harassment, intimidation, and incarceration, these young intellectuals were not easily dissuaded from their goals and contributed in no small way to the outbreak of revolutionary activity in Mexico in 1910.

Recommended for Further Study

Agostini, Claudia. *Monuments of Progress: Modernization and Public Health in Mexico City, 1876–1910.* Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003.

Barton, Mary. *Impressions of Mexico with Brush and Pen.* London: Methuen, 1911.

Beezley, William H. *Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987.

Brushwood, John S. *Mexico in Its Novel: A Nation's Search for Identity.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966.

Charlot, Jean. *The Mexican Mural Renaissance, 1920–1925.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967.

Díaz, María Elena. "The Satiric Penny Press for Workers in Mexico, 1900–1910: A Case Study in the Politicisation of Popular Culture." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22 (1990): 497–526.

Fowler-Salamini, Heather, and Mary Kay Vaughan, eds. *Women of the Mexican Countryside, 1850–1990: Creating Spaces, Shaping Transition.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994.

French, William E. *A Peaceful and Working People: Manners, Morals, and Class Formation in Northern Mexico.* Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996.

Hale, Charles A. *The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Piccato, Pablo. *City of Suspects: Crime in Mexico City, 1900–1931.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001.

Pilcher, Jeffrey M. "Tamales or Timbales: Cuisine and the Formation of Mexican National Identity." *The Americas* 53 (October, 1996): 193–216.

Porter, Susie S. *Working Women in Mexico City: Public Discourse and Material Conditions, 1879–1931.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003.

Sierra, Justo. *The Political Evolution of the Mexican People.* Translated by Charles Ramsdell. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.

Tenorio Trillo, Mauricio. *Mexico at the World's Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

Tyler, Ron, ed. *Posada's Mexico.* Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1979.

Vaughan, Mary Kay. *The State, Education and Social Class in Mexico, 1880–1928.* DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982.

Wasserman, Mark. *Everyday Life and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Men, Women and War.* Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2000.

Widdifield, Stacie G. *The Embodiment of the National in Late Nineteenth Century Mexican Painting.* Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1995.

Wood, Andrew G. *Revolution in the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protest in Veracruz, 1870–1927.* Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2001.

VIII

The Revolutic

The Military Phase, 1910-

The Liberal Indictment and the Overthrow of Díaz

The Liberal Leadership

The opening of the twentieth century found Mexico a far different place than it had been only twenty-five years earlier. It would be sheer folly to gainsay the tremendous material benefits that had accrued in the industrial, commercial, and mining fields. But there is no Ciudad Porfirio Díaz in Mexico today, no public school or street bears his name, and it is hard to find a public statue or monument erected in his honor. Porfirian capitalism shunned the masses; the economic surplus generated by the dynamic economy had been appropriated by the few. A system that perpetuated itself for the sake of order and economic progress, and atrophied in the process, became less and less palatable to an increasing number of young, socially aware Mexicans. The federal Constitution of 1857, with its theoretical guarantees, had been violated incessantly. Elections at all levels of government were a farce. The administration of justice in rural Mexico was a euphemism for the capricious whims of the local jefe político. Freedom of the press did not exist, and the restrictions of the Reform limiting the participatory role of the clergy were not enforced. To those who were concerned with the longevity of the regime, Don Porfirio became "Don Perpetuo," while those more concerned with the brutality dubbed him "Porfiriopoxtli." The científicos continued to be loyal apologists for the dictatorship, but a younger generation of intellectual activists, embracing a new faith and unwilling to be intimidated by the arrogance of the científicos, began to question the effete dictatorship.

One of the first to speak out for reform was Wistano Luis Orozco, a jurist from Guadalajara. Unlike the majority of liberal malcontents, he was concerned with social, not political, issues. As early as 1895 he had written a volume criticizing the Díaz land laws and the land companies that profited from them. Arguing that the concentration of landownership was detrimental to both the rural peasantry and the

progress of agriculture, he called for the government to break up and sell all public lands and begin buying up some of the huge haciendas for the same purpose. But Orozco was not propagandizing for revolution. He believed the reforms he envisioned could be effected from within the administration.

In San Luis Potosí, Camilo Arriaga, a mining engineer by profession, rejected the positivist doctrine he had learned in the schools and by the turn of the century counted himself in the small anti-Díaz camp. A typical nineteenth-century liberal, Arriaga moved into the opposition fold because of Díaz's *modus vivendi* with the Roman Catholic Church. In late 1900 he called for the organization of liberal clubs throughout Mexico and summoned a national liberal convention to meet in San Luis Potosí. Although the resolutions adopted at the 1901 convention were narrowly conceived and primarily anticlerical, the malcontents would gradually broaden the base of their antigovernment attack.

The least timid members of the liberal movement in the early twentieth century were the Flores Magón brothers—Jesús, Ricardo, and Enrique. In August of 1900 the brothers began publication of *Regeneración*, a Mexico City weekly. Not yet ready to preach the injustice of private land ownership, through its columns they supported the nascent liberal movement in San Luis Potosí and decried the excesses of Porfirismo. But when they attacked a local jefe político in Oaxaca in the columns of *Regeneración*, the brothers were arrested in the late spring of 1901 and confined to Belén prison for a year. Their arrest served to invigorate the liberal movement as freedom of the press and suppression of the jefes políticos became new causes the liberals could add to their militant anticlericalism. By the time the Flores Magón brothers were released Camilo Arriaga had been arrested, as had other leaders of the liberal cause. The brothers renewed their attacks, this time in the columns of *El Hijo de Ahuizote*; six months later they were in prison once again. A release and a third brief arrest convinced them of the futility of trying to conduct their campaign from Mexican soil; in January 1904, broke and disheartened, they crossed over into the United States to attack the Díaz regime from exile.

From San Antonio, Texas, the Flores Magón brothers and Arriaga, who joined them shortly, began soliciting funds from liberals to reinstitute *Regeneración*. Former subscribers and liberal clubs throughout Mexico made small contributions, and an unexpected benefactor was found in Francisco I. Madero, son of a wealthy Coahuila hacendado. The first issue of the newly revived tabloid came off the press in the fall of 1904. The *Regeneración* published from San Antonio was much more militant and belligerent; attacks against Díaz were more categorical and vicious and the remedies more radical.

Cartoon from El Hijo de Ahuizote *titled "The Governors Praying for Díaz Support."*

In reaction, Díaz dispatched a would-be assassin to the Texas city to end once and for all his problem with the Flores Magón brothers. The assassination attempt failed, but the liberals in exile decided it would be wiser to move deeper into the heartland of the United States. The exiles chose St. Louis, Missouri, and in 1905 not only again began publishing *Regeneración* but also organized a revolutionary junta for the expressed purpose of overthrowing the Díaz dictatorship. But the local St. Louis authorities were no more friendly than those in San Antonio; they arrested the Flores Magón brothers, charging them with violating United States neutrality laws. Although they were released, Ricardo's subsequent activities in other parts of the United States landed him in jail several times, and he died in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1922.

In the summer of 1906 the junta in St. Louis published its Liberal Plan. Part of it was a simple rehash of nineteenth-century liberal concerns. It called for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, suppression of the jefes políticos, the complete secularization of education, and the nationalization of all church property. But the Liberal Plan of 1906 added a series of new concepts manifesting graphically that a new age of liberalism had finally dawned. Socially oriented measures included the abolition of the death penalty (except for treason), educational reform in favor of the poor, and prison reform emphasizing rehabilitation rather than punishment. More revolutionary yet was the call for



Treatment of the Mexican Liberal party. A print by José Guadalupe Posada.

a nationwide eight-hour workday and a six-day workweek, the abolition of the tienda de raya, the payment of all workers in legal tender, and the prohibition of child labor. The rural areas of Mexico were not overlooked as they had been so often in the past. All uncultivated lands were to be taken over by the state and redistributed to those who would work them. To enable the small farmer to take advantage of the new law, an agricultural credit bank would be established to provide low-interest loans. And, finally, special emphasis would be placed on restoring the ejido lands seized illegally from the Indian communities.

