

Safe Assets in Emerging Market Economies

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Job Market Paper

This version: October 2022

Abstract

Investors pay a premium for the safety and liquidity of U.S. Treasuries compared to private comparable U.S. debt. In other words, they enjoy a safe asset status. Similarly, I estimate that investors pay more than 30 basis points for the safety and liquidity of local-currency sovereign bonds of a group of nine emerging economies. However, important differences remain with respect to US Treasuries: the premium comes mainly from local investors, and the safe asset status is procyclical. Empirical evidence suggests that this procyclicality is driven by the availability of alternative (local and global) safe assets. I extend the real-small open economy model to incorporate demand for safety, which is satisfied by either foreign or local sovereign bonds. I use the model to derive implications for policy: Unconventional monetary policy in the form of emergency liquidity supply (used by many emerging economies during 2020) is less effective when facing a downturn, as investors prefer the dollar liquidity; accordingly, bond market segmentation between local and foreign bonds improves the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy. The model also includes the chance of sudden stops; it predicts a sharp drop in local-currency convenience yields during those episodes.

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1 Introduction

U.S. Treasuries enjoy a safe asset status: investors pay a premium for the safety and liquidity of U.S. Treasuries compared to private comparable US debt, and this price is larger during financial distress. This not only allows the US government to save through cheaper borrowing (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012), but also impacts short- and long-term equilibrium interest rates (Del Negro et al., 2017a; Lenel et al., 2019) and the extent to which the central bank can deploy unconventional monetary policy (Krishnamurthy and Vissing Jorgensen, 2011; Del Negro et al., 2017b). Do local-currency sovereign bonds in emerging market economies (EMEs) share any of this safe asset status? What are their properties as safe assets? By estimating their local-currency convenience yield in a sample that included nine EMEs between 2007 and 2021, I find that investors pay a sizeable premium for their safety and liquidity compared to non-Treasury U.S. safe dollar assets. However, the difference with U.S. Treasuries is that this local-convenience yield is procyclical: they lose their safe asset status during downturns. As I show in this paper, this has important implications for local central banks' unconventional interventions in EMEs.

This finding is particularly relevant as local-currency bonds now represent the lion's share of outstanding sovereign bonds in EMEs (Hofmann et al., 2020; Du and Schreger, 2022), and many EMEs deployed unconventional monetary policies during the Covid crisis (Arslan et al., 2020). This paper emphasizes that certain assets serve as safe harbors to hedge risk, and thus determine the tools countries have to manage idiosyncratic and global risk. Currency and government debt in emerging markets can possibly take on the role of local safe assets, but they might compete with other global sources of safety (Brunnermeier et al., 2020). Recently, Kekre and Lenel (2021) showed that shocks to safety demand accounted for 25% of output volatility in the U.S. and 10% of output volatility in the rest of the world. From the perspective of emerging markets, there is little empirical and theoretical work on how monetary policy, foreign exchange intervention, capital controls policy, and macroprudential regulation can shape the international competition among safe assets and global risk appetites.

In the first part of this paper, I estimate what I will call the EME local-currency convenience yield: the premium of a synthetic dollar bond (a local-currency EME bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars) against non-Treasury safe dollar bonds (such as highly rated corporate or agency bonds). This spread is a measure of how much investors are willing to pay for the safety and liquidity of an EME bond compared to non-Treasury U.S. safe bonds. Notice that this measure is different from the U.S. Treasury premium, which estimates how much investors pay for U.S. Treasuries compared to sovereign bonds of other countries (Du et al., 2018). Instead, I estimate the EME local-currency convenience yield because its analysis will allow for a comparison with the convenience yields widely estimated for U.S. Treasuries, that is, their premium against comparable U.S. private debt. I build on the methodology used by Du et al. (2018), who relied on the

decomposition of covered interest parity condition deviations to study sovereign bonds of G10 economies. I significantly extend their approach to account for issues particularly relevant to EMEs: default risk, the risk of facing capital controls, and the losses coming from large currency depreciations during these events.

I find that among the nine countries in my sample, the EME local-currency convenience yield has an average of more than 30 basis points, which corresponds to a sizeable 10-20% of their total yield on average. However, unlike U.S. Treasuries, this premium is mainly driven by local investors (which is consistent with EMEs not sharing the property of a global reserve currency), and capital inflows have little effect. This is an important distinction as foreigners have increased their participation in the ownership of EME local-currency bonds (see recent trends in Appendix A). Furthermore, the EME local-currency convenience yield is procyclical: The safety/liquidity value drops during downturns and episodes of high global risk aversion, which is the opposite of what happens in the United States. I analyze two exogenous adverse shocks to EMEs (the Taper Tantrum and the Covid pandemic) to gain insight about the mechanism. These episodes suggest that the safety status of EME sovereign bonds drops because of the availability to investors of alternative safe assets (such as U.S. Treasuries).

In the second part of the paper, I extend the standard real small open economy model to include demand for safe assets by households, beyond standard precautionary savings demand. The model accounts for the procyclicality of the EME local-currency convenience yield and allows me to draw policy implications for EMEs. Safety demand can be satisfied with foreign bonds - whose price is world determined - and local bonds -issued by the government and financed with taxes. The economy is subject to two types of shocks, productivity shocks and safety, or global, shocks. The latter correspond to an exogenous increase in the world interest rate along with the foreign bond's safety premium (similar to the safety shocks observed in Kekre and Lenel, 2021). An adverse global shock increases the expected excess return of the local assets, both capital and the local bond. Regarding capital, this increased expected excess return is achieved by a drop in its price and a corresponding drop in investment and labor demand (and hence output). The result is that the foreign bond ends up paying well in a bad state of the world, which makes it an effective global safe asset. The local bond, on the other hand, is the opposite: The drop in consumption and the larger holdings of the foreign bond reduce its convenience yield, showing a negative covariance with the global and local cycle. Finally, when the household borrows via the foreign bond, it faces an endogenous collateral constraint in the spirit of Bianchi and Mendoza (2020), which will allow for the analysis of sudden stops.

The main takeaway from the model is that the cyclicity of the EME local-currency convenience yield determines the effectiveness of unconventional liquidity policy. These policies have become common in advanced economies since 2008, but little is known about their use in EMEs. When hit by a shock, the local central bank can purchase capital from households in exchange for local

bonds, which satisfy the demand for safety. However, central bank intervention under a safety shock is less effective as the local agents have access to a better global safe asset (the foreign bond). However, a larger degree of segmentation between foreign and local bonds -for example, in the form of capital controls- can increase the effectiveness of unconventional liquidity policy, as the household is less able to substitute local versus foreign liquidity. Finally, the model shows that the EME local-currency convenience yield drops during sudden stops, suggesting they are not a good safe asset either in these states of the world.

1.1 Related Literature

To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to estimate the safe asset status of local-currency sovereign bonds in EMEs and to contrast their determinants and behavior with those of advanced economies. The empirical literature is ample in the study of the safety of U.S. Treasuries against comparable dollar private debt (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2015; Nagel, 2016) and against sovereign bonds of other advanced countries (Du et al., 2018; Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig, 2021; Jiang et al. 2021). Du and Schreger (2016) apply a similar methodology to analyze EMEs' sovereign bonds, but their aim is to explain local versus foreign-currency credit spreads.

On the theoretical side, my approach is novel as it is the first to build on the small open economy model and to analyze the interaction of two competing safe assets (local and foreign bonds). Unlike my approach, the literature has focused on the international role of dollar debt as a global safe asset, as modeled in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2019); Jiang, Krishnamurhty and Lustig (2019); and Kekre and Lenel (2021). Jiang, Krishnamurthy, and Lustig (2019) analyzed the effects of the supply of dollar safe assets on the nominal value of the dollar exchange rate, but they did not consider their interaction with safe assets from other countries. Kekre and Lenel (2021) quantified the importance of dollar-safety shocks in a two-country model, where convenience yields on dollar assets were fully exogenous and assets from the rest of the world did not share the safe asset status.

The policy implications make two contributions. First, they extend closed-economy models where convenience yields are at the center of unconventional monetary policy transmission (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Del Negro et al., 2017). These models and others, for example, Gertler and Karadi (2013); and Reis (2017), fail to characterize the challenges faced by a small open economy whose local investors have access to an alternative source of convenience services, i.e., U.S. Treasuries. These papers take the position of an advanced economy and assume the liquidity services of their government bonds are always valuable to investors. This allows their central banks to provide unlimited liquidity and affect interest rates (in the case of the United States, through the Term Auction Facility, the Primary Credit Facility, and the Term Securities Lending Facility, which can be thought of as nonstandard open market operations).

Second, policy implications extend the literature on monetary policy for small open economies. By relying on foreign currency borrowing, this literature has focused on the effectiveness of policies such as reserve accumulation (Bianchi et al., 2018) or foreign exchange intervention (Fanelli and Straub, 2021). This paper is a first step towards studying macroeconomic policies that tackle local-currency liquidity, such as the deployment of the central bank’s balance sheet. This is the more relevant as some early empirical papers have found that unconventional policies in EMEs had positive economic effects during the Covid-19 crisis (Arslan et al, 2020; Sever et al, 2020; Fratto et al, 2021; Ha and Kindberg-Hanlon, 2021; Rebucci and Hartley, 2021). These papers applied the event study methodology to estimate the effects on yields, exchange rates, and other variables. However, they did not provide any model with which to understand the results. In general, these papers found that these policies were effective in increasing liquidity and lowering long-term yields, although there was large heterogeneity in the impacts among different EMEs.

Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on the global financial cycle (GFC) and international risk spillovers. Rey (2013) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021) documented strong global co-movements in capital flows, credit growth, and asset prices, whose main determinants are global risk aversion and U.S. monetary policy. Kalemli-Ozcan (2019) highlighted the role of risk spillovers in the transmission of U.S. monetary policy into emerging markets and studied the implications for currency regimes and local monetary policy rate decisions. Brunnermeier et al. (2020) conjectured monetary and macroprudential policy implications for EMEs, but theirs was not a full fledged international model specific to developing countries. My paper estimates the impact of the GFC to the valuation of local-currency sovereign bonds through convenience yields, and how they respond to global risk perceptions.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the derivation of convenience yields and shows a preliminary analysis of the time series. Section 3 undertakes a formal empirical analysis based on panel regressions and event studies. Section 4 presents the model and Section 5 the policy exercises. Section 6 then concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Decomposition of Covered Interest Parity Deviations

I build on the methodology in Du et al. (2018), but significantly extend it to fit emerging economies. Du et al. (2018) calculated the U.S. Treasury premium over sovereign bonds of other developed economies, that is, how much investors are willing to pay for the safety and liquidity of U.S. Treasuries compared to the sovereign bonds of G10 countries. To achieve this, they compared the yield of a U.S. Treasury bond with the G10 sovereign bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars through a forward contract. These are, in practice, two dollar-denominated bonds, and so there

is no currency risk between them. The spread between them equals the covered interest parity (CIP) deviations from a dollar investor perspective. Since there is no currency risk, CIP deviations must come from either safety/liquidity premia, differential default risk, or mispricing of the forward premium.

When considering EMEs, this exercise proves to be incomplete. Not only because default risk is much larger, but also because local-currency sovereign bonds in EMEs carry a larger number of risks: capital control risks and large currency depreciations during default or capital controls events, among others. In what follows, I describe how I account for these extra issues. Keep in mind that this is a preliminary step, as my main interest in this paper is not the U.S. Treasury premium (how much investors are willing to pay for the safety/liquidity of U.S. Treasuries against EME bonds), but the EME bonds' convenience yield against non-Treasury safe dollar bonds (how much investors are willing to pay for a local-currency EME bond against a highly-rated corporate or agency bond in the United States).

To start, take the position of a local investor in EME i which I will call, without loss of generality, a *peso* investor. This investor can price bonds in his local currency i or in dollars (\$). The exchange rate S_t is defined in terms of local currency per dollar, so an increase (decrease) means a depreciation (appreciation) of the local currency. The Euler equation pricing a U.S. Treasury bond by this investor is given by:

$$P_{US,t} \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} = e^{-y_{i,t}^{rf}} \mathbb{E}_t \left[(1 + \Lambda_{t+1}^{\$,i})(1 - L_{US,t+1}) \right] \quad (1)$$

which in logs can be rewritten as:

$$y_{US,t} = y_{i,t}^{rf} - \lambda_t^{\$,i} + l_{US,t} - \xi_{US,t} - \log \Delta s_{t+1} \quad (2)$$

where $y_{i,t}^{rf}$ is the risk-free rate in country i 's local currency. Henceforth, $\lambda_t^{z,j}$ will denote the convenience yield of investors of country j for bonds issued by the government in country z . Also, l_t is the risk of default and ξ_t is the covariance between the convenience yield and the risk of default. This expression shows that, from the peso investor's perspective, the yield on a U.S. Treasury is reduced by the convenience attached to it. In other words, the bigger the safety and liquidity services provided, all else equal, the lower the overall yield of the bond.

Consider now this same peso investor pricing a local-currency bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars through a forward contract (also known as a synthetic dollar bond):

$$P_{i,t} \frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t} \frac{S_t}{F_{t,t+1}} = e^{-y_{i,t}^{rf}} \mathbb{E}_t \left[(1 + \Lambda_{t+1}^{i,i})(1 - \tilde{L}_{i,t+1}) \left(1 - \tilde{L}_{i,t+1} + \tilde{L}_{i,t+1} \left(1 - \frac{F_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}} \right) \right) \right] \quad (3)$$

Here, S_t and $F_{t,t+1}$ are the spot and the forward exchange rate, respectively. $\Lambda_{t+1}^{i,i}$ is the safety/liquidity service provided by the peso bond to peso investors and $\tilde{L}_{i,t+1}$ encompasses a

broader view of credit risk: not only default, but also capital controls and currency convertibility risks, which also impose losses on the investor. The last expression in the parentheses can be explained as follows. When agents invest in local-currency EME sovereign bonds, default or capital controls impose an extra loss on them. They not only receive fewer pesos back, but those pesos are now worth less if the currency depreciates upon default. The yield on the synthetic bond does not capture the latter, as currency risk is being hedged. Therefore, the yield on the synthetic bond underestimates the risk of loss upon default for foreign investors. Du and Schreger (2016) showed that, for the synthetic bond, this extra loss was equivalent to an FX hedging error as captured by the last expression in (3) above.

