For my mother, Chris Maddison,
and father, Morgan James,
with love and gratitude

In memory of Bryn Morgan,
Welsh miner, 1908–79

and Daniel Hopen,
disappeared in Argentina,
August 1976

RESISTANCE AND INTEGRATION

PERONISM AND THE ARGENTINE WORKING CLASS, 1946–1976

DANIEL JAMES
Assistant Professor, Department of History, Yale University



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Peronism and the working class, 1943–55

– Speak freely. What is the problem? You speak Tedesco. The colonel will understand you better. – Well... – You are Tedesco? Son of Italians, no? – Yes, colonel. – I thought so. What's up Tedesco? – Very simple, colonel; a lot of work and very little cash. – That's clear. Where? – We work on the night shift in ... They pay us 3 pesos and 30 centavos each night. – That's a disgrace! We'll fix that immediately. I will call the owners of the factory so that they sign a contract with you people. How much do you want to earn? – We would settle for 3 pesos and 33 cents but the just wage would be 3.50 a night. – Everything will turn out alright. It's impossible that they still exploit workers in this way. – Thank you colonel. – Tedesco, you stay. The rest can go and rest easy.

Mariano Tedesco, founder of the *Asociación Obrera Textil*

Well look, let me say it once and for all. I didn't invent Perón. I'll tell you this once so that I can be done with this impulse of good will that I am following in my desire to free you a little of so much bull shit. The truth: I didn't invent Perón or Evita, the miraculous one. They were born as a reaction to your bad governments. I didn't invent Perón, or Evita, or their doctrines. They were summoned as defence by a people who you and yours submerged in a long path of misery. They were born of you, by you and for you.

Enrique Santos Discépolo

Organised labour and the Peronist state

Under the guidance of successive conservative governments the Argentine economy had responded to the world recession of the 1930s by producing internally an increasing number of manufactured goods it had previously imported.[1] While generally maintaining adequate income levels for the rural sector, and guaranteeing the traditional elite's privileged economic ties with the United Kingdom, the Argentine state stimulated this import substitution by a judicious policy of tariff protection, exchange controls and the provision of industrial

credit.[2] Industrial production more than doubled between 1930/5 and 1945/9; imports which in 1925/30 accounted for almost one quarter of the Argentine GNP had been reduced to some 6% in the 1940/4 quinquennium. From importing some 35% of its machinery and industrial equipment in the first period, Argentina imported only 9.9% in the second.[3] In addition the Second World War saw a considerable amount of export-led industrial growth as Argentine manufactured goods penetrated foreign markets.[4] By the mid 1940s Argentina was an increasingly industrialised economy; while the traditional rural sector remained the major source of foreign exchange earnings, the dynamic centre of capital accumulation now lay in industry and manufacture.

Changes in the social structure reflected these economic developments. The number of industrial establishments increased from 38,456 in 1935 to 86,440 in 1946. At the same time the number of industrial workers proper increased from 435,816 to 1,056,673 in 1946.[5] The internal composition of this industrial labour force had also changed. New members were now drawn from the interior provinces of Argentina rather than from overseas immigration, which had effectively ceased after 1930. They were attracted to the expanding urban centres of the littoral zone, in particular to the Greater Buenos Aires area outside the limits of the Federal Capital. By 1947 some 1,368,000 migrants from the interior had arrived in Buenos Aires attracted by the rapid industrial expansion.[6] In the overwhelmingly industrial suburb of Avellaneda, across the Riachuelo river from the Capital, out of a total population in 1947 of some 518,312 over 173,000 had been born outside the city or province of Buenos Aires.[7]

While the industrial economy expanded rapidly the working class did not benefit from this expansion. Real wages declined in general as salaries lagged behind inflation. Faced with concerted employer and state repression, workers could do little to successfully improve wages and work conditions. Labour and social legislation remained sparse and sporadically enforced. Outside the workplace the situation was little better as working-class families confronted, unaided by the state, the social problems of rapid urbanisation. A survey of 1937 found, for example, that 60% of working-class families in the Capital lived in one room.[8]

The labour movement which existed at the time of the military coup of 1943 was divided and weak. There existed in Argentina four labour centrals: the anarchist Federación Obrera Regional Argentina (FORA), now simply a rump of anarchist militants; the syndicalist Unión Sindical Argentina (USA), also considerably reduced in influence; finally there was the Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT), which was divided into two organisations, a CGT No. 1 and another CGT No. 2.[9] The influence of this organisationally fragmented labour movement on the working class was limited. Perhaps some 20% of the urban labour force was organised in 1943, the majority of them being in the tertiary sector. The great majority of the industrial proletariat was outside effective union organisation. The most dynamic group to attempt to organise in non-traditional areas were the communists who had some success in organising in construction, food processing and wood working. However, the vital areas of industrial expansion in the 1930s and 1940s – textiles and metal working – were still virtually *terra incognita* for labour organisation in 1943. Of 447,212 union members in 1941 the transport sector and services accounted for well over 50% of membership, while industry had 144,922 affiliates.[10]

Perón, from his position as Secretary of Labour and late Vice President of the military government installed in 1943, set about addressing some of the basic concerns of the emerging industrial labour force.[11] At the same time he set about undermining the influence of rival, radical competitors in the working class. His social and labour policy created sympathy for him among both organised and unorganised workers. In addition, crucial sectors of the union leadership came to see their future organisational prospects as bound up in Perón's political survival, as traditional political forces from both left and right attacked his figure and policies in the course of 1945. The growing working-class support for Perón which this engendered first crystallised in the 17 October 1945 demonstration which secured his release from confinement and launched him on the path to victory in the presidential elections of February 1946.[12]

While there had been many specific improvements in work conditions and social legislation in the 1943–6 period the decade of Peronist government from 1946 to 1955 was to have the most profound effect on the working class's position in Argentine society. First, the period saw a great increase in the organisational strength and social weight of the working class. A state sympathetic to the extension of union organisation and a working class eager to translate its political victory into concrete organisational gains combined to effect a rapid increase in the extension of trade unionism. In 1948 the rate of unionisation had risen to 30.5% of the wage-earning population, and in 1954 it had reached 42.5%. In the majority of manufacturing industries the rate was between 50% and 70%.[13] Between 1946 and 1951 total union membership

increased from 520,000 members to 2,334,000. Industrial activities such as textiles and metal working, where unionisation had been weak or non-existent prior to 1946, by the end of the decade had unions with membership numbering in the 100,000s. In addition a large number of state employees were also unionised for the first time. Accompanying this massive extension of unionisation there was, for the first time, the development of a global system of collective bargaining. The contracts signed throughout Argentine industry in the 1946–8 period regulated wage scales and job descriptions and also included a whole array of social provisions concerning sick leave, maternity leave, and vacations.[14]

The organisational structure imposed on this union expansion was important in moulding the future development of the union movement. Unionisation was to be based on the unit of economic activity, rather than that of the individual trade or enterprise. In addition, in each area of economic activity only one union was granted legal recognition to bargain with employers in that industry. Employers were obliged by law to bargain with the recognised union, and conditions and wages established in such bargaining were applicable to all workers in that industry regardless of whether they were unionised or not. Beyond that, a specific centralised union structure was laid down, encompassing local branches and moving up through national federations to a single confederation, the Confederación General de Trabajo (CGT). Finally, the role of the state in overseeing and articulating this structure was clearly established. The Ministry of Labour granted a union legal recognition of its bargaining rights with employers. Decree 23,852 of October 1945, known as the Law of Professional Associations, which established this system, also established the right of the state to oversee considerable areas of union activity. Thus, the legal structure assured unions many advantages: bargaining rights, protection of union officials from victimisation, a centralised and unified union structure, automatic deductions of union dues and the use of these dues to underwrite extensive social welfare activities. It also, however, made the state the ultimate guarantor and overseer of this process and the benefits deriving from it.

While the massive expansion of union organisation assured the working class recognition as a social force in the sphere of production, the Peronist period also saw the integration of this social force within an emerging political coalition overseen by the state. From labour's point of view the precise nature of their political incorporation within the regime was not immediately apparent. The general contours of this political integration only emerged in the course of Perón's first presidency and they were to be confirmed and developed during the second. The first period, from 1946 to 1951, saw the gradual subordination of the union movement to the state and the elimination of the old-guard leaders who had been instrumental in mobilising the support of organised labour for Perón in 1945, and who had formed the Partido Laborista to act as labour's political expression. Their notions of political and organisational autonomy, and the conditional nature of their support for Perón, did not combine well with his political ambitions. Nor, it must be said, did their insistence on the principle of labour autonomy match the dominant perceptions of the rapidly expanding union membership.[15] Moreover, the weight of state intervention and the popular political support for Perón among their members inevitably limited the options open to the old-guard union leadership. Increasingly the unions were incorporated into a monolithic Peronist movement and were called upon to act as the state's agents vis-à-vis the working class, organising political support and serving as conduits of government policy among the workers.

As the outline of the justicialist state emerged in the second presidency, with its corporatist pretensions of organising and directing large spheres of social, political and economic life, the role officially allotted to the union movement in incorporating the working class into this state became clear. The attractions of such a relationship were great for both leaders and rank and file. An extensive social welfare network was in place operated through the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, the Fundación Eva Perón, and the unions themselves. Labour leaders were now to be found sitting in the congress; they were routinely consulted by the government on a range of national issues; they entered the Argentine diplomatic corp as labour attachés.[16] In addition, concrete economic gains for the working class were clear and immediate. As Argentine industry expanded, impelled by state incentives and a favourable international economic situation, workers benefited. Real wages for industrial workers increased by 53% between 1946 and 1949. Although real wages would decline with the economic crisis of the regime's last years, the shift of national income towards workers was to be unaffected. Between 1946 and 1949 the share of wages in the national income increased from 40.1% to 49%.[17]

While there were demonstrations of working-class opposition to aspects of Peronist economic policy, there was little generalised questioning of the terms of the political integration of labour within the Peronist state. Indeed, a crucial legacy of the Perón era for labour was

the integration of the working class into a national political community and a corresponding recognition of its civic and political status within that community. Beyond that, the experience of this decade bequeathed to the working-class presence within that community a remarkable degree of political cohesion. The Peronist era largely erased former political loyalties among workers and entrenched new ones. Socialists, communists, and radicals who had competed for working-class allegiance prior to Perón had been largely marginalised in terms of influence by 1955. This marginalisation was partly due to state repression of non-Peronist politicians and labour leaders. Principally, however, it reflected the efficacy of Perón's social policy, the advantages of state patronage and the inadequacies of non-Peronist competitors for working-class allegiance. For socialists and radicals Peronism was to remain a moral and civic outrage; a demonstration of the backwardness and lack of civic virtue of Argentine workers. This position had determined their opposition to the military government of 1943–6, their support of the Unión Democrática, and their consistent hostility to Perón throughout the following decade.

The Communist Party attempted to adopt a more flexible position than its erstwhile allies. Soon after the election victory the party changed its characterisation of Peronism as a form of fascism, dissolved its union apparatus and ordered its militants to enter the CGT and its unions in order to work with the misguided Peronist masses and win them over.[18] Yet it, too, was never able to recover from the political error of supporting the anti-Peronist coalition, the Unión Democrática, in the 1946 elections; nor was it able to offer a credible alternative to the clear gains to be derived from integration within the Peronist state. While at the local level some of its militants were able to maintain credibility and lead some important strikes, politically the party could never challenge the hegemony of Peronism among organised labour. The importance of this legacy of political cohesion can be clearly appreciated if we also bear in mind the relative racial and ethnic homogeneity of the Argentine working class, and the concentration of this working class within a few urban centres, above all Greater Buenos Aires. Together these factors helped give the Argentine working class and its labour movement a weight within the wider national community which was unparalleled in Latin America.

Workers and the political appeal of Peronism

The relationship between workers and their organisations and the Peronist movement and state is, therefore, clearly vital for understanding the 1943–55 period. Indeed, the intimacy of the relationship has generally been taken as defining the uniqueness of Peronism within the spectrum of Latin American populist experiences. How are we to interpret the basis of this relationship, and beyond that, the significance of the Peronist experience for Peronist workers? Answers to this question have increasingly rejected earlier explanations which saw working-class support for Peronism in terms of a division between an old and new working class. Sociologists like Gino Germani, leftist competitors for working-class allegiance, and indeed Peronists themselves, explained worker involvement in Peronism in terms of inexperienced migrant workers who, unable to assert an independent social and political identity in their new urban environment and untouched by the institutions and ideology of the traditional working class, were *disponible* (available) to be used by dissident elite sectors. It was these immature proletarians who flocked to Perón's banner in the 1943–6 period.[19]

In the revisionist studies working-class support for Perón has been regarded as representing a logical involvement of labour in a state-directed reformist project which promised labour concrete material gains.[20] With this more recent scholarship the image of the working-class relationship to Peronism has shifted from that of a passive manipulated mass to that of class-conscious actors seeking a realistic path for the satisfaction of their material needs. Political allegiance has, thus, been regarded, implicitly at least, within this approach as reducible to a basic social and economic rationalism. This instrumentalism would seem to be borne out by common sense. Almost anyone enquiring of a Peronist worker why he supported Perón has been met by the significant gesture of tapping the back pocket where the money is kept, symbolising a basic class pragmatism of monetary needs and their satisfaction. Clearly, Peronism from the workers' point of view was in a fundamental sense a response to economic grievances and class exploitation.

