility which permits this actually drains the theory of the power needed to block hindrance-*get* from the particle(-first) construction. The construction's causative semantics does not actually suffice for this, since the responsibility requirement threatens to make hindrance-*get* close enough to a causative for it to be a viable candidate for insertion in the construction, and since constructions are assumed to be polysemous, so that the particle(-first) construction could *a priori* have a hindrance-specialized responsibility reading alongside the causative one. What the theory cannot do is refer to the presence of HAVE in the semantics of hindrance-*get* in describing the blockage on particle-object order. Apart from forcing learners to rely on negative evidence, admitting this negative generalization as a possible constraint on constructions begs the question as to whether there are any principled limits on the

number and nature of semantic constraints to which any construction could be sensitive. Language learners would need to assess the compatibility of particle-object order with an indeterminate number of semantic verb classes, e.g. inherently punctual acts (*spit out the tablet*, *shoot down the can* or *knock over the chair*), verbs of sustained motion causation (*drag/pull/push in the car*), etc.

If we assume a non-abstract syntax like (52a) but see the VP as a projection of a lexical verb, the arbitrariness problems just discussed remain. The verb would need to carry a syntactically visible tag indicating some or all of its semantic content, and the sensitivity of the generation of particle-object order to this tag would raise tricky questions about how and why word order should relate to verb semantics.

(52) a. $[_{VP}\ [_{V}\ ]\ \{Prt\}\ NP\ \{Prt\}]$
b. $[_{\nu P}\ NP\ \nu\ [_{VP}\ \textit{get}\ [_{SC}\ NP\ Prt]]]$
c. $[_{\nu P}\ NP\ \nu\ [_{VP}\ NP\ \textit{get}\ Prt]]$

Another alternative to syntactic decomposition would be one where causative verbs project a complex predicate as in (52c) while hindrance-*get* and *have* take small clauses as in (52b). The particle-object order could by hypothesis only be derived from (52c) (e.g. because particle-object order requires re-analysis which requires adjacency), but not from (52b). This is the best alternative to syntactic decomposition, since a verb's meaning can uncontroversially affect complement selection, which can itself affect word order. This approach would divest itself of the arbitrariness tainting the other approaches, provided it could be supplemented with predictions on the differing conditions under which a verb will project a small clause or a complex predicate. The latter proviso seems unfulfillable. Take (53), used of inserting a cork in a bottle. In both cases, the particle is a goal and a predicate on the object, so one cannot attribute the putative difference in argument projection to a difference in the particle's semantic role. One might assume that the complex predicate analysis is motivated when the verb and particle share an argument, but if there is argument sharing, one wonders why *the cork* in (53) is less an argument of *get* than of *jam*, *stick* or *wedge*, which do not select the object: **I wanted to seal the bottle, so I jammed/wedged/stuck the cork*. Moreover, I see argument sharing with resultatives and particles as questionable. McIntyre (2004) notes that obligatorily transitive verbs need not retain their argument structure in such constructions, witness examples like *I lit *(a cigar)* v. *I lit up (a cigar)*. None of the particle constructions supporting the anti-sharing claim shows any tendency towards resisting particle-object order. If the

particle's role and the verb-selected status of the object are not enough to predict the distinction between small clauses and complex predicates, then this distinction yields no principled explanation of the particle order facts with *get*.

(53) *get {*in} the cork {in}* v. *jam/wedge/put/force/stick/bung/whack/twist/hammer {in} the cork {in}*

With the failure of this initially appealing alternative, we are left with a choice between syntactic lexical decomposition, which leads one to expect interactions between verb meaning with word order like that seen with *get*, and other theories, where such interactions require mysterious stipulations. To be sure, many linguists may prefer stipulations, however arbitrary, to a syntax replete with invisible, hard-to-detect heads, however closely they match the invisible primitives located in abstract lexical/semantic/conceptual structures in other theories. Or perhaps there is an account I have overlooked which can explain the data naturally without syntactic decomposition. This study will have been worthwhile if it inspires the formulation of viable alternative accounts, or even if it does no more than to encourage linguists of diverse persuasions to include the data it discusses in their deliberations about how syntax and semantics interact.

