



CHAPTER PREVIEW

- How did life change in Russia and the former East Bloc countries after 1989?
- How did globalization affect European life and society?
- How is growing ethnic diversity changing contemporary Europe?
- What challenges will Europeans face in the coming decades?

Life in a Globalizing World

Inside Out, a global art project initiated by the French photographer JR, installs large-scale photographs of ordinary people in public locations around the world. This version, from the floor of the Panthéon in Paris, underscores the ethnic diversity and cultural variety of EU and French citizens in the second decade of the twenty-first century. (DENIS/REA/Redux)

How did life change in Russia and the former East Bloc countries after 1989?

Establishing stable democratic governments in the former East Bloc countries and the fifteen diverse republics of the former Soviet Union was not easy. While Russia initially moved toward economic reform and political openness, by 2010 it had returned to its authoritarian traditions. The transformation of the Communist East Bloc was also difficult. After a period of tense reform, some countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, established relatively prosperous democracies and joined NATO and then the European Union (see “The New European Union” later in the chapter). Others lagged behind. In multiethnic Yugoslavia, the collapse of communism and the onset of a disastrous civil war broke the country apart.

Economic Shock Therapy in Russia

Politics and economics were closely intertwined in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. President Boris Yeltsin (r. 1991–1999), his democratic supporters, and his economic ministers wanted to create conditions that would prevent a return to communism and right the faltering economy. Adopting the model of economic reform already implemented in Poland in 1990 (see “Economic and Political Transformations in the Former East Bloc” ahead), and agreeing with neoliberal Western advisers who argued that a quick turn to free markets would speed economic

growth, Russian reformers opted in January 1992 for liberalization at breakneck speed—so-called **shock therapy**, a set of economic policies also adopted by other former Communist countries.

To implement the plan, the Russians abolished price controls on most consumer goods, with the exception of bread, vodka, oil, and public transportation. The government also launched a rapid privatization program, selling formerly state-owned industries and agricultural concerns to private investors. Thousands of factories and mines were turned over to new private companies. In an attempt to share the wealth privatization was expected to generate, each citizen received a voucher worth 10,000 rubles (about \$22) to buy stock in these private companies. Ownership of these assets, however, usually remained in the hands of the old bosses—the managers and government officials from the Communist era—undermining the reformers’ goal of worker participation.


Instead of reviving production and bringing widespread prosperity through shock therapy, prices immediately soared, increasing by a factor of twenty-six in the course of 1992. At the same time, production fell a staggering 20 percent. Nor did the situation stabilize quickly. After 1995 inflation still raged, though at slower rates, and output continued to fall. According to most estimates, Russia produced from one-third to one-half less in 1996 than it had in 1991. The Russian economy crashed again in 1998 in the wake of Asia’s financial crisis.

Shock therapy worked poorly for several reasons. Soviet industry had been highly monopolized and strongly tilted toward military goods. Production of many items had been concentrated in one or two gigantic factories or in interconnected combines. With privatization, these powerful state monopolies became powerful private monopolies that cut production and raised prices in order to maximize profits. Moreover, Yeltsin’s government handed out enormous subsidies to corporate managers and bureaucrats, ostensibly to reinforce faltering firms and avoid bankruptcies, but also to buy political allegiance. New corporate leaders included criminals who intimidated would-be rivals



Rich and Poor in Postcommunist Russia A woman sells knitted scarves in front of a department store window in Moscow in September 2005. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the use of shock therapy to reform the Russian economy created new poverty as well as new wealth. (SVF2/Getty Images)

TIMELINE



in attempts to prevent the formation of competing businesses.


Runaway inflation and poorly executed privatization brought a profound social revolution to Russia. The new capitalist elite—the so-called Oligarchs—acquired great wealth and power, while large numbers of people struggled to make ends meet. The Oligarchs, Yeltsin's main supporters, maintained control with corrupt business practices and rampant cronyism.

At the other extreme, the vast majority of people saw their savings become practically worthless. Pensions lost much of their value, living standards drastically declined, and many people sold their personal goods to survive. Under these conditions, effective representative government failed to develop, and many Russians came to equate democracy with the corruption, poverty, and national decline they experienced throughout the 1990s. Yeltsin became increasingly unpopular; only the backing of the Oligarchs kept him in power.

Russian Revival Under Vladimir Putin

This widespread disillusionment set the stage for the rise of Vladimir Putin (POO-tih) (b. 1952), who was elected president as Yeltsin's chosen successor in 2000 and re-elected in a landslide in March 2004. A colonel in the secret police during the Communist era, Putin maintained relatively liberal economic policies but re-established semi-authoritarian political rule. Critics labeled Putin's system an "imitation democracy," and indeed a façade of democratic institutions masked authoritarian rule.¹ Putin's government maintained control with rigged elections, a weak parliament, the intimidation of political opponents, and the distribution of state-owned public assets to win support of the new elite. In addition, the Russian president increased military spending and expanded the secret police.

shock therapy Economic policies set in place in Russia and some former East Bloc countries after the collapse of communism, through which a quick turn to free markets was meant to speed economic growth.



Vladimir Putin on Vacation in 2009 After two terms as Russian president (2000–2008), Putin served as prime minister for four years before returning to the presidency in 2012. Putin's high approval ratings were due in part to his carefully crafted image of strength and manliness. (AFP/Getty Images)

Putin's government combined authoritarian politics with economic reform. The regime clamped down on the excesses of the Oligarchs, lowered corporate and business taxes, and re-established some government control over key industries. Such reforms—aided greatly by high world prices for oil and natural gas, Russia's most important exports—led to a decade of economic expansion, encouraging the growth of a new middle class. In 2008, however, the global financial crisis and a rapid drop in the price of oil caused a downturn, and the Russian stock market collapsed. The government initiated a \$200 billion rescue plan, and the economy stabilized and returned to modest growth in 2010.

Putin stepped down when his term limits expired in 2008 but was re-elected president in 2012 and then won 76 percent of the vote in the elections of 2018. International observers agreed that the election itself was open and democratic, but critics called attention to a number of suspected irregularities during the vote.

Throughout his rule Putin's government decisively limited political opposition. The 2003 arrest and

imprisonment of the corrupt oil billionaire Mikhail Khodorkovsky, an Oligarch who had openly supported opposition parties, on charges of tax evasion and fraud showed early on that Putin and his United Russia Party would use state powers to stifle dissent. Though the Russian constitution guaranteed freedom of the press, the government cracked down on the independent media. Using a variety of tactics, officials and pro-government businessmen influenced news reports and intimidated critical journalists. The suspicious murder in 2006 of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, a prominent critic of the government's human rights abuses and its war in Chechnya, reinforced Western worries that the country was returning to Soviet-style press censorship. Other attacks on critics of Putin's Russia outraged Western public opinion, but faced with blanket denials there was little the West could do to rein in Russian tactics.

In foreign relations, Putin's Russia has taken an ambitious and at times interventionist stance toward the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose confederation of most of the former Soviet republics (see ahead). Further abroad, Putin generally championed assertive anti-Western policies in an attempt to bolster Russia's status as a great Eurasian power and world player. (See "Evaluating Written Evidence: President Putin on Global Security," page 941.) He forcefully opposed the expansion of NATO into the former East Bloc and regularly challenged U.S. and NATO foreign policy goals. In the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011, for example, Russian backing of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad flew in the face of U.S. attempts to depose him. In a dramatic turn of events, western security services accused Russia of using social media, fake websites, and stolen e-mails to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, Great Britain's 2016 "Brexit" referendum on leaving the European Union, and the 2017 presidential elections in France.

Putin's domestic and foreign policies proved quite popular with a majority of Russians. His housing, education, and health-care reforms significantly improved living standards. Capitalizing on Russian patriotism, Putin repeatedly evoked the glories of Russian history, expressed pride in the accomplishments of the Soviet Union, and downplayed the abuses of the Stalinist system. Putin's carefully crafted manly image and his aggressive international diplomacy soothed the country's injured pride and symbolized its national revival.

Political Instability in the Former Soviet Republics

The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the establishment of the Russian Federation and fourteen other newly independent republics and brought major changes to east-central Europe and south-central Asia

President Putin on Global Security

In this wide-ranging speech, delivered to representatives of over forty nations at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, Russian president Vladimir Putin explained his views on achieving global security. He attacked the militarization of outer space, the expansion of NATO into former East Bloc countries, and unlimited nuclear proliferation—all key elements of Russian foreign policy after communism—but reserved his sternest comments for U.S. actions in what he called a “unipolar world.”



What is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it . . . is [a] world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within. . . .

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world. . . . The model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilization. . . .

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this? . . .

The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. . . .

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice—one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia—a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.

And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us—these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of politicians, to disassemble and dismantle these new walls?

EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE

1. Putin's speech often seems overly general or vague. Given the date of the speech, exactly which U.S. actions do you think draw his concern, and why would he worry about them?
2. How do Putin's words reflect the diminished stature of Russia in global affairs after the end of the Cold War? Why does he claim that “new walls” are being built between Russia and the West?

Source: Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/-the-universal-indivisible-character-of-global-security/4741>.

(Map 30.1). In some ways, the transformation of this vast and diverse region paralleled the experience of the former East Bloc countries and Russia itself. Though most of the fourteen new republics, which included almost one-half of the former Soviet Union's total population, adopted some sort of liberal market capitalism, political reforms varied broadly. In the Baltic republics, where Gorbachev's perestroika had quickly encouraged powerful separatist movements, reformers established working democratic government. While Ukrainians struggled to construct a working democratic system, elsewhere—in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the other Central Asian republics, and the new

republics in the Caucasus—systems of “imitation democracy” and outright authoritarian rule took hold.

Though Putin encouraged the former Soviet republics to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose confederation dominated by Russia that supposedly represented regional common interests, stability and agreement proved elusive. Popular protests and revolts challenged local politicians and Russian interests alike. In the country of Georgia, the so-called Rose Revolution (November 2003) brought a pro-Western, pro-NATO leader to power. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution (November 2004–January 2005) challenged the results of a national election and



MAP 30.1 Russia and the Successor States, 1991–2019 After the failure of an attempt in August 1991 to depose Gorbachev, an anticommunist revolution swept the Soviet Union. The republics that formed the Soviet Union each declared their sovereignty and independence, with Russia, under President Boris Yeltsin, being the largest. Eleven of the fourteen republics then joined with Russia to form a loose confederation called the Commonwealth of Independent States, but the integrated economy of the Soviet Union dissolved into separate national economies, each with its own goals and policies. Conflict continued to simmer over these goals and policies, as evidenced by the ongoing civil war in Chechnya, the struggle between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia, the Russian annexation of the Crimea, and the Ukrainian separatist movement.

expressed popular nationalist desires for more distance from Russia. Similar **Color Revolutions** in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova exemplified the unpredictable path toward democratization in the new republics that bordered the powerful Russian Federation.

Putin took an aggressive and at times interventionist stance toward anti-Russian revolt in the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Russian borderlands. Conflict was particularly intense in the oil-rich Caucasus, where an unstable combination of nationalist separatism and ethnic and religious tensions challenged Russian dominance. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian troops have

repeatedly invaded Chechnya (CHEHCH-nyuh), a tiny Muslim republic with 1 million inhabitants on Russia's southern border that declared its independence in 1991. Despite ultimate Russian victory in the Chechen wars, the cost of the conflict was high. Thousands lost their lives, and both sides committed serious human rights abuses. Moscow declared an end to military operations in April 2009, but Chechen radicals, inspired by nationalism and Islamic radicalism, continued to fight an underground, terroristic campaign against Russia.

Russia also intervened in the independent state of Georgia, which won independence when the Soviet

Union collapsed in 1991. Russian troops invaded Georgia in 2008 to support a separatist movement in South Ossetia (oh-SEE-shuh or oh-SET-tia), which eventually established a breakaway independent republic recognized only by Russia and a handful of small states.

Revolution broke out again in Ukraine in February 2014. When popular protests brought down the pro-Russian government, Putin sent Russian troops into Crimea, Ukraine's strategically valuable peninsula on the Black Sea where pro-Russian sentiment ran high. The territory, with a major naval base in the city of Sevastopol and large reserves of oil and natural gas, was incorporated into the Russian Federation. Then, in response to the anti-Russian policies of the new Ukrainian government, in April 2014 a group of armed rebels took over the regional capital Donetsk and other cities in eastern Ukraine and declared the establishment of the separatist, pro-Russian Donetsk and Luhansk "People's Republics" (see Map 30.1).

A full-scale military assault by Ukrainian government troops failed to push back or defeat the separatist forces. According to Ukrainian and U.S. sources, the Russians prevented the defeat of the insurrection by supplying substantial numbers of weapons and troops. In response, the United States and the European Union placed economic sanctions on Russia, and since February 2015 a shaky ceasefire has dampened hostilities in eastern Ukraine. Yet the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain, a revealing example of the way great power interests continue to create instability in the former Soviet republics.

Economic and Political Transformations in the Former East Bloc

Developments in the former East Bloc paralleled those in Russia in numerous ways. The former satellites worked to replace state-controlled production and distribution of goods of Soviet-style communism with market-based economic systems, and industries, businesses, and farms formerly managed by the state would now be privatized. In addition, these countries established systems of Western-style electoral politics.

