

Global Environmental Politics

Carlos Felipe Balcazar

Department of Political Science & School of Public Policy
University College London

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Last class: Climate change and conflict

- Climate change can induce aggressive behavioral changes.
- Climate change reduces the opportunity cost of violence.
- Climate change makes resources scarcer, incentivizing conflict.
- State capacity + low corruption are key to address this.
- Internationally, treaties can help but they may face limits. Why?

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Shark attacks and climate change





Figure 5.3. Change in Woodrow Wilson's Vote Share (1912–1916) in Ocean County Townships

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- Accountability ⇒ incentivizes for leaders to address issue.
 - Why doesn't this occur in the Shark attacks story?

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Shark attacks and climate change

	Drought index			Rural drought index		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Election-year drought index	-0.060 (0.031)	-0.052 (0.034)	—	-0.176 (0.083)	-0.140 (0.082)	—
(Election-1) drought index	—	-0.043 (0.029)	—	—	-0.116 (0.088)	—
(Election-2) drought index	—	0.016 (0.036)	—	—	0.023 (0.102)	—
(Election-3) drought index	—	-0.043 (0.040)	—	—	-0.024 (0.102)	—
Time-weighted drought index	—	—	-0.104 (0.045)	—	—	-0.273 (0.122)
Standard error of regression	3.61	3.60	3.60	3.61	3.61	3.60
Adjusted R^2	.88	.88	.88	.88	.88	.88
N	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233	1,233

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- Adaptation can be done ex-ante (policy) or ex-post (relief).
- Constraints on the capacity to adapt/provide relief.
- Politicians' incentives can also affect adaptation/providing relief.

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Tamil Nadu farmers' protests



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- Karnataka declined to release water from the Kavery river.
- Farmers expressed discontent with government response.
- Economic losses/inadequate compensation sparked protests.

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
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- Farmers expressed discontent with government response.
- Economic losses/inadequate compensation sparked protests.
- Lower government approval.

(How) Does climate change erode citizen-state relations?

Climate change:

- Reduces confidence in govt. leaders and (democratic) institutions.
- Generates grievances/reduces legitimacy (can lead to conflict).

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Adaptation planning:

- Requires credible governance.
- Requires expanding state capacity (legibility).

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Can occur in developed countries; source of accountability or instability.

Climate Change and Political Legitimacy



- Ex-ante and ex-post policy:
 - Security and adaptation (ex-ante): first responders; ag. policy, etc.
 - Security and relief (ex-post): property rights; govt. transfers, other.

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- Obstacles to effective governance:
 - Govt. lacks capacity: legibility and/or physical.
 - Govt. lacks incentives: corruption.
- Climatic pressures distort citizens' opinions about government.

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
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The information paradox

	<i>Confidence in state government</i>	<i>Confidence in police</i>	<i>Cooperation to get water</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>a. One month lag</i>			
Shock	-0.079*** (0.027)	-0.078*** (0.024)	0.083** (0.030)
R-squared	0.512	0.549	0.532
Observations	68524	69112	69454
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls included	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>b. Two months lag</i>			
Shock	-0.076*** (0.024)	-0.058* (0.029)	0.096** (0.037)
R-squared	0.513	0.549	0.529
Observations	68542	69130	69472
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls included	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>c. Three months lag</i>			
Shock	-0.036 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.033)	0.072 (0.051)
R-squared	0.514	0.549	0.529
Observations	68474	69062	69404
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls included	Yes	Yes	Yes

- Are shocks climate's or governments' fault?
- Accountability is associated with those that are rational to blame.
- Informed citizens are less likely to blame the government!

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
The information paradox

	<i>Electoral outcomes</i>		<i>Protests</i>		
	<i>Incumbent reelected</i> (1)	<i>Turnout rate</i> (2)	<i>Obstructions</i> (3)	<i>Strikes</i> (4)	<i>Hunger</i> (5)
<i>a. One month lag</i>					
Shock	-0.076** (0.034)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.024** (0.011)	-0.036* (0.020)	0.023** (0.011)
Observations	12692	12692	10330	10330	10330
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>b. Two months lag</i>					
Shock	-0.051 (0.039)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.025 (0.020)	0.010 (0.011)
Observations	12692	12692	10331	10331	10331
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>c. Three months lag</i>					
Shock	-0.024 (0.067)	-0.009 (0.024)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.014)
Observations	12692	12692	10330	10330	10330
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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
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**Figure B. 4: Impact of Temperature Shocks on Electoral Outcomes
(Lok Sabha)**




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Class exercise: Blame attribution and accountability

- 1 Make groups of 2/3 people.
- 2 Between 2011 and 2021, lightning strikes claimed the lives of 3,273 people in Bangladesh.
- 3 Interpret this claim using “shark attacks” or rational blame attribution.
- 4 Should someone be held accountable? If so, who? Why?
- 5 If you were a local politician up for reelection, would you respond to this event? Why? How?
- 6 15 minutes.
 - Feel free to use the Internet.