

Hardware Root Of Trust

Chapter 5


- [1] J. Szefer, “Principles of secure processor architecture design,” *Synth. Lect. Comput. Archit.*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 1–173, 2018.

The Root of Trust


- ▣ Measure the chain of trust
 - ◆ Trusted authenticated boot, remote attestation, and data sealing
 - ◆ Runtime attestation and continuous attestation
- ▣ Secure processor should ensure for TEE
 - ◆ **Authentication:** the processor should authenticate himself (to guarantee that the information coming from it can be trusted).
 - v.gr. deriving asymmetric crypto keys from a manufacture dependent unique secret key
 - ◆ **Confidentiality:** data going out of processor should be protected.
 - v.gr. For memory using a key created at boot time (ephemeral) for persistent keys are persistent and generated (in a systematic way)
 - ◆ **Integrity:** additional keys are required for integrity checking.
Cryptographic hashing (one-way) from secret key to prevent tampering

The Processor Key (The root of trust)

- **K_R** is a unique key per chip: is the root of trust. Others derived from that with one-way hashing
- **Never should leave the chip boundary**
- Created at manufacturing time (e.g., eFUSE)
- Manufacturer can't hold a copy of the key
- Use PUF?, more costly to guarantee reliability/stability




Keys belong to TC, if TEE need keys, they will be generated from them



PKI and Secure Processors

- **How to tell if a processor is who it says he is?**
- PKI is required to distributed the certificate of the public key of the processors
- The manufacturer should keep a list of known-good keys and the associated processors ID
- K_r is used to derive different encryption (K_{sk} , K_{pk}) or signing keys (K_{SigK} , K_{vK}) one-way
- The public (K_{pk}) and verification (K_{vk}) keys, and corresponding certificates, are **generated at manufacture** and given to the certificate authority
- Given some ID of a processor, **the users can obtain from CA the certificates for that processor's keys**



Aside: RSA and Asymmetric Cryptography

1. Generate two large random primes, p and q , of approximately equal size such that their product $n=pq$ is of the required bit length, e.g. 1024 bits.
 2. Compute $n=pq$ and $\phi=(p-1)(q-1)$
 3. Choose an integer e , $1 < e < \phi$, such that $\gcd(e, \phi) = 1$
 4. Compute the secret exponent d , $1 < d < \phi$, such that $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi}$
 5. The public key is (n, e) and the private key (d, p, q) . Keep all the values d , p , q and ϕ secret.
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- n is known as the *modulus*.
 - e is known as the *public exponent* or *encryption exponent* or just the *exponent*.
 - d is known as the *secret exponent* or *decryption exponent*.

Access to Root Of Trust


- Although complex physical attacks and/or rogue manufacturer can compromise Root of trust, the most likely scenario is **bugs in TCB**
 - ◆ Low level code (e.g., UEFI) should be able to access secret keys (e.g., to sign digital messages generated by the processor)
 - ◆ Code is kept in flash memory
 - ◆ Bugs in that code can lead to exploits that can leak the secret key

Chain of Trust and Measurements

- ▣ When run TEE, is crucial to be correctly configured
 - ◆ A trusted small BIOS loaded at system boot (first thing load!)
 - ◆ This piece can "**measure**" next piece to be loaded (e.g., firmware)
 - ◆ Firmware "**measure**" the OS that starts next
 - ◆ ...
- ▣ **Measure** == act of generating a cryptographic hash of the code (and data) before it is executes
 - ◆ If **measurement** != **expectations**, **tampering is detected**
- ▣ Measurements can be chained (or completed) from multiple components.
 - ◆ Each measurement is "**extend**" with the next one in the chain (coined by TPM)
 - ◆ This idea is used by Trusted Platform Module (TPM): low cost dedicated to providing root of trust. Protects against software attacks (mainly rootkits)

Chain of Trust and Measurements

- ▣ Chains of trust can include untrusted levels
- ▣ **Usually**, only trusted components are measured
 - ◆ **Only if software is part of TCB and TEE is measured**



Trusted and Authenticated Boot

- ▣ **Trusted boot** means system boots only if all measurements are correct (**measured boots** just perform the measurements but system boots)
- ▣ **Authenticated boot** means users can access to all measurements taken during boot
- ▣ If measurements aren't correct no standardized actions
 - ◆ A system can stop executing or secret data won't be decrypted
 - ◆ But what if the system is part of a critical infrastructure?
 - ◆ But what if my laptop and I want to prevent Linux + passwd cracker to unencrypt my disk content?

