Discussion of

The Anatomy of Sentiment-Driven Fluctuations

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June 9, 2017

What is a sentiment?

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- 2. about local conditions ...

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- 1. common shock to beliefs, unrelated to fundamentals ...
- 2. about local conditions ...
- 3. that arises endogenously.

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- Amazingly general
- Only iid fluctuations if past conditions observable
- Otherwise, persistent sentiments possible

Discussion

- 1. Intuition for sentiment
- 2. Link between sentiments and fundamentals
- 3. Importance of observations from the past

Intuition

action:
$$a_{i,t} = \alpha E_t^i[u_{i,t}] + \varphi E_t^i[\theta_t]$$
 info: $x_{i,t} = \beta a_t + (1 - \beta)u_{i,t}$

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Everything normal, iid, with unit variance.

Optimal action linear in signal:

$$a_{i,t} = w_i x_{i,t}$$

Integrate...

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the rational expectations restrictions on sentiment!

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• optimal inference

$$w = \frac{\alpha(1 - \beta) + \varphi \beta \phi_2}{(\beta \phi_1)^2 + (\beta \phi_2)^2 + (1 - \beta)^2}$$

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
- 1. case $\varphi = 0$: either θ_t or ϵ_t can play role of sentiment...or a combination.
 - pick just one, and (2) delivers a quadratic with at most two sol'ns.
 - keep both, and (2) delivers a circle with sentiment allocated to either shock.

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
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- 2. case $\varphi > 0$: (2) still delivers a circle
 - fundamentals can "carry water" for sentiment, or ...
 - sentiment can neutralize fundamental


Sentiments and Fundamentals



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Observations of the Past

$$\mathbf{a}_{i,t} = \alpha E_t^i[u_{i,t}] + \varphi E_t^i[\theta_t]$$
 $\mathbf{I}_{i,t} \supseteq \{\mathbf{a}_{t-1}, \mathbf{a}_{t-2}, ..., \theta_{t-1}, \theta_{t-2}, ...\}$

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Result:

• any info equilibrium can be written

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(Chahrour & Ulbricht, 2017)

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In words: if agents can infer past mistakes, they will not repeat them.

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(note: with endogenous states, this changes.)

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- Upper bound on autocorrelation

$$\rho(\epsilon_t, \epsilon_{t-1}) \le (1 + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{\sigma_\eta^2})^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$

 ${\sf Suppose}$

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- $\eta_t \iff$ initial vs. final revisions

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then bound implies

$$\rho(\epsilon_t, \epsilon_{t-1}) \leq 0.62$$

Conclusions

- 1. Insightful paper
- 2. Exciting research agenda
- 3. Lots of good work still to be done!