The methods of restructuring and privatization varied from country to country. Encouraged by Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, Poland's new leaders were the first in eastern Europe to adopt shock therapy policies. Starting in 1990, the Poles liberalized prices and trade policies, raised taxes, cut state spending to reduce budget deficits, and quickly sold state-owned industries to private investors. As they would in Russia a few years later, these radical moves at first brought high

inflation and a rapid decline in living standards, which generated public protests and strikes. But because the plan had the West's approval, Poland received Western financial support that eased the pain of transition. By the end of the decade, the country had one of the strongest economies in the former East Bloc. Other countries followed alternate paths. Czechoslovakia and the Baltic republic of Estonia, for example, slowed down privatization, continued more practices from the Communist past, and in general experienced less social disruption.

Economic growth in the former Communist countries was varied, but most observers agreed that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were the most successful. Each met the critical challenge of economic reconstruction more successfully than Russia. The reasons for these successes included considerable experience with limited market reforms before 1989, flexibility and lack of dogmatism in government policy, and an enthusiastic embrace of capitalism by a new entrepreneurial class. In its first five years of reform, Poland created twice as many new businesses as did Russia in a comparable period, despite having only a quarter of Russia's population.

In the years that followed 1989, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary also did far better than Russia in creating new civic institutions, legal systems, and independent media outlets that reinforced political moderation and national revival. Lech Wałęsa in Poland and Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia were elected presidents of their countries and proved as remarkable in power as in opposition. After Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution in 1989, the Czechoslovak parliament accepted a "velvet divorce" in 1993, when Slovakian nationalists wanted to break off and form their own state, creating the separate Czech and Slovak Republics. In 1999 Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were accepted into NATO, and in 2004 they and Slovakia gained admission to the European Union. Yet, as we shall see ahead, after the global recession of 2008, conservative populist parties took over in these key postcommunist countries and began to attack liberal institutions such as freedom of the press and independent judicial systems.

Romania and Bulgaria lagged behind in the post-communist transition. Western traditions were weaker there, and both countries were poorer than their more successful neighbors. Romania and Bulgaria did make progress after 2000, however, and joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007.

The social consequences of rebuilding the former East Bloc were similar to those in Russia, though

■ **Color Revolutions** A series of popular revolts and insurrections that challenged regional politicians and Russian interests in the former Soviet republics during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

people were generally spared the widespread shortages and misery that characterized Russia in the 1990s. Ordinary citizens and the elderly were once again the big losers, while the young and former Communist Party members were the big winners. Inequalities between richer and poorer regions also increased. Capital cities such as Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest concentrated wealth, power, and opportunity, while provincial centers stagnated and old industrial areas declined. Crime, corruption, and gangsterism increased in both the streets and the executive suites.

Though few former East Bloc residents wanted to return to communism, some expressed longings for the stability of the old system. They missed the guaranteed jobs and generous social benefits provided by the Communist state, and they found the individualism and competitiveness of capitalism cold and difficult. One Russian woman living on a pension of \$448 a month in 2003 summed up the dilemma: “What we want is for our life to be as easy as it was in the Soviet Union, with the guarantee of a good, stable future and low prices—and at the same time this freedom that did not exist before.”²

The question of whether or how to punish former Communist leaders who had committed political crimes or abused human rights emerged as a pressing issue in the former East Bloc. Germany tried major offenders and opened the records of the East German secret police (the Stasi) to the public, and by 1996 more than a million former residents had asked to see their files.³ Other countries designed various means to deal with former Communist elites who might have committed crimes, with right-wing leaders generally taking a more punitive stand. The search for fair solutions proceeded slowly and with much controversy, a reminder of the troubling legacies of communism and the Cold War.

Civil War in Yugoslavia

Postcommunism turned tragic in Yugoslavia, which under Josip Broz Tito had been a federation of republics under centralized Communist rule. After Tito’s death in 1980, power passed increasingly to the sister republics. This process encouraged a revival of regional, religious, and ethnic conflicts that were exacerbated by charges of ethnically inspired massacres during World War II and a dramatic economic decline in the mid-1980s.

The revolutions of 1989 accelerated the breakup of Yugoslavia. Serbian president Slobodan Milošević (1941–2006), a former Communist bureaucrat, wished to strengthen the federation’s centralized

government under Serbian control. In 1989 Milošević (mee-LOH-sheh-veech) severely limited the right of self-rule in the territory of Kosovo, an Autonomous Province established in the Republic of Serbia after the Second World War. In Kosovo ethnic Albanians constituted the overwhelming majority of residents, but the province included a medieval battleground that nationalists like Milošević claimed was sacred to Serbian identity. Religious differences reinforced ethnic and regional tensions: most Albanians were Muslims, while the vast majority of Serbs were Eastern Orthodox Christians.

In 1990 Milošević called for the unification of all Serbs in a “Greater Serbia,” regardless of where they lived in the weakening Yugoslavian federation. This aggressive move strengthened the cause of national separatism, and in June 1991 the relatively wealthy federal republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Milošević ordered the Yugoslavian federal army to invade both areas to assert Serbian control. The Serbs were quickly repulsed in Slovenia, but they managed to conquer about 30 percent of Croatia.

In 1992 the civil war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had also declared its independence. Serbs—about 30 percent of that region’s population—refused to live under the more numerous Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks (Map 30.2). Yugoslavia had once been a tolerant and largely successful multiethnic state with different groups living side by side and often intermarrying. But the new goal of the armed factions in the Bosnian civil war was **ethnic cleansing**: the attempt to establish ethnically homogeneous territories by intimidation, forced deportation, and killing. The Yugoslavian army and irregular militias attempted to “cleanse” the territory of its non-Serb residents, unleashing ruthless brutality, with murder, rape, destruction, and the herding of refugees into concentration camps. Before the fighting in Bosnia ended, some three hundred thousand people were dead, and millions had been forced to flee their homes.

While appalling scenes of horror not seen in Europe since the Holocaust shocked the world, the Western nations had difficulty formulating an effective, unified response. The turning point came in July 1995 when Bosnian Serbs overran Srebrenica (sreb-reh-NEET-suh)—a Muslim city previously declared a United Nations safe area. Serb forces killed about eight thousand of the city’s Bosniak civilians, primarily men and boys. Public outrage prompted NATO to bomb Bosnian Serb military targets intensively, and the Croatian army drove all the Serbs from Croatia. In November 1995 President Bill Clinton helped the warring sides hammer out a complicated accord that gave Bosnian Serbs about 49 percent of Bosnia

■ **ethnic cleansing** The attempt to establish ethnically homogeneous territories by intimidation, forced deportation, and killing.



MAP 30.2 The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1991–2006 Yugoslavia had the most ethnically diverse population in eastern Europe. The Republic of Croatia had substantial Serbian and Muslim minorities, while Bosnia-Herzegovina had large Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian populations, none of which had a majority. In June 1991 Serbia's brutal effort to seize territory and unite all Serbs in a single state brought a tragic civil war.

and gave Bosniaks and the Roman Catholic Bosnian Croats the rest. About seven thousand troops from NATO and then after 2004 from the European Union were stationed in Bosnia to keep the peace; by 2012 only about six hundred remained, suggesting that while ethnic and religious tensions remained, the situation had improved.

The Kosovo Albanians, who hoped to establish self-rule, gained nothing from the Bosnian agreement. Frustrated Kosovar militants formed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and began to fight for independence. Serbian repression of the Kosovars increased, and in 1998 Serbian forces attacked both KLA guerrillas and unarmed villagers, displacing 250,000 people.

When Milošević refused to withdraw Serbian militias from Kosovo and accept self-government (but not independence) for Kosovo, NATO began bombing Serbia in March 1999. Serbian paramilitary forces responded by driving about 865,000 Albanian Kosovars into exile. NATO redoubled its destructive bombing campaign, which eventually forced Milošević to withdraw and allowed the Kosovars to

regain their homeland. A United Nations and NATO peacekeeping force occupied Kosovo, ending ten years of Yugoslavian civil wars. Although U.S.-led NATO intervention finally brought an end to the conflict, the failure to take a stronger stand in the early years led to widespread and unnecessary suffering in the former Yugoslavia.

The war-weary and impoverished Serbs eventually voted the still-defiant Milošević out of office, and in July 2001 a new pro-Western Serbian government turned him over to a war crimes tribunal in the Netherlands to stand trial for crimes against humanity. After blustering his way through the initial stages of his trial, Milošević died in 2006 before the proceedings were complete. In 2008, after eight years of administration by the United Nations and NATO peacekeeping forces, the Republic of Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The United States and most states of the European Union recognized the declaration. Serbia and Russia did not, and the long-term status of this troubled emerging state remained uncertain.

Srebrenica Refugees More than 2,300 Bosnian Muslims packed into NATO trucks to flee the Serbian encirclement of Srebrenica in the spring of 1995. That July, the Serbian army massacred approximately 8,000 civilians in the city, and outraged public opinion in western Europe and North America finally led to decisive intervention against Serbia. In early 2016 twelve of the Serbian military leaders believed responsible were still on trial for crimes against humanity at the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal; eighty had been sentenced by the international court.

(Michel Euler/AP Images)



How did globalization affect European life and society?

The new era of **globalization** that emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century brought new international economic, cultural, and political connections. Multinational corporations restructured national economies on a global scale, and an array of international governing bodies, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization, increasingly set policies that challenged the autonomy of traditional nation-states. At the same time the expansion and ready availability of highly efficient computer and media technologies led to ever-faster exchanges of goods, information, and entertainment around the world.

The Global Economy

Though large business interests had long profited from international trade and investment, multinational corporations grew and flourished in a world economy increasingly organized around free-market neoliberalism, which relaxed barriers to international trade. Multinational corporations built global systems of production and distribution that generated unprecedented wealth and generally escaped the control of regulators and politicians acting on the national level.

Conglomerates such as Siemens and Vivendi exemplified this business model. Siemens, with international headquarters in Berlin and Munich and offices around the globe, is one of the world's largest engineering companies, with vast holdings in energy, construction, health care, financial services,

and industrial production. Vivendi, an extensive media and telecommunications company headquartered in Paris, controls a vast international network of producers and products, including music and film, publishing, television broadcasting, pay-TV, Internet services, and video games.

The development of sophisticated personal computer technologies and the Internet at the end of the twentieth century, coupled with the deregulation of national and international financial systems, further encouraged the growth of international trade. The ability to rapidly exchange information and capital meant that economic activity was no longer centered on national banks or stock exchanges, but rather flowed quickly across international borders. Large cities like London, Moscow, New York, and Hong Kong became global centers of banking, trade, and financial services. The influence of financial and insurance companies, communications conglomerates, and energy and legal firms headquartered in these global cities extended far beyond the borders of the traditional nation-state.

At the same time, the close connections between national economies also made the entire world vulnerable to economic panics and downturns. In 1997 a banking crisis in Thailand spread to Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan and then echoed around the world. The resulting slump in oil and gas prices hit Russia especially hard, leading to high inflation, bank failures, and the collapse of the Russian stock market. The crisis then spread to Latin America, plunging

most countries there into a severe economic downturn. A decade later, a global recession triggered by a crisis in the U.S. housing market and financial system created the worst worldwide economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s (see “The Global Recession and the Viability of the European Union” ahead).

The New European Union

Global economic pressures encouraged the expansion and consolidation of the European Common Market, which in 1993 proudly rechristened itself the **European Union (EU)** (Map 30.3). The EU added the free movement of capital and services and eventually individuals across national borders to the existing free trade in goods. In addition, member states sought to create a monetary union in which all EU countries would share a single currency. Membership in the monetary union required states to meet strict financial criteria defined in the 1991 **Maastricht Treaty**, which also set legal standards and anticipated the development of common policies on defense and foreign affairs.

Western European elites and opinion makers generally supported the economic integration embodied in the Maastricht Treaty. They felt that membership requirements, which imposed financial discipline on national governments, would combat Europe’s ongoing economic problems and viewed the establishment of a single European currency as an irreversible historic step toward basic political unity. This unity would allow Europe as a whole to regain its place in world politics and to deal with the United States as an equal.

Support for the Maastricht Treaty, however, was hardly universal. Ordinary people, leftist political parties, and right-wing nationalists expressed considerable opposition to the new rules. Many people resented the EU’s ever-growing bureaucracy in Brussels, which imposed common standards on everything from cheese production to day care, supposedly undermining national customs and local traditions. Moreover, increased unity meant yielding still more power to distant “Eurocrats” and political insiders, which limited national sovereignty and democratic control.

Above all, many citizens feared that the European Union would operate at their expense. Joining the monetary union required national governments to meet stringent fiscal standards, impose budget cuts, and contribute to the EU operating budget. The resulting reductions in health care and social benefits hit ordinary citizens and did little to reduce high unemployment. When put to the public for a vote, ratification of the Maastricht Treaty was usually very close. In France, for example, the treaty passed with just 50.1 percent of the vote. Even after the treaty was ratified, battles over budgets, benefits, and high unemployment continued throughout the EU in the 1990s.

Then in 2002, brand-new euros finally replaced the national currencies of all Eurozone countries. The establishment of the European monetary union built confidence in member nations and increased their willingness to accept new members. On May 1, 2004, the European Union began admitting its former East Bloc neighbors. This rapid expansion underscored the need to reform the EU’s unwieldy governing structure, and in 2007 the member nations signed the Treaty of Lisbon, which streamlined the EU bureaucracy and reformed its political structure. When the Treaty of Lisbon went into effect on December 1, 2009, it capped a remarkable fifty-year effort to unify what had been a deeply divided and war-torn continent. By 2019, with the recent admission of Croatia in 2013, the EU was home to about 500 million citizens in twenty-eight countries. It included most of the former East Bloc and, with the Baltic nations, three republics of the former Soviet Union. Yet profound questions about the meaning of European unity and identity remained. How would the European Union deal with disruptive membership issues, maintain its democratic ethos in the face of growing right-wing populism, and manage general economic and political crises? We return to these issues later in the chapter.