Let $q_{i,t}$ be the covariance between default risk and currency risk, and $p_{i,t}$ the covariance between capital control risk and currency risk. Both are positive if the currency depreciates when default is declared or capital controls are imposed, respectively. Equation (3) can be worked in the same way as (1) to give the following yield decomposition:

$$y_{i,t} - \tilde{\rho}_{i,t} = y_{i,t}^{rf} - \lambda_t^{i,i} + (l_{i,t} - q_{i,t}) + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) - \log \Delta s_{t+1} - covs_{i,t} \quad (4)$$

where $\tilde{\rho}_{i,t}$ is the frictionless forward premium. The term $l_{i,t} - q_{i,t}$ is the default risk net of the covariance between default risk and currency risk. Similarly, $k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}$ is the risk of capital controls net of its covariance with currency risk. The last term $covs_{i,t}$ contains a number of other covariances, mainly the covariance between the convenience yield and default risk, $\xi_{i,t}$, and the covariance of the convenience yield with currency risk.

The spread between the two strategies gives the following expression (subtracting (2) from (4)):

$$y_{i,t} - \tilde{\rho}_{i,t} - y_{US,t} = (\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \lambda_t^{i,i}) + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) - q_{i,t} + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) - covs_{i,t} \quad (5)$$

In addition, I consider that the actual forward premium can differ from the frictionless value. This can happen because of financial frictions like counterparty risk, information asymmetries, or others. As in Du et al. (2018), I assume that the frictionless forward premium is equal to the observed value plus an adjustment term that accounts for these financial frictions. Therefore, $\tilde{\rho}_{i,t} = \rho_{i,t} + \tau_{i,t}$. Equation (5) becomes:

$$y_{i,t} - \rho_{i,t} - y_{US,t} = (\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \lambda_t^{i,i}) + \tau_{i,t} + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) - q_{i,t} + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) - covs_{i,t} \quad (6)$$

The expression in the left-hand side is equal to the CIP deviation in sovereign bonds, that I will denote $\Phi_{i,t} \equiv y_{i,t} - \rho_{i,t} - y_{US,t}$. Therefore, CIP deviations can be decomposed into three main components: the differential convenience yield, differential default risk, and a third term I will call “other”:

$$\underbrace{\Phi_{i,t}}_{\text{CIP dev.}} = \underbrace{(\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \lambda_t^{i,i})}_{\text{US Treasury Premium}} + \underbrace{(l_{i,t} - l_{US,t})}_{\text{Diff. default risk}} + \underbrace{(\tau_{i,t} - q_{i,t} + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) + (\xi_{US,t} - \xi_{i,t}) - \psi_{i,t})}_{\text{Other}} \quad (7)$$

The first term on the right-hand side is what Du et al. (2018) called the “U.S. Treasury Premium”, i.e., the premium investors are willing to pay for the safety/liquidity of a U.S. Treasury compared to the safety/liquidity of an EME sovereign bond. This premium arises only from non-pecuniary services unrelated to the actual discounted cash flows of the bond. The U.S. Treasury Premium is expressed in dollar terms. The term “other” is the sum of the mispricing of the forward premium, $\tau_{i,t}$; the covariance between default risk and currency risk, $q_{i,t}$; the capital control risk net of its covariance with currency risk, $k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}$; the differential covariances of convenience yield and default risk, $\xi_{US,t} - \xi_{i,t}$; and the covariance of convenience yield and currency risk, $\psi_{i,t}$ (assuming it is zero for the United States).

Appendix B shows the same decomposition of CIP deviations, but this time from a dollar-investor perspective. In this case, the dollar-investor compares the purchase of a dollar bond versus a local bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars through a forward contract. The Appendix shows that this strategy gives the same expression as in (7), but with $(\lambda_t^{\$,\$} - \lambda_t^{i,\$})$ in the first term of the right-hand side instead. This is how much more convenience service the dollar-investor derives from a U.S. Treasury compared to a EME bond. This is an important result to keep in mind for the following reason. Below, I proceed by estimating all the other variables in (7) and then I compute the U.S. Treasury Premium as a residual. However, this residual can represent either $(\lambda_t^{\$,\$} - \lambda_t^{i,\$})$ or $(\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \lambda_t^{i,i})$. I leave the question of from which investor is this premium coming for the empirical section.

The main challenge is to estimate all the variables contained in the “other” term. I rely on the spread between the synthetic bond and the bond denominated in foreign-currency. EME sovereign bonds denominated in foreign-currency do not carry the currency covariances or the forward premium mispricing term inside the “other” term. Furthermore, they do not carry the convenience yield of *local*-currency bonds. And finally, EME sovereign bonds denominated in foreign currency are almost entirely issued in foreign jurisdictions, and thus are not subject to many types of capital controls such as currency convertibility restrictions and differential taxation regimes.

To show this formally, consider a dollar investor investing in an EME sovereign bond denominated in dollars. The log approximation would be:

$$y_{i,t}^{\$} = y_{US,t}^{rf} + l_{i,t}^{\$} - \lambda_t^{\$,\$} \quad (8)$$

where $y_{i,t}^{\$}$ is the yield of the sovereign bond of country i denominated in dollars. As before, $y_{US,t}^{rf}$ is the dollar risk-free rate, and $l_{i,t}^{\$}$ is the default risk on this bond. $\lambda_{i,t}^{\$}$ is the convenience service the dollar investor attaches to this bond denominated in dollars.

Consider a dollar investor comparing the yields of two bonds: one, the EME local-currency bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars; the other, the EME bond denominated in dollars. The spread must be equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Phi_{i,t}^{FC} &\equiv y_{i,t} - \rho_{i,t} - y_{i,t}^{\$} \\
&\equiv (y_{i,t} - \rho_{i,t} - y_{US,t}) - (y_{i,t}^{\$} - y_{US,t}) \\
&= y_{US,t}^{rf} + \tau_{i,t} - \lambda_{i,t}^{i,\$} + (l_{it} - q_{i,t}) + (k_{it} - p_{i,t}) - \xi_{i,t} - \psi_{i,t} - (y_{US,t}^{rf} + l_{i,t}^{\$} - \lambda_{i,t}^{\$,\$}) \\
&= \tau_{i,t} + (\lambda_{i,t}^{\$,\$} - \lambda_{i,t}^{i,\$}) + (l_{it} - l_{i,t}^{\$} - q_{i,t}) + (k_{it} - p_{i,t}) - \xi_{i,t} - \psi_{i,t}
\end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

As long as $l_{i,t}^{\$} \approx l_{i,t}$ and $\lambda_{i,t}^{\$,\$} \approx \lambda_{i,t}^{i,\$}$, the expression $\Phi_{i,t}^{FC}$ will approximate the “other” term in (7). The condition $l_{i,t}^{\$} \approx l_{i,t}$ requires that the default risk of the EME sovereign is approximately equal for local versus foreign currency-denominated debt (I discuss evidence on this in Appendix C). On the other hand, the condition $\lambda_{i,t}^{\$,\$} \approx \lambda_{i,t}^{i,\$}$ holds as long as the dollar investor derives approximately the same non-pecuniary services from EME sovereign bonds denominated in either currency. I will maintain this assumption henceforth. Previous evidence so far has found that swapped local-currency bonds are slightly more liquid than foreign currency-denominated debt. Du and Schreger (2016) studied a sample of EMEs and found a sample mean bid-ask spread equal to 11.1 basis points for the former versus 14.5 basis points for the latter.

2.2 From CIP Deviations to EME Local-Currency Convenience Yields

Now, equation (7) for CIP deviations can be rewritten as:

$$\Phi_{i,t} = (\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \lambda_t^{i,i}) + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) + \Phi_{i,t}^{FC} + \xi_{US,t} \tag{10}$$

Rearrange to get an expression of $\lambda_t^{i,i}$:

$$\lambda_t^{i,i} = \lambda_t^{\$,i} - \Phi_{i,t} + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) + \Phi_{i,t}^{FC} + \xi_{US,t} \tag{11}$$

I am interested in the convenience yield of EME bonds, which I define as the premium investors are willing to pay for the safety/liquidity of EME bonds compared to non-Treasury safe dollar bonds. To reach this value, subtract on both sides the convenience yield of these ‘non-Treasury safe dollar bonds’, $\lambda_t^{\$,i}$:

$$\lambda_t^{i,i} - \lambda_t^{\$,i} = (\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \lambda_t^{\$,i}) - \Phi_{i,t} + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) + \Phi_{i,t}^{FC} + \xi_{US,t} \tag{12}$$

On the left-hand side, I have the desired convenience yield of EME bonds against non-Treasury safe dollar bonds. The first term in the right-hand side is the same premium but for U.S. Treasuries: how much investors pay for the safety/liquidity of U.S. Treasuries against these other safe

dollar bonds. The existing literature on convenience yields has already estimated this premium by calculating the spread of U.S. Treasuries over comparable non-Treasury U.S. bonds, like high-grade corporate bonds, commercial paper, and agency bonds (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2015; Nagel, 2016). Since this term is widely available, I can calculate $(\lambda_t^{i,i} - \hat{\lambda}_t^{\$,i})$ as a residual. Appendix C describes all data sources for each variable in the right hand side of equation (12). The empirical analysis in section 3 will be run using the measure $\lambda_t^{i,i} - \hat{\lambda}_t^{\$,i}$ as the dependent variable.

The nine countries included in the rest of the paper are Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey. This selection is based solely on data availability.

2.3 Analysis


Here I show an analysis of the magnitudes of the EME local-currency convenience yield. This is a measure of the premium investors are willing to pay for the safety and liquidity of EME sovereign debt over non-Treasury safe dollar debt. I compute this measure because it gives an estimate of the convenience yield of EME bonds against the most common “non-safe” benchmark in the literature. In terms of Equation (10), the following analysis still does not include a proxy for $\xi_{US,t}$. However, as default risk is minimal for the United States, the magnitude of $\xi_{US,t}$ is probably very small (see Appendix D for additional analysis on the evolution of the U.S. Treasury premium against EME sovereign bonds).

Figure 1 shows the result for the 5-year sovereign bond. Many patterns stand out. First, notice that local-currency convenience yield dropped sharply during crises (both the 2008 financial crisis and the Covid pandemic in 2020). In those episodes, the safety premiums turned significantly negative. Negative values must be interpreted as EME sovereign bonds providing less safety and liquidity than non-Treasury U.S. safe debt. This suggests that these sovereign bonds are not a good safe asset during global crises, unlike global safe assets like U.S. Treasuries. Second, there was a widespread increase in local-currency convenience yields around 2014-2016, followed by a persistent decline from then on. Third, not all countries seem to have been affected by the Covid crisis in a similar way. Large drops in local-currency convenience yields happened in Mexico, Peru, Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Africa, while Brazil did not experience a large drop.

The series in Figure 1 shows large variations during the 2008 crisis, especially for Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and the Philippines. This might be explained by EME bonds becoming illiquid during periods of financial stress. In particular, during 2008, there was a significant increase in CDS spreads that might have been driven by mispricing of these contracts. This concern will be more formally addressed in the empirical section.

Table 1 shows summary statistics for this measure of the local-currency convenience yield of

Figure 1: Convenience Yield on 5-Year Local-Currency Sovereign Bonds



sovereign bonds. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean and the standard deviation of each country's convenience yield. Brazil stands out as the country with the highest premium, and Turkey with the lowest.

Column 3 reports the unconditional correlations of the EME local-currency convenience yield with the same premium of U.S. Treasuries, both set against the common benchmark of the non-Treasury U.S. safe assets. This correlation is in general negative, except for most of the Latin American economies. A negative correlation might be explained by investors attaching safety services to one sovereign at a time: In states of the world where investors flock to U.S. Treasuries, they lower their safety services attached to their local sovereign bonds. This evidence reinforces the intuition above that EMEs' sovereign bonds might not be an effective safe asset in periods of global crisis.

How economically relevant are these magnitudes? Figure 2 shows the local-currency convenience yield (as showed in Figure 1) as a proportion of the total yield of the local-currency bond. I also

Table 1: Summary Statistics (5-Year Sovereign Bond)

Country	Sample starts	(1)	(2)	(3)
		Mean	Std	Corr w/U.S.
Brazil	June 2010	62.83	28.76	0.0326*
Colombia	December 2007	24.09	25.99	0.0566***
Mexico	December 2007	40.63	23.72	0.3535***
Peru	December 2007	39.40	27.89	-0.1248***
Turkey	December 2007	-3.42	25.32	-0.1897***
Chile	April 2011	43.72	25.11	0.2522***
Indonesia	February 2015	29.06	15.1	-0.2462***
Philippines	December 2007	34.55	27.71	-0.124***
South Africa	June 2014	23.62	36.63	-0.5615***
United States	February 2006	40.95	12.39	-

Notes: Daily frequency. Sample ends on March 9, 2021.

Mean and std are calculated from 1/1/2010 onwards. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

add the CDS to compare with the role of credit risk. Although credit risk accounts for a bigger share of the total yield, which is unsurprising for EMEs, local-currency convenience yields account for around 10-20% of the total yield, with the only exception of Turkey. Countries where it explains a larger proportion are Chile, Peru, and the Philippines. Even though Brazil has the largest mean convenience yield (see Table 1), it is one of the EMEs with the highest yields on its debt; overall, the convenience yield accounts for 10% of the total yield.