The discontent over the political abuses of the Díaz dictatorship had been gradually transmuted into a new gospel of social reform. For the first time in Mexican history an articulate and organized minority, albeit a small one, had displayed genuine concern for the plight of the masses. The liberal leaders in exile had immersed themselves in European social thought and had begun to apply the lessons to Mexican reality as they understood it. In the thousands of copies of *Regeneración* smuggled into Mexico monthly, the Flores Magón brothers and their liberal compatriots in exile exposed the regime as intellectually impoverished and socially bankrupt. They received their first promising news from the fatherland in the summer of 1906. It came from Cananea, Sonora.

Labor Unrest

On June 1, 1906, the Mexican workers at Colonel William Greene's Cananea Consolidated Copper Company went out on strike. The liberal junta had not planned the strike, but young socialist activists in Cananea—Manuel Diéguez, Estéban Calderón, and Francisco Ibarra—had been in correspondence with the exiles, had formed an affiliate liberal club in Cananea, and had agitated the workers, distributing copies of *Regeneración*.

The grievances of the miners at Cananea were manifold. Mexicans were paid less than their United States counterparts for performing the same jobs. Qualified Mexican laborers were consigned to undesirable posts, while the technical and managerial positions were staffed entirely by United States personnel. The workers elected a delegation, including Diéguez and Calderón, to negotiate these matters, and salary and hours, with the management. When Colonel Greene refused to arbitrate, the activists decided to stop all company operations.

The violence began in the company lumberyard. Disgruntled but unarmed workers attempted to force their way through a locked gate, and the resident manager ordered high-pressure water hoses to be turned on them. When the gate finally buckled and the workers swarmed into the yard, they were greeted with several volleys of rifle fire. During the chaos of the next hour several dozen Mexicans and two United States managers were slain. The remaining workers retired, leaving the lumberyard in flames. The atmosphere was explosive as the workers marched into Cananea. Colonel Greene informed Governor Rafael Izábal of the danger and telephoned friends across the border in Arizona to raise a volunteer force in his behalf. When the governor was apprised that the rurales could not arrive until late the next day, he gave permission for 275 Arizona Rangers to cross the border to patrol the streets of Cananea. To veil the violation of Mexico's neutrality, Izábal did not allow the Rangers to enter the country as a force. They crossed over individually and were subsequently sworn in as Mexican volunteers.

The situation in Cananea was still tense when the American force arrived, together with Governor Izábal. While no major military engagements ensued, the Rangers and the workers did exchange fire on several occasions, and deaths resulted on both sides. Late in the day a detachment of rurales arrived under the command of Colonel Emilio Kosterlitzky. "Justice" was quick for those workers Kosterlitzky considered ringleaders: they were rounded up, escorted out of town, and hanged from trees. The strike was broken, and the workers, threatened with induction into the army, returned to their jobs. Nonetheless, it

Mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters supported the miners' demands by demonstrating in Cananea.

focused attention on the Díaz policy of protecting foreigners at the expense of Mexicans. United States troops had been allowed to cross into Mexican territory and kill Mexicans to guard the interests of an American mining magnate.

The discontent of the miners at Cananea proved not to be an isolated phenomenon. Even as the strike in Sonora was being suppressed, liberal leaders among the textile workers in Veracruz organized the Gran Círculo de Obreros Libres and began seeking affiliate clubs in neighboring states. The last six months of 1906, with the echos of Cananea still fresh, witnessed the most intense labor conflict of the entire Porfiriato. Late in the year textile strikes supported by the Gran Círculo occurred in Puebla, Orizaba, and Tlaxcala, but the major showdown was postponed until January 1907.

Working conditions in the Río Blanco textile mills were nothing short of horrible. The common workday was twelve hours, the wages were grossly inadequate, and, on top of everything else, the workers were required to pay for the normal depreciation of the machinery they used. Children of eight and nine years of age performed physically demanding work. All strikes were illegal, and workers whose affiliation with the Gran Círculo became known were

subject to immediate dismissal. The abuses seemed so patent that the workers agreed to lay their complaints directly before President Díaz for his arbitration. The dictator agreed to hear the complaints, but when he issued his decision he supported the textile owners on almost every count. On Sunday, January 6, the workers held a mass meeting and decided to strike the following day.

The trouble set in at the grocery counter of the tienda de raya. Several of the wives of the striking workers were refused credit for food. Insults led to pushing and shoving, then fisticuffs, and finally shooting. The enraged strikers put the tienda de raya to flame, and the local jefe político ordered in the rurales and the federal troops. When the troops arrived they fired point-blank into the crowd and killed several women and children along with numerous workers. The crowd dispersed, but when some of the workers returned later to collect the bodies of the dead they were again assaulted by the troops and even more were killed, the dead numbering over a hundred.

The government reaction to the textile strike at Río Blanco was the grossest evidence of mass suppression yet. It was easy—too easy—to blame labor unrest entirely on liberal agitators in the United States without questioning seriously whether the grievances had any basis in fact. Again law and order were assured at the expense of personal liberty and social justice.

Heightened Political Activity

Despite the liberal indictment and despite the suppression of the nascent labor movement, most Mexican politicians believed that a revolution could be avoided and that change could be effected through the political process. The moderates were encouraged when in early 1908 the dictator granted an interview to the United States journalist James Creelman.

> No matter what my friends and supporters say, I retire when my presidential term of office ends, and I shall not serve again. I shall be eighty years old then. I have waited patiently for the day when the people of the Mexican Republic should be prepared to choose and change their government at every election without danger of armed revolution and without injury to the national credit or interference with the national progress. I believe that day has come. I welcome an opposition party in the Mexican Republic.[1]

1. Quoted in Frederick Starr, *Mexico and the United States* (Chicago, 1914), p. 253.

Díaz's bombshell that he did not plan to seek re-election in the upcoming presidential elections of 1910 ushered in a rash of political activity and intellectual ferment. Shortly after this interview the Mexican literati went to work. The Yucatecan sociologist Andrés Molina Enríquez, a positivist but not a Porfirista, published an important volume entitled *Los grandes problemas nacionales* (translated as *The Great National Problems*). A brilliant analysis of contemporary Mexican society, the work called for a penetrating program of reform, especially in the rural areas. Molina Enríquez knew that agrarian discontent had already manifested itself in sporadic outbreaks of violence, and he feared that if positive steps were not taken the movement might fall into radical or anarchist hands.

A still more influential book, *La sucesión presidencial en 1910* (translated as *The Presidential Succession in 1910*), came from the pen of Francisco I. Madero. Unlike Molina Enríquez, Madero held that Mexico's problems were primarily political in nature. The greatest danger to Mexico, as Madero perceived it, was continued military dictatorship. Although Madero himself did not believe that Díaz was going to step down voluntarily, he urged Mexicans to take the dictator at his word and to begin forming an opposition party, an anti-reelectionist party dedicated to the principles of effective suffrage and no re-election. Madero's book affirmed that the desired change could be effected through the ballot box, and, together with the Creelman interview, it set into motion the political forces that would ultimately lead to the conflagration in the fall of 1910.