Supranational Organizations

Beyond the European Union, the trend toward globalization empowered a variety of other supranational organizations that had tremendous reach. National governments still played the leading role in defining and implementing policy, but they increasingly had to take the policies of institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization into consideration.

The United Nations (UN), established in 1945 after World War II, remains an important player on the world stage. Representatives from all independent countries meet in the UN General Assembly in New York City to try to forge international agreements. UN agencies deal with issues such as world hunger and poverty, and the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands, hears cases that violate international law. The UN also sends troops in attempts to preserve peace between warring parties—as in

■ **globalization** A label for the new international economic, cultural, and political connections that emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century.

■ **European Union (EU)** The economic, cultural, and political alliance of twenty-eight European nations.

■ **Maastricht Treaty** The basis for the formation of the European Union, which set financial and cultural standards for potential member states and defined criteria for membership in the monetary union.



MAPPING THE PAST

MAP 30.3 The European Union, 2019

No longer divided by ideological competition and the Cold War, much of today's Europe has banded together in a European Union that facilitates the open movement of people, jobs, and currency across national borders.

ANALYZING THE MAP Trace the expansion of membership from its initial founding as the European Economic Union to today. How would you characterize the most recent members? Whose membership is still pending?

CONNECTIONS Which countries are and are not part of the Eurozone, and what does this suggest about how successful the European Union has been in adopting the euro?

Yugoslavia in the 1990s or more recently in Ukraine. While the smaller UN Security Council has broad powers, including the ability to impose sanctions to punish uncooperative states and even to endorse military action, its five permanent members—the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China—can each veto resolutions introduced in that body. The

predominance of the United States and western European powers on the Security Council has led some critics to accuse the UN of implementing Western neocolonial policies. Others, including U.S. president Donald Trump, argue that UN policies should never take precedence over national needs, and UN resolutions are at times ignored or downplayed.

Nonprofit international financial institutions have also gained power. Like the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were established in the years following World War II to help rebuild war-torn Europe, and these organizations now provide loans to the developing world. Their funding comes primarily from donations from the United States and western Europe, and they typically extend loans on the condition that recipient countries adopt neoliberal economic reforms, including budget reduction, deregulation, and privatization. In the 1990s the World Bank and the IMF played especially active roles in shaping economic and social policy in the former East Bloc.

The **World Trade Organization (WTO)** is one of the most powerful supranational financial institutions. It sets trade and tariff agreements for over 150 member countries, thus helping manage a large percentage of the world's import-export policies. Like the IMF and the World Bank, the WTO generally promotes neoliberal policies.

Life in the Digital Age

The growing sophistication of rapidly proliferating information technologies has had a profound and rapidly evolving effect on patterns of communications, commerce, and politics. As tiny digital microchips replaced bulky transistors and the Internet grew in scope and popularity, more and more people organized their everyday lives around the use of ever-more-powerful high-tech devices.

Leisure-time pursuits were a case in point. Digital media changed popular forms of entertainment and replaced many physical products. The arrival of cable television, followed swiftly by DVDs and then online video streaming, let individuals watch movies or popular television shows on their personal computers or smartphones at any time. Europe's once-powerful public broadcasting systems, such as the BBC, were forced to compete with a variety of private enterprises, including Netflix, a U.S. online video provider that entered the European media market in 2014. Music downloads and streaming audio files replaced compact discs, vinyl records, and cassettes; digital cameras eliminated the need for expensive film; e-book readers and tablets offered a handheld portable library; and smartphone apps provided an endless variety of conveniences and distractions.

Digitalization and the Internet, which began its rapid expansion in the 1980s, transformed familiar forms of communication in a few short decades. Early in the twenty-first century, the evolution of the cell phone into the smartphone, with its multimedia telecommunications features, hastened the change. The growing popularity of communication tools such as e-mail, text




Life in the Digital Age Attendees at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona in 2018 react to a virtual reality headset demonstration. The annual conference, which explores the impact of mobile information and artificial intelligence technologies on individuals and businesses, is the world's largest trade fair for wireless industries and a telling example of the way digitalization has transformed everyday life. (Simon Dawson/Bloomberg/Getty Images)

messaging, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other social media changed the way friends, families, and businesses kept in touch. Letters sent on paper became a relic of the past. A variety of chat platforms offered personal computer and smartphone users the ability to engage in virtual face-to-face meetings from any location across the globe. The old-fashioned "landline," connected to a stationary telephone, seemed ready to join the vinyl LP and the handwritten letter in the junk bin of history.

Entire industries were dramatically changed by the emergence of the Internet and the giant tech companies Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft. With faster speeds and better online security, people increasingly purchased goods from clothes to computers to groceries on the Web. Online file sharing of books and popular music transformed the publishing and music industries, while massive online retailers such as Amazon and eBay, which sell millions of goods across the globe without physical storefronts, transformed familiar retail systems.

The rapid growth of the Internet and social media raised complex questions related to politics and personal privacy. (See "Viewpoints: Debating the Impact of Social Media and the Internet," page 950.)

■ World Trade Organization (WTO) A powerful supranational financial institution that sets trade and tariff agreements for over 150 member countries and so helps manage a large percentage of the world's import-export policies. Like the IMF and the World Bank, the WTO promotes neoliberal policies around the world.



VIEWPOINTS

Debating the Impact of Social Media and the Internet

The Internet revolution and the ever-growing popularity of social media brought profound changes and generated intense debates about the potential impacts on people and their relationships. In the selections below, Harvard Law School professor Yochai Benkler emphasizes the creative possibilities supposedly inherent in the emerging digital information networks, a popular stance among supporters of the Web. Computer scientist and philosopher Jaron Lanier disagrees. By 2010, according to Lanier, the original creativity and room for self-expression associated with the early years of the Internet had been overtaken by crass commercialization, undermining the very meaning of personhood.

Yochai Benkler, from *The Wealth of Networks*, 2006

In the past decade and a half, we have begun to see a radical change in the organization of information production. Enabled by technological change, we are beginning to see a series of economic, social, and cultural adaptations that make possible a radical transformation of how we make the information environment we occupy as autonomous individuals, citizens, and members of cultural and social groups. . . .

These newly emerging practices have seen remarkable success in areas as diverse as software development and investigative reporting, avant-garde video and multiplayer online games. Together, they hint at the emergence of a new information environment, one in which individuals are free to take a more active role than was possible in the industrial information economy of the twentieth century. This new freedom holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual freedom; as a platform for better democratic participation; as a medium to foster a more critical and self-reflective culture; and, in an increasingly information dependent global economy, as a mechanism to achieve improvements in human development everywhere. . . .

This does not mean that [personal computers and network connections] cannot be used for markets, or that individuals cease to seek market opportunities. It does mean, however, that whenever someone, somewhere, among the billion connected human beings, and ultimately among all those who will be connected, wants to make something that requires human creativity, a computer, and a network connection, he or she can do so—alone, or in cooperation with others. . . . The result is a flourishing nonmarket sector of information, knowledge, and cultural production, based in the networked environment, and applied to anything that the many individuals connected to it can imagine.

Jaron Lanier, from *You Are Not a Gadget*, 2010

Something started to go wrong with the digital revolution around the turn of the twenty-first century. . . . The way the Internet has gone sour . . . is truly perverse. The central faith of the web's early design has been superseded by a different faith in the centrality of imaginary entities epitomized by the idea that the Internet as a whole is coming alive and turning into a superhuman creature. . . . The early waves of web activity were remarkably energetic and had a personal quality. People created personal "homepages," and each of them was different, and often strange. The web had flavor.

Entrepreneurs naturally sought to create products that would inspire demand . . . where there was no lack to be addressed and no need to be filled, other than greed. . . . An endless series of gambits backed by gigantic investments encouraged young people entering the online world for the first time to create standardized presences on sites like Facebook. Commercial interests promoted the widespread adoption of standardized designs like the blog, and these designs encouraged pseudonymity in at least some aspects of their designs, such as the comments, instead of the proud extroversion that characterized the first wave of web culture.

Instead of people being treated as the sources of their own creativity, commercial aggregation and abstraction sites presented anonymized fragments of creativity as products that might have fallen from the sky or been dug up from the ground, obscuring the true sources. . . . The deep meaning of personhood is being reduced by illusions of bits.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

1. Compare the arguments presented above. What are the strengths and weaknesses of each? Where are the main sources of disagreement?
2. Drawing on the material above and in this chapter, and in your own experience with the Internet, would you say that Internet technologies lead to more passive or more active social interaction?

Sources: Yochai Benkler, *The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 1–2, 6–7; Jaron Lanier, *You Are Not a Gadget: A Manifesto* (New York: Knopf, 2010), pp. 6, 13–14, 17.

Individuals and groups could use smartphones and social media sites to organize protest campaigns for social justice. Facebook and Twitter, for example, helped mobilize demonstrators in Egypt during the Arab Spring (see “Turmoil in the Muslim World” later in this chapter). Online platforms also provided a ready means for the spread of hate speech and disinformation of all kinds. A number of authoritarian states from North Korea to Iran to Cuba, recognizing the disruptive powers of the Internet, strictly limited online access.

Governments and Web businesses, such as Facebook and Google, regularly used online tracking systems to amass an extraordinary amount of information on individuals, including political and personal activities; this information could be used in political campaigns or sold for targeted advertising. Hackers also attacked large databases, exposing the private information of millions of people to criminal use. Such abuses of data did not go unchecked. The revelation, for example, that the British consulting firm Cambridge Analytica had acquired the personal data of millions of Facebook users for use in the U.S. 2016 presidential campaign led to a political scandal and calls for tighter regulation of data collection.

In general, online privacy rules developed along with the Internet and were more stringent in Europe than in the United States, as exemplified by the General Data Protection Regulation instituted by the EU in May 2018. According to this broad mandate, tech companies had to clearly describe their information-gathering practices and their use of private data; the new regulations required Internet users to specifically “opt in” before companies could collect their personal data. In the United States, to the contrary, simply clicking on a link generally exposed personal information to website managers.

The vast amount of information circulating on the Internet also led to the exposure of government and business secrets, with mixed results. The classified U.S. National Security Agency information leaked in 2013 by former CIA contractor Edward Snowden embarrassed U.S. diplomats and fueled debates about Internet surveillance, national security, and privacy protection. (See “Individuals in Society: Edward Snowden,” page 952.) The materials posted online by the nonprofit organization WikiLeaks, dedicated to the publication of secret information and news leaks, documented numerous examples of government and corporate misconduct. In the U.S. presidential elections of 2016, however, WikiLeaks published e-mails hacked from Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman, leading to accusations of election meddling and ongoing congressional investigations.

The Costs and Consequences of Globalization

Globalization transformed the lives of millions of people, as the technological changes associated with postindustrial society remade workplaces and lifestyles around the world. Widespread adoption of neoliberal free-trade policies and low labor costs in developing countries, including the former East Bloc, Latin America, and East Asia, made it less expensive to manufacture steel, automotive parts, computer components, and all manner of consumer goods in developing countries and then import them for sale in the West.

In the 1990s China, with its low wages and rapidly growing industrial infrastructure, emerged as an economic powerhouse that supplied goods across the world—even as the West’s industrial heartlands continued to decline. Under these conditions, a car made by Volkswagen could still be sold as a product of high-quality German engineering despite being assembled in Chattanooga, Tennessee, using steel imported from South Korea and computer chips made in Taiwan.

The outsourcing of manufacturing jobs also dramatically changed the nature of work in western Europe and North America. In France in 1973, for example, some 40 percent of the employed population worked in industry—in mining, construction, manufacturing, and utilities. About 49 percent worked in services, including retail, hotels and restaurants, transportation, communications, financial and business services, and social and personal services. In 2004 only 24 percent of the French worked in industry, and a whopping 72 percent worked in services. The numbers varied country by country, yet across Europe the general trend was clear: by 2016 only about 15 percent of employed workers were still working in the once-booming manufacturing sector; in the United States, less than 9 percent of workers held such jobs.⁴

The deindustrialization of the West established a multilayered society with winners and losers. At the top was a small, affluent group of experts, executives, and professionals—about one-quarter of the total population—who managed the new global enterprises. In the second, larger tier, the middle class struggled with stagnating incomes and a declining standard of living as once-well-paid industrial workers faced stubborn unemployment and cuts in both welfare and workplace benefits. Many were forced to take low-paying jobs in the retail service sector.

In the bottom tier—in some areas as much as a quarter of the population—a poorly paid underclass performed the unskilled jobs of a postindustrial economy or were chronically unemployed. In western

INDIVIDUALS IN SOCIETY

Edward Snowden

Edward Snowden—traitor or hero? When the former CIA operative leaked a trove of classified documents about American surveillance programs to the world press, he was praised by some, vilified by others, and ultimately indicted on espionage charges by the U.S. government.

Snowden perhaps seems an unlikely candidate for masterminding the biggest intelligence leak in history. Born in 1983, the gun-owning, political conservative never finished high school and took computer classes at a community college. In 2006 he got a job in information technology with the CIA. From 2009 to 2013 he worked as a contractor for the National Security Agency.