3 Empirical Analysis

3.1 Determinants of the EME local-currency Convenience Yield

Do EME local-currency convenience yield arise from a demand for safety and liquidity by investors? If yes, by which investors, locals or foreigners? The latter is important since the proportion of local-currency government debt of EMEs owned by foreigners has significantly increased in recent years (see Appendix A). To answer the first question, I built on the existing literature on U.S. convenience yields and replicated their empirical analysis (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2015; Nagel, 2016; Cuevas, 2022). These papers have found that convenience yields arising from safety and liquidity demand are driven by the supply of safe and liquid assets (usually the supply of U.S. government debt) and by monetary policy decisions (as the central bank sets the overall price of liquidity in the economy).

Accordingly, I proceeded by estimating panel regressions of the following form:

Figure 2: Convenience Yield and Credit Risk as Proportion of Total Yield



$$cy_{i,t} = \beta_1 i_{t-1}^{MP} + \beta_2 (\text{Safe Asset supply}/\text{GDP})_{t-1} + \beta_3 i_t^{US} + c_i + \tau_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (13)$$

where i is currency/country, t is time, and $cy_{i,t}$ is the convenience yield on local currency sovereign bonds. The variable i^{MP} is the level of the local monetary policy rate, which intends to capture the price of overall liquidity in local currency set by the local central bank. ($\text{Safe Asset supply}/\text{GDP}$) is the supply of safe and liquid assets. Here I added both the local-currency sovereign debt supply as well as U.S. government debt supply. It is well known that U.S. Treasuries are the global safe asset, and in a small open economy, their supply should have an impact on the price of liquidity attached to local-currency bonds. Both quantities are net of central bank holdings. Finally, I added the level of the U.S. federal funds rate, i_t^{US} . If dollar-denominated

debt is the global safe asset, then not only its supply but also the price of dollar liquidity should have an impact on the local-currency bond premium. The independent variables are lagged one month to avoid endogeneity and reverse causality as much as possible (I address endogeneity more formally in Section 3.3). The variables c_i and τ_t are country and time fixed effects, respectively, that allow to control for time and country specific factors. I double clustered the standard errors across year and country.

Table 2 shows the results. In Column 1, both the local and the U.S. monetary policy rate have a positive effect. This is consistent with EME local-currency safety premia arising from liquidity and safety services. The intuition, drawn from the closed-economy literature, is as follows: As central banks tighten the stance of monetary policy, liquidity in the form of currency and private deposits becomes scarcer and drives up the price of liquidity in all other liquid assets, such as government debt.

The supply of local currency debt and the supply of U.S. government debt have opposite signs, although the magnitude of the latter is much larger. An increase in the supply of U.S. debt decreases the local-currency convenience yield by more than 100 basis points, which suggests that local-currency government bonds serve the same demand for safety and liquidity. The positive coefficient of local-currency debt supply might suggest that it is the relative supply that matters. In Column 2, I added the supply of U.S. government debt to GDP divided by the local-currency debt supply to local GDP as a regressor. The negative coefficient on the relative supply of U.S. Treasuries (which is the main global safe asset) is a key result; if the measure of local-currency convenience yield is actually capturing demand for safety and liquidity, then the estimated coefficient should be negative and statistically significant. This coefficient captures the slope of the demand for safe assets, similar to the analysis in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012): As supply increases, the price decreases by almost 16 basis points.

In addition to these business cycle-frequency variables, I inspected the role of determinants in the cross-section. A natural candidate is the size of the local financial market, as it is the most likely to derive convenience services from local-currency sovereign bonds. This variable would also answer the question of who derives safety and liquidity services from these local-currency sovereign bonds. Is it local investors or foreign ones? As explained in Section 2, the derivation of the CIP deviations decompositions can come from two different investment strategies: either a dollar investor or an EME-currency investor comparing a U.S. Treasury against the EME-currency bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars.

To disentangle the two types of investors, I used data from the IMF's Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Emerging Markets to build a new independent variable measuring the proportion of total debt in each country held by domestic investors including the local central banks, domestic banks, and domestic non-banks. However, I was unable to distinguish the currency denomination of these holdings, and “total debt” here includes government securities as well as other debt for which there

Table 2: Determinants of Convenience Yields (5-Year Sovereign Bond)

Dep. var: $cy_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MP rate _{t-1}	0.867*	0.988*	0.852*	0.990*
	(0.509)	(0.515)	(0.512)	(0.515)
U.S. fed funds _{t-1}	11.66***	13.64***	11.77***	13.70***
	(3.269)	(4.066)	(3.236)	(4.008)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{Local gov debt}}{GDP_{local}}\right)_{t-1}$	14.33*		13.28*	
	(8.018)		(7.475)	
$\log\left(\frac{\text{U.S. gov debt}}{GDP_{US}}\right)_{t-1}$	-131.0***		-127.7***	
	(39.74)		(38.88)	
$\log\left(\frac{\text{U.S. debt to GDP}}{\text{Local Debt to GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$		-15.83**		-15.41**
		(7.874)		(7.261)
Local share			27.19*	30.21**
			(14.39)	(14.35)
Constant	-297.0***	-19.97	-291.4***	-21.16
	(71.78)	(36.42)	(70.27)	(34.24)
Observations	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137
R-squared	0.670	0.658	0.674	0.663

Notes: Data are at monthly frequency. All columns include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by country and year. Start dates vary among countries but ends in March 2021 for all. Both U.S. debt and EME local-currency debt-to-GDP variables are net of central bank's holdings. "Local share" is the share of EME debt owned by domestic investors (central bank, banks and nonbanks) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

might not be a secondary market (such as bank loans). Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 show that the coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant. The more debt that is held by local investors, the larger is the level of the local-currency convenience yield, which suggests that local investors are the ones deriving non-pecuniary services from sovereign bonds. While I cannot conclude that foreign investors derive actually *zero* convenience services, I take this result as evidence that their influence is negligible. The next subsection will provide further evidence on this point when I estimate the effect of capital inflows.

Results in Table 2 are robust to including a time trend (that controls for trends in the dependent variable) and to including the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. Since right-hand variables are lagged one period, autocorrelation in local-currency convenience yields can bias their

coefficients. Inclusion of the lagged-dependent variable controls for endogeneity that may arise from persistence of the dependent variable. Since the data are at the monthly frequency and span more than ten years, adding the lagged dependent variable is unlikely to give rise to the Nickell (1981) bias.

3.2 EME Local-Currency Convenience Yield and the Global Financial Cycle

In this section, I extend the analysis above to study the dynamics of the local-currency convenience yield along global variables. To do this, I rely on the insights from the literature on the global financial cycle (Rey, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2021). This literature has documented significant co-movements in asset prices, capital inflows, and credit growth across regions and countries, and has identified global risk aversion and U.S. monetary policy as the main drivers. The following exercise can therefore be seen as an effort to extend this literature by analyzing the co-movements of the price of safety and liquidity across countries, which has not been studied so far.

Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021) documented that the VIX was strongly correlated with a global factor that explained about a quarter of the variance in risky asset prices and about 35% of the variance of gross capital flows. This evidence supports the wide acceptance of the VIX as a measure of global risk aversion and as the main driver of the global financial cycle. They also reviewed the findings linking the U.S. monetary policy decisions with perceptions of global risk aversion. Rey (2013) found that reductions in the federal funds rate were associated with reductions in the VIX after about 4 quarters. The mechanism would go as follows: the lower federal funds rate would decrease the cost of dollar funding, encouraging leverage in global banks, which increased credit flows and led to a lowering of the perception of risk.

These findings also might impact the interpretation of some of the results in the previous subsection. There, I found that increases in the federal funds rate increased the convenience yield of EMEs' sovereign bonds. To be sure that this captures the effect of the supply of dollar liquidity, I need to control for the impact of the federal funds rate on global risk aversion.

Table 3 shows the results. In Column 1 I added the VIX index. The coefficient on the VIX is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the safety status of local-currency sovereign bonds decreases during periods of high risk aversion. In the next subsection, I will show evidence suggesting this is due to the local investors preferring the safety/liquidity of U.S. Treasuries. For now, I highlight that this is a remarkable result as it is the opposite of the response of convenience yields in advanced economies. In the United States, a rise in the VIX increases the convenience yield on its debt, driving dollar rates down and creating liquidity shortages.

Notice also that the federal funds rate loses most of its significance, and the magnitude is reduced by around half. This might suggest that the U.S. monetary policy works mainly through

risk perceptions rather than through the supply of dollar liquidity. However, keep in mind that both the federal funds rate and the VIX are identified at the monthly frequency in the time series dimension. In Section 3.3, I will be able to better disentangle them.

Table 3: Convenience Yields and the Global Financial Cycle (5-Year Sovereign Bond)

Dep. var: $cy_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
MP rate $_{t-1}$	1.349** (0.543)	1.407** (0.551)	1.269** (0.547)	1.234** (0.544)	2.481*** (0.737)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{U.S. debt to GDP}}{\text{Local Debt to GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$	-18.45** (7.867)	-18.94** (7.712)	-17.66** (7.655)	-16.72** (7.890)	-13.13 (9.034)
U.S. fed funds $_{t-1}$	5.351* (3.021)	4.711 (2.888)	5.432* (2.992)	5.336* (3.005)	8.872** (3.885)
vix $_{t-1}$	-1.012*** (0.307)	-0.991*** (0.291)	-1.027*** (0.304)	-1.047*** (0.300)	-1.019*** (0.387)
$(\frac{\text{DebtInflow}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$		5.721 (4.463)			4.988 (4.471)
$(\frac{\text{EquityInflow}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$		6.230 (11.05)			9.815 (10.97)
$(\frac{\text{GovdebtInflow}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-1.530 (1.913)	-1.855 (1.902)	
$(\frac{\text{BankdebtInflow}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-3.221** (1.290)	-3.372*** (1.272)	
$(\frac{\text{CorpdebtInflow}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			1.653* (0.938)	1.625* (0.930)	
Terms of trade				-127.6 (83.94)	-122.1 (94.49)
Diff. Inflation					-1.076 (0.749)
Democratic risk					-9.810** (4.752)
Constant	51.20 (40.53)	56.25 (39.86)	45.78 (39.41)	629.2 (380.1)	549.1 (425.5)
Observations	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,137	1,012
R-squared	0.680	0.683	0.686	0.688	0.708

Notes: Data are at monthly frequency. All columns include country and year fixed effects. Standard errors are double-clustered by country and year. Start dates vary among countries but ends in March 2021 for all. Capital inflows-to-GDP variables are standardized by mean and standard deviation of each country. “Diff. inflation” is yearly inflation rate in each country minus yearly inflation in the United States. “Democratic risk” measures political accountability (International Country Risk Guide, April 2019 version), and it is standardized by mean and standard deviation of each country (higher values reflect higher risk). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, I controlled for capital inflows as a robustness check for the effect of the VIX. As mentioned earlier, the VIX is strongly correlated with a global factor that explains about 35% of the variance of gross capital flows. As the GFC literature suggests, a lower federal funds rate lowers dollar funding costs, lowering risk perception and encouraging credit and capital inflows. In Columns 2-4, I added capital inflows disaggregated by type (debt versus equity) and by the sector to which they are directed (government, bank, or corporate debt). Data for the latter are taken from Adjiev et al. (forthcoming).

There are three important results in this exercise. First, the VIX kept its negative effect on the local bond convenience yield, which suggests that the effect comes from global risk perceptions and not from capital flows. Second, inflows into government debt did not affect the local-currency convenience yield, which adds further evidence for the role of local investors as the source of safety and liquidity demand. Third, inflows into bank debt significantly reduced the local-currency convenience yield. This is consistent with the empirical regularity of local banks being the largest holders of sovereign debt in EMEs. This result might be explained by banks having lower demand for collateral services from local sovereign bonds at times when foreigners flock to bank debt.

In Column 4, I controlled for the terms of trade for each country, measured as the commodity price index of exports over the equivalent for imports. This is an important robustness check as Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2021) found that a global factor highly correlated with commodity indices and international trade was the second main factor for capital flows and additionally explained 31% of the variance of fluctuations in private liquidity worldwide. Column 4 shows that my results regarding the local-currency convenience yield were not driven by this global factor. More importantly, Column 4 provides further evidence that local-currency convenience yields are driven by risk perceptions rather than factors related to trade.

One last robustness exercise consists of introducing local secular factors that do not vary at the business cycle frequency. It is natural to expect that EMEs with better institutions, governance, and higher levels of investor confidence would enjoy a higher local-currency convenience yield. It might be the case that the global determinants I have so far considered are just masking these local secular factors. To check this possibility, in the last column, I added the differential yearly inflation in each country with respect to the United States, and the differential index in democratic accountability, taken from the dataset of the International Country Risk Guide. I standardized this index so higher values mean higher political risk. The results show that higher political risk decreased the local-currency convenience yield, but, importantly, it did not account for the effect of the global determinants.

The results in this subsection are also robust to the inclusion of a time trend and to the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor.

3.3 Event Studies

In this subsection, I address the possible endogeneity of the local monetary policy rate, the U.S. monetary policy rate, and the VIX index. The local monetary policy rate is the most likely to be endogenous, as an unobserved liquidity demand shock can affect both the local central bank's rate decisions and the local-currency convenience yield. The U.S. monetary policy rate and the VIX index are less likely to be endogenous, since financial developments in emerging markets seldom call for a policy response by the Fed or to an increase in global risk aversion.

To address these issues, I conducted event studies within narrow windows around monetary policy movements and risk-on events. In particular, I tested the panel specification:

$$\Delta cy_{i,t} = c_i + \tau_t + \gamma \times MPM_t^i + \beta \times MPM_t^{US} + \delta \times RP_t + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (14)$$

In Equation (14), MPM_t^{US} is the change in the 2-year U.S. Treasury yield between the closing of the business day before and the day after each monetary policy meeting of the U.S. Federal Reserve. The rationale for this measure, proposed by Hanson and Stein (2015), is that the actual federal funds rate changes are infrequent and often anticipated by the market. Moreover, relevant information could be presented at each meeting about the course of monetary policy that would be missed if one used only the contemporaneous federal funds rate. For these reasons, the authors proposed using a relatively short-maturity yield for capturing changes in the stance of future monetary policy that could arise from information released during FOMC meetings. MPM_t^i is the analogous variable for local monetary policy, i.e., the change in the local-currency 2-year yield sovereign bond around monetary policy meetings of the local central bank.