Within the administration itself various factions began to vie for the mantle of succession. The followers of General Bernardo Reyes, the capable and energetic former governor of Nuevo León and secretary of war, pushed their hero as a logical successor to Díaz, or at least his vice-presidential running mate. Other científicos, led by José Limantour, supported the slate of Díaz and Ramón Corral, a former governor of Sonora and currently vice-president. They accepted and for good measure sent Reyes to undertake a military study mission in Europe. The general's acceptance of the contrived assignment in November 1909 was tantamount to political exile.

Madero and the Anti-Re-electionist Cause

The political opposition to Díaz in the 1910 presidential elections would come, at any rate, from outside the official party, as Francisco I. Madero dedicated himself to the Anti-Re-electionist cause. Born in Coahuila in 1873 to a family of wealth and prestige, young Madero received the best education that money could provide. The family had garnered a fortune in mining, land speculation, cattle, and banking;

Madero's father was happy to send his teenage son to Paris and then to Berkeley, California, for proper grooming. Upon his return to Coahuila, Madero was placed in charge of some of the family haciendas and quickly developed an unusual interest in the welfare of the peones who worked them. He not only observed the gross social inequities firsthand but took time to ponder the pathetic written complaints that crossed his desk daily. Stories of physical abuse at the hands of the mayordomos were not as frequent as tales of poverty that left children without shelter or food, of sickness without the possibility of medical care, of military conscription as a means of punishment, and of incarceration without the formalities of law. He did what he could on the family properties, but he realized fully that the Madero haciendas were simply a microcosm of rural Mexico. For Madero nothing could change until democratic processes had a chance to work their miraculous cures. Though Madero had initially contributed to the cause of the Flores Magón brothers, he became estranged from them as they grew more radical. In the spring of 1908 he set to work on his manuscript, *La sucesión presidencial en 1910*.

To foment anti-re-electionism and to test the political winds, Madero toured Mexico in the last half of 1909. During the summer and early fall he made public appearances in Orizaba, Veracruz, Progreso, Mérida, Campeche, Tampico, Monterrey, and Torreón. If the receptions were not always as enthusiastic as he would have liked, he was building a revolutionary network to which he would later appeal. The winter months were no less hectic as Madero, his close confidants, and his wife continued their political tours to Querétaro, Guadalajara, Manzanillo, Mazatlán, and into the northern states of Sonora and Chihuahua. Gaining confidence and stature along the way, Madero offered himself as an energetic, capable, and articulate young leader in stark contrast to a tiring and decrepit regime—not a member of Díaz's cabinet was under sixty; many of the state governors were in their seventies. Especially well received in Chihuahua, Madero held several meetings with Abraham González, an ardent foe of the dictatorship and president of the Centro Anti-Re-eleccionista Benito Juárez.

The convention met in April 1910 with broad geographical representation. The 120 delegates in attendance, following the lead of Abraham González and his Chihuahua colleagues, officially nominated Madero for the presidency. The following afternoon the vice-presidential nomination was given to Dr. Francisco Vásquez Gómez, a distinguished physician but a lukewarm liberal at best.

The philosophy of the Anti-Re-electionist party came out gradually during the campaign that carried the candidate to twenty-two of the twenty-seven Mexican states. Madero simply expanded upon the ideas contained in his book. Mexican presidents, he argued, should serve

only a single term because they should be focused not on the next election but on the next generation. Political reform, predicated upon free and honest elections, was basic to the entire program. Social benefits might then accrue, but democracy was the one imperative. During a campaign speech in San Luis Potosí, Madero was interrupted by a question voiced from the audience asking why he did not break up his own haciendas. Madero's answer epitomized his philosophy. The Mexican people, he responded, did not want bread; they wanted liberty. Not long thereafter, the Díaz administration began arresting Anti-Reelectionist leaders, including Madero himself.

Election day, June 21, 1910, found Madero in prison in San Luis Potosí and thousands of his Anti-Re-electionist colleagues in jails throughout the republic. Nobody was surprised when the government announced that Díaz and Ramón Corral had been overwhelmingly re-elected for still another term. The Madero family was able to arrange for Madero's release on bail with the proviso that he confine himself to the city of San Luis Potosí. He did remain in the city for several months, but in early October, when the rigor of his confinement was relaxed, he boarded a northbound train in disguise and escaped to the United States.

The Last Hurrah

Soon after the election Díaz began preparations for his final extravaganza. In September he would celebrate his eightieth birthday and Mexico the hundredth anniversary of its Declaration of Independence. The entire month was given over to pageants, celebration, and commemoration. Civic ritual competed mightily with self-congratulation to dominate the public's sensibility. A soaring column capped by a gold angel was unveiled on the Paseo de la Reforma in honor of the Independence movement. An equally impressive monument to the Niños Héroes was dedicated at the entrance to Chapultepec Park. Distinguished guests from abroad had their expenses paid to partake of the festivities. Gala balls were held in their honor, and imported French champagne flowed like water. Flags were displayed everywhere, banquets followed banquets, parades crowded the streets, fireworks lit up the night skies, and *mariachis* (folk musicians) strolled the downtown avenues. Foreign governments took part as well. The American colony, thinking of no better way of commemorating the heroic deeds of Father Hidalgo, sent Díaz and the Mexican people a statue of George Washington, and the Italians—not to be outdone—sent one of Giuseppe Garibaldi. In a rare display of *entente cordiale* the Third French Republic returned the keys to the city of Mexico that had been ingloriously sequestered by the army of Napoleon III a half-century before. King Alfonso XIII demonstrated the lasting confraternity of the Spanish people by returning the uniforms of José María Morelos.

The centennial celebrations epitomized everything that was right and everything that was wrong with the Díaz regime. Beggars were pushed off of the streets of the capital city for the duration so that the guests would receive the proper impressions of a prosperous Mexico. The cost of the celebrations exceeded the entire educational budget for the year 1910. Mexico was at last enjoying its place in the international sun—respect was no longer lacking. But while the champagne was flowing for a few, tens of thousands were suffering from malnutrition. While guests were treated to young female companions, Indian women in Yucatán were dying in childbirth. While European waiters served at the banquets, urban Mexicans were unemployed. While letters of congratulation arrived on time, 85 percent of the population was still illiterate. While visitors rode in shiny new motorcars on well-paved streets in the center of the city, mud and filth engulfed the workers' barrios in the suburbs. In September 1910 Mexico appeared to many to be enjoying its finest hour. But with social reform still alien to the Porfirian mentality, the peace would soon prove to be fragile and the showy façade would collapse with it.

The Plan de San Luis Potosí

For years Francisco Madero had resisted the prodding of liberals who exhorted that Díaz must be overthrown by force. But when he escaped from San Luis Potosí and made his way north to the sanctuary of the United States border, he realized that it was no longer possible to unseat the dictator by constitutional means. Now he would call his fellow Mexicans to arms in the task of national redemption.

In the middle of October 1910, as supporters gathered around him in San Antonio, Texas, he began drafting a revolutionary plan. To avoid any possible international complications with the United States, he dated the plan October 5, the last day he had been in San Luis Potosí, and, in fact, called it the *Plan de San Luis Potosí*. He made his appeal emotionally.

> Peoples, in their constant efforts for the triumph of the ideals of liberty and justice, find it necessary at certain historical moments to make the greatest sacrifices. Our beloved fatherland has reached one of those

moments. A tyranny that we Mexicans have not been accustomed to suffer since we won our independence oppresses us in such a manner that it has become intolerable.

But this violent and illegal system can no longer exist. . . . [As] a patriot . . . [I am] ready to sacrifice himself, if necessary, to obtain liberty and to help the people free themselves from the odious tyranny that oppresses them. . . .

