Communist Era Managers in Modern Times: A Comparison of Management Skills Across Generations

Miklós Koren (CEU, HUN-REN KRTK, CEPR and CESifo) Gergely Attila Kiss (HUN-REN KRTK, CEU and KSH)

March 21, 2024¹

¹Supported by Forefront Research Excellence Grant (144193), and the European Research Council (313164 and 101097789)

Introduction


Hungary, 1980 (Fortepan / Szalay Zoltán)




Hungary, 1990 (MTI)



Number of Executive Positions Increased



Business Degrees Became More Prominent



We know that...

Management matters

- Firms with better management practices are more productive (Bloom et al 2010).
- Management can be improved by intensive training (Bloom et al 2013, Giorcelli 2019).

Managers matter

- Managers are important for firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Bennedsen et al 2007).
- Top CEOs are paid a lot (Gabaix and Landier 2008, Frydman et al 2010).

Literature

- Large-scale management interventions: Italy (Giorcelli 2019), US (Bianchi and Giorcelli 2022, Giorcelli 2023)
- Large-scale education interventions: Italy (Bianchi and Giorcelli 2020), Colombia (Ferreyra et al 2023), Vietnam (Vu 2023)
- Selection by skill: Denmark (Akcigit, Pearce and Prato 2020)
- Calibrated models with education and selection: Guner et al 2008, Bhattacharya et al. 2013, Gomes and Kuehn 2017 and Esfahani 2019.

Setup and Data

Data

Manager Data 1985-2019

Universe of corporations (1m) and their CEOs (1.3m). Firm size (employment) as proxy for manager quality.

Biographies

Full biographies (school, work experience, etc.) for 63k people in 2013. 30k matched to CEO panel.

College graduates

Number of gradues by degree and year.

Measuring Manager Quality

Log employment of firm i in year t in industry s, with a mananager having entered in cohort c is

$$\ln L_{icst} = \beta_1 \text{manager_age}_{ict} + \beta_2 \text{firm_age}_{ict} + \mu_c + \xi_{st} + \epsilon_{ict}.$$

Quality: μ_c

Degree of Selection


$$\ln \pi_{ic} = \theta \ln \lambda_i - \theta \mu_c + \varepsilon_{ic}.$$

Selectivity: θ

Manager Selection by Degree

· <u>··</u>		
	(1)	
VARIABLES	ln_pi	
(firstnm) firm_size	-6.872***	
	(1.982)	
(firstnm) degree $= 1$, economics	4.032***	
	(0.368)	
(firstnm) degree $= 2$, engineering	3.676***	
	(0.492)	
(firstnm) degree $= 3$, other	2.041***	
	(0.455)	
Constant	-14.92***	
	(2.106)	
Observations	87	
R^2	0.553	
Robust standard errors in parentheses		

Quantity Up, Quality Down



World Management Survey

Methodology

Hungarian wave

Spring and Summer of 2018.

Target population: manufacturing firms with 50+ employees.

Sample: 762 firms.

Survey logistics


10 surveyors

Funnel


- 1 762 firms contacted by phone
- 2 281 (37%) resulted in direct contact to manager
- 3 144 (51%) scheduled an interview
- 4 126 (87%) completed the interview
- **5** 118 (94%) usable responses

Validation


How old is your firm?




How many employees does your firm have?




...zooming in




What percentage of your revenue is coming from exports?



Birth year of respondent and the CEO



... if the respondent **is** the CEO



Management Scores

VARIABLES

InL

entrepreneur

foreign

exporter

Constant

Observations

expat

management

0.382***

(0.0615)

-0.319**

(0.128)

1.068***

(0.352)

118

(1)

Larger foreign firms are better managed

management 0.361***

(0.0589)

0.461***

(0.109)

0.856***

(0.302)

118

(2)

0.398*** (0.0679)

0.274

(0.165)

0.637**

(0.320)

118

(3)

management

(4)

management

0.449***

(0.0600)

0.0991

(0.152)

0.578*

(0.319)

118

27 / 1


Management improves labor productivity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES	InQ	TFP	exporter
management	0.454***	0.0385	0.0839
	(0.171)	(0.0478)	(0.0670)
InL	1.097***	-0.00639	0.151***
	(0.147)	(0.0377)	(0.0481)
foreign	0.108	0.0381	0.0833
	(0.217)	(0.0420)	(0.0703)
Constant	8.167***	-0.0901	-0.248
	(0.682)	(0.148)	(0.235)
Observations	118	114	118
R^2	0.546	0.025	0.206


Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Cohort Effects


Distribution of birth years of respondents





Distribution of birth years of CEOs




Older cohorts are worse managers







Cohort effects only matter for domestic CEOs



... not for expats