Yet, it was also something more. It was also a political movement which represented a crucial shift in working-class political allegiance and behaviour, and which presented its adherents with a distinct political vision. In order to understand the significance of this new allegiance we need to examine carefully the specific features of this political vision and the discourse in which it was expressed, rather than simply regard Peronism as an inevitable manifestation of social and economic dissatisfaction. Gareth Stedman Jones, commenting on the reluctance of social

historians to take sufficient account of the political, has recently observed that 'a political movement is not simply a manifestation of distress and pain, its existence is distinguished by a shared conviction articulating a political solution to distress and a political diagnosis of its causes'.[21] Thus if Peronism did represent a concrete solution to felt material needs, we still need to understand why the solution took the specific political form of Peronism and not another. Other political movements did speak to the same needs and offer solutions to them. Even programmatically there were many formal similarities between Peronism and other political forces. What we need to understand is Peronism's success, its distinctiveness, why its political appeal was more credible for workers – which areas it touched that others did not. To do this we need to take Perón's political and ideological appeal seriously and examine the nature of Peronism's rhetoric and compare it with that of its rivals for working-class allegiance.

Workers as citizens in Peronist political rhetoric

Peronism's fundamental political appeal lay in its ability to redefine the notion of citizenship within a broader, ultimately social, context. The issue of citizenship *per se*, and the question of access to full political rights, was a potent part of Peronist discourse, forming part of a language of protest at political exclusion that had great popular resonance. Part of the power of such elements in Peronist political language, came from a recognition that it formed part of a traditional language of democratic politics which demanded equal access to political rights. This tradition had found its principal prior embodiment in the Unión Cívica Radical and its leader Hipólito Yrigoyen. The Radical Party prior to 1930 had mobilised the urban and rural middle classes and a not inconsiderable section of the urban poor with a rhetoric permeated with symbols of struggle against the oligarchy, and with a traditional language of citizenship, political rights and obligations.[22] Peronism was certainly eclectic enough to lay claim to, and absorb elements of, this Yrigoyenist heritage.[23]

In part, too, the force of such a concern for the rights of political citizenship lay in the scandal of the *década infame*, the infamous decade which followed the military overthrow of Yrigoyen in 1930.[24] The *década infame*, which stretched in fact from 1930 until the military coup of 1943, witnessed the reimposition and maintenance of the conservative elite's political power through a system of institutionalised fraud and corruption. It was the epoch of 'Ya votaste, rajá pronto para tu casa' (You've already voted, get along quickly to your home!), enforced by the hired thugs of the conservative committees.[25] In Avellaneda Don Alberto Barceló controlled Argentina's emerging industrial centre with the aid of a police force, a political machine, the underworld and votes from the dead, much as he had done since the First World War.[26] In the province of Buenos Aires Governor Manuel Fresco coordinated a similar machine of clientelism and corruption. The only island of relative political rectitude was in the Federal Capital where fraud was rarely practised. Political corruption set a tone of social degeneration of the traditional elite, epitomised in the seemingly endless series of scandals involving public figures and foreign economic groups which was to furnish the emerging groups of nationalists with many of their targets.[27]

Beyond that, such institutional corruption bred a broader public cynicism. In the words of one author 'this was a corruption which gave lessons'.[28] The political and moral malaise embodied in this situation clearly engendered a crisis of confidence and legitimacy in established political institutions. Peronism could, therefore, draw political capital by denouncing the hypocrisy of a formal democratic system which had little of democracy's real content. Moreover, the weight of Peronist claims to this heritage was reinforced by the fact that even those parties formally opposed to the fraud of the 1930s were perceived to have compromised themselves with the conservative regime. This was particularly the case with the Radical Party which after a period of principled abstention between 1931 and 1936 had, under the leadership of Manuel T. de Alvear, reentered the political fray to act as a loyal opposition in a political system it knew it would never be allowed to dominate. The crisis of legitimacy extended, therefore, far beyond the conservative elite itself and was a constantly reiterated theme of Peronist propaganda in 1945 and 1946. As the organ of the Partido Laborista expressed it during the run up to the 1946 elections: 'The old traditional parties, for many years passed, have ceased to be voices of the people in order to act instead in small circles of clear unpopular character, deaf and blind to the worries of that mass whose aid they only think to call upon when elections come around.'[29]

Nevertheless, Peronism's political appeal to workers cannot be explained simply in terms of its capacity to articulate claims to political participation and a full recognition of the rights of citizenship. Formally the rights associated with such claims – universal suffrage, the right of association, equality before the law – had long existed in Argentina. The Saenz Peña Law of 1912, the law of universal suffrage, con-

tinued in operation in Argentina throughout the *década infame*. Similarly there existed in Argentina a long-established tradition of representative social and political institutions. Peronism's articulation of democratic demands was, therefore, a claim for a *re*establishment of previously recognised rights and claims. Moreover, Perón had no monopoly of this language of political exclusion. Indeed it was a language which his opponents in the Unión Democrática used against him, accusing him of representing a closed, undemocratic system, and it was a discourse which would continue to form the basis of political opposition to Perón throughout his regime and after his fall from power. Finally, it was, in the sense that it addressed the general issue of citizenship, not an appeal directed specifically at workers but, by definition, at all voters whose rights had been abused.

Perón's political success with workers lay, rather, in his capacity to recast the whole issue of citizenship within a new social context.[30] Peronist discourse denied the validity of liberalism's separation of the state and politics from civil society. Citizenship was not to be defined any longer simply in terms of individual rights and relations within political society but was now redefined in terms of the economic and social realm of civil society. Within the terms of this rhetoric to struggle for rights in the sphere of politics inevitably implied social change. Indeed, by constantly emphasising the social dimension of citizenship Perón explicitly challenged the legitimacy of a notion of democracy which limited itself to participation in formal political rights and he extended it to include participation in the social and economic life of the nation. In part this was reflected in a claim for a democracy which included social rights and reforms, and in an attitude which treated with scepticism political claims couched in the rhetoric of formal liberalism. This was most starkly apparent in the election campaign of 1946. The political appeal of the Unión Democrática was almost entirely expressed in a language of liberal democratic slogans. In the political manifestos and speeches there was virtually no mention made of the social issue. Instead, one finds a political discourse entirely framed in terms of a rhetoric of 'liberty', 'democracy', 'the constitution', 'free elections', 'freedom of speech'.[31]

Perón, in contrast, constantly reminded his audiences that behind the phraseology of liberalism lay a basic social division and that a true democracy could only be built by doing justice to this social issue. In a speech in July 1945 in which he responded to growing opposition demands for elections he said: 'If some ask for liberty we too demand it ... but not the liberty of fraud ... nor the liberty to sell the country

out, nor to exploit the working people.'[32] Luis Gay, the secretary general of the Partido Laborista, echoed this perception in a speech at the formal proclamation of Perón's presidential ticket in February 1946:

> Political democracy is a lie on its own. It is only a reality when it is accompanied by an economic reconstruction of the economy which makes democracy possible on the terrain of practical happenings. They are lying who don't agree with this concept and only speak of the constitution and of that liberty which they defrauded and denied right up to the coup of 3 June 1943.[33]

It seems clear that this kind of rhetoric struck a deep chord with working people emerging from the *década infame*. Manuel Pichel, a delegate of the CGT, stated in the first official demonstration organised by the CGT to back Perón against the mounting opposition attack in July 1945: 'It is not enough to speak of democracy. We don't want a democracy defended by the reactionary capitalists, a democracy which would mean a return to the oligarchy is not something we would support.'[34] Mariano Tedesco, a textile workers' leader, recalled some years later that 'people in 1945 had already had a belly-full. For years they had seen the satisfaction of their hunger delayed with songs to liberty.'[35] In a similar vein, the scepticism with which the formal symbols of liberalism were met is forcibly evoked in an anecdote Julio Mafud recalls from the year 1945. Mafud remembers a group of workers responding to a questioner who asked if they were worried about freedom of speech if Perón were to be elected in the upcoming election. They had replied, 'Freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it.'[36]

More fundamentally still, Perón's recasting of the issue of citizenship implied a distinct, new vision of the working class's role in society. Traditionally the liberal political system in Argentina, as elsewhere, had recognised the political existence of workers as individual, atomised citizens with formal equality of rights in the political arena, at the same time as it had denied, or hindered, its constitution as a social class at the political level. Certainly, faithful to the liberal separation of state and civil society, it had denied the legitimacy of transferring the social identity built around conflict at the social level to the political arena. Rather, any unity, social cohesion and sense of distinct interests attained in civil society were to be dissolved and atomised in the political marketplace where individual citizens sought, through the mediation of political parties, to influence the state and thus reconcile and balance the competing interests which existed in civil society.

Radicalism, for all its rhetoric of 'the people' and 'the oligarchy',

never challenged the presuppositions of this liberal political system. Indeed, its clientelistic political machine, built around local bosses, was ideally placed to act as the broker of the individual citizens' claims in the political marketplace.[37] Peronism, on the other hand, premised its political appeal to workers on a recognition of the working class as a distinct social force which demanded recognition and representation as such in the political life of the nation. This representation would no longer be achieved simply through the exercise of the formal rights of citizenship and the primary mediation of political parties. Instead, the working class as an autonomous social force would have direct, indeed privileged access, to the state through its trade unions.

The uniqueness of this vision of working-class social and political integration in the Argentina of the 1940s becomes apparent if we examine the distinctive way Perón addressed the working class in his speeches both during the election campaign of 1945–6 and after.[38] In contrast to the more traditional *caudillo* or political boss Perón's political discourse did not address workers as atomised individuals whose only hope of achieving social coherence and political meaning for their lives lay in establishing ties with a leader who could intercede for them with an all-powerful state. Instead Perón addressed them as a social force whose own organisation and strength were vital if he were to be successful at the level of the state in asserting their rights. He was only their spokesman and could only be as successful as they were united and organised. Continually Perón emphasised the frailty of individuals and the arbitrariness of human fate, and hence the necessity for them to depend on nothing but their own will to achieve their rights. Those rights and interests would have to be negotiated with other social groups. Within this rhetoric, therefore, the state was not simply an all-powerful dispenser of desired resources which distributed these – through its chosen instrument, the leader – to passive individuals. Rather, it was a space where *classes* – not isolated individuals – could act politically and socially with one another to establish corporate rights and claims. Within this discourse the ultimate arbiter of this process might be the state, and ultimately the figure of Perón identified with the state, but he did not on his own constitute these groups as social forces; they had a certain independent, and irreducible, social, and hence political, presence.[39]

Clearly there were strong elements of a personalist, almost mystical *caudillismo* attached to the position of both Perón and Evita Perón within Peronist rhetoric. Partly this resulted from the different political needs of Perón and Peronism at different times. From a secure position

of state power the need to emphasise working-class organisational autonomy and social cohesion was evidently less than in the period of political contest preceding the achievement of that power. Indeed such an emphasis would soon conflict with the new demands of the state. Even during the pre-1946 period the personalist elements of Perón's political appeal were present, as witness the consistent, overwhelming chant of 'Perón! Perón!' which dominated the mobilisation of 17 October 1945. Nevertheless, even at the height of the adulation of Evita and the growing state-sponsored cult of Perón's personal power during the second presidency, this personalist element was not present entirely at the expense of a continued affirmation of the social and organisational strength of the working class.

This affirmation of the workers as a social presence and their incorporation directly into the affairs of state evidently implied a new conception of the legitimate spheres of interest and activity of the working class and its institutions. This was most evident in Perón's assertion of the workers' rights to be concerned with, and to help determine, the economic development of the nation. It was within the context of this new vision of the working class's role in society that the issues of industrialisation and economic nationalism, key elements in Peronism's political appeal, were to be situated. Peronist rhetoric was open enough to absorb existing strands of nationalist thought. Some of these went back, once again, to the Yrigoyenist heritage, particularly his conflict with foreign petroleum companies in his last years in office. Other elements were absorbed from the groups of nationalist intellectuals which emerged in the 1930s and whose ideas were influential among the military. Thus, for example, terms such as *cipayo* and *vendepatria* became incorporated into the political language of Peronism to refer to those forces which wished to maintain Argentina within the economic orbit of the United States or the United Kingdom as a provider of agricultural and pastoral products.[40] Such a language became symbolic of a commitment to industrialisation overseen and guided by a commitment to *Argentina potencia* in contrast to the *Argentina granja* of Peronism's opponents.

The success of Perón's identification of himself with the creation of an industrial Argentina and the political appeal of such symbolism did not reside primarily in programmatic terms. Given the evident concern of an emerging industrial workforce with the issue of industrialisation, and Peronism's strenuous self-identification with this symbol, and later monopoly of the language of economic development, it would be tempting to explain such a success in terms of a unique attachment on

the part of Perón to such a programme. Yet, in terms of political programmes and formal commitments, the association of Peronism with industrialisation and of its opponents with a rural, pastoral Argentina was scarcely accurate. Emphases varied greatly and the commitment was rarely consistent, but very few of the major political parties in Argentina denied by the 1940s the need for some sort of state-sponsored industrialisation. The most articulate sector of the conservative elite had affirmed their recognition of the irreversibility of industrialisation with the *Plan Pinedo* of 1940. The Radical Party had also increasingly adopted a pro-industrialisation stance and the Yrigoyenist wing of the party adopted in April 1945, with the Declaration of Avellaneda, an economic blueprint every bit as industrialist as that of Perón. The left, too, in the form of the communists and socialists had consistently used an anti-imperialist rhetoric throughout the 1930s.[41]

The real issue at stake in the 1940s was not, therefore, so much industrialisation *versus* agrarian development, or state intervention *versus* laissez-faire. Rather it was the issue of the different potential meanings of industrialism, the social and political parameters within which it should take place which were at stake. It was Perón's ability to define these parameters in a new way which appealed to the working class, and his ability to address this issue in a particularly credible way for workers that enabled him to appropriate the issue and symbol of industrial development and make it a political weapon with which to distinguish himself from his opponents.