I declare the last election illegal and accordingly the republic, being without rulers, I assume the provisional presidency of the republic until the people designate their rulers pursuant to the law. . . .

I have designated Sunday, the 20th day of next November, for all the towns in the republic to rise in arms after 6 o'clock P.M.[2]

The Plan de San Luis Potosí, like *La sucesión presidencial en 1910* before it, demonstrates amply that Madero's concerns were primarily political. The few references to Mexico's social maladies were vague and ill conceived. Yet the boldness of the statement and the self-confidence it reflected struck a responsive chord. The leaders who had previously worked for the Anti-Re-electionist party began preparing

Aquiles Serdán and his family in Puebla. A print by Fernando Castro Pacheco.

2. The text of the plan can be found in Isidro Fabela, ed., *Documentos históricos de la revolución mexicana* (Mexico City, 1960–73), 6: 69–76.

themselves for November 20. The revolution actually began two days prematurely in the town of Puebla. There the local liberal leader Aquiles Serdán, had stored arms and ammunition in his home. An informant notified the police, and the fight was on. Serdán and his family became the first martyrs of the new cause. Madero himself crossed over into Mexico on the evening of November 19, but, when his expected rebel army failed to rendezvous, he crossed back into the United States without firing a shot. It was not yet clear that the masses would rally to the cry of *¡Viva la Revolución!*

The Rise of Rebel Armies and the Resignation of Díaz

Local corridos record the names of the many who took up arms everywhere on the stipulated day. But nowhere did the sparks fly as in Chihuahua. Town after town responded on November 20 and 21. Toribio Ortega marched on Cuchillo Parado, Gaspar Durán on Calabacillas, José de la Luz Blanco on Santo Tomás, Guadalupe Gardea on Chuviscar, Feliciano Díaz on Témoris, Cástulo Herrera on Temósachic, Guillermo Baca on Hidalgo del Parral, Pancho Villa on San Andrés, and Pascual Orozco on San Isidro and Miñaca.

The rebel forces were not armies, but neither were they merely peasant mobs. There were peones, to be sure, but in addition servants, shopkeepers, mechanics, beggars, miners, federal army deserters, lawyers, United States soldiers of fortune, young and old, bandits and idealists, students and teachers, engineers and day laborers, the bored and the overworked, the aggrieved and the adventuresome, all constituted the rank and file. Some were attracted by commitment to the cause and some by the promise of spoils; some joined impulsively and others with careful forethought. Some preferred Flores Magón radicalism and some Madero liberalism; many had heard of neither. Even among the politically astute some viewed the November movement as a fight against hacendados, others decided to offer their lives to oppose local jefes políticos, while still others saw the Revolution as a chance to recapture Mexico from the foreign capitalists. But they all had one thought in common: Díaz was the symbol of all Mexico's ills, and they were convinced that almost any change would be a change for the better. Thus they were willing to strap cartridge belts on their chests; find, buy, or steal rifles somewhere; and become *guerrilleros*. Indifferently armed, without uniforms, with no notion of military discipline, the disparate rebel bands lived off the land and attacked local authorities and small federal outposts in tiny pueblos. It did not take them long to realize that they enjoyed a dormant but fortuitous

The Mexican guerrilla at the beginning of the Revolution would soon be immortalized in legend and song.

asset—the cooperation of much of rural Mexico. Madero's communications network began to inform him that his recent efforts had not been in vain.

The Díaz regime was by no means prepared to lay down and roll over. With more frenzy than care, army units and corps of rurales were dispatched on scattered missions in Mexico's ten military zones, and slowly they began to curtail the spread of the rebellion. Only in Chihuahua did the rebel movement continue to grow. The military leadership there had devolved upon Pascual Orozco, Jr., a tall, gaunt mule skinner whose business had suffered because he did not enjoy the favor of the Terrazas-Creel machine. When Orozco was contacted by Abraham González, the leader of the Anti-Re-electionists in the state, he had already been reading copies of *Regeneración* and did not have to be convinced that he should begin recruitment in Guerrero District. González supplied some modest funds and a few weapons. By November 20, Orozco had attracted about forty men to the cause. During the next two weeks, striking rapidly from the almost inaccessible *sierras* of western Chihuahua, he garnered four victories. Pancho Villa, José de la Luz Blanco, Cástulo Herrera, and other local leaders placed

themselves under his command, and the Orozco army increased by twentyfold. On January 2, 1911, the Chihuahua rebels ambushed and almost totally destroyed a large federal convoy sent to pursue them. Now cocksure, Orozco stripped the dead soldiers of their uniforms, wrapped up the articles of clothing, and sent them to Don Porfirio with a graphically descriptive taunt: *Ahí te van las hojas; mándame más tamales* (Here are the wrappers; send me some more tamales).

In February Madero decided to cross over into Mexico for the second time and, although he had no special military talent, to assume military as well as political command. After a punishing defeat at Casas Grandes, Madero realized that he had better leave the day-to-day fighting to Orozco, Villa, and the other guerrilla leaders who had already proved themselves on the field of battle.

Soon the insurrection began to bear fruit in Sonora, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Veracruz, Zacatecas, Puebla, Guerrero, and Morelos. In Baja California the Flores Magón brothers and their followers had the government on the run. Picking their own ground and their own time of battle, the small rebel contingents throughout the country kept the federals constantly off balance. The military bureaucracy was inflexible, the government campaigns uncoordinated, the communications network tenuous, and the supply system inadequate. The rebels, on the other hand, moved in smaller units, lived off the land, and generally enjoyed the sympathy and cooperation of the local populace. They found it easier to smuggle in ammunition from the United States than federal commanders did to requisition it from Mexico City.

In the late spring of 1911 Orozco and Villa convinced Madero that the northern rebels should expend all their energy on capturing Ciudad Juárez, the border city across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. By early May the most seasoned rebel troops had congregated on the outskirts of the city and were ready to attack. Suddenly, however, Madero changed his mind. Fearing that stray rebel shells might fall on El Paso and thus occasion United States intervention, he ordered a retreat. In direct violation of his commander's order, Orozco ordered the attack. Although the advantage of manpower and firepower lay with the rebels, the federal defense of the city, entrusted to General Juan Navarro, was stubborn. Thousands of El Paso residents climbed to their rooftops to watch the proceedings and cheer on their favorites. On the morning of May 10 the tide turned in favor of the rebels. Low on ammunition and completely encircled by the enemy, General Navarro decided to surrender and in the early afternoon hoisted a white flag over the federal barracks.

Madero did not know whether to be grateful, angry, or embarrassed. Against his order Orozco had handed him an important city, an offi-

cial port of entry from the United States, and a provisional capital. When a few days later the provisional president named his cabinet, Orozco's name was curiously absent. The showdown took place on May 13 during a meeting of the new provisional government. Revolvers in hand to emphasize their point, Orozco and Villa burst into the room with a series of demands that highlighted their frustrations with Maderós failure to reward his rebel followers and appoint men who would more forcefully advance their goals.

The confrontation was momentarily defused, but it had significance that no one present could have foreseen. Though only five months old, the revolutionary coalition was already falling apart. The military's challenge to the civilian leadership would be repeated regularly for the next chaotic decade. But more important yet, the affair portended an age of bitter factionalism that exacerbated personal rivalries, turned Mexican against Mexican, extended the war, exacted a tremendously high toll of life, and increased the pain and anguish for hundreds of thousands.

Meanwhile, rebels throughout the country took heart and redoubled their efforts. Tehuacán, Durango, Hermosillo, Cananea, Torreón, and Cuautla fell into revolutionary hands. Business fell victim to the



The battle of Ciudad Juárez (May 1911) proved to be the decisive engagement for control of the north.