Measurement Validation and Remote Attestation


- Main method: check measurements against a list of good values
 - ◆ But any change in the boot (e.g., change in the version of the loader) might completely change the resulting hash → Can't have all combinations of system software locally "tagged": Use PKI for key distribution

(a) Processor generate measurements of the TCB (and TEE) signed with K_r .

(b) User can obtain certificates from a CA and validate the signatures of the measurements.

(c) User can send some sensitive information to the TEE, by sending encrypted information (and decryption key protected with K_{pk}).

(d) The user can also send to TEE keys needed for decryption of data stored on disk (next)



Sealing

- Act of **encrypting** some data with a key derived from a measurement.
- Unsealing, is the act of decrypting data with a key derived from a measurement.
- Tie the data to a specific hardware and software configuration.
 - ◆ For example, if hard drive data is sealed at shutdown, then next time the system boots up, if there is any change to the measurements (e.g., any of the trusted software was somehow changed), then the proper decryption key cannot be derived, and data cannot be decrypted.
- This prevents malicious users from accessing data if they changed the software while the system was turned off (e.g., replacing the boot disk)

Time-to-check to time-to-use attacks



- Measurement technique does not say anything about the code after it was measured.
 - ◆ It only is based on raw measurements of static code as it was right before the piece of software executed.
 - ◆ This leads to well-known class of Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOC-TOU) problems.
- The system may be correct at time t_0 , but it may become compromised at time t_1 , if user asks for the values of measurements at some later time t_2 , he or she will get the hash value that states that system was okay at t_0 , but no information about state at t_2 is gained
- One solution to this problem is to perform **continuous attestation** at system runtime.

Runtime Attestation and Continuous Monitoring of TCB and TEEs

- Monitoring of the execution of the system via co-processor
 - ◆ Validates continuously the execution path (combined with PMU)
- Observing the execution pattern (Basic Block size, branch predictor accuracy, performance metric ...) we can infer when a program deviates from expected behavior
 - ◆ Mostly applied to untrusted component (Use in TCB not explored)
- Using CFG of the program (from the source code of the program) to check if there are deviations (valid only for software, not clear for hardware)
- Using PMU to detect anomalies can be **easily defeated** by hiding the attack “in the noise” (e.g., by carefully modifying slightly the normal execution characteristics)

PUFs and Root of Trust


- PUFs are impossible to replicate (even for the manufacturer) and provides a good fingerprint for the systems
 - ◆ Turns process variation problem into a virtue
- Can permanently bind hardware-software by condition TEE execution path (i.e. not only in measurements)
 - ◆ The PUF might generate a stream of output for the TEE (that can't be replicated)
 - V.gr. Generate a seed for a PRNG
 - V.gr. Use for some form of indirection (DRAM PUF)



0 or 1?

Limiting the Execution to Only Authorized Code

- TCB updates (or protected) software can be authenticated with a separate key (manufacturer dependent)
- Add public key to the processor at manufacture time
- Only software signed by manufacturer can be sent to the processor
- Code can be **signed under demand** using also processor keys (v.gr. to prevent install certain firmware out of a particular time window)



Lock-In and Privacy Concerns

- User depends on manufacturer to send information to TEE
 - ◆ V.gr. Software running inside SGX requires Intel signature
- When TCB and TEE is authenticated, use processor specific keys that can be used by the Certification Authority to infer information about the systems requesting the update
- Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) on TPM addresses these issues (partially)

Root of Trust Assumptions

- ▣ Unique key assumptions
 - ◆ Manufacturer can never reuse the same key or use PUF
- ▣ Protected root of trust assumption
 - ◆ K_r will never be disclosed
 - ◆ TCB never will leak it
- ▣ Fresh measurement assumption
 - ◆ Need to be fresh to prevent TOC-TOU attacks