As a systems analyst with a high-level security clearance, Snowden had access to highly classified NSA materials. Over the years, he grew increasingly outraged by the extent of secret government surveillance. In contravention of NSA regulations, he began to copy files on a personal thumb drive and ultimately collected tens of thousands of top-secret documents from NSA archives.

In January 2013 a journalist working for the liberal British newspaper the *Guardian* and an American documentary film maker received e-mails from an anonymous source asking for an exchange of encrypted (highly encoded) information. "I am a senior member of the intelligence community," read the anonymous e-mail. "This won't be a waste of your time."* Enticed, they agreed to meet the source in a Hong Kong hotel. There Snowden disclosed his identity and handed over a selection of documents. Recognizing a scoop, the *Guardian* revealed the secret surveillance programs. Other media outlets pounced on the story, and Snowden's revelations became a global sensation.

The explosive news reports described extensive U.S. spy programs that shocked people around the world. The leaks revealed that the NSA had collected phone records from virtually every person in the United States and had misled the U.S. Congress about the extent of the surveillance. The agency had accessed the Internet servers of major telecommunications providers and could thus collect information about e-mail messages, Internet searches, and individual friends and contacts from Facebook and Google. The documents described programs that monitored the telephone calls of notable politicians in friendly nations. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, a close ally of the United States, was infuriated to find out that the NSA had tapped her cell phone; so were the presidents of Mexico and Brazil, among others.

The response took many forms. Foreign leaders were dismayed by the extensive leaks from a major allied security service and by the pervasiveness of U.S. surveillance programs. Conservative pundits and U.S. officials condemned Snowden, arguing that the leaked materials revealed secret antiterrorism operations and could even endanger the lives



Former NSA contractor and antisurveillance whistleblower Edward Snowden receives the 2015 Bjornson Prize from the Norwegian Academy of Literature and Freedom of Expression. (NTB SCANPIX/Reuters/Newscom)

of agents in the field. As President Barack Obama put it, "If any individual who objects to government policy can take it in their own hands to publicly disclose classified information, then we will not be able to keep our people safe, or conduct foreign policy."[†]

Proponents of civil liberties, defenders of the right to online privacy, and critics of U.S. foreign policy nonetheless welcomed Snowden's revelations. "It is time for President Obama to offer clemency to Edward Snowden, the courageous U.S. citizen who revealed the Orwellian reach of the National Security Agency's sweeping surveillance of Americans," wrote a liberal commentator in the *Washington Post*. "His actions may have broken the law, but his act . . . did the nation a great service."[‡]

Fearing for his freedom, Snowden went underground in Hong Kong. Several weeks later, he surfaced in Russia, where he received an offer of temporary asylum. Snowden now lives somewhere around Moscow, where he continues to comment on electronic surveillance and privacy rights.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS

1. Why did the arrival of the digital age lead to heated debates about the individual's right to privacy?
2. Where would you draw the line between the need for online privacy and the government's need to collect personal information in order to protect society from terrorist attacks? Where does Snowden fit in?

* Luke Harding, "How Edward Snowden Went from Loyal NSA Contractor to Whistleblower," *Guardian*, February 1, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/01/edward-snowden-intelligence-leak-nsa-contractor-extract>.

† Josh Gerstein, "Obama Hits Snowden over NSA Leaks," *Politico*, January 17, 2014, <http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/barack-obama-edward-snowden-nsa-leaks-102316>.

‡ Katrina vanden Heuvel, "Justice for Edward Snowden," *Washington Post*, October 28, 2014.

Europe and North America, inclusion in this lowest segment of society was often linked to race, ethnicity, and a lack of educational opportunity. Recently arrived immigrants had trouble finding jobs and often lived in unpleasant, hastily built housing, teetering on the edge of poverty. In London, unemployment rates among youths and particularly young black men soared above those of their white compatriots. Frustration over these conditions, coupled with anger at a police shooting, boiled over in immigrant neighborhoods across the city in August 2011, when angry youths rioted in the streets, burning buildings and looting stores.

A similar wave of riots broke out in the multiethnic immigrant suburbs of Stockholm, Sweden, in May 2013, spurred by growing economic inequality and discrimination, and in late 2018 protests by so-called Yellow Vests brought street violence to cities across France over economic problems facing the working and middle classes. Police powers generally brought such unrest under control, and while parliamentarians recognized that poverty, unemployment, and perceived racism inspired unrest, they struggled to find solutions to problems generated by large-scale economic trends.

Geographic contrasts further revealed the unequal aspects of globalization. Urban redevelopment turned the downtown cores of major Western cities into consumerist playgrounds and work centers that only the wealthy could afford to live in, while poorer residents were pushed far out into the suburbs. Regions in the United States and Europe that had successfully shifted to a postindustrial economy, such as Silicon Valley or northern Italy and southern Germany and Austria, enjoyed prosperity. Lagging behind were regions historically dependent on heavy industry, such as the former East Bloc countries and the factory districts



Antiglobalization Activism French protesters carry the figure of Ronald McDonald through the streets to protest the trial of José Bové, a prominent leader in campaigns against the human and environmental costs associated with globalization. Bové was accused of demolishing a McDonald's franchise in a small town in southern France. With its worldwide fast-food restaurants that pay little attention to local traditions, McDonald's has often been the target of antiglobalization protests. (Witt/Haley/Sipa)

north of London, or underdeveloped areas, such as rural sections of southern Italy, Spain, and Greece. In addition, a global north-south divide increasingly separated Europe and North America—both still affluent despite their economic problems—from the industrializing nations of Africa and Latin America. Though India, China, and other East Asian nations experienced solid growth, other industrializing nations struggled to overcome decades of underdevelopment.

How is growing ethnic diversity changing contemporary Europe?

The ethnic makeup of European communities shifted dramatically in the early twenty-first century. Western Europe's remarkable decline in birthrates seemed to predict a shrinking and aging population in the future, yet the peaceful, wealthy European Union attracted rapidly growing numbers of refugees and immigrants from the former Soviet Union and East Bloc, North Africa, and the Middle East. The unexpected arrival of so many newcomers raised perplexing questions about ethnic diversity and the costs and benefits of multiculturalism.

The Prospect of Population Decline

In 2019 population rates were still growing rapidly in many poor countries but not in the world's industrialized nations. In 2000 families in developed countries

had only 1.6 children on average; only in the United States did families have, almost exactly, the 2.1 children necessary to maintain a stable population. In Europe, where birthrates had been falling since the 1950s, national fertility rates ranged from 1.2 to 1.8 children per woman of childbearing age. By 2013 Italy and Ireland, once known for large Catholic families, had each achieved one of Europe's lowest birthrates—a mere 1.3 babies per woman. None of the twenty-eight countries in the EU had birthrates above 2.0; the average fertility rate was about 1.55 children per woman.⁵

If the current baby bust continues, the long-term consequences could be dramatic, though hardly predictable. At the least, Europe's population would decline and age. For example, total German population, barring much greater immigration, would

gradually decline from about 83 million in 2019 to about 66 million around 2050.⁶ The number of people of working age would fall, and because of longer life spans, nearly a third of the population would be over sixty. Social security taxes paid by the shrinking labor force would need to soar to meet the skyrocketing costs of pensions and health care for seniors—a recipe for generational conflict. As the premier of Bavaria, Germany's biggest state, has warned, the prospect of demographic decline is a “ticking time bomb under our social welfare system and entire economy.”⁷

Why, in times of peace, did Europeans fail to reproduce? Studies showed that European women and men in their twenties, thirties, and early forties still wanted two or even three children—like their parents. But unlike their parents, young couples did not achieve their ideal family size. Many women postponed the birth of their first child into their thirties in order to finish their education and establish careers. Then, finding that balancing a child and a career was more difficult than anticipated, new mothers tended to postpone and eventually forgo having a second child. The better educated and the more economically successful a woman was, the more likely she was to have just one child or no children at all. The uneven, uninspiring European economic conditions since the mid-1970s also played a role. High unemployment fell heavily on young people, especially after the recession of 2008, convincing youths to delay settling down and having children.

By 2013 some population experts concluded that European birthrates had stabilized, though women continued to postpone having children. Moreover, the frightening economic implications of dramatic population decline emerged as a major public issue. Opinion leaders, politicians, and the media started to advocate for larger families and propose policies to provide more support for families with children. Europeans may yet respond with enough vigor to reverse their population decline and avoid societal crisis.

Europe’s Refugee Crisis A Kurdish refugee family from northern Iraq seeks shelter in May 2018 in a refugee camp in Thessaloniki, Greece. People in the camp complained about lack of food, water, and a secure place to sleep. At the height of the refugee crisis in the fall and early winter of 2015–2016, about five thousand refugees reached Europe each day. While the number of migrants has declined, the crisis stoked anti-immigrant tensions across Europe and called into question the internal open-border system. (NurPhoto/Getty Images)


Changing Immigration Flows

As European demographic vitality waned in the 1990s, a new surge of migrants from the former Soviet bloc, Africa, and most recently the Middle East headed for western Europe. Some migrants entered the European Union legally, with proper documentation, but undocumented or irregular immigration into the European Union also exploded, as increasing numbers of people were smuggled in despite beefed-up border patrols. Large-scale immigration, both documented and undocumented, emerged as a critical and controversial issue.

The collapse of communism in the East Bloc and savage civil wars in Yugoslavia drove hundreds of thousands of refugees westward in the 1990s, as did equally brutal conflicts in Somalia and Rwanda. More recently, immigration flows have shifted to reflect the dislocation that emerged in North Africa and the Middle East in the wake of the U.S.-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the “Arab Spring” of 2011, and the war against the Islamic State (see “Turmoil in the Muslim World” later in the chapter). Smugglers with a callous disregard for the well-being of their charges demanded thousands of euros to bring undocumented migrants from these troubled regions across the Mediterranean to Greece, Spain, and Italy.

In the summer of 2015, during the height of the Syrian civil war, the migration issue reached crisis proportions. Counting irregular migrants is always difficult, but estimates suggest that in 2015–2016 more than 2.3 million people, mostly from Syria and Iraq, illegally entered the European Union. Many traveled across Turkey and crossed the Mediterranean Sea to the relatively accessible Greek islands. From there they passed through Serbia into Hungary and then struggled to travel north into more hospitable Austria, Germany, and northern Europe. Others continued to enter the EU from North Africa into Italy or Spain (Map 30.4).





MAP 30.4 Major Migration Routes into Contemporary Europe In the wake of wars and the collapse of the Arab Spring, migration from northern Africa and the Middle East into Europe reached crisis proportions. Aided by smugglers, thousands of migrants traveled two main routes: through Libya and across the Mediterranean Sea into southern Italy, and across Turkey to close-by Greek islands and then north through the Balkans. Countries with relatively lenient refugee regulations, such as Sweden and Germany, were favorite destinations. Under the Schengen Agreement, the EU's open-border policy made travel through Europe fairly easy. As the number of migrants increased in the fall of 2015 and the spring of 2016, however, European politicians began to close national borders, and many migrants were stranded in quickly built refugee camps.

When in 2015 Germany's first woman chancellor Angela Merkel (r. 2005–) responded to the crisis by promising homes for 800,000 migrants and encouraged other EU nations to take a share, tens of thousands of migrants trying to reach Germany choked train and bus stations on the Hungarian-Austrian border. Others languished in quickly established refugee camps built in northern Greece and the Hungarian countryside, and Hungary's anti-immigrant government quickly

built a 108-mile razor-wire fence along the border with Serbia to squelch further movement.

The discovery of seventy-one dead migrants locked in an abandoned truck on an Austrian highway—and the deaths of thousands more who in the last several years attempted to cross the Mediterranean in rudimentary rubber rafts and leaky boats—underscored the venality of the smugglers and the human costs of uncontrolled immigration.

However, EU experts estimate that in 2017 the number of irregular migrants entering the EU dropped to 204,719 and would continue to drop. Stricter border controls, the growth of popular anti-immigration sentiment across western Europe, and the election of far-right anti-immigrant governments in Hungary and Italy, which moved to close their national borders, accounted for much of the decline. Nonetheless, European leaders were still struggling to contain the humanitarian crisis and the political fallout caused by the largest movement of peoples across Europe since the end of World War II.⁸

Why was Europe such an attractive destination for non-European migrants? First, economic opportunity in relatively prosperous western Europe undoubtedly was one attraction. Germans, for example, earned on average three and a half times more than neighboring Poles, who in turn earned much more than people farther east and in North Africa. In 1998 most European Union states abolished all border controls; entrance into one country allowed for unimpeded travel almost anywhere (though Ireland and the United Kingdom opted out of this agreement). This meant that irregular migrants could enter across the relatively lax borders of Greece and south-central Europe and then move north across the continent in search of refuge and jobs. And because Europe was simply closer to the troubled regions of North Africa and the Middle East than other wealthy countries such as the United States or Japan, it was an “easier” and more accessible destination for desperate migrants.

Second, EU immigration policy offered migrants the possibility of acquiring asylum status if they could demonstrate that they faced severe persecution based on race, nationality, religion, political belief, or membership in a specific social group in their home countries. Many migrants turned to Europe as they fled civil wars in North Africa and the Middle East, as well as poverty and political repression in other parts of Africa. The rules for attaining asylum status varied by nation, though Germany and Sweden offered relatively liberal policies, housing for applicants, and relatively high benefit payments—about \$425 per month per adult.

