Southampton

Verification and tools in Event-B modelling

Mike Poppleton users.ecs.soton.ac.uk/mrp

Slides adapted from Prof. Michael Butler, Marktoberdorf Summer School 2012

Overview

- Abstraction & refinement validation & verification
- Proof obligations in Event-B
- · Rodin tool features

Problem Abstraction

- Abstraction can be viewed as a process of simplifying our understanding of a system.
- The simplification should
 - focus on the intended purpose of the system
 - ignore details of how that purpose is achieved.
- The modeller/analyst should make judgements about what they believe to be the key features of the system.

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Abstraction (continued)

- If the purpose is to provide some service, then
 - model what a system does from the perspective of the service users
 - 'users' might be computing agents as well as humans.
- If the purpose is to control, monitor or protect some phenomenon, then
 - the abstraction should focus on those phenomenon
 - in what way should they be controlled, monitored or protected?

Refinement


- Refinement is a process of enriching or modifying a model in order to
 - augment the functionality being modelled, or
 - explain how some purpose is achieved
- Facilitates abstraction: we can postpone treatment of some system features to later refinement steps
- Event-B provides a notion of consistency of a refinement:
 - Use proof to verify the consistency of a refinement step
 - Failing proof can help us identify inconsistencies

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Validation and verification

- Requirements validation:
 - The extent to which (informal) requirements satisfy the needs of the stakeholders
- Model validation:
 - The extent to which (formal) model accurately captures the (informal) requirements
- Model verification:
 - The extent to which a model correctly maintains invariants or refines another (more abstract) model
 - Measured, e.g., by degree of validity of proof obligations

Event-B verification and tools



Event structure

```
E = \\ event name

any
x1, x2, ... \\ event parameters
where
G1 \\ event guards (predicates)
G2
...
then
v1 := exp1 \\ event actions
v2 := exp2
...
end

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```

Role of Event Parameters

• Most generally, parameters represent nondeterministically chosen values, e.g.,


```
NonDetInc = 
any d where v+d \le MAX then v:=v+d end
```

- Event parameters can also be used to model input and output values of an event
- Can also have nondeterministic actions:

```
when v < MAX then v : | v < v' \le MAX end
```

Refinement for events

- A refined machine has two kinds of events:
 - Refined events that refine some event of the abstract machine
 - New events that refine skip
- Verification of event refinement uses
 - gluing invariants linking abstract and concrete variables
 - witnesses for abstract parameters



Proof obligations in Event-B

- Well-definedness (WD)
 - e.g, avoid division by zero, partial function application
- Invariant preservation (INV) ***
 - each event maintains invariants
- Guard strengthening (GRD) ***
 - Refined event only possible when abstract event possible
- Simulation (SIM) ***
 - update of abstract variable correctly simulated by update of concrete variable
- Convergence (VAR)
 - Ensure convergence of new events using a variant

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Invariant Preservation

- Assume: variables v and invariant I(v)
- Deterministic event:

```
Ev = when P(v) then v := exp(v) end
```

• To prove Ev preserves I(v):

```
INV: P(v), I(v) \vdash I(exp(v))
```

- This is a sequent of the form Hypotheses ⊢ Goal
- The sequent is a Proof Obligation (PO) that must be verified

Using Event Parameters

• Event has form:

```
Ev = any x where P(x,v) then v := exp(x,v) end
```

```
INV: I(v), P(x,v) \vdash I(E(x,v))
```


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Example PO from Rodin

```
Enter/inv3/INV
] 🗢 🗹 🦑 🗆 ]
               ∀u, r·
                    u∈dom(location) ∧
                    location(u)=r
                    takeplace[{r}]\subseteq authorised[{u}]
               u \in USER \setminus dom(location)
               takeplace[{r}]⊆authorised[{u}]
               (locationu\{u \mapsto r\})(u0)=r0
               u0 \in dom(location \cup \{u \mapsto r\})
               takeplace=ROOM × ACTIVITY
               location∈USER → ROOM
Selected Hypotheses
                                                                                               - -
☑ Goal 🖾
               takeplace[{(locationu\{u \mapsto r\})(u0)}]\subseteq authorised[{u0}]
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```

How do we know what to prove?