The success of this appropriation was partly a matter of perception. Certainly, the association of Perón's political opponents in 1945 and 1946 with the bastions of traditional rural society, the *Sociedad Rural* and the Jockey Club, weakened the credibility of their commitment to industrialism. In a similar way, their close association with the US ambassador did not strengthen belief in their devotion to national sovereignty and economic independence. In terms of image making the identification of Peronism with industrial and social progress, with modernity, was an established fact by the end of the presidential election campaign of 1946. It was not, however, solely a matter of images and public relations. More fundamentally the working class recognised in Perón's espousal of industrial development a vital role for itself as an actor in the greatly expanded public sphere which Peronism offered to it as a field for its activity. Indeed Perón consistently premised the very notion of national development on the full participation of the working class in public life and social justice. Industrialisation within his

discourse was no longer conceivable, as it had been prior to 1943, at the expense of the extreme exploitation of the working class. In a speech delivered during the election campaign Perón had affirmed: 'In conclusion: Argentina cannot continue to stagnate in a somnolent rhythm of activity to which so many who had come and lived at her expense had condemned her. Argentina must recover the firm pulse of a healthy and clean living youth, Argentina needs the young blood of the working class.'[42] Within Peronist rhetoric social justice and national sovereignty were credibly interrelated themes rather than simply enunciated abstract slogans.

A believable vision: credibility and concreteness in Perón's political discourse

The issue of credibility is crucial for understanding both Perón's successful identification of himself with certain important symbols such as industrialism and, more generally, the political impact of his discourse on workers. Gareth Stedman Jones, in the essay to which we have already referred, notes that to be successful 'a particular political vocabulary must convey a practicable hope of a general alternative and a believable means of realising it such that potential recruits can think in its terms'.[43] The vocabulary of Peronism was both visionary and believable. The credibility was in part rooted in the immediate, concrete nature of its rhetoric. This involved a tying down of abstract political slogans to their most concrete material aspects. As we have already seen, in the crucial years 1945 and 1946 this was clearly contrasted with a language of great abstraction used by Perón's political opponents. While Perón's rhetoric was capable of lofty sermonising, particularly once he had attained the presidency, and depending on the audience he was addressing, his speeches to working-class audiences in this formative period have, for their time, a unique tone.

They are, for example, framed in a language clearly distinct from that of classic radicalism, with its woolly generalities concerning national renovation and civic virtue. The language of 'the oligarchy' and 'the people' was still present but now usually more precisely defined. Their utilisation as general categories to denote good and evil, those who were with Perón from those against, was still there but now there was also a frequent concretising, sometimes as rich and poor, often as capitalist and worker. While there was a rhetoric of an indivisible community – symbolised in 'the people' and 'the nation' – the working class was given an implicitly superior role within this whole, often as the re-

pository of national values. 'The people' frequently were transformed into 'the working people' (*el pueblo trabajador*): the people, the nation and the workers became interchangeable.

A similar denial of the abstract can be found in Peronism's appeal to economic and political nationalism. In terms of the formal construction from the state of Peronist ideology, categories such as 'the nation' and 'Argentina' were accorded an abstract, mystical significance.[44] When, however, Perón specifically addressed the working class, particularly in the formative period, but also after, one finds little appeal to the irrational, mystical elements of nationalist ideology. There was little concern with the intrinsic virtues of *Argentinidad* nor with the historical precedents of *criollo* culture as expressed in a historical nostalgia for some long-departed national essence. Such concerns were mainly the province of middle-class intellectuals in the various nationalist groups which attempted, with little success, to use Peronism as a vehicle for their aspirations. Working-class nationalism was addressed primarily in terms of concrete economic issues.

Moreover, Peronism's political credibility for workers was due not only to the concreteness of its rhetoric, but also to its immediacy. Perón's political vision of a society based on social justice and on the social and political integration of workers into that society was not premised, as it was for example, in leftist political discourse, on the prior achievement of long-term, abstract structural transformations, nor on the gradual acquisition at some future date of an adequate consciousness on the part of the working class. It took working-class consciousness, habits, life styles and values as it found them and affirmed their sufficiency and value. It glorified the everyday and the ordinary as a sufficient basis for the rapid attainment of a juster society, provided that certain easily achievable and self-evident goals were met. Primarily this meant support for Perón as head of state and the maintenance of a strong union movement. In this sense Peronism's political appeal was radically plebeian; it eschewed the need for a peculiarly enlightened political elite and reflected and inculcated a profound anti-intellectualism.

The glorification of popular life styles and habits implied a political style and idiom well in tune with popular sensibilities. Whether it was in symbolically striking the pose of the *descamisado* (shirtless one) in a political rally, or in the nature of the imagery used in his speeches, Perón had an ability to communicate to working-class audiences which his rivals lacked. The poet Luis Franco commented cryptically

on Perón's 'spiritual affinity with tango lyrics'.[45] His ability to use this affinity to establish a bond with his audience was clearly shown in his speech to those assembled in the Plaza de Mayo on 17 October 1945. Towards the end of that speech Perón evoked the image of his mother, 'mi vieja': 'I said to you a little while ago that I would embrace you as I would my mother because you have had the same griefs and the same thoughts that my poor old lady must have felt in these days.'[46] The reference is apparently gratuitous, the empty phraseology of someone who could think of nothing better to say until we recognise that the sentiments echo exactly a dominant refrain of tango – the poor grief-laden mother whose pain symbolises the pain of her children, of all the poor. Perón's identification of his own mother with the poor establishes a sentimental identity between himself and his audience; with this tone of nostalgia he was touching an important sensibility in Argentine popular culture of the period.[47] Significantly, too, the speech ended on another 'tangoesque' note. Perón reminded his audience as they were about to leave the Plaza, 'remember that among you there are many women workers who have to be protected here and in life by you same workers'.[48] The theme of the threat to the women of the working class, and the need to protect their women, was also a constant theme of both tango and other forms of popular culture.

Perón's use of such an idiom within which to frame his political appeal often seems to us now, and indeed it seemed to many of his critics at the time, to reek of the paternalistic condescension of the traditional *caudillo* figure. His constant use of couplets from Martín Fierro, or his conscious use of terms taken from *lunfardo* argot grates on modern sensibilities. However, we should be careful to appreciate the impact of his ability to speak in an idiom which reflected popular sensibilities of the time. In accounts by observers and journalists of the crucial formative years of Peronism we frequently find the adjectives *chabacano* and *burdo* used to describe both Perón himself and his supporters. Both words have the sense of crude, cheap, coarse and they also implied a lack of sophistication, an awkwardness, almost a country bumpkin quality. While they were generally meant as epithets they were not descriptions Peronists would necessarily have denied.

Indeed this capacity to recognise, reflect and foster a popular political style and idiom based on this plebeian realism contrasted strongly with the political appeal of traditional working-class political parties. The tone adopted by the latter when confronted by the working-class effervescence of the mid 1940s was didactic, moralising and apparently

addressed to a morally and intellectually inferior audience. This was particularly the case of the Socialist Party. Its analysis of the events of 17 October is illustrative of its attitude and tone:

> The part of the people which lives its resentment, and perhaps only for its resentment, spilt over into the streets, threatened, yelled, trampled upon and assaulted newspapers and persons in its demon-like fury, those persons who were the very champions of its elevation and dignification.[49]

Behind this tone of fear, frustration and moralising lay a discourse which addressed an abstract, almost mythical working class. Peronism on the other hand was prepared, particularly in its formative period, to recognise, and even glorify, workers who did 'threaten, yell, and trample with a demon-like fury'. Comparing Perón's political approach to that of his rivals one is reminded of Ernst Bloch's comment concerning Nazism's preemption of socialist and communist appeal among German workers that 'the Nazis speak falsely but to people, the communists truthfully, but of things'.[50]

Perón's ability to appreciate the tone of working-class sensibilities and assumptions was reflected in other areas. There was, for example, in Peronist rhetoric a tacit recognition of the immutability of social inequality, a common sense, shrug of the shoulders acceptance of the reality of social and economic inequities, a recognition of what Pierre Bourdieu has called 'a sense of limits'.[51] The remedies proposed to mitigate these inequities were plausible and immediate. Perón, in a speech in Rosario in August 1944, had emphasised the apparently self-evident reasonableness of his appeal, the mundaneness behind the abstract rhetoric of social equality: 'We want exploitation of man by man to cease in our country and when this problem disappears we will equalise a little the social classes so that there will not be in this country men who are too poor nor those who are too rich.'[52]

This realism implied a political vision of a limited nature but it did not eliminate utopian resonances; it simply made such resonances – a yearning for social equality, for an end to exploitation – more credible for a working class imbued by its experience of the *década infame* with a certain cynicism regarding political promises and abstract slogans. Indeed the credibility of Perón's political vision, the practicability of the hope it offered, was affirmed on a daily basis by its actions from the state. The solutions it offered the working class did not depend on some future apocalypse for confirmation but were rather directly verifiable in terms of everyday political activity and experience. Already by 1945 the slogan had appeared among workers which was to symbolise this credibility: 'Perón cumple!' (Perón delivers).

The heretical social impact of Peronism

Peronism meant a greatly increased social and political presence for the working class within Argentine society. The impact of this can be measured in institutional terms by reference to such factors as the intimate relationship between government and labour during the Perón era, the massive extension of unionisation, the number of union-sponsored members of congress. These are factors that are clearly demonstrable empirically and often measurable statistically. There are, however, other factors which need to be taken into account in assessing Peronism's social meaning for the working class – factors which are far less tangible, far more difficult to quantify. We are dealing here with factors such as pride, self-respect and dignity.

The meaning of the 'década infame': working-class responses

In order to assess the importance of such factors we must return to the *década infame*, for it was clearly a benchmark against which workers measured their experience of Peronism. Popular culture of the Peronist era was dominated by a temporal dichotomy which contrasted the Peronist present with the recent past. As Ernesto Goldar has noted in his analysis of Peronist popular fiction this dichotomy was accompanied by a corresponding contrast of values associated with the *hoy* of 1950 and the *ayer* of the 1930s.[53] Some of these evaluative contrasts referred to the concrete social changes associated with better social welfare, improved wages and good union organisation. Yet, others spoke to a wider, more personal social realm outside improvements in the world of the production line, the wage packet or the union. These suggest strongly that the *década infame* was experienced by many workers as a time of profound collective and individual frustration and humiliation.

While we lack a comprehensive account of the elements which made up the social universe of the working class in the pre-Perón period, the evidence of anecdote, personal testimony, popular cultural forms and working-class biography nevertheless can provide us with suggestive fragments of a whole picture. The harsh conditions and discipline attested to by most observers of the period evidently had an impact in the wider working-class community. Cipriano Reyes notes, for example, in his memoirs of his organising experiences in the meatpacking plants of Berisso in the 1930s and 1940s that 'the company was the master of the lives and dwellings of its workers ... when a workman didn't pay

his debts the tradesman went to see the personel chief of the *frigorífico* and the offender was fired or suspended. The vigilance was incredible; everything was controlled'.[54]

This sort of control was probably most fierce in working-class communities dominated by a single large concern, such as the meatpacking plants. Nevertheless, the wider social implications arising from such a situation of employer dominance were not confined to the extreme case of the company town. Angel Perelman remembers leaving school at ten in order to enter a metal-working workshop in the Federal Capital where he worked 'without any fixed hours ... the time we finished was fixed by the boss ... the sum total of happiness for a working-class family consisted in keeping your job'. The 1930s were, he remembers, 'the era of the desperate, the ingenious and the petty theft'.[55] Another writer, commenting on the wider implications of the labour situation in the same era observed that: 'Fear of unemployment in this period led to humiliation. You had to be quiet, not talk. The lack of elemental defensive actions led to a moral decline, to cynicism. Within the factory the worker was alone, deprived of all social consciousness.'[56] Although such sweeping generalisations about moral decline and cynicism being characteristic of working-class attitudes in the 1930s need to be treated with caution, there is other evidence which tends to point in a similar direction.

Some of the most suggestive of this evidence is to be gleaned from popular cultural forms and in particular the tango. The social universe depicted in the tangos of the 1930s was universally bleak. The traditional themes of tango are still present – the betrayal of love, the nostalgia for a simpler past centred on an idyllic recreation of the *barrio* or *arrabal*, the affirmation of the virtues of valour and courage – but to this has now been added, in some of the most popular and significant tangos, a wider social context. In the tangos of Enrique Santos Discépolo, in particular, the impossibility of a meaningful relationship between a man and a woman has come to symbolise the impossibility of any social relationship which is not based on greed, egotism and a total lack of moral scruples in a world based on injustice and deceit. A crucial figure in many of Discépolo's tangos is the *gilito embanderado* – the naive little man, humiliated by poverty and society, who still has illusions that he can survive in the world while being morally honest and decent or, more ingenuously still, that he can effect some change in an unjust world.[57] The object of the tango then becomes to disabuse him of his illusions by confronting him with a reality where 'Not even God saves those who are lost.'[58] The tone is one of bitterness and resignation. The popular wisdom about social life embodied in the narrative recommends an adoption of the dominant values of egotism and immorality. At its most extreme this implied an understanding – if not approval – of the attraction for the poor of the logic of the *mala vida* – prostitution, pimping and crime.[59] The alternative was a resigned acceptance or 'an obstinate silence' for those who could not conform to this dominant social ethos.[60]

Now evidently care must be taken in drawing conclusions about working-class attitudes from tango and other popular cultural forms of the period. Tango, for example, was increasingly a commercialised art form whose connection with the working-class *barrio* was very tenuous by the 1930s. What reached the general public was largely determined by record companies and commercial success and failure depended on the reception in the wider consumer market and the theatres and music halls of downtown Buenos Aires. It seems likely, too, that the bohemian element which had always been a crucial part of tango was given greater prominence as tango lyricists came more and more from the urban lower middle class. Certainly, the desperate lament of Discépolo's great tango, 'Cambalache', written in 1935, that 'Everything is equal, nothing is better; it's the same to be a jack ass as a great professor' rings with the educated middle class's disenchantment with society's failure to recognise true merit. The lyrics of the *década infame* lack, too, some of the optimism and social engagement found in some of the tangos of an earlier era. Yet the immense popularity of these tangos among the working class of Buenos Aires seems to attest to the fact that whatever the manipulations of the culture industry, whatever the caveats we place on the reading of working-class consciousness directly from the lyrics of tango, they did respond to certain attitudes and experiences recreated in tango which they recognised as authentic to themselves and their experience.