Across Europe asylum regulations were nonetheless restrictive. Though numerous migrants applied, after an average fifteen-month wait many were rejected, classified as illegal job seekers, and deported to their home countries. The acceptance rate varied broadly across the different countries in the EU, but the total numbers for 2017 offer some insight into the general plight of the refugees. That year EU countries evaluated about 1 million asylum applications and granted about 538,000 people protected residency status. These numbers reflected a downward trend from the

peak crisis in 2015, but were still far above the approximately 200,000 people who sought asylum in the EU in 2006.⁹

Toward a Multicultural Continent

By 2019 immigration had profoundly changed the ethnic makeup of the European continent, though the effects were unevenly distributed. One way to measure the effect of these new immigrants is to consider the rapid rise of their numbers. Since the 1960s the foreign population of western European nations has grown by two to ten times. In the Netherlands in 1960, only 1 percent of the population was foreign-born. In 2017 the foreign born made up 12 percent. Over the same years the proportion of foreign-born residents grew from 1.2 percent to almost 15 percent in Germany and from 4.7 percent to 12.2 percent in France. In 2017 non-natives constituted about 10 percent of the population, on average, across Europe—though they typically constituted a far smaller share of the former East Bloc nations.¹⁰ For centuries the number of foreigners living in Europe had been relatively small. Now, permanently displaced ethnic groups, or diasporas, brought ethnic diversity to the continent.

The new immigrants were divided into two main groups. A small number of highly trained specialists found work in the upper ranks of education, business, and high-tech industries. Engineers from English-speaking India, for example, could land jobs in international computer companies. Most immigrants, however, had little access to high-quality education or language training, which limited their employment opportunities and made integration more difficult. They often lived in separate city districts marked by poor housing and crowded conditions, which set them apart from more established residents. Districts of London were home to tens of thousands of immigrants from the former colonies, and in Paris North Africans dominated some working-class suburbs.

The **multiculturalism** associated with ethnic diversity inspired a variety of new cultural forms, as native and foreign traditions transformed European lifestyles. Recipes and cooks from former colonies in North Africa enlivened French cooking, while the *döner kebab*—the Turkish version of a gyro sandwich—became Germany’s “native” fast food. Indian restaurants proliferated across Britain, and controversy raged when the British foreign minister announced in 2001 that chicken tikka masala—a spicy Indian stew—was Great Britain’s new national dish.¹¹ Multiculturalism also inspired a rich variety of works in literature, film, and the fine arts; from rap to reggae to *rai*, it had a profound effect on popular music, a medium with a huge audience.

■ multiculturalism The mixing of ethnic styles in daily life and in cultural works such as film, music, art, and literature.



The Changing Face of London's Arsenal Football Club

Growing ethnic diversity is transforming many aspects of everyday life in contemporary Europe, including the ethnic makeup of European football (soccer) teams. In 1950 the Arsenal Football Club of northern London was composed entirely of white ethnic Britons (right). Today, its diverse roster includes players from around the globe (above).

(2018 team: David Klein/Cal Sport Media/Newscom; 1950 team: Bob Thomas/Getty Images)



The growth of immigration and ethnic diversity created vital social and cultural interactions and goods but also generated controversy and conflict. In most EU nations, immigrants can become full citizens if they meet certain legal qualifications; adopting the culture of the host country is not a requirement. This legal process has raised questions about who, exactly, could or should be European and about the way these new citizens might change European society. The idea that cultural and ethnic diversity could be a force for vitality and creativity has run counter to deep-seated beliefs about national homogeneity and unity, particularly among political conservatives. Some commentators accused the newcomers of taking jobs and welfare benefits from unemployed native Europeans, especially in times of economic decline.

Europe and Its Muslim Population

General concerns with migration often fused with concerns about Muslim migrants and Muslim residents who have grown up in Europe. Islam is now the

largest minority religion in Europe. The EU's 15 to 20 million Muslims outnumber Catholics in Europe's mainly Protestant north, and they outnumber Protestants in Europe's Catholic south. Major cities have substantial Muslim minorities, who make up about 25 percent of the population in Marseilles and Rotterdam, 15 percent in Brussels, and 10 percent in Paris, Copenhagen, and London.¹²

Worries increased after the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attack on New York's World Trade Center and the subsequent war in Iraq. A string of terrorist attacks in Europe organized by Islamist extremists heightened anxieties. In March 2004, radical Moroccan Muslims living in Spain exploded bombs planted on trains bound for Madrid, killing 191 commuters and wounding 1,800 more. A year later, an attack on the London transit system carried out by British citizens of Pakistani descent killed over 50 people. Since then, a number of attacks have kept Islamist terrorism in the public eye—including the murderous January 2015 assault on the staff of the satiric French magazine *Charlie Hebdo*, which had published cartoons critical of the Prophet Muhammad,

Terrorist Attacks in Paris,

November 2015 At a makeshift memorial made of flowers, candles, and messages left by mourners and passersby, onlookers observe a moment of silence for the victims of the November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks in central Paris. Islamic State jihadists claimed responsibility for the series of coordinated assaults, which killed 130 people and wounded hundreds more at a concert hall (Le Bataclan), restaurants, and the national stadium. (Jacques Demarthon/AFP/Getty Images)



and the even more deadly attacks in Paris in November 2015, when extremists motivated by the ideologies of the Islamic State killed 130 people.

The vast majority of Europe's Muslims supported democracy and rejected violent extremism, but these spectacular attacks and other assaults by Islamist militants nonetheless sharpened the debate over immigration. Security was not the only issue. Critics across the political spectrum warned that Europe's rapidly growing Muslim population posed a dire threat to the West's liberal tradition, which embraced freedom of thought, representative government, toleration, separation of church and state, and, more recently, equal rights for women and gays. Islamist extremists and radical clerics living in Europe, critics proclaimed, rejected these fundamental Western values and preached the supremacy of Islamic laws for Europe's Muslims. Secular Europeans struggled to understand the depths of Muslim spirituality. French attempts to enforce a ban on wearing the hijab (the headscarf worn by many faithful Muslim women) in public schools expressed the tension between Western secularism and Islamic religiosity on a most personal level and evoked outrage and protests in the Muslim community.

As busy mosques came to outnumber dying churches in European cities, anti-immigrant, nationalist politicians exploited widespread doubts that immigrant populations from Muslim countries would ever assimilate into Western culture. Time was on the side of Euro-Islam, far-right critics warned. Europe's Muslim population, estimated at about 26 million in 2016, appeared likely to increase rapidly in the next several decades. Population rates are difficult to predict, but one recent account

suggests that in 2050 the share of Muslims in Europe's total population could range from 11 to 14 percent, with the highest percentages in Sweden, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom and much smaller numbers in Spain and east-central Europe.¹³

Liberal pundits and politicians admitted that Islamist extremism could pose problems, but they emphasized the potential benefits of long-term integration of non-Western, Muslim residents. They argued that Europe badly needed newcomers to limit the impending population decline, boost social benefit budgets, and provide valuable technical skills. Some asserted that Europe should recognize that Islam has for centuries been a vital part of European life and culture and that mutual respect might help head off the resentment that can drive a tiny minority to separatism and acts of terror.

Liberal commentators also emphasized the role of economics and cultural discrimination as the root cause of terrorist activity. Although the first generation of Muslim migrants had found jobs as unskilled workers in Europe's great postwar boom, they and their children had been hard hit after 1973 by the general economic downturn and the decline of manufacturing. Offered only modest welfare benefits and limited access to education or housing, many second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants felt like outcasts in their adopted countries. To liberal observers, economics and discrimination had more influence on immigrants' attitudes about their host communities than did religion and extremist teachings. Liberals thus criticized anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim discrimination and its racist overtones.

What challenges will Europeans face in the coming decades?

Beyond Russia's interference in former Soviet territories, uncontrolled immigration, and radical Islamic terrorism, European societies faced a number of other interconnected challenges that posed long-term challenges, including growing differences between the United States and Europe, turmoil in the Muslim world, economic recession, the unity of the Eurozone, and environmental degradation. At the same time, the relative wealth of European societies provoked serious thinking about European identity and Europe's humanitarian mission in the community of nations.

Growing Strains in U.S.-European Relations

In the fifty years after World War II, the United States and western Europe generally maintained close diplomatic relations. Although they were never in total agreement, they usually worked together to promote international consensus, typically under U.S. guidance, as in the NATO alliance. For example, a U.S.-led coalition that included thousands of troops from France and the United Kingdom and smaller contributions from other NATO allies attacked Iraqi forces in Kuwait in the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War, freeing the small nation from attempted annexation by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Over time, however, the growing power of the European Union and the new unilateral thrust of Washington's foreign policy created strains in traditional transatlantic relations.

The growing gap between the United States and Europe had several causes. For one, the European Union was now the world's largest trading block, challenging the predominance of the United States. Prosperous European businesses invested heavily in the United States, reversing a decades-long economic relationship in which investment dollars had flowed the other way.

A values gap between the United States and Europe likewise contributed to cooler relations. Ever more secular Europeans had a hard time understanding the intense religiosity of many Americans; in a 2017 survey 76 percent of people identifying as Christians in the United States "believe[d] in God with absolute certainty," compared to 23 percent in western Europe.¹⁴ Relatively lax gun control laws and the use of capital punishment in the United States were viewed with dismay in Europe, where most countries had outlawed private handgun ownership and abolished the death penalty. Despite U.S. president Barack Obama's health-care reforms—which evoked controversy among

Americans—U.S. reluctance to establish a single-payer, state-funded program surprised Europeans, who saw their own programs as highly advantageous.

In addition, under Presidents George W. Bush (U.S. pres. 2001–2009), Barack Obama (U.S. pres. 2009–2017), and Donald Trump (U.S. pres. 2017–), the United States often ignored international opinion and policy in pursuit of its own interests. This trend had been escalating at least since 1997, when, citing the economic impact, Washington refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol intended to limit global warming; nearly two hundred countries had already signed off. Nor did the United States join the International Criminal Court, a global tribunal founded in 2002 that prosecutes individuals accused of crimes against humanity, and which nearly 140 states agreed to join. These positions troubled EU leaders, as did unflagging U.S. support for Israel in the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli crisis.

President Trump's policies of "America First" opened further rifts in U.S.-European relations. Trump announced in June 2017 that the United States would withdraw from the Paris Agreement, intended to control climate change, and his willingness to set tariffs on European imports upset familiar patterns of international trade. When criticized, the American president tweeted blistering attacks on European politicians, including German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Emmanuel Macron (r. 2017–), which only served to further widen the rift.

Military considerations also undermined the close relationship between the United States and Europe. American-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, undertaken in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, were a source of strain. On the morning of September 11, 2001, passenger planes hijacked by terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center towers in New York City and crashed into the Pentagon. Perpetrated by the radical Islamist group al-Qaeda, the attacks took the lives of more than three thousand people from many countries and put the personal safety of ordinary citizens at the top of the West's agenda.

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the peoples and governments of Europe and the world joined Americans in heartfelt solidarity. Over time, however, tensions between Europe and the United States re-emerged and deepened markedly, particularly after President Bush declared a unilateral U.S. **war on terror**—a determined effort to fight terrorism

■ **war on terror** American policy under President George W. Bush to fight global terrorism in all its forms.

in all its forms around the world. The main acts in Bush's war on terror were a U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, which started in 2001 and continues today, and another in Iraq, which lasted from 2003 to 2011. Both succeeded in quickly bringing down dictatorial regimes, but the wars fomented anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world and failed to stop regional violence driven by ethnic and religious differences.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent events caused some European leaders, notably in France and Germany, to question the rationale for and indeed the very effectiveness of a "war" on terror. Military victory, even over rogue states, would hardly end terrorism, since terrorist groups easily moved across national borders. Terrorism, they concluded, was better fought through police and intelligence measures. Europeans certainly shared U.S. worries about stability in the Middle East, and they faced their own problems with Islamist terrorist attacks. But European leaders worried that the tactics used in the Iraq War, exemplified by Washington's readiness to use its military without international agreements or UN backing, violated international law.

The presidency of Barack Obama brought some improvement to U.S.-European foreign relations. Upon election, Obama announced that he would halt deployment of missiles in central Europe and reduce nuclear arms, easing tensions with Russia. He pulled U.S. troops out of Iraq in 2011 and quietly shelved the language of the "war on terror."

Tensions over military issues renewed under President Trump, however, as he repeatedly derided NATO as an obsolete alliance and pressured European members to do more to support NATO budgets. As the EU expanded and U.S. support appeared increasingly tentative, some argued that Europe should determine its own military and defense policy without U.S. or NATO guidance. Although transatlantic ties remained firm, the United States and Europe seemed poised to move further apart, especially during the Trump presidency.

Turmoil in the Muslim World

Over the past decade, civil wars, sectarian terrorist attacks, civilian dislocation and misery, and flagging political and economic stability have shaken much of the Muslim world in North Africa and the Middle East. In many ways, these problems were the results of recent historical events. Yet the turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East had a deeper history that included the legacies of European colonialism, Cold War power plays, and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Radical political Islam, a mixture of traditional religious beliefs and innovative social and political reform ideas, emerged in the 1920s, in part as an expression of

resentment against the foreign control associated with the mandate system established in the Middle East after World War I (see Chapter 25). Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, gained support in the following decades. While the broad spectrum of Islamist ideas is difficult to summarize, adherents tended to fall into two main groups: a moderate or centrist group that worked peacefully to reform society within existing institutions, and a much smaller, more militant minority willing to use violence to achieve its goals.