5 SUMMARY OF THE MAIN PROPERTIES OF THE READINGS OF *get* + PP STRUCTURES

A. Hindrance-*get*: *I got the nail in (the wall)*

- It disallows particle-object order.
- It can be translated by German *kriegen* and *bekommen*.
- It is hindrance-specialized, i.e. suggests that the result is hard to attain (2.1, 3.5).
- It yields achievement VPs (2.1, 3.4).
- It does not denote agentive acts (2.1) although it does show the responsibility requirement, i.e. characterizes the subject as responsible for achieving the result (3.2).
- Possibility operators do not effect the interpretation of negated hindrance-*get* VPs (*I didn't (=couldn't) get the nail in the wall*), due to a presupposition that the subject tried to realize the result (2.1, 3.5).
- It is argued to be nothing more than an inchoative of the responsibility reading of have (e.g. *I had the nail in the wall*).

- It is decomposed semantically as in (33) (and, assuming syntactic decomposition, as in (49a)).

B. (Genuinely) causative *get*: *I got my wallet out (of my pocket)*

- The term *causative* is used here only of uses with PP/particle complements, not of other causative uses of *get*.
- It allows particle-object order or object-particle order.
- It does not translate with German *kriegen* and *bekommen*.
- It is genuinely causative and agentive (2.3).
- In most uses, it requires that the object come to be possessed or manually controlled by the subject (probably because it was originally used in resultative contructions based on agentive DP complement uses, cf. parallels between *get*/*take out the key* and *get*/*take the key*). (17) lists the details of the possession constraint for different speakers.
- Its semantic representation is as in (18) (and, assuming syntactic decomposition, as in (49b)).

C. Unintentional *get*: *The camera got dust in it*

- It does not seem to combine with verb particles.
- The subject of this use of *get* is not in any way responsible for the result (2.2).
- It disallows exclusively directional prepositions like *into* and mostly requires co-indexation between the subject and something in its complement (2.2, 3.2).
- It is an inchoative of unintentional *have* structures like *the camera has dust in it* (3.2, 3.3).

Acknowledgements

This article benefited greatly from extensive and fair comments by the journal's anonymous readers, and from discussions with Willi Geuder, Heidi Harley, Jaume Mateu, Irene Rapp and the audience at the 2002 Sinn und Bedeutung conference. Credit for my initial reflections on *get* goes to the Australian schoolteachers who enjoined me to avoid *get* when I write because it is 'boring'.

ANDREW McINTYRE
Institut für Anglistik
Universität Leipzig
Beethovenstr. 15
04107 Leipzig
e-mail: mcintyre@rz.uni-leipzig.de

Received: 20.08.03
Final version received: 08.12.04
Advance Access publication: 14.03.05

REFERENCES

Baker, M. (1988) *Incorporation*. University Press. Chicago.

Baker, M. (1997) 'Thematic roles and syntactic structure'. In L. Haegeman (ed.), *Elements of Grammar*. Kluwer. Dordrecht.

Belvin, R. (1993) 'The two causative *have*s are the two possessive *have*s'. *MIT Working Papers in Linguistics* **20**:19–34.

Belvin, R. (1996), *Inside Events*. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Southern California.

Belvin, R. & den Dikken, M. (1997) '*There*, happens, *to, be, have*'. *Lingua* **101**:151–183.

Benveniste, E. (1966) *Problèmes de Linguistique Générale*. Gallimard. Paris.

Bierwisch, M. (2004) BECOME and its Presuppositions. Ms. Humboldt-Universität. Berlin.

Cruse, D. A. (1973) 'Some thoughts on agentivity'. *Journal of Linguistics* **9**:11–23.

Déchaine, R.-M., Hoekstra, T., & Rooryck, J. (1994) 'Augmented and non-augmented *have*'. In L. Nash and G. Tsoulas (eds.) *Proceedings of Langues et Grammaire* **1**:85–101.

Dehé, N. (2002), *Particle Verbs in English*. Benjamins. Amsterdam.

Dehé, N., Jackendoff, R. McIntyre, A., & Urban, S. (eds.), (2002) *Verb particle explorations*. Mouton de Gruyter. Berlin.

den Dikken, M., (1995), *Particles*. Oxford University Press. Oxford.

den Dikken, M. (1997) 'The syntax of possession and the verb "have"'. *Lingua* **101**:129–150.

Di Meola, C. (1994) *Kommen und Gehen*. Niemeyer. Tübingen.

Dowty, D. (1979) *Word meaning and Montague Grammar*. Reidel. Dordrecht.