The revolutionary leadership following the capture of Ciudad Juárez. The coalition would soon fall apart.

trauma of uncertainty, and merchants bemoaned the lack of trade. Th press became increasingly outspoken in criticism of the regime. Fed eral troops, who had not acquitted themselves too badly to this point began deserting to the Revolution *en masse*. Díaz reluctantly agree to dispatch a team of negotiators to meet with Madero and his staf The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez provided that Díaz and Vice-Presiden Corral would resign before the month was out. Francisco León de l Barra, the secretary of foreign relations and an experienced diplomat would assume the interim presidency until new elections could be held Don Porfirio signed his resignation and submitted it to the Congres on May 25.

Díaz had indeed been overthrown, but the Revolution had scarcel triumphed. It had barely yet begun. The conviviality and jubilee of th next few days soon gave way to acrimonious debate as Mexicans be gan to ask themselves, what, exactly, they had won. Their answers, o course, were predicated upon what had motivated them to join th movement at the outset. As the dictator sailed away into European ex ile the one bond that had held them together vanished from sight. Ar old age had ended without a new age beginning.

The Interim Presidency and Division within the Rebel Ranks

The interim presidency of León de la Barra (May to November 1911 turned out to be a crucial period. Madero's radical supporters, in cluding the Flores Magón brothers, were unhappy enough with the

choice of the interim president, but they were even more displeased when the provisional cabinet named by León de la Barra included a majority of Porfiristas. Emiliano Zapata in Morelos adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude. Orozco in Chihuahua was still bristling from his recent encounter with Madero following the battle of Ciudad Juárez.

Unaware that the rumblings within his ranks were serious, in early June, Madero left the north for Mexico City. His seven-hundred-mile journey by train was truly triumphant, as thousands of enthusiastic admirers greeted him at large and small stations along the way. His reception in the capital was no less spectacular, as recorded by Edith O'Shaughnessy, the wife of the United States chargé d'affaires in the Mexico City embassy.

> There was a great noise of *vivas*, mingling with shouts of all kinds, tramping of feet, and blowing of motor horns. I could just get a glimpse of a pale, dark-bearded man bowing to the right and left. I kept repeating to myself: *"Qui l'a fait roi? qui l'a couronné?—la victoire."* . . . There were three days of continual plaudits and adoration, such as only the Roman emperors knew. . . . People came from far and near, in all sorts of conveyances or on foot, just to see him, to hear his voice, even to touch his garments for help and healing. . . .[3]

Among those there to greet Madero and talk to him was the most famous revolutionary of all—Emiliano Zapata. Like Orozco in the north, Zapata had never been a peón. His family had passed on a little land to him, and he supplemented his modest income as a muleteer, a horse trainer, and a stable master. Elected in 1909 to local office by the villagers of Anenecuilco, Morelos, he was regularly exposed to the full array of tragedies that had beset rural Mexico during the late Díaz regime. More concerned with local land problems than with the national movement to unseat the dictator, he did not call his villagers to support the Plan de San Luis Potosí on November 20, 1910. But within a few months he had linked the future of his own people with that of the Maderista cause and began recruiting an insurgent army. When appropriate, he made his appeal to local inhabitants in Nahuatl rather than in Spanish. A teenage girl in Milpa Alta remembered when Zapata addressed the villagers.

> Notlac ximomanaca! Nehuatl onacoc; oncuan on ica tepoztli ihuan nochantlaca niquinhuicatz. Ipampa in Totazin Díaz aihmo ticnequi yehuatl techixotiz. Ticnequi occe altepetl achi cuali. Ilhuan totlac ximomanaca ipampa amo nechpactia tlen tetlaxtlahuia. Amo conehui ica tlacualo ica netzotzomatiloz. Noihqui nicnequi nochtlacatl quipiaz itlal: oncuan on quitocaz ihuan quipixcaz tlaoli, yetzintli ihuan occequi xinachtli. Tlen nanquitoa? Namehuan totlac namomanazque?[4]

3. Edith O'Shaughnessy, *Diplomatic Days* (New York, 1917), p. 53.

Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919). pata played only a minor role again Díaz, his stature as a re grew steadily until his assassi 1919.

Zapata's military contributions to the overthrow of the Díaz dictatorship were not great, but he had scored a couple of victories over the federal forces by the time Díaz submitted his resignation in May

4. "Join me. I rose up. I rose up in arms and I bring my countrymen. We no longer wish that our Father Díaz watch over us. We want a much better president. Rise up with us because we don't like what the rich men pay us. It is not enough for us to eat and dress ourselves. I also want for everyone to have his piece of land so that he can plant and harvest corn, beans, and other crops. What do you say? Are you going to join us?"

The Spanish and Nahuatl texts are found in Fernando Horcasitas, *De Porfirio Díaz a Zapata: Memoria Náhuatl de Milpa Alta* (Mexico City, 1968), p. 105. Whether Zapata actually used Nahuatl has been the subject of recent scholarly debate.

1911. With the new day now supposedly arrived, Zapata wanted to talk to Madero about the one matter that concerned him most—the land problem in Morelos. To Zapata the overthrow of Díaz had genuine meaning only if land were immediately restored to the pueblos. The encounter between the two men was dramatic. Zapata, with a large sombrero on his head and his carbine in his hand, gestured to the gold watch Madero sported on his vest and then made his point.

> Look, Señor Madero, if I, taking advantage of being armed, steal your watch and keep it, and then we meet again sometime and you are armed, wouldn't you have the right to demand that I return it?
>
> Of course, General, and you would also have the right to ask that I pay you for the use I had of it.
>
> Well, this is exactly what has happened to us in Morelos where some of the hacendados have forcibly taken over the village lands. My soldiers, the armed peasants, demand that I tell you respectfully that they want their lands returned immediately.[5]

With characteristic caution Madero would make no immediate commitment, but when he traveled to Morelos shortly thereafter, he insisted that Zapata demobilize his army as a prerequisite to reducing tensions in the state. Zapata detected something absurd in the request. The revolutionaries had won; yet while the federal army remained intact, the victorious rebels were asked to disband. To show good faith the southern rebel reluctantly agreed. His acquiescence was for naught as interim President León de la Barra decided to send federal troops into the state to enforce the demobilization order. Madero was furious when he learned that federal General Victoriano Huerta had exchanged fire with a band of Zapatistas north of Cuernavaca. He pleaded with the interim president to withdraw the troops, but the tenuous peace had already been shattered. By August the state of Morelos was again in angry revolt, and Madero, perhaps through no fault of his own, could add Zapata's name to his growing list of enemies.

When the campaign for the 1911 presidential elections got under way, the political atmosphere was already tense. Madero's party met in Mexico City in August and gave him the nomination by acclamation. But the vice-presidential nomination divided the convention. Madero decided to dump his 1910 running mate, Francisco Vásquez Gómez, in favor of a Yucatecan lawyer and a journalist, José María Pino Suárez. The convention gave Madero his choice, but Vásquez

5. Quoted in Gildardo Magaña, *Emiliano Zapata y el agrarismo en México* (Mexico City, 1934–52), 1: 160.

Gómez and his followers would never reconcile themselves to their sudden political demise.

The opposition candidate around whom many of the old regime could rally, albeit without enthusiasm, was General Bernardo Reyes. By early fall the election was in full swing and the debate heated. In September a group of Madero's supporters, without their leader's knowledge or approval, physically attacked Reyes at a Mexico City rally. The Reyista party protested vigorously and petitioned the Congress to postpone the elections because of the unfair treatment afforded their candidate. But the Congress turned down the request, and Reyes, perhaps realizing that his campaign stood little chance of victory anyway, withdrew from the race and went into a self-imposed exile in San Antonio, Texas. Another powerful enemy was on the list.