However, even if we recognise the suggestiveness of such evidence we must also recognise that cynicism, apathy or resignation were not the only responses available to workers. Luis Danussi who would become, after 1955, a leader of the print workers's union found when he first arrived in Buenos Aires in 1938 a city which was 'tumultuous and possessed a frantic union activity, offering a broad field for action; national congresses, zonal, municipal congresses of workers and unions' according to his biographers.[61] The militant working-class culture characteristic of an earlier epoch was still present. This culture was centred around the existence of 'unions, atheneums, libraries, the distribution of pamphlets, papers, reviews, leaflets and books; demon-

strations, committees for the release of political prisoners, theatre groups, cooperatives, communities and attempts at a solidarity life style. Also campaigns were carried out against alcoholism, tobacco, picnics were organised, lectures discussed and the spirit of mutual aid inculcated.'[62] Elements of this sort of traditional militant culture shared by socialists, communists, anarchists and syndicalists alike still flourished. They found an expression in the numerous committees formed in the 1930s to aid the Spanish Republicans, and they were still a living presence in unions such as the print workers which Luis Danussi entered.

Danussi himself had an anarchist background before arriving in Buenos Aires, but workers from outside this culture could be attracted by it and use it as a channel to express their resentment at exploitation and as part of their search for political solutions. Angel Perelman notes, for example, that:

> I learned about capitalist exploitation and class struggle first in that factory rather than in the books ... at the age of fourteen, and with already four years as a worker I couldn't help but be interested in politics. How could I not have been interested? There were many demonstrations by the unemployed. Some left-wing parties protested against the reigning misery. Union meetings ... brought together the most militant and determined workers. I began to attend all sorts of meetings and acts.[63]

Other evidence, too, suggests an increase in union activity and attendance at union meetings in the late 1930s and early 1940s as unemployment decreased, industry expanded and the union movement recovered somewhat from the decline of the years following the coup of 1930. Union membership responded to an improved national and international climate, increasing by some 10% between 1941 and 1945.[64]

Yet this positive organisational and collective response to the conditions of the pre-1943 period does not seem to have been the predominant one. Evidently there was a wide spectrum of working-class experience and response. The working-class militants themselves recognised, however, that the militant culture of the union or ideological grouping touched only a minority of the working class. Danussi's biographers stress that 'to open up the road for union organisation was enormously difficult, in many respects because of police and employer repression, but what represented an almost insuperable obstacle to overcome was the indifference and disbelief of the workers themselves, reluctant to organise in defence of their own interests'.[65]

Something of the feeling of impotence and resignation which we may suggest characterised the response of many workers to the experience

of the pre-1943 period can be found in the personal testimony of the non-militant. The following two excerpts from such testimony are offered in an attempt to convey the essence of this feeling. The first comes from a worker who had worked in the ports along the Paraná River, particularly in the port of Rosario:

> *Question:* What were the thirties like for you?
> *Don Ramiro:* Well life was very hard back then ... working people weren't worth anything and we got no respect from those who controlled everything. You had to know your place and keep in line. I used to vote for the Radicals in the twenties but after 1930 things got really bad. The conservative bosses ran the whole show. On election day I would go down to the town hall to vote but I couldn't get in ... You see I was known as someone they couldn't trust so they would stop me voting. By law they couldn't, but that was a joke, what was the law back then? There would be a group of them, heavies, paid by the local conservative committee ... everyone knew them ... and they would block the doorway when you wanted to go in. You could see their guns bulging under their jackets.
> *Question:* You mean they would use force to stop you voting? They would threaten you?
> *Don Ramiro:* No. They never did that openly ... not to me at least, they didn't have to ... you knew you would have to pay for it somehow if you went against them. It was a sort of game for them.
> *Question:* So what did you do?
> *Don Ramiro:* What could you do? Nothing. You'd go home. Complain maybe to your friends about those bastards. If you made a fuss they would get you one way or another and it wouldn't do any good anyway. You were nothing to them. But later with Perón that all changed. I voted for him.
> *Question:* How did it change?
> *Don Ramiro:* Well, with Perón we were all machos.[66]

The second excerpt comes from a younger worker from Buenos Aires who entered the workforce in the late 1930s:

> *Lautaro:* One thing I remember about the thirties was the way you were treated. You felt you didn't have rights to anything, everything seemed to be a favour they did for you through the church or some charity or if you went and begged the local political boss he'd help you get medicine or get into a hospital. Another thing I remember about the thirties is that I always felt strange when I went to the city, downtown Buenos Aires – like you didn't belong there, which was stupid but you felt that they were looking down on you, that you weren't dressed right. The police there treated you like animals too.
> *Question:* Were unions or politics important to you at that time?
> *Lautaro:* Well, I voted for the socialists usually. My brother was more interested in them, though I always thought that they were at least honest. But I never thought that it would do any good. The same really with unions. We didn't have a union in the shops where I worked – it must have been in the early forties, before Perón. We had plenty to complain about but I don't recall that we thought seriously about the union. That was just the way things were, you

just had to put up with it ... with everything, their damn arrogance, the way they treated you. Some of the activists my brother hung out with wanted to change that but they were exceptions I think. Not many workers thought of being heroes then.[67]

Private experience and public discourse

It is against the background of this working-class experience of the pre-1943 period that the profounder social impact of Peronism must be considered. With the crisis of the traditional order inaugurated by the military coup of 1943 far more was challenged than the political and institutional authority of the conservative elite. By 1945 political crisis had provoked, and was itself compounded by, a questioning of a whole set of social assumptions concerning social relationships, forms of deference and largely tacit understandings about 'the natural order of things', 'the sense of limits', of what could and could not be legitimately questioned and spoken. In this sense Peronism's power ultimately lay in its capacity to give public utterance to what had until then been internalised, lived as private experience. As Pierre Bourdieu has written:

> Private experiences undergo nothing less than *change of state* when they recognise themselves in the *public objectivity* of an already constituted discourse, the objective sign of recognition of their right to be spoken and to be spoken publicly. 'Words wreck havoc,' says Sartre, 'when they find a name for what had up till then been lived namelessly.'[68]

It is surely in this context that the fragments presented in the preceding section acquire their significance. In particular we can appreciate the image of silence which runs through them: 'You have to be silent, not talk'; 'an obstinate silence'; or Don Ramiro's response when asked what he did about the power of the political bosses, 'Nothing. You'd go home. Complain maybe to friends.' Peronist discourse's ability to articulate these unformulated experiences was the basis of its truly heretical power. Now there were other heretical discourses – in the sense of offering alternatives to establishment orthodoxy – present in the form of socialist, communist and radical rhetoric. However, as we have seen, these were unable to acquire unchallenged authority as valid expressions of working-class experience. Peronism had the enormous advantage over these other political forces of being an 'already constituted discourse' articulated from a position of state power, and this vastly increased the legitimacy it bequeathed on the experiences it expressed.

The heretical social power Peronism expressed was reflected in its use

of language. Terms expressive of notions of social justice, fairness, decency – whose expression had been silenced (or ridiculed as in tango) – were now to become central to the new language of power. More than this, though, we find that terms which had previously been symbolic of working-class humiliation and explicit lack of status in a deeply status-conscious society now acquired diametrically opposite connotations and values. The most famous example is clearly the implications attached to the word *descamisado* (shirtless one). The word had been used originally as an epithet by anti-Peronists prior to the election of 1946 to refer to Perón 's working-class supporters.[69] The explicit connotation of social, and hence political and moral, inferiority was based on a criteria of social worth which took one of the most evident signs of working-class status – work clothes – and treated that as a self-evident badge of inferiority. Peronism took the term and inverted its symbolic significance, turning it into an affirmation of working-class value. This inversion was magnified by the attachment of the *descamisados* in official rhetoric to the figure of Eva Perón, their designated protectress.[70]

Perhaps more significantly still we find terms current in the pre-1943 period to refer even more scornfully to the working class now being transformed, inverted, in a similar fashion. *Negro* in general usage referred to inhabitants from the interior of the country and often had clear ethnic, pejorative, connotations. The traditional elite had disrespectfully referred to Yrigoyen's supporters as *los negreros radicales*.[71] With the mass influx of internal migrants to the industry of Buenos Aires in the 1930s the word was commonly used as synonymous with manual workers and *negrada* was used as a generic equivalent of proletariat. The connotations were unmistakable: *una negra* meant in *porteño* slang a woman of 'low condition', *negrear* meant to pick up such women for sexual purposes. As José Gobello notes in his *Diccionario Lunfardo*, all but one of the variants of *negro* carry the strong sense of inferiority and disrespect.[72] The use of *negrada* as a synoym for the proletariat of the 1930s thus had a strong social symbolism which was at the root of its use by anti-Peronist forces. *La negrada de Perón, las cabecitas negras,* were frequent terms of derision used by Perón's political opponents from the mid 1940s on. Their incorporation into the language of Peronism conferred on them a new status. The fact that *la negrada* found expression and affirmation in this public discourse meant that a range of experiences normally associated with the term – and which by being so designated had been ruled illegitimate, unworthy of concern and hence condemned to be suffered silently, internalised or expressed obliquely in certain anguished forms of popular

culture – could now be spoken and enter into the realm of public discussion, social concern and hence political action.

Something of this heretical social meaning was apparent in the vast upsurge of working-class mobilisation which stretched from 17 October 1945 until the election victory of February 1946. This mobilisation demonstrated workers' capacity to mobilise and defend their perceived interests. In addition, however, it also expressed a more diffuse social challenge to accepted forms of social hierarchy and symbols of authority. This was particularly noticeable during the demonstration of 17 October. While most attention has been directed to the ultimate political object of the demonstration – the personal figure of Perón and his release from confinement – the mobilisation itself, and the forms it took, themselves suggest an ampler social significance. Most sensitive observers of the event have agreed on the dominant tone of irreverence and ironic good humour among the demonstrators on that day. Felix Luna has summarised the atmosphere as one resembling 'a great fiesta, of carnival groups, of candomblé'.[73] The communist press spoke disparagingly of clans with *aspecto de murga*, which took part in the demonstration.[74] The use of the word *murga* is interesting since in popular usage it referred to groups who at carnival and other festivals dressed up and went around singing, dancing and playing instruments. While such behaviour was acceptable within the strict limits of carnival, and restricted to working-class *barrios*, its breaking out of these confines in a demonstration with a clear political content represented a symbolic subversion of accepted codes of behaviour and deference for the working class.

An important part of this subversion related to the area in which such behaviour was taking place – to implicit notions of spatial hierarchy. As the irreverent crowds moved out of the working-class suburbs of the outer limit of the Federal Captial or crossed the Puente Alsina from Avellaneda and beyond, and converged on the central area and the Plaza de Mayo in front of the presidential palace, they violated such notions. The behaviour of the workers as they moved through the wealthier suburbs compounded the blasphemy implicit in such a violation. The ditties they sang became increasingly insulting and ridiculing of the wealthy, the *gente decente* (decent folk), of *porteño* society. One of the many refrains directed at the puzzled onlookers of the Barrio Norte as they watched the emergence of the 'invisible Argentina'[75] under their balconies went: 'Get off the corner you mad oligarch, your mother doesn't love you and nor does Perón.'[76]

The fact that the culmination of the demonstration was the Plaza de Mayo was itself significant. Up until 1945 the Plaza in front of the presidential palace had been very much the territory of the *gente decente* and workers who ventured there without jacket or tie were not infrequently moved on or even arrested. A much published photograph taken on 17 October shows workers with shirt sleeves rolled up, sitting and bathing their feet in the fountains of the plaza. The symbolism implicit here can be readily appreciated if contrasted with the feeling of unease expressed by Lautaro whenever he visited the central area of the Federal Capital in the years prior to Perón.

Much of this irreverence, blasphemy, dancing and reappropriation of public space characteristic of 17 October and the election campaign which followed would seem to constitute a form of 'counter-theatre', of ridicule and abuse against the symbolic authority and pretensions of the Argentine elite.[77] The result was, certainly, a puncturing of elite self-assurance. It also represented a recovery of working-class pride and self-esteem, encapsulated in Don Ramiro's pithy summary of the change wrought by Perón: 'Well, with Perón we were all machos.' Perhaps above all it marked an affirmation of the working class's existence and a defiant end to silence and privatisation of grievance. This mixture of symbolic meanings is astutely captured in Felix Luna's recollection of his own memories of 17 October as he and his student friends, all anti-Peronist radicals, watched the columns of workers march through the city:

> Well, there they were. As if they wanted to show all their power, so that nobody could doubt that they really existed. There they were all over the city, shouting in groups which seemed to be the same group multiplied by hundreds. We looked at them from the side walk, with a feeling akin to compassion. From where did they come? So they really existed? So many of them? So different from us? Had they really come on foot from those suburbs whose names made up a vague unknown geography, a *terra incognita* through which we had never wandered ... During all those days we had made the rounds of the places where they spoke of preoccupations like ours. We had moved through a known map, familiar: the faculty, Recoleta for the burial of Salmon Feijoo, the Plaza San Martin, the Casa Radical. Everything up till then was coherent and logical; everything seemed to support our own beliefs. But that day when the voices began to ring out and the columns of anonymous earth-coloured faces began to pass by we felt something tremble which until that day had seemed unmoveable.[78]

The limits of heresy: the ambivalence of Peronism's social legacy

It would be misleading, however, to leave the characterisation of

Peronism's social impact on the working class at this level. Peronism in power did not regard the working-class ebullience and spontaneity of the period from October 1945 to February 1946 in the same favourable light as it had done when it had been a contender for power. Indeed, much of the Peronist state's efforts between 1946 and its demise in 1955 can be viewed as an attempt to institutionalise and control the heretical challenge it had unleashed in the earlier period and to absorb this challenge within a new state-sponsored orthodoxy. Viewed in this light Peronism was, in a certain sense, a passive, demobilising social experience for workers. It stressed increasingly in its official rhetoric the controlled, limited mobilisation of workers under the aegis of the state. Perón himself frequently referred to his concern with the dangers of 'unorganised masses', and in the ideal Peronist scenario unions acted very much as instruments of the state in both mobilising and controlling workers. This cooptative side of the Peronist experience was reflected in the fundamental slogan addressed from the state to workers in the Perón era exhorting them to go peacefully 'From home to work, and from work to home.'

