Global Environmental Politics

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Last class: climate change and political mobilization

- No adaptation or relief can increase grievances against govt.
- Govt. can be rationally blamed (rational blame attribution).
- Increases collective action and mobilization (peaceful).
- The way information is presented shapes accountability.
- Needs state capacity (legibility and physical) and low corruption.

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The international regime complex for climate change

Figure 1.1. The governance triangle



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

a. Pre-1985 **b. 1985-94** **c. Post-1994**

Fig. 2 **a–c** Evolution of the governance triangle. Shading indicates density of schemes in each zone

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- It has become more complex overtime, espcially due to firms.

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

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- Is the collection of actors, institutions, agreements etc., in regards to climate change regulation.
- It has become more complex overtime, espcially due to firms.
- What limitations can emerge from this trend?

The international regime complex for climate change

- There are many agreements and innitiatives regarding climate change regulation.
- Some bilaterial, some multilateral, some private.
  - Between countries.
  - International organizations.
  - Between cities.
  - Between companies.
  - Some are Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)
- Fewer actors facilitates consensus, addressing collective action issues.

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- Creates duplicates with varying levels of quality.
  - International organizations can have more broad expertise.
  - Sub-national government may understand better local needs.
  - Firms may understand better the needs of the industry.
- Makes it hard to standardize and create wider agreement.
- Creates competition and “forum shopping.”
  - Reinforces the role of special interests.
  - Can lead to suboptimal agreements.
  - In the aggregate it may reduce effective cooperation.
- Competition can create a race to the bottom.

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International Organizations

Core Organizations
- UNFCCC: including Kyoto Protocol, organs, funds, and other emanations (*R*)
- Global Environment Facility (GEF): financial mechanism, special funds
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

Related Organizations

Environmental
- United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (*R*)
- Montreal Protocol: addresses greenhouse gases (*R*)

Informal
- Group of 8 (G8) (*R*)
- Group of 20 (G20) (*R*)
- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (*R*)
- Major Economies Forum (*R*)

Sectoral
- International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (*R*)
- International Maritime Organization (IMO) (*R*)
- UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) (*R*)
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- World Trade Organization (WTO) (*R*)

Energy
- International Energy Agency (IEA)
- International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (*R*)

Development
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (*R*)
- UN Development Program (UNDP) (*R*)
- World Food Program (WFP)
- World Health Organization (WHO) (*R*)

Development Banks
- World Bank: including Climate Investment Funds, other specialized funds
- Regional Development Banks: African, Asian, Inter-American Development Banks; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

- Specialization but also competition.
- Duplicates efforts with varying advise and standards.
- IOs compete for scarce resources from donnors.
- IOs need have incentives to cater to donnors' needs.

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Cities as transnational agents

- IOs and national policies may not suit local needs.
- Local needs may be at odds with others' needs.
- Requires coordination (e.g., COP meetings).
- Can generate gridlock and hamstring coordination.

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Private transnational regulatory organizations

TABLE 2. *Climate change-focused PTROs and year established*

Business Environmental Leadership Council	1998
Cleaner and Greener Certification	1999
WWF Climate Savers	1999
CarbonNZero	2001
Greenhouse Gas Protocol	
Corporate Standard	2001
Project Standard	2005
Product Standard	2011
Value Chain Standard	2011
Carbon Disclosure Project	
Climate Change Program	2003
Forests Program	2009
Supply Chain Program	2009
Carbon Neutral Protocol	2003
Chicago Climate Exchange (offset standards)	2003/2011
The Gold Standard	2003
Refrigerants, Naturally!	2004
Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards	2005
Green Tick Carbon Neutral/Negative	2005
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14000 series standards	
Environmental management standards	2006
Carbon accounting standards	2006
Verified (formerly voluntary) Carbon Standard	2006
CarbonFree Certified	2007
Climate Counts Scorecard	2007
Climate Disclosure Standards Board	2007
ClimateWise Principles	2007
FTSE4Good Climate Change Criteria	2007
VER+	2007
Carbon Trust Standard	2008
CEMARS	2008
Green-e Climate	2008
Social Carbon	2008
American Carbon Registry	2009
Climate Bond Initiative	2011
International Sustainability and Carbon Certification	2011
NEPCon Carbon Footprint Management Standard	2011
REDD + Social and Environmental Standards	2011
Natural Forest Standard	2012
The W+ Standard	2013

- PTROs adopt voluntary standards using market incentives
  - Consumer demand, reputation, avoid regulation, etc.
- Can complement IOs norms and programs.
- Fragile, with higher “death rates” than IGOs.