The election was held without further incident on October 1, 1911. Only minor candidates opposed Madero, and he swept to an overwhelming victory. Madero's faith in democracy would soon be put to the test, and, while his faith would remain unshaken, democracy would fall victim to the rancor and passion of the day.

Recommended for Further Study

Albro, Ward S. *To Die on Your Feet: The Life, Times and Writings of Práxedis G. Guerrero.* Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1996.

Beezley, William H. *Insurgent Governor: Abraham González and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua.* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973.

Bell, Edward I. *The Political Shame of Mexico.* New York: McBride, Nast, 1914.

Blaisdell, Lowell L. *The Desert Revolution: Baja California, 1911.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962.

Cockcroft, James D. *Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900–1913* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968.

Creelman, James. *Díaz: Master of Mexico.* New York: Appleton, 1916.

Cumberland, Charles C. *Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero.* Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952.

Guzmán, Martín Luis, *Memoirs of Pancho Villa.* Translated by Virgina H. Taylor. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965.

Hart, John M. *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.

Henderson, Peter V. N. *In the Absence of Don Porfirio. Francisco León de la Barra and the Mexican Revolution.* Wilmington, Del.: 1999.

Joseph, Gilbert, and Daniel Nugent, eds. *Everyday Forms of State Formation and Negotiations of Rule in Modern Mexico.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994.

Knight, Alan. *The Mexican Revolution.* Vol. 1: *Porfirians, Liberals and Peasants.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

MacLachlan, Colin M. *Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Meyer, Michael C. *Huerta: A Political Portrait*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.

———. *Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution, 1910–1915*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Raat, William D. "The Diplomacy of Suppression: *Los Revoltosos*, Mexico and the United States, 1906–1911." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 56 (1976): 529–60.

Ross, Stanley R. *Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Shadle, Stanley F. *Andrés Molina Enríquez: Mexican Land Reformer of the Revolutionary Era*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994.

Sherman, John W. "Revolution on Trial: The 1909 Tombstone Proceedings against Ricardo Flores Magón, Antonio Villarreal and Librado Rivera." *The Journal of Arizona History* 32 (1991): 173–94.

Truett, Samuel. *Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006.

Turner, John Kenneth. *Barbarous Mexico*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969.

Womack, John, Jr. *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*. New York: Knopf, 1968.

Madero and the Failure of Democracy

In late May 1911, on his way to Veracruz and ultimate exile, Porfirio Díaz reputedly told Victoriano Huerta, the commander of his military escort, "Madero has unleashed a tiger. Now let's see if he can control it." The remark, both prophetic and reflective of Díaz's keen perception of his fellow countrymen, augured ominous consequences. For the next decade Mexico would be torn apart, and the catharsis would be slow in coming. There would be little time to repair the devastation of war or to refashion the contours of society. Politics would undermine altruism.

Disappointing Reforms

Bursting with optimistic idealism, Madero approached his presidential challenge with all the fresh enthusiasm of the novice. Mexico was embarking upon a democratic era, and democracy, Madero contended, would be equal to the task. But Madero the president, unlike Madero the revolutionary, found himself quickly besieged with demands from all sides. Only when established in the presidential office did he begin to realize fully that the Revolution had profoundly different meanings to different groups of Mexicans. The spurious alliance began to break up irretrievably. Of the disparate elements he had previously counted in his ranks, those of nineteenth-century liberal persuasion, interested in political reform and the growth of democracy, supported him with unabashed devotion. But both the aristocratic elite he displaced and the social revolutionaries he embraced were increasingly displeased with the modest steps he undertook. The press began to assail him mercilessly, but, in the best democratic tradition, he gave it full rein and stoically accepted the barbed criticism and cruel satires.

It was only natural that Madero should be more responsive to the prodding of his former supporters. Although he could defy anyone to

Francisco I. Madero (1873–1913). President of Mexico in the crucial period following the overthrow of Díaz, Madero had a faith in democracy that proved ill suited to the political realities of the day.

show him where he had ever promised sweeping reform, he did, nevertheless, embark upon a meager and imperfect program to restructure the prevailing social order. Though unwilling to accede to Zapata's urgent demand that land be immediately restored to the villages, the president appointed a National Agrarian Commission, under the chairmanship of his conservative cousin Rafael Hernández, to study the land question. Hernández urged that the government begin purchasing a few private estates for subdivision and sale to the small farmer. But only ten million pesos were allocated to the project, and the hacendados demanded such high prices for the land that even this modest plan was soon abandoned in favor of restoring some of the ejido lands that had been seized illegally during the late Porfiriato. The burden of proof, however, fell on the villages, and few village leaders were able to cope with the bewildering legal arguments thrown in their faces by the ha-

cendados' lawyers. A handful of cases were settled in favor of the villages, but progress on the agrarian question was meager.

The story was much the same in the field of labor reform. Late in 1912 the Congress authorized the formation of a Department of Labor but placed it, too, under the jurisdiction of conservative Hernández, a man whose quixotic faith in the law of supply and demand was never shaken. The budget for the Department of Labor was a paltry forty-six thousand pesos. After a convention with government officials in Mexico City, a group of textile factory owners promised to initiate a ten-hour day, but in practice the working schedules did not change.

Perhaps the greatest benefit accruing to labor during the Madero presidency was that labor organizers no longer felt so intimidated as they had in the past. Encouraged by the possibilities of revolutionary change, a group of radicals under the leadership of Juan Francisco Moncaleano, a Spanish anarchist, founded the Casa del Obrero Mundial. Not properly a union, the Casa served as a place where labor leaders could meet, exchange views, and, through their official newspaper, *Luz*, disseminate propaganda favorable to the cause. But the government, caught between business interests and labor demands, was jittery. Madero feared labor strikes, and, although no labor massacres on the scale of Cananea and Río Blanco were recorded, government troops and local police authorities were used to disperse striking workers on a number of occasions. Hernández interpreted the strikes as inspired by agitators rather than resulting from intolerable conditions and finally had Moncaleano expelled from the country. But the strikes continued, and labor unrest began to disrupt the Mexican economy, growing shaky once again. The gains by labor as a result of these strikes were negligible.

In the field of education the social reformers were again disappointed. Although Madero had promised to broaden the educational base during the presidential campaign, the annual budget for 1911 to 1912 allocated only 7.8 percent for educational programs, as opposed to 7.2 percent during the last year of the Porfiriato. The new president did manage to build some fifty new schools and to initiate a modest program of school lunches for the underprivileged. But his education program is really more notable for what it did not do. No dramatic increase in expenditures was requested, nor was any project for revising the científico curriculum advanced.

In sum, the liberals of the twentieth-century stripe felt swindled by Madero as the administration failed at both the national and state levels. As the disappointed asked themselves why the president did not do more, some most assuredly must have realized that he believed that reform should proceed at a slow and gradual pace so as not to disrupt

the fragile economy. But another factor was involved as well. Madero's hands were tied and his energies diverted by a series of revolts that broke out against him before he even had a chance to make himself comfortable in the presidential chair. The Revolution's lack of ideological cohesion had begun to exact a terrible toll and in the process imperiled the administration itself.

Revolts against the New Government

Emiliano Zapata was the first to pronounce against the new regime. In November 1911 the Zapatistas promulgated their famous *Plan de Ayala*. The general principles were those of Zapata himself, but the development and articulation were the work of Otilio Montaño, a schoolteacher from Ayala. After withdrawing recognition of Madero and recognizing Chihuahuan Pascual Orozco as titular head of the rebellion, the plan spelled out its program of agrarian reform.