Formal Peronist ideology reflected this concern. It preached the need to harmonise the interests of capital and labour within the framework of a benevolent state, in the interest of the nation and its economic development. Perón, in his May Day speech of 1944, had said, 'We seek to surpass the class struggle, replacing it by a just agreement between workers and employers, based on a justice that springs from the state.'[79] Peronist ideology distinguished between exploitative, inhuman capital and progressive, socially responsible capital committed to the development of the national economy. Workers had nothing to fear from the latter: 'International capital is an instrument of exploitation, but national capital is an instrument of welfare; the first represents misery, the second prosperity.'[80] Peronist ideology stressed, too, as a logical extension of this premise that the interests of the nation and its economic developments were to be identified with the workers and their unions. Workers were seen as sharing with national, non-exploitative capital a common interest in defence of national development against the depradations of international capital and its internal allies, the oligarchy, who wanted to prevent Argentina's independent development.

In the context of our discussion concerning Peronism's social implications for workers, and its success in channelling and absorbing what we have called its heretical social potential, several factors need to be borne in mind. The Peronist state clearly did have considerable success in controlling the working class, socially and politically, and while class

conflict was in no sense abolished, and the idyll of social harmony portrayed by official propaganda was not realised, relations between capital and labour did improve. The feared plebeian vengeance of the *porteño* sans culotte, apparently presaged in the social and political turmoil of 1945/6, did not materialise. Several reasons for this success can be suggested. The working class's ability to satisfy its material aspirations within the parameters set by the state is one; the personal prestige of Perón another. The ability of the state and its related cultural, political and ideological apparatus to promote and inculcate notions of class harmony and common interest must also be weighed. We must be careful, however, not to analyse this solely in terms of manipulation and social control. The efficacy of official ideology depended crucially on its ability to tie in with working-class perceptions and experience. Peronist rhetoric, like any other, drew its authority ultimately from its capacity to tell its audience what they wanted to hear.

As an example of what we mean we may take the treatment of the Day of the Workers, 1 May, in official Peronist rhetoric. A document published in 1952 by a state agency, entitled *Emancipation of the Workers*, was typical of official efforts in this direction. At its centrepiece is a collection of photographs, with a written commentary under each. The first photos show workers gathering to celebrate Labour Day with red flags and black-and-red anarchist banners raised high. Mounted police are visible in the photos. The commentary tells the story: 'Labour day as it was formerly celebrated in the country; taking part in the celebrations signified real courage.' 'The police, strongly armed and ready for anything, hindered workers from proclaiming their just aspirations.' The third photo bears witness to a 'sad account of the tragic happenings of Labour Day of thirty years ago'. The photos show those wounded or killed by the police. The next three photos are in explicit contrast and carry the moral of the story. They show a huge May Day demonstration in the Plaza de Mayo, full of union banners but now no red flags. 'In the new Argentina created by General Perón, 1 May is joyfully celebrated by a united people.' 'Labour Day is always a popular event of the greatest importance in Argentina.' The photo shows crowds of workers on their way to Government House to listen to a speech by Perón.[81]

This piece is evidently illustrative of Peronism's capacity to absorb and appropriate, and neutralise, the symbols of older rival class traditions. More importantly for our discussion is the way in which this appropriation involved altered meanings. The point can scarcely be missed: the symbolic contrast in the text is unavoidable. Far from being

an affirmation of an identity forged in class conflict, a symbol of struggle and the holding fast for the sake of principle as it had been for an earlier generation of militants, May Day in the pre-Perón era now symbolised sadness, pain and impotence etched on the bandaged faces as they stare out of the text. On the other hand, May Day under Perón means happy faces walking toward the presidential palace, an atmosphere of tranquillity and harmony, an absence of panic, no police and no injuries. Now, clearly, this is government propaganda but the point is that its efficacy depended partly at least on its ability to tap a receptiveness to its message among workers.

Such a receptiveness existed among Argentine workers. Its roots, we may suggest, lie, once more, in the working-class experience of the pre-1943 era. The lessons of that experience were an important theme of popular culture in the Peronist years. Goldar summarises the treatment of the issue in popular fiction in the following way: 'The Day of the Workers during the *década infame* will be of struggle, repression, internationalist slogans, impotent rebellion; "your hunger, the hatred of those people, your misery, the waiting, the dirty and torn clothes, the worn out coat, the hoarse voices, struggling only so that life would be nothing more than tiredness and old dreams".'[82] In contrast to this picture of conflict and pain associated with May Day before Perón, the image associated with the post-1946 era will be one of tranquillity, where 1 May will be a fiesta of labour and the bloody meetings will become fading memories of the past.

Similar attitudes to the symbols of the class struggles of the past can be found in personal testimony. A long-time activist prominent in the founding of the Partido Laborista, explaining why he became involved in politics in 1945, said: 'I decided to collaborate in politics so that the working people, my class, could obtain the right to live better without the danger of having to confront tragedies like *Semana Trágica*, the massacre of Patagonia, 1921, Gualeguaychu, Berisso, Avellaneda, Mendoza and many other cases too numerous to mention.'[83]

We should be careful not to interpret such testimony solely in terms of working-class incorporation. Such fragments clearly do represent a yearning for social advancement without the pain of class conflict, for stability and routine in comparison with the arbitrariness and impotence associated with the earlier period. Though such a yearning could, as we shall see, coexist with a recognition of the reality of a lack of harmony. Moreover, the bedrock on which such attitudes rested—what gave them, and the official rhetoric which reflected them, credibility – was the notion of dignity and regained self respect. Time and again this

seems to surface as the irreducible, minimal social meaning of the Peronist experience for workers. Enrique Dickmann, at more than eighty years of age, with more than fifty years as a militant and leader of the Socialist Party, attempted, finally, reluctantly to come to terms with what Peronism had meant for the working class:

> I have spoken to many workers in the Federal Capital and in the interior, and each one says, 'Now I am something, I am someone.' And I asked a worker his opinion and in his ingenuous simplicity he said this to me: 'So that you can understand the change produced by this government I will tell you that when in the old Department of Labour we had to discuss some question with the boss, the boss would be seated and I, the worker, would be standing; now I, the worker, am seated and the boss is the one who is standing.'[84]

In summarising our analysis of the nature of the Peronist experience for Argentine workers in the 1943–55 period we must start by stating the obvious: Peronism marked a critical conjuncture in the emergence and formation of the modern Argentine working class. Its existence and sense of identity as a coherent *national* force, both socially and politically, can be traced to the Perón era. The legacy acquired during this period was not to be easily shed after Perón's fall from power. This legacy was not, however, a straightforward one. Its impact on workers was both socially and politically complex. We have suggested, for example, that its appeal for workers cannot be reduced simply to a basic class instrumentalism. An adequate attention to Peronism's specifically political appeal would, we have suggested, uncover a particular political discourse which, while emphasising the righting of social and economic inequities, linked these to a vision of citizenship and the working class's role in society. This vision was expressed in a distinct rhetoric and political style of particular appeal to Argentine workers.

There are several implications to be drawn from this analysis. First, Perón's support among workers was not solely based on their class experience within the factories. It was also a political allegiance generated by a particular form of political mobilisation and discourse. Clearly the two bases for mobilisation should not be counterposed – certainly not in the form of the classic dichotomy between 'old' and 'new', 'traditional' and 'modern' working class. A political rhetoric needs to speak to perceived class needs if it is to have success in politically mobilising workers, but this does not exhaust the range of its appeal. As Sylvia Sigal and Juan Carlos Torre have commented, in Latin America the public plaza rather than the factory has frequently been the main point of constitution of the working class as a political force.[85]

This raises a related issue. The working class did not come to Peronism

already fully formed and simply adopt Peronism and its rhetoric as the most conveniently available vehicle to satisfy its material needs. In an important sense the working class was constituted by Perón; its self-identification as a social and political force within national society was, in part at least, constructed by Peronist political discourse which offered workers viable solutions for their problems and a credible vision of Argentine society and their role within it. This was evidently a complex process, involving for some workers a *re*-constitution of their sense of identity and political loyalty as they abandoned established allegiances and identities. The construction of the working class did not necessarily imply the manipulation and passivity associated with Germani's powerful image of *masas disponibles* against which so much of the literature on Peronism has been directed.[86] A two-way process of interaction was clearly involved and if the working class was partly constituted by Peronism then Peronism was itself also in part a creation of the working class.

Socially, too, the heritage bequeathed to the working class by the Peronist experience was a profoundly ambivalent one. Certainly, for example, Peronist rhetoric preached and official policy increasingly sought to realise an identification with, and incorporation of, the working class into the state. This implied, as we have suggested, working-class passivity. The official Peronist vision of the working class's role tended to be that of a profoundly soporific idyll in which workers would move contentedly from a harmonious work environment to the union vacation resort and from there to the state dependencies which would resolve their personal and social problems. Beyond the state Perón himself would be the ultimate guarantor of this vision.

Similarly, the union movement emerged from this period with a deeply imbedded reformism. This rested on a conviction of the need to achieve conciliation with employers and to satisfy its members' needs by establishing an intimate relationship with the state. This relationship implied a commitment on the part of the union leadership to the notion of controlling and limiting working-class activity within the limits established by the state and to acting as a political conduit into the working class. In this sense Peronism could be considered to have played a prophylactic role in preempting the emergence of autonomous activity and organisation.

Yet the Peronist era also bequeathed an immensely increased sense of class solidity and potential national importance to the working class. Moreover, the array of social welfare legislation and labour law did represent a massive achievement in terms of working-class rights and recognition; an achievement which reflected labour mobilisation and class consciousness and not simply passive acceptance of the state's largesse. The development of a centralised, mass union movement – no matter how much under the aegis of the state it might be – inevitably confirmed the existence of workers as a *social* force within capitalism. This meant that at the level of the union movement, for all the success of an increasingly bureaucratised leadership in acting as the mouthpiece of the state, conflicting class interests *did* break through and working-class interests *were* articulated by this union movement. There was always a limit to how far the integration of the unions within the Peronist state could be relied upon to ensure the acceptance of policies which were not perceived to be in the workers' interests. In general, the union leadership was remarkably faithful in fulfilling its role for the state, but in return the state, and fundamentally this meant Perón himself, had to provide at least the minimum basis of a *quid pro quo*. The relationship was not that of a diktat but, rather, that of a bargain which had to be negotiated.

Similarly, the weight of a formal philosophy of conciliation and class harmony, an ideology which emphasised values crucial to the reproduction of capitalist social relations, was considerable. However, the effectiveness of such an ideology was limited in everyday practice by the development of a culture which affirmed ideas of workers' rights within society at large and within the workplace in particular.

Peronism aspired to be a viable hegemonic alternative for Argentine capitalism, as a promoter of economic development based on the social and political integration of the working class. In this respect comparisons of Peronism with the New Deal policies of Roosevelt, and the development of welfare state capitalism in Western Europe after 1945 clearly have merit, in that they all to varying degrees marked the confirmation of the working class's 'economic civil rights', while at the same time confirming, and indeed strengthening, the continued existence of capitalist production relations. At the same time, however, Peronism in an important sense defined itself, and was defined by its working-class constituency, as a movement of political and social *opposition*, as a denial of the dominant elite's power, symbols and values. It remained, in a fundamental way, a potentially heretical voice, giving expression to the hopes of the oppressed both within the factory and beyond, as a claim for social dignity and equality.

The tensions arising from this ambiguous legacy were considerable. Ultimately we may suggest that the most fundamental of these centred on the conflict between Peronism's meaning as a social movement and

its functional needs as a specific form of state power. In this sense to speak of Peronism as a monolithic movement obscures more than it clarifies. For those who were aspirants to positions of power in the administrative bureaucracy and the political machine Peronism was embodied in a set of formal policies and institutions. For employers who supported Perón it represented a risky gamble of an expanded internal market, state-sponsored economic incentives and a guarantee against radical control of labour, in return for which they had to accept a working class with a greatly increased institutional power and sense of its own weight. For sectors of the middle class Peronism represented, perhaps, greater opportunities for jobs within an expanded state sector. For the mass of Perón's working-class support formal social policies and economic benefits were important but not finally definitive of Peronism's import. Peronism was, perhaps, most enduringly for them a vision of a more decent society in which they recognised for themselves a vital role, a vision couched in a language with which they could identify. It represented, too, a political culture of opposition, of rejection of all that had gone before – politically, socially, and economically; a sense of blasphemy against the norms and self-esteem of the traditional elite.