RP_t is a global risk-on event, defined as a date on which the VIX had a daily variation (either positive or negative) larger than two standard deviations (computed on the daily average change in the period January 2003 through December 2019). Then, I defined the risk-on shock as the 2-day differential in the VIX around those days. c_i and τ_t are currency and year fixed effects, respectively, that control for common events that could affect yields. $\epsilon_{i,t}$ are clustered standard errors around currency and year.

The left-hand side of Equation (14) is the change in the local-currency convenience yield between the close of the business day after and the day before each monetary policy meeting and risk-on event. As before, this is the convenience yield on the 5-year local-currency sovereign bond.

Between December 2007 and March 2021, there were 103 FOMC meetings of the Fed, and an average of 144 local monetary policy meetings in emerging markets (most of which hold monthly meetings, whereas the Fed only conducts eight meetings a year). There were 1,073 risk-on events on the daily sample.

To interpret the results as causal forces affecting the local-currency convenience yield, the three events defined above must not overlap and should not be contaminated by other economic releases.

Table 4: Determinants of Convenience yields - Event Studies

$\Delta cy_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MPM_t^i	0.185*** (0.0585)	0.183*** (0.0576)	0.184*** (0.0576)	0.167** (0.0694)
MPM_t^{US}	0.401* (0.212)	0.403* (0.210)	0.403* (0.210)	0.423* (0.219)
RP_t	-1.055*** (0.293)	-1.074*** (0.286)	-1.074*** (0.286)	-0.280 (0.252)
Constant	-1.497 (1.506)	-2.409 (1.558)	-2.313 (1.568)	-1.541 (1.505)
Currency FE	Y	N	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Month FE	N	Y	Y	N
Observations	22,695	22,695	22,695	20,309
R-squared	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.004

Notes: Data are at daily frequency. Standard errors are double-clustered by country and year. Column 4 excludes crises (January 2010-December 2019). MPM^i stands for local central banks' meetings, MPM^{US} stands for U.S. Fed's FOMC meetings. RP_t are risk-on events measured by the VIX intraday variation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Albagli et al. (2022), for a larger sample of emerging markets, showed that less than 2% of local monetary policy meetings overlapped with FOMC meetings, and less than 5% overlapped with risk-on events. Similarly, Albagli et al. (2019) showed that economic data releases in the U.S. and emerging markets (including inflation, industrial production, and unemployment new data releases) overlapped at most with 6% of local and U.S. monetary policy meetings.

Table 4 shows the results. Columns 1-3 provide different specifications for the fixed effects included in the estimation. Column 4 drops the 2008's financial crisis and the Covid pandemic to make sure results are not driven by mispricing during these extreme events (The sample in Column 4 runs from January 2010-December 2019).

Overall, previous results are robust: The local convenience yield significantly increased around local monetary policy tightenings. This supports that safety and liquidity are the sources of the local-currency convenience yield. As the central banks raises the price of liquidity, it also increases the premium investors are willing to pay for the liquidity of sovereign bonds.

Risk-on events significantly reduced the local-currency convenience yield, supporting the finding that global events reduce the safety value investors attach to these sovereign bonds. In Column 4, the coefficient lost its significance, but this is mostly explained by the sample used. Between January 2010 and December 2019, there were only 64 risk-on events, compared to 1,073 such events considered in Columns 1-3. Interestingly, these event studies were able to capture the isolated impact of the federal funds rate: U.S. monetary policy tightenings increased the value of the convenience service of local sovereign bonds. This suggests that the U.S. federal funds rate has an impact through the supply of dollar liquidity, which is different from its effect through risk perception. However, this effect is only slightly significant and lower in magnitude than the effect of risk-on events.

3.4 Local-Currency Convenience Yield's Cyclical

If local-currency convenience yields are not a good hedge against global shocks, then what sustains the safety value attached by investors? In this section I test the response of the convenience yield to the local cycle. In the United States, the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries has been shown to be countercyclical (i.e., the safety value increases in recessions), which puts downward pressure on interest rates during these crises. To test this property for EME sovereign bonds, I estimated a regression of the local-currency convenience yield on the output gap. To be consistent with the literature and the previous section, I also included the monetary policy rate, the supply of safe assets, and global risk aversion (VIX). The coefficient on the output gap will measure the cyclical of the local-currency convenience yield conditional on the short-term policy rate, the public provision of safe assets, and demand shifters such as the VIX. I measured the output gap using the year-on-year change in the log of industrial production index. This index is available monthly only for seven of the countries considered, excluding Peru and the Philippines.

Table 5 shows the results. I find that the local-currency convenience yield is mildly procyclical across all columns (i.e., coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level). The last two columns imply increases of about 17 basis points in the local-currency bond premium with a 1% increase in output growth above trend. This result implies that the safety/liquidity services of local-currency sovereigns are supported by these services' provision during good times, unlike the case of the United States.

It is important to note that the results stand after controlling for several endogenous variables that are likely to mitigate the independent effects of output. Results are robust to including a time trend and clustering errors on currency alone, as well as to including the lagged dependent variable.

This result is even more interesting because it cannot be explained by government debt supply in developing countries being countercyclical. If that were the case, then the local-currency convenience yield could be low during recessions because the government would be issuing too much debt

Table 5: Cyclicity of Convenience Yields

$cy_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Output gap	19.58** (9.747)	14.12** (6.774)	14.57** (6.987)	13.25* (6.755)
MP rate $_{t-1}$	0.745 (0.485)	0.946* (0.488)	1.018** (0.496)	0.666 (0.481)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{US debt to GDP}}{\text{Debt to GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$	-5.314 (10.75)	-7.180 (10.66)	-7.333 (10.70)	
US fed funds $_{t-1}$	11.10* (5.898)	4.875 (4.355)		3.334 (3.855)
vix $_{t-1}$		-0.809** (0.374)	-0.913** (0.420)	-0.812** (0.365)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{EME debt}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$				-0.261 (10.54)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{US debt}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$				-151.2*** (53.33)
Constant	-45.69 (50.06)	9.262 (53.96)	33.50 (55.65)	-268.9*** (94.60)
Observations	833	833	833	833
R-squared	0.685	0.698	0.697	0.713

Notes: Monthly frequency. Standard errors are clustered by country and year. All columns include currency and year fixed effects. Output gap is measured as the 12-month log difference in industrial production (OECD series). Data available for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa, and Turkey. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

in such a state of the world. However, all available evidence points to the procyclicality of debt supply in EMEs. It is a well established fact that government spending in developing countries has often been procyclical (Frankel et al., 2013). In other words, government spending has increased in good times and contracted in bad times, thus exacerbating the underlying business cycle, which is the opposite of what has happened in developed countries. At the same time, tax revenues have been shown to be procyclical: The government raises less revenue during recessions. Végh and Vuletin (2013) showed that this was due to tax policy: Governments in developing countries actually increased the tax *rate* during recessions. These empirical regularities suggest that the supply of government debt in EMEs is likely to be procyclical. In fact, the limited access to credit markets in

bad times is one of the main explanations offered for government spending procyclicality in EMEs.

If the supply of government debt in developing countries is procyclical, then the procyclicality of the local-currency convenience yield must be explained by the demand side. The safety value investors attach to local-currency sovereign bonds must drop during bad times to deliver the procyclicality of the convenience yield. A natural explanation would be that investors demand for the safety of the local asset during adverse episodes is driven by the availability of alternative safe assets. The next subsection will present evidence supporting this mechanism and discuss alternative explanations.

3.5 Inspecting the Mechanism

This subsection suggests possible mechanisms behind the loss of the safety status of EMEs' sovereign bonds during bad times. I do so by analyzing two identifiable exogenous shocks to EMEs, the Taper Tantrum and the Covid pandemic. These are widely accepted as exogenous and unanticipated adverse shocks to EMEs. The Taper Tantrum started with Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's speech in May 2013 whereas the Covid-19 episode likely represents many shocks; therefore, I will focus my analysis on the early months of the pandemic (March-June 2020). Both episodes involved an increase in risk and a capital inflow reversal for EMEs, but one difference is that, unlike the first months of the Covid shock, the Taper Tantrum did not trigger a flight to safety episode (understood as global investors buying U.S. Treasuries because of their safety). This can be seen in the response of the VIX index (which did not increase) and in the fact that it also drove a sell-off of U.S. Treasuries.

In Table 6, I interact the shocks with the explanatory variables to differentiate among possible channels. In the case of the Taper Tantrum, the coefficient of the interaction between the shock and the local monetary policy rate was significant. The monetary policy rate proxies the price of alternative safe and liquid assets, such as local currency and private deposits. As the central bank tightens, the price of these other assets increases, driving up the price on close substitutes, such as government debt. This mechanism sheds light on the procyclicality with local economic activity of the local-currency convenience yield. Monetary policy easing during downturns increases the availability of currency and private forms of money, driving down the premium local investors attach to government debt. Lastly, the coefficient of the interaction between U.S. debt supply and the Taper Tantrum measures any change in the slope of the demand for global safe assets. This coefficient is not significant, which is consistent with the lack of a flight to safety episode.

Column 2 shows that the Covid shock significantly reduced the local-currency convenience yield. The interaction with debt supply was significantly negative, suggesting that the demand for global safe assets became significantly steeper. This is consistent with a global flight to the safety of U.S. Treasuries, and with local investors preferring this safe asset over the local one. Another mechanism

Table 6: Effects of Taper Tantrum and Covid-19 Shocks

Dep. var: $cy_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)
MP rate $_{t-1}$	0.748*** (0.279)	0.838*** (0.289)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{US debt to GDP}}{\text{Debt to GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$	-10.82*** (3.338)	-11.49*** (3.440)
vix $_{t-1}$	-0.361* (0.203)	-0.405 (0.262)
$\left(\frac{\text{DebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$	3.028 (2.682)	2.919 (2.679)
$\left(\frac{\text{EquityInfl}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1}$	1.629 (5.474)	2.042 (5.401)
TT $_{t-1}$	3.191 (2.671)	
MP rate $_{t-1} \times$ TT	1.899*** (0.632)	
$\log\left(\frac{\text{US debt to GDP}}{\text{Debt to GDP}}\right)_{t-1} \times$ TT	0.328 (0.479)	
vix $_{t-1} \times$ TT	-0.554 (0.461)	
$\left(\frac{\text{DebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1} \times$ TT	0.328 (0.479)	
$\left(\frac{\text{EquityInfl}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1} \times$ TT	-3.952 (14.18)	
Covid-19 $_{t-1}$		-21.38*** (5.394)
MP rate $_{t-1} \times$ Covid-19		-2.387 (1.510)
$\log\left(\frac{\text{US debt to GDP}}{\text{Debt to GDP}}\right)_{t-1} \times$ Covid-19		-2.824*** (0.623)
vix $_{t-1} \times$ Covid-19		0.722*** (0.267)
$\left(\frac{\text{DebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1} \times$ Covid-19		-2.636 (5.972)
$\left(\frac{\text{EquityInfl}}{\text{GDP}}\right)_{t-1} \times$ Covid-19		-15.80 (15.02)
Constant	43.91** (17.11)	47.48** (18.38)
Observations	1,137	1,137
R-squared	0.686	0.688

Notes: See Table 3. TT is a dummy variable taking the value 1 from May to December 2013. Covid-19 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 from March to June 2020. All columns include country and year fixed effects *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

at work was the overall risk aversion, as shown by the interaction with the VIX.

Are there other mechanisms that could be at play? A common alternative explanation rests

on the mechanism of financial repression. The government might want to force the local banks to hold its debt, and specially so during downturns. However, if financial repression drives down local yields and it is likely to be enforced during recessions, then it would show up in the data as a countercyclical convenience yield. Another one is inflation risk, since economic activity in EMEs is more likely to face adverse supply shocks. However, this and other risks are already part of the decomposition of local convenience yields in Section 2.

Of course, the mechanism highlighted in this section still leaves questions open. If its true that the local-currency convenience yield is driven by the existence of alternative safe assets (be either local currency or global safe assets), it still needs to be explained what precise feature of the local-currency sovereign bond makes it less preferred than these alternatives. This question goes beyond the scope of this paper, but it certainly represents a venue for future research.

3.6 Summary of Empirical Analysis

Let me briefly summarize the key takeaways from this and the previous section. Data on deviations of covered interest parity conditions show that investors are willing to pay more than 30 basis points for the safety and liquidity of EMEs' local-currency sovereign bonds, compared to non-Treasuries safe dollar bonds. However, this does not make them equivalent to a U.S. Treasury or a reserve currency country. The main difference is that their local-currency convenience yield is procyclical, suggesting that their value as safe assets drops during recessions. Available evidence for developing countries suggests that government debt supply is also procyclical, which implies that the procyclicality of the convenience yield must come from the demand side since the safe asset status investors place on them is lost during recessions. An inspection of the Taper Tantrum and Covid crises suggests that the mechanism works through the availability of alternative safe assets, either within the local economy or globally.

In the Appendix I ran a series of robustness tests for Sections 3.1-3.5. First, I ran the same regressions but with credit risk as a dependent variable, which is another component of CIP deviations. If my decomposition in Section 2 accurately disentangled local-currency bond premiums from default risk, then determinants should be different. The results of that exercise confirm this. In stark contrast with convenience yields, credit risk does not respond to the supply of safe assets, and debt inflows significantly reduce default risk. Second, I also addressed the concern that my results might be driven by periods of high illiquidity and mispricing of EME assets (either sovereign bonds, CDS contracts, or interest rate swaps). I reran the regressions by dropping both the 2008 and 2020 crises in order to only capture only "normal" periods. The results there suggest that the role of safety and liquidity demand as a source of EMEs' convenience yields is robust to this smaller sample.