- Need for proofs imposes *proof obligations*
 - the user does not have to state them
 - they are automatically generated by a tool
- Proof obligations serve to
 - verify properties of a model




Proof and model checking

- Model checking: force the model to be finite state and explore state space looking for invariant violations
 - completely automatic
 - powerful debugging tool (counter-example)
- (Semi-)automated proof: based on logical deduction rules
 - no restrictions on state space
 - leads to discovery of invariants that deepen understanding
 - not completely automatic

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Models are created and verified iteratively Modelling Proof Obligations Proving 1st Oct 2012 SAICSIT: Event-B/2 20



Rodin Architecture

- Extension of Eclipse IDE
- Repository of structured modelling elements
- Rodin Eclipse Builder manages:
 - Well-formedness + type checker
 - Consistency/refinement PO generator
 - Proof manager
 - Propagation of changes
- Extension points to support plug-ins

Differential proving in Rodin

- · Models are constantly being changed
- When a model changes, proof impact of changes should be minimised as much as possible:
- Sufficiency comparison of POs
 - In case of success, provers return list of *used hypotheses*
 - Proof valid provided the used hypothesis are in the new version of a PO
- · Model refactoring:
 - Identifier renaming applied to models (avoiding name clash)
 - Corresponding POs and proofs automatically renamed

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Rodin Proof Manager (PM)

- PM constructs proof tree for each PO
- Automatic and interactive modes
- PM manages used hypotheses
- PM calls reasoners to
 - discharge goal, or
 - split goal into subgoals
- Collection of reasoners:
 - simplifier, rule-based, decision procedures, ...
- Basic tactic language to define PM and reasoners

Statistics from Flash-based file development in Event-B

Machines	Total POs	Automatic	Interactive
MCH0	35	22	13
MCH1	57	49	8
MCH2	33	32	1
MCH3	37	34	3
MCH4	26	26	0
MCH5	27	26	1
MCH6	31	30	1
MCH7	109	97	12
MCH_FL0	8	8	0
MCH_FL1	110	110	0
MCH_FL2	57	57	0
MCH_FL3	9	9	0
Overall	540	501 (93%)	39 (7%)

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Range of Automated Provers

- Built-in: tactic language, simplifiers, decision procedures
- AtelierB plug-in for Rodin (ClearSy, FR)
- SMT plug-in (Systerel, FR)
- Isabelle plug-in (Schmalz, ETHZ)

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Validation/verification offered by ProB

- Animation: show behaviour of model in clear terms
- Model Checking
- Refinement Checking
- Graphical Domain Specific Visualization
- Visualization of State Space



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
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
ProB


- · Animator and model checker
 - search for invariant violations
 - search for deadlocks
 - search for proof obligation violations
- Implementation uses constraint logic programming
 - makes all types finite
 - exploits symmetries in B types

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Proof and model checking

- Model checking: force the model to be finite state and explore state space looking for invariant violations
 - © completely automatic
 - © powerful debugging tool (counter-examples)
 - **⊗**state-space explosion
- (Semi-)automated proof: based on deduction rules
 - not completely automatic
 - © leads to discovery of invariants deepen understanding
 - © no restrictions on state space

Some references

- Full introduction to modelling and verification in Event-B, to advanced level (including definition of proof obligations):
 - Jean-Raymond Abrial. Modeling in Event-B: System and Software Engineering. Cambridge University Press 2010
- · Abrial, Butler, Hallerstede, Hoang, Mehta and Voisin
 - Rodin: An Open Toolset for Modelling and Reasoning in Event-B.
 - International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer (STTT), 12 (6), 2010.
- · Leuschel and Butler
 - ProB: An Automated Analysis Toolset for the B Method. International Journal on Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 10, (2), 185-203, 2008.

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Rodin and its plug-ins: read about and install via www.event-b.org

- · ProB model checker:
 - consistency and refinement checking
- External provers:
 - AtelierB plug-in for Rodin (ClearSy, FR)
 - SMT plug-in (Systerel, FR)
 - Isabelle plug-in (Schmalz, ETHZ)
- Theory plug-in user-defined mathematical theories
- UML-B: Linking UML and Event-B
- Graphical model animation
 - ProB, AnimB, B-Motion Studio
- · Requirements management (ProR)
- Team-based development
- Decomposition
- · Code generation
- ..

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