> The lands, woods, and water that the landlords, científicos, or bosses have usurped . . . will be immediately restored to the villages or citizens who hold the corresponding titles to them. . . . The usurpers who believe they have a right to those properties may present their claims to special courts that will be established on the triumph of the Revolution. Because the great majority of Mexicans own nothing more than the land they walk on, and are unable to improve their social condition in any way . . . because lands, woods, and water are monopolized in a few hands . . . one-third of these properties will be expropriated, with prior indemnification, so that the villages and citizens of Mexico may obtain ejidos, townsites, and fields.[1]

The armed conflict began immediately and quickly spread from Morelos to the neighboring states of Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Puebla, Mexico, and even into the Federal District. When Madero's federal commanders were unable to contain the spread of the rebellion, they were replaced by others who promised to conduct a more vigorous campaign. But the Zapatista army continued to grow, and Madero was unable to thwart it. By early 1912 Zapata had disrupted railroad and telegraph service and taken over a number of towns; he had repeatedly defeated the federals and had the government on the run.

At approximately the same time General Bernardo Reyes launched a second movement in the north. In some ways Madero was more con-

1. The entire plan is quoted in Jesús Silva Herzog, *Breve historia de la revolución mexicana* (Mexico City, 1962), 1: 240–46.

cerned with the Reyistas than with the Zapatistas. He feared that General Reyes still enjoyed a wide base of support among the army. Rey crossed over into Mexico from the United States in the middle of D cember 1911 but found few Mexicans willing to rally to his banne Unlike Zapata, Reyes was associated in the public mind with the o regime, and the northern Mexicans were not prepared to embrace h movement, even if many believed that Reyes had been treated unfair in the recent presidential elections. Realizing that his sluggish revol tion was not garnering sufficient support, on Christmas Day Reyes su rendered to a detachment of rurales. The commander of Mexico's thi military zone, General Jerónimo Treviño, sent him first to prison i Monterrey and then had him transferred to the Prisión Militar de Sa tiago Tlaltelolco in Mexico City to await trial for treason.

At the end of the year a third revolt broke out against Madero i Chihuahua. Emilio Vásquez Gómez, believing that he and his brothe Francisco had been unfairly treated in the last elections, launched h movement calling for Madero's ouster from office. At the end of Jar uary Madero was shocked to learn that the Vasquistas had capture Ciudad Juárez. The president knew full well the significance of thi border city—he had seen his own revolt triumph there. Realizing th popularity that Pascual Orozco enjoyed in the north, Madero com missioned the Chihuahua commander to take charge of the govern ment campaigns. For the rank and file of the Vásquez Gómez arm Orozco—not Madero—had been responsible for the overthrow o Díaz. Orozco had recruited the troops and led them in battle. He wa the symbol of Chihuahua manhood and living proof that a poor, in differently educated northerner could humble a professional arm trained in the big city. The Vasquistas did not want to fight Orozco, s they agreed to meet with him. In the simple, folksy idiom of the north Orozco made an impassioned speech calling for national unity in a hour of crisis, and he persuaded the rebel army to lay down arms with out firing another shot.

But a few months later the most serious antigovernment movemen broke out in the north. Its leader was the same man who had just called for national unity and saved Madero from the Vasquista offensive—Pascual Orozco. The Orozco rebellion was complex. While it combined nineteenth- and twentieth-century liberalism, it enjoyed the conservative financial support of the Terrazas clique in Chihuahua, who believed they could control the movement once it triumphed.

The *Plan Orozquista*, dated March 25, 1912, was the most comprehensive call for reform yet voiced from Mexican soil. It caustically attacked Madero for failing to abide by his own principles as set forth to the Mexican nation in the Plan de San Luis Potosí. Government

corruption was still in evidence at the state and local levels, and nepotism and favoritism were more exaggerated in 1912 than they had been at any time during the Porfiriato. Not only had Madero's cousin, Rafael Hernández, been awarded the critical cabinet position of secretary of development, but his uncle, Ernesto Madero, had been made secretary of the treasury; a relative by marriage, José González Salas, was secretary of war; brother Gustavo Madero and four other members of the family were in the Congress; brother Raúl Madero was given a series of government-supported military assignments; another relative was on the Supreme Court, two were in the postal service, and yet another was an undersecretary in the cabinet. Government army uniforms came from cotton cloth manufactured in Madero mills, while ammunition was purchased from cousin José Aguilar's munitions plant in Monterrey.

The Plan Orozquista, however, was more concerned with social than political reform. Drawing its inspiration from the Liberal Plan of 1906, it called for a ten-hour workday, restrictions on child labor, improved working conditions, higher wages, and the immediate suppression of the tiendas de raya. Anticipating the surge of economic nationalism that would sweep over Mexico in the next two decades, it called for the immediate nationalization of the railroads and the utilization of Mexican nationals in their operation. Agrarian reform also figured prominently. Persons who had resided on their land for twenty years were to be given title to it, while all lands illegally seized from the peasantry were to be returned. All lands owned by the government were to be distributed, and, most important, land owned by the hacendados, but not regularly cultivated, would be expropriated.

With alarming speed Orozco amassed a large army—some eight thousand strong—and began marching south to Mexico City. Capturing federally held towns along the way the rebels prepared themselves for a major showdown. The anticipated battle occurred at Rellano, close to the Chihuahua-Durango border. Madero's secretary of war, José González Salas, opted to command the government forces personally, and the army career officer was humiliated by Orozco's untrained rebels. As the federals retreated in disarray, González Salas, fearful of public rebuke, committed suicide. With panic growing in Mexico City, Madero named Victoriano Huerta to head a new government offensive. Huerta planned his campaigns with much deliberation, and by late May 1912 felt strong enough to meet the rebels face to face. By sheer chance the artillery duel once again occurred on the fields of Rellano, but on this occasion the results were different. Not only was Huerta a better field commander than his predecessor, but the Orozquistas were handicapped by lack of ammunition. Huerta

pushed them back to the north and in the process temporarily saved the teetering Madero government.

Madero had no time for rejoicing, for his woes were not yet over. In early October 1912 a fifth serious rebellion broke out against him. This time it was Félix Díaz, the nephew of Don Porfirio, who called an army together in Veracruz. The Felicista movement was clearly counterrevolutionary in orientation and comprised many disgruntled supporters of the former dictator. Félix Díaz appealed to the army and suggested that Madero had trampled on its honor by passing over many competent career officers and placing self-made revolutionary generals in charge of key garrisons. The troops stationed in Veracruz came to Díaz's support, but his appeal to other army units throughout the republic went unheeded. Late in October loyal army troops isolated the rebels in Veracruz and forced their surrender. A hastily conceived court-martial found Díaz guilty of treason and sentenced him to death. But Madero reviewed the sentence and, believing his enemies to be pitied rather than executed, commuted it to imprisonment. Díaz was taken under arms to the capital and placed in the Federal District penitentiary. Madero's generosity was in no way reciprocated. Within two months Félix Díaz in one Mexico City prison had established contact with Bernardo Reyes in another, and the two were plotting to overthrow the government. This sixth rebellion would succeed, and Madero would lose not only his office but, a victim of his own ideals, his life as well.