4 Model

The aim of this section is to formalize the interaction of different safe assets from the perspective of a small open economy and to allow for policy experiments. The model economy builds on the standard RBC-SOE model with incomplete insurance markets and endogenous collateral constraints (Mendoza, 2010; Bianchi, 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2020). Three important extensions are introduced here. First, the representative household has a preference for safe assets. This preference is introduced through a money-in-the-utility function specification. Second, safe assets include a local bond, financed by taxes, and a foreign bond, whose price is world-determined. And third, I introduce a shock to safety demand as in Kekre and Lenel (2021), which they showed accounted for a sizeable portion of output volatility in the United States and the rest of the world.

4.1 Households

The small open economy is inhabited by a large set of identical, infinitely lived households. The preference specification is:

$$E_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [u(c_t - N(L_t)) + v(b_t^S, b_t; \zeta_t)] \right] \quad (15)$$

In this expression, $u(\cdot)$ and $v(\cdot)$ are standard twice-continuously differentiable and concave period utility functions. Following GHH (1988), $u(\cdot)$ is defined in terms of the excess of consumption relative to the disutility of labor, with the latter given by the twice-continuously differentiable convex function, $N(\cdot)$. This assumption eliminates the wealth effect on labor supply by making the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor independent of consumption. $v(\cdot)$ is defined in terms of the holdings of two type of bonds: foreign, b_t^S , whose price fluctuates exogenously and which admits either short or long positions by the household, and local, b_t , issued by the local government and for which the restriction $b_t \geq 0$ applies. The latter means that the household cannot borrow from the local government. Both bonds are 1-period bonds. ζ_t captures an exogenous shock to the demand for safety and liquidity.

Households choose sequences of consumption and labor supply. Investment opportunities are domestic capital, k_{t+1} ; local 1-period bonds, b_{t+1} ; and foreign borrowing or lending in 1-period international bonds, b_{t+1}^S . Decisions maximize (15) subject to the following period budget constraint:

$$(1 + \tau_t)c_t + q_t k_{t+1} + q_t^b b_{t+1}^S + p_t^b b_{t+1} = (d_t + q_t)k_t + w_t L_t + b_t^S + b_t + T_t \quad (16)$$

Households take as given the dividend rate on capital holdings, d_t ; the market price of capital, q_t ; the wage rate, w_t ; the price of the local bond, p_t^b ; and the stochastic gross world interest rate on foreign assets, $R^S \exp(\epsilon_t^R) \equiv 1/q_t^b$. ϵ_t^R is an interest rate shock that follows a Markov process joint with the other shocks defined later.

The world credit market is imperfect. Lenders require households to guarantee their debt by offering domestic assets as collateral. The collateral constraint takes the form of the margin requirement proposed by Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and commonly used in Mendoza (2010) or Bianchi and Mendoza (2020):

$$q_t^b b_{t+1}^{\$} \geq -(\kappa^h q_t k_{t+1} + \kappa^b p_t^b b_{t+1}) \quad (17)$$

Thus, households can borrow internationally up to a fraction κ^h of the market value of their capital and a fraction κ^b of the market value of the local bonds. The margin constraint is not derived from an optimal credit contract. Instead, the constraint is imposed directly as in the models with endogenous credit constraints examined in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), even though a constraint like (17) can be endogenously modeled.

4.2 Firms

Firms are owned by households and discount future profits by taking as given the households' stochastic discount factors, Λ_t . Firms produce a tradable good that sells at a world-determined price (normalized to one for simplicity). They make plans for factor demands and investment. Net investment, $z_t = k_{t+1} - k_t$, incurs unitary investment costs determined by the function $\Psi(z_t/k_t)$, which is linearly homogenous in z_t and k_t . To this, I introduce working capital constraints. In particular, firms need working capital to pay for a fraction ϕ of their labor costs in advance of sales. Firms are required to guarantee working capital loans so working capital financing cannot exceed the fraction κ^f of the value of firms' assets. The role of working capital constraints is to allow for sudden stops to have an impact on contemporary output.

The firms' problem is to choose labor demand and investment so as to maximize their value:

$$E_0 \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(\prod_{j=0}^t \Lambda_j^{j-1} \right) \left(A_t F(k_t, L_t) - w_t L_t - \delta k_t - \phi(R_t^{\$} - 1) w_t L_t - z_t \left[1 + \Psi \left(\frac{z_t}{k_t} \right) \right] \right) \right] \quad (18)$$

subject to the law of motion for capital,

$$z_t = k_{t+1} - k_t \quad (19)$$

and the collateral constraint on working capital financing:

$$R_t^{\$} \phi w_t L_t \leq \kappa^f q_t k_{t+1} \quad (20)$$

Gross output in (18) is defined by a constant-returns-to-scale technology, $A_t F(k_t, L_t)$, that requires capital, k_t , and labor, L_t , to produce the tradable good. This total factor productivity (TFP) is subject to random shocks. The firm makes wage payments, $w_t L_t$, and payments on the

interest of the working capital loans, $\phi(R_t^{\$} - 1)w_t L_t$. Working capital in (20) is a within-period loan contracted at the beginning of each period and paid off after the current output is sold at the end of the period. Hence, lenders set the limit on working capital considering that the market value of the assets offered as collateral must cover interest and principal on working capital loans.

4.3 Government

The government collects taxes on consumption and borrows from households. This borrowing, in turn, determines the supply of the local bond (1-period bond). At the same time, the government aims to keep a stable ratio of debt to GDP, which is a direct way to achieve a procyclical supply of the local bond (and thus match the evidence for developing countries discussed in Section 3.4).

Every period, the government issues new bonds and adjusts the tax rate in order to pay for the maturing bonds from the previous period. Ricardian equivalence does not hold here because bond holdings provide a safety service for the households.. The tax rate will vary to satisfy the following budget constraint:

$$\tau_t c_t + p_t^b b_{t+1} = b_t \quad (21)$$

Equation (21) implies that tax rates are going to be higher both in states where output is higher and in states where the price of the local bond is lower. Therefore, tax rates are going to be procyclical, which is also consistent with evidence for emerging markets (Vegh and Vuletin, 2013; Frankel et al., 2013). Concurrently, lower demand for the local bond will encourage the government to raise the tax rate.

Results and policy implications in the next section do not rely on this procyclicality. These insights will be robust to alternative specifications, such as a constant tax rate or bond supply. I defer to Section 5 the modelling of unconventional liquidity policy, in which the government is able to buy capital from households in exchange for local bonds.

4.4 Driving Forces

Productivity A_t follows an AR(1) process with first-order autocorrelation ρ^A and standard deviation σ^A . The global shock is modeled as a pair $\{R_t^{\$}, \zeta_t\}$ that follows a discrete Markov process. I model $R_t^{\$}$ as in Mendoza (2010) where $R_t^{\$} = R^{\$} \exp(\epsilon_t^R)$, where $R^{\$} = 1.0857$ and $\epsilon_1^R = -\epsilon_2^R = 0.0196$.

The two realizations of ζ_t are calibrated to approximate the statistical moments of the dollar convenience yield as described in Kekre and Lenel (2021). In this setting, ζ_t positively co-moves with the world rate, $R_t^{\$}$. This parameter captures the impact of global demand for dollar safe assets, on which the small open economy has little influence. The positive comovement with the world rate is grounded on the empirical findings of Nagel (2016), who documented a strong positive correlation between the federal funds rate and the liquidity premium on U.S. government debt.

The intuition behind the correlation is that a higher monetary policy rate reduces the supply of liquid assets such as bank deposits and T-bills, raising the price paid on liquidity services.

4.5 Equilibrium

There are two endogenous states, $\{k_t, b_t^S\}$, and two exogenous states that correspond to the two exogenous shocks that work as driving forces: productivity, A_t , and the shock that moves the pair $\{R_t^S, \zeta_t\}$.

A competitive equilibrium for the small open economy is defined by decision rules $\{c_t, L_t, k_{t+1}, b_{t+1}^S, b_{t+1}, z_t\}$ and prices $\{q_t, d_t, w_t, p_t^b, \Lambda_t\}$ such that: (a) households maximize (15) subject to (16) and (17), taking as given dividends, wages, equity and bond prices, and the world interest rate; (b) firms maximize their value subject to (19) and (20), taking as given wages, the world interest rate, and the household stochastic discount factor; and (c) the capital, bonds, labor, and goods markets clear.

The households' optimality conditions with respect to bond holdings yield the following Euler equations for the international and the local bond, respectively:

$$q_t^b = \beta E \left[\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left(1 + \frac{v_{F,t+1}}{\lambda_{t+1}} \right) \right] + \frac{\mu_t}{\lambda_t} \quad (22)$$

$$p_t^b = \beta E \left[\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left(1 + \frac{v_{L,t+1}}{\lambda_{t+1}} \right) \right] + \frac{\mu_t \kappa^b}{\lambda_t} \quad (23)$$

where λ_t and μ_t are the Lagrange multipliers for the budget constraint and the collateral constraint, respectively. As usual, λ_t equals the lifetime marginal utility of c_t . v_i represents the first derivative of the $v(.,.)$ function in (15) with respect to $i \in \{L, F\}$, which stand for “local” and “foreign” bonds, respectively. The price of the bonds depends on the two reasons why households demand bonds. First, there is the intertemporal substitution motive. This is the typical motive in standard neoclassical models in which households demand bonds to smooth their consumption path. This is captured by the stochastic discount factor, $\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t}$, in equations (22) and (23).

Second, there is a safety motive, above and beyond the intertemporal substitution motive. This demand for safety is captured in a reduced-form way by the convenience yield, $CY_{i,t+1} \equiv \frac{v_{i,t+1}}{\lambda_{i+1}}$, $i \in \{L, F\}$. This term measures the marginal non-pecuniary convenience service of an extra bond. This convenience yield drives a spread with respect to a bond that provides no safety/liquidity services. The price of such a bond (call it \hat{q}_t^b), although not traded in the model, can be tracked by the pure intertemporal savings motive, $\hat{q}_t^b = \beta E(\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t})$. The foreign and the local bond will have higher prices than this non-safe bond, depending on the magnitude of their convenience yields; respectively:

$$q_t^b - \hat{q}_t^b = \beta E \left[\frac{v_{F,t+1}}{\lambda_t} \right] \quad (24)$$

$$p_t^b - \hat{q}_t^b = \beta E \left[\frac{v_{L,t+1}}{\lambda_t} \right] \quad (25)$$

Even though it is a reduced-form specification, this captures the main empirical properties found in Section 3. First, the convenience yield lowers the equilibrium yield on the bonds, below the level that would be implied by the consumption smoothing demand alone. Second, it depends negatively on the supply of safe assets (through $v_{i,t+1}$), and positively on expected future consumption (through $1/\lambda_{t+1}$) which represents a wealth effect. Third, the equilibrium convenience yields are fully endogenous (unlike, for example, the specification in Kkre and Lenel, 2021).

Equations (22) and (23) also make clear that the introduction of the bonds in the utility function serves two important purposes. First, it allows a model counterpart for the convenience yields found in the empirical section. Second, it disentangles the prices of the two bonds. If $v_F = v_L = 0$, I would face the common issue with small open economy models where the local interest rate is equal to the world interest rate. Any increase in demand for precautionary savings would not affect p_t^b because the adjustment in b_t^S would offset the impact. Importantly, p_t^b would be exogenously determined, and thus I could not analyze the behavior of the local interest rate along the global financial cycle. This strategy to obtain a local interest rate is close to the one used by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017, Chapter 4) but with one important difference: They introduced a wedge that captured default risk, and so the wedge was *increasing* with the supply of debt.

The expected excess return of capital with respect to the foreign bond is given by:

$$E[R_{t+1}^k - \tilde{R}_{t+1}^S] = \frac{\mu_t(1 - \kappa^f) - cov(\lambda_{t+1}, R_{t+1}^k) + cov(\lambda_{t+1}, CY_{F,t+1})}{E[\lambda_{t+1}]} \quad (26)$$

where the tilde (\sim) variable denotes the return including the convenience payoff. On the right-hand side, the first term in the numerator is the direct effect of the collateral constraint on the equity premium: The binding constraint increases the shadow price of borrowing by μ_t , and the fact that capital holdings allow one to borrow more reduces this cost by $\kappa\mu_t$. The second term is the standard covariance between consumption risk and capital return. Since this covariance is negative, consumption risk increases the equity premium. The third term captures the convenience service provided by the foreign bond, so it represents the convenience yield. Therefore, expected excess return of capital is the sum of consumption risk premia, safety premia, and the risk of sudden stops. As the safety shock increases the third term, it is easy to see that an increase in the demand for safety will have an impact on q_t -and on investment - through the expected excess return of capital.

In addition, equations (22) and (23) can be worked out to deliver the following expression for the differences in prices of the two bonds:

$$q_t^b - p_t^b = \beta E \left[\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t - \kappa^b \mu_t} \left(CY_{F,t+1} - CY_{L,t+1} \right) \right] \quad (27)$$

This expression is equivalent to the CIP deviation in the model since the model is set up in real terms and there is no default risk. The foreign bond will have a higher price than the local bond if its marginal convenience service is higher than the marginal convenience service provided by the local bond, the term inside the parentheses. This differential convenience yield is discounted at the stochastic discount factor, adjusted by the possibility of a sudden stop, $\frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t - \kappa^b \mu_t}$.

