


Subtle and not so Subtle Ways to Lose Your Cryptocurrency




A Little About Me...

- Software Engineer @ Microsoft in Pittsburgh
- Tech Educator @ chaintuts
- Love to build free and open source technical education!
 - Interested in cryptocurrencies, blockchains, digital security topics
 - Tired of meeting folks **after** they lost money – I want to help people *before* that happens



Cryptocurrency – Powerful But Vulnerable....


- Cryptocurrencies are powerful tools with irreversible transactions and PKI
- Thieves and scammers take advantage of this
- What you'll get:
 - Common attack vectors & mitigation techniques
 - **Take this back to your products, users, etc.!**




Cryptocurrency – Powerful But Vulnerable....

- Social Engineering
- Malware
- User Error
- Bad Security Hygiene Practices
- Wallet Implementation Problems

... all ways *real* users get rekt. Let's talk about fixing that!



Social Engineering #1 – Fake “Support”



Import All Existing Wallets

Mnemonic phrases, or seeds, allow you to create and manage a greater number of wallets with a single human-readable password.

Provide the 12 or 24 words Mnemonic phrase below

Import wallet

Dear customer

We faced the problem that our customers do not have access to hardware wallets, but they need to track their balance and receive transactions without the possibility of withdrawing funds.

We are excited to provide the KeepKey support for our customers. It means that we provide priority access only for tracking balances so as not to violate hardware security of your cold storage.

Our team has developed a unique wallet that helps restore users access to KeepKey and give them opportunity to keep track of the balance. It's very important to know that your balance is safe.

atomicswebwallet.onl

Atomic Wallet

Restore Your Wallet


Please enter your 12 word phrase

Please separate each Mnemonic Phrase with a space.

Enter temporary session password

Before you enter your mnemonic phrase, we recommend you connect your device to the internet. You will be able to disconnect once your wallet is restored.

Restore Wallet



AboutFaqWallet

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




Social Engineering #1 – Fake “Support”

- Example #1 - Crypto company "support" phishing - ex: fake KeepKey wallet tools
- **Attack:** trick the user into giving up account access (via 2FA codes/password reset) or seed phrase (direct access to keys)
- **Countermeasures:** Know that no legitimate support will ask for 2FA codes, seed phrases
 - We need warnings on our stuff; reminders for end users



Social Engineering #2 – Impersonation



Social Engineering #2 – Impersonation

- Example #2 – Impersonation ex: fake Andreas, Roger, chaintuts, etc.
- **Attack:** an account impersonating a crypto celebrity tricks you into sending Bitcoin to a fake, but convincing "Bitcoin investment" website
- **Countermeasures:** awareness of the irreversibility of crypto transactions, what these scams look like, impersonation tactics
 - Ex: Andreas' Twitter bio says "BEWARE of giveaway scams" - a simple message goes a long way



Malware – Clipboard Swaps

r ▾ > Address

🔍 1fakedontsendinvalidmfBsbif4miY36v ✕

Background processes (63)

🖼️ addrjack (32 bit)

Address

1BRLMX61jXuxMELvFbiKv9TQu... 📋

Format

BASE58 (P2PKH)



Scanner

Threat Scan results

Items detected: 35 | Scan time: 3m 41s | Items scanned: 328.387

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Name	Type	Object type	Location
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\APPDATAL\LOCAL\GOOGLE\CHROME\USER DAT..._ALIN\HIM\BIFGPFADMH\113.958.19.16054_0\MANIFEST.JSON
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	Folder	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\APPDATAL\LOCAL\GOOGLE\CHROME\USER DA..._FILE 1\EXTENSIONS\IKKDGEDBKNKKAALIN\HIM\BIFGPFADMH
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	Registry Value	HKUS-1-5-21-2988084762-3884602194-1280821442-100..._ENSIONS SETTINGS\IKKDGEDBKNKKAALIN\HIM\BIFGPFADMH
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\APPDATAL\LOCAL\GOOGLE\CHROME\USER DATA\Profile 1\Secure Preferences
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\Users\ivivsh\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Profile 1..._Extension Settings\ikkdgedbnkkaalinhjmbifgpfadmh\000003.log
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\Users\ivivsh\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Profile 1\Local Extension Settings\ikkdgedbnkkaalinhjmbifgpfadmh\LOCK
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\Users\ivivsh\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Profile 1\Local Extension Settings\ikkdgedbnkkaalinhjmbifgpfadmh\LOG
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\Users\ivivsh\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Profile..._ion Settings\ikkdgedbnkkaalinhjmbifgpfadmh\MANIFEST-000001
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Op...eneric	Potentially...ted Program	Folder	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\APPDATAL\LOCAL\GOOGLE\CHROME\USER DATA\Pro...ocal Extension Settings\ikkdgedbnkkaalinhjmbifgpfadmh
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Generic...picious	Malware	File	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\DOWNLOADS\BOB PROCTOR-YOU WERE BORN RICH (SUCCESS EBOOK)\EJER ROBBINS KIYOSAKI.RAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RiskWa...Logger	Malware	File	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\DOWNLOADS\BEST-FREE-KEYLOGGER-6-0-1.EXE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Opt...taller	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\DOWNLOADS\UTWEB\INSTALLER.EXE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Opt...rchDial	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\USERS\IVIVSH\APPDATAL\LOCAL\GOOGLE\CHROME\USER DATA\Default\Secure Preferences
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PUP.Opt...rchDial	Potentially...ted Program	File	C:\Users\ivivsh\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Sync Data\LevelDB\000005.kdb