Decolonization, the Cold War, and the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict sharpened anti-Western and particularly anti-U.S. sentiments among radical Islamists. As the western European powers loosened their ties to the Middle East, the Americans stepped in. Applying containment policy to limit the spread of communism and eager to preserve steady supplies of oil, the United States supported secular, authoritarian regimes friendly to U.S. interests in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and elsewhere. Such regimes were generally unpopular with faithful Muslims.

U.S. policies in the Middle East produced "blowback," or unforeseen and unintended consequences. One example was the Iranian revolution of 1979, when Islamist radicals antagonized by Western intervention, state corruption, and secularization overthrew the U.S.-supported shah and established an Islamic republic. The successful revolution encouraged militant Islamists elsewhere, as did the example of the mujahideen, the Muslim guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan who successfully fought off the Soviet army from 1979 to 1989. During that conflict, the United States supplied the mujahideen with military aid as part of Cold War containment policies, but this support also generated blowback. Many of the U.S.-armed mujahideen would go on to support the Taliban, a militant Islamist faction that came to rule Afghanistan in 1996. The Taliban established a strict Islamist state based on shari'a law. They denied women's right to education, banned Western movies and music, and provided a safe haven for the Saudi-born millionaire Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network.

During the 1990s the United States, along with western Europe, became the main target for Islamist militants angered by Western intervention in the Middle East; al-Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center was one tragic result. Afterwards President Bush declared with some justification that bin Laden and the terrorists "hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote."¹⁵ In public calls for jihad (or struggle) against the United States and the West, however, bin Laden offered a more pragmatic list of grievances, including U.S. support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, the sanctions on Iraq that followed the Persian Gulf

War, and the presence of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia—seen as an insult to the Muslim holy sites in Mecca and Medina.¹⁶

The Bush administration hoped that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq would end the terrorist attacks and bring peace and democracy to the Middle East, but both brought chaos instead. The military campaign in Afghanistan quickly achieved one of its goals, bringing down the Taliban, and the United States installed a friendly government. But U.S. troops failed to disable al-Qaeda, and Taliban insurgents mounted a determined and lasting guerrilla war. Although U.S. commandos killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011, the apparently unwinable guerrilla war in Afghanistan became increasingly unpopular in the United States and among NATO allies in Europe.

With heavy fighting still under way in Afghanistan in late 2001, the Bush administration turned its attention to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, arguing that it was necessary to expand the war on terror to other hostile regimes in the Middle East. U.S. leaders justified their attack with charges that Saddam Hussein was still developing weapons of mass destruction in flagrant disregard of his 1991 promise to end all such programs. Some Americans shared the widespread doubts held by Europeans about the legality—and wisdom—of an American attack on Iraq, especially after UN inspectors found no weapons of mass destruction in the country. Even though they failed to win UN approval, in March 2003 the United States and Britain, with token support from a handful of other European states, invaded Iraq.

The invasion quickly overwhelmed the Iraqi army, and Saddam's dictatorship collapsed in April. Yet America's subsequent efforts to establish a stable pro-American Iraq proved difficult. Poor postwar planning and management by administration officials was one factor, but there were others. Iraq, a creation of Western imperialism after the First World War, was a fragile state with three distinct groups: non-Arab Kurds, Arab Sunni Muslims, and Arab Shi'ite Muslims. Sectarian conflicts among these groups led to a protracted civil war. Although the Obama administration felt confident enough to withdraw U.S. forces in 2011, the shaky Iraqi government continued to struggle with ethnic divisions and terrorist violence.

In early 2011 an unexpected chain of events that came to be called the **Arab Spring** further destabilized the Middle East and North Africa. In a provincial town in Tunisia, a poor fruit vendor set himself



Iraq, ca. 2010

on fire to protest official harassment. His death eighteen days later unleashed a series of spontaneous mass protests that brought violence and regime change; six weeks later, Tunisia's authoritarian president fled the country, opening the way for reform. Massive popular demonstrations calling for democratic government and social tolerance broke out across the Middle East. In Egypt, demonstrators forced the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak, a U.S.-friendly leader who had ruled for thirty years. An armed uprising in Libya, supported by NATO air strikes, brought down the dictatorial government of Muammar Gaddafi that October. A civil war broke out in Syria in July 2011 as Libyan president Bashar al-Assad (elected 2000), with Russian support, hurled his army at the rebels and Western powers disagreed about what to do. Protests arose in other countries in the region as well, evoking a mixed response of repression and piecemeal reform.

As the popular movements inspired by the Arab Spring faltered, the emergence of the **Islamic State** (sometimes called IS or ISIS) brought insurgent violence to new heights. The Islamic State, an extremist Islamist militia dedicated to the establishment of a new caliphate to unify Muslims around the world, grew out of al-Qaeda and the various other insurgent groups fighting in Iraq and the Syrian civil war. By summer 2015 IS soldiers had taken control of substantial parts of central Syria and Iraq. Over 4 million Syrians and Iraqis lost their homes during the fighting, and hundreds of thousands streamed north in attempts to find asylum in Europe.

In the territories under their control, IS militants set up a terroristic government based on an extremist reading of shari'a law. Islamic State terror tactics included the violent persecution of sectarian religious groups; mass executions and beheadings of military, political, or sectarian enemies; and the "cultural cleansing" (destruction and looting) of ancient cultural monuments and shrines that failed to meet its stringent religious ideals. All these actions were documented in widespread Internet propaganda campaigns intended to demonstrate IS power and entice recruits.

By early 2019, as this was being written, the U.S. military and its allies had defeated the Islamic State

■ Arab Spring A series of popular revolts in several countries in the Middle East and North Africa that sought an end to authoritarian, often Western-supported regimes.

■ Islamic State A radical Islamist militia that controlled substantial parts of central Syria and Iraq, where it applied an extremist version of shari'a law.

in the field, yet the militant group could still mount isolated terrorist attacks across the globe, and much of the Middle East was still struggling to find peace and stability. The Arab Spring seemed, for the most part, a dismal failure. The young activists who sought greater political and social liberties from authoritarian regimes quickly lost control of the changes they unleashed. Multiple players now vied for power: military leaders and old elites, local chieftains representing ethnic or sectarian interests, and moderate and radical Islamists. In Egypt, the first open elections in decades brought to power representatives of the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood; a year later, military leaders overthrew this elected government. In Libya, Syria, and especially Yemen, persistent civil wars undermined the search for stability. Western policymakers grappled in vain for clear and effective ways to help bring order to the region. Their efforts were especially freighted because problems in the Muslim world were at the center of many of Europe's problems. These included the immigration emergency of 2015–2016, ongoing Islamist terrorist attacks, and the disastrous human rights crisis faced by millions of Middle East residents.

The Global Recession and the Viability of the European Union

While chaos in the Muslim world caused great concern in the West, economic crisis shattered growth and political unity in Europe and North America. In 2008 the United States entered a deep recession, caused by the burst of the housing boom, bank failures, and an overheated financial securities market. The U.S. government spent massive sums to recharge the economy, giving banks, insurance agencies, auto companies, and financial services conglomerates billions of dollars in federal aid. By 2012 the economy had improved and much of the housing market had recovered, though some critics claimed that income inequality was higher than ever.

The 2008 recession swept into other parts of the world and across Europe, where a housing bubble, high national deficits, and a weak bond market made the crisis particularly acute. One of the first countries affected, and one of the hardest hit, was Iceland, where the currency and banking system collapsed outright. Other countries followed—Ireland and Latvia made deep and painful cuts in government spending to balance national budgets. By 2010 Britain was deeply in debt, and Spain, Portugal, and especially Greece were close to bankruptcy.

This sudden “euro crisis” put the very existence of the Eurozone in question. The common currency grouped together countries with vastly divergent economies. Germany and France, the zone’s two strongest

economies, felt pressure to provide financial support to ensure the stability of far weaker countries, including Greece and Portugal. They did so with strings attached: recipients of EU support were required to reduce deficits through austerity measures. Even so, the transfer of monies within the Eurozone angered the citizens of wealthier countries, who felt they were being asked to subsidize countries in financial difficulties of their own making. Such feelings were particularly powerful in Germany, encouraging Chancellor Merkel to move cautiously in providing financial stimulus to troubled Eurozone economies.

The difficulty dealing with the stubborn Greek debt crisis prompted debates about the viability of a single currency for nations with vastly different economies as well as widespread speculation that the Eurozone might fall apart. In 2010 and 2012 Greece received substantial bailouts from the IMF, the European Common Bank, and the European Union (the so-called Troika). In return for loans and some debt relief, Greek leaders were required to implement a painful austerity plan—which meant raising taxes, privatizing state-owned businesses, reforming labor markets, and drastically reducing government spending on employee wages, pensions, and other popular social benefits. Greek unemployment hit a record 25 percent in 2012, and more than half of young adults lacked jobs. Rampant joblessness meant declining tax revenues, and the Greek economy continued to weaken. As the government cut popular social programs, demonstrators took to the streets to protest declining living standards and the lack of work; in Athens, protests large and small were almost a daily occurrence.

The 2015 Greek elections brought the left-wing, populist Syriza Party to power. Syriza promised voters a tough stand against the Troika’s fiscal demands and an end to austerity, yet Troika negotiators, led by Germany, maintained an uncompromising line: if Greece failed to meet its debt payments, it would be forced into a “Grexit” (a Greek exit from the Eurozone). Syriza backtracked and accepted further austerity measures in return for yet another bailout loan. Among other conditions, Greek leaders promised to sell off about 50 billion euros’ worth of government-owned property, including airports, power plants and energy assets, roads and railroads, and the national post office.

Even as the Greek crisis shook European unity, in June 2016 residents of the United Kingdom narrowly voted to leave the EU altogether. The campaign for the referendum on **Brexit** (the informal name for the British exit from the EU) was intense, with populists on the right promising “Leavers” autonomy from the EU’s economic and trade ties and freedom from the EU’s relatively open immigration policies. The victory of those wanting out showed that many Brits did

not want “Eurocrats” in Brussels intruding on national policy. Prime Minister David Cameron (r. 2010–2016) resigned and was replaced by Prime Minister Theresa May, who struggled with divisions in her own Tory (Conservative) Party over the best way to leave the EU. Standout issues included the right of EU residents to freely cross into the United Kingdom, the ability to preserve existing or make new trade deals, and the open border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Although May and EU representatives negotiated a tentative agreement on these and other issues in November 2018, the British Parliament voted overwhelmingly to reject the deal in January 2019. May was allowed to delay the U.K.’s departure, but the outcome of Brexit and its effects on the EU remained hard to predict.

The New Populism

As the material presented throughout this chapter suggests, one of the most significant aspects of Western politics after the turn of the century was the emergence of new forms of political populism in Europe and the United States. Populism, currently identified in the United States with President Donald Trump, is typically based on an appeal to the needs and virtues of ordinary people, who stand in determined opposition to a corrupt or exploitative elite and the broad effects of globalization.

In the 2000s powerful populist voices and political parties emerged on both sides of the political spectrum. On the left, the Greek Syriza Party, with its challenge to EU austerity policies, calls for increased public investment, and celebration of the ordinary worker, exemplified left-populism in Europe. In the United States leftist populism found expression in the Occupy movement, which began in the United States in 2011 and quickly spread to over eighty countries. Although the Occupy movement fizzled out, its condemnation of a tiny wealthy elite (the “1 percent”) who supposedly exploited the vast majority of ordinary people inspired the surprisingly successful 2016 U.S. presidential campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders.

The new populism has had a greater impact on the politics of the far right. In the United States, New York businessman Donald Trump rode a wave of populist sentiment to win the presidency in 2016, surprising pollsters and complacent Democrats alike. Drawing on themes articulated by the Tea Party, which emerged in 2009, Trump’s winning platform called for an end to oppressive taxation, strong immigration controls, the relaxation of government regulation of the economy



“Stop Tory Brexit” Anti-Brexit campaigners unfurled a banner in front of the British Houses of Parliament in November 2018, protesting the Brexit deal negotiated by Tory (or Conservative Party) prime minister Theresa May and European Union leaders earlier that month. The protesters insisted that “Another Europe Is Possible” and demanded “Free Movement for All,” a key EU policy that allows anyone in twenty-six EU countries (the so-called Schengen Area) to cross national borders without passports or other controls. Under the terms of Brexit, residents of the United Kingdom would be cut off from the EU free-trade zone and would no longer enjoy the right to open borders, among other changes. (Adrian Dennis/Getty Images)

and environment, support for fading rustbelt industries and jobs, and a foreign policy that put “America First.”

In Europe, although far-right populist parties, including the French Popular Front and the Austrian Freedom Party, had already enjoyed electoral success in the 1990s, right-wing populism has grown dramatically in recent decades. European populists typically oppose membership in the European Union and the Eurozone. They champion nationalism, demand an end to immigration and tolerant refugee policies, and decry the growth of Islam in Europe. Whatever the cause, the number of Europeans voting for populists on the left and the right swelled from 7 percent in 2000 to over 25 percent in 2018.¹⁷

In Germany, for example, tens of thousands of people joined the anti-immigrant movement called Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) or the Alternative for Germany, a far-right political party that won impressive electoral gains in 2018. In Britain, an upstart populist movement including far-right members of the Tory Party successfully campaigned for Brexit. In both Italy and Austria, government coalitions in 2019 included populist parties. In the former East Bloc, right-wing populism has been especially strong: in 2018, populist, authoritarian governments ruled Poland and Hungary,

■ **Brexit** The informal name for Great Britain’s exit from the European Union.

where they worked to undermine freedom of the press and judicial independence.