In general equilibrium, the equity market clears and asset prices adjust so that the households' investment plans are consistent with those formulated by firms. On the firms' side, the optimality conditions for k_{t+1} and z_t are:

$$1 + \Psi \left(\frac{z_t}{k_t} \right) + \frac{z_t}{k_t} \Psi' \left(\frac{z_t}{k_t} \right) = \eta_t \quad (28)$$

$$\begin{aligned} E_t[\Lambda_t(d_{t+1} + \eta_{t+1})] + \chi_t \kappa^f q_t &= \eta_t \\ d_{t+1} &\equiv A_{t+1} F_1(k_{t+1}, L_{t+1}) - \delta + \left(\frac{z_{t+1}}{k_{t+1}} \right)^2 \Psi' \left(\frac{z_{t+1}}{k_{t+1}} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (29)$$

where η_t and χ_t are the Lagrange multipliers on the investment Equation (19) and the working capital constraint (20), respectively.

Notice that, since firms discount at the households' stochastic discount factor, the forward solution of (29) yields asset prices consistent with the households' decision when $\eta_t = q_t$. The optimal choice for z_{t+1} (given k_t and q_t) implied by the firms' optimal investment condition (28) represents the firms' demand for investment resources (i.e., its equity supply function). Since (28) is a standard Tobin Q relationship, the fact that $\Psi(\cdot)$ is increasing and convex implies that there is a positive relationship between investment demand and the equity price, or that the firms' equity supply function is upward sloping. This is because adjustment costs prevent firms from instantaneously adjusting the stock of capital to its long-run level. Hence, increases in demand for safety ultimately will have an impact on investment, and output, through this channel: Drops in q_t will make firms gradually reduce the capital stock and thus in firm investment.

Finally, the firms' first order condition with respect to labor gives the following expression:

$$A_t F_2(k_t, L_t) = w_t(1 + \phi(R_t - 1) + \phi R_t \chi_t) \quad (30)$$

On the right-hand side, the term $R_t \chi_t$ reflects the increase in the effective marginal financing cost of working capital caused by the collateral constraint. As explained in Mendoza (2010), this allows a sudden stop to have a negative impact on contemporary output and employment.

Fisherian deflation as described in Bianchi and Mendoza (2020) is present in the model and affects all assets that serve as collateral, although it is harder to illustrate it in closed-form equations. When the collateral constraint binds, households respond by fire-selling equity and local bonds. When they sell equity, they meet with firms that feature an upward-sloping supply of equity because of Tobin’s Q. These firms thus find it optimal to lower investment given the reduced demand for equity and higher discounting of future dividends, so equilibrium equity prices fall. But this only reinforces the tightness of the constraint, so a second round of sales takes place and Fisher’s deflation mechanism is set into motion. In the case of the local bond, this effect can be (partially) offset by an increase in the demand for its convenience services.

4.6 Discussion

Empirical counterparts. Most of the model elements can be justified as a way to match the empirical results in the previous section. The dependent variable in the regressions, the local-currency convenience yield for each country, can be traced in the model by the behavior of v_L/λ_{t+1} . In this case, the non-Treasury U.S. safe dollar bond in the data corresponds to the implied non-safe bond in the model, whose price is \hat{q}_t^b . The effect of the VIX index, which is a proxy for global risk aversion, is captured in the model by the effect of the exogenous global shock that affects both the world interest rate and the convenience yield of the foreign bond. As documented in Rey (2013), increases in the U.S. federal funds rate led to increases in the VIX and to a reduction in capital and credit inflows. Capital inflows in the model are endogenous and correspond to negative values of b_t^S .

Although the regressions included the local monetary policy rate, there is no explicit monetary policy rate in the model. This is because, as shown in Cuevas (2022), the effect of the monetary policy rate on convenience yields works through the supply of liquid assets (under a scarce reserve system). An increase in the interest rate induces commercial banks and financial intermediaries to reduce the supply of deposits and other alternative liquid assets, decreasing the overall supply and increasing the convenience yield on all remaining liquid assets. This effect in the model is well captured by the $v(.,.)$ function. Adding an explicit monetary policy rate would not add new intuitions, and to keep the model as simple as possible, I abstracted from it. Therefore, the $v(.,.)$ function should be broadly understood as a device to capture the effect of the overall supply of liquid assets in different areas of the economy.

The two shocks, TFP and safety shock, were introduced to explicitly capture the difference between shocks to “local” and “global” variables. The process for TFP does not depend on global variables like the world interest rate or the preference for safety. The TFP shock has an impact on both the local and the foreign bond through the demand for consumption smoothing, and through the supply of the local bond (which is procyclical). Finally, even though there is no explicit

financial sector in the mode, the role of domestic investors is implicit in the role of the local bond as a collateral asset. A larger mass of local investors can be rationalized through a larger value of κ^b in the model, since they are the ones who will value the local bond as collateral. Section 5 below will show that a larger value of κ^b reduced the chances of sudden stops and this sustained a higher value of the convenience yield.

Other modeling choices There are alternative ways of achieving a convenience yield in a tractable model. For example, Del Negro et al. (2017), for a closed-economy model, did not rely on bonds-in-the-utility-function. Rather, they achieved a convenience yield on government bonds by adding a resaleability constraint on risky equity. When a shock reduced the resaleability of equity, entrepreneurs increased their demand for government bonds, which they could sell to take idiosyncratic investment opportunities. My model can be seen as an open-economy extension of Del Negro et al. (2017), as the function $v(.,.)$ is a “reduced form” way to capture the same dynamics but in an open-economy setting. A second advantage is that my strategy simplifies the simulation of an ergodic set with local and global shocks and an occasionally binding constraint. In contrast, Del Negro et al. (2017) achieved tractability by making entrepreneurs always binding in their collateral constraint, so they were only able to simulate a one-time reduction in the resaleability of equity, holding all other shocks constant.

In addition, the positive covariance between the foreign bond and the stochastic discount factor can be achieved through the introduction of the real exchange rate. This is the modeling choice in Maggiori (2017), for whom U.S. bonds are safe because the dollar appreciates in bad times. A real exchange rate can be added to my model by including a non-tradable sector. I abstract from this in order to highlight the dynamics of convenience yields alone. My approach is closer to Kekre and Lenel’s (2021), who introduced a shock to the demand for safety. However, many differences remain: Theirs was a two-country model, the convenience yield was fully exogenous, there was no role for the supply of safe assets, and their model did not account for the existence of two safe assets.

Fanelli and Straub (2021) also set up a real model for a small open economy with a local and a foreign bond. The local bond was in zero net supply, as they modeled two agents and financial intermediaries. These features can be added to my model, but I rather rely on one representative household and no intermediaries in order to achieve simplicity since they are not strictly necessary to highlight the mechanism I am analyzing.

4.7 Functional Forms

The functional forms for preferences and technology are the following:

$$u(c_t - N(L_t)) = \frac{\left[c_t - \frac{L_t^\omega}{\omega} \right]^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} \quad (31)$$

$$F(k_t, L_t) = A_t k_t^\gamma L_t^{1-\gamma} \quad (32)$$

$$\Psi\left(\frac{z_t}{k_t}\right) = \frac{a}{2} \left(\frac{z_t}{k_t} \right) \quad (33)$$

$$v(b_t^S, b_t) = \alpha \frac{Q_t^{1-\sigma_v}}{1 - \sigma_v} \quad (34)$$

where Q_t is the real stock of liquid assets that the household draws service flow from. As is now common in the literature (see Nagel, 2016), I assume this stock is a CES aggregate:

$$Q_t = \left[\theta \zeta_t (\max\{0, b_t^S\})^\rho + (1 - \theta \zeta_t) (b_t)^\rho \right]^{1/\rho} \quad (35)$$

The utility function in (31) is standard from DSGE-SOE models. The parameter σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ω determines the wage elasticity of labor supply. The Cobb-Douglas technology (32) is the production function for gross output, and Equation (33) is the net investment adjustment cost function.

Equation (34) is the preference function for safe assets and deserves a careful explanation. As explained above, ζ_t is exogenous and captures demand for global safe assets. Equation (34) assumes that demand for safety can be satisfied by the two available bonds. The parameter ρ controls the elasticity of substitution between the foreign and the local bond. With $\rho = 1$, both bonds are perfect substitutes. In the Cobb-Douglas limiting case, $\rho \rightarrow 0$, foreign and local bonds are neither substitutes nor complements. For any values $0 < \rho \leq 1$, they will be imperfect substitutes. The parameter θ is the relative weight of both bonds. Notice that only positive values of b_t^S enter into Equation (34), since it makes sense that foreign bonds only satisfy demand for safety when the household is holding an asset. Whenever $b_t^S < 0$, the household is borrowing abroad (representing capital inflows, in this case denominated in dollars), and therefore should not satisfy safety demand.

4.8 Calibration

Externally set parameters. I rely heavily on the calibration Mendoza (2010) completed for the Mexican economy. I do not intend this paper to be restricted to the Mexican case, but rather I take these parameters as representative of a developing economy. The parameters taken from this source are listed in Table 7.

Table 7: Externally Set Parameters

Parameter	Value	Notes
β	0.97	
σ	2	
ω	1.846	
γ	0.306	
δ	0.088	
a	2.75	
ϕ	0.26	
κ	0.2	
ρ^A	0.537	
σ^A	1.34	

Notes: Parameters are from Mendoza (2010)'s calibration for the Mexican economy.

Calibrated parameters. Parameters left to be calibrated are mostly related to the convenience yield, which comes from Equation (34). Parameters that need to be calibrated are α , σ_v , θ , and ρ . The first target is the mean proportion of the local-currency convenience yield to the total local-currency yield. In the model, this target will correspond to the mean convenience yield (which is endogenous) as a proportion of the local interest rate, $R_t^b \equiv 1/p_t^b$. The other targets are the standard deviation of the local-currency convenience yield, the U.S. Treasury premium, and the procyclicality of the EME local-currency convenience yield with respect to output. The latter is especially important as it captures the main empirical difference between EMEs and advanced economies.

Both θ and ρ have a more direct influence on the U.S. Treasury premium and the procyclicality. The local-currency convenience yield will be more procyclical the closer substitutes the two bonds are and the larger the weight of foreign bonds in the liquidity aggregate. At the same time, the U.S. Treasury premium (the difference between the foreign- and local-currency convenience yield) will be lower the lower the relative weight of the foreign bond. Parameters α and σ_v will more directly affect the mean proportion of convenience yield to total yield and the standard deviation. At the end, all four parameters affect the different targets, so I minimize the distance with respect to the empirical moments.

I solved the model with the global non-linear method of Cao et al. (2020). As the borrowing constraint is tied to the price of capital and the price of the local bond, a shock that reduces asset prices tightens the collateral constraint, leading to deleveraging and reductions in both investment

Table 8: Targeted Moments and Calibrated Parameters

Parameter	Value	Moment	Target	Model
α	0.0012	$\text{mean}(CY_{Lt}/R_t^b)$	10%	8%
σ_v	1.8	$\text{std}(CY_{Lt})/\text{mean}(CY_{Lt})$	0.98	0.74
ρ	0.6	$\text{corr}(\text{GDP}, CY_{Lt})$	0.09	0.15
θ	0.4	$\text{mean}(CY_{Ft} - CY_{Lt})$	8.05 bp	9 bp
Untargeted moments				
		$\text{corr}(\text{GDP}, CY_{Ft})$	-0.1569	-0.3165
		$\text{corr}(\text{GDP}, \text{Cons})$	0.893	0.214
		$\text{corr}(\text{GDP}, \text{Inv})$	0.944	0.3347
		$\text{std}(\text{GDP})$	2.72	3.78
		$\text{std}(\text{Inv})$	9.77	12.32

Notes: based on the simulation of 50,000 periods, dropping the first 10,000 as burn in. CY_{Lt} corresponds to the EME local-currency convenience yield, and CY_{Ft} to the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries against comparable U.S. dollar bonds.

and working capital, so the effect of the shocks gets amplified. The collateral constraint is occasionally binding in the ergodic set, and the equilibrium policy and state transition functions are highly nonlinear. The algorithm in Cao et al. (2020) relies on simultaneous transition and policy function iteration and is able to capture the nonlinearities accurately.

Quantitative performance. Table 8 shows the results. The calibration was able to match fairly well the mean convenience yield as a proportion of the local yield. The standard deviation is somewhat lower than in the data, but still substantial compared to real variables. In addition, the parameterization matched the procyclicality of the EME local-currency convenience yield. Interestingly, the calibration matched these moments with a value of θ below 0.5, which is consistent with some degree of home bias in bond holdings.


The lower panel of Table 8 shows the performance of the model with respect to untargeted moments. The model was able to match the countercyclicality of the foreign bond convenience yield and showed lower correlations between GDP and both consumption and investment. In addition, the model slightly overshot the volatility of real variables, especially that of consumption.

4.9 Impulse Responses

Impulse responses to a TFP shock. I begin by evaluating the responses to a negative TFP shock to illustrate the response of the EME local-currency convenience yield to the local source of fluctuations. I refer to these as “local” because it is a shock that affects both the return on capital and on the local bond, but with no impact on the world interest rate.

Figure 3 summarizes a subset of the impulse responses. The top row shows the responses of

Figure 3: Impulse Responses to a Negative TFP Shock




output, investment, and consumption. The negative TFP shock reduced output, investment, and consumption, as in standard RBC models. The government had to increase taxes and reduce the supply of local bonds. At the same time, the households saved abroad, which increased the holdings of the foreign safe asset. At the end, there were two opposing forces on the local-currency convenience yield. The larger holdings of the foreign safe asset reduced the convenience yield, but the lesser supply of the local safe asset and future consumption growth increased it. Under the present calibration with $\theta < 1/2$ and $\rho < 1$, the latter effect outweighs the former, and the local-currency convenience yield increases. Notice that this is not in contradiction with the procyclicality of the local convenience yield estimated in Section 3.4. Table 5 shows that the local convenience yield is conditionally procyclical, while Figure 3 shows the unconditional impulse responses.

Impulse responses to a global shock. Now I show that the responses were different to an adverse global shock, represented by an exogenous increase in the world interest rate, R_t , accompanied by an increase in the demand for safety, ζ_t .