Now, for those who controlled the political and social apparatus of Peronism this oppositional culture was a burden, since it meant that Peronism was unable to establish itself as a viable hegemonic option for Argentine capitalism. They recognised the social and political mobilising potential inherent in the working class's adherence to Peronism, and they used this as a bargaining counter with rival contenders for political power – a sort of *après moi le déluge* tactic. Finally, however, they had to recognise that this was akin to riding the tiger. Certainly the dominant economic and social forces in Argentine society, who had initially been forced to tolerate Peronism, recognised by the early 1950s the danger inherent in such ambivalence. From the point of view of Peronism as a social movement, however, this oppositional element represented an enormous advantage since it gave to Peronism a dynamic substratum that would survive long after peculiarly favourable economic and social conditions had faded, and which even the increasing sclerosis of ten years of sycophancy and corruption could not undermine. It would be this substratum which would form the basis of rank-and-file resistance to the post-1955 regimes and lay the basis for the reassertion of Peronism as the dominant force within the Argentine workers' movement.

matic' its leadership, represented a considerable stumbling block to the needs of Argentine capitalism. In part it also lay in the continued identification, in however ambivalent a fashion, with the legacy of Peronism's original 'heretical' appeal to workers.

This presented considerable problems for Peronism's rivals for working-class allegiance in the 1955–73 period. As we have seen, the new wave of *clasista* militants who emerged after 1969 were constantly confronted with this issue. It was on the ground established by the working class's pre-1955 experience that left-wing appeals fell in the post-1955 era. Many of the basic elements of leftist rhetoric had already found echo in the Peronist experience. The contestatory, oppositional credentials of Peronism were moreover reinforced by the Resistance period, which is clearly of crucial importance in this process. Given this situation what need was there for working-class adherence to a more formal leftism symbolised by left-wing political parties? In this situation, too, it was meaningless to expect workers to simply abandon a tradition and experience which, for better or worse, they felt was *their* experience and tradition, not that of a particular political party. Peronism had become by the late 1950s a sort of protean, malleable commonplace of working-class identification. In the course of researching this book I was constantly struck by the seemingly unquestioning, identification, particularly amongst militants, of working-class activism, resistance and organisation with being a Peronist. It seems to have become almost an accepted part of working-class 'common sense' in the 1955–73 period.

Finally, this was, I think, compounded by a perception of Peronism as not primarily a political doctrine, nor a sectarian political party. Its quest for social justice and a recognition of the working class's rights as citizens and workers was viewed as beyond the pettiness of party-political strife. In a system where the legitimacy of party-political activity was constantly being undermined by institutional upheaval and restrictions placed on the political expression of working-class interests, this perception of the apolitical status of Peronism was a great advantage. Osvaldo Soriano in his fine evocation of the tragedy of Perón's return in 1973 as experienced by a small town in the province of Buenos Aires has captured this element. The mayor of the town, Don Ignacio, a life-long Peronist, arrives one day to work in the town hall to find that he has been denounced by rivals as a communist. When he informs his assistant, Mateo, of the charges against them the latter replies: 'Bolsheviks? But how? I was always a Peronist ... I never got involved in politics.'[22]

Notes

1 Peronism and the working class, 1943–55

1 For the military background to the coup of 1943 see Robert Potash, *The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945, Yrigoyen to Perón* (Stanford, 1969). For a general analysis of the 1943–55 era see Peter Waldmann, *El peronismo, 1943–1955* (Buenos Aires, 1981). For developments in the labour field see Samuel L. Baily, *Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina* (New Brunswick, 1967); also Hugo del Campo, *Sindicalismo y peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1983).

2 The rural elite's economic interests were safeguarded by the Roca–Runciman treaty of 1933 which guaranteed continued access to British markets for Argentine beef in return for major concessions concerning the status of British imports into Argentina. Effectively the treaty ensured the maintenance of Argentina's traditional position within the British sphere of the international economy and as such it was denounced by nationalists and others. See Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, 'Crecimiento industrial y alianza de clases en la Argentina, 1930–40', *Estudios sobre los orígenes del peronismo*, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires, 1972).

3 These figures are calculated on the basis of data in the Economic Commission on Latin America, *El desarrollo económico en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1959), cited in Miguel Angel García, *Peronismo: desarrollo económico y lucha de clases* (Llobregat, 1979), p. 54.

4 This peaked in 1943 when these non-traditional manufacturing exports accounted for some 19.4% of total exports. It has been estimated that some 180,000 new jobs had been created by this export-led industrial growth in the war years. See Juan José Llach, 'El Plan Pinedo de 1940: su significación histórica y los orígenes de la economía política del peronismo', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 23, no. 92 (1984), pp. 515–58.

5 García, *Peronismo*, p. 62.

6 Gino Germani, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición* (Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 307.

7 Ruben Rotundaro, *Realidad y cambio en el sindicalismo* (Buenos Aires, 1972), p. 128.

8 Alejandro Bunge, *Una nueva Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1940), p. 372.

9 For a detailed analysis of the internal divisions within organised labour in this period see Hiroschi Matsushita, *Movimiento obrero argentino: 1930–*

45: sus proyecciones en los orígenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1983); David Tamarin, *The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930–45: a study in the origins of Peronism* (Albuquerque, 1985).

10 See Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, 'El movimiento obrero en los orígenes del peronismo', *Estudios*, p. 80.

11 For Perón's personal background and ideas see Joseph Page, *Perón: a biography* (New York, 1983). For an analysis of Perón's labour policy and its impact in the 1943–5 period see Walter Little, 'La organización obrera y el estado peronista', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 19, no. 75 (1979), pp. 331–76.

12 On the background to the October events see Felix Luna, *El 45, crónica de un año decisivo* (Buenos Aires, 1969).

13 See Louise Doyon, 'El crecimiento sindical bajo el peronismo', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 15, no. 57 (1975), pp. 151–61.

14 See Louise Doyon, 'Conflictos obreros durante el regimen peronista, 1946–55', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 17, no. 67 (1977) pp. 437–73.

15 See Juan Carlos Torre, 'La caída de Luis Gay', *Todo es Historia*, vol. 8, no. 89 (1974). One of the last symbols of *laborista* autonomy was Cipriano Reyes, the meatpackers' leader, who remained in congress as a *laborista* representative until 1948 when his mandate expired. Perón then had him arrested and he remained in prison until the end of the regime. For *laborismo* see Cipriano Reyes, *Qué es el laborismo?* (Buenos Aires, 1946).

16 See Rotundaro, *Realidad y cambio*, ch. 4. The Fundación Eva Perón was established by an act of congress and was entirely under the control of Eva Perón. It acted as a huge patronage machine and distributor of social welfare resources.

17 Economic Commission for Latin America, *El desarrollo económico*, pp. 122ff.

18 See Jorge Abelardo Ramos, *Historia del Stalinismo en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1974), for a highly critical account. For an official communist version see *Esbozo de la historia del Partido Communista Argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1947). Also Rubens Iscaro, *Historia del Movimiento Sindical*, vol. 1 (Buenos Aires, 1974).

19 For examples of this approach see Germani, *Política y sociedad*; Rodolfo Puiggros, *El peronismo: sus causas* (Buenos Aires, 1965); Alberto Belloni, *Del anarquismo al peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1960). For a critical review of some of the basic assumptions see Walter Little, 'The popular origins of Peronism' in David Rock, ed., *Argentina in the Twentieth Century* (Pittsburgh, 1975).

20 For a review of this revisionist literature see Ian Roxborough, 'Unity and diversity in Latin American history', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 16, part 1 (1984), pp. 1–26. Revisionist interpretations have not gone entirely unchallenged. Gino Germani in his last contribution to the debate on the origins of Peronism restated his basic arguments concerning the weight of the new migrants in the formation of Peronism and the importance of traditional psycho-social cultural patterns, see 'El rol de los obreros y de los migrantes internos en los orígenes del peronismo', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 13, no. 51 (1973), pp. 435–88. For critical comments see Tulio Halperin Donghi, 'Algunas observaciones sobre Germani, el surgimiento del peronismo y los migrantes internos', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 15, no. 56 (1975), pp. 765–81.

21 Gareth Stedman Jones, 'Rethinking Chartism', *Languages of Class: studies in English working class history* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 97.

22 For the Radical Party see David Rock, *Politics in Argentina, 1890–1930: the rise and fall of Radicalism* (Cambridge, 1975)

23 For Perón's recognition of the importance of the Yrigoyenist heritage see Felix Luna, *El 45: crónica de un año decisivo* (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 205 and passim.

24 The term was coined by the nationalist historian, José Luis Torre, and became widely used in the nationalist and opposition literature of the time.

25 For a political history of the 1930s see Alberto Ciria, *Parties and Power in Modern Argentina, 1930–46* (Albany, 1969); for examples of the specific mechanisms of fraud see Felix Luna, *Alvear* (Buenos Aires, 1958).

26 See Norberto Folino, *Barceló, Ruggierito y el populismo oligarquico* (Buenos Aires, 1966).

27 For an account of this corruption see Luna, *Alvear*, pp. 196–234.

28 *ibid.*, p. 232.

29 *El Laborista*, 24 January 1946, cited in Dario Canton, *Elecciones y partidos políticos en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 227.

30 The issue of the different categories of rights associated with a developing concept of citizenship has been analysed in T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, London, 1947. Marshall makes the distinction between civil and political rights associated with formal democracy and the gradual enlargement of this notion of citizenship to embrace 'social rights'. For an outline and critique, see Anthony Giddens, 'Class divisions, class conflict and citizenship rights', *Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory* (Berkeley, 1982). An attempt to develop such concepts for developing nations is to be found in Gino Germani, 'Clases populares y democracia representativa en América Latina', *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1962), pp. 23–43.

31 The conservative politician Marcelo Sanchez Sorondo's comment on the speeches of Alvear could with justification be extended to the politicians of the Unión Democrática: 'His speeches seem plucked out of an anthology of democratic commonplaces.' Cited in Ciria, *Parties and Power*, p. 128. See also Luna, *El 45*, pp. 108ff for an examination of the political rhetoric of the anti-Peronist opposition in 1945/6.

32 Luna, *El 45*, p. 206.

33 Cited in Carlos Fayt, *La naturaleza del peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1967), p. 143.

34 Cited in Luna, *El 45*, p. 192.

35 See *Primera Plana: historia del peronismo*, 31 August 1965.

36 Julio Mafud, *Sociología del peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1972), p. 107.

37 See Rock, *Politics in Argentina*, p. 59: 'As the activities of the committees illustrate, the Radicals relied a great deal on paternalistic measures. The main advantage of this was again that it could be used to break down the divisive interest group ties by atomising the electorate and individualising the voter.'

38 Perón's principal speeches from this era were collected and published in Juan D. Perón, *El pueblo quiere saber de que se trata* (Buenos Aires, 1957).

39 Guita Grin Debert, in *Ideologia e populismo* (São Paulo, 1979), presents an interesting analysis of the role of individuals, classes and the state in different forms of populist discourse. Her analysis of a quintessential populist rhetoric of a populist leader such as Adhemar de Barros makes an instructive contrast with Perón's political discourse.

40 The principal group which influenced Peronism was FORJA, the Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina, made up primarily of dissident Radical Party intellectuals. While its political influence was limited, the status of intellectuals like Raul Scalabrini Ortiz, Arturo Jauretche, Luis Dellapiane and others was considerable. *Cipayo* literally meant sepoy and implied a servile instrument of a colonial power. The fact that the reference was directly taken from British colonial history clearly implied that Argentina under its traditional elite was as equally subservient to British interests as colonial India. *Vendepatria* was an invented epithet meaning literally 'a seller of one's country'.

41 See Llach, 'El Plan Pinedo de 1940', for the different political responses to the issue of industrialism.

42 Milciades Peña, *El peronismo: selección de documentos para la historia* (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 10.

43 Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class*, p. 96.

44 See, for example, Juan D. Perón, *Doctrina peronista* (Buenos Aires, 1973), pp. 51–83.

45 Luis Franco, *Biografía patria* (Buenos Aires, 1958), p. 173.

46 Eduardo Colom, *17 de octubre, la revolución de los descamisados* (Buenos Aires, 1946), pp. 106–7.

47 For a study of such themes in tango see Judith Evans, 'Tango and popular culture in Buenos Aires' (unpublished paper presented to the American Historical Association conference, Washington, 1980). For an analysis of the subtext of Peronist discourse as manifested by Perón's speech on 17 October see Emilio de Ipola, 'Desde estos mismos balcones', *Ideología y discurso populista* (Buenos Aires, 1983).

48 Colom, *17 de octubre*, p. 107.

49 From the socialist newspaper, *La Vanguardia*, cited in Angel Perelman, *Como hicimos el 17 de octubre* (Buenos Aires, 1961), p. 78.

50 See Anson Rabinach, 'Bloch's theory of fascism', *New German Critique* (Spring 1977).

51 Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge, 1977), p. 178.

52 Cited in Manuel Gálvez, *En el mundo de los seres reales* (Buenos Aires, 1955), p. 79.

53 Ernesto Goldar, 'La literatura peronista' in Gonzalo Cárdenas *et al.*, *El peronismo* (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 151.

54 Cipriano Reyes, *Como yo hice el 17 de octubre* (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 144.

55 Perelman, *Como hicimos el 17 de octubre*, p. 12.

56 Mafud, *Sociología del peronismo*, p. 107.

57 See for example the classic tangos of Discépolo, 'Qué vachaché', 'Yira, yira'. Similar themes can be found in other forms of popular culture of the 1920 and 1930s such as *grotesco* theatre. See Noemi Ulla, *Tango, rebelión y nostalgia* (Buenos Aires, 1967); Norberto Galaso, *Discépolo y su época* (Buenos Aires, 1967); Gustavo Sosa-Pujato, 'Popular culture' in Ronald Dockhart and Mark Falcoff, *Prologue to Perón: Argentina in depression and war* (Berkeley, 1975).

