

# Global Environmental Politics

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## Last class: designing agreements

- Needs to consider hegemons and veto players.
- Climate clubs can be effective, but represent powerful interests.
- Too stringent, few join; too flexible, few comply.
- Basic + power game for incentive compatibility.
- Independent information collection + sanctions.
- No need for everyone to be at the table.

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# Transnational movements can exert influence



- Through seeking participation in transnational governance.
  - Womens groups; indigenous groups; waste pickers, etc.
- Demand for rights; extension of existing rights.
- Existence of IOs, PTROs present opportunities.
  - Demonstrations; boycotts.

# Transnational movements can exert influence

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF WASTE PICKERS

MEET OUR  
DELEGATION #INC-1

SILVIO RUIZ  
ARI - WASTE PICKERS  
ASSOCIATION OF BOGOTA -  
COLOMBIA

SOLEDAD MELLA  
RED LACRE - CARIBBEAN AND  
LATIN AMERICAN WASTE PICKERS  
NETWORK

ESTELA MARY RECALDE  
UCRUS - UNION OF SOLID URBAN  
WASTE CLASSIFIERS - URUGUAY

ADJA MAME DIOP  
BOK DIOM  
ASSOCIATION - SENEGAL

BARBRA WEBER  
GROUND SCORE  
ASSOCIATION - USA

JOHN CHWEYA  
KISUMU WASTE PICKERS WELFARE  
ASSOCIATION - KENYA

MADITHLARE KOENA  
SWAPPI - SOUTH AFRICAN  
WASTE PICKERS ASSOCIATION

LUIS ALBERTO CATALANO  
UCRUS - UNION OF SOLID URBAN  
WASTE CLASSIFIERS - URUGUAY

INDUMATHI  
HASHI DALA  
POKA

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Regime Rights Typology

<i>Regime Rights Type</i>	<i>Function</i>	<i>Relevant Concepts in the Literature</i>
Recognition	Diffuse, codify and institutionalize norms that link entitlements or protections to the group's identity	Norm institutionalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)
Representation	Enhance the institutional inclusion, participation and/or representation of particular groups in regime politics	Procedural gains (Betsill and Correl 2008) Global citizenship (Muetzelfeldt and Smith 2002)
Capability	Enhance the capability to act upon representation rights, overcoming various forms of inequality	Citizenship (Somers 2008) Capabilities (Sen 2001; Nussbaum 2001)
Extended rights	Establish international mechanisms that uphold rights at the local, state and/or regional level	Boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998)

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*Extended rights*   **Moderate:**

- The Green Climate Fund governing framework has sections on Safeguards and Accountability; however it is not clear how these will be interpreted and enforced.
- Implementing agencies for REDD+ have developed safeguards requirements for national and local governments; however, there are various shortcomings.
- REDD+ safeguards were established in the climate regime; however, they are weakly worded and without robust requirements.
- The Cancun agreements say that REDD+ should ensure "...this decision are not used for the conversion of natural forests."<sup>84</sup> However, this text is weakly worded and without accountability measures.
- The CDM Executive Board revised its baseline methodology to require that eligible projects don't reduce recycling.<sup>85</sup> However, there are currently no criteria to validate that CDM waste projects meet this requirement, and several other demands of GAWA at the CDM were not met.
- Biofuels from peatlands were excluded from CDM eligibility, and nuclear power was not granted eligibility.


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# The power of transnational movements

- Steer constituents towards (global) public goals.
- Extend the range of social networks as bases for activism.
- Generate broader movements (Face-to-face + virtual).
- Link specific targets outside local phenomena to the movement.
- Build organizations, elaborate ideologies, socialize and mobilize.

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## Transnational movements rarely emerge




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- Focal points often needed for grassroots movements.
- Low survival without resources/methods to galvanize supporters.
- Legitimacy of the movement is necessary for survival.

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
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- “Checkbook” supporters reduce widespread activism.
- Need for resources may lead to capture.
- Most militant activists are more likely to choose violence.
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# Successful transnational movements




FIGURE 7.1. Components of Movement Solidarity

- Well-structured social networks.
- Identity/frames: Culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols.
- Timely: strong emotions and (often) one-issue ownership.
- Transparent: Organic movements that are not captured.
- Linking: similar actions/objectives across borders.

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


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


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


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


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# Identity and frames



- Identify grievance(s) for aggregation of preferences.
- Ideology dignifies discontent, identifies a target for grievances.
- Embed concrete grievances within emotion-laden “packages.”
  - The cause is just, important and worth mobilizing for.
- Identity confers ownership of the issue to a group.

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# Activities and performance




FIGURE 5.1. Italian Contention, 1966–1973. Source: Author's data.

- Three broad types: disruption, violence, and contained behavior.
- Violence are limited to small groups with few resources.
- Contained behavior builds routines ⇒ institutionalization.
- Disruption breaks with routine, disorients leites; innovation.
  - Can become stale and degenerate into violence.

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


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


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


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# The role of NGOs



- NGOs operate effectively; complement existing TGOs.
- If legitimate, can coordinate and mobilize resources and people.
  - May count already with identity and frames (e.g., green peace).
- Affected by relational pressure from their peers.
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- They are also prone to forum-shopping; forum-linking.

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



Fig. 2. *Ecologistas en Accion* and *Greenpeace Germany* egonetworks in 2008, shaded by percentage protest events

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## Additional challenges for transnational climate movements

- Lack of awareness, concern or ideological divisions.
- Gridlock emerging from political divisions.
- Framing - e.g., global warming instead of climate shocks.
  - Are frames like divesting enough? Local activism enough?
- Union-driven mobilization on the issue has been small.

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## Unintended (but equilibrium) consequences

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- Top-down capture of transnational actors; low accountability.
- Narrower economic interests may exert undue influence.
- Greenwashing in response to transnational movements.

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## Class exercise: The role of unions in climate movements

- 1 Make groups of 2/3 people.
- 2 Have unions been involved in climate mobilization?
- 3 Should labor unions be involved in climate mobilization?
- 4 Is labor unions' support necessary or sufficient?
- 5 20 minutes.
  - Feel free to use the Internet.

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