Figure 4 shows the impulse responses for the same set of variables. The higher safety premium ζ_t increased the expected excess return on all assets, which was achieved by a drop in assets' prices. The drop in the price of capital, in turn, reduced investment. Households increased their holdings of the foreign bond, which was accommodated by a drop in consumption. Output also dropped since there was a drop in demand for labor.

Importantly, the foreign bond paid well in a bad state of the world, i.e., in a state where output

Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a Safety Shock



and consumption dropped. There were two effects on the local bond. The larger holdings of the foreign bond more than satiated the demand for safety, and the government reduced the supply of the local bond. Both effects reduced the local-currency convenience yield and the price of the local bond. This made the local bond a risky asset when facing a global shock. Therefore, the foreign bond was a better safe asset than the local bond.

5 Policy Implications

In this section, I explore policy consequences of these results. I will take the drop in investment as the main adverse effect of safety shocks. This drop is produced by the increase in the convenience yield, which increases expected excess returns and so depresses asset prices. The root of the problem is a scarcity of safe assets in the economy. In a closed-economy framework, this problem has been analyzed in Del Negro et al. (2017), who quantified the effectiveness of purchases of capital from households financed by government bonds. In the remainder of this section, I will study the implications of that policy in my open-economy framework. The exercise does not involve a welfare analysis, which is certainly relevant but is left for future research.

5.1 Unconventional Liquidity Policy

Can the government intervene to reduce the scarcity of convenience assets and reduce the drop in investment? The advanced economy-equivalent would be the policies carried out by the U.S.

Federal Reserve during the 2008 financial crisis, such as the Term Auction Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and the Term Securities Lending Facilities. In broad terms, these facilities can be thought of as nonstandard open market operations, whereby the government exchanges highly liquid government paper for less liquid private paper. Alternatively, one can think of them as nonstandard discount window lending, which provides government liquidity -using private assets as collateral.

To add these policies to the model, I follow Del Negro et al. (2017) and allow the government to buy capital from the households, in exchange for local bonds. Since capital does not provide convenience services, this policy should have the effect of increasing the supply of liquidity. I replace the government's budget constraint in (21) for the following:

$$q_t k_{t+1}^g + b_t = \tau c_t + (q_t + d_t)k_t^g + p_t^b b_{t+1} \quad (36)$$

The left-hand side sums the government expenses, e.g., the purchase of capital holdings, k_{t+1}^g , and the payment of outstanding bonds, b_t . The right-hand side sums the source of funds, e.g., consumption tax revenue, returns on existing capital holdings, and new debt issuance.


This framework adds two new state variables, k_t^g and b_t . τ is now a parameter, which I set equal to 0.17 to be consistent with the parameterization in Mendoza (2010). The policy variable k_{t+1}^g follows the rule $k_{t+1}^g = \max\{\psi_k \zeta_t, 0\}$. As taxes are constant, the purchase is fully funded by new debt issuance. ψ_k is calibrated to deliver a liquidity injection of 0.6% of GDP, which is close to the average size of liquidity injections by EME central banks during 2020 (see Arslan et al, 2020).

The extent of market segmentation between foreign and local bond markets will be a key parameter for the analysis of this policy. In this section, I will deal with bond market segmentation in a reduced-form way, that is, not by modeling a micro foundation for bond market segmentation but by comparing the dynamics of the model under different values of the parameter ρ . In reality, such segmentation can arise from preferences or policy decisions. Regarding preferences, for example, it can be the case that a country has deeper trust or confidence in the local currency, and dollar-liquidity might not play the same role for cultural or historical reasons. Similarly, there are many policies that can create a specific demand for local-currency liquidity, for example, capital controls (by adding extra costs to the purchase of dollar-liquidity) or liquidity regulation (by requiring local banks to hold the local-currency sovereign debt).

Figure 5 shows the difference in IRFs with and without government intervention, for two degrees of bond market segmentation. The upper panel shows that central bank intervention has a different effect on the response of investment and the price of capital depending on the value of ρ . Under perfect substitution ($\rho = 1$), the local bonds provided by the government only crowd-out foreign holdings, so this has little effect on the liquidity aggregate, Q_t .

When both bonds are imperfect substitutes ($\rho = 0.1$), intervention can have greater effective-

Figure 5: IRF With Intervention Minus IRF Without Intervention



ness. Under imperfect substitutability, the composition of the liquidity aggregate between foreign and local bonds matters. However, the increase in holdings of the foreign bond does not compensate the households for the fewer local bonds (the drop in output reduces the government's issuance). As a result, the demand and the convenience yield for local bonds increase. This allows the local-currency liquidity provision by the government to have an impact on asset prices. The extra local bonds issued to finance the purchase of capital satisfy the demand for safety, reducing the adverse impact on asset prices and investment.

The lower row in Figure 5 shows that there is no difference in the response of consumption. This is because both bonds are perfect substitutes as savings instruments. As the local bonds provided through the central bank intervention crowd-out foreign bonds, this makes no difference for intertemporal consumption, but it does make a difference for safety demand. The response of output is slightly better under intervention, especially after 4 quarters, when the larger stock of capital outweighs the wealth effect on labor supply.

The calibrated value of ρ is 0.6, and this matches average moments for the nine EMEs in the sample. This suggests that the buyer-of-last-resort policies enacted by EMEs' central banks during 2020 might have had a positive impact on investment and output, at a level between the two polar cases depicted in Figure 5. Of course, heterogeneity in local-currency convenience yields among these countries would translate into heterogeneous effectiveness of these unconventional policies.

More research is needed to clarify the extent of segmentation and to disentangle its sources. Then a more formal micro foundation can be introduced into this model. As of now, the model, with a value of $\rho = 0.6$, is consistent with a somewhat close substitution. If we think of capital

controls as a source of imperfect substitutability, then this is also consistent with the data. Annual data from Fernandez et al. (2016) show that most of the countries in this sample have some restriction on bond trading. Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey have adopted some type of controls on bond purchases abroad by residents and on bond sales locally by nonresidents. Chile and Indonesia only have controls on purchases abroad, while Peru has none.

How would the model be different if nominal rigidities were to be included? The zero lower bound and nominal wages rigidities played a significant role in the model of Del Negro et al. (2017). There, the shock that increased the liquidity premium of government bonds decreased investment too, and the interest rate had to drop to encourage households to consume more. The increase in the convenience yield was an added downward force on the interest rate. When the interest rate hit the zero lower bound, consumption could not increase as much and the recession was worse, as both investment and consumption were depressed. This is an amplification mechanism that can play a role in EMEs when bond markets are segmented.

5.2 Sudden Stops


Empirically, sudden stops are usually identified as significantly large yearly increases in the current account-to-GDP ratios. Evidence shows that they are infrequent events, but twice as likely to occur in emerging as in advanced economies. They are associated with sharp economic downturns (i.e., falls in output, consumption, and investment, as well as real exchange rates and equity prices), preceded by expansions and followed by protracted recessions (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2020). Small open economy models have so far represented these events as reversals in external (dollar) funding (Mendoza, 2010).

Here I characterize the response of the local-currency convenience yield to a sudden stop. I define a sudden stop in the model as the state when the collateral constraint binds ($\mu_t > 0$) and the households are no longer able to borrow abroad. This represents a reversal in dollar-denominated funding, but this will have implications on local currency-denominated bonds. However, the data span in the empirical section does not contain a sufficiently large number of sudden stops to be able to test these implications.

Figure 6 summarizes some of the policy functions of the model and shows how they are affected in the area where the collateral constraint binds (which is the portion of the state space where b_t^S becomes very negative). Output and investment drop sharply. This response mimics the occurrence of an endogenous rare disaster as empirically documented in Barro (2006) and modeled in Gourio (2012), although in those papers the occurrence of a disaster was exogenous. The drop in output happens because the binding collateral constraint prevents firms from borrowing abroad for working capital loans, so the demand for labor drops sharply.

The drop in investment follows the sharp drop in the price of capital. As households face a

Figure 6: Policy Functions - Sudden Stops



binding collateral constraint, they fire sale the assets that serve as collateral (which includes the local bond). The sale of capital further reduces the price, which tightens the constraint even more, and a Fisherian deflation ensues. This result is similar to those in Mendoza (2010) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2020).

The current model allows me to analyze further what happens to the local safe asset. As Figure 6 shows, both the local-currency convenience yield and the price fall sharply. There are three forces affecting the convenience yield. First, the sharp drop in output reduces the supply of the local safe asset, which should increase the convenience yield. Second, the binding collateral constraint forces the households to reduce their external borrowing. Third, the collapse in consumption reduces the wealth effect. The latter two effects more than offset the effect of the reduced supply, and the local-currency convenience yield drops.

The drop in the convenience yield then drives down the price of the local bond. In addition, Fisherian deflation also reduces the price, which likewise affects the price of capital. As the price of the bond drops, the local interest rate rises although there is no effect on the world interest rate.

This can further help to interpret the role of local investors found in the regressions of Section 3. Without an explicit financial sector in the model, deeper local financial markets can be rationalized by a higher value of κ^b , meaning that the local bond has a higher demand as good collateral. This higher κ^b , in turn, increases the overall value of convenience yields by reducing the chance of sudden

stops at present and in the future. This would come at the cost, however, of larger drops in the price when the sudden stop actually occurs, because the Fisherian deflation effect will reinforce the downward effect of the drop of the local-currency convenience yield.

Overall, the model predicts that, conditional on being in a sudden stop, the local bond would not be a valuable safe asset for the households of the small open economy. More empirical evidence is needed on this insight, but it suggests that unconventional liquidity policy might not be as effective during these events.

6 Conclusion

In this paper I have shown that local-currency sovereign bonds in emerging market economies work as safe assets. However, an important difference with sovereign bonds of advanced economies is that the local-currency convenience yields in EMEs are procyclical and drop during episodes of increased global risk aversion, suggesting that they do not provide as much safety and liquidity in these states of the world. Evidence suggests that the explanation rests on the competition such bonds face from alternative sources of safety and liquidity, such as U.S. Treasuries.

I extended the standard open economy-real business cycle model to include demand for safety and the existence of two alternative safe assets, local bonds and foreign bonds. The model is purposedly simple and aims to match the empirical results and draw some policy conclusions. In a small open economy where the foreign bond is a global safe asset, the government has less room to deploy their balance sheets as advanced economies did during the crises of 2008 and 2020. However, when foreign and local markets are segmented, these policies can be more effective.

The goal of this paper has been to show that local-currency convenience yields exist and are relevant for EMEs. As a result, more research is needed on them. Empirically, it would be relevant to know what precise feature of local-currency sovereign bonds drives investors to prefer the alternatives, such as the U.S. Treasury (either credit risk, primary surpluses, inflation, or others). In addition, it is necessary to better understand how policies common to EMEs interact with convenience yields, such as reserves accumulation, different forms of capital controls, or foreign exchange intervention. On the theoretical side, the simplicity of the model in this paper tried to highlight the main mechanisms, but it came at the cost of leaving many issues unaddressed. For example, a structural specification for the convenience yield would be valuable.

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
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Appendix A Trends in EME's Local-Currency Sovereign Bonds


Figure 7 shows an upward trend in local-currency denomination of sovereign debt, and an increase in foreign ownership of these bonds. This evidence is consistent with evidence shown in Du and Schreger (2022) on currency denomination of sovereign external debt in EMEs.

Figure 7: EME Sovereign Debt, 2004-2021

(a) % of debt denominated in foreign currency



(b) % of local-currency debt owned by foreigners



IMF sample includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Turkey, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Egypt, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Ukraine.

Appendix B Alternative Decomposition of CIP Deviations

In this section, I show the decomposition of CIP deviations from a dollar investor perspective. I will show that the result is very similar to equation (7) in the main text, but with the difference that the U.S. Treasury premium component corresponds to the valuation of a dollar investor.

The pricing of a U.S. Treasury bond by a dollar investor is given by (in logs):

$$y_{US,t} = y_{US,t}^{rf} - \lambda_t^{\$,\$} + l_{US,t} - \xi_{US,t} \quad (37)$$

where $y_{US,t}^{rf}$ is the dollar risk free rate, $\lambda_t^{\$,\$}$ denotes the convenience yield for the dollar investor in bonds issued by the U.S. government (notice the different meaning with respect to $\lambda_t^{\$,i}$ in the

main text). Also, $l_{US,t}$ is the risk of default of U.S. Treasuries, and ξ_t is the covariance between the convenience yield and the risk of default.

Consider now this same dollar investor pricing an EME local-currency sovereign bond with its cash flows swapped into dollars (also known as a synthetic dollar bond):

$$P_{i,t} \frac{S_t}{F_{t,t+1}} = e^{-y_{US,t}^{rf}} \mathbb{E}_t \left[(1 + \Lambda_{t+1}^{i,\$}) (1 - \tilde{L}_{i,t+1}) \left(1 - \tilde{L}_{i,t+1} + \tilde{L}_{i,t+1} \left(1 - \frac{F_{t+1}}{\mathcal{E}_{t+1}} \right) \right) \right] \quad (38)$$

Here, S_t and $F_{t,t+1}$ are the spot and the forward exchange rate, respectively. $\Lambda_{t+1}^{i,\$}$ is the convenience service provided by the peso bond to dollar investors. $\tilde{L}_{i,t+1}$ and the last term have the same meaning as in the main text. They represent the losses upon either default or capital controls and the concurrent depreciation of the local currency in those events.

Again, let $q_{i,t}$ be the covariance between default risk and currency risk, and $p_{i,t}$ the covariance between capital control risk and currency risk. Both are positive if the currency depreciates in the event of default or capital controls, respectively. Equation (38) gives the following yield decomposition:

$$y_{i,t} - \tilde{\rho}_{i,t} = y_{US,t}^{rf} - \lambda_t^{i,\$} + (l_{i,t} - q_{i,t}) + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) - covs_{i,t} \quad (39)$$

where $\tilde{\rho}_{i,t}$ is still the frictionless forward premium. The right-hand side of (39) is identical as in the case of the peso investors in the main text (see Equation (4)) with two differences. First, it includes the dollar risk-free rate, and, second, the convenience yield captures the perspective of the dollar investor.