58 From Discépolo's tango 'Qué vachaché'. The lyrics can be found in Osvaldo Pelletieri, *Enrique Santos Discépolo: obra poética* (Buenos Aires, 1976), p. 80.

59 See Julio Mafud, *La vida obrera en la Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1976), p. 241.

60 The phrase is Osvaldo Pelletieri's, in Pelletieri, *Discépolo*, p. 63.

61 Jacinto Cimazo and José Grunfeld, *Luis Danussi en el movimiento social y obrero argentino* (Buenos Aires, 1976), p. 93.

62 *ibid.*, p. 86.

63 Perelman, *Como hicimos el 17 de octubre*, p. 12.

64 See del Campo, *Sindicalismo y peronismo*. Also of interest is Ricardo Gaudio and Jorge Pilone, *Estado y relaciones obrero-patronal en los orígenes de la negociación colectiva en Argentina*, CEDES, Estudios Sociales, no. 5 (Buenos Aires, 1976).

65 Cimazo and Grunfeld, *Luis Danussi*, p. 103. See also Tamarin, *Argentine Labor Movement*, especially chapter 7. Tamarin stresses the importance of communist organising activity in moving beyond the boundaries of the traditional organised sectors of the working class, though he notes that the increase in union membership in the late 1930s and early 1940s scarcely kept pace with the increase in the labour force, or succeeded in penetrating those areas of greatest industrial expansion.

66 Interview with Don Ramiro González, Rosario, November 1976.

67 Interview with Lautaro Ferlini, Buenos Aires, November/December 1976.

68 Bourdieu, *Outline*, p. 170.

69 According to Felix Luna this term was first used by the socialists in their paper, *La Vanguardia*, to refer to Perón's supporters. Luna, *El 45*.

70 See Julie M. Taylor, *Eva Perón: the myths of a woman* (Chicago, 1979). The most complete biography of Evita is that of Nicholas Fraser and Marysa Navarro, *Eva Perón* (New York, 1981).

71 A point made by Dario Canton in Fayt, *La naturaleza del peronismo*, p. 343.

72 José Gobello, *Diccionario lunfardo y otros términos antiguos y modernos usados en Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1975). The exception was the use of *negra* among the poor as a term of affection between a man and woman.

73 Luna, *El 45*, p. 350.

74 Quoted in Perelman, *Como hicimos el 17 de octubre*, p. 78.

75 The phrase is Leopoldo Marechal's: 'It was the invisible Argentina that many had announced in literature without even knowing or loving their millions of concrete faces.' See Elbia Rosbaco Marechal, *Mi vida con Leopoldo Marechal* (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 91.

76 Luna, *El 45*, p. 350.

77 For the notion of 'counter-theatre' see E. P. Thompson, 'Eighteenth-century English society', *Social History* (May 1978).

78 Luna, *El 45*, p. 397.

79 Cited in Monica Peralta Ramos, *Etapas de acumulación y alianzas de clase*

en la Argentina, 1930–1970 (Buenos Aires, 1972), p. 120. For justicialist ideology see Alberto Ciria, *Perón y el justicialismo* (Buenos Aires, 1974).

80 Peralta Ramos, *Etapas de acumulación*, p. 120.

81 Servicio Internacional de Publicaciones Argentinas, *Emancipation of the Workers* (Buenos Aires, 1952), pp. 27–30.

82 Goldar, 'Literatura peronista', p. 155.

83 Cited in Dario Canton, *El parlamento argentino en épocas de cambio, 1890, 1916, y 1946* (Buenos Aires, 1966), p. 168.

84 *Argentina de Hoy*, August 1953.

85 Sylvia Sigal and Juan Carlos Torre, 'Reflexiones en torno a los movimientos laborales en América Latina' in Ruben Katzman and José Luis Reyna, eds., *Fuerza de trabajo y movimientos laborales en América Latina* (Mexico City, 1969), p. 145.

86 The concept of *disponibilidad* (availability) occurs in many of Germani's key works. See especially *Política y sociedad* and 'Clases populares y democracia respresentativa'. While it seems to me that criticisms of this and other concepts in the work of Germani in terms of their implications of passivity and manipulation are justified, Germani's work does, nevertheless, contain many fundamental insights into the specificity and peculiarity of a movement such as Peronism which are in tune with the general drift of the argument in this chapter. In particular his insistence concerning the uniqueness of Peronism as a form of political mobilisation seems to me to be of continuing relevance. His insistence that this should be viewed within the framework of a traditional/modern dichotomy would seem to me to be both wrong and unnecessary, a point astutely made by Tulio Halperin Donghi in 'Algunas observaciones'.

2 The survival of Peronism

1 *Crítica*, 19 September 1955.

2 *Crítica*, 21 September 1955.

3 Santiago Sénen González and Juan Carlos Torre, *Ejército y sindicatos* (Buenos Aires, 1969), p. 12.

4 *ibid.*, p. 33.

5 *El Obrero Ferroviario*, October 1955. A similar pattern occurred in the petrol workers', meatpackers', and garment workers' unions.

6 *CGT*, 7 October 1955.

7 *ibid.*

8 *La Vanguardia*, the socialist newspaper, carried a report in late October on the state of union affairs in Rosario in which it bitterly attacked the action of local authorities who had handed back the local CGT to Peronists after it had been taken over by a local socialist/syndicalist committee. See *La Vanguardia*, 27 October 1955.

9 See Sénen González and Torre, *Ejército y sindicatos*, pp. 87–90, for the different civilian backers of the distinct military tendencies.

10 *Crítica*, 2 November 1955.

11 See Cerrutti Costa's statement to this effect in Sénen González and Torre, *Ejército y sindicatos*, pp. 137–43. On Lonardi's thought and actions in this period see Luis Ernesto Lonardi, *Dios es justo* (Buenos Aires, 1958) and Marta Lonardi, *Mi padre y la revolución del 55* (Buenos Aires, 1980).

12 Sénen González and Torre, *Ejército y sindicatos*, p. 97.

13 *ibid.*, p. 97.

14 *La Nación*, 24 September 1955, mentions shooting in Avellaneda involving 'undisciplined elements'. For details of the Lanus demonstration see Roberto, 'De la resistencia peronista a las elecciones de 11 de marzo', *Peronismo y Socialismo*, no. 1, September 1973.

15 *La Nación*, 26 September 1955.

16 Interview with Alberto Belloni, Buenos Aires, 14 January 1974. Belloni was at this time a worker in the port of Rosario.

17 *New York Times*, 25 September 1955. This is one of the best sources for events in Argentina at this time; certainly many events which never penetrated the Argentine press are to be found there.

18 Juan M. Vigo, *La vida por Perón: crónicas de la Resistencia* (Buenos Aires, 1973), p. 54.

19 *ibid.*, p. 50.

20 *New York Times*, 20 October 1955.

21 Interview with Alberto Belloni,

22 *New York Times*, 4 November 1955. The *New York Times* gave a figure of 65% absenteeism nationally, reaching 100% in the most industrially concentrated *barrios*.

23 Roberto, 'De la resistencia peronista'.

24 Vigo, *La vida por Perón*, p. 55.

25 See Sénen González and Torre, *Ejército y sindicatos*, p. 54.

26 *New York Times*, 15 November 1955.

27 Vigo, *La vida por Perón*, p. 69.

28 *La Nación*, 16 November 1955. Only those unions already taken over by anti-Peronists such as the shop clerks and the bank workers, and public services forcibly kept open by the military, failed to respond.

29 *New York Times*, 16 November 1955.

30 Miguel Gazzera, 'Nosotros los dirigentes' in Norberto Ceresole and Miguel Gazzera, *Peronismo: autocrítica y perspectivas* (Buenos Aires, 1970), p. 61.

31 Statement of the Minister of Labour, Raul Migone, *La Nación*, 17 November 1955.

32 Decree 14.190 which modified the previous decree 7107 spoke of rehabilitating some 92,000 persons. Even after this, however, some observers maintained that upward of 50,000 remained legally proscribed from union activity. *Qué*, 26 August 1956.

33 This happened for example in the SIAM di Tella plants. See *La Verdad*, 28 November 1955.

34 *Qué*, 21 December 1955.

35 *La Verdad*, 2 January 1956.

36 *La Vanguardia*, 5 January 1956.

37 See the speech of José Gelbard, the head of the Confederación General Económica, at the Congress of Productivity and Social Welfare held in March 1955. 'Report of the proceedings of the *Congreso Nacional de Productividad y Bienestar*', *Hechos e Ideas* (Buenos Aires, 1955), p. 282.

29. MSS, AESP, Império, Colonias, box 1 and 2.

30. Charles Expilly quotes J. U. Sturz's letter of 5 December 1857 in which he says: "Si vous pouviez parvenir à sacrifier assez de vos compatriotes allemandes pour que leur travail peut revenir au Brésilien à aussi bon marché que celui des nègres, vous seriez certes hautement loué, bien payé et même distingué"; Expilly, *La traîte*, 27.

31. MSS, AESP, Império, Colonias, box 1.

32. Von Tschudi, *Viagem*, 152.

33. About the colonist's social mobility, see MSS, AESP, Império, Colonias, box 1; Sylvia Bassetto, "Política de Mão de Obra," 135; Holloway, "The Coffee Colono of São Paulo." See also Thomas Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886–1934* (Chapel Hill, 1980).

34. Barão Patí do Alferes, *Fundação e Custeio de uma Fazenda na Província do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963).

35. MSS, AESP, Império, Colonias, box 1.

36. Stanley Stein, *Grandeza e Decadência do Café no Vale do Paraiba* (São Paulo, 1961), 353.

37. Patí do Alferes, *Fundação e Custeio*, 245–46, 262–67; Augusto Ramos, "Máquinas Primitivas para Beneficiar Café," in *O Café no Segundo Centenário de sua Introdução no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1934), 1:75.

38. C. F. van Delden Laërne, *Brazil and Java Report on Coffee Culture in América, Ásia, and África* (London, 1885).

39. *AALPSP*, 1854–55, 47.

40. MSS, AESP, Império, Colonias, box 2.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., letter from the municipal judge Antonio Peixoto, Campinas, 30 May 1858, to the provincial president.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., box 1.

45. Ibid., box 2, letter dated Campinas, 23 December 1865, signed G. H. Krug.

46. Von Tschudi, *Viagem*, 131.

47. Davatz, *Memórias de um Colono*, 29–30. According to José de Souza Martins, 67 colonies had been founded between 1851 and 1860, whereas only 18 were founded between 1861 and 1870; *A Imigração e a Crise do Brasil Agrário*, 53.

48. MSS, Arquivo Nacional, SH Códice 544, Relatório do Inspetor Geral de Terras e Colonização José Cupertino Coelho Cintra ao Sr. Cansanção de Sinimbu. See also Thomas Holloway, "Condições do Mercado de Trabalho e Organização do Trabalho nas Plantações na Economia Cafeeira de São Paulo, 1885–1915, Uma Análise Preliminar," *Estudos Econômicos* 2, 6 (1972): 145–77.

49. Expilly, *La traîte*, 93.

50. João E. Carvalho Monte Negro, *Colonias Nova Lousã e Nova Colombia* (São Paulo, 1875).

51. Johan Jakob von Tschudi talks about 400 *reis*, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda in his preface to Davatz mentions 500 and even 600 *reis*. This difference between these authors can probably be explained by difference in chronology.

52. MSS, AESP, Impérios, Colonias, box 1 and 2.

53. *Relatório apresentado ao Ilmo. Sr. Dr. Jorge Tibiriçá . . . pelo Inspetor de Engenharia, Leandro Dupré* (1893). See also José Francisco Camargo, *Crescimento da População no Estado de São Paulo e seus Aspectos Econômicos* (3 vols.; São Paulo, 1952).

54. For a different interpretation of the failures of the sharecropping system, see Dean, *Rio Claro*, 106.

Chapter Six

1. Hipólito da Costa, *Correio Braziliense* (29 vols.; London, 1808–22), 7:608–9. For an abridged edition, see Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, *Antologia do Correio Brasiliense* (Rio de Janeiro, 1977), 103, 107, 132, 605, 607.

2. João Severiano Maciel da Costa, *Memória sôbre a Necessidade de Abolir a Introdução dos Escravos Africanos no Brasil: sôbre o Modo e Condições com que esta Abolição se Deve Fazer e sôbre os Modos de Remediar a Falta de Braços que Ela Pode Ocasionar* (Coimbra, 1821); José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, *Representação à Assembléia Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil sôbre a Escravatura* (Paris, 1825); José Eloy Pessoa da Silva, *Memória sôbre a Escravatura e Projeto de Colonização dos Europeus e Pretos da África no Império do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1826); and Frederico L. Cesar de Burlamaque, *Memória Analítica Acerca do Comércio de Escravos e Acerca dos Males da Escravidão Doméstica por F.L.C.B.* (Rio de Janeiro, 1837).

3. M. F. J. Santanna Nery, *Le Brésil en 1889* (Paris, 1889); A. Balbi, *Essai statistique sur le royaume du Portugal et d'Algarve, comparé aux autres états de l'Europe* (2 vols.; Paris, 1822); Malte Brum, *Tableau statistique du Brésil* (Paris, 1830).

4. Emília Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 2d ed. (São Paulo, 1982).

5. *Relatório apresentado à Assembléia Legislativa da Província do Rio de Janeiro Pelo Conselheiro Antonio Nicoláu Tolentino* (Rio de Janeiro, 1858); Maria Sylvia de Carvalho Franco, *Homens Livres na Ordem Escravocrata* (São Paulo, 1969); Eny Mesquita, "O papel do Agregado em Itú" (Master's thesis, FFCH, USP, 1975).

