Global Environmental Politics

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Last class: climate change and governance

- The regime complex for climate change can be inefficient.
- Makes it hard to standardize and generate effective cooperation.
- Competition generates forum shopping and race to the bottom.
- Can generate poorly designed agreements.
- Requires vertical coordination.

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Potential outcomes of climate change agreements



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

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

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

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		Cooperate	No cooperate
A	Cooperate	2,1	1,1.5
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- As the number of actors n increases, δ_A increases too!
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

- (IIa) The development model (e.g., IOs).
- (IIb) Politically cheap but limited impact.
- (IIc) Situational constraints; depend on innovation reducing cost.
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

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

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

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

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

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

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Table 1 Likely orientations of intergovernmental organization members as a function of power configurations

		Power in the basic game	
		Weak	**Strong**
Power in the negotiation game	**Strong**	Prefers strong organization	Prefers moderately strong organization
		Contributes more than expected given its capabilities	Contributes at about the level expected given its capabilities
	Weak	Sees for itself few, if any, benefits from membership	Prefers 1. Organizational reform 2. A weak organization
		Passive member, paying at most a small contribution to organizational activities	Contributes less than expected given its capabilities; may well work through other channels or at least explore alternative arrangements

- Uncertain cost/benefits for hegemons and veto players.
- Trade-off between depth and participation.
- Domestic support is important for generating int' cooperation.

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  - Cities, firms, voters, etc. which can also act as veto players.

The game of international climate agreements

- The players or actors involved.
- The rules of the game, including access procedural rules, and decision rules.
  - Who can do what (i.e., actions).
  - Who knows what about the state of the world and interests (i.e., information).
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  - Who moves or decides first, who follows, and so on...
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- As noted above a distribution of pay-offs can encourage participation (basic game).
- ...then we need to secure compliance (power game).
  - A ruling coalition may be sufficient.
  - ...but needs to be incentive compatible.
  - Too stringent and few will join.
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