

# Shaded Revealed Preference: A Structural Reinterpretation of Choice<sup>\*</sup>

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**Abstract**—Classical Revealed Preference (RP) theory posits that observed choices directly reveal stable, underlying preferences. This paper introduces Shaded Revealed Preference (Shaded-RP), a structural reinterpretation that addresses behavioral anomalies like preference reversals and framing effects without discarding the core logic of rational choice. We propose that preferences are only revealed when structurally "activated." By introducing a conditional activation function,  $\theta(x)$ , we model observed choice as the result of utility maximization over a structurally filtered, rather than a complete, set of options. In this framework, inconsistencies are not evidence of irrationality but manifestations of a context-dependent choice architecture where some preferences remain structurally silent. Shaded-RP thus bridges the gap between classical microeconomic theory and observed behavior by refining the boundaries of observability.

**Index Terms**—Revealed Preference, Structural Activation, Choice Architecture, Framing Effects, Bounded Rationality, Conditional Choice

## I. INTRODUCTION: WHEN DOES A CHOICE SPEAK?

Revealed Preference (RP) theory is built on the powerful premise that if an agent chooses A over B, then A is preferred to B. However, persistent behavioral anomalies, such as preference reversals and framing effects, challenge the assumption that observed choices are a complete and consistent expression of underlying utility. This paper argues that the issue is not that preferences are unstable or irrational, but that they are **conditionally expressed**. We propose that a preference can only be revealed when the structure of the choice environment permits its activation.

## II. THE SHADED REVEALED PREFERENCE (SHADED-RP) MODEL

We introduce a minimal, structure-preserving extension to the classical RP framework. The core idea is that utility maximization occurs over a subset of options that are structurally activated.

### A. The Conditional Activation Function

We model the observability of choice using a **conditional activation function**,  $\theta(x)$ . This function deter-

mines whether a preference over an option  $x$  can be expressed as a choice. The agent's problem is then:

$$x^* = \arg \max_{x \in X} \theta(x) \cdot u(x) \quad (1)$$

Here,  $u(x)$  is the agent's latent, stable utility function, consistent with classical RP. The innovation is  $\theta(x)$ , a structural filter that is not part of the preference itself.

- If  $\theta(x) > 0$ , the option is active and participates in the choice problem.
- If  $\theta(x) = 0$ , the option is **structurally silent**—unavailable for expression, regardless of its utility ranking.

This reframes the act of choosing as a two-step process: first, structural conditions permit a set of preferences to be activated; second, the agent optimizes within that activated set.

## III. REINTERPRETING BEHAVIORAL ANOMALIES

The Shaded-RP framework provides a unified structural explanation for well-known violations of classical RP axioms like GARP and SARP.

- **Preference Reversals and Framing Effects:** These are not seen as evidence of unstable preferences. Instead, they are interpreted as outcomes of a shift in the activation context. Different frames or contexts alter the activation function  $\theta(x)$ , changing the set of expressible choices and thus leading to different observed outcomes, even with an unchanged utility function.
- **Intransitivity:** Apparent intransitive choices (e.g.,  $A > B$ ,  $B > C$ , but  $C > A$ ) can arise if the activation domains for each pairwise comparison are non-overlapping. The agent may be perfectly consistent within each activated choice set, but the collection of choices appears inconsistent because the underlying structure of what is expressible has changed.

In this view, behavioral anomalies are not errors of the agent but mismatches between the observer's assumption of a complete choice set and the agent's structurally constrained expressive domain.

#### IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT WAS REVEALED WAS PERMISSION

Shaded-RP does not discard the rational core of Revealed Preference theory. Instead, it clarifies the conditions under which a preference can be revealed in the first place. By introducing a structural activation layer, the model reinterprets behavioral inconsistencies not as irrationality, but as rational choices made within a conditionally expressive structure. What is revealed in an agent's choice is not just their preference, but the structural permission they were given to express it. This shifts the focus of economic analysis from what is chosen to what was allowed to be chosen.

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