6. Many travelers gave detailed descriptions of slaves' living conditions. See Jean Baptiste Debret, *Viagem Pitoresca e Histórica ao Brasil*, 2d ed. (3 vols.; São Paulo, 1941); Charles Ribeyrolles, *Brasil Pitoresco*, 2d ed. (2 vols.; São Paulo, 1941); Henry Chamberlain, *Views and Costumes of the City and Neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro* (London, 1822); Daniel Kidder, *Sketches of Residence and Travels in Brazil* (2 vols.; Philadelphia, 1845); Ferdinand Denis, *Le Brésil: Histoire, moeurs, usages et costumes des habitants de ce royaume* (2 vols.; Paris, 1822); Maria Graham, *Journal of a Voyage to Brazil and Residence There during the Years 1821, 1822, 1823* (London, 1824); Henry Koster, *Travels in Brazil* (2 vols.; Philadelphia, 1817); Johan Moritz Rugendas, *Viagem Pitoresca através do Brasil*, 3d ed. (São Paulo, 1941); Carl Seid-

ler, *Dez Anos no Brasil*, 2d ed. (São Paulo, 1941). See also farmers' guides such as those published by Luis Peixoto Lacerda Werneck, *Memória Sôbre a Fundação e Custeio de uma Fazenda na Província do Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1878); João Baptista A. Imbert, *Manual dos Fazendeiros ou Tratado Doméstico Sobre as Enfermidades dos Negros* (Rio de Janeiro, 1839); Antonio Caetano da Fonseca, *Manual do Agricultor e dos Gêneros Alimentícios* (Rio de Janeiro, 1863). Particularly informative are Katya Queiroz Mattoso, *Etre esclave au Brésil* (Paris, 1979); Mary C. Karash, "Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1850," (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1972); Francisco Vidal Luna, *Minas Gerais: Escravos e Senhores* (São Paulo, 1981).

7. Leslie Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil, and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–1869* (Cambridge, 1970); idem, "The Independence of Brazil and the Abolition of the Slave Trade: Anglo-Brazilian Relations, 1822–26," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1 (November 1969): 115–47; Robert Conrad, "The Contraband Slave Trade to Brazil, 1831–1845," *HAHR* 49 (November 1969): 618–38.

8. *AALPSP*, 1855, 101, 266, (1856), 182; MSS, Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo, Império, Escravos, box 1.

9. Philip Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, Wis., 1969); Herbert Klein, *The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Princeton, 1978); W. P. Christie, *Notes on Brazilian Questions* (London, 1865), 83–86; Robert Slenes, "The Demography and Economics of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888" (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1976); Maurício Goulart, *Escravidão Africana no Brasil: Das Origens à Extinção do Tráfico* (São Paulo, 1949).

10. *Coleção Das Leis do Império do Brasil* (1850).

11. Rumors of contraband were heard from time to time until as late as 1870; see MSS, Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo, Império, Escravos, box 1 and MSS, Arquivo Nacional, Ij. 525, Ij. 522.

12. See below, n. 14.

13. Slenes, "The Demography and Economics of Brazilian Slavery"; Warren Dean, *Rio Claro: A Brazilian Plantation System, 1820–1920* (Stanford, 1976); Maria Luiza Marcílio, *La ville de São Paulo: Peuplement et population, 1780–1850, d'après les registres paroissiaux* (Rouen, 1968).

14. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, xliii–xliv; Evaristo de Moraes, *A Escravidão Africana no Brasil: Das Origens à Extinção* (São Paulo, 1933), 174; about slaves' marriage, see Francisco Vidal Luna and Irací del Nero, "Vila Rica: Nota sobre Casamentos de Escravos, 1727–1826," *África* 4 (1981): 3–6; idem, "Devassa nas Minas Gerais: Observações Sôbre Casos de Consubinato," *Anais do Museu Paulista* 31 (1982): 3–15.

15. For a discussion of paternalism, see Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan, Roll* (New York, 1979).

16. Clovis Moura, *Rebeliões das Senzales* (São Paulo, 1959); Stuart Schwartz, "The Mocambo: Slave Resistance in Colonial Bahia," *Journal of Social History* 3 (Summer 1970): 313–33; idem, "Resistance and Accommodation in Eighteenth Century Brazil," *HAHR* 57 (1977): 69–81.

17. Debret, *Viagem Pitoresca* 2:185; Ribeyrolles, *Brasil Pitoresco* 1:36; Adolphe d'Assier, *Le Brésil contemporain* (Paris, 1867), 98.

18. MSS, Arquivo Público Mineiro, Livro 573; Debret, *Viagem Pitoresca* 2:225; Roger Bastide, *Les religions africaines aux Brésil* (Paris, 1960); idem, *Sociologia do Folclore Brasileiro* (São Paulo, 1959).

19. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 274.

20. Pedro Carvalho de Mello, "The Economics of Slavery in Brazilian Coffee Plantations, 1850–1888," (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1977); idem, "Aspectos Econômicos da Organização do Trabalho na Economia Cafeeira do Rio de Janeiro, 1850–1888," *Revista Brasileira de Economia* 32 (January–March, 1978): 19–67; Peter Eisenberg, *Sugar in Pernambuco: Modernization without Change, 1840–1910* (Berkeley, 1974).

21. Klein, *The Middle Passage*, 97–98; Slenes, "The Demography and Economics of Slavery," 123.

22. *Trabalhos do Congresso Agrícola do Recife, Outubro de 1878* (Recife, 1978); see also Eisenberg, *Sugar in Pernambuco*, 154–55.

23. André Rebouças, *A Agricultura Nacional: Estudos Econômicos, Propaganda Abolicionista e Democrática* (Rio de Janeiro, 1883); Luis Peixoto Lacerda Werneck, *Idéias sôbre Colonização* (Rio de Janeiro, 1855), 62; Quintino Bocaiuva, *A Crise da Grande Lavoura e da Grande Propiendade no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1878), 10; C. A. Taunay, *Algumas Considerações sobre a Colonização como Meio de Coadjuvar a Substituição do Trabalho Cativo pelo Trabalho Livre no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1834).

24. Eisenberg, *Sugar in Pernambuco*, 181.

25. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 124–28.

26. Sylvia Bassetto, "Política de Mão de Obra na Economia Cafeeira do Oeste Paulista" (Ph.D. diss., FFCH, USP, 1982); see also Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, and Thomas H. Holloway, *Immigrants on the Land: Coffee and Society in São Paulo, 1886–1934* (Chapel Hill, 1980).

27. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 138–57; Augusto Emílio Zaluar, *Peregrinação pela Província de São Paulo, 1860–1861* (São Paulo, 1953), 191; *AALPSP*, 1863, 372, 396.

28. Flávio Saes, "A Grande Emprêsa de Serviços Públicos na Economia Cafeeira" (Ph.D. diss., FFCH, USP, 1979);

29. Cheywa R. Spindel, *Homens e Máquinas na Transição de uma Economia Cafeeira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1979); Eduardo Perez de Souza, "A Evolução das Técnicas Produtivas no Século XIX: O Engenho de Açucar e a Fazenda de Café" (Master's thesis, IFCH, Universidade de Campinas, 1978).

30. Louis Couty, *Etude de biologie industrielle sur le café* (Rio de Janeiro, 1883); C. F. Van Delden Laërne, *Brazil and Java: Report on Coffee Culture in America, Asia, and Africa* (London, 1885).

31. Eisenberg, *Sugar in Pernambuco*.

32. Ibid.

33. Louis Couty, *Le Brésil en 1884* (Rio de Janeiro, 1884); idem, *Pequena Propriedade e Imigração Européia, 1883–1884* (Rio de Janeiro, 1887).

34. Aroldo de Azevedo, "Última Etapa na Vida do Barão de Santa Eulália," *Revista de História* 10; 3 (1952): 417–30.

35. Rodrigues Alves, *Relatório Apresentado à Assembléia Legislativa Provincial de São Paulo* (1888).

36. The debate over slave productivity is still very much alive. For Warren Dean (*Rio Claro*) free labor is more productive than slave labor. This is also the opinion of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (*Capitalismo e Escravidão no Brasil Meridional* [São Paulo, 1962]) and Octavio Ianni ("O Progresso Econômico e o Trabalhador Livre" in Sérgio Buarque de Hollanda, ed., *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira* [1969], 2[3]:297–319). Both Jacob Gorender (*O Escravismo Colonial* [São Paulo, 1978]) and Pedro Carvalho de Mello ("Aspectos Econômicos"), consider slave labor more productive than free labor. Jaime Reis (*Abolition and the Economics of Slaveholding in Northeast Brazil*, Glasgow University, Institute of Latin American Studies, Occasional Papers [Glasgow, 1979], argues that slave labor is sometimes more and sometimes less productive than free labor. For discussions of this problem, see also Sylvia Bassetto, "Política de Mão de Obra," 68; Odilon Nogueira de Matos, "O Visconde de Indaiatuba e o Trabalho Livre em São Paulo," *Anais do VI Simpósio da APUH* (São Paulo, 1973), 69.

37. Carvalho de Mello, "Aspectos Econômicos."

38. Hall, "The Origins of Mass Immigration in Brazil"; Thomas Holloway, "Immigration and Abolition: The Transition from Slave to Free Labor in the São Paulo Coffee Zone," in *Essays concerning the Socio-Economic History of Brazil and Portuguese India*, ed. Dauril Alden and Warren Dean (Gainesville, Florida, 1977).

39. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 172–79.

40. João Elisário Carvalho Monte Negro, *Colonias Nova Lousã e Nova Colombia* (São Paulo, 1875); see also Bassetto, "Política de Mão de Obra," 72–75.

41. João Pedro da Veiga, *Estudo Econômico e Financeiro sôbre o Estado de São Paulo* (São Paulo, 1896), 63; Francisco de Paula Ferreira de Rezende, *Minhas Recordações* (Rio de Janeiro, 1944), 27, 438, 442, 498.

42. Alice Barros Fontes, "Os Caifazes, 1882–1889" (Master's thesis, FFCH, USP, 1976); Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 421; see also Evaristo de Moraes, *A Campanha Abolicionista, 1876–1888* (Rio de Janeiro, 1924); Osório Duque Estrada, *A Abolição, 1831–1888* (Rio de Janeiro, 1918); Suely Robles Reis de Queirós, *Escravidão Negra em São Paulo: Um Estudo das Tensões Provocadas pelo Escravismo no Século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro, 1977).

43. Joaquim Nabuco, *Campanha Abolicionista no Recife: Eleições de 1884* (Rio de Janeiro, 1885), 10.

44. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 290–319. See also Robert B. Toplin, *The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil* (New York, 1972).

45. For a different point of view, see Pedro Carvalho de Mello, "The Economics of Slavery"; Robert Slenes, "The Demography and Economics of Brazilian Slavery"; Robert Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888* (Berkeley, 1972).

46. *APBCD*, 1871, 4, 26.

47. F. A. Brandão, Jr., *A Escravatura no Brasil* (Brussels, 1865). See the articles published in the newspaper *A Província de São Paulo*, 24 Nov. 1880, 23 Dec. 1880, 15 Jan. 1881. See also João Cruz Costa, *O Desenvolvimento da Filosofia no Brasil no Século XIX e a Evolução Histórica Nacional* (São Paulo, 1950), 227–365.

48. Sud Menucci, *O Precursor do Abolicionismo no Brasil: Luiz Gama* (São Paulo, 1938).

49. For a detailed analysis of the pattern of voting, see Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 384, and Conrad, *Destruction of Brazilian Slavery*, 301, 303.

50. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 290–319; Robert Toplin, *The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil* (New York, 1972).

51. *APBCD*, 1884, 4, 121.

52. *APBCD*, 1885; *Anais do Senado* (1885).

53. Viotti da Costa, *Da Senzala à Colonia*, 418.

54. José Maria dos Santos, *Republicanos Paulistas e a Abolição* (São Paulo, 1942). See also Emília Costa Nogueira, "O Movimento Republicano em Itú: Os Fazendeiros do Oeste Paulista e os Pródromos do Movimento Republicano," *Revista de História* 20 (1954): 379–405.

55. Barão do Javari, *Organização e Programas Ministeriais*, 2d ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1962).

56. Florestan Fernandes, *A Integração do Negro na Sociedade de Classes* (São Paulo, 1964). See also José Bento de Araujo, *Relatório Apresentado a Assembléia Legislativa Provincial do Rio de Janeiro* (1888).

57. Amélia de Rezende Martins, *Um Idealista Realizador, Barão Geraldo de Rezende* (Rio de Janeiro, 1939), 289, 358.

Chapter Seven

1. Gilberto Freyre, *The Mansions and the Shanties (Sobrados e Mucambos): The Making of Modern Brazil* (New York, 1963); Pedro Pinchas Geiger, *Evolução da Rede Urbana Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963); Richard Morse, "Cities and Societies in Nineteenth Century Latin America: The Illustrative Case of Brazil," in Jorge Hardoy and Richard Schaedel, eds., *The Urbanization Process in America from Its Origins to the Present Day* (Buenos Aires, 1969); José Arthur Rios, "The Cities of Brazil," in T. Lynn Smith and A. Marchant, eds., *Portrait of Half a Continent* (New York, 1951), 108–208; Stuart Schwartz, "Cities of Empire: Mexico and Bahia in the Sixteenth Century," *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 11 (October 1969): 616–37; Richard Morse, "Brazil's Urban Development: Colony and Empire," in A. J. R. Russell-Wood, ed., *From Colony to Nation* (Baltimore and London, 1975); Katya Queiroz Mattoso, *A Cidade do Salvador e seu Mercado no Século XIX* (São Paulo, 1978).