Discussion of

# The Supply and Demand for Safe Assets

by Gary Gorton and Guillermo Ordoñez

Ryan Chahrour

June 17, 2020

## Summary

- A very transparent model of shadow banking
- Connects private asset creation with monetary policy
- Bond Exchange Facility...not so different from current practice
  - Long run: Agency MBS
  - Recent: Term Securities Lending Facility, Primary Dealer Credit Facility
  - Alternative: Direct Lending Programs

# My discussion

- 1. Model recipe
- $2. \ \, \mathsf{Importance} \,\, \mathsf{of} \,\, \mathsf{savings} = \mathsf{investment} \,\,$
- 3. Analyzing the policy implications

The Model "Recipe"

# Ingredient 1: Government saving technology

Government issues bonds  $\rightarrow$  (initially) only asset that transfers resources across time.

- Establish Euler equation as efficiency benchmark
- Give monetary policy a role

# **Ingredient 2: Distortionary taxation**

If bonds are "mispriced" then resources are wasted.

• Using policy tool to offset private asset creation is costly

## **Ingredient 3: Collateralized Production**

Production in 2nd period depends on having enough collateral.

- Real consequences of low savings
- Reason for convenience yield

# Ingredient 4: Risky production

A fraction of HH randomly receive production opportunities.

• Reason for lenders and borrows

## **Ingredient 5: Private asset creation**

Concave production fcn for private savings/collateral assets.

- Private assets potential substitute for government bonds
- Game between private financial markets and government

# Ingredient 6: Good collateral/Bad Collateral

Mean-preserving spread in the collateral value of private assets.

- ullet Concave production & utility function o losses from volatility
- Qualitative difference compared to government savings technology

# Ingredient 7: Endogenous information acquisition

Increasing returns to scale cost of information acquisition.

- Connection between asset supply and asset risk
- Reason for government to accept intertemporal distortions
- Government can transform into safe assets

**Savings and Investment** 

### Safe Asset Creation

Model: government unilaterally transfers real resources across time.

 $\hookrightarrow$  increasing collateral means excess savings

Reality: government borrows potentially crowding out real investment.

 $\hookrightarrow$  increasing collateral may imply savings too high or too low

# Savings = Investment: Implications

- Model of benefit of collateral is very convincing
- Policy tradeoffs less clear
  - may or may not be consistent with other policy goals
  - sign may even flip depending on context

# **Policy Implications**

and Challenges

# **Some Policy Implications**

- Reinforces/consistent with arguments for Euro bonds
- Mechanism strength depends on source of production funding
- Complex securitization good: CDO<sup>2</sup> >> CDO

# **Challenges**


- Solution for friction requires embracing degree of moral hazard.
- Defining acceptable "exchanges" becomes political choice
  - $\hookrightarrow$  threatens CB independence

# **Government Debt Shortage?**

Figure 1

### **U.S. Government Debt / GDP**

Annual data, 1917-2011\*



\*CBO forecasts for 2001-11.

SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Robert Gordon,

Macroeconomics (2000).

Reproduced from Wheelock, "Conducting Monetary Policy Without Government Debt", FRB ST Louis, 2002

### **Conclusions**

- A very clear model ...
- of an important mechanism for policy makers.
- Potential for clarifying of the costs of adapting policy to it.

### Extra note

I didn't understand the origin of the m term in equation (1). The fact that  $m \neq 1$  appears in the Euler equation implies taxation is not lump sum: agents are internalizing the effect of bond holdings on their tax bill.

- With true lump sum taxes, still get P = 1 implements optimal. And get deviations from optimality whenever P ≠ 1.
- Whereas, in current model, need  $\chi \neq 1$  to have distortion if too many bonds issued, and to have resources thrown in ocean if too few bonds.
- So, couldn't you get the same/similar tradeoffs with true lump sum taxes?