Fodor, J. A. & Lepore, E. (1998) 'The emptiness of the lexicon'. *Linguistic Inquiry* **29**:269–288.

Freeze, R. (1992) 'Existentials and other locatives'. *Language* **68**:553–596

Givon, T. & Yang, L. (1994), 'The rise of the English get-passive'. In B. Fox and P. J. Hopper, *Voice*. Benjamins. Amsterdam. 119–149.

Goldberg, A. (1995) *Constructions*. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.

Haegeman, L. (1985) 'The get-passive and Burzio's generalisation'. *Lingua* **66**:53–77.

Haegeman, L. & Guéron, J. (1999) *English Grammar*. Blackwell. Oxford

Haider, H. (1997) 'Precedence among predicates'. *Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics* **1**:3–41.

Hale, K. & Keyser, S. (1993) 'On argument structure and the lexical expression of syntactic relations'. In K. Hale & S. Keyser (eds), *The View from Building 20*. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA. 53–110.

Harley, H. (1995) Subjects, events and licensing. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. MIT.

Harley, H. (1998) 'You're having me on! Aspects of *have*'. In J. Guéron & A. Zribi-Hertz (eds), *La Grammaire de la Possession*. Publedix. Nanetter. 195–226.

Harley, H. (2004) 'Wanting, having and getting'. *Linguistic Inquiry* **35**:255–267.

Harley, H. & Noyer, R. (1998) 'Mixed nominalisations, short verb movement and object shift in English'. *NELS* **28**:143–157.

Jackendoff, R. (1990) *Semantic Structures*. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.

Johnson, K. (1991) 'Object Positions'. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* **9**:577–636.

Kayne, R. (1993) 'Toward a modular theory of auxiliary selection'. *Studia Linguistica* **47**:3–31.

Kimball, J. (1973) 'Get'. In J. Kimball (ed.), *Syntax and Semantics 2*. Academic Press. New York. 205–15.

Koizumi, M. (1993) 'Object agreement phrases and the split VP hypothesis'. *MIT Working Papers in Linguistics* **18**:99–148.

Koopman, H. (1995) 'On verbs that fail to undergo V-second'. *Linguistic Inquiry* **26**:139–163.

Kratzer, A. (1996) 'Severing the external argument from the verb'. In J. Rooryck & L. Zaring (eds), *Phrase Structure and the Lexicon*. Kluwer. Dordrecht. 109–137.

Larson, R., den Dikken, M., & Ludlow, P. (1997) 'Intensional transitive verbs and abstract clausal complementation'. http://semlab2.sbs.sunysb.edu/Users/rlarson/larson-papers.html

Marantz, A. (1997) 'No escape from syntax'. *University of Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics* **4**:201–225.

McIntyre, A. (2004) 'Event paths, conflation, argument structure and VP shells'. *Linguistics* **42**:523–571.

Olsen, S. (2000) 'Against Incorporation'. *Linguistische Arbeitsberichte* **74**:149–172.

Pesetsky, D. (1992) *Zero Syntax*. (Version 2.0) Ms. MIT.

Pesetsky, D. (1995) *Zero Syntax*. MIT Press. Cambridge, MA.

Piñón, C. (1997) 'Achievements in an event semantics'. A. Lawson and E. Cho (eds), *Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 7*. CLC Publications, Cornell University. Ithaca, NY .

Pylkkänen, L. (2002) Introducing Arguments. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. MIT.

Radford, A. (1997) *Syntactic Theory and the Structure of English*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

Richards, N. (2001) 'An idiomatic argument for lexical decomposition'. *Linguistic Inquiry* **32**:183–192.

Ritter, E. & Rosen, S. T. (1997) 'The function of *have*'. *Lingua* **101**:295–321.

Stechow, A. von (1996) 'The different readings of *wieder* "again"'. *Journal of Semantics* **13**:87–138.

Svenonius, P. (1996) 'The verb-particle alternation in the Scandinavian languages'. Ms. Tromsø. www.hum.uit.no/a/svenonius

Tobin, Y. (1994) *Aspect in the English verb*. Longman. London.

Williams, E. (1981) 'On the notions "Lexically Related" and "Head of a Word"'. *Linguistic Inquiry* **12**:245–74.

Wunderlich, D. (1997) 'CAUSE and the structure of verbs'. *Linguistic Inquiry* **28**:27–68.

Zeller, J. (2001) *Particle Verbs and Local Domains*. John Benjamins. Amsterdam.