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TABLE 3. *Diversified PTROs with climate standards and year established*

Business based	
Ethical Tea Partnership	1997
Green Globe Certification Standard for Sustainable Tourism	1999
International Council on Mining and Metals sustainability principles	2003
Program for the Endorsement of Forest Certification	1999
Sustainable Forestry Initiative	1994
Nongovernmental organization based	
Plan Vivo	2008
Rainforest Alliance Sustainable Agriculture Network	1997
Sustainability Consortium	2010
Collaborative	
4C Association code of conduct for coffee	2006
Bonsucro standard for sugar cane	2004
EPEAT standards for electronics products	2005
Equitable Origin standard for petroleum	2009
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations	1997
Forest Stewardship Council	1993
Global Reporting Initiative	1997
Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef	2010
Global Sustainable Tourism Council	2010
IFOAM organic agriculture standard	1972
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels	2007
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil	2003
Roundtable on Sustainable Soy	2006
UTZ certified standard for agricultural products	2002

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

Fig. 4 TGI institutional design across issue areas

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

Fig. 2 TGI functions across issue areas

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

Fig. 1 TGI growth and issue areas

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

FIGURE 1. *Organizational growth rates over time*

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

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- Recall... firms look to self-regulating when it benefits them.

Consequence: Poorly designed agreements

Figure 1
The regime complex for managing climate change.



Note: Boxes show the main institutional elements and initiatives that comprise the climate change regime complex. (For a

- Disaggrement on measures; unclear incentives to cooperate.
- Vaguene obligations; discretion; consensus but no enforcement.
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

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Table 1 | Prospects for coordination and cooperation under four different conditions.

	Potential joint gains are high	Potential joint gains are low
Agreements are not self-enforcing (cooperation is required for collaboration)	Possible cooperation with high rewards, but with dangers of defection that rise with the depth of cooperation.	Little incentive to seek to cooperate, although shallowness of cooperation limits dangers of defection.
Agreements are self-enforcing (coordination is sufficient for collaboration)	Likely coordination, with limited but realizable gains, often leaving potential gains 'on the table'.	Easy coordination, limited by the low level of potential gains.

- Disaggrement on measures; unclear incentives to cooperate.
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Consequence: Poorly designed agreements

Box 1 | The range of interests reflected in national pledges.

(1) **Create the global public good of reduced climate change.** It might be thought that most countries seek to contribute to a global public good. But only a small fraction of world emissions — perhaps one-quarter or less — comes from jurisdictions such as the EU and some regions in the United States (for example, California and the northeast) — that are primarily motivated by global public goods. For the rest, other logics drive preferences.

(2) **Create local or national public goods that happen to address, as well, the global public good of climate change.** An example is provided by measures to reduce emissions of soot, or black carbon, which both cause local health problems and contribute to global warming. One of the important advances in climate science over the past decade has been to understand how these 'co-benefits' are linked to global climate change[71]. However, most climate science has analysed these links by starting with policies aimed at slowing global warming and showing the local or national co-benefits. A political analysis would emphasize the local benefits, as these often drive policy decisions.

(3) **Generate competitive economic benefits, such as the creation of new industries — solar, wind, batteries.** Governments will be more interested in emission regulations at home and abroad insofar as they believe that they have competitive advantage, real or potential, in zero-carbon industries, such as solar and wind power. But they may, at the same time, persist in high-emissions activities, especially where vested interests — for instance, in coal power — are strong, so their search for economic benefits can be beneficial or harmful from the standpoint of mitigating climate change.

(4) **Bargain for side-payments, such as requests for money to help pay the cost of controlling emissions and adapting to climate change.** This motivation is likely to be especially strong for relatively poor developing countries, particularly those countries likely to bear significant costs as they prepare for and adapt to rising sea levels, more extreme weather and other effects of global climate change.

(5) **Create reputational benefits.** Governments have stakes in a wide variety of issues, and may find it advantageous to be seen as leaders in providing global public goods. According to J. S. Nye, doing so may enhance their 'soft power'[73]. For other states, as climate pledges become the norm, it could be important not to be stigmatized as a non-cooperator, which could hurt the state with respect to issues in which it has clear interests.

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Class exercise: Boosting under-represented groups

1. Make groups of 2/3 people.
2. The indigenous people's of the Amazon are affected by climate change by are underrepresented in UN's COP.
3. How would you increase participation for them at COP?
4. How would you ensure that their preferences are incorporated into policy?
5. 10 minutes.
    - Feel free to use the Internet.