Save results ▾ | Close | Quarantine

Malware – Clipboard Swaps

- Example – my homebrew “AddrJack”
 - <https://github.com/chaintuts/addrjack>
 - <https://youtu.be/suOpeSUIwN8> - Quick demo
 - It takes all of 30 minutes to make a basic one, and real ones are more sophisticated!
- **Attack:** malware on a user's computer senses a crypto address in the clipboard, swaps it to an attackers. The user pastes the malicious address and sends coins to the attackers
- **Countermeasures:** Always double, triple checking that addresses match the intended recipient's




User Error #1 – “Cross Chain” Swaps




User Error #1 - “Cross Chain” Swaps

- **Attack:** Not an attack, but a user error.
 - The user mistakenly sends Bitcoin Cash to a Bitcoin address, or mixes one Ethereum token for another.
 - For exchanges, this results in permanent loss of funds. For non-custodial wallets, recovery through manual intervention is *sometimes* possible.
 - I have done successful manual recoveries, but they are 1 in 100
- **Countermeasures:** Always double, triple checking the address belongs to the intended Cryptocurrency
 - **EVERY WALLET UI/UX** should have this warning. None that I know of actually do.



Security Hygiene #1 - Passwords



Entropal – a hardware diceware demo

<https://github.com/chaintuts/entropal>

```
$ ./passperms -l -r
Combinations for constant complexity 62, variable length
Cracking w/ 7.652 GH/s, MD5 - NVidia GeForce 1050 Ti consumer laptop
```

Length	Combinations	Crack Time
8.	2.E+14	20.21668 minutes
9.	1.E+16	20.89057 hours
10.	8.E+17	53.96729 days
12.	3.E+21	567.96791 years
14.	1.E+25	2.18327E+06 years
16.	5.E+28	8.39248E+09 years
20.	7.E+35	1.24010E+17 years

PassPerms – a basic password cracking time demo that shows why length > complexity in general

<https://github.com/chaintuts/passperms>



Security Hygiene #1 - Passwords

- **Attack:**
 - The user reuses an insecure password between other accounts and an exchange (ex: Coinbase) or web wallet (ex: blockchain.com).
 - A breach exposes the password and the attacker compromises the user's exchange/wallet accounts
- **Countermeasures:** Proper password hygiene - no password reuse, *long passphrases/randomly generated passphrases*, the use of secure password managers
 - If you own a crypto-related website, *insist* on whatever the industry standard is for user passwords
 - Don't allow your users to mess this up



Security Hygiene #2 - 2FA




- SIM swaps – an all-too-common plague in the crypto space
- **Attack:**
 - The attacker knows the user has SMS-based 2FA on an exchange and an exposed phone number.
 - The attacker socially engineers the phone company into porting the number to their device.
 - The attacker initiates a password reset to compromise the user's account.
- **Countermeasures:** Only using App-based/TOTP (okay) or security key (best) based 2 factor authentication
 - If you own a crypto related website, *do not* use SMS 2FA. Just don't.
 - And be the coolest by enabling U2F/FIDO security keys!






Poor Wallet Implementations

- Wallet implementation/installation issues - ex: Electrum phishing attack, ECDSA nonce reuse, brainwallets
- **Attack:** varies, the attacker uses some poor implementation detail to compromise a wallet software or wallet keys, gaining direct access to user funds
- **Countermeasures:**
 - signature/hash verification of software
 - use of well-audited and reputable wallet software
 - never using brainwallets/paper wallets



Final Thoughts

- A lot of this *probably isn't news to you* – and that's the point
- These are common ways *real people lose money, every day*
- MOST attacks are mitigated by common-sense, relatively non-technical countermeasures
- It's our job as industry professionals to **educate our users, implement sound user experiences, build secure software, and *develop* best practices** - This industry is so new, everyone watching this can be a part of building better security – go do it!



Questions?

- Twitter @chaintuts
- chaintuts.com – Contact Form
- DEFCON discord @joshmcintyre#2481

I would love to hear from you – Seriously, get in touch with those questions and feedback!

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