Far-right populist success has been aided by bigotry and widespread misconceptions about immigration and the nature of Muslim faith. For example, recent polls show that Europeans routinely overestimate the number of Muslims in Europe. In France the public believes that 31 percent of the population is Muslim, when the actual number is about 8 percent; the British believe that 21 percent of the population is Muslim, when the actual number is only 5 percent.¹⁸ Immigration and the supposed “Islamization” of Europe, along with fundamentalist terrorism, have become highly charged political issues, and conservative and far-right pundits and politicians across Europe offer a variety of diagnoses and solutions to these perceived problems. (See “Thinking Like a Historian: The Conservative Reaction to Immigration and Islamist Terrorism,” page 966.)

As the political fringe grows in power, support for traditional centrist parties has shrunk, remaking the political structures that emerged in the post–World War II decade. Center-right parties certainly suffered, but the real losers have been Europe’s social democratic parties. In fall 2018, center-left social democrats were included in only six governments in the twenty-eight EU member states. In 2017 the center-left French Socialist Party received just 7.4 percent in national elections, and the Dutch Labour Party won 5.7 percent. That same year Germany’s once-mighty Social Democrats received just over 20 percent of the vote in the national elections, only one-half of what they won in 1998.¹⁹ The outcome of these trends remains unclear. Yet the consensus politics shaped around neoliberal socioeconomic policies, state-sponsored benefits, multiculturalism and (relatively) open borders, and the EU project itself—embraced by center-left and center-right parties alike—no longer had much appeal to voters shaken by sweeping social change, economic stagnation, and mass migration.

Dependence on Fossil Fuels, Climate Change, and Environmental Degradation

One of the most significant long-term challenges facing Europe and the world in the early twenty-first century was the need for adequate energy resources.

Maintaining standards of living in industrialized countries and modernizing the developing world required extremely high levels of energy use, and supplies were heavily dependent on fossil fuels: oil, coal, and natural gas. In 2011 Europe and Russia combined had about 12 percent of the world’s population but annually consumed about 34 percent of the world’s natural gas production, 22 percent of oil production, and 13 percent of coal output. Scientists warned that such high levels of usage were unsustainable over the long run and predicted that fossil fuel supplies will eventually run out, especially as the countries of the developing world—including giants such as India and China—increased their own rates of consumption.²⁰

Struggles to control and profit from these shrinking resources often resulted in tense geopolitical conflicts. The need to preserve access to oil, for example, has led to a transformation in military power in the post–Cold War world. Between 1945 and 1990 the largest areas of military buildup were along the iron curtain in Europe and in East Asia, as U.S. forces formed a


bulwark against the spread of communism. Today military power is increasingly concentrated in oil-producing areas such as the Middle East, which holds about 65 percent of the world’s oil reserves. One scholar labeled conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia “resource wars” because they are fought, in large part, to preserve the West’s access to the region’s energy supplies.²¹

Beyond questions of supply, dependence on fossil fuels has led to serious environmental problems. Burning oil and coal releases massive amounts of carbon dioxide (CO₂) into the atmosphere, the leading cause of **climate change**, or global warming. While the future effects of climate change are difficult to predict, the vast majority of climatologists agree that

global warming is proceeding far more quickly than previously predicted and that some climatic disruption is now unavoidable. Rising average temperatures already play havoc with familiar weather patterns, melting glaciers and polar ice packs and drying up freshwater resources. Moreover, in the next fifty years rising sea levels may well flood low-lying coastal areas around the world.

Since the 1990s the EU has spearheaded efforts to control energy consumption and contain climate change. EU leaders have imposed tight restrictions on CO₂ emissions, and Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark have become world leaders in harnessing

Primary Oil and Gas Pipelines to Europe, ca. 2005





Global Warming in the Austrian Alps This photo, taken in August 2016, shows the melting and rock-covered Pasterze glacier in the Austrian Alps in the distant background and a sign in the foreground indicating the location of the glacier in 2015—the prior year. The Pasterze glacier is shrinking rapidly and has receded in length by at least three kilometers since the nineteenth century. Although glaciers across Europe have been receding since the 1870s, the process began accelerating in the early 1980s, a phenomenon many scientists attribute to global warming. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

alternative energy sources such as solar and wind power. Some countries, hoping to combat the future effects of global warming, have also taken pre-emptive measures. The Dutch government, for example, has spent billions of dollars constructing new dikes, levees, and floodgates. These efforts provided models for U.S. urban planners after floodwaters churned up by Hurricane Sandy swamped low-lying swaths of New York City in October 2012.

Environmental degradation encompasses a number of problems beyond climate change. Overfishing and toxic waste threaten the world's oceans and freshwater lakes, which once seemed to be inexhaustible sources of food and drinking water. The disaster that resulted when an offshore oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, spewing millions of gallons of oil into the gulf waters, underscored the close connections between energy consumption and water pollution. Deforestation, land degradation, soil erosion, and overfertilization; species extinction related to habitat loss; the accumulation of toxins in the air, land, and water; the disposal of poisonous nuclear waste—all will continue to pose serious problems in the twenty-first century.

Though North American and European governments, NGOs, and citizens have taken a number of steps to limit environmental degradation and regulate energy use, the overall effort to control energy consumption has been an especially difficult endeavor, underscoring the interconnectedness of the contemporary world. Rapidly industrializing countries such as India and China—the latter surpassed the United States in 2008 as the largest emitter of CO₂—have had a difficult time balancing environmental concerns

and the energy use necessary for economic growth. Because of growing demand for electricity, for example, China currently accounts for about 47 percent of the world's coal consumption, causing hazardous air pollution in Chinese cities and contributing to climate change.²²

Can international agreements and good intentions make a difference? In December 2015 representatives of almost two hundred nations met at the annual United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris, France. The resulting Paris Agreement set ambitious goals for the reduction of CO₂ emissions by 2020 and promised to help developing countries manage the effects of climate change. President Trump's rejection of the agreement in 2017 marked a setback for environmentalists, but even before withdrawal of U.S. support the ultimate success of ambitious plans to limit human energy consumption was uncertain.

Promoting Human Rights

Though regional differences persisted in the twenty-eight EU member states, Europeans entering the twenty-first century enjoyed some of the highest living standards in the world, the sweet fruit of more than fifty years of peace, security, and overall economic growth. Nevertheless, the recent agonies of barbarism and war in the former Yugoslavia, as well as the memories of the horrors of World War II and

■ **climate change** Changes in long-standing weather patterns caused primarily by carbon dioxide emissions from the burning of fossil fuels.

THINKING LIKE A HISTORIAN

The Conservative Reaction to Immigration and Islamist Terrorism

The impact of immigration on European values and society, the connections between immigration and Islamist terrorism, and the best means to stop terrorist attacks are among the most critical and controversial issues in contemporary Europe. In these selections, conservative politicians offer their diagnoses and prescriptions. What are the main problems, according to these leaders? What solutions do they propose?

1 Immigration and the German welfare state. Former Social Democratic senator and German central bank board member Thilo Sarrazin's bestselling book *Germany Does Itself In* (2010), a radical critique of the Muslim presence in Germany, generated heated controversy. Sarrazin explained his views in an interview with the newspaper *Kurier*.

KURIER: What does [Germany's national debt crisis] have to do with immigration?

SARRAZIN: At this time in Berlin there is massive influx of Roma and Bulgarian Turks. In 2014 they will all have permanent residence rights and a claim on the German benefits system. It won't work, financing the growing burdens of demographic aging as well as further uncontrolled immigration on the German welfare state by raising taxes on the so-called rich. . . .

2 Popular opposition to the "Islamization" of Europe. The programs offered by conservative politicians evoked substantial popular support, as seen in demonstrations across Europe, such as this April 2016 anti-immigrant/anti-Islam rally in Warsaw, Poland. The banner in the foreground, surrounded by the Polish national flag and bearing an eagle and the Polish coat of arms, reads, "No to Islam in Poland."

KURIER: And you would very much like to stop it. How?

SARRAZIN: First: change the benefits system—immigrants receive no benefits for at least ten years. Second: change the permanent residency law—only those able and willing to make a long-term, highly skilled contribution to Germany receive residency rights. Third: social and family benefits in Germany should be dependent on adequate knowledge of the language and efforts at integration. Fourth: we must clearly say to the Muslim immigrants who are already here: at some point you become German, even if you obviously continue to cook Turkish food and go to the mosque, and if you don't want to do that, it's best you return home. Opinion polls show that more than 60 percent of Turks in Germany speak no German at all or cannot speak it well, and a third would leave Germany immediately if there were no German welfare benefits.



(Franciszek Mazur/Agencja Gazeta/Reuters/Newscom)

ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE

1. Why and how do the conservative politicians evoke Western values and ideals in their critiques of Islamist extremism?
2. Why would conservative critics of Islamic fundamentalism, as represented in the sources here, be more likely to challenge the immigration policies of the European Union than more left-wing politicians would?
3. Examine the statistics in Source 3. What conclusions can you draw about popular concerns with Islamist extremism in contemporary Europe?

3 **Islamist extremism in Europe: some statistics on popular attitudes.** This Pew Research Center poll taken in the spring of 2015 suggested that popular concerns about Islamist extremism varied significantly across national borders and that gender, age, and ideology were statistically significant factors in such concerns.

Percentage responding they are very concerned about Islamic extremism in their country:

	Total %	By age (percent)			By gender (percent)		By ideology (percent)		
		18–29	30–49	50+	Male	Female	Left	Moderate	Right
Germany	46	22	39	56	42	50	33	48	55
UK	52	33	49	64	51	52	37	53	56
Spain	61	47	55	70	54	67	52	65	61
France	67	54	63	74	62	71	52	68	73
Italy	53	49	48	58	46	59	48	61	52
Poland	22	18	18	27	21	23	30	21	22
Russia	23	16	18	32	24	23	—	—	—

4 **The Dutch government turns away from multiculturalism.** The 2010 Dutch elections brought to power a conservative government that announced plans to restrict immigration, ban face-covering garments for Muslim women, and ensure that immigrants "integrate" into Dutch society. The new interior minister, P. H. Donner, mounted a trenchant critique of multiculturalism.

“ The government distances itself explicitly from the relativism contained in the concept of a multicultural society and envisions a society which may change, also through the influence of immigrants who settle here, but is not interchangeable with any other society. The fundamental elements which determine Dutch society are rooted in its history and constitute reference points which many Dutchmen share and which cannot be discarded.

5 **The British crackdown on Islamic extremism.** In July 2015 British prime minister David Cameron announced that his Conservative Party government would seek new policies to combat Islamist extremism. The key problem, he argued, was a "radical ideology" that was violent and subversive of Western liberal values but also an exciting temptation for youths facing identity crises and failures of integration.

“ We should expose their extremism for what it is—a belief system that glorifies violence and subjugates its people—not least Muslim people. We should contrast their bigotry, aggression and theocracy with our values. . . . We are all British. We respect democracy and the rule of law. We believe in freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, equal rights regardless of race, sex, sexuality or faith. . . . Whether you are Muslim, Hindu, Jewish, Christian or Sikh . . . we can all feel part of this country—and we must now all come together and stand up for our values with confidence and pride. . . .

We must . . . deglamorize the extremist cause, especially ISIL [the Islamic State]. . . . This isn't a pioneering movement—it is vicious, brutal, and a fundamentally abhorrent existence. And here's my message to any young person here in Britain thinking of going out there. . . . You are cannon fodder for them. . . . If you are a boy, they will brainwash you, strap bombs to your body and blow you up. If you are a girl, they will enslave and abuse you. That is the sick and brutal reality of ISIL. . . .

We need our internet companies to go further in helping us identify potential terrorists online. . . . It's now time for [Internet companies] to protect their users from the scourge of radicalization. . . .

Government has a key role to play in this. It's why we ban hate preachers from our country. . . . We need to put out of action the key extremist influencers who are careful to operate just inside the law, but who clearly detest British society and everything we stand for. . . . So as part of our Extremism Bill, we are going to introduce new narrowly targeted powers to enable us to deal with these facilitators and cult leaders, and stop them peddling their hatred. . . . This is not about clamping down on free speech. It's just about applying our shared values uniformly.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

Using the sources above, along with what you have learned in class and in Chapters 29 and 30, write a short essay that summarizes the conservative viewpoint on Islamist extremism. Are the conservative critics able to reconcile Western democratic traditions of freedom and tolerance with the perceived need to limit immigration, clamp down on fundamentalism, and prevent terrorist attacks?

Sources: (1) Andreas Schwarz, "Thilo Sarrazin legt nach," *Kurier*, December 5, 2011, <http://kurier.at/politik/thilo-sarrazin-legt-nach/731.594>, translated by Joe Perry; (3) Spring 2015 Global Attitudes survey, Q23, Pew Research Center, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/16/extremism-concerns-growing-in-west-and-predominantly-muslim-countries/extremism-concerns-08>. Used by permission of the Pew Research Center; (4) Quoted in Geert Wilders, *Marked for Death: Islam's War Against the West and Me* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2011), p. 206; (5) David Cameron extremism speech, at Nonestiles School in Birmingham, July 20, 2015.