The spread between the two strategies gives the following expression (subtracting (37) from (39)):

$$y_{i,t} - \tilde{\rho}_{i,t} - y_{US,t} = (\lambda_t^{\$,\$} - \lambda_t^{i,\$}) + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) - q_{i,t} + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) - covs_{i,t} \quad (40)$$

This expression can be further worked out in the same way as in the main text. Recalling that $\Phi_{i,t} \equiv y_{i,t} - \rho_{i,t} - y_{US,t}$ denotes CIP deviations, I arrive at the following equation:

$$\underbrace{\Phi_{i,t}}_{\text{CIP dev.}} = \underbrace{(\lambda_t^{\$,\$} - \lambda_t^{i,\$})}_{\text{US Treasury Premium}} + \underbrace{(l_{i,t} - l_{US,t})}_{\text{Diff. default risk}} + \underbrace{(\tau_{i,t} - q_{i,t} + (k_{i,t} - p_{i,t}) + (\xi_{US,t} - \xi_{i,t}) - \psi_{i,t})}_{\text{Other}} \quad (41)$$

This equation is almost the same as Equation (7) in the main text, except that now the U.S. Treasury premium represents the preferences of the dollar investor.

Appendix C Data Sources

Recall from the main text the expression for the EME local-currency convenience yield:

$$\lambda_t^{i,i} - \hat{\lambda}_t^{\$,i} = (\lambda_t^{\$,i} - \hat{\lambda}_t^{\$,i}) - \Phi_{i,t} + (l_{i,t} - l_{US,t}) + \Phi_{i,t}^{FC} + \xi_{US,t} \quad (42)$$

The sources for each component are the following:

U.S. Treasuries' convenience yield ($\lambda_{US,t}$). The first term on the right-hand side is the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries against other private U.S. dollar bonds, which is widely available in the literature. I used the spreads between the Resolution Funding Corporation (Refcorp) bonds and Treasuries for various maturities, which Longstaff (2004) suggested are mostly due to liquidity premia since Refcorp bonds are effectively guaranteed by the U.S. government, and are subject to the same taxation. As in Longstaff (2004), I measured the spreads by taking the differences between the constant maturity on the Bloomberg fair value curves for Refcorp and Treasury zero-coupon bonds. Maturities available are 6-month, 1-, 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 20-year. For robustness, I also uses the spread between Aaa corporate bonds and Treasuries, which Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) argued is driven by liquidity demand given the low default rate on Aaa bonds. The authors also argued that the spread between Baa corporate bonds and Treasuries is driven by liquidity and safety premia. Data on these corporate bond spreads are available in FRED. However, they only provide a 20-year maturity benchmark.

CIP deviations ($\Phi_{i,t}$). The value of $\Phi_{i,t}$ was taken from the database of Du et al. (2018). The authors provided estimations of CIP deviations of sovereign bonds for 10 developed and 18 developing countries with respect to U.S. Treasuries. The data are at daily frequency between approximately 2000 and March 9, 2021, although the start date varied among countries. Data are available for maturities at 3-months, 1-, 2-, 3-, 5- and 10-years.

I focused on their observations for developing countries. Their bond yields data came from Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters. Since forward contracts are in general not very liquid, they computed $\rho_{i,t}$ from a hedging strategy involving interest rate swaps and cross-currency swaps, according to the formula $\rho_{i,n,t} = irs_{i,n,t} + bs_{i,n,t} - irs_{US,n,t}$. $irs_{i,n,t}$ is the n -year interest rate swap for exchanging fixed currency i cash flows into the floating interbank rate benchmark in country i . $bs_{i,n,t}$ is the n -year cross-currency basis swap rate for exchanging the floating benchmark interbank rate in country i for the U.S. Libor rate, and $irs_{US,n,t}$ is the n -year U.S. Libor swap rate for exchanging fixed dollar cash flows into the U.S. Libor rate. The combination of these three swaps eliminates all floating cash flows. At the inception and maturity of the swap, only fixed cash flows remain between local-currency and U.S. dollars, which exactly replicates an n -term forward contract.

Default risk differentials ($l_{US,t} - l_{i,t}$). I proxied $l_{i,t}$ with data on CDS spreads. I obtained the CDS spread series for EMEs' sovereign bonds of different maturities from Bloomberg at daily frequency. However, some caveats apply. First, I used the CDS spreads for foreign-currency debt, as their data are more widely available and show greater liquidity than local-currency CDS. Therefore,

I assumed that the risk of default on foreign-currency debt also applies to local-currency bonds. As discussed in Du and Schreger (2016), this assumption is not much different from reality as default events in EMEs since the late 1990s show that incidence of default on domestic-currency debt is comparable with the incidence of external foreign-currency defaults.

Spread between swapped local-currency bond and foreign-currency bond ($\Phi_{i,t}^{FC}$).

To calculate $\Phi_{i,t}^{FC} = y_{i,t}^{LC} - \rho_{i,t} - y_{i,t}^{FC}$, I used the data for $y_{i,t}^{LC}$ and $\rho_{i,t}$ from Du and Schreger (2016). For $y_{i,t}^{FC}$, I used the Bloomberg Fair Value curves (BFV) for the prices of foreign-currency sovereign bonds for each EME. These curves are at par yield curves, so they needed to be adjusted to represent zero-coupon yields. BFV prices are not available for some of the countries. In those cases, I estimated prices by collecting data for each individual bond and computing the overall zero-coupon yield curve using the methodology of Nelson and Siegel (1987).

Other adjustments. Another adjustment can be considered if I take into account that investors have a preference for dollar currency. Investment in the swapped local-currency bond involves buying a local-currency bond and then swapping the cash flows into U.S. dollars. If, from the perspective of the investor, this dollar cash flow fully converts the original local-currency bond into the equivalent of a dollar-bond, then the CIP deviation decomposition would show a zero convenience yield differential. Jiang et al. (2021) confirmed this result by showing how this specific dollar-currency preference led to an under-estimation of the convenience yield of local-currency bonds. However, they provided a method to adjust for this issue, which they performed for advanced economies.


Appendix D Analysis of the U.S. Treasury Premium

I discuss the evidence for the U.S. Treasury premium against EME sovereign bonds and compare it with the results for G10 countries shown in Du et al. (2018). In terms of Equation (7) in the main text, Figure 8 compares the evolution of CIP deviations and two of its components, differential default risk and the U.S. Treasury premium.

CIP deviations spiked during crises (i.e., in 2008 and 2020), and this was driven by both an increase in differential default risk and the U.S. Treasury premium. The increase in the U.S. Treasury premium is in line with intuition: During financial distress, investors prefer the liquidity and safety of U.S. Treasuries. After 2008, the U.S. Treasury premium steadily declined until 2015-2016. This means that during this period, investors were willing to pay a lower premium for the safety and liquidity of U.S. government debt versus comparable debt of EMEs. This premium then increased again until the end of the sample.

These patterns are in stark contrast with the G10 counterparts estimated in Du et al. (2018). In that paper, the authors showed that the U.S. Treasury premium for long maturities became consistently negative after 2010, meaning that investors were no longer willing to pay an extra

Figure 8: CIP Deviation and Components, 5-Year Local-Currency Sovereign Bonds



price for the safety and liquidity of U.S. Treasuries when compared to the sovereign bonds of the G10 countries. Based on this result, some authors have cast doubt on the safety status of long-term U.S. Treasuries. Figure 8 shows that this is not the case for EMEs, though. U.S. Treasuries are still seen as a safe asset compared to their EME counterparts.

Surprisingly, CIP deviations outside of financial crises followed closely the dynamics of the U.S. Treasury premium -and not the dynamics of default risk- for Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Indonesia, and South Africa. In these countries, even though differential credit risk significantly increased in 2015-16, CIP deviations decreased, following the dynamics of the U.S. Treasury premium. This is surprising as research on EMEs has predominantly focused on the determinants of default risk, not convenience yields. One final note of caution is needed for Turkey in 2018-2019. The series for CIP deviations became very noisy and turned negative. These were years of severe capital outflows and recession in Turkey, and the negative values of the CIP deviation likely arose

because of market segmentation, in which only local investors predominantly hold local-currency sovereign bonds.

The role of capital control risk (absent in Du et al., 2018) can be seen in Figure 8 by the vertical distance between the CIP deviation (blue line) and the two components shown (red and green lines). This was accounted for by the “other” term in Equation (7). Two episodes in the data stand out: Brazil during 2010-2014 and Colombia soon after 2010. In the case of Brazil, the government imposed a tax on financial transactions in October 2009 to curb portfolio investment flows and cross-border derivative trading, but the tax was lifted in June 2013.

Appendix E Robustness for Section 3

If my decomposition of CIP deviations in Section 2 successfully disentangled differential default risk from differential convenience yields, then default risk should respond differently to the determinants of convenience yields analyzed in Section 3.

Table 9 replicates the regressions in Section 3 but with the CDS for each country and time as the dependent variable. The larger number of observations is due to the fact that I had data for CDS spreads for a few more countries than I had convenience yield estimates. Unlike the EME local-currency convenience yield, credit risk was not affected by relative safe asset supply, suggesting that the demand for safety and liquidity is accurately captured by the convenience yield. The level of the local monetary policy rate increased credit risk, since it likely increased the cost of servicing the debt. The VIX index also had a positive impact on credit risk, which is consistent with intuition. Interestingly, debt inflows to government debt significantly reduced credit risk, which is expected as foreigners’ buying local debt increases the chance of repayment. The same happened with inflows into bank debt, which is consistent with sovereign debt’s being mostly held by banks in EMEs. Overall, this evidence suggests that the decomposition of CIP deviations in Section 2 accurately distinguished between credit risk and convenience yields.

As a second robustness test, I re-ran the regressions in Section 3 with a shorter sample that did not include the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 pandemic crisis. In particular, I replicated the regression with the sample starting in September 2009 and ending in December 2019. The goal was to confirm that results in Section 3 were not driven by these two crises and the possible mispricing of EME assets during those two events.

Table 10 shows that results held in this shorter sample. EME local-currency convenience yields increased when the local interest rate increased, and a larger relative supply of safe assets significantly reduced the convenience yield. The main difference is that the VIX index was insignificant. This result is likely explained by the absence of any global risk aversion episode in this period. The only exception could have been the Euro crisis in 2011-2012, but this event did not evolve into a global crisis like the 2008 or 2020 crises. Column 4 tests for the robustness of the procyclicality of

Table 9: Determinants of Credit Risk (5-Year Sovereign Bond)

Dep. var: $cds_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
MP rate $_{t-1}$	11.94*** (1.410)	11.48*** (1.377)	11.65*** (1.404)	11.70*** (1.413)	6.214*** (1.924)
$\log(\frac{\text{US debt to GDP}}{\text{Debt to GDP}})_{t-1}$	-8.027 (16.09)	-4.336 (14.86)	-8.776 (16.37)	-9.849 (16.47)	-30.78** (12.11)
US fed funds $_{t-1}$	-14.66** (7.115)	-11.31 (7.349)	-13.86* (7.149)	-14.09* (7.177)	-11.77 (7.894)
vix $_{t-1}$	4.575*** (0.420)	4.352*** (0.456)	4.429*** (0.421)	4.339*** (0.442)	4.271*** (0.520)
$(\frac{\text{DebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$		-26.84*** (6.746)			-21.75*** (7.064)
$(\frac{\text{EqtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$		-30.39* (15.58)			-13.49 (14.77)
$(\frac{\text{GovdebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-6.065* (3.167)	-6.690** (3.198)	
$(\frac{\text{BankdebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-8.105** (3.154)	-7.921** (3.151)	
$(\frac{\text{CorpddebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-3.961* (2.142)	-3.982* (2.121)	
Terms of Trade				-241.4 (189.7)	-196.4 (165.3)
Diff. Inflation					8.440*** (2.229)
Democratic risk					-1.152 (7.117)
Constant	-1.286 (88.08)	-28.20 (86.53)	-7.972 (91.53)	1,110 (875.5)	1,058 (746.5)
Observations	1,338	1,338	1,338	1,338	1,213
R-squared	0.689	0.702	0.698	0.700	0.734

Notes: see Table 3. All columns include country and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

the local-currency convenience yield.

Table 10: Determinants of Convenience Yields (Shorter Sample)

Dep. var: $cy_{i,t}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
MP rate $_{t-1}$	1.179** (0.515)	1.210** (0.511)	1.140** (0.525)	1.078* (0.548)
$\log(\frac{\text{US debt to GDP}}{\text{Debt to GDP}})_{t-1}$	-16.71** (8.318)	-17.42** (8.076)	-16.95** (8.155)	-11.27 (11.85)
US fed funds $_{t-1}$	-6.322* (3.582)	-6.923* (3.660)	-5.395 (3.593)	-7.775* (4.079)
vix $_{t-1}$	-0.0180 (0.264)	-0.0425 (0.250)	-0.0436 (0.263)	0.0223 (0.318)
$(\frac{\text{DebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$		2.768 (2.471)		
$(\frac{\text{EqtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$		6.451 (9.754)		
$(\frac{\text{GovdebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-0.706 (1.446)	
$(\frac{\text{BankdebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			-2.173 (1.479)	
$(\frac{\text{CorpdebtInfl}}{\text{GDP}})_{t-1}$			1.596** (0.718)	
Output gap			6.659** (3.219)	
Constant	98.06** (42.77)	102.9** (41.31)	98.58** (41.93)	83.33 (58.90)
Observations	979	979	979	729
R-squared	0.726	0.728	0.730	0.749

Notes: see Table 3. All columns include country and year fixed effects.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1