The Overthrow of Madero

Planned for several months, the military coup that began in Mexico City on February 9, 1913, drastically altered the course of the Mexican Revolution. The capital had thus far been spared the ravages of the war that had engulfed much of the nation since November 1910. Now Mexico City residents would be given practical instruction in the full destructive significance of civil war. Early in the morning of February 9, General Manuel Mondragón, supported by several artillery regiments and military cadets, released Bernardo Reyes and Félix Díaz from their respective prisons and marched on the National Palace. Reyes, sporting a fancy military uniform and mounted on a white horse, led the charge and was felled by one of the first machine gun blasts. The rebel leadership then devolved on Félix Díaz. When loyal government troops repulsed the assault on the National Palace, Díaz led his troops westward across the city and installed his army in the Ciudadela, an old and well-fortified army arsenal. Madero, disregarding the advice of several confidants, named General Victoriano Huerta to command his troops. It proved to be a momentous decision.

A federal machine gun nest awaits the rebel advance.

For the next ten days—the *Decena Trágica*—Mexico City became a labyrinth of barricades, improvised fortifications, and trenches. Artillery fire exchanged between the rebels in the Ciudadela and the government troops in the National Palace destroyed buildings and set fires. As commercial establishments were forced to close their doors for the duration, consumer goods became scarce and people panicked. Downtown streets were strewn with burning cars, runaway horses, and abandoned artillery pieces. Live electric wires dangled precariously from their poles. Looters broke store windows and carried off wares with complete impunity. On one occasion an artillery barrage opened a breach in the wall of the Belén prison and hundreds of inmates scurried through the opening to freedom. A few surveyed the chaos outside and decided to remain.

With neither side able to gain a clear military advantage, civilian casualties mounted into the thousands and bodies began to bloat in the streets. Foreign residents sought the sanctuary of embassies, but not all made it in time. Most traffic came to a halt as only ambulances, military vehicles, and diplomatic automobiles, identified by special flags, moved on the streets. On February 17, after nine days of constant fighting, Madero summoned Huerta and asked when the fighting could be expected to cease. Huerta assured him that peace would be restored to the beleaguered city the following day. The residents of

the capital were awakened early on the morning of February 18 by t sounds of artillery and machine gun fire, just as they had been for t previous nine days. But in the afternoon the clamor of war stoppe Huerta had decided to change sides. He withdrew recognition of t federal government and dispatched General Aureliano Blanquet to t National Palace to arrest the president. Blanquet encountered Made in one of the patios and, with revolver in hand, proclaimed, "You a my prisoner, Mr. President." Madero retorted, "You are a traitor." B Blanquet simply reaffirmed, "You are my prisoner."[2] Within a half ho Vice-President Pino Suárez, Madero's brother Gustavo, and most the cabinet had been arrested as well.

The agreement according to which Huerta joined the rebels known as the Pact of the Embassy because the final negotiations we conducted under the aegis of the American ambassador in Mexico Cit Henry Lane Wilson. A typical diplomat of the age of dollar diplomac Wilson saw his role as protector of United States business interest Throughout the Madero presidency he had meddled shamelessly i Mexico's internal affairs, and during the Decena Trágica he played a active part in charting the course of events. On one occasion, in con cert with the British, German, and Spanish ministers, he even de manded Madero's resignation, alleging as his reason the tremendou damage to foreign property in Mexico City. After being rebuffed b the Mexican president, Wilson changed his tactics and worked activel to bring Huerta and Díaz to an accord. On the evening of Februar 18 the two generals met with Wilson at the American embassy an hammered out the pact that was made public the following day.

> In the city of Mexico, at nine-thirty in the evening on February 18, 1913 General Félix Díaz and Victoriano Huerta met in conference. . . . General Huerta stated that because of the unbearable situation created by the government of Mr. Madero, he had, in order to prevent the further shedding of blood and to safeguard national unity, placed the said Madero, several members of his cabinet, and various other persons under arrest. . . . General Díaz stated that his only reason for raising the standard of revolt was a desire on his part to protect the national welfare, and in that light he was ready to make any sacrifice that would prove beneficial to the country. . . . From this time forward the former chief executive is not to be recognized. The elements represented by Generals Díaz and Huerta are united in opposing all efforts to restore him to power. . . . Generals Díaz and Huerta will do all in their power to enable the latter to assume . . . the provisional presidency.[3]

2. Quoted in Michael C. Meyer, *Huerta: A Political Portrait* (Lincoln, 1972), p. 57.

3. The Pact of the Embassy has been translated and included in its entirety in ibid., pp. 235–36.

Wishing to cloak his assumption of power in some semblance of legality, Huerta first secured the official resignations of Madero and Pino Suárez and then convened a special evening session of the Congress. The resignations were accepted by the legislative body with only five dissenting votes, and the presidency legally passed to the next in line, Secretary of Foreign Relations Pedro Lascuráin. Sworn into office at 10:24 P.M., Lascuráin immediately appointed General Huerta as secretary of interior and at 11:20 P.M. submitted his own resignation. The Constitution of 1857 provided that in the absence of a president, a vice-president, and a secretary of foreign relations, the office passed to the secretary of interior. Huerta, clad in a formal black tuxedo, was sworn into office shortly before midnight. Madero-style democracy had ended in derision as Mexico had its third president in one day.

The political charade perpetrated before the Congress was not the greatest indignity Mexicans were called upon to suffer in February 1913. On the evening of February 21, Francisco Madero and José María Pino Suárez were transferred from the National Palace, where they had been held prisoners since the day of their arrest, to the Federal District penitentiary. The capital city newspapers the following day blared an improbable tale. A group of Madero's supporters attacked the convoy escorting the prisoners, attempted to free them, and during the ensuing melee both the former president and vice-president were killed.

Virtually no one believed this official version, but few Mexicans knew what really happened. Madero and Pino Suárez had been taken to the penitentiary under the guard of Francisco Cárdenas, a major in the rurales. When the convoy reached the prison, Cárdenas ordered the captives out of the cars and, by prearranged signal, the spotlights high on the wall were turned off. The hapless men were then shot point-blank. Perhaps Victoriano Huerta ordered the assassinations, or perhaps it was Félix Díaz, or even Aureliano Blanquet. The nature of the available evidence simply precludes positive determination. But what cannot be doubted is that the senseless murders of Madero and Pino Suárez set the tone of the Revolution for at least the next five years.

Recommended for Further Study

Beezley, William H. *Insurgent Governor: Abraham González and the Mexican Revolution in Chihuahua*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973.

Calvert, Peter. *The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1914: The Diplomacy of the Anglo-American Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Cumberland, Charles C. *Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952.

Conzales, Michael J. *The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1940*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002.

Harris, Charles H., and Louis R. Sadler. "The Underside of the Mexican Revolution. El Paso, 1912." *The Americas* 39 (1982): 69–84.

———. "The 1911 Reyes Conspiracy: The Texas Side." *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 82 (1980): 325–48.

Hart, John Mason. "The Mexican Revolution 1910–1920," in *The Oxford History of Mexico*. Edited by Michael C. Meyer and William H. Beezley, pp. 435–65. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Henderson, Peter V. N. *Félix Díaz, the Porfirians and the Mexican Revolution*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981.

LaFrance, David G. *Revolution in Mexico's Heartland: Politics, War, and State Building in Puebla, 1913–1920*. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2003.

Meyer, Michael C. *Huerta: A Political Portrait*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972.

———. *Mexican Rebel: Pascual Orozco and the Mexican Revolution*, 1910–1915. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967.

Ross, Stanley R. *Francisco I. Madero, Apostle of Mexican Democracy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955.

Turner, Frederick C. "Anti-Americanism in Mexico, 1910–1913." *Hispanic American Historical Review* 47 (1967): 502–18.

Wilson, Henry Lane. *Diplomatic Episodes in Mexico, Belgium and Chile*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page, 1927.

Wolfskill, George, and Douglas W. Richmond, eds. *Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist Views of the Leaders*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979.

Womack, John, Jr. *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*. New York: Knopf, 1968.