Demonstrating for Peace

Holding torches, some 3,500 people form the peace sign in Heroes Square in central Budapest, the capital of Hungary, in 2006. The rally marked the third anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Millions long for peace, but history and current events suggest that bloody conflicts will continue. Yet Europeans have cause for cautious optimism: despite episodes of intense violence and suffering, since 1945 wars have been localized; cataclysmic catastrophes like World Wars I and II have been averted; and Europe has become a world leader in the push for human rights. (Karoly Arvai/Reuters/Newscom)



the Holocaust, were reminders of the ever-present possibility of collective violence. (See “Evaluating Visual Evidence: The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, Germany,” page 969.) For some Europeans, the realization that they had so much and so many others had so little kindled a desire to help. European intellectuals and opinion makers began to envision a new historic mission for Europe: the promotion of domestic peace and human rights in lands plagued by instability, violence, and oppression.

European leaders and humanitarians believed that more global agreements and new international institutions were needed to set moral standards and to regulate countries, leaders, armies, corporations, and individuals. In practice, this meant more curbs on the sovereign rights of the world’s states, just as the states of the European Union had imposed increasingly strict standards of behavior on themselves to secure the rights and welfare of EU citizens. As one EU official concluded, the European Union has a “historical responsibility” to make morality “a basis of policy” because “human rights are more important than states’ rights.”²³

In practical terms, this mission raised questions. Europe’s evolving human rights policies would require military intervention to stop civil wars and to prevent tyrannical governments from slaughtering their own people. Thus the EU joined the United States to intervene militarily to stop the killing and protect minority rights in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The EU states vigorously supported UN initiatives to verify compliance with anti–germ warfare conventions, outlaw the use of land mines, and establish a new international court to prosecute war criminals.

Europeans also broadened definitions of individual rights. Having abolished the death penalty in the EU, they condemned its continued use in China, the United States, and other countries. At home, Europe expanded personal rights. The pacesetting Netherlands gave pensions and workers’ rights to prostitutes and provided assisted suicide (euthanasia) for the terminally ill. The Dutch recognized same-sex marriage in 2001. By the time France followed suit in 2013, nine western European countries had legalized same-sex marriage and twelve others had recognized alternative forms of civil union. (The U.S. Supreme Court guaranteed the right to same-sex marriage in June 2015.) The countries of the former East Bloc, where people were generally less supportive of gay rights, lagged behind in this regard.

Europeans extended their broad-based concept of human rights to the world’s poorer countries, often criticizing globalization and unrestrained neoliberal capitalism. For example, Europe’s moderate Social Democrats joined human rights campaigners in 2001 to secure drastic price cuts from international pharmaceutical corporations selling drugs to combat Africa’s AIDS crisis. Advocating greater social equality and state-funded health care, European socialists embraced morality as a basis for the global expansion of human rights.

The record was inconsistent. Critics accused the European Union (and the United States) of selectively promoting human rights in their differential responses to the Arab Spring—the West was willing to act in some cases, as in Libya, but dragged its feet in others, as in Egypt and Syria. The conflicted response to the immigration emergency of 2015 underscored the difficulties of shaping unified human rights policies

The Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin, Germany

Berlin's Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, a somber monument of 2,711 concrete slabs on a vast, uneven plain, stands at the city's center, just footsteps away from the American Embassy and the famous Brandenburg Gate. Opened in 2005, the memorial commemorates the 6 million Jews murdered by the Nazis during the Holocaust of World War II. Its blank walls and forbidding, rolling passageways symbolize the brutality of crimes against humanity that stretch the limits of understanding, but may also remind viewers of the difficulty of remembering those monstrous events.



(Jens Kalaene/Getty Images)

EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE

1. What would it be like to walk around and through this memorial in Berlin? What sort of mood do you think would be evoked by a visit? How would the color, solidity, uniformity, and arrangement of the materials contribute to that mood?
2. Memorials generally attempt to tell a story about the past to those who see them. What story is told by the Holocaust memorial in Berlin? Who is its intended audience? Do you think it is effective? What does the memorial leave out of the story?

that would satisfy competing political and national interests. Attempts to extend rights to women, indigenous peoples, and immigrants remained controversial, especially on the far right. Even so, the general trend suggested that most of Europe's leaders and peoples took very seriously the ideals articulated in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In an era defined by sharp political conflicts, riven by growing social inequality, and troubled by environmental decline, this commitment to basic human rights offered some hope for meeting ongoing and future challenges.

NOTES

1. P. Anderson, "Managed Democracy," *London Review of Books*, August 27, 2015, pp. 19–27.
2. Quoted in T. Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2005), p. 691.
3. Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 698–699.
4. *Quarterly Labor Force Statistics*, vol. 2004/4 (Paris: OECD Publications, 2004), p. 64; "Which Sector Is the Main Employer in the EU Member States?" *Eurostat: Your Key to European Statistics*, October 24, 2017, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20171024-1>; Robert E. Scott, "The Manufacturing Footprint and the Importance of U.S. Manufacturing Jobs," *Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper No. 338*, January 22, 2015, <https://www.epi.org/publication/>

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5. "Fertility Statistics," *Eurostat: Statistics Explained*, accessed August 7, 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Fertility_statistics.
 6. "Germany: More Babies?" *The Economist*, January 6, 2001, p. 6.
 7. Quoted in "Germany: More Babies?" p. 6.
 8. European Commission, *Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2017* (European Migration Network, 2018), p. 47; "EU Migrant Crisis: Facts and Figures," News/European Parliament, June 30, 2017, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20170629STO78630/eu-migrant-crisis-facts-and-figures>.
 9. "Asylum Statistics," *Eurostat*, April 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Final_decisions_taken_in_appeal.
 10. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage, 2000), p. 415; United Nations, *International Migration Report 2017* (New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017), pp. 28–29.
 11. L. Collingham, *Curry: A Tale of Cooks and Conquerors* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 2, 9.
 12. J. Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 16; Malise Ruthven, "The Big Muslim Problem?" *New York Review*, December 17, 2009, p. 62.
 13. "Europe's Growing Muslim Population," Pew Research Center, November 29, 2017, <http://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europe-growing-muslim-population/>.
 14. Jonathan Evans, "U.S. Adults Are More Religious Than Western Europeans," Pew Research Center, September 5, 2018, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/05/u-s-adults-are-more-religious-than-western-europeans/>.
 15. Quoted in "Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation," *Washington Post Online*, September 20, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.
 16. See M. H. Hunt, ed., *The World Transformed, 1945 to the Present: A Documentary Reader* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's), pp. 410–411.
 17. Jon Henley, "How Populism Emerged as an Electoral Force in Europe," *theguardian.com*, November 20, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/nov/20/how-populism-emerged-as-electoral-force-in-europe>.
 18. "Islam in Europe," *The Economist*, January 7, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/01/daily-chart-2>.
 19. Henley, "How Populism Emerged," p. 12.
 20. Statistics in *BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012*, http://www.bp.com/en_no/norway/media/press-releases-and-news/2012/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2012.html.
 21. M. T. Klare, *Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict* (New York: Henry Holt, 2001), pp. 25–40.
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 23. Quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, June 15, 2001, p. 6.



LOOKING BACK LOOKING AHEAD

The twenty-first century opened with changes and new challenges for the Western world. The collapse of the East Bloc brought more representative government to central and eastern Europe, but it left millions struggling to adapt to a different way of life in market economies. Digital technology and information systems that quickened the pace of communications and the global reach of new supranational institutions made the world a smaller place, yet globalization left some struggling to maintain their livelihoods. New contacts between peoples, made possible by increased migration, revitalized European society, but the massive influx of refugees in 2015–2016 raised concerns about cultural tolerance and the EU's open internal borders policy.

Despite the success of European democracy and liberalism, and despite the high living standards enjoyed by most Europeans, the challenges won't go away. The search for solutions to environmental degradation and conflicts between ethnic and religious groups, as well as the promotion of human rights across the globe, will clearly occupy European and world leaders for some time to come.

However these issues play out, the study of the past puts the present and the future in perspective.

Others before us have trodden the paths of uncertainty and crisis, and the historian's ability to analyze and explain the choices they made helps us understand our current situation and helps save us from exaggerated self-pity in the face of our own predicaments. Perhaps our Western heritage may rightly inspire us with measured pride and self-confidence. We stand, momentarily, at the head of the long procession of Western civilization. Sometimes the procession has wandered, or backtracked, or done terrible things. But it has also carried the efforts and sacrifices of generations of toiling, struggling ancestors. Through no effort of our own, we are the beneficiaries of those sacrifices and achievements. Now that it is our turn to carry the torch onward, we may remember these ties with our forebears.

To change the metaphor, Westerners are like card players who have been dealt many good cards. Some of them are obvious, such as their technical and scientific heritage, their environmental resources, and their commitment to human rights and individual freedoms. Others are not so obvious, sometimes half-forgotten or even hidden up the sleeve. We can consider, for example, the almost-miraculous victory of peaceful revolution

in the East Bloc in 1989—an expression of what Václav Havel called “the power of the powerless.” That revolution showed the regenerative strength of the Western ideals of individual rights and democratic government.

The study of history, of mighty struggles and fearsome challenges, of shining achievements and tragic failures, gives a sense of the essence of life itself: the process of change over time. Again and again we have seen how peoples and societies evolve, influenced by ideas, human passions, and material conditions. This

process of change will continue as the future becomes the present and then the past. Students of history are well prepared to make sense of this unfolding process because they have closely observed it. They understand that change is rooted in existing historical forces, and they have tools to explore the intricate web of activity that propels life forward. Students of history can anticipate the new and unexpected in human development, for they have already seen great breakthroughs and revolutions. They have an understanding of how things really happen.

Make Connections

Think about the larger developments and continuities within and across chapters.

1. Did people’s lives really change dramatically during the wave of globalization that emerged in the late twentieth century? How have they stayed the same?
2. The globalization of today’s world seems inseparable from advances in digital technology. How are the two connected? Were there other times in the history of Western society during which technological developments drove social, political, or cultural change?
3. How are the challenges that confront Europeans in the twenty-first century rooted in events and trends that came before?

30 REVIEW & EXPLORE

Identify Key Terms

Identify and explain the significance of each item below.

shock therapy (p. 938)

Color Revolutions (p. 942)

ethnic cleansing (p. 944)

globalization (p. 946)

European Union (EU) (p. 947)

Maastricht Treaty (p. 947)

World Trade Organization (WTO) (p. 949)

multiculturalism (p. 956)

war on terror (p. 959)

Arab Spring (p. 961)

Islamic State (p. 961)

Brexit (p. 962)

climate change (p. 964)

Review the Main Ideas

Answer the section heading questions from the chapter.

1. How did life change in Russia and the former East Bloc countries after 1989? (p. 938)
2. How did globalization affect European life and society? (p. 946)
3. How is growing ethnic diversity changing contemporary Europe? (p. 953)
4. What challenges will Europeans face in the coming decades? (p. 959)

Suggested Resources

BOOKS

- Caldwell, Christopher. *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West*. 2009. A controversial and thought-provoking book that emphasizes the problems associated with growing numbers of Muslim immigrants in Europe.
- Gillingham, John. *European Integration, 1950–2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?* 2003. A brilliant interpretive history.
- Jordan, Andrew. *Environmental Policy in the European Union: Actors, Institutions and Processes*. 2005. A critical look at the European Union's response to major environmental problems.
- Klausen, Jytte. *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe*. 2006. Reviews the goals of Europe's Islamic leaders and takes a positive view of future Muslim integration in western Europe.
- Laqueur, Walter. *Putinism: Russia and Its Future with the West*. 2015. A critical look at Russia's leader and Russian-U.S. relations after the Cold War, by a renowned historian.
- Noueihed, Lin, and Alex Warren. *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution, and the Making of a New Era*. 2012. Explores the causes and results of the popular revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa.
- Pinder, John, and Simon Usherwood. *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction*, 4th ed. 2018. A readable overview of the history, institutions, and policies of the European Union.
- Ryan, Johnny. *A History of the Internet and the Digital Future*. 2011. An accessible review of the way electronic communications are changing commercial, political, and cultural life.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. *Making Globalization Work*. 2006. An excellent overview of the successes and failures of globalization, by a distinguished economist.
- Tarrow, Sidney. *The New Transnational Activism*. 2005. A sympathetic account of the transnational activism opposed to corporate globalization.
- Ther, Philip. *Europe Since 1989: A History*. 2016. Focused on the effects of liberalization and privatization in east-central Europe, this book explores social and economic changes after the end of the Cold War.

MEDIA

- *Citizenfour* (Laura Poitras, 2014). A documentary about Edward Snowden and the NSA leaks scandal.
- *The Class* (Laurent Cantet, 2008). In this feature film a teacher attempts to connect with his ethnically diverse students in a working-class neighborhood in Paris.
- *Debtocracy* (Aris Chatzistefanou and Katerina Kitidi, 2011). A documentary that explores the causes of the Greek debt crisis and critiques the government austerity plans intended to resolve it.
- *European Union*. A website sponsored by the European Union that explains "How the EU Works" and gives access to documents pertaining to the EU, among other resources. europa.eu/
- *Global Warming: The Signs and the Science* (PBS, 2005). Documents the evidence and effects of global warming; includes interviews with scientists on

particular ways people can cope with or change this environmental problem.

- *The History Place: Genocide in the 20th Century: Bosnia-Herzegovina*. An overview of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in the 1990s. www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/bosnia.htm
- *Leviathan* (Andrey Zvyagintsev, 2014). This moving film explores the challenges faced by ordinary people in postcommunist Russia.
- *Once Brothers* (ESPN, 2010). A dramatized documentary about Drazen Petrovic and Vlade Divac, friends who played together on the Yugoslavian National Basketball team but ended up on separate sides of the civil war.
- *World Trade Organization*. The homepage of the World Trade Organization, which includes official documents pertaining to the